Optimal voting rules

Gershkov, Alexander, Moldovanu, B and Shi, X (2016) Optimal voting rules The Review of Economic Studies, 84 (2). pp. 688-717.

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Abstract

We derive the incentive compatible and ex-ante welfare maximizing (i.e., utilitarian) mechanism for settings with an arbitrary number of agents and alternatives where the privately informed agents have single-crossing and single-peaked preferences. The optimal outcome can be implemented by modifying a sequential voting scheme, due to Bowen (1943), and used in many legislatures and committees. The modiÖcation uses a áexible majority threshold for each of several alternatives, and allows us to replicate, via a single sequential procedure, the entire class of anonymous, unanimous and dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms. Our analysis relies on the elegant characterization of this class of mechanisms for single-peaked preferences by Moulin (1980) and, subsequently, for single-crossing preferences by Saporiti (2009).

Item Type:	Article
Subjects :	Economics
Divisions :	Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > School of Economics
Authors :	Name Email ORCID Gershkov, Alexander a.gershkov@surrey.ac.uk UNSPECIFIED Moldovanu, B UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Shi, X UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
Date :	14 September 2016
Identification Number :	10.1093/restud/rdw044
Copyright Disclaimer :	This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in The Review of Economic Studies, following peer review. The version of record: Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu, Xianwen Shi; Optimal Voting Rules. Rev Econ Stud 2017; 84 (2): 688-717. doi: 10.1093/restud/rdw044 is available online at: https://academic.oup.com/restud/article/84/2/688/2419531/Optimal-Voting-Rules.
Related URLs :	Publisher
Depositing User :	Symplectic Elements
Date Deposited :	16 Aug 2016 12:37
Last Modified :	13 Jul 2017 12:38
URI:	http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/811721

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