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Optimal voting rules

Gershkov, A, Moldovanu, B and Shi, X (2017) Optimal voting rules The Review of Economic Studies.

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We derive the incentive compatible and ex-ante welfare maximizing (i.e., utilitarian) mechanism for settings with an arbitrary number of agents and alternatives where the privately informed agents have single-crossing and single-peaked preferences. The optimal outcome can be implemented by modifying a sequential voting scheme, due to Bowen (1943), and used in many legislatures and committees. The modiÖcation uses a áexible majority threshold for each of several alternatives, and allows us to replicate, via a single sequential procedure, the entire class of anonymous, unanimous and dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms. Our analysis relies on the elegant characterization of this class of mechanisms for single-peaked preferences by Moulin (1980) and, subsequently, for single-crossing preferences by Saporiti (2009).

Item Type: Article
Subjects : Economics
Divisions : Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > School of Economics
Authors :
Date : 16 February 2017
Copyright Disclaimer : This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in The Review of Economic Studies following peer review. The version of record will be available online at:
Related URLs :
Depositing User : Symplectic Elements
Date Deposited : 16 Aug 2016 12:37
Last Modified : 16 Aug 2016 12:37

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