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A Defence of Hart’s Semantics as Non-Ambitious Conceptual Analysis

Rodriguez-Blanco, V (2003) A Defence of Hart’s Semantics as Non-Ambitious Conceptual Analysis Legal Theory, 9 (2). pp. 99-124.

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Abstract

Two methodological claims in Hart's The Concept of Law have produced perplexity: that it is a book on “analytic jurisprudence”H.L.A Hart, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1994). and that it may also be regarded as an essay in “descriptive sociology.”Id. Are these two ideas reconcilable? We know that mere analysis of our legal concepts cannot tell us much about their properties, that is, about the empirical aspect of law. We have learned this from philosophical criticisms of conceptual analysis; yet Hart informs us that analytic jurisprudence can be reconciled with descriptive sociology. The answer to this puzzle lies in the notion of nonambitious conceptual analysis. The theorist analyzes concepts but accepts the limitations of conceptual analysis and therefore uses empirical knowledge and substantive arguments to explain, refine, or perhaps refute initial insights provided by intuitions. This is the conclusion that this paper arrives at as an argumentative strategy to defend Hart's legal theory from the criticisms of Stavropoulos and Dworkin. The latter argues that Hart's legal theory cannot explain theoretical disagreements in law because he relies on a shared criterial semantics. Stavropoulos aims to show that Hart's semantics is committed to ambitious conceptual analysis and relies on the usage of our words as a standard of correctness. Both attacks aim to show that the semantic sting stings Hart's legal theory. This essay refines both challenges and concludes that not even in the light of the most charitable interpretation of these criticisms is Hart's legal theory stung by the semantic sting. This study defends the view that Hart's methodological claims were modest and that he was aware of the limits of conceptual analysis as a philosophical method. He was, this study claims, far ahead of his time.

Item Type: Article
Subjects : Law
Divisions : Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > School of Law
Authors :
AuthorsEmailORCID
Rodriguez-Blanco, VUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Date : 1 June 2003
Identification Number : https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325203000053
Copyright Disclaimer : Copyright 2003 Cambridge University Press
Additional Information : Full text not available from this repository.
Depositing User : Symplectic Elements
Date Deposited : 09 Sep 2016 15:08
Last Modified : 09 Sep 2016 15:08
URI: http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/812082

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