Optimal voting rules
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Gershkov, Alexander, Moldovanu, B and Shi, X (2016) Optimal voting rules The Review of Economic Studies, 84 (2). pp. 688-717.
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Abstract
We derive the incentive compatible and ex-ante welfare maximizing (i.e., utilitarian) mechanism for settings with an arbitrary number of agents and alternatives where the privately informed agents have single-crossing and single-peaked preferences. The optimal outcome can be implemented by modifying a sequential voting scheme, due to Bowen (1943), and used in many legislatures and committees. The modiÖcation uses a áexible majority threshold for each of several alternatives, and allows us to replicate, via a single sequential procedure, the entire class of anonymous, unanimous and dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms. Our analysis relies on the elegant characterization of this class of mechanisms for single-peaked preferences by Moulin (1980) and, subsequently, for single-crossing preferences by Saporiti (2009).
| Item Type: | Article | ||||||||||||
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| Subjects : | Economics | ||||||||||||
| Divisions : | Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > School of Economics | ||||||||||||
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| Date : | 14 September 2016 | ||||||||||||
| Identification Number : | 10.1093/restud/rdw044 | ||||||||||||
| Copyright Disclaimer : | This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in The Review of Economic Studies, following peer review. The version of record: Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu, Xianwen Shi; Optimal Voting Rules. Rev Econ Stud 2017; 84 (2): 688-717. doi: 10.1093/restud/rdw044 is available online at: https://academic.oup.com/restud/article/84/2/688/2419531/Optimal-Voting-Rules. | ||||||||||||
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| Depositing User : | Symplectic Elements | ||||||||||||
| Date Deposited : | 16 Aug 2016 12:37 | ||||||||||||
| Last Modified : | 13 Jul 2017 12:38 | ||||||||||||
| URI: | http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/811721 |
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