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'Genuine Disagreements: a Realist Reinterpretation of Dworkin'

Rodriguez-Blanco, V (2001) 'Genuine Disagreements: a Realist Reinterpretation of Dworkin' Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 21 (4). pp. 649-671.

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This article contends that Dworkin's notion of ‘genuine’ theoretical disagreements, which is a fundamental pillar in his criticism of legal positivism and semantic disagreements, requires a realist reinterpretation. This view is defended according to two core arguments. First, a realist reinterpretation of ‘genuine’ theoretical disagreements enables Dworkin to avoid semantic criticisms such as the one advanced by Joseph Raz, who propounds a sophisticated model of criterial semantics to explain theoretical disagreements. Second, to make intelligible the distinction between theoretical and semantic disagreements in law, we need to resort to realist elements. The conclusion is striking and in clear contradiction with Dworkin's ametaphysical and epistemic abstinence. The article shows that there is a problematic tension within Dworkin's constructivist project and that he should revise either its ametaphysical view and epistemic abstinence, or notions such as ‘genuine’ theoretical disagreements.

Item Type: Article
Subjects : Law
Divisions : Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > School of Law
Authors :
Rodriguez-Blanco, V
Date : 2001
DOI : 10.1093/ojls/21.4.649
Copyright Disclaimer : Copyright 2001 Oxford University Press
Additional Information : Full text not available from this repository.
Depositing User : Symplectic Elements
Date Deposited : 09 Sep 2016 15:15
Last Modified : 31 Oct 2017 18:41

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