Aid & the Ouroborus: US Foreign Military Assistance and Human Security in Pakistan

Ciaran Gillespie
URN: 619995
c.gillespie@surrey.ac.uk

Supervisory Team:
Dr. Jack Holland, Prof. Marie Breen Smyth, Dr. Roberta Guerrina

Department of Politics,
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences,
University of Surrey,
Guildford,
September 30th, 2015
Declaration

This thesis and the work to which it refers are the results of my own efforts. Any ideas, data, images or text resulting from the work of others (whether published or unpublished) are fully identified as such within the work and attributed to their originator in the text, bibliography or in footnotes. This thesis has not been submitted in whole or in part for any other academic degree or professional qualification. I agree that the University has the right to submit my work to the plagiarism detection service TurnitinUK for originality checks. Whether or not drafts have been so-assessed, the University reserves the right to require an electronic version of the final document (as submitted) for assessment as above.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I have a great many people to thank for making this piece of work possible, and I will almost certainly do a terrible job in attempting to do so. Firstly, I must thank everyone within the Department of Politics at Surrey for creating the type of environment that stimulates curiosity and provides such a strong base of support for early career academics, both in terms of their research and professional development. It is has been an honour to work among such dedicated professionals.

In particular I would like to thank our head of department Roberta Guerrina and my initial supervisor Professor Marie Breen Smyth for seeing something in me at the outset and giving me the opportunity to start my career. Marie in particular has been a huge source of support and inspiration both personally and academically over the years. Without her this thesis would not have been possible. I would also like to thank Jack Holland for his tireless support and input, primarily because I expect this acknowledgement from his first PhD supervisee to be famous someday, such is my confidence in his destiny with academic rock-stardom.

To Fanis, Ipshita, Malte, Tereza, Louise, Laura, Simon, Alex, Mike, Mark and Maxine, thank you all for being a source of support, inspiration and most of all friendship.

I would also like to thank the academic support staff here who make everyone else’s work possible, particularly Anne-Maria Cann and Karen Short who remind us what fires need put out and when.

That this department attracts such quality of individuals is a testament to its strength as an academic community. At a time of great uncertainty for social science research, these people are an inspiration to continue to fight for the type of university future generations deserve.

Now for the people I blame. Nobody can get through a PhD without friends, and I have been blessed enough to have a few people who are of strong enough character to tolerate a graduate student as a mate. Firstly my PhD colleagues, who like comrades in a submarine, stop the madness setting in the tin can that is the office. To Will, Sam, Nik, Ben and other veterans of the PhD process, the Op Review and other wars, I hope I can be as strong a means of support to you as you were to me. In particular I’d like to thank Christiano and John, for schooling me on Surrey and teaching me not to stick my head up. And I would like to thank both Stavroula and Katharine, for being two of the smartest, strongest, coolest women I know. Without your interference over the years, I’d be happily working in McDonald’s.

I’d like to thank all my friends and family for their support over the last few years. I’m prevented from writing out your names in the manner I’d like but suffice to say if you’ve have had a pint and a chat with me since 2011, I’m grateful to you! To the Derry headz, the Belfast babes, the London crew, Liverpool ledges’ as well as the Sligo and Donegal contingents. To the weird and wonderful I’ve met in the last few years. Thank you deeply.

I’d like take this opportunity to publically call out the people who actively hindered this thesis, such was their determination to help me blow off steam. To Decky, McCauley, Rhys, Mike, John, Eddie, O’dee, Boo and B, I’m eternally grateful.

Finally my family. To Mabel, James, Jamie and Danielle, you’re the only reason I do stuff like this to myself, I blame you the most.
The politics of aid and the effect aid strategies have on recipient populations has been a significant interest area in international politics and economics. While studies of this behaviour have tended to focus on economic or developmental impacts, the security implications of military based aid have enjoyed less attention. It is an important area as the transfer of military capacity from states to allies or allied non-state actors is having resurgence in the midst of new, intersecting proxy conflicts in the Middle East and Europe. This article questions whether military aid strategies can contribute to the conditions of political violence and terrorism that they are ostensibly intended to address.

The study uses a structured within-case comparative analysis of two periods of recent Pakistani history in which the state has been both the recipient of massive influxes of US military aid, and a target for embargo from such programs. A modified human security framework is used to assess changes in the security environment for the recipient population in these two time periods with a focus on the frequency and intensity of political violence. It finds that in this particular case, military aid has correlated with the entrenchment of military power and increasing political violence within the recipient state.
Aid & the Ouroborus:
US Foreign Military Assistance and Human Security in Pakistan

“The Ouroboros is a dramatic symbol for the integration and assimilation of the opposite, i.e. of the shadow. This ‘feed-back’ process is at the same time a symbol of immortality, since it is said of the Ouroboros that he slays himself and brings himself to life, fertilizes himself and gives birth to himself”

Carl Jung

“You may succeed in your policy and ensure your own damnation by your victory.”

James Larkin
(6.4) Testing Hypothesis Three: Rise in Violence Involving the State ................................................................. 210
(6.5) Hypothesis Outcomes ....................................................................................................................................... 221
Conclusion: Observations for TWO Audiences ........................................................................................................... 224
(7.1) Introduction ......................................................................................................................................................... 224
(7.2) Operationalisation of HUman Security In Policy Analysis .................................................................................... 225
(7.3) The Problem Solving View: Observations for the Policy Orientated Audience ...................................................... 226
  Critical Policy perspective: The GEneration of Violence ............................................................................................ 229
(7.5) Limitations and Further Research ........................................................................................................................ 232
  Limitations: Choosing and Framing Subjects .............................................................................................................. 232
  Opportunities for Further Research: Broadening and Deepening .............................................................................. 234
(7.6) Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................................. 236
Bibliography................................................................................................................................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined.
Tables and Figures

Figure 1: US Aid to Pakistan 1951-2011 ................................................................. 38
Figure 2 Central Tenets of Human Security .............................................................. 55
Figure 3 International Arms Transfers to Pakistan 1950-1970 .................................... 97
Figure 4 Total US Military Aid 1960-70 ................................................................... 98
Figure 5 Military Sales and Military Aid 1970-1994 .................................................... 100
Figure 6: Number of Students Trained (IMET) 1972-1992 .......................................... 105
Figure 7 US Military Aid and Total Pakistan Military Expenditure ............................ 106
Figure 8 Pakistan Military Expenditure in Dollars .................................................... 107
Figure 9 Frequency of Incidents of Political Violence (1988-99) ................................. 109
Figure 10 Total Deaths from Political Violence (1988-99) ........................................... 110
Figure 11 Frequency of Incidents by Province (1988-1999) ........................................ 112
Figure 12 Frequency of Incidents by Province (1995) ................................................ 112
Figure 13 Frequency of Incidents by Cities within Sindh (1995) ................................. 113
Figure 14 Frequency of Types of Incident within Sindh (1995) .................................... 114
Figure 15 Frequency of Event Types within Punjab (1988-1999) .............................. 120
Figure 16 Frequency of Attacks in Punjab by Party Responsible (1988-1999) ............. 121
Figure 17 Frequency of Event Types 1988-99 ............................................................. 123
Figure 18 Frequency of Incident Types in Sindh 1988-99 ........................................... 124
Figure 19 Frequency of Incident Types in Punjab 1988-99 ........................................ 124
Figure 20 US Military Aid (Excluding Coalition Support Funds) 1999-2012 (USAID, 2012) ................................................................. 146
Figure 21 Pakistan Military Expenditure (SIPRI, 2014 b) .......................................... 156
Figure 22 Pakistan Military Expenditure as Proportion (%) of State Spending .......... 156
Figure 23 Frequency of Incidents of Political Violence (2000-11) ............................... 159
Figure 24 Total Deaths from Political Violence (2000-11) .......................................... 160
Figure 25 Incidents of Political Violence in FATA (2000-11) ........................................ 162
Figure 26 Political Violence Event Type in FATA (1988-99) ......................................... 166
Figure 27 Political Violence Event Type in FATA (2000-11) ....................................... 167
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARD</td>
<td>Alliance to Restore Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTO</td>
<td>Central Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSF</td>
<td>Coalition Support Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSCA</td>
<td>Defense Security Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>FATA</td>
<td>Federally Administered Tribal Areas</td>
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<td>FMF</td>
<td>Foreign Military Financing</td>
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<td>FMS</td>
<td>Foreign Military Sales</td>
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<td>HuM</td>
<td>Harkat-ul-Mujahideen</td>
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<td>IDA</td>
<td>Islamic Democratic Alliance</td>
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<td>IMET</td>
<td>International Military Education and Training</td>
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<td>JeM</td>
<td>Jaish-e-Mohammed</td>
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<td>LeJ</td>
<td>Lashkar-e-Jhangvi</td>
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<td>LeT</td>
<td>Lashkar-e-Toiba</td>
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<tr>
<td>LoC</td>
<td>Line of Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>MMA</td>
<td>Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (United Council of Action)</td>
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<td>MQM</td>
<td>Muttahida Quami Movement</td>
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<td>MRD</td>
<td>Movement to Restore Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>North West Frontier Province</td>
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<tr>
<td>PML</td>
<td>Pakistan Muslim League</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Pakistan People's Party</td>
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<td>PTI</td>
<td>Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf</td>
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<td>SSP</td>
<td>Sipah-e-Sahaba</td>
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<td>TiT</td>
<td>Tehrik-i-Taliban (Pakistan Taliban)</td>
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“We would have loved that Europe and the United States offer the thousands of scholarships that Cuba has offered to Ecuadorean students to study medicine. There are 2,000 Ecuadorean students who are studying medicine in Cuba. Other countries only want to train our military personnel. That’s quite a contrast.”

Ricardo Pitano, Ecuadorean Foreign Minister
Interview with Democracy Now, 26th September 2013

Discussion of the character, design and effect of foreign aid in the study of international politics is ubiquitous. The depth of interest is indicative of the myriad ways that aid can affect populations, states and the wider international environment. We understand it to be a means of shaping diplomacy between states and the domestic politics within (Alesina, A. & Dollar, D., 2000) that it can have both highly beneficial (Svensson, 2000) or extremely detrimental effects on both recipient and donor societies (Easterly W., 2002). It is a means through which states, corporations, charities and other institutions can intervene in the economic, social and political landscape of a targeted population (Easterly, 2003).

Popular narratives have attested to the importance for both the developed and developing world to move beyond intransient conceptions of statehood or nationality. Increasing transnational interconnectivity is
presented as providing a historically unique opportunity for meaningful improvement in the living standards of a truly global population (Stiglitz, 2013) (Sachs, 2011) (Stern, 2002). The rhetoric is lofty and perhaps justifiably so, considering the magnitude of the vision proposed. Initiatives such as the ‘millennium development goals’, designed with the aim of halving global poverty rates by 2015 are indicative of the scope of macro level aid strategies (McArthur, 2013, p. 152).

The provision of aid is a product of truly interactive international society. However, as critical readings commonly point out, the capacity for international actors to intervene in the political environment of a recipient population is not necessarily, or even all that commonly, an altruistic endeavour (Schrader, P.J., Hook, S.W. & Taylor, B., 1998, p. 320) (Easterly W., 2003). Aid strategies can belie a strategic necessity (Morgenthau, 1962) (Callaway, R.L & Matthews, E.G., 2008). This is evidenced by the fact that not all aid is intended to address immediate social or economic development concerns (Gates, 2010). Aid for the reinforcement of security apparatus, often seen as a precursor to development goals, has been a significant yet relatively understudied means of building the capacity of actors in the international system. What is even less understood, is how effective the donation of military aid from one country to another is in generating either domestic or regional security.

Beyond the idealistic description of ‘helping others to help themselves’ (Arslanalp, S. & Henry, P.B., 2006) (Gates, 2010) there is an underlining economic conception of entities in the international system using excess resources to build the capacity of wider systems in order to achieve strategic or economic gains e.g. increasing purchasing ability or developing new markets (Easterly, 2003). Indeed, in the post-war period, theorists were already characterising aid in terms of the management of strategically significant states in the post-Colonial context (Chenery, H.B. & Strout, A.M., 1966, p. 679).

In this manner, we can understand aid not only as a mechanism for supporting overall development, but also as a means for actors to propagate systems that are structurally non-self-sufficient but that are deemed favourable to actors in donating roles. Military aid is a particularly interesting aspect of such externally enacted structural reinforcement. This form of aid relates to the free transfer of military equipment from one actor to another, the provision of training for a recipient state’s forces or support through the provision of intelligence (Baines, 1972, p. 473). It can also cover financial support for the purchase of military equipment such as loans or grant programs (United States Department of Defense, 1960, pp. 121-122).
A key issue arising from the ability of one state to unilaterally arm an ally is that of legitimacy. As Weber famously observed, a state’s internal legitimacy is tied to its ability to wield a monopoly of legitimate physical force in the enforcement of its orders (Weber, 2009, p. 78). By introducing a reliance on an outside party for the development of a state’s security apparatus, a question may arise over that state’s sovereign legitimacy. The theoretical proposition for the immediate study is that security aid can, when viewed in the context of legitimacy, be self-defeating. That is to say that pursuit of military solutions to political legitimacy issues can be theorised to produce self-reinforcing cycles of violence (Gupta, 2008, p. 187).

There are two essential variables that must be defined and operationalised to form a useful research question to interrogate the logic and effectiveness of military aid as a form of foreign intervention; aid itself, and security. For the purposes of this study, the US military aid relationship with Pakistan in the post-Cold War era will be investigated due to its distinctive suitability as a ‘natural experiment’. For the last decade of the Cold War, Pakistan received a substantial investment of US military aid in its capacity as a key partner in balancing against the Soviet Union in Asia. The end of the Cold War, and the fallout regarding Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, resulted in the blocking of further military aid throughout most of the 1990’s. After the attacks of September 11th 2001, the state once again became a major strategic partner for the US and substantial new military aid programs were implemented. This fluctuation provides a somewhat unique opportunity to investigate the impact of military aid on security by studying two comparable periods when it was present, and when it was absent. This however raises the secondary question, who’s security is to be studied?

While there is a broad variety of variables that might indicate the extent to which a state is secure or stable, the study will approach the problem through the lens of population security. This approach is adopted for several reasons. Primarily, the research aims to contribute to the literature on human security, a concept that gained notoriety in the early 1990’s as a means of reimagining security in terms of persons as opposed to nation states. As a prescriptive policy tool, human security has had some success in providing a conceptual basis for arms control agreements, such as the Ottawa Treaty prohibiting the use, transfer, production and stockpiling of Cluster munitions (English, 1998). But the significance of the handful of notable successful applications of the concept have been somewhat tempered by the slow progress in other important areas of
arms control such as the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons, as well as attempts to produce a conventional arms trade treaty (Alcade, 2014, p. 236). The broad scope for such agreements, the multilateral character of their negotiation and the inevitable reluctance from many states to participate means that there has been a large degree of paralysis in their realisation (Ibid).

Human security has thus been the subject of much critical discussion in terms of what it can provide in prescriptive policy terms (Paris, 2001). This study attempts to deploy the concept as critical policy analysis tool by using a restricted interpretation that focuses on particular metrics of human security that could reasonably be expected to be affected by a particular policy or strategy (Owen, 2004a, p. 377). In this case, US foreign military aid to Pakistan will be investigated strictly in terms of levels of political violence experienced by the population as a whole over time. It will be argued that this is not only a reasonable metric for this policy in human security terms, but is also one that is explicitly invoked in a US policy as an aim for the program. The case for the utility of a restricted view of human security (Alkire, 2003, p. 27) will be explored before being implemented in a study of the types of political violence experienced by the population in Pakistan, the types of actors involved, and exploration of the potential relationship between such violence and foreign military aid. Namely, to help answer the central research question “What impact has US military aid had on human security in Pakistan?”

Recognising some of the ambiguities and analytical weaknesses of human security (Paris, 2001), this research will attempt to situate itself amongst the substantial body of literature that uses the concept as reference point for investigations into a broad swathe social phenomenon (Hudson, 2005) (Micheal & Marshall, 2007) (Stuvoy, 2010). From an international studies perspective, a human security lens allows for a reorientation of foreign policy analysis away from the strategic aims of states towards an appreciation for impact on populations, providing something of a pre-determined framework for critical assessment of interventionist behaviour.

This research should contribute to our understanding of an important foreign policy strategy that has direct relevance to contemporary international security concerns. From Russian and Saudi military aid to respective allies in the Syrian conflict, to Indian balancing of China in Myanmar and Sri Lanka, to continued US transfers to Israel in the midst of highly controversial attacks in Gaza, or violent crackdowns by the autocratic military regime of Abdel Fatah al-Sissi in Egypt, the subject matter is understudied relative to the potential effects on
international security, and more specifically, populations of recipient states. By adopting a new frame of reference in human security, this study hopes to both challenge existing understanding of how success for such policies are understood, as well contributing to existing scholarship that treats human security as a critical policy analysis tool.

(1.2) HYPOTHESIS & STRUCTURE

(1.2.1) HYPOTHESIS

The hypotheses laid out below reflect part of the investigatory framework guiding the analysis of the US/Pakistan case study. As will be expanded upon in the methodology section, the decision to restrict metrics of security to political violence experienced by the population reflects both availability of consistent, quality data sources over time on various human security indicators, as well as the particular urgency of the problem of political violence in the case of Pakistan. Terrorist violence in particular has been notable, with Pakistan being pushed to third in the world for such attacks in 2014, behind only Iraq and Afghanistan and ahead of Syria and Nigeria (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2014). And while this is clearly a major source of political violence within the state, there are a great deal of other sources including religiously motivated attacks, kidnappings, assaults, violent political demonstrations and violence by the police, military and paramilitary forces. Such attacks are carried out by a variety of different political actors, in different regions, for different purposes. Thus, while the decision to focus on political violence is extremely restrictive in terms of the very broad catalogue of indicators offered by human security, even this restricted area is in itself highly complex, multifaceted and dynamic.

In order to gain some form of analytical purchase on this broad range of violence, the study will broadly categorise insecurity into three relatively distinct sectors- militant organisations, public order and the state. While this may generate a degree of simplification in the characterisation of specific actors or violence generating tactics that affect the Pakistani population, it will also provide a means through which to identify trajectories in particular types of violence as it affects particular areas of the population, either geographically, ethnically or politically. The potential linkage between these categories of violence, and military aid are presented within three guiding hypothesis that will provide a framework for the comparative analysis of the
two case study periods. As will be discussed below, these hypothesis are generated from existing literature on drivers of political violence in contemporary international security. They posit a potential link between these three sectors and military aid in the following way-

1) Reliance on an external state for provision of security capacity may lead to challenges to the authority of the state or the undermining of the state’s monopoly on the use of force.

2) Reliance on an external state for provision of security may exacerbate popular resentment amongst the public, fuelling widespread protest or political instability.

3) External support may facilitate a more proactive security state, leading to increased militarisation of security problems and potential increases in violence by the state. This may in turn fuel grievances and political legitimacy issues covered in hypotheses 1 and 2.

This conceptualisation is informed by a variety of research on the nature of foreign policy, legitimacy, states and power, in conjunction with the broader conceptual framework of the human security agenda. The epistemological view is particularly influenced by the significant body of scholarship produced since the attacks of September 11th that explore the deeper motivating factors behind militancy, terrorism or other organised non-state actor violence. In particular, critical terrorism studies scholars have challenged existing assumptions regarding the political construction of terrorist violence (Jackson, 2007), the issues facing traditional ‘problem solving’ approaches to research on the subject (Gunning, 2007) or how the ‘othering’ effect on suspect communities produced by traditional approaches can itself facilitate radicalisation (Breen-Smyth, 2014, p. 234). Thus, the hypotheses are geared towards an enquiry framework for non-state actor violence that appreciates these potential pitfalls and attempts to situate violent acts in a political context; namely that of a crisis of state legitimacy, or in the context of perceptions of, or reactions to, international or domestic hegemonies (Nagengast, 1994) (Bergesen, A.J. & Lizardo, O., 2004) (Evans, 2011).

They also aim to explore violence as an indicator of resistance, drawing upon a body of work that has viewed civil unrest in recent major political mobilisations as symptomatic of deep crises in state legitimacy (Schnieder, 2011) (Johnston, 2012) (Oroz-Vincent, 2014). The Arab Spring has presented something of a proving ground for
the development of theories relating to states with democratic deficiencies or despotic tendencies, and how mass political mobilisations have negotiated the state’s capacity for violence in pursuit of reform or immanent change.

Finally, they are designed to ‘bring the state back in’ to the discussion of instability (Blakely, 2007); how the state uses violence (Milliken, J. & Krause, K., 2002, p. 756), and how such violence, in the context of foreign sponsorship, affects its legitimacy (Rubin, 2006, pp. 178-179) and thus the potential propagation of violent non-state actors (Hafez, M. & Wiktorowicz, Q., 2004, p. 61), all of which directly affect the security of the wider population. While this has been a key concern of many critical approaches (Jackson, 2008), it is also one of the central assumptions of human security that populations may be ‘insecure within secure’ borders due to a variety of threats, not least of which is the state itself. The framing of this hypothesis allows not just for an exploration of state violence, but a critical assessment of whether militarisation of security problems contributes to increased stability for the population. By taking this approach, the study has a framework for research that will treat problems of insecurity with the necessary contextual detail while internalising the human security centric view that treats all three areas as serious potential sources of insecurity of populations.

(1.2.2) RELEVANCE TO TWO AUDIENCES

While the project is designed to exist under the general umbrella of human security centric research, the findings should be relevant to two distinct audiences. Firstly, it will directly engage the policy dimension by asking to what extent is military aid effective in attaining the strategic policy goals upon which it is predicated? In recent years US military aid has been characterised as a means to fight terrorism (Bush, 2002), as a means to help allies defend themselves from external and internal attack (Gates, 2010) and as a means to help states become more secure and stable (US Department of State, 2015). Using data on levels of political violence carried out by range of actors including ethnic, religious and sectarian militancy, it should be possible to determine the effectiveness of the policy by comparing periods where aid is present, and when it has been absent. Combining observed changes in levels of violence by non-state actors and contextual analysis of the
politics of such groups, should yield sufficient information to critically frame existing US military aid policy to Pakistan, and will give some limited insight into the potential for foreign military aid to affect political/security environments into which it is introduced more generally.

Secondly, it will test the broader human security credentials of military aid policy. Beyond the question of effectiveness in protecting the population from violent non-state militancy, the population centric concerns of human security necessarily broadens the focus of the research to include threats posed to the population by the state. Thus comparing fluctuations in military aid, and data on levels of violence attributed state forces will give an indication as to the effect of external strategic support on the potential for violence by the recipient state. Taken in conjunction with violence emanating from non-state sources, the study will reflect a broad range of threats that affect the population from all actors for which there is data, giving an indication of the distribution of insecurity to the population across both time periods. Comparing this range of indicators with military aid data will thus give an impression of the effectiveness of the intervention at a human security level.

(1.2.3.) STRUCTURE

The thesis will revolve around a within-case comparative analysis split into two roughly equivalent temporal sections, with the early chapters establishing the approach and theoretical context. Chapter 2 will set out the methodology, covering research strategy, case selection and data gathering approaches. The strengths and weaknesses of different formulations of case study research will be considered before making clear the requirements of the specific problem and how they are best facilitated by the within-case comparative method. The rationale for case selection will be outlined providing insight into the potential for Pakistan to be both a uniquely suitable candidate for research on military aid, due to the nature of its recent strategic history with the US, but also due its situation in a region that may be at the forefront of interventionist politics in coming years. Sources for data on both human security and military aid will be identified, and the structure for the case study research and comparative analysis will be set out.
In Chapter 3 the grounds for adopting a perspective that focuses on the security of a population rather than strategic objectives of states will be established. This will be done primarily by asserting that the general concept of ‘human security’ has been partially accepted as a norm in international interventions that gives precedence for prioritisation of individuals, populations and communities in assessments of foreign policy. It will make an argument that the concept can act as a ‘broad church’ under which multidisciplinary research might contribute to an increasing understanding of insecurity in the international system. Specifically it will attempt to reflect a view of human security as a policy centric critical research tool, linking a broad range of enquiry under the common concern of both identifying threats to populations and providing a means of assessment for proposed policy responses. This approach will be presented as the conceptual framing for thesis and operationalised for assessing military aid in Pakistan.

Chapters 4 and 5 will function as the two case studies that will detail the transfer of military aid in the relevant period, the fluctuations in human security therein, and the political context both in Pakistan and the US for the distribution or withholding of military aid. Case study 1 will cover the period from 1988 to 1999. In this period we see how the strong strategic partnership between the US and Pakistan occurred in the context of the military’s attempts to reconstitute Pakistani society on the basis of conservative religious structural reforms that secured the cultural primacy of the army. The wider international security context is discussed to establish the strategic priorities of the US at a time that saw substantial military aid transfers to Pakistan in the context of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. As the Cold War came to an end, and as controversy over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program increased, the US dramatically reduced its strategic engagement with Pakistan and embargoed it from further military aid. The major points of insecurity affecting Pakistan in this time period will be outlined, in particular the massive violence affecting Karachi in the mid-90’s. Data on political violence across the time period will be presented to show general trends in types of violence, its intensity and its geographic distribution.

Case study two will cover the period between 2000 and 2011, where in the immediate aftermath of the September 11th attacks, Pakistan once again becomes a major strategic partner to the US. Despite the military coup that brings Pervez Musharraf to power (and the legislative restrictions on aid such an event normally produces) Pakistan would receive a substantial new round of military aid that would persist for the rest of the
case study period. Coinciding with the renewal of the US-Pakistan strategic relationship was a significant increase in political violence across the country generated by a range of different political crises. The distribution and typology of this violence will be assessed to establish a macro image of human security in the time period.

Chapter 6 will provide a comparative analysis of the two periods that will draw together the findings from both case study periods to generate an assessment of how human security changed in the context of fluctuations of external security investment. Each of the three hypotheses outlined earlier in the introduction will be tested against both the data on political violence, and the contextual research produced in the case studies, to establish their explanatory strength. The first hypothesis will test data on militant violence against levels of military aid and analyse both correlations in data, and research on the politics of such violence, to assess the strength of any potential relationship. The second hypothesis will explore data on distribution and frequency of popular unrest in the form of riots or violent political demonstrations and assess whether their distribution correlates with periods of intense aid investment. Finally, hypothesis three will be tested by looking at the distribution of violence by state actors (military paramilitary and police) to ascertain whether levels are higher in periods of high military aid. State violence will also be assessed in terms of its use against non-state actors and in cases of mass unrest to ascertain any link between it, and the two potential legitimacy problems outlined in hypotheses 1 and 2.

In Chapter 7 the conclusions for the study will be established, making clear the findings for the three audiences outlined in this introduction, i.e. the policy focused audience, those interested in operationalising human security and those interested in a critical assessment of in this particular variant of foreign intervention.

(1.3) LITERATURE ON THE STUDY OF SECURITY RELATED AID

There is a storied history to the use of foreign aid in a strategic capacity to achieve desired changes to a political environment. Modelski’s study of writings by the revered Indian philosopher, Chanakya revealed a candid interpretation of the merits of wielding material advantage over allies and competitors:
“Gifts and conciliation should be used to subdue weak kings, and dissension and threats against strong kings. Such gifts might include grants of land and girls in marriage, and the creation of a climate of security and freedom from fear (Modelski, 1964, p. 553)".

Modelski, and perhaps Chanakya, were contributing to a theoretical discussion that had been started by Hans Morgenthau two years previously in his attempt at developing a political theory of foreign aid (Morgenthau, 1962). He identified six types of foreign aid revolving around the transfer of money, goods and services from one state to another; humanitarian foreign aid, military foreign aid, bribery, prestige foreign aid and foreign aid for economic development (Morgenthau, 1962, p. 301). Military aid, Morgenthau maintained, was a self-evidently logical strategy of actors shoring up military alliances with the transfer of excess materials that can in any way support a war effort, from weapons and training to food and clothing. He charts its use in strategic alliances from ancient Rome to the British Empire (Morgenthau, 1962, p. 303).

Study on contemporary military aid programs exist very much in the shadow of Cold War politics. The Truman Doctrine, founded to support non-communist parties and elites in post war Europe, made substantial military assistance available for states engaged internal conflict with leftist movements (Trachtenberg, 2003) (Selva, 2005) (Warner, 1985). It would become a useful strategy for shoring up the position of client states within both superpowers’ respective spheres of influence.

While there is some promising early literature assessing strategic implications of Soviet and US behaviour in this regard (Baines, 1972) (Fitch, 1979) (Wolf, 1985) (Cooper, 1985) it was not until the 1980’s, when the US government was facing growing domestic criticism over its perceived support for dictatorial regimes in Latin America (Amnesty International, 1981) (Pearce, 1982), that academic research assessing how various forms of aid (economic and military) interacted the domestic political environment of recipient states. There was particular interest in investigating the claims that US aid was disproportionately allocated to states which suffered from high levels of political repression or violence and if so, what domestic or regional geo-political concerns were driving factors (Chomsky, N & Herman, E.S., 1979).
Early studies by Baines (Baines, 1972) and Fitch (Fitch, 1979) into the political effect of US military programs in Latin America give conflicting outputs. Baines uses a mixed method approach, providing a substantive historical background to the political process revolving around the allocation of aid and its usage by donor states as well as providing a bivariate regression analysis of aid allocation and the occurrence of military coup d’états. The results indicate that claiming military aid has little effect on probability of the occurrence of military takeovers (Baines, 1972). Fitch’s study on the effect of military aid on the political institutions of recipient states finds that while it had beneficial impacts on the levels of organisational adaptability, cohesion and autonomy it also helped to increase the military’s role in politics and to institutionalise the coup d’état as an integral part of the political process (Fitch, 1979). It would seem that, at the very height of Cold War military aid program usage, very little was understood about how they might affect a recipient state’s socio-political environment.

One of the first major critical works into the area was by Lars Schoultz who, by positioning all Latin American states on human rights ‘scale’ based on the testimony of experts, found that the US did tend towards states with poorer human rights records in its allocation of aid (Schoultz, 1981b). In a 1981 statement, Secretary of State Alexander Haig responded to such criticism stating that while the United States always endeavoured to support fundamental human rights internationally, the government had a duty to balance these concerns with the most immediate threat to its national security and that of its allies; international terrorism and it’s chief source, the Soviet Union (Alexander, 1992, p. 549). Stating that “International terrorism will take the place of Human Rights” the Reagan administration was signifying a change in policy which they had seen as becoming too focused on humanitarian issues during the Carter administration, a position directly challenged by Micheal Stohl, David Carleton and Steven E. Johnson (Stohl, M. et. al, 1984).

In their study, Stohl et al. set out to test Schoultz’s findings and other political commentary on the subject using a similar, albeit more sophisticated regression analysis that captured data from a wider range of sources. Their research found no significant correlation between US military and economic aid for countries in Latin America based on human rights record either for the Reagan or Carter administrations, indicating it was not a particularly important factor in allocation rationale (Stohl, M. et. al, 1984, p. 222). Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s work on the subject refuted the early criticisms of academics and commentators stating that those observations failed to take account of congressional institutionalisation of human rights protections under
Carter that had begun to make human rights concerns a significant barrier to the executive in determining aid allocation (Cingranelli, D.L. & Pasquarello, T.E., 1985).

However Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s findings were called into question in studies produced by McCormick and Mitchell (1988) and Poe (1991) which criticised it for restricting its observations to a single year which didn’t account for the Reagan administration’s subsequent rescinding of certain restrictions. They also observed that Cingranelli and Pasquarello had removed El Salvador from their analysis as it had proved such a substantial outlier, having a terrible human rights record while receiving almost 27% of US aid in the period of study (McCormick, J.M. & Mitchell, N., 1988).

Meernik and Poe presented what is probably the most definitive study of the subject from the approach of large n multivariate regression analysis by using data on US military aid globally (Meernik, J & Poe, S.C., 1995). Rather than limiting itself to independent variables related to humanitarian concerns, the study looked at a broader range of factors including domestic political/ideological characteristics, geography and international organisation membership. They found that positioning in Central America, popularity of leftist ideology and proximity to communist countries and membership of NATO were all important determinants in allocation of military aid.

Blanton’s investigation (2000), which deals specifically with arms exports, provides interesting context as it indicates that states involved in on-going conflicts are less likely to receive aid. However, the analysis also found that once an initial nominal democratic entry barrier was cleared a state’s behaviour regarding conflict or human rights had little relevance. Exports instead correlated with levels of trade and existing strategic relationships (Blanton, 2000, p. 129). More recently, Berrigan et al again contested the idea that democracy or active conflict status were significant factors determining military exports. Their study found that of the 25 largest recipients of US military transfers, 13 were ‘undemocratic’ while 18 were engaged in active conflicts (Berrigan, F et al., 2005).

Each of these studies provide extremely useful commentary on the geopolitical interplay between states in securing aid. The study proposed here however, seeks to approach the problem from a slightly different perspective. It does not aim to assess what determines whether a country receives aid or not but rather to show how aid affects the recipient state population once it is allocated. Existing macro level studies do not,
and indeed could not, answer the types of questions due to the adopted methodologies. They can indicate certain trends in aid allocation policy but can explain very little about how that aid affect’s the security environment into which it is distributed. For state’s receiving aid, there has been little scope to understand its usefulness in generating stability in situations where recipient countries face substantial internal security problems, or how such an external intervention might affect levels of violence. For donating states, such wide ranging studies by necessity forgo an in-depth understanding of the political considerations for deploying military aid to allied states, obscuring insight into the rationale in the few large cases that account for the majority of military aid. As Cingranelli and Pasquarello found in attempting to account for the substantial inequality of distribution of US military aid across cases:

“A few countries like Israel, Egypt, India and El Salvador receive disproportionate shares of that aid when compared with their neighbours. Our analysis says little about why these counties have been singled out for preferential treatment. Aid decisions pertaining to these most favoured countries often involve national security interests, are nonroutine and controversial, and can probably be explained only on a case by case basis” (Cingranelli, D.L. & Pasquarello, T.E., 1985, p. 560).

As recent history of interventions in Syria and Ukraine may attest, an understanding of cases that are ‘nonroutine’ and ‘controversial’ that receive disproportionate attention from intervening states may be the most important to understand in the light of their ability to affect the security of a broad range of populations, both immediate and further afield. By looking in-depth at a carefully selected examples of we can tease out a more contextual, causative account of the processes of recipient state behaviour, the reaction of other political actors and most importantly, be able to produce useful information about the efficacy of such programs by reporting on trends in specific human security indicators throughout the relevant time period. The specific strategy for achieving this will be outlined in the following chapter.

(1.4) CONCLUSION: AIMS FOR OUTCOMES

By adopting a hybridised approach that seeks to fuse commonalities in critical and human security approaches, and operationalising them in a within case comparative analysis, this study will provide a new perspective on a
specific type of foreign intervention strategy. It is designed with the aim of delivering insights relevant to a variety of audiences to maximise the utility of the research. The study will test the basic ‘problem solving’ credentials of military aid policy, to assess whether it is ‘doing the job’ for which it is discursively justified. Secondly it will yield interesting findings for security related scholarship, particularly for those interested in a critical understanding of foreign intervention strategies. Finally, the study will contribute to the growing body of research carried out under the umbrella of human security, helping to further establish the utility of the concept as critical policy analysis tool.

Military aid, the transfer of military capacity, financing or training is a form of intervention that is likely to become more frequently utilised as major military powers use indirect means to push for influence and access in a variety of contested spaces throughout the world. This study aims to present a population centric account of how such programs might affect levels of violence experienced by recipient populations.
CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY: STRUCTURED FOCUSED WITHIN CASE COMPARISON

(2.1) INTRODUCTION

Pakistan’s experience with US military aid, the fluctuations between its activation and suspension in recent history, make it an excellent candidate for investigation of effects for the recipient state population. Between 1992 and 2000, the state was barred from either receiving military aid, or making purchases from US arms manufacturers. In the months following the attacks of September 11th, a new round of military aid from the US was negotiated and substantial transfers occurred in the years since. Subsequently, the BFRS dataset (Bueno de Mesquita, E.B. et al., 2013) was released which compiled incident level data on political violence in Pakistan between 1988 and 2011, in one of the most in-depth studies of political violence in the country yet conducted. This has presented the means for an investigation of changes to the security environment in Pakistan over the last twenty two years, representing two 11 year periods governed by substantially different strategic relationships. The period between 1988 and 2000 saw a decline and eventual termination of military aid. The period between 2000 and 2011 saw the rebirth of strategic relations and the reestablishment of a substantial new military aid program. The following chapter will outline the approach and rationale of this study, detailing the strategy for generating and analysing data relevant to the hypotheses outlined in the introduction.

Firstly, the reasoning behind adopting a within-case comparative study approach will be established making clear the benefits it will have over other approaches to investigating the hypotheses. It will also explain the rationale for engaging with this particular case as a means of understanding the problem, both in terms of geostrategic relevance, and its methodological parsimony. Pakistan is an important case that can yield significant policy relevant findings for understanding regional politics, as well as potentially offering up broader conceptual observations for security studies scholarship.

The subsequent section will outline the benefits to this approach over others in terms of understanding the relationship between the two variables, acknowledging relative weaknesses as well as strengths. The study
aims to balance the concerns of broadly competing research philosophies, by deriving the case studies from a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches. The balance of these approaches is attained via adoption of a structured focused comparison, with a set of questions aimed at illuminating both the historical and political context of the US and Pakistan’s security relationship and a data centric investigation of trends in insecurity in Pakistan in the time period. The questions structuring the enquiry will be outlined in this section, demonstrating the trajectory of the investigation and indicating the strategy for attaining data necessary for testing the hypotheses. Each case study will be divided into four sections based on four key research questions, with the first two sections focusing on determining the political context of military aid policy, and the last two sections investigating changes in aid and security in each time period.

Finally, there will a discussion on the sources of data on human security and military aid, highlighting how the limitations of such data are themselves a factor in the methodological approach of the study. The BFRS dataset will be discussed in terms of its strengths and weaknesses in illustrating general trends in security in the time period. Specifically, the nature of the study as one based on media reporting will be considered in terms of the problematic relationship between the military infrastructure of the state and journalism in Pakistan. The sources for data on military aid will be similarly assessed, highlighting both the openness of access to such information provided by the US government, while acknowledging the extent of the limitations of potentially covert operations.

**(2.2) CASE STUDY METHOD: RESEARCH STRATEGY**

The security relationships between states are potentially as interdependent as economic relations. There are clear indications that strategic assistance, alliance building and proxy conflicts play a key role in the foreign policy of major and intermediary powers, that seek to maintain influence in regions of key geostrategic importance (Ahmed, Z.S. & Bhatnagar, S., 2015) (Cragin, 2015) (Peou, 2014). As was discussed in the previous chapter, existing academic work has been Cold War centric and for the most part investigated the circumstances that determined whether or not aid was given by a donating state, rather than attempting to understand the impact of such aid on the recipient society.
The study proposed here seeks to approach the subject matter in a markedly different way. In order to attempt to understand some of the causal processes arising out of military donations, specifically in regards to aspects of human security, a case will be made for studying the problem via a singular in-depth case study rather than through the wider and shallower approaches that have been the norm of previous literature (Fitch, 1979) (Cooper, O & Fogarty, C, 1985) (Stohl, M. et. al, 1984) (Poe, 1991) (Blanton, 2000).

### (2.3) UNIVERSAL OR SAMPLING APPROACH VERSUS CASE STUDY

Preference for multiple or single case approaches has fuelled longstanding debate among proponents of qualitative methods in the social sciences. Primarily, the question of which approach best suits the needs of a study comes down to the strength of ‘deep case’ versus ‘surface case’ analysis (Dyer, W.G. & Wilkins, A. L., 1991, p. 614). Proponents of a multi case method will tend to highlight the advantages in building more complex theoretical explanations due to the ability to generalize that can only be made through multiple observations of case phenomenon (Gomm, R. Hammersley, M. & Foster, P., 2000, p. 98) (Eisenhardt, 1989). On the other hand, proponents of a single case approach maintain that the depth of understanding of causative processes is limited when using multiple cases and that simplifications required to produce theoretical constructs can limit the usefulness of such theory in explaining individual cases (Dyer, W.G. & Wilkins, A. L., 1991).

These debates exist towards one end of a spectrum of opinion in social science concerning the nature of population size in social scientific research. At one end lies the statistically orientated approach that seeks to build a body of observations that is reflective or representative of a universal population. In the context of conflict research, examples might include studies such as the ‘Correlates of War’ project, that have constructed datasets that catalogue essential parameters of most of the conflicts in contemporary history (Sarkees, M. R. & Schafer, P., 2000). The scale of such an endeavour means that each conflict is reduced to a series of variables (date, location, force sizes, casualties etc.) that can be uniformly collected across all cases. Such datasets have been used to test various theories relating to conflict such as democratic peace theory.
(Håvard, H. et al., 2001) or geographic contiguity as a potential conflict driver (Bremer, 1992). Necessarily, collection of data on a wide range of conflicts in this manner requires a substantial simplification of the character of a conflict; very little can be said about the political contexts of individual cases but general patterns of behaviour can be observed. Such approaches have been an established means of developing models to explain and predict actor behaviour in the international system.

On the other end of the spectrum are case study approaches. These differ from attempts to capture patterns in a global dataset by instead utilizing representative sample cases of observed behaviours in order to develop theory. Each case study will typically combine methods of data collection such as archival research, interviews, and surveying in order to provide a more holistic picture of an event or phenomenon (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 534). The ‘explanatory richness’ that comes from focusing on a specific sample of cases inevitably sacrifices a substantial amount of theoretical parsimony and generalizability. This is typically seen as an acceptable trade off for as George and Bennet observe “case study researchers are more interested in finding the conditions under which specific outcomes occur, and the mechanisms through which they occur, rather than uncovering the frequency with which those conditions and their outcomes arise” (George, A.L. & Bennett, A., 2005, pp. 31-32).

Rather than attempting to capture a global population or to achieve a large enough sample to be statistically representative of the whole, case study approaches seek out a smaller number of situations for observation. The process of selecting cases for study due to their holding a particular characteristic that the researcher seeks to understand in greater contextual detail (or, selecting on the dependent variable, an issue which will be discussed further below) is problematic for statistically orientated or positivist approaches (Collier, D. & Mahoney, J., 1996, pp. 70-1) (Levy, 2002, p. 440). From this perspective, selecting to observe only cases displaying particular characteristics undermines substantive theory development by removing the ability to determine frequency or likelihood of the phenomenon occurring in other situations (George, A.L. & Bennett, A., 2005, pp. 31-32). However, while the apparent trade off required in selecting cases for study would appear too great to maintain the scientific rigour sought in positivist approaches (Keohane, R et al., 1994, p. 35), those working from post-positivist or critical perspectives maintain that each approach has a balance of problematic characteristics.
One of the most substantial issues arising for the large N studies are the assumptions required to code when time constraints allow for only a shallow body of research on each case. While there are major problems in studying only cases that contain specified phenomenon, classifying cases without a substantive body of research can be equally, if not more problematic for a the validity of a study. Lebow and Stein explore this problem in their seminal critique of realist perceptions of deterrence strategy in international relations (Lebow, R.N. & Stein, J.G., 1990):

“Aggregate data analysis across cases places a heavy burden on investigators. They must examine large numbers of cases in sufficient historical detail... Examination of cases must go well beyond existing data collections to a wide range of primary and secondary sources, since the intentions of alleged challengers as well as the deterrent commitments of defenders are critical to the identification of relevant cases. Investigators must also make explicit their criteria for coding outcomes in each case they include in their collection. This kind of documentation is essential because of the multiple interpretations that are characteristic of many of the cases. It is misleading, then, to assume that, in the evidence it requires, the analysis of data aggregated across large numbers of cases is less labour-intensive or less demanding than the case-study approach (Lebow, R.N. & Stein, J.G., 1990, p. 349).”

Lebow and Stein use the example of deterrence to point out a significant problem with attempting to develop theory from large N studies of security related behaviours; the role of inference and interpretation in building datasets. Coding political phenomena is not a self-evidently objective task. Positively or negatively ascribing a certain characteristic to a given event, in this case whether or not deterrence is utilized successfully or not, must be established rather than assumed if the data is to reflect reality accurately (assuming, perhaps even more problematically, that political reality can be thus reflected with a degree of objectivity). In this case, Lebow and Stein revisit several cases that have been understood by realist theorists to classically portray cases of the success and failure of deterrence in international security and raise significant questions as to whether such claims withstand an in-depth analysis. Scientific rigour, the leading advantage of statistically orientated approaches, is therefore contingent on a high degree of standardization in codification and reporting conventions that is particularly difficult to achieve in international security research (Gibbert, M. & Ruigrok, W., 2010, p. 710).
From this perspective, using a selection of case studies that can be explored with depth can provide a substantially different account of the behaviours targeted for observation. In particular, as will be discussed in detail below, cases which involve international security quite often rely on imperfect or inaccurate data for a range of different factors; classification, intentional manipulation and the general ‘fog of war’ that surrounds conflict situations. In the case of the immediate study, data sources such as rates of political violence and levels of military assistance are rarely definitive nor are they consistent in character or reliability across cases. The researcher must establish a closest approximation of reality by using a variety of sources of overlapping information or what is referred to as the ‘triangulation of imperfect measures’ (Eckstein, 2000, p. 151).

(2.4) SINGLE VERSUS MULTIPLE CASE METHOD: THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT

In adopting the case study approach, it is then necessary to identify whether a multiple or single case strategy best serves the research subject as there are advantages and disadvantages to each approach. Once again, a key difference relates to the ability to generalize findings from the research. Multiple case approaches have a significant advantage in this regard as repeated observations of a particular behaviour can be seen as analogous to multiple experimentation (Yin, 2009, p. 54). Repeated ‘experiments’ of between four and ten observations are generally held to provide grounds for ‘analytical generalization’ (Eisenhardt, 1989). Analytical generalization differs from statistical generalization in that while the later describes the process of moving from observation to population, the former refers to the movement from empirical observation to a theoretical explanation (Gibbert, M. & Ruigrok, W., 2010, p. 714).

Methods for analysis across cases, and the means through which inferences can be drawn from this process, are the subject of an extensive literature on comparative political research (Wiarda, 2002) (Landman, 2004) (Mahony, J. & Ruseschemeyer, D., 2009) (Lange, 2013). There are however, well-documented problems with cross-country comparisons due to the extensive differences existent within any two given societies (Landman, 2004, p. 46) (Hofstede, 1998). Just as with large N studies, the problem of identifying sources of data that gather information with methodological approaches that are similar enough to facilitate integration or comparison. Concerns of comparing ‘apples and oranges’ might seem particularly problematic in exploration of
extreme case phenomenon such as political violence, war and revolution as the development of such incidents are difficult to extricate from a deep historical context (Kornprobst, 2007, p. 33).

The political framing of foreign policy, or the goals and strategies employed by those implementing it, also create potential problems with comparative analysis. The broad range of potential motivations in aid distribution in contemporary politics were catalogued by Morgenthau in his ‘Political Theory of Foreign Aid’ (1962). The study established six different types of foreign aid including economic, prestige, development, humanitarian, military, and bribery. Whilst the study made clear there was much scope for overlap within these categories, it also indicated some starkly contrasting approaches to the overall construction of aid as a means of foreign intervention. Military aid itself can be subcategorized by differing competing objectives, which in turn can change over time depending on the political circumstances of both the donating and recipient state. A cursory exploration of some prominent examples of US military aid programs in recent history can illustrate just how dynamic each relationship can be, and thus the potential problem of using a selection of different cases for comparative analysis.

As one of the United States’ most important strategic partners in Latin America, Colombia has received a consistent supply of military aid since the Second World War with the rationale for transfers changing dramatically over time. The program was initially conceived in the context of building alliances for the defence of the hemisphere from external attack (United States Department of Defense, 1960), but as the Cold War became the prominent concern in US foreign policy, aid was reformulated as a means of improving internal security from the perceived threat posed by communist revolutionaries (Maullin, 1971, p. 82). Civil conflict persisted within Colombia throughout the late 20th century, and as Cold War came to a close the focus of aid shifted towards combating the drug trade, with particular attention paid to the reformulation of non-state militants as Narco-guerrilas (Leogrande, 2000). The political characterisation of military aid to Colombia transformed once again in the wake of 9/11, as a program designed to facilitate counter-terrorist operations (Tickner, 2003). While critics of US intervention may hold that the goals of military aid policy have remained largely similar, despite changes in advertising, the shifting policy justifications potentially obfuscate comparison. Such reformulations are the product not just of changing circumstances in the US, but also the dynamic of Colombian politics. Judging the effectiveness of military aid policy in this case would mean taking seriously pronouncements about the particular goals aid strategies hold at different times with reference to
different outcomes. Adding comparative cases, conceived under completely different circumstances, into this dynamic is thus potentially problematic as will be shown.

One of the other major recipients of US military aid in the contemporary history has been Egypt, and while the size and consistency of the aid it has received might make for an ostensibly interesting comparison with the experiences of Colombia, the political context illustrates a starkly different rationale. While both the British and American governments initially invested in the military capacity of the state to reinforce its internal security in the immediate post-war period in a similar fashion to Colombia (Sirrs, 2010, p. 24), the rise of Israel as a key US ally profoundly changed geostrategic perspectives on the region. The tensions made the Sinai one of the key fronts in the Cold War, with the US and the Soviet Union using military aid to support Israel and the Egypt respectively in what became a proxy balancing effort by the superpowers (Quandt, 1976, p. 5). This transformation itself would be only temporary, as the US used the promise of significant military aid transfers as an enticement for Sadat to enter an alliance with the US, leaving the Soviet Union with a substantial outstanding debt for its military investment in Egypt (United States Department of State, 2012, pp. 207-9). The tensions between Israel and Egypt persisted, and the character of US aid changed once again, as billions of dollars of transfers were granted relatively equally to both countries in an attempt to create a balance of power that deterred further conflict between two important allies over the next several decades (Sharp, 2010, p. 23).

A more recent and controversial case indicating a further distinctive motivation behind transfers can be seen in interactions with Muammar Gaddafi’s regime in Libya. In that case the US agreed to provide the necessary expertise in fixing Libya's fleet of aging c-130 military transport aircraft in return for approval for a vast new embassy complex in Tripoli (Wikileaks, 2009, p. Sec. 1). Similarly, Russia agreed to forgive outstanding debts on Libyan military purchases from the USSR, clearing the way for new arms deals, in return for potentially lucrative energy and infrastructure development contracts (Katz, 2008, p. 122). Such agreements with Gaddafi’s Libya were conceived neither to build a strong strategic partner, nor to quell an immediate threat to regional stability. Rather the process was a means to buy favour, or what Morgenthau categorises as simple bribery (Morgenthau, 1962).
The motivations behind aid policy are important to distinguish. Circumstances, priorities and personnel change over time and lead to the construction of a variety of framing rationales. This is particularly true of military aid as the program is a financial indication of strategic priorities through time. As per the observation from Cingranelli and Pasquarello invoked in the introduction aid decisions regarding “most favoured countries often involve national security interests, are nonroutine and controversial, and can probably be explained only on a case by case basis (1985, p.560).” Pakistan certainly fits this description. And while US aid policy to Pakistan in recent years has been framed as helping to build a secure and stable country (US Department of State, 2015), over the years it has shared characteristics with all three aid motivations listed above. Whilst also guarding against the methodological problems associated with comparison of cases that are ‘nonroutine’ or idiosyncratic (Kornprobst, 2007, p. 33) maintaining a single case study can help focus the research on outcomes of not just a single administration’s objectives, but of the accumulation of interventions over time.

This approach is of course not without its weaknesses as the commonly discussed issues relating to generalizability from a singular observation become apparent (Simons, 2015) (Carmel, 1999, p. 142). While it is far from established that generalisation cannot occur from a small set or singular observations (Ruddin, 2006, p. 799), selecting for extreme or deviant cases presents particular issues for generalisability (Seawright, J. & Gerring, J., 2008, pp. 301-302). Whilst comparing cases that are the product of unique historical, political or cultural circumstances is problematic, so too is attempting to understand an intervention only via the extreme cases of its deployment. A possible solution to the problem is to use a single observation that contains within it not only all the variables of interest to the study, or what Lijphart describes as the crucial case (Hooghe, L. & Marks, G., 2004, p. 415), but can also demonstrate variance on the dependent variable (Keohane, R et al., 1994, p. 108).

This means identifying a case that would reflect periods of time where a country has received military aid and, for comparison, a time when it has not and observing any differences in security outcomes for the population. With a structured investigative framework, this would allow for a certain degree of causative inference due to the ability to observe the same case with and without the dependent variable (Burnham, P. et al., 2008, p. 174). It also addresses the issue arising from comparing cases that might seem too contextually different to be comparable, as a one country focus maintains a certain degree consistency in historical, cultural, economic and political factors. This would seem as close an approximation to ‘natural experiment’ as would be possible in
macro, state-level analysis of the effectiveness of particular foreign policy strategies (Lee, 1989) (Hyde, 2007). Identifying a suitable candidate case is therefore a key aspect of the research design.

(2.5) CASE SELECTION: REGIONAL FACTORS DETERMINING SUITABILITY OF STUDY

Central Asia is increasingly becoming one of the key focus areas for studies of international security especially in relation to US foreign policy (Manyin, M.E. et. al, 2012). While there are many changes in the contemporary international history that have contributed to the future significance of the region, two factors in particular have played a major role. Firstly, the region has within it an intersection of three of the world’s largest emerging markets; Russia, China and India. Increasing interaction between rising powers on matters of security have raised questions for students of international relations as to the potential for tension in the region, as well as for enhanced cooperation (MacFarlane, 2006). New security relationships between economies of this size have given rise to questions about new structures of balancing against global US power and the various effects such a shift in international polarity might trigger (Goh, 2005) (Swaine, 2011) (Sutter, R.G. et. al., 2013). In particular, the Sino-US security relationship is commonly seen as the most important geo-strategic balance in the coming decades (Ikenberry, 2008) (Friedberg, 2005) (Kaplan, 2010) (Manyin, M.E. et. al, 2012). US foreign policy under Barack Obama has been popularly interpreted as reflecting an American ‘pivot’ from its historical focus on the Middle East towards China and wider Asia (Liberthal, 2011) (Manyin, M.E. et. al, 2012).

Using excess military capacity as a means of jockeying for position may become an increasingly common tactic among hegemons in areas of geopolitical contention. A central theme of post-Cold War international relations theory is the instrumentality of interdependence in maintaining relatively calm and stable relations between major powers (Stein, 1993) (Oneal, J.R. & Russett, B.M., 1999) (Keohane, R.O. & Nye, J.S., 2011). Increasing interdependence among major powers however has not equated to an end of ‘grand strategy’ or geostrategic manoeuvring (Kaplan, 2010) (Calder, 2012) (Scott, 2012) (Sutter, R.G. et. al., 2013). While it would seem clear that escalation of regional disputes into potential conflict scenarios is not in the interest of major powers, providing the types of strategic support listed may once again become an increasingly attractive means of
Indeed several commentators have observed that within conflicts such as Syria, a conflict largely defined by military assistance to proxy forces from external supporters, we find clues as to the future trends of 21st century conflict (Mumford, 2013) (Garton Ash, 2013). As Timothy Garton Ash put it, we may be ‘glimpsing the ghost of wars to come’ (Ibid). Regionally, several states in Asia are already tied to external supporters in a complex interconnected network of alliances. For example, as plans for the eventual withdrawal from Afghanistan by NATO forces were being drawn up in 2013, the difficulties of leaving an independent Afghan security state became apparent. Withdrawal plans were contingent on continued military assistance to maintain the 350,000 person security force that NATO forces have built and trained (Reuters, 2013). The United States had at this point, invested some $40 Billion in this process and will likely need to spend up to $6 Billion to maintain the force in coming years (Walt, 2013). Concerns within the Afghan government over continued support for the state’s internal security apparatus became clear as President Karzai’s push for an obligation of increasing military assistance pledges from India (Reuters, 2013). At the same time the Pakistani government, then facing the prospect of substantial reductions in the military aid it receives from the United States, sought to establish new strategic investment from China in large part due to the improving security relationship between India and Afghanistan (Reuters, 2012). The spectre of a potential power vacuum opening in central Asia after NATO withdrawal has also seen Russia boost its military aid programs to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012).

In short, the region has many intersecting interventions, and at the heart of many are transfers of strategic capacity from major military powers. Understanding the potential impact on recipient populations will be important for both policy and scholarship relating to the region, and for audiences critical of the logic of such interventions.
Pakistan presents a timely case for further exploration of the problem. Seen as a major faultline in regional security politics (Scobell, 2001, p. 13), it is the subject of the attention of many competing power brokers including the United States and China (Kronstadt, 2009, p. 49). While much of the recent attention given to the US-Pakistan security relationship has focused on ‘drone war’ in the North-West of the country, it is particularly suitable for the immediate study due to its receipt of substantial military aid packages in recent history. Since 1948, the United States has pledged some $30 Billion in direct aid to Pakistan, half of which came in the form of military aid (Kronstadt, K.A. & Epstein, S.B., 2013, p. i). Two thirds of this total has been appropriated since 2001 (Ibid.). In the period between 1989 and 2001 however, US aid to Pakistan drops significantly, ostensibly in light of tensions relating to Pakistan’s attempts at developing nuclear weapons, but more likely due to the end of the Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

![Graph of US Aid to Pakistan 1951-2011](centre_for_global_development_graph.png)

**Figure 1: US Aid to Pakistan 1951-2011. Source: (Centre for Global Development, 2012)**
This period of Pakistan’s history, in between the significant attention it received in the midst of Cold War geopolitics and the beginning of the United States’ ‘War on Terror’ provides a possibility for observing the effect of the absence of military aid while controlling for other factors. Not only is the study therefore geographically uniform, it is also temporally proximate. This means that the case provides not only a means of comparison that is contextually contiguous, but satisfies the fundamental need for the inclusion of negative or deviant cases that is seen to be the greatest weakness of small N case study research (Landman, 2004, p. 112). Of course, it is not possible to absolutely control for other explanatory possibilities, as internal political reality is fluid and any state can experience significant political, economic or cultural changes within such a lengthy time period. But to the extent possible, Pakistan’s recent history allows for the exploration of the effect of military aid’s absence and presence in two highly comparable scenarios.

(2.8) RESEARCH STRATEGY: STRUCTURED FOCUSED COMPARISON

The research strategy for the case study is therefore a within case comparative analysis of Pakistan’s recent strategic relationship with the US military aid program, with a contextual investigation of changes in human security within both time periods. In order to direct the research to the areas of most significance it will also be necessary to take steps to make both temporal sections comparable. A established method for effectively achieving this is George’s method of structured focused comparison (George, A.L. & McKeown, T.J., 1985).

Utilizing this method, the researcher derives a series of questions that reflect the research objective. This series of questions is then used to investigate each case being used for comparison, thus providing a uniform structure to enquiry that increases reliability but also maintains a focus on specific areas of interest. The method through which this focus is achieved is by deriving a question structure from a well-defined theoretical objective. As George and McKeown maintain, one of the main reasons that case studies fail to contribute to theory development is the lack of common focus, meaning different investigators seize on very different aspects of a case when no central hypothesis guides the research across different observations. The systematic nature of the data collection established under structured focused comparison has been highlighted by the
more positivist orientated scholarship as one of the few case study methods to hold the potential for making causal inferences (Keohane, R et al., 1994, p. 45).

This study seeks to establish whether a connection exists between threats to human security, in this case specifically arising from political violence, and perceptions of state legitimacy that arise when a government accepts and utilises foreign military assistance. As described in the introduction, the theoretical basis is formulated in under three central hypotheses:

1) Reliance on an external state for provision of security capacity may lead to challenges to authority of the state or the undermining of the state’s monopoly on the use of force.

2) Reliance on an external state for provision of security may raise questions of legitimacy amongst the public, fuelling widespread protest or political instability.

3) External support may facilitate a more proactive security state, leading to increased militarisation of security problems and potential increases in violence by the state. This may in turn fuel grievances and political legitimacy issues covered in hypotheses 1 and 2.

(2.8.1) QUESTION SERIES FOR CASE STUDY AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

The basis for the structured focused comparison will be a set of questions that target research towards investigating, and generating data relevant to, the above three hypotheses. The approach is ‘focused’ by the specific research objective determined by the theoretical approach, the basis for which will be elaborated on in the following chapter. Generating questions in advance of the case study will improve efficiency and provide a framework for enquiry. Applying the set of questions to both case studies in as similar a manner as possible will maximise compatibility and thus yield the most useful data for comparative analysis, and ultimately, hypothesis testing.

The questions that form the structure of the case studies are laid out below. They are designed not just to maximise the effectiveness and utility of the research, but also to provide a structural basis for a mixed methods approach. Sections 1 and 2 will provide an account of the political context in which security issues affecting both states are situated, utilising existing historical accounts, scholarship, declassified archival
records and media reporting. Section 3 and 4 will introduce data on military aid and political violence, which will be the anchor points for analysis of bilateral strategic relations, as well as an analysis of the distribution of insecurity in Pakistan within each time period.

The structure for the comparative analysis (Chapter 6) is also established below. This question series is designed to locate and extract the most relevant data from both case studies suitable for testing the hypotheses. The central comparative mechanism will be an illustration of the changes in military aid and security over time, comparing transfers of aid against a variety of security indicators. The indicators are selected for their relevance to the concerns outlined in each hypothesis and relate to a variety of different aspects of political violence and civil disorder (Islamist militancy, riots, state violence). Together, both the case study and comparative analysis chapters will deliver a context heavy understanding of how security in Pakistan has evolved along with fluctuations in US military aid in recent history.

**Section 1) What is the security context for the recipient state?**

- What *domestic* political developments are influencing security priorities? What institutions govern security policy? How are they changed by domestic political developments over the time period?
- How does the state interact with the *international* security environment? What strategic priorities exist? What is the nature of the political relationship with the donating state?

**Section 2) What is the security context for the donating state in relation to the recipient?**

- What are the *international* factors guiding the donating state’s foreign security policy? What relationship does the recipient state have to the security priorities of the donating state in the time period? What are the underlying goals of aid policy (either its execution or suspension)?
- What *domestic* factors contribute to the state’s security priorities? How is justification for aid expenditure crafted politically?

**Section 3) What are the characteristics of military aid policy in the time period?**

- What are the aims of military aid policy (execution or suspension)?
• What are the components of military aid? How much is the program estimated to have cost financially? What material transfers of equipment are known to have occurred?
• What are the characteristics of the recipient state’s defence expenditure? How much of a proportion of defence expenditure is foreign military aid?
• Are other states delivering strategic assistance to the recipient state? How do the donor state’s transfers compare to volumes from other states?

Section 4) Human Security: What are the characteristics, levels and trends of violence experienced by the population in the time period?

• What are the macro level trends in political violence within the time period?
• What are the main sources of insecurity? What are the political conditions leading to outbreaks of violence or sustained instability?
• How is violence distributed geographically? What types of violence affect different areas?
• What proportions of violence are different groups responsible for? Which actors does the data indicate are the largest drivers of insecurity in the time period?

Structure for Comparative Analysis

Following both case studies, the comparative analysis chapter will draw together findings to assess changes in a variety of indicators across the two time periods that are relevant to the hypotheses of the study.

Testing Hypothesis One: Reliance on an external state for provision of security capacity may lead to challenges to authority of the state or the undermining of the state’s monopoly on the use of force.

• How do levels of non-state actor violence (ethnic, sectarian, Islamist etc.) change over time in relation to levels of military aid?
• Is there any positive or negative correlations between violence and levels of aid?
• What are the political contexts for those changes across both time periods?
• Is there evidence of a causative relationship between levels of aid and levels of violence?

Testing Hypothesis Two: Reliance on an external state for provision of security may raise questions of legitimacy amongst the public, fuelling widespread protest or political instability.

• How do levels of popular unrest (riots, violent political demonstrations) change over time in relation to levels of military aid?
• Is there any positive or negative correlations between this instability and levels of aid?
• What are the political contexts for those changes across both time periods?
• Is there evidence of a causative relationship between levels of aid and levels of violence?

External support may facilitate a more proactive security state, leading to increased militarisation of security problems and potential increases in violence by the state

• How do levels of state violence (military, paramilitary, police) change over time in relation to levels of military aid?
• Is there any positive or negative correlations between this instability and levels of aid?
• What are the political contexts for those changes across both time periods?
• Is there evidence of a causative relationship between levels of aid and levels of violence?
As will be elaborated on in the following chapter, a restricted interpretation of human security will be utilised that primarily focuses on rates of political violence experienced by the Pakistani population in the time period. The main source for data on political violence comes from the BFRS dataset (Bueno de Mesquita, E.B. et al., 2013) which stands as one of the most extensive studies of political violence in Pakistan in recent history. The dataset is compiled entirely from Pakistan’s largest English language newspaper, ‘Dawn’ (ibid.). Multiple sources are used to corroborate individual incidents where possible, but the accounts within Dawn act as the main body of information in the dataset. This approach is advantageous as not only is there a consistent source of reportage throughout the time period, it is an English language newspaper with a reputation for being amongst the most editorially independent in the country (Rasul, A. & Proffitt, J.M., 2013, p. 599).

However, while the information derived from this thorough investigation is extremely useful for any scholar carrying out research into security in Pakistan, there are some important corollaries that must be established from the outset in relation to a) who is counting b) how they are counting. These observations have significant implications for the kinds of conclusions that might be taken from the general trends observed in the time period.

Firstly, the question of who is counting. While Dawn has a reputation for independence and a demonstrable capacity for criticising sitting governments, it does not sit outside elite media structures and is a subsidiary of one of only five companies that monopolized print media up until 2002 (Rasul, A. & Proffitt, J.M., 2013, p. 599). Indeed, the Herald group of which it is a part was established by Pakistan’s founding father, Muhammad Ali Jinnah (Rasul, A. & McDowell, S.D., 2012, p. 8). While in its contemporary form it is seen as independent, the paper has been a significant actor in Pakistani politics, using its power to support particular parties and agendas (Mezzera, M. & Sial, S., 2010, p. 16) (Rasul, A. & McDowell, S.D., 2012, p. 8). This means that the characterisation of political violence in media reporting is subject to ‘filtration’ (Herman, E.S.& Chomsky, N., 1994) due to the scope for interpretation or misrepresentation of violent acts or actors that are essentially political in nature. Pakistani news organisations are, more generally, subject to censorship from the strict controls that have been implemented by various governments (Pakistan has consistently ranked in the bottom decile of the Press Freedom Index) which curb the ability of the press to report on stories that might prove
controversial. For example, ‘The Special Power’ that allowed the state to prevent publication of stories held to be ‘prejudicial’, or the sections of the penal code which state that:

> “spoken or written words, visible representations that do anything which is likely to be prejudicial to the interests of the security of Pakistan or public order or to the maintenance of friendly relations of Pakistan with foreign states shall be punishable” (Siraj, 2009, p. 45).

Perhaps understandably then, the press have demonstrated an inclination towards self-censorship when reporting on the actions of the military (Mezzera, M. & Sial, S., 2010, p. 32). This self-censorship can be seen as both reflective of the historical centrality of the military in Pakistan’s cultural identity and also as an indication of the savviness of the military as a media actor in its own right. The military is the largest source of advertising for print media, accounting for 30% of all revenue (Dickinson, R. & Memon, B., 2011, p. 621). The military and its press wing, Inter Services Press Relations (ISPR) are also one of the only sources of information on a range of state matters and thus wield the ability to lock out access for particular organisations (Mezzera, M. & Sial, S., 2010, pp. 32-33). The ISPR not only acts to supply news, but also acts as a monitor of print media, television and radio (Yusuf, 2011, p. 105). On the civilian side, it is understood that the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting maintains a sizeable fund for bribing journalists (Ibid, p.106). Corruption is a serious problem, particularly in rural areas where journalists are known to be recipients of substantial amount of paid influence from commercial as well as ethnic, religious and sectarian groups (Dickinson, R. & Memon, B., 2011, p. 621).

This leads to the secondary observation; how violence is counted in Pakistani media. Not only are journalists restricted by the political-media structure of the state, they face restrictions in the form of threats to their personal safety. An estimated 66% of the population live in rural Pakistan (UNICEF, 2012) where there exists a less developed media infrastructure (Siraj, 2009, p. 44). Areas that have seen subject to sustained military action or are under the control of militant non-state actors as in parts of Balochistan, Kashmir or FATA are particularly dangerous to outsiders despite being epicentres for political violence. Such areas are notorious for ‘disappearances’ and brutal killings of perceived enemies of the state or terrorist sympathisers (The Guardian, 2011). In 2010 and 2011, the final years accounted for by the BFRS dataset, Pakistan was described by Reporters without Borders as the deadliest country in the world for journalists for two years running with 15 reported deaths (CNN, 2011). The ability of the media therefore, to penetrate into areas of the country
experiencing some of the most sustained political violence is seriously curtailed by personal insecurity

(Dickinson, R. & Memon, B., 2011, p. 621)

Finally, while there is good evidence to explain the geographic clustering of political violence around the urban centres of Pakistan, there is also the potential for these areas to reflect a higher, or more accurate account of violence, due to the higher density of media professionals in those areas. The tendency towards increasing political violence levels over the years in Pakistan may be partially explained by gradual improvements in the communication infrastructure within the country allowing more consistent access to areas not considered safe for journalists (Siraj, 2009, p. 44).

(2.10) MILITARY AID: DATA AND RELEVANT AGENCIES

Under the United States’ Foreign Military Sales Act (FMSA) foreign countries are eligible to procure defence equipment, services and training from the US government or private industry, as well as US guarantees for private loans, to purchase these goods and services (Brzoska, 1983, p. 272). Under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the State Department was given the remit of overseeing the implementation of aid programs for foreign militaries (Serafino, 2008, p. 11). Most military aid comes in the form of grants rather than loans taking the form of either direct transfers of equipment, or transfers of cash with the specific function of helping purchase equipment (Tarnoff, C. & Lawson, M.L, 2011, p. 23). The three central mechanisms through which aid and grants are delivered are Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and the International Military Education and Training program (IMET) (Ibid). While the State Department oversees the implementation of these programs, they are carried out by the Department of Defense by one of its own sub agencies, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) (Serafino, 2008, p. 11).

The DCSA, as the central avenue of official military aid disbursement since 1984, has established regulations that set out the basic criteria governing what equipment and services can be provided to foreign states and on what grounds (DSCA, 2009, p. 1). Parameters include:

- The prime contractor must be a U.S. supplier or manufacturer, incorporated or licensed to do business in the United States.
- Purchase agreements should be made directly with the manufacturer of the defense article service, if possible. The prime contractor is expected to add value to the product being sold.

- In order for a DCC to be approved for FMF funding, the defense articles purchased must be manufactured and assembled in the United States, or the defense services purchased must be performed by U.S. manufacturers and suppliers, purchased from U.S. manufacturers or suppliers, and composed of U.S.-origin materiel, components, goods, and services (hereafter “U.S. content”).

Beyond the Department of Defence’s own guidelines on what can or cannot be transferred, foreign military transfers must meet the legal requirements set out under the Export Administration Act (EAA) and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). The primary purpose of both acts is, as per Sievert’s description (Sievert, 2002, p. 1989)

- to restrict the sale of scarce materials, to utilize exports to further U.S. foreign policy, and
- to advance the primary and overriding interest of protecting our national security.

DCSA also oversees the design and implementation of International Military Education and Training (IMET), which offer foreign military personnel the opportunity to attend US military training and education facilities (Serafino, 2008, p. 11). These programs are also privy to regulations established by the AECA (Defence Institute of Security Assistance Management, 2014).

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, existing means of providing support for foreign military partners were supplemented by the Defense Appropriations Act of 2002, which established Coalition Support Funds (CSF) as a means of financing military operations conducted by partners in the ‘war on terror’. The fund was ostensibly available to all 49 nations making up the ‘coalition of the willing’ to which Pakistan has been a substantial recipient (US GAO, 2008, p. 19). As a source of funding aimed to directly to support US military operations, CSF comes under the direct authority of the Department of Defense, rather than the Department of State, and is thus not classed as foreign assistance (Congressional Research Service, 2015).

Along with these formal avenues for the provision of military aid through the Department of Defence, the US also maintains an array of strategies for the provision of clandestine aid, which do not have to conform to the
above regulatory structures (Lobel, 1986). For example the CIA facilitated the acquisition of a huge body of small arms for Pakistan in the period in question that were destined for Afghanistan (Yousaf, M. & Adkin, M., 1992, p. 83) (HRW, 1994, p. 9), about which only very limited information is available. It is therefore not possible to have an exhaustive account of US military aid to Pakistan in the given time period.

Public data on overt transfers of military aid are available primarily from the US Department of State, the Department of Defense and US AID. Information on aid has been collected consistently since 1945 within USAID’s ‘Green book’, the annual report to congress of all US overseas loans and grants (USAID, 2015). The dataset’s information on military aid accumulates economic data from the primary State Department programs, FMF, FMS and IMET. The Department of Defence and Defence Security Cooperation Agency carry contextual information on approved licences for export and commercial weapons transfers (Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 2015) (United States Department of State, 2011). The Stockholm Institute for Peace Research has also catalogued most publically available data on arms transfers by major producers and consumers in recent history and have a substantial record of the equipment donated and sold to Pakistan by the US within the case study time period (SIPRI, 2014 a).

Information about more ambiguous transfers such as those derived from the Coalition Support Funds can be acquired from a variety of sources, with the Congressional Research Service and the Government Accountability Office providing particularly good reportage (Congressional Research Service, 2015) (US GAO, 2008). While few reliable sources exist for covert transfers of either financing or equipment, some contextual information can be gleaned from sources such as WikiLeaks (BBC, 2010 a) and good investigative reporting (Scahill, 2009) (The Guardian, 2011).

(2.11) CONCLUSION

By using Pakistan in a within-case comparative analysis, this investigation takes advantage of relatively unique conditions that present a research opportunity analogous to an experiment. Two case studies illustrating two periods of time where large aid transfers are recorded, and times where they have been embargoed, will be presented to illustrate the differing political contexts within which aid policy is determined for both recipient
and donor. Applying an identical set of questions to both case studies will keep the empirical research focused on similar areas in the two time periods, allowing for maximum compatibility. It will also however, allow for exploration of insecurity in two ostensibly separate cases, revealing how different security priorities relate to different administrations and political conditions. It will also assess the perceivable extent to which foreign military aid or its absence affects those priorities. Both case studies will be drawn together in the comparative analysis, assessing them within the framework of the three guiding hypotheses. This will give an indication as to whether data and contextual evidence support the predicted changes in security conditions in the relevant areas.

The fluctuations in US military aid to Pakistan in its recent history allow for observation of the impact of donation and withdrawal of support on a range of factors that such aid can be theorised to affect. For this study, the hypothesis has centred on the potential increases in political violence relating to state and non-state actors, as well as potential disturbances from the wider population in the form of riots and violent political demonstrations. This is both the result of the restrictions in available data, which necessarily produce a fairly broad understanding of changes in the security of the population, and also due to the theoretical basis for the research. Human security is a broad concept that is not easily operationalised for the purposes of either proscriptive policy, or academic research. An attempt to restrict the definition has been necessary in order to operationalise the term in a useful manner. For the purposes of this study, human security is understood in a ‘vital core’ of fundamental survival needs (Alkire, 2003). To the extent possible, the study will illustrate broad changes in areas related to this core conception, via available data and a contextual situation of that data. The rationale for this approach, in terms of the theoretical construction and application of human security, will be established in the following chapter.
CHAPTER 3

THEORY FRAMEWORK: OPERATIONALISING HUMAN SECURITY THROUGH CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES

(3.1) INTRODUCTION

The question of what to measure when investigating the impact of policy is a fundamental one. Early decisions about what indicators to utilise or what types of data to gather will determine the political framing and utility of the results. In this thesis, human security has been adopted as the framework for assessing US military aid policy in Pakistan. This chapter will establish the rationale for this particular approach, considering the many other types of indicators that could be used to gauge the success of this type of foreign intervention. It will attempt to posit the research in a theoretical overlap between the ambiguous normative outlook of the human security concept, and the more practical orientation of emancipatory focused critical security studies scholarship. Both views have in common the determination that true security comes in the form of freedom from threat. This perspective will be harnessed to provide a guide for measuring security in the case of Pakistan, and thus the extent to which military aid is effective in providing it.

The first section will establish the historical development of the concept of human security. It will argue that many of the values of human security have already been internalised in the policy language of states that have invoked principles such as Responsibility to Protect, which includes the US. This makes a prima facie case for the legitimacy of using human security as a framework for assessing foreign policy at a general level.

The second and third sections will deal with locating human security within the wider landscape of theories of international politics and security. It will draw the parallels between human security and the emancipatory focus of certain strands of critical security studies. While the potential for an integration of approaches is highlighted, the deep concerns other theoretical perspectives maintain over the analytic or prescriptive utility of human security will also be made clear.

The final sections will deal with the operationalization of the concept for research on foreign policy. It will outline the strengths in adopting a restricted view of human security that focuses on ‘vital core’ as a
commonality bridging a wide variety of research into conflict and instability. It will establish the immediate study as an attempt to hybridise this restricted, policy centric vision, with the emancipatory logic of welsh school approaches that will aim to deliver a critical, yet policy focused, appraisal of the human security impacts of US military aid programs in Pakistan.

(3.2) A DE FACTO SECURITY PARADIGM? SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY POST COLD WAR

While the ‘conventional view’ (Garrett, 1998, p. 71) of the globalising era is of a normalisation of political economic perspectives that minimize or challenge the centrality of the state (Christie, 2010, p. 172) (Hirst, 1997, p. 409) (Fukuyama, F., & Bloom, A., 1989), mainstream perspectives of state relations to international security have also changed substantially, albeit at a slower pace (Christie, 2010, p. 172). As the bipolar era of the Cold War ended, the focus of mainstream debate reoriented away from issues of strategic competition between the superpowers to ‘new wars’, referring to the apparent increase in the volume of civil conflicts globally (Kaldor, 2005) (Melander, E., Oberg, M. & Hall, J., 2006). Although the empirical basis for such an interpretation has faced serious challenge (Melander, E., Oberg, M. & Hall, J., 2006) (Newman, 2004), the growth in its popularity reflected shifting perspectives in international norms (Barkin, J. S., & Cronin, B., 1994, pp. 125-127). The dominance of realism, secure in its position throughout a bi-polar era that regarded sovereignty as the primary constitutive rule of international organisation, began to face challenges from various international relations theory perspectives (Lebow, 1994). In particular, proponents of Liberal Peace, Just War Theory and Cosmopolitanism amongst others, would question whether we would witness a ‘rolling back of the state’, such as was perceived in the political and economic spheres of the globalising world, with reference to reorganisation of the concept of sovereignty away from the state towards individual persons (Richmond, 2004, p. 133) (Malmvig, 2001, p. 251). This would be the context for a new conceptualisation of international security utilizing the person, rather than the state, as its referent object.

In the Cold War era, the state was ‘reified’ within its borders, which provided the capacity for tremendous internal repression, domination and even genocide without significant threat of outside intervention (Barkin, J. S., & Cronin, B., 1994, pp. 125-6). The fragility of international relations between the superpowers meant that
the idea of intervening in conflicts for the purposes of humanitarian defence was almost inconceivable within the parlance of realism (Lebow, 1994, pp. 276-7). Indeed within the period there are very limited cases of such operations being attempted. The interventions of India in East Pakistan, Vietnam in Cambodia and Tanzania in Uganda are regarded as the few genuine Cold War era humanitarian military interventions (Shraga, 2011, p. 20) (Seybolt, 2007) (Walzer, 2002) (Finnemore, 1996). These actions were regarded with open hostility by many states in the international arena (Finnemore, 1996) due to the potential for undermining sovereignty, or the strategic upset involved in the downfall of allied or neutral regimes. More importantly as Walzer has argued, had the Security Council been called into session on any of these cases it almost certainly would have decided against authorisation for intervention due to great-power opposition (Walzer, 2002, p. 4). As Barnett maintains, the UN’s predisposition at this time was to favour the sovereign rights of states in situations of internal repression or ethnic conflict (Barnett, 1997, p. 565). The approach reflected the deep-seated contradiction in the UN Charter that holds the organisation responsible for upholding the universal rights of peoples while also professing adherence to a guiding principle of non-interference in internal affairs (Ibid). As such, while moral appeals were made in diplomatic discussions (Finnemore, 1996), in each case mentioned above, the intervening parties framed the justification for their actions in the context of their own national security (Seybolt, 2007, p. 9) or the need to support the self determination of peoples from neo-colonial expansionism (Finnemore, 1996).

As the Cold War came to an end, it became clear that the barriers towards interventions of a political, economic or military nature by the remaining major powers, could be substantially lowered (Barkin, J. S., & Cronin, B., 1994, p. 126). For realists attempting to reconceptualise international relations in a new multi-polar era, the potential fallout from the lack of deterrent restrictions held potential for heightened distrust, new arms races and the proliferation of major conflict (Valentino, 2001, p. 61)(Mearsheimer, 1990). Critics of this interpretation countered the argument with the observation that, to the contrary, it was security communities, of the kind described by Karl Deutsch in 1957, that were proliferating by the end of the century (Lebow, 1994) (Adler, 2008). Indeed throughout the 1990’s, a security community born out of the Helsinki Process, would grow to successfully encompass NATO, the EU through to the Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) and even reach parts of the middle east (Adler, 2008, p. 197). Such communities were seen as the predictable consequence of a normalisation of political and economic standards across many states in the
context of a globalised world. While, as discussed above, the classical centrality of the state was facing challenge in popular political ideology, in international security the state would no longer be seen as a lone actor in the anarchic world characterised by bi-polarity, but as a node in a network that reflected a functional international community (Begby, E. & Burgess, J.P., 2009, p. 91).

The gradual shift in the interpretation of both security and sovereignty was reflected in several hallmark pieces of literature produced by NGOs over the course of the post-Cold War period. Among the most prominent documents in the early years was the United Nations Development Programme’s Human Security Report entitled ‘New Dimensions in Human Security’ produced in 1994 (UNDP, 1994). While the idea of developing a human security framework to rival national security was not new, the UNDP’s report provided a platform for discussion. It problematized security in a new light by positing, ‘a secure state, untroubled by contested territorial boundaries could still be inhabited by insecure people’ (Thomas, N. & Tow, W.T., 2002, p. 178). As the UNDP report maintained:

“The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust. It has been related more to nation states than to people....Human security is a universal concern. It is relevant to people everywhere, in rich nations and poor. There are many threats common to all people- such as unemployment, drugs, crime, pollution and human rights violations. Their intensity may differ from one part of the world to another, but all these threats to human security are real and growing (UNDP, 1994, p. 22).”

This interpretation of ‘human sovereignty’ in contemporary international politics would influence many responses to international crises. The guiding principles enshrined in the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ report subsequently produced by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) maintain that sovereignty should be seen in relative terms, taking priority in all cases except for those when a host state proves unwilling or unable to provide protection to civilians within its territory (ICISS, 2001). The fundamental shift in attitude was in the attempt to reconceive sovereignty in terms of responsibility rather
than rights, both in terms of potential interveners and the intervened (ICISS, 2001, p. 3). If a state cannot live up to its ‘responsibilities’, namely the provision of a basic standard of political and socio-economic protection, that state may no longer be considered to exercise ‘legitimate’ authority and thus can potentially lose the sovereignty otherwise protected under Article 2.1 of the UN Charter (ICISS, 2001, pp. XI, 7, 55). While the report is clear in its intent to emphasize responsibilities in security discourse, ‘rights’ do still make a centrally important contribution, being discussed in reference to the ‘right to protection’ enjoyed by individuals in any state (Chandler, 2004, p. 64). This basic premise found international recognition through Kofi Annan’s description of “Two Concepts of Sovereignty” in the aftermath of NATO’s operation in Kosovo:

“State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined—not least by the forces of globalisation and international co-operation. States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa. At the same time individual sovereignty—by which I mean the fundamental freedom of each individual, enshrined in the charter of the UN and subsequent international treaties—has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights. When we read the charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse them (Annan, 1999).”

Human security has acted as a basic organising principle for Responsibility to Protect, as the principles that have informed its own development have normalised R2P’s understanding of the adequate execution of a state’s security responsibilities to sub-state populations and individuals (Wheeler, 2005, p. 98). Human Security, for the ICISS, concerned “people - their physical safety, their economic and social well-being, respect for their dignity and worth as human beings, and the protection of their human rights and fundamental freedoms (ICISS, 2001, p. 15).” In terms of sovereignty, this included recognition that “the security of people against threats to life, health, livelihood, personal safety and human dignity - can be put at risk by external aggression, but also by factions within a country, including “security” forces (Ibid.).” The language is at many points indistinguishable from that of the Human Security literature.
However, the extent to which a concept of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ or any existing iteration of human security has been, or indeed can be, successfully operationalized in the international system continues to be debated (Charap, 2013) (Welsh, 2011) (Badescu, C.G.& Bergholm, L., 2009) (Focarelli, 2008). The contention for the purposes of this thesis is that while a prescriptive vision of human security may be far from established, consistent interest in its capabilities as a policy assessment tool have reformulated the concept as something more akin to a school of enquiry for research on insecurity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central Tenets of Human Security</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Economic security (e.g., freedom from poverty);</td>
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<td>• Food security (e.g., access to food);</td>
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<td>• Health security (e.g., access to health care and protection from diseases);</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Environmental security (e.g., protection from such dangers as environmental pollution and depletion);</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Personal security (e.g., physical safety from such things as torture, war, criminal attacks, domestic violence, drug use)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Community security (e.g., survival of traditional cultures and ethnic groups as well as the physical security of these groups)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Political security (e.g., enjoyment of civil and political rights, and freedom from political oppression)</td>
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(Paris, 2001)
(3.3) FROM LIBERAL THEORY TO INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE

Historically, liberal IR traditions have been sympathetic to the underlying principles of a broader conceptualisation of individual or sub state sovereignty. Whether in the guise of Mill’s attempts at locating the most basic parameters for security that a liberal state could be understood to guarantee, to the Kantian or Wilsonian visions of popular sovereignty as guarantor of international peace (Franceschet, 2000), the liberal IR heritage has provided a base for the understanding of security through the individual. Indeed, the spectrum of debate regarding liberal conceptualisations of international sovereignty is reflected in the competing visions of human security itself even with liberal IR.

The UN and its subsidiaries have played a significant role in the diffusion of human rights centric norms that benchmark state behaviour in the international system. In particular, the organisation which did the most to popularise the concept of human security, the UNDP, has excelled at providing a broad framework for aligning liberal values with tangible policy guidelines. The UNDP has managed to maintain the broad conceptualisation of human security in the construction of international development goals and standards. In particular, in contrast to many contemporary attempts at operationalization of human security (including this study, as will be discussed further below) that have attempted hone the policy relevance by focusing on a narrow ‘vital core’ of security concerns that emphasize ‘freedom from fear’ concerns, the UNDP has been relatively steadfast in its association of security with questions of economic development.

Consistent throughout the 1993 Vienna Declaration, the Millennium Development goals, and now the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development has been the framing of targets simultaneously in the language of both rights and security (UNDP, 2015). The strong link between the UN institutional understanding of development, and the vision of security reflected in human security’s ‘freedom from want’ is consistently reinforced by agencies such as the UNDP. As Mary Robinson noted in the
introduction to the UNDP’s 2003 ‘Poverity Reduction and Human Rights’ practice note: “I am often asked what is the most serious form of human rights violations in the world today, and my reply is consistent: extreme poverty (Alston, 2005, p. 786).” From the perspective of many institutional proponents of human rights, political freedoms are thus synonymous with economic development.

However, as stated above, the tension between different conceptualisations, and the extent to which both freedom from fear and freedom from want are realisable policy prescriptions not only reflects a division in perceptions of the innate practicalities of human security, but the more basic division between different constructs of international liberalism itself. The catalogue of responsibilities for provision of rights to citizens necessitated by the broad vision of ‘freedom from want’ necessitates a particular vision not just of specific development metrics, but for political and economic philosophy.

At a domestic level, even within the most developed countries, the debate between different visions of liberal economics is large enough to be one of the key demarcation points in left/right political establishments, evidenced perhaps most starkly in debates in recent years between proponents of austerity or stimulus as a response to economic crisis (Talbot, 2016, p. 1). Concepts that follow from this broad construction of rights such as the ‘privatisation of rights’ or the ‘internationalisation of responsibility’ attract controversy even with the confines of the liberal IR discipline (Alston, 2005). Negotiation of this division while developing prescriptive policy would seem to be one of the key challenges for any singular vision of human security that could be constructed at the international institutional level, and as such, is one of the key areas for criticism seized upon by the more sceptical and critical IR scholarship, as will be discussed in the following sections. While the area for debate on the workability of human security may be substantial, institutions such as the UNDP would appear to have a mandate for constructing broad, far reaching policy aims due to the somewhat ‘aspirational’ quality of the institutions and their objectives (Petersmann, 2001, p. 6) (Botcheva, L. & Martin, L.L., 2001, p. 12). It is thus unsurprising policy relating to the protection of rights and
freedoms of the individual become narrowed in their translation from the level of international institutions to the level of states.

As perhaps demonstrated in Risse, Ropp and Sikkink’s attempts to trace the diffusion rights related norms from international to domestic policy, following the diverse body of rights established within various UN frameworks is an extraordinarily difficult task, necessitating a narrowing of focus to yield useful insight. The framing for their particular enquiry is instructive:

“The Universal Declaration of Human Rights contains thirty articles detailing diverse rights from the right to life, to the right to work, and the right to rest and leisure. Because we could not evaluate progress on all these rights, we chose a central core of rights - the right to life (which we define as the right to be free from extrajudicial execution and disappearance) and the freedom from torture and arbitrary arrest and detention. By choosing to focus on these rights we do not suggest that other rights in the declaration are unimportant. But these basic “rights of the person” have been the most accepted as universal rights, and not simply rights associated with a particular political ideology or system (Risse, T., Ropp, S. and Sikkink, K., 1999, p. 2).”

As will be discussed in relation to institutional attempts at a similar narrowing of human security to ‘core’ concepts (Alkire, 2003), a certain degree of streamlining would appear to be ineluctable within academic and policy constructions in order to define a body of metrics to indicate diffusion or successful adoption. And while the process of prioritisation of ‘rights’ or ‘freedoms’ may be an area of strong ethical debate, this reorientation can still be understood to be occurring within an overarching liberal framework by simply reflecting ‘broad versus narrow’ conceptualiations of security (Chandler, 2012). But while it can be argued that the concept of human security can be discovered amongst the various aspirational institutions states such as the US have endorsed, to what extent can a shift to a prioritisation of invidual or sub—state sovereignty be seen to have been formally adopted at the level of foreign policy?
The answer is, only in a fairly ambiguous manner. While states such as Japan, Sweden and Canada have made human security an explicit framework for the development of foreign policy, the United States has for the most part avoided invoking the concept directly in relation to policy. Even R2P, which has been constructed here as the narrower, less controversial successor to human security as the conceptualisation of a cosmopolitan foreign security policy, has eluded explicit endorsement. As Morris notes, while some proponents of R2P saw in 2011 Libyan intervention a US endorsement of its principles, the divisions within the Obama administration, the stressing of the individual circumstances of the case by the President, and the lack of clear R2P language within US submissions to the Security Council suggest otherwise. The US has tended to avoid explicit invocation of either human security’s broad normative framework, or the more narrow instrumental prescription found in R2P (Morris, 2013).

As has been discussed previously, the US does however tend to conceptualise its foreign policy in terms of increasing the security of the populations, indicating an appreciation for some of the broad principles, if not a clear endorsement of them. In his reformulation of US security aid policy as ‘helping others to help themselves’ then Secretary of Defence Robert Gates stated that foreign security assistance was not just a question of building military capacity, but ‘police, the justice system, and other governance and oversight mechanisms’ to support macro security gains for partner states as opposed to merely strategically expedient ones (Gates, 2010). Human rights are now a much vaunted part of International Military Education Training (IMET) program to that extent that the US has withheld military aid from specific military battalions that have accused of human rights abuses until such time as those units can be retrained (The Telegraph, 2010). Highlighting the specific role of human rights considerations in determining the distribution of military aid, Assistant Secretary of State Andrew Shapiro wrote in 2012 that:
“Making arms transfer decisions requires a significant focus on human rights and democracy. These have never been more central to U.S. foreign policy, and as a result they play a crucial role in determining the manner of our security assistance (Shapiro, 2012, p. 30).”

In terms of the analytical framework presented here, the explicit endorsement or lack thereof is not a determining factor in the utility of human security. Indeed, such a proposition would contradict the rationale for developing this set of principles in order to identify populations that were under threat from their violation. Rather it has been argued here that enough of a consensus exists within the international community regarding the utility of these core principles as indicators of population security for it to be an appropriate framework for studying specific aspects of foreign policy. As Richmond notes,

“Peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and reconstruction are activities now closely associated with liberal state-building, and in this context human security has become a validating concept of the overall project’s goals, even though many international actors working in non-civil-society-oriented areas would not use this term to describe their work (Richmond, 2006, p. 459).”

However, as shall be seen in the following sections, this argument is contested. The basic utility of this approach is questioned by a variety of theory perspectives in international relations, ranging from those that critique the broadening of concepts of security at a strategic level, to those that challenge the more fundamental aspects of this liberal framework for understanding security.
One of the most consistent critiques of the concept relates to its operationalisability. This type of criticism can take many different forms and arises from a variety of theoretical perspectives. One type of observation posits that introducing issues of human development, such as poverty and human rights violations, would act to dilute the focus on traditionally defined sources of threat i.e. the material capabilities through which the security of a state and its population can be undermined (Thomas, N. & Tow, W.T., 2002) (Buzan, 2004). This might be seen as particularly dangerous in zero-sum calculations of national security infrastructure development, as outlays in one area necessarily mean diverting resources from others (Paris, 2001, pp. 89,92).

As the threats outlined under human security approaches are understood by to reflect an explicitly normative basis, many realist orientated scholars reject the notion that states could or would incorporate such principles into negotiation of the international environment (Tarry, 1999). Cultural rights or environmental concerns for instance, even when accepted to be issues that can effect national security, are not seen as having their prospects for improvement expedited through a reclassification into the realm of security (Levy, 1995, p. 61). Implementing treaty obligations that would make such norms enforceable would be problematic as, for realists, state behaviour is governed by three basic material concerns; power, sovereignty and territorial integrity (Hyde-Price, 2007).

Roland Paris’ provocatively titled critique ‘Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air’ is perhaps amongst the most well discussed neorealist treatments of the subject, precisely because it takes head on the problems around workability (Pettman, 2005, p. 144). Paris observes that human security is like sustainable development, ‘everyone is for it but few people have a clear idea of what it means’. It is an important point of analysis, as a consistent criticism levelled at the human security literature is that it is merely an international development or human rights strategy posing as a security concept (Buzan, 2004) (Krause, 2004) (Turner, M., Cooper, N. & Pugh, M., 2011, pp. Section 2, Para. 5). Despite the title, Paris maintains that human security has successfully united a diverse group of states, NGOs and international organisations in a manner that has
delivered practical outcomes such as the negotiation of the land mines convention (ibid., p. 102) but can only be expected to do so within a framework that guides research and policy making into specific areas of security.

This raises the secondary and perhaps more substantial problem. As human security challenges the very notion of state sovereignty by asserting the individual person or sub national collective as the referent object (Buzan, 2004) (Newman, 2010, p. 78), it is effectively dismissing the conception of international order that most clearly defines realist theories of IR. For many realists, it is unlikely that states would voluntarily limit their own authority or make themselves subservient to organisations in a manner that undermines sovereignty, as the international environment, by its nature, severely punishes such behaviour (Grico, 1999, p. 12). There may be cases, for example in the European Union, where states make trade-offs in terms of adhering to common principles and regulations, in order to reap greater rewards in the long run i.e. with access to the common market for their own industries. Both classical and structural realism conceive of compliance as ‘coincident with the path dictated by self-interest’ in a world of relative state power (Hathaway, 2002, p. 1946). The prospect of states voluntarily adhering to common standards in human, political or socio-economic rights in a manner that is not only effective, but enforceable by international organisations, is therefore seen as incongruent with the anarchic system states inhabit (Gilpin, 1986, p. 321).

While critical theorists find use for the contributions of realism in assessing the potential for broadening and deepening, neorealism’s dogmatic fixation with the narrow interpretation of security has seen a substantial amount of criticism in the Post-Cold War era (Lebow, 1994) (Moolakkattu, 2009) (Collard-Wexler, 2006). It’s nomothetic approach to global security has been undermined by the significant changes witnessed in how states, institutions and communities view security (Moolakkattu, 2009, p. 446). Examples such as the integrationist approach of the EU continue to cause problems for a theory perspective that insists on a degree of universalism in the behaviour of actors in the international system. As Collard-Wexler makes clear, the EU has not only confounded neo-realist assumptions by forcefully occupying and blurring the space between nation-state and international institution, it has done so while engaging in a variety of normative behaviours (Collard-Wexler, 2006).

As such, the problems neo-realists in particular face when contemplating a ‘paradigm’ like human security are to a certain extent predictable. As Cox observed in discussion of the difference between problem solving and
critical theory perspectives, neorealist approaches are trapped within a basic assumption that ‘with respect to essentials, the future will be like the past’ in a world that seems to vigorously reject such notions and appearing to guarantee only the exact opposite (Moolakkattu, 2009, p. 446). For its strongest critics, neorealism’s inability to engage with security environments past state level are merely a reflection of its antiquation, as Mack posits: “because Realism was developed to explain international and not internal wars, it is consequently not equipped to explain the wilful attack, incompetence, or lack of resources that may result in a state harming rather than protecting its own citizens.” (as quoted in Newman, 2004, p. 379)

Ironically, despite the established conception of realism as a strictly problem-solving theory that makes no normative judgements about the security landscape, in the post-Cold War era it has had to adopt normative tendencies. Scholars working within its theoretical confines of the variants of realism have been forced into becoming proponents of a particular, narrow, conception of security in the face of new avenues opened up by concepts like human security; thus participating in a debate about what should be considered a security issue rather than being able to hold an operating assumption about what is a security issue (Tarry, 1999).

CRITICAL QUESTIONS

It is perhaps understandable that human security would be met with protestations from the more strategically minded international relations scholarship. However, some of the most ardent and sophisticated criticism of the concept has come from authors working from the critical sphere of international relations, despite, as noted above, human security’s apparent embodiment of a critical approach.

While critical security literature has demonstrated a firm interest in pushing into new territories, questioning the centrality of the state and its sovereignty in international affairs, it does not disregard the state or the military dimensions to world politics (Booth, 1994). As such, many of the criticisms made in strategic studies are similarly reflected in the critical literature, particularly when it comes to the question of operationalization and attempts to derive substantive policy prescriptions from human security. Again, the sheer breadth of issues laid out in the original UNDP report is acknowledged to be less conducive to developing strategies for
institutional responses to insecurity (Owens, H. & Arneil, B., 1999, pp. 1-2) than it is at providing a ideological anchoring point or ‘rallying cry’ for liberal internationalists in the post-Cold War period (Paris, 2001, p. 102).

For critical theorists, just as with mainstream strategic studies, the concept outlined in the 1994 document, and even with subsequent revisions, lacks structural definition and does not lend itself to operationalization within the context of actually existing international political institutions. It is seen instead as a form of catchall idealism, reflecting within it the most tantalising utopian notions of the beholder, which necessarily can form only the crudest, subjective and unworkable policy prescriptions:

“The world of politics, clashing interests and policy trade-offs is consigned to the realist paradigm of power politics, while the human security paradigm occupies an idealized world in which human security is the magic genie fulfilling Aladdin’s three wishes: freedom from want, freedom from fear, and a life lived in dignity. While the aspirations of the authors may be peerless, there is a danger that critique can become unmediated and disengaged in the tendency to present human security goals in the form of abstract policy prescription (Chandler, 2008, p. 430)”.

Leading figures from the critical perspective who have challenged the ‘classical security complex theory’ by looking to non-traditional sectors (Buzan, B., Waever, O.& de Wilde, J, 1998, p. 16) have expressed frustration with the reductionist nature of a maximalist conception of individual security (Buzan, 2004) and a desire to see a narrower expression of the concept adopted (Krause, 2004). For Krause, by making every human ill a source of insecurity, proponents are hindering scholars or policy makers’ understanding of threats to human safety by removing their ability to prioritise different types of threat within society:

“My own position on this is clear: human security ought to be about “freedom from fear,” and not about this broad vision of “freedom from want”, for two reasons. The first reason is a negative one: the broad vision of human security is ultimately nothing more than a shopping list; it involves slapping the label of human security on a wide range of issues that have no necessary link, and at a certain point, human security becomes a loose synonym for ‘bad things that can happen’ (Krause, 2004, p. 44).”

In a study of operational practicality, Krause and Muggah looked at two of the UN’s major operations in Haiti spaced nearly a decade apart and spanning much of the life span of Human Security, including its revisions
(Kruase, K. & Muggah, R., 2006). They found that while admirable steps had been taken in several areas such as identifying key drivers of insecurity, developing frameworks that could potentially provide improvements, and beginning implementation of such frameworks; actual outcomes were not readily apparent (ibid., p.138).

As Newman describes it, human security is therefore, “normatively attractive, but analytically weak” (Newman, 2004, p. 82). But even to dismiss the concept as misguided, weak or overly idealistic is to avoid perhaps the strongest critique, relating to the potential for misappropriation. As David Chandler hints in his review of literature supporting further adoption of Human Security:

“Nevertheless, the fact that human security advocates do not counterpoise interests in a direct political challenge to power, but rather seek to conflate ethical and security prerogatives, would suggest that this approach could be easily co-opted by political elites” (Chandler, 2008, p. 431).

The breadth of interest for Human Security policies, the vagueness of their potential applications or prescriptions makes them not just practically unwieldy but potentially ripe for co-option in facilitating the communication of elite interests (McDonald, 2002, p. 281)(Turner, M., Cooper, N. & Pugh, M., 2011, pp. Section 1, Para. 7). The concept of ‘humanitarian imperialism’ has been popularized within the new age of humanitarian intervention (Chomsky, 1999) (Nardin, 2006) (Bricmont, 2006). Critics from this perspective assert that the lofty goals of post-Cold War liberal humanism have lent themselves to justification of aggressive western foreign policies, in the absence of the Soviet nemesis, by providing the necessary cover in disguising geopolitical conquest as humanitarian intervention.

One particularly problematic aspect of the paradigm of humanitarian liberalism, is the designation of state sovereignty as a conditional rather than absolute principle (Garrigues, 2007, p. 2). This is essentially the argumentation of Responsibility to Protect; that the established norm guaranteeing a state’s right of sovereignty can be successfully waived if the international community deems it necessary for regional or domestic security (Ibid.). Failure of proponents to fully engage with the potential threat posed by states utilising the language of human security or responsibility to protect as pretext for war risks the entire concept collapsing under the weight of hypocrisy.

Large portions of the global south have held strong reservations about pillar 3 of Responsibility to Protect, (which contains within it justification for military intervention), due to historical experiences of colonialism and
interventionism (Kikoler, 2009, pp. 10-11). While few states outright reject the principle to protect populations who cannot protect themselves, the debates leading up to the UN General Assembly adoption of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (UN, 2005) are indicative of the suspicion held among critics that the principles established under human security and operationalised under responsibility to protect can be a cynical guise for imperialism (Bellamy, 2010, p. 144) or provide legitimisation for use of violence to achieve national security goals (Turner, M., Cooper, N. & Pugh, M., 2011). As Chandler points out, almost all military action engaged by western institutions from NATO to the European Common Defence Policy, eschew any military centric description to their actions and instead adopt the language of humanitarianism so as not to describe war but ‘ethical crisis management’ (Chandler, 2005, p. 167).

Feminist scholarship provided an example of this very problem by highlighting the appropriation of the plight of Afghan women under the Taliban as a means of justifying the continued presence of foreign troops. While Hilary Clinton proclaimed in 2001 that “Thanks to the courage and bravery of America's military and our allies, hope is being restored to many women and families in much of Afghanistan (Clinton, 2001)”, feminist critics observed that the simultaneous support for the Northern Alliance was a clear indication that

“the rights of women are championed when doing so dovetails with the interests of the United States, and ignored when they do not... The political power of this outrage against the treatment of Afghan women is based on gaining public and international support for US foreign policy aimed at overthrowing the Taliban (Hunt, 2002, pp. 118-119)”.

The lack of clear territorial scope and definition for human security, and more importantly its lack of ability to take steps to inoculate itself from co-option has contributed to its continued perception as being problematic or ‘listless’ in academic scholarship (Turner, M., Cooper, N. & Pugh, M., 2011) (Hoogensen, G. & Stuve, K., 2006, p. 208).

It is clear that any attempts to utilise human security as a means of studying insecure populations must build within it an appreciation for the criticisms laid out above. This study seeks to utilise a highly restricted conception as guideline for research on security concerns derived from the ‘vital core’ of human security relating to violent insecurity. In order to do this, it must first be established that is in fact possible to reconceptualise or adapt human security from an ambiguous concept into a tangible research agenda.
How can the normative framework of human security be harnessed into an analytically useful tool? Canadian foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy surmised the point well by appealing to the idea that human security should be seen as an umbrella under which many avenues of scientific enquiry may coalesce:

“We must begin to develop a science of human security where we take the incredible advances and insights of our scientists and translate them into understanding of how security issues affect the human condition… it is important to bridge the divide between the social and natural scientists, grounding the human security agenda in sound fact – for example, knowledge of the pathology of small weapons, the health impact of conflicts, the climate change threat to security, etc. (Axworthy, 2004).”

The deployment of human security as measuring stick through which to scientifically investigate threats is perhaps a useful starting point in attempting to understand its potential analytical utility. It is possible to conceive of a group of natural, social and political scientists approaching various problems and subject areas with a general commonality that places human security as the eternal dependent variable. This is not to say that human security can build a truly ‘objective’ measurement of threat, as is perhaps suggested by Axworthy, rather that approaches attempting to scientifically measure insecurity can provide the empirical basis for progressive evolutions in threat assessment.

If some guide to security prioritisation is to be determined by the invocation of human security, there must be some definitional constraints that allow for the identification of useful indicators, which are currently far from established. Even within the realms of the human security literature, attempting to set criteria that identifies threat ‘objectively’ can be seen as problematic as the push to the individual as referent object in security necessities an appreciation of subjective interpretations of threat to the self (Tadjbakhsh, S. & Chenoy, A.M., 2007, p. 241) (Stuvoy, 2010). Attempting to identify threats to individuals and communities across different geographies, contexts and temporal periods yields a truly unwieldy set of potential parameters. As such the most prominent critiques of human security have centred on its inability to identify specific objective or
universal indicators that are recognisable to social scientists and can yield useful information for security research (Paris, 2001) (Mack, 2004) (MacFarlane, S.N. and Khong, Y.F., 2006, p. 240). Proponents of the concept have suggested implementing criteria linking the identification of variables for study based on thresholds of severity so that individual variables can be identified (Owen, 2004) (Roberts, 2008).

The question arises then; how does Human Security translate into an approach to analysing specific threats? David Roberts has provided a straightforward response by proposing a clear definition for the condition of insecurity:

“Avoidable civilian deaths, global in reach, that are caused by changeable human-built social, political, economic, cultural or belief structures, created, inhabited and operated by other civilians whose work or conduct, indirectly and/or directly, unintentionally, unnecessarily and avoidably causes needless mortality around the world (Roberts, 2006).”

While this may seem like a restricted interpretation of the concept to some (and a still fungible one to others), it stands as a good example of how limitation can provide some of the analytical bite that has been seen as lacking in previous incarnations (Paris, 2001) (Floyd, 2007) (Newman, 2010, p. 82). In particular, it concedes to the argument posed by critics that a constricted definition of threat is unavoidable for there to be any hope of operationalising human security (Paris, 2001) (Krause, 2004, p. 44). In further work, Roberts made an attempt to further specify the approach by focusing on a particular variable as an indicator of insecurity: the under 5 mortality rate (U5M) (Roberts, 2008, p. 125).

Data on U5M are collected by a coalition of NGOs including the World Bank, World Health Organisation and the United Nations Population Division that form the inter-agency group for Child Mortality Estimation (UN IGME, 2013). Many studies already exist that use the variable as an indicator of the effect of policy on a given population (Ascherio et al., 1991) (Seshamani, 1998) (Singer, 2002). In particular, Lucas et al. have successfully operationalised this particular approach within their ‘Global Integrated Sustainability Model’ that links environmental degradation risks posed by climate change with their potential impact on child mortality rates to identify populations that face the greatest threat (Lucas et al., 2013). The approach is informed by a specific vision of human security that is above and beyond the fields of development or health studies, that treats
threat as preventable risks identified by a scientific approach that objectively presents issues for redress in public policy (Ibid, p.91).

In her ‘Conceptual Framework for Human Security’, a key policy guideline for the UN’s Commission on Human Security, Alkire proposed the development of a ‘vital core’ of human security. While Alkerie herself concedes the definition is still not quite as precise as critics require, a notable effort is made to shrink human security down to a ‘minimal or basic or fundamental set of functions related to survival, livelihood and dignity’, drawing upon basic human rights and development norms to sketch a framework for the most basic needs for individual survival and livelihood (Alkire, 2003, p. 3). Alkire’s prime example of a vital core is the freedom from premature preventable death, presented with the ancillary proposition that despite its relative simplicity, this basic freedom internalises a nexus of interconnecting human security concerns:

“by focusing on the human side of security (rather than the threat side), even in its narrowest connotation of freedom from premature preventable death, the traditional distinctions between death caused by violent war or terrorism or natural disaster, and death caused by economic collapse, lack of health care or social security structures, criminality, and environmental degradation, break down. The distinctive nexus of human security issues – poverty and conflict – emerges organically from the single value of physical security.”

From this one can imagine a raft of human security related research arising from operationalising this vital core in a given case, incident or problem area. Where are people not surviving? Why are they not surviving? What populations are at risk of not surviving? With a certain degree of honing and specification, such questions could feasibly form the backbone of a range of different studies into human security problems.

While there may be a great deal of debate as to how researchers determine what variables are used as a basis for the study of human security when attempting to determine what are global ‘objective’ threats, the concept holds particular utility as a means of assessing the effectiveness of particular policies. Humanitarian interventions are ostensibly designed to increase security and can be assessed for the implications they have on a range of indicators derived from the concept. For example, there is currently substantial concerns about the stability and viability of the post- Gaddafi Libyan state. The NATO intervention was predicated on increasing security for the Libyan population. But the rebel forces aided to victory by NATO have dissolved into
factions that violently compete for control of different territories, contributing to instability that has at times bested Iraq in terms of violence per capita (Chivvis, C. & Martini, J., 2014), and may have knock on consequences for the population in the region for years to come (Washington Post, 2014).

We can thus gauge effectiveness of particular policies in human security terms by looking at ‘vital core indicators’ before and after they are implemented. The types of indicators used by practitioners of human security centric research will necessarily be varied, determined by discipline, subjects and methodologies. But if targeted at measuring areas derived by an appreciation for a ‘vital core’ of human security, an operationalisable research agenda may not be a far removed from possibility as critics maintain. As in the above case of Libya, for those interested in understanding the human security impact of foreign military interventions, one of the most basic indicators in this regard is measurements of political violence, which will form the connection to the vital core of human security within the case studies of this thesis.

(3.6) MEASURING THE VITAL CORE: POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND HUMAN INSECURITY

In contrast to the now infamous remark by General Tommy Franks in the wake of the US invasion of Iraq that “We don’t do body counts”, there are now organisations and individuals attempting to study conflict through the lens of casualty or political violence metrics (Morayef, 2007, p. 413). Working across a diverse range of geographies and methodologies, they are linked by a common interest in understanding conflict from the perspective of those living in its midst. In Northern Ireland, organisations such as INCORE and ‘Counting the Cost’, have worked to establish an account of total deaths during ‘the troubles’ (Fay, M., Morrissey, M. & Smyth, M., 1999). They have consistently advocated for the data to be used in conjunction with healthcare providers and outreach programs to target populations that have suffered the most through the conflict and ensure relevant services are targeted to geographies and populations most heavily affected.

The work done by Chris Woods, Jack Serle, Alice Ross and others at the Bureau of Investigative Journalism measuring the drone campaign in Pakistan has received a great deal of attention and has formed the basis for a range of new studies into the conflict (BIJ, 2014). While a string of organisations have focused on tracking the ‘drone war’ from a point of strategic interest (New America Foundation, 2015)(The Long War Journal, 2015)
other groups have gone into the territory itself to conduct surveys that demonstrate the physical and physiological impact of the war for civilians on the ground (Civilians in Conflict, 2012) (International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic & Global Justice Clinic, 2012).

An appreciation for the importance of using metrics as a means of locating insecurity has been a strong draw for organisations interested in advocacy. Action on Armed Violence, which formerly worked to campaign for de-mining (as Landmine Action) altered its mission to allow casualty metrics to guide its advocacy focus. Its annual report collates available data on explosive violence and disaggregates by conflict area, allowing for policy relevant assessment that locates the gravest areas of insecurity for this particular type of violence in different parts of the world (AOAV, 2014).

During the Iraq War, several research groups attempted to provide an account of the impact of the invasion and resultant occupation through casualty metrics. That some studies were challenged either for poor, or potentially problematic methodologies (Spagat, M. & Dougherty, J., 2010) high quality and well respected work on the conflict has provided important insight into the distribution of insecurity in populations across the country (Iraq Family Health Study Group, 2008) (IBC, 2015). The public debate over these research methodologies in the midst of the Iraq war reminds the researcher of the intensely political nature of the endeavour (Morayef, 2007).

The growing community of researchers working on measurement focused approaches to the study of conflict is perhaps typified by the establishment of the Every Casualty Programme, a coalition of international conflict monitoring practitioners that are jointly campaigning for standardised casualty measurement methodologies to be adopted by states involved in armed conflict (Minor, 2012). Similarly, Patrick Ball’s efforts to create effective human rights data gathering systems in El Salvador in the early 90’s, has led to the creation of a global network of human security centric research under the umbrella of the Human Rights Data Analysis Group (HRDAG, 2015). These approaches are not only significant in terms of the growing appetite for civilian centric conflict research, but for the fact that they embody the principles of the restricted, vital core vision of human security outlined by Alkirie, demonstrating the ability to find common grounds for operationalisation across a range of different practitioners, subjects and location areas.
While many other indicators of the so-called ‘vital core’ exist beyond measurements of casualties or political violence, successful operationalization in the immediate context of this thesis is contingent on two factors. First and foremost is the question of available data. Measurements of conflict can only be carried out where useful information is accessible or even theoretically attainable. While many states maintain good records of a broad range of vital core indicators, many developing states do not. Indeed, states suffering the most amount of insecurity are likely to have the most amount of problems when it comes to accessibility of relevant data on the security of the population (Salehyan, 2015, p. 107). Thus human security targeted research must use the best information available to attain insights into trends in insecurity. For this study, the BFRS work on political violence is perhaps a natural, and fairly common, methodology for collecting data on insecurity in states experiencing conflict. Day to day insecurity, such as domestic abuse, sexual violence, low level criminality or deaths from lack of health services are poorly or unsystematically recorded over the time period in question. Political violence however, is something that tends to attract widespread attention and thus, is fairly consistently reported in the media. While the account is not in any way exhaustive, as made clear in the methodology discussion, the data can nonetheless provide a picture of general trends in violence across different parts of the country, at different times, by different actors (de Mesquita, E.B., et al., 2014, p. 3).

Secondly, in order to maximise the relevance of findings in research on a specific state program or policy, there must be some degree of prioritisation of the research towards areas related to that policy. While this may seem, to many advocates of either human or critical security approaches, a conservative or unnecessary restriction on research, particularly regarding externalities relating to foreign interventions, there are clear incentives to do so. Not least of which, the warnings by scholars such as Jentleson on the problematic space between theory and praxis in current academic research on foreign policy:

“In the contemporary era, when debate rages not only over the foreign policy “answers” but even more fundamentally over what the defining “questions” are, dominant disciplinary norms and practices are widening the theory-policy gap, and leaving the university-based scholarly world increasingly isolated (Jentleson, 2002, pp. 181-182).”
Operationalising research with the aim of maximising policy relevance may be restrictive to certain modes of enquiry but should be the ambition of any project that seeks to understand policy, or more importantly, to challenge it. Far from being necessarily restrictive for critical scholars, a focus on policy relevance has the ability to yield strong critical research agendas by asking, as McDonald puts it, whether a particular policy ‘is doing the job’ to which it is advertised.

“Applied to the study of terrorism, such an approach might be used to interrogate the extent to which the commitments of counter-terrorism discourses (e.g. ridding the world of terrorism) are being realised through the practices that they are invoked to justify (e.g. military campaigns in the ‘war on terror’). Locating disjunctures here can be viewed as providing a basis for radical change in dominant means of engaging with the threat posed by ‘terrorism’. In this sense, one of the central goals of research through the application of immanent critique becomes a praxeological concern with locating and pursuing possibilities for change (McDonald, 2007, p. 254).”

This direct engagement of policy provides an excellent point of access for research relating to the security of populations. Interrogating the logic of policies ostensibly designed to increase security, by attempting to measure the extent to which they do so, provides not just logical structure for analysis, but should yield results that have substantial policy relevance. As such, having existing policy act as a guide for research would seem to go a long way in addressing the operationalization problem in human security related academic research.

This is the underlying theoretical and methodological approach of this study. In the case of Pakistan, US policy towards Pakistan, its investment in the military, and the reinforcement of the security apparatus of the state has been predicated on the basis that not only will it improve Pakistan’s ability to participate in the war on terror, but it will improve stability and increase security for the Pakistani population (US Department of State, 2015). Comparatively assessing existing data on both military aid and levels of political violence yields a good opportunity for interrogating the logic of this type of intervention by providing the means to test it. The uniqueness of Pakistan’s situation, with its long periods of receipt and disbarment from US military aid, also allows for the investigation of the more general political changes occurring within the country as it shifts from being the focus of strong strategic interest by a major foreign power, to being largely ignored, to being in focus again. From a policy focused perspective, this will give insight into the success or failures in attempting to use
military aid as a means of achieving security or stability in a foreign state. From a critical perspective, the approach will give an indication as to what institutions, political actors or discourses are affected by influx of foreign military aid—by also illuminating what occurs in its absence.

(3.8) CONCLUSION

While there are many valid criticisms relating to its prescriptive capacity, these should not act to nullify attempts at reformulation or improvement of both the concept itself and its practical workability for research purposes. The indicators that form the boundaries of enquiry for this project may be quite narrow in relation to the many areas covered by human security, but the argument proposed here is that human security research should be seen as taking place ‘under the umbrella’ of the concept. Both critical and mainstream approaches have accurately established that it is unlikely that any set of universal indicators could be developed to give a picture of the broad vision of human security that is accepted across different fields of enquiry. Instead, human security should be seen as a concept for guiding research on the security of individuals, communities and populations—embodying the shift in focus across almost all international relations theory perspectives to broaden the concept of security, and to give an equal degree of attention to individuals as to states.

The following case studies will investigate Pakistan’s security problems in recent history from such a perspective. While data gathered on political violence will illustrate macro trends in the intensity and distribution of a specific aspect of insecurity throughout variations in military aid policy, the broader contextual assessment will illustrate the changes in the state and its security institutions in both time periods.
CHAPTER 4

CASE STUDY ONE: MILITARY AID AND HUMAN SECURITY 1988-1999

(4.0.1) INTRODUCTION

The following chapter represents the first case study period of the thesis. It will start with a brief, pre-case study period outline of some of the key historical developments in the US-Pakistan strategic relationship. The first two sections of the case study will expand these contexts in further detail to establish respective security priorities at the outset of the time period.

In the case of Pakistan (Section 1), the period towards the end of the Cold War is dominated by the military regime of Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq. The drives toward Islamification and further centralisation of military power will be outlined as major political and security developments that have far reaching consequences for later periods in both case studies. For the US (Section 2), both the domestic and international determinants of aid policy are established, as well as the reasons for its eventual termination in the early 1990’s.

Section 3 will establish the size and scope of the US military aid program to Pakistan before its termination. This will cover transfer of materials throughout the Reagan administration, providing insight into its size in dollar amounts as well as a breakdown of the types of equipment Pakistan purchased from the US in the time period. Aid disbursements will also be contrasted with donations from other states and Pakistan’s own defence expenditure.

Finally, Section 4 will use a combination of historical research in conjunction with the BFRS dataset to identify the largest threats to human security between 1988 and 1999 in terms of political violence. As a large majority of violence in this period centred around Sindh generally, and Karachi specifically, there will be a detailed breakdown of the factors driving insecurity in that area. Other major factors explored are the growing threat of violence towards women as a result of Zia’s ‘Islamization’ drive, and the growing prevalence of sectarian
violence in Punjab. The distribution of violence by different actors will be established via an analysis of the BFRS dataset, giving an indication to volume of violence attributed to different groups in the time period.

(4.0.2) PRE-CASE STUDY CONTEXT: US – PAKISTAN SECURITY RELATIONS THROUGH THE COLD WAR

(4.0.2) DEVELOPMENT OF PAKISTAN’S SECURITY STATE

One of the central features of Pakistan’s security history is its relationship to India. The partition of the two wings of India into the independent state of Pakistan, took place in the context of a period of civil violence and ethnic cleansing of such intensity as to be considered genocidal within many academic assessments (Brass, 2003, p. 72)(Mayaram, 1997)(Haque, 1995, p. 190). Indeed, as Gilmartin observes, few events in the history of modern South Asia have been as definitive as the 1947 separation of India into two sub-nations (Gilmartin, 1998, p. 1068). It occurred with remarkable speed, a whirlwind of violence that left an atmosphere of seething resentment, animosity and militant nationalism in the populations of both states (Pandey, 2001, p. 2). Pakistan was a nation state born without the type of national history that typically facilitated a coherent cultural identity; as Callard points out “members of the Pakistani nation did not speak a common language, they did not have a homogenous culture; they did not even have a geographical or economic unit (Callard as cited in Islam, 1981, p. 56).” There was little in the way of established political or ideological leadership within the state after the death of the leader of the independence movement, Muhammed Ali Jinnah in 1948. The perception amongst the founding Muslim League that India viewed Pakistani independence as a ‘temporary secession of certain territories from India which would soon be reabsorbed (Ali as cited in Shah, 2014, p.13)’ exacerbated the uncertainty surrounding the birth of the state. For the first Pakistani leaders, high levels of defence expenditure, strong political posturing and an obligatory nationalist identity would shape the new political establishment (Rizvi, 2000, p. 1) (Islam, 1981, p. 57). The military of Pakistan elevated itself into a pivotal position of power and influence within the state, holding not only the position of guarantor of Pakistan’s cultural and religious heritage, but as the central gatekeepers to civilian leadership of the country (Siddiqa, 2007, p. 62).
According to Hussein, Pakistan’s religious identity - the distinguishing feature that necessitated independence - would inevitably become associated with the military since the popular perception treated the military as the guardians of Pakistani sovereignty (Hussain, 2005, p. 3). Military coups followed by extended periods of military rule would become a defining feature of Pakistan’s early history, during which the army were in direct control of the state for 38 of its first 67 years (Hussain, 2005, p. 36). The first military coup occurred less than a decade after the state’s formation, with leading military figures assuming that the ‘neutrality’ of the army was a more effective and unifying means of government than divisive parliamentary politics (Shah, 2014, p. 93).

The 1958 coup that installed General Ayub Khan as the Chief Martial Law Administrator, saw a military crackdown on political leaders and the media. Prominent dissenters were imprisoned and public criticism of the army was shut down (Wilcox, 1965, p. 143). These methods of restricting public spaces for political dissent and criticism of the military would become a blueprint for future coups in Pakistan. The election of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto marked the first sustained period of civilian administration. He would become an icon in liberal Pakistani politics due to a populist manifesto that aimed to address the myriad social problems facing the country (Rashid, 2009, p. 37). His Pakistani People’s Party (PPP) stood as a secular, social democratic counterweight to religious conservatives and military elites who had dominated politics since independence (Richter, 1979, p. 548). Bhutto took power in the aftermath of the disastrous war of 1971 which led to East Pakistan (with assistance from India) establishing its independence. Bhutto managed to capture and hold the centre ground of Pakistani politics, appealing to a population that was frustrated with the failure of a succession of military rulers to deal with crippling rural poverty and the severely inequitable distribution of land and wealth in the state (Zahoor, 2011, p. 146) (Rashid, 2009, p. 37) (Irfan, M. & Amjad, R., 1984). Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s party was instrumental in adopting the 1973 constitution, which made plots to over-throw a legally constituted government a treasonous offence (Burki, 1988, p. 1085) (Siddiqa, 2007, p. 89).

Bhutto’s desire to pre-empt any future military coups led him to appoint Lieutenant General Zia-ul-Haq rather than other more senior members of staff, to the post of Chief of Army Staff (COAS) due to Zia’s reputation for loyalty and the low risk that he would challenge civilian leadership (Burki, 1988, p. 1085). Bhutto’s strategy backfired. In spite of the landslide victory for the PPP in the 1977 general elections, Bhutto was deposed by the military. Large scale demonstrations, instigated by the military and conservative political groups, were organised under the umbrella of the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), which protested the PPP’s ‘disrespect
for the Pakistani ideology’ (Burki, 1988, p. 1087) (Siddiqa, 2007, p. 84). This unrest, together with allegations of vote rigging were used by the military command as a pretext to depose Bhutto, who was subsequently executed after a dubious murder trial (Burki, 1988, p. 1087). General Zia, as a central figure in the coup, took control of the state and declared it his ‘divine mission’ to bring Islamic order to Pakistan (Rashid, 2009, p. 38). A range of measures involving the banning of certain political parties, censorship of the media and persecution of non-Muslim populations were drafted (Siddiqa, 2007, p. 84). The following 11 years of Zia’s administration not only had a defining impact on the Pakistani state, but the regime’s efforts in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan would be a key determinant in the outcome of the Cold War in South East Asia. The US-Pakistani security relationship, and in particular the sustained US support for the military governance of Pakistan in exchange for Zia’s facilitation of mujahedeen resistance across the Afghan/Pakistan border would be remembered as a decisive contribution to the end of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

(4.0.3) US-PAKISTAN STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP

The normalisation of the Truman doctrine in US foreign policy in the early stages of the Cold War meant that foreign aid would become the main currency for the acquisition and management of allies in strategically significant areas. As well-scrutinized documents such as National Security Council (NSC) Paper 68 attest, US policy makers assumed that one of the primary aims of any Soviet military action at the time would be to ‘drive toward oil bearing areas of the near and middle east’ (NSC, 1950, p. 18). The perceived vulnerability of the Middle East to a Soviet expansion pushed the US to seek long term strategic partnerships with governments that had the motivation and capability to defend and maintain western influence in the region (McMahon, 1988, p. 813). Prominent Pakistani politicians had appealed to the US immediately after the 1947 partition for military assistance to establish Pakistan as ‘the Eastern bastion against communism’ (McMahon, 1988, p. 819). Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan were identified as being fundamental to any such efforts and military aid programs for each state were established to enhance their capabilities. These states would form the backbone of the Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO) and later the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) (Khan, 1964, p. 195).
As the declassified record shows, a military aid program for Pakistan was mooted internally within the Eisenhower administration throughout 1953 (United States Department of State, 1953). Rumours of the potential deal drew criticism from the Soviet Union, India and China who issued a formal protest, with India warning that acceptance of a US military aid program would turn Pakistan into a ‘colonial power’ (Spain, 1954, p. 740). The internal discussion of the pros and cons of such a program indicate that while the US was concerned about the reaction in India to Pakistani military aid, the potential diplomatic fallout was mitigated by the fact that it would ‘bolster the [Pakistani] government’s prestige with the Pakistani public, and would tend to consolidate the [Pakistani] government’s friendly relations with the US’ (United States Department of State, 1954). The resulting 1954 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement would see the beginning of a military aid program that would deliver $4 billion in arms to Pakistan by 1965 (Chabra, 2011, Sec. B). The donation of technologically superior American equipment upgraded many sections of Pakistan’s armed forces, particularly its armoured divisions, to a more advanced stage than India’s (Marwah, 1979, p. 552).

Military assistance from the US continued well after the coup that unseated Pakistan’s first civilian government (SIPRI, 2014 a). The first obstacle for continuing the military aid program did not arise until 1965 when Pakistani troops invaded Kashmir. The US partially suspended its military assistance programs to both India and Pakistan, but Pakistan’s significant dependence on US support meant that it felt the looming threat of suspension more acutely (Kronsdadt, 2009, p. 39). The importance of US assistance in the tense relationship between India and Pakistan was highlighted during the East Pakistan war of independence in 1971. As the Pakistan military cracked down heavily on the Bengali independence movement, refugees numbering anywhere from 4-11 million flowed in to India, which Delhi maintained provided justification for intervention into the conflict on the side of the rebels (Tanca, 1993, p. 77).

The scale of violence being carried out by the military in East Pakistan garnered global attention and the US came under increasing pressure to suspend assistance. Nixon personally decreed that now was not the time to ‘squeeze’ Ayub’s regime (Siddiqa, 2007, p.78). The Pakistan ambassador to the US pleaded with the administration that “a great tragedy had befallen Pakistan and the army had to kill people in order to keep the country together (ibid.).” Christopher Van Hollen, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near East affairs at the time, would later write that the US failure to cease military aid provided encouragement to the Pakistani military when they needed to be restrained (Haqqani, 2005, pp. 84-85).
The Nixon administration had privately agreed that the US should ‘tilt towards Pakistan’ and act to restrain India’s intervention (United States Department of State, 1971). The primary strategy was to threaten to suspend further military aid to India and to embargo ‘everything in the pipeline’ amounting to some $10-15 million worth of assistance (ibid). India was however, much less dependent on US assistance than Pakistan, largely due to significant levels of military assistance and cooperation it received from the Soviet Union (Chari, 1970). Much of the Indian air force had been developed through Soviet military assistance which came, unlike US aid, without coercive pressure for shifts in foreign policy that might threaten India’s non-aligned status (Marwah, 1979, p. 553).

The election of Bhutto, after the disastrous events of 1971, left the US in an uncertain position. Nixon was a personal friend of Ayub and viewed the potential replacement of the military leader with trepidation due to the US president’s assessment of Bhutto as ‘a total demagogue’ (United States Department of State, 1971, p. Sec. 199). As President, Bhutto was seen by the Nixon administration as potentially driving Pakistan closer to China in a relentless bid to improve Pakistan’s defensive position relative to India (ibid).

It was this relentlessness that saw Bhutto establish the early components of Pakistan’s nuclear program almost immediately after taking office in December 1971 (Levy, A. & Scott-Clark, C., 2007, p. 18). Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, and its proliferation of weapons technology, presented further problems for continued military assistance. The Carter administration, which sold much of its foreign policy on the language of Human Rights and increasing international cooperation (Haqqani, 2005, p.128), became critical of Bhutto’s apparent fuelling of a nuclear arms race in Asia (Kronsdad, 2009, p. 40). Bhutto would claim that in 1976 Henry Kissinger warned that if Pakistan did not abandon its program, Democrats in the US were prepared “to make a horrible example of your country” (Shah, 2014, p.136). Bhutto and the PPP were heavily critical of Carter and believed he had used US military assistance (or its withholding) as a political tool. The suspension of $65,000 worth of tear gas at the height of the PNA/military organised demonstrations against the outcome of the 1977 elections, was seen as a clear indication of who the US favoured in the domestic power struggle between the civilian leadership and the military (ibid.).

While the Carter administration housed serious concerns over any potential Pakistani nuclear weapons program, the rapidly changing geostrategic circumstances of the late 70’s meant that Pakistani security
cooperation would be imperative (NSDD 147, 1984). In 1978, an Afghan military coup overthrew the relatively neutral regime of Daoud Khan and replaced it with a chaotic, violent and unstable dictatorship creating significant uncertainty in the region (Chaffetz, 1980). Compounding this was the 1979 Iranian revolution that unseated the Shah, one of the US’s most steadfast ally’s in the Middle East. As such, Pakistan’s position on the border with Afghanistan and Iran became more important than ever (NSDD 147, 1984).

Despite the apparent urgency brought about by new political realities, the Carter administration was still deeply uncomfortable with Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. It attempted to use its military supply chain to influence Pakistan’s nuclear strategy, offering 50 F-5E jet fighters replete with advanced missiles, if Islamabad would allow a covertly constructed uranium enrichment facility to come under international safeguards (Paul, 1992, p. 1088). After receiving no assurances, some in the administration mooted for a ‘buy-out’ by offering more advanced weaponry (Ibid), but instead President Carter moved to suspend all US military aid to Pakistan (Kronsadzt, 2009, p. 40) and members of his national security advisory team even mooted a military strike against the facility (Levy, A. & Scott-Clark, C., 2007, p. 67).

However, within a few short weeks at the end of 1979, much of the US’s existing strategy for the region was turned upside down. In late November, a group of Iranian students occupied the US embassy in Iran, trapping 52 members of staff inside where they would remain hostage for the next year triggering a major crisis in US-Iranian relations (Chubin, 1983). Several US embassies around the world were attacked in copycat protests, including the Islamabad embassy, which was set alight (Washington Post, 2004). The following month, Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan, occupying Kabul in an attempt to restore order to its allied regime now suffering from widespread rebellion (Chaffetz, 1980, p. 24). Fears abounded in the US that Soviet occupation of Afghanistan left it ‘within a hair’s breadth of Iranian Oil reserves’, a prospect that would shatter the established order of the Middle East (Levy, A. & Scott-Clark, C., 2007, p. 72).

In his State of the Union address in January 1980, President Carter announced ‘the Carter doctrine’ which vowed to tackle aggressive ‘Soviet expansionism’ wherever it arose. In a massive turnaround in its stance, the US approved a $400 million military aid package to Pakistan (Ganji, 2006, p. 174). Despite the profound sense of relief among many in the upper echelons of Pakistan’s military, Zia famously dismissed Carter’s offer as ‘peanuts’ (Rashid, p.38). Carter’s handling of the Iran crisis would eventually see him replaced by Reagan, who
would negotiate a much more concerted military aid program to Pakistan to support the Mujahedeen resistance in Afghanistan and attempt to undermine the perceived Soviet power grab in the region.
General Zia-Al-Haq and the military were Pakistan’s uncontested rulers between 1977 and 1985, remaining in power until 1988. In that time they had set about reorganising central government along two mutually constitutive frameworks:

1) The ‘Islamization’ of Pakistani society through Nizam-i-Mustapha (Islamic Reforms); an effort to rebuild the moral character of the country in the wake of the corrupting civilian leadership of Bhutto, using Islam as a guide due its cultural centrality in Pakistani national identity (Abbas, 2005, p. 113) (Haqqani, 2005, p. 135).

2) The institutionalisation of the Army as the epicentre of government, the economy and the judiciary (Shah, 2014, p. 154) (Kennedy, 1990, p. 73)

In this way, Zia was invoking the ‘policy tripod’ established by Ayub Khan in the first few years of Pakistan’s history, with society governed by the perception of “India as Pakistan’s eternal enemy, Islam as the national unifier, and the United States as the country’s provider of arms and finances (Haqqani, 2005, p. 43).”

From the moment he took power, General Zia reconstituted the Pakistani legal system in order to transform the state in line with his own puritanical interpretation of Sunni Deobandi Islam (Murphy, 2013, p. 87). The Pakistan judiciary became multi-tiered (Hyman, A, Ghayur, M & Kaushik, I., 1989, p. 46); the first tier, from which Zia attained the body of his power, was the declaration of martial law. Second to martial law was the imposition of the Shariat (Islamic) courts, which tried a variety of mid-level crimes including theft, as well enforcing the newly strengthened ‘Hudood Ordinances’ that covered offences of adultery, slander and alcohol
consumption (Quarashi, 1997, p. 288). Offences in these courts carried brutal punishments such as amputations, public flogging, stoning and whipping (Rizvi, 2000, p. 171). Harsh penalties for the destruction of government property came to be utilised as an effective way of criminalising public demonstrations (Murphy, 2013, p. 87). The ordinances also gave sovereign legal authority to cultural practices that subordinated women in society (Quarashi, 1997, p. 291). The courts were highly politicised, with judicial appointments and tenure coming under the discretion of the president (Rizvi, 2000, p. 171). And, while the Federal Sharia Court (FSC) oversaw many areas of domestic law, it was prevented from exercising any jurisdiction in constitutional or economic matters, which were of fundamental concern to the ruling elite (Ibid).

Outside of the judiciary, the process was pursued through a revolution in the education system. New taxes implemented by the state raised extra funding that allowed for both the proliferation of religious schools or madrasahs and the financing of lower class students to attend them. In this regard the Zia regime consciously attempted to socially engineer a new generation of religiously educated young people who could be used to repopulate the state bureaucracy, and hence, sow the seeds for future reproduction of socially conservative state policy (Qazi, R.R.K. et al., 2013). The state employment opportunities available to graduates ensured that the program was successful, driving a massive expansion in madrasahs across the country (Nasr, 2001, p. 143).

While the state derived much of the funding for this education expansion through a new, and politically problematic, religious tax (Zakat, discussed below), much of the funding was external (Murphy, 2013, p. 131). As a response to the rise in popularity of the PPP, Sunni gulf states (Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in particular) had supplied a huge amount of funding for various Sunni religious organisations (Nasr, 2000, p. 144). They feared that Pakistan might sway towards a more liberal democratic or socialist model under Bhutto and supported both the religious conservative political movement against him, and the Zia regime’s attempts at Islamisation afterward (Ibid.)

In the military, many junior officers adopted Islam more thoroughly into their personal lives at the behest of Zia, although it was never clear that a religious imperative informed the decision making of the senior Army staff (Fair, 2011) (Shah, 2014, p. 163). As the Zia plan for Islamisation took hold, rank and file military staff and officers were increasingly encouraged to adopt a more overt religious identity in order to secure promotion (Fair, 2014, p. 83). Many officers, including Zia in his younger years, trained in Gulf state forces where they were exposed to a strict orthodox, Wahhabist, military environment (Ibid).
The process of ‘Islamisation’ had a profound effect on society. One of the key outcomes was an institutionalisation of sectarianism in Pakistani governance. While Islam had been one of the few unifying factors for the citizens of the state since partition, the country was not religiously homogenous. Within the populace there exists several denominations of Sunni (Barelvi, Deobandi, Ahl-e-Hadith and Jamaat-e-Islami) (Fair, 2014) and a minority Shia (roughly 15-20%) population, also divided into sub denominations (Twelver, Islami’ilm Khoja and Bohri) (Nasr, 2000, p. 139). Upon implementation of the Hudood Ordinances, minority non-Sunni populations became vulnerable to accusations of blasphemy as many religious practices could be interpreted as insulting the Prophet (Murphy, 2013, p. 93). The Ahmadi, a separate Pakistani subsect of Islam, were particularly badly persecuted under Zia and new provisions in the Pakistan Penal Code it became a criminal offence for members to even call themselves Muslims (ibid).

The Shia population of the country became increasingly discontent with their status as a second tier religious group within society, finding itself increasingly victim to sectarian violence and institutional repression. Compulsory taxation is prohibited in many Shia denominations and as such, the Zakat was doubly problematic as it was both a tax but also one of the sources for the state’s funding of its sectarian Islamisation program that further isolated their community (Murphy, 2013, p. 91). On 5th July 1980, a 25,000 strong Shia protest defied martial law and laid siege to central government offices in Islamabad for two days, effectively shutting down government. As the Zia regime came close to collapse, it was forced to back down on the Zakat and provide an exemption for Shia (Haqqani, 2005, p. 141). The success of the movement was a catalyst for Shia political activism, and several militant organisations were spawned in its aftermath (ibid). The political victory of the Shia over the Zakat led to further increased tensions between the communities and by the mid-80’s, sectarian attacks between the Shia and Sunni were becoming common place (Rizvi, 2000, p. 198) (Nasr, 2000, p. 155).

As democracy returned in 1988, the military’s Islamisation project was wound down. As a result of this and the declining health of the Pakistani economy generally, graduates of the madrasahs found they were no longer gaining access to the much vaunted employment opportunities. Expected to return to a less politically influential status, mid-level religious leaders began to revolt, using mosques madrasahs to sow an increasingly radical, sectarian political message (Nasr, 2000, p. 150). As the supply line of state funding that had been available under Zia dried up, the problem of radicalisation was compounded by foreign sources of funding.
Sunni political organisations and madrasahs competed with each other both in terms of sectarian rhetoric and violence in order to impress Saudi donors and attain stronger financial support (Ibid, p.152).

THE ARMY

Despite the humiliating defeat of 1971, the Pakistani army of the 1980’s was a confident and relatively well-developed institution. While it had come to power on the back of a campaign for popular democracy that would restrict the power of Pakistan’s established elites, the Bhutto administration’s fixation with national security had translated into continued investment in the military (Siddiqa, 2007, p. 79). Domestic arms production had increased dramatically while also being supplemented by external security assistance from both China and the US (Haqqani, 2005, p. 115). By the end of his regime Bhutto had struck deals with the military to secure the position of the PPP in Pakistani politics, cracking down heavily on the left wing remnants of the party (Siddiqa, 2007, p. 79). Under Zia the military further increased its domestic influence, consolidating their already considerable political and economic power (Siddiqa, 2007, p. 139). In particular, organisations such as the Inter Intelligence Services (ISI) gained increased prominence both as tool for furthering the security aims of the state, as well as undermining potential political challenges to military control (Shah, 2014, p. 158). Throughout the various military administration’s since Pakistan’s creation, the ISI had been a part of the national security apparatus established to monitor and counter-act potential Indian operations in the country.

It would now form the centre of the army’s three-pronged approach to management of domestic politics (Haqqani, 2005, p. 55). Firstly, the ISI and the military helped to establish political parties that reflected the concerns of the army hierarchy. In particular, parties such as Jamat-e-islami (JI) provided a popular organising platform for promoting the religious conservative ideology supported by the Army hierarchy (Siddiqa, 2007, p. 87). Secondly, the ISI would infiltrate political parties of the left or independent leaning regional governments to spread disinformation. Conflict was sown between opposition political groups and the religious parties supported by the military (Ghosh, 1989, p. 25). Thirdly, the Ministry of Information spread propaganda to the affect that the state was under constant existential threat from socialists and communists in order to undermine support for left wing politics generally, a strategy which was bolstered by the occupation of
Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and the strong perception by both Pakistan and the West that India was a Soviet ally (Zagoria, 1984, p. 31).

A clear example of the ISI’s role in the process came with the hijacking of Pakistan’s Airline’s flight by an organisation called ‘Al-Zulfikar’, named after Bhutto and led by his son. The group denounced Zia for the death of ZulifiKar Bhutto and demanded the release of political prisoners held captive by the military (Haqqani, 2005, p. 142). While the hijacking ended peacefully after two weeks with the release of 54 prisoners, the ISI used the incident and the connection between Al-Zulfikar and Bhutto family members, to spread propaganda indicting the PPP as a terrorist organisation (ibid). Zia also used the incident and apparent threat posed by domestic terrorism to gain the authority to make changes to the constitution that both allowed for further amendments, and curtailed the ability of the judiciary to question directives from the executive (ibid).

In terms of direct political control, the army sought to relieve the pressure exerted by opposition parties for a return to democratic control by allowing local elections. The continued strength of support for the PPP at the local level meant that national elections remained out of the question and as such were continuously postponed with a variety of justifications (Mehdi, 2013, p. 10). But the pressure for a return to some form of civilian government could not be resisted forever, and in 1985 the military acquiesced to a return to parliamentary elections. The 1985 election allowed only party-less, ostensibly independent candidates (but who were in reality strategically tied to various political sects) (Rais, 1988, p. 199). From those elected, Zia personally chose members of a new cabinet as well as a new Prime Minister, Mohamed Khan Junejo, who was aligned to the army favoured ‘Pakistan Muslim League’ (PML) (ibid.) In exchange for allowing parliamentary elections, the military moved to make many of the structural changes implemented under martial rule permanent by amending the constitution to protect them – and thus attempting to permanently entrench the military hierarchy within the ruling elite (Rizvi, 1986, p. 1067).

The restriction of access to parliamentary politics by opposition parties caused several groups, including the PPP to come together and form the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) which would launch several protest campaigns throughout Zia’s reign (Shah, 2014, p. 159). Enjoying a large degree of support amongst the professional classes, and particularly solicitors who objected to the military’s control of the judiciary, the MRD attempted to organise a boycott of the 1985 election. In response, the army arrested all
MRD leaders shortly before the elections and kept them imprisoned until the conclusion (Rizvi, 2000, p. 185).

Newspapers were forbidden from printing any coverage of the movement for a boycott (ibid). Distribution of propaganda in support of the campaign was also made an offence under the jurisdiction of the military courts (ibid). Throughout the MRD’s lifespan, the state also took more direct methods, using helicopter gunships to attack MRD stronghold villages in Sindh, killing over a hundred people and arrested many thousands more (Shah, 2014, p. 160). Despite such pressure from the military regime, the MRD managed to assert itself as the only major popular opposition movement to the regime, establishing the careers of several opposition leaders including Zulfikar Bhutto’s daughter, Benazir (Rais, 1988, p. 201).

While the MRD opposition was absent from the National Assembly between 1985 and 1988 due to the boycott, the seeds for the end of the military regime had already been sown. The PML had for many years tethered itself politically to the military, but once it had secured its position in the national assembly it began to behave much more independently than Zia’s regime had anticipated (Rais, 1988, p. 199). Tensions would build throughout the brief lifespan of the 1985 Assembly culminating in a major disagreement between Prime Minister Junejo and Zia over the handling of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Junejo convened an all party conference, which included Bhutto and the PPP, in an attempt to garner a national consensus on the best approach to Afghan transition while neither consulting with nor inviting Zia to partake (Rizvi, 2000, p. 201). Even beyond the ongoing concerns regarding Afghanistan, it was commonly felt by participants that it was time for Zia to step aside and allow for new leadership in the executive (Rais, 1988, p. 200).

Regarding Afghanistan, Zia was determined to wrest as many concessions as possible from the Soviets in order to maximize gains for the Mujahedeen and leave them in total control of the country (Haqqani, 2005, p. 195). Junejo, more focused on the devastating effect the conflict was having on Pakistan’s security, pushed to support the UN’s approach established in the Geneva accords that would see a removal of Soviet forces and mechanisms to protect returning Afghan refugees (Rais, 1988, p. 200). The last straw came when Junejo pursued an investigation into a fire that broke out in a Rawalpindi weapons depot that was being used for storing much of externally supplied munitions that were on their way to the Afghan Mujahedeen (Shah, 2014, p. 161). Exploding shells and ammunition rained down on the nearby population resulting in the deaths of hundreds of people in an incident that drew little in the way of concrete explanations, and much in the way of conspiracy theories regarding the perpetrators and their motives.
On May 29th 1988, Zia dissolved the National and Provincial Assemblies, citing corruption and a deviation from the Islamification agenda (ibid). He announced a new round of elections to be conducted in several months, with every chance they may be postponed indefinitely, as had occurred at many times in the past. The question of whether Zia could have weathered the mounting political opposition became moot when, in August 1988, his military transport plane mysteriously crashed, killing him, several senior military officers and the US ambassador to Pakistan (Shah, 2014, p. 161). The military regime of Zia came to an end, and a new era of democratisation began.

(4.1.2) INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: PAKISTAN, THE US AND THE WIDER WORLD

Pakistan’s situation in a post-Cold War, post Zia international context would be defined by the propagation of two major security problems that were related to its two primary theatres of geostrategic interest; India and Afghanistan. While the ISI continued to build the Taliban to quietly fight a proxy war for control in Afghanistan (National Security Archive, 2007), it would be Pakistan’s nuclear program that would attract increasing concern from the wider world. Especially in the context of continued aggressive stand offs with India over Kashmir.

THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM

The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet system, reduced the significance of Pakistan as a strategic ally for the US, dramatically altering the perception of Pakistan vis-à-vis US security concerns. The nuclear program to which the Reagan administration had turned a blind eye during its proxy war with the Soviet Union, came to be seen as one of the gravest threats to international security in the region (Quester, 1992) (Carpenter, 1993) (Kahan, 1994).

The most immediate threat came in the form of a new era of proliferation that had been jumpstarted by nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan. Khan had been key to developing Pakistan’s weapons program, but by the late 90’s US intelligence had become aware the he had sold his services to several states hoping to develop their own nuclear arsenals (Albright, D. & Hinderstein, C., 2005, p. 111). Worse still, the states Khan aided between 1989 and 1997 (Iran, North Korea and Libya) were already viewed by the US as potential threats (Kahan, 1994) (Albright, D. & Hinderstein, C., 2005, p. 111). With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the existing assumptions
regarding ‘spheres of influence’ that deterred overt conflict between the US and enemy states had disappeared (Carpenter, 1993) (Kahan, 1994, pp. 6-7). By 1991, the US had already engaged one ex-Soviet ally in Iraq, which had failed to complete a nuclear program after the destruction of its own research facilities by Israel in 1981 (Quester, 1992, p. 31). The uncertainties of the new global political landscape added to the growing perception that achieving a nuclear capability was the ultimate form of self-defence.

The secondary concern for the US arose from the nature of proliferation itself. The dissemination of weapons manufacturing expertise meant that the potential for radical groups to attain a crude nuclear weapon dramatically increased (Albright, D. & Hinderstein, C., 2005, p. 113). With several high profile attacks by Islamic militants on US embassies and military bases in the late 90’s, the US became increasingly concerned with the threat posed to its population by even the crudest nuclear weapon- carried, as it may be, by a small group or individual into an American city.

The threat from Pakistan’s nuclear program did not manifest solely in the potential dangers of proliferation. Nuclear tests in India and Pakistan in 1998 made it clear that the tensions between the two countries presented the single most dangerous nuclear flashpoint in the post-Cold War era, posing a danger not only to the region, but to the entire world (Heisbourg, 2010, p. 77). In April/May, 1999, the recently appointed Pakistani Army Chief, General Pervez Musharraf, helped implement a secret operation that sent thousands of Pakistani troops across the Kashmir ‘line of control’ (LoC), surrounding the strategically valuable town of Kargil (Levy, A. & Scott-Clark, C., 2007, p. 288). The troops were made up of Pakistani regular and special forces, as well as Kashmiri Mujahedeen (Murphy, 2013, p. 217). Fighting erupted in the mountains surrounding Kargil, with Indian forces initially suffering heavy losses, but gradually gaining an upper hand on Pakistani forces which became increasingly starved of supplies (Ibid.). On a visit to the front line in June, Prime Minister Sharif threatened India with ‘irreparable losses’ and the use of the ‘ultimate weapon’ if it’s forces crossed the Kashmir LoC (Sidhu, 2007, p. 193).

Prime Minister Sharif was summoned to Washington to explain Pakistan’s action after US satellite images appeared to show Pakistan readying nuclear warheads at Sargodha air force base (Levy, A. & Scott-Clark, C., 2007, p. 287). Sharif maintained that General Musharraf was operating without his consent and that he now feared for his life by objecting to the actions of his own military. Under threat that the Clinton administration
would announce Pakistan was entirely responsible for the crisis, Sharif managed to have the troops pulled back (Sidhu, 2007, p. 193). He was warned shortly thereafter by his attorney general that he was about to be overthrown in a military coup (Levy, A. & Scott-Clark, C., 2007, p. 289). The operation proved a diplomatic disaster and raised serious questions about the ability of a civilian administration to maintain command and control of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal, or to execute authority over the military more generally (Murphy, 2013, p. 127).

AFGHAN BLOWBACK

Another major problem area for Pakistan's international security profile, arose around the spread of radical Jihadist organisations following the Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan. The weapons, funding and training that had been given to Mujahedeen fighters in Pakistan by US intelligence and the ISI had spread out from Afghanistan after Soviet withdrawal, moving to areas of the Middle East where grievances against the United States were strong (Mohamedou, 2011, p. 18). Buoyed by their sense of victory in destroying the Soviet Union, radical Islamists turned on those states that had aided their campaign (Hoffman, 2002, p. 432). Attacks against US, Egyptian, Pakistani and Saudi targets in the early to mid-90's indicated that the Soviet Union had only been the first in a line of states targeted for Jihad (Waever, 1996). The organisation that would become known as Al Qaeda coalesced out this diffused network of extremists, launching major attacks against US embassies in 1998 that killed hundreds and injured thousands (Hoffman, 2002, p. 436).

Under the leadership of Ayman Zawahari and Osama Bin Laden, Al-Qaeda established itself as an organisation with an ambiguous structure that promoted political violence against the enemies of Islam. While the essential characteristics of ‘what Al-Qaeda is’ (Hoffman, 2002, p. 430) are contested, there were a few basic descriptors governing its logic i.e. ‘1)The West is implacably hostile to Islam; 2)The only way to address this threat and the only language that the West understands is the logic of violence; 3)Jihad is the only option’ (Hoffman, 2002, p. 435). Despite inflicting some of the largest casualties on Americans in the time period, Al Qaeda remained just one of a number of organisations that had developed out of the Mujahedeen network of Afghanistan that was
now turning its attention on those states that had once supported them, including Pakistan and the US (Waever, 1996).

Even after major attacks on US personnel in 1998, the ISI maintained links to Bin Laden, making use of Al Qaeda’s Afghan training camps (Levy, A. & Scott-Clark, C., 2007, p. 289). In 2001 US intelligence officials told the New York times that they believed ISI was using such camps for its own purposes throughout the late 90’s (The New York Times, 2001). They maintained that when the US had bombed an Al Qaeda camp in Afghanistan after the embassy attacks, they had found Kashmiri militants with links to the ISI among the casualties (Ibid.).

(4.2) SECTION 2) UNITED STATES SECURITY: ISSUES AND STRATEGY

(4.2.1) INTERNATIONAL DETERMINANTS OF SECURITY STRATEGY

As the Reagan administration came to power in 1980, the major concern in US foreign policy was the potential spread of the Soviet sphere of influence from Asia into the Middle East. The occupation of Afghanistan meant that an enormous contingent of Soviet forces lay on the border with Iran, one of the largest oil reserves in the Middle East. Fears abounded that not only was revolutionary Iran susceptible to either Soviet influence or direct military control, but that Soviet action may not even stop at Iran, thus posing a threat to the US position in the Middle East in general (Chubin, 1983, p. 921) (Ravenhal, 1982, p. 8). While in reality the threat was massively overblown, the perception of impending loss of US control in the region had a significant global impact, with consumer and investment level panics leading to a tripling of oil prices (Ibid).

The US strategic reaction to perceived Soviet expansionism was to attempt to create as many problems for its occupation of Afghanistan as possible. Funding the Islamist uprising against both the Afghan government and the Soviet occupiers was seen as the perfect way to achieve the desired results by proxy, as well as providing a means of extracting revenge for the Soviet support of the Viet Cong in Vietnam (Tanner, 2009, p. 273). While there were some efforts to make direct US/Mujahedeen military aid exchanges, Pakistan presented itself as the perfect through route to supply weapons and training to the Afghans. The Pakistani ISI already had
substantial links to Mujahedeen as Pakistan saw their outright victory as being the best possible safeguard to a India-friendly government in Kabul.

As Paul (1992) determined in his study of the program, the Reagan administration and other senior policy makers justified the aid on four grounds:

1) A permanent Soviet presence in Afghanistan was likely to begin to influence the politics of Pakistan and could, by extension, seriously affect US strategic options in the region

2) It was the most direct means of indirectly supporting Afghan resistance

3) Any major geo-strategic upsets in the region might require Pakistani territory as staging area for US forces

4) Defending Pakistan from the threat of Soviet takeover would increase US prestige with the Arab countries and even China.

Strategic relations between the Zia regime and the United States had soured considerably at the end of the Carter administration. The risk taken by Zia in boisterously rejecting Carter’s $400 million in military aid as ‘peanuts’ was considerable, but his justification signified his confidence in his position: “You take Pakistan out of the region, and you will find that you have not one inch of soil where America can have influence - right from Turkey down to Vietnam (New York Times, 1981).” The Reagan administration appeared to agree, and by September 1981 had agreed a $3.2 billion military aid package for Pakistan (Hagerty, 2005, p. 54); a substantial rise from the $1.7 million donated throughout the entire period of Bhutto’s reign (Haqqani, p.152).

The logic behind such a vast increase can be gleamed from declassified National Security Directives such as NSD 75, where the administration makes clear that its strategy involves using defence expenditure “so that Soviet leaders perceive that the U.S. is determined never to accept a second place or a deteriorating military posture” (FAS, 1983, p. 2). In relation to Afghanistan, this meant that the ‘Soviet’s political, military, and other costs remain high while the occupation continues’; a thinly veiled reference to supporting the mujahedeen (Ibid, p.4).
While the international sphere could be presented as the arena for an historic, existential struggle against Communism, US foreign policy was also grounded in more pragmatic domestic political concerns (Xenakis, 2002, p. 36). The Reagan administration had come to power in the midst of a protracted economic slump which had, in the previous year, been exacerbated by the economic impact of international instability on global energy markets. Despite winning election on the promise of reducing the footprint of government in the American economy, the administration was hamstrung in implementing its ideological vision by the realities of a struggling economy, an opposition controlled congress and a growing deficit (King, D. & Wood, S., 2003, p. 385). Throughout his time in office, Reagan would struggle to make the kind of cuts to US welfare programs and reductions in taxations that had been promised (Ravenhal, 1982).

From the outset though, one of the areas that was designated as completely off-limits to spending reductions was the area of defence spending. The 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act saw an increase of $7 billion in defence spending at a time when over $35 Billion in spending cuts were being implemented (King, D. & Wood, S., 2003, p. 385). The spectre of Soviet expansion provided the justification for the ring-fencing of the defence budget, but other factors played a role.

In the midst of a stagnating economy, the arms industry represented a substantial portion of US manufacturing and was responsible for employing millions of highly skilled American workers (Sievert, 2002, p. 103). A Congressional Budget Office report in the early 90’s estimated that a post-Cold War reduction in US arms exports could cost as many as 75,000 highly skilled jobs in American industry (Ibid). By continuing to spend heavily on new equipment for US armed forces (high tech jet fighters, armaments, communications technology etc.) the administration provided a lifeline to a section of the American economy at a time of stagnation. Indeed, one of the crown jewels of Reagan defence policy was the headline grabbing announcement of the ‘Strategic Defence Initiative’ commonly known as Star Wars, a space based weapons platform designed to secure US dominance in any potential nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union (Schmeder, 2006, p. 258). The program provided up to $3 billion annually for SDI related projects across a range of different industries and sectors. Leading figures in high tech industry hailed the program as a means
of saving the country from post-industrial wreckage (Gallagher, 1984, p. 53) As a Los Angeles Times editorial observed in 1986:

“By the time Reagan leaves office in 1989, the space-based system of anti-missile defence may be so firmly ingrained in the Defence Department’s budget and so vital to the profit margins of the nation’s defence contractors that the new President, whatever his personal inclinations, will have difficulty dislodging it” (Los Angeles Times, 1986).

Maintenance of high defence spending can be seen therefore as providing the ‘communicative’ deterrent effect outlined internally by the administration (FAS, 1983, p. 2), and also a form of government protection to an important industry (Griffin, L.J. et al., 1982). Providing grant aid to other countries provides a similar subsidy to the American defence industry while also boosting the capacity of allied states in something of a win-win subsidy program (Griffin, L.J. et al., 1982, p. 12). On top of this, the Foreign Assistance Act specifically grants the President and the Pentagon discretion to gift surplus defence equipment to approved allies (FAS, 2013). From 1984, guidelines on Foreign Military Financing stipulate that equipment paid for by the US government for foreign states must be either built in the US, or by a US firm using US materials and services (DSCA, 2009, p. 1). Between 1990 and 1995, the US gave away, or sold at steep discounts, some $8.7 billion in weaponry originally purchased for its own forces (Hartung, 1999, p. 8). By 1996, the US state was responsible for financing, through loans or grants, around half of all foreign military sales (Ibid, p.1). The constant upgrading and renewal of US military equipment, combined with the transfer of excess stock had thus successfully performed a dual functionality industrial protectionism and international strategic capacity building.

(4.2.3) THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND TERMINATION OF PAKISTANI MILITARY AID

Pakistan had been a major beneficiary of Reagan era domestic and international defence policy. By 1989 it was behind only Egypt and Israel in terms of military aid distributions (Thorton, 1989, p. 151). However, as the Soviet Union ended its occupation of Afghanistan and entered into a terminal decline, the strategic importance of Pakistan began to come into question. Specifically, the diplomatic costs of Pakistan’s nuclear program became increasingly difficult for US policy makers to ignore.
The 1985 addition of Section 620E (the Pressler Amendment) to the Foreign Assistance Act made aid to Pakistan contingent on its refrain from the manufacture or proliferation of nuclear weapons technologies (Kerr, P.K. & Nikitin, M.B., 2013). While it had been clear as far back as the Carter administration that Pakistan had been in flagrant breach of IAEA protocols on weapons development (Levy, A. & Scott-Clark, C., 2007, p. 65), the amendment also provided the President with the authority to waive restrictions on aid based on the annual certification by the US executive that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear weapon (Fair, 2011). While these assurances were indeed granted, it was clear to the US executive that Pakistan was engaged in nuclear weapons development and proliferation. Declassified records indicate that as early as 1982, Secretary of State George Shultz informed President Reagan of the overwhelming evidence that Zia had broken his assurances regarding weapons development, and was even potentially sharing that technology with ‘unstable Arab countries’ (National Security Archives, 2012). By 1987, State Department officials wrote that Pakistan was approaching the threshold whereby Zia could no longer keep his pledge ‘not to embarrass the President’, such was the obviousness of Pakistan’s weapons program (Ibid).

With the fall of the Soviet Union removing one of the central organising principles for US strategic policy in Asia, President Bush failed to certify that Pakistan had not developed a nuclear bomb and all military aid and transfers of equipment were stopped (Kerr, P.K. & Niktin, M.B., 2013). Military aid or sales to Pakistan would not be re-established in earnest until the mid-2000’s (Centre for Global Development, 2011).

(4.3) SECTION 3) US MILITARY AID TO PAKISTAN

(4.3.1) PRE-CASE STUDY TRANSFERS HISTORY

In line with the foreign aid strategy embodied in the Truman doctrine and formalised with the Mutual Security Act of 1953, US foreign policy in the early Cold War period focused on developing an alliance network that

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1 NB: All data discussed in this section relating to arms sales and defence expenditure has been compiled from my own analysis of the Stockholm Institute for Peace Research’s arms trade registry (SIPRI, 2014 a) and its database of military transfers and spending (SIPRI, 2014 b) unless otherwise stated.
would balance against the Soviet Union (Kronstadt, K.A. & Epstein, S.B., 2013, p. 9). While the experience of developing NATO as European barrier to the Soviet Union had been a fairly successful project, other regional security initiatives were proving more difficult.

Pakistan would become closely associated with not one, but four US mutual security arrangements. In 1954 it joined the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), it was included in the 1958 Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) as well as its precursor ‘the Baghdad Pact’ and also signed a 1959 bilateral security Agreement of Cooperation along with Turkey and Iran that reinforced CENTO (Khan, 1964, p. 195). From the outset however, it was clear to US diplomats that although Pakistan held an important geostrategic position in Asia, it did not have the military capabilities to exert an effective presence in such regional security organisations (United States Department of State, 1954).

![Figure 3 International Arms Transfers to Pakistan 1950-1970 (SIPRI Total Trend Indicator Values) (SIPRI, 2014 b)](image)

For its early history, the United States provided Pakistan with the financial capacity to develop a modern defence infrastructure. The US supplied surplus military equipment in the form of tanks, armoured personnel carriers and aircraft in a massive effort to create a strategically viable anti-Soviet ally that saddled the border of the Middle East and Asia and could act to support alliance networks in both areas (Kronstadt, K.A. & Epstein,
S.B., 2013, p. 9). Britain was also a substantial early partner in these efforts, and was able to take advantage of grant aid delivered to Pakistan by the US to sell some of its own surplus equipment. Much of the arms agreements the British government signed with Pakistan related to developing its naval capacity. The UK transferred around 100 ‘Sea Fury’ aircraft carrier based fighter planes along with several ship based radar and weapon systems. Seven British ‘Destroyer’ class ships and one cruiser were transferred (SIPRI, 2014 a), with much of the funding coming from US military aid grants (Goldrick, 1997, pp. 54-55). The building of Pakistan’s capacity in this fashion was recognised by British Parliamentarians to be a potential hazard to the maintenance of good relations with India, but received widespread parliamentary support nonetheless (HC Deb 08 March 1954 vol 524 cc1718-9, 1954).

The conflict between India and Pakistan over Bangladeshi independence, and in particular the accusations of brutal violence against civilians by the Pakistan military, brought US military transfers under public scrutiny. Despite the illegality of transferring military aid to Pakistan in the midst of such a conflict, President Nixon secretly authorised transfers of US aircraft held by Jordan and Iran to Pakistan (Ghandi, 2002). In the wake of the conflict, and as the military lost control of the country to a civilian leadership under Bhutto, US military transfers to Pakistan become more erratic.
While arm sales do continue in the 1970’s period the India-Pakistan crisis is preceded by a decline in overt US military aid. This trend continues until almost completely bottoming out as relations between the Carter administration and the governments of both Bhutto and Zia reached a ‘dead end’ (National Security Archives, 2012). The lack of military aid in the late 70’s can perhaps be explained by the growing awareness within the Carter administration that Pakistan was attempting to attain a nuclear weapon. More generally, President Carter’s determination to shift away from the ‘ethical and moral poverty’ of previous administrations, and to use American power for ‘humane purposes’ did see the implementation of arms transfer restrictions on states determined to be gross violators of human rights (Stohl, M. et. al, 1984, p. 216). While this may have been a factor in limiting Pakistan’s access to US military aid, studies conducted on the period suggest that overall, US foreign policy regarding military aid did not change significantly between the Carter and Reagan administrations (Poe, 1991, p. 210). The fact that declines in US military aid in the period coincide with a period of civilian democratisation would also challenge any framing of Carter’s foreign policy as following a particularly normative framework in human rights terms.

(4.3.2) REAGAN AID AND CUT-OFF

TRANSFERRED EQUIPMENT FROM US

The relative declines in total military transfers to Pakistan reversed abruptly at the end of the decade. While much of the official financial records show aid and transfers remaining relatively low towards the end of the Carter administration and at the beginning of Reagan’s; the declassified record makes clear that the US had begun to see the transfer of military equipment to both Pakistan itself, and to the Afghan Mujahedeen via the Pakistani military, as key to undermining the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (NSC 0013, January 2, 1980 as compiled in Ostermann, C.F. & Munteanu, M., 2002) (Kuperman, 1999, p. 221).
Figure 5 Military Sales and Military Aid 1980-2000

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Table 1 Military Sales and Military Aid 1980-2000 (Constant 2009 Dollars)
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<td>1979</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
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<td>Heavy Transport Aircraft</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
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<td>6</td>
<td>T-37B</td>
<td>Twin Engine Jet Trainer Aircraft</td>
<td>1979</td>
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<td>Anti-Submarine Destroyer</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1980</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Bell-209/AH-1s Cobra</td>
<td>Combat Helicopter</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1984-85</td>
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<tr>
<td>1005</td>
<td>BGM-71 TOW</td>
<td>Anti-Tank Missile</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1983-86</td>
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<td>Self-Propelled Artillery Gun</td>
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<td>1983-84</td>
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<td>1984-86</td>
</tr>
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<td>Tank</td>
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<td>52</td>
<td>M-88A1</td>
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<td>1981</td>
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<td>1981</td>
<td>1981</td>
</tr>
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<td>Description</td>
<td>Model</td>
<td>Years</td>
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<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
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<td>1982 - 1984-85</td>
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<td>Combat Helicopter</td>
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<td>Anti-Submarine Destroyer</td>
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<td>Commander-680FL</td>
<td>Light Transport</td>
<td>1983 - 1983</td>
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<td>Air to Surface Missile</td>
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<td>Armoured Personnel Carrier</td>
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<td>Year(s)</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Garcia Frigate</td>
<td>1988-1989</td>
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<td>RIM-66B Standard-1MR Surface to Air Missile</td>
<td>1988-1989</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>LAADS Low Altitude Aircraft Detection Radar System</td>
<td>1989-1990</td>
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<td>Ajax Support Ship</td>
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<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>RGM-84 Harpoon Anti-Ship Missile</td>
<td>1990-1996</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 US Military Transfers to Pakistan 1977-1994
The concurrent shocks of both the Soviet invasion and the rapidly degrading relations with post-revolution Iran changed the character of US transfers. With the agreement of a $3.2 billion military grant aid package in September 1981 (Hagerty, 2005, p. 54); the Zia regime set about ordering a huge catalogue of advanced American equipment. While the late 70’s had seen a lot of transfers to bolster Pakistan’s traditional role as a deterrent towards Soviet submarine operations in the Indian Ocean (Goldrick, 1997, p. 54), the dramatic change in materials ordered from 1981 reflect the changing security landscape. Over 100 tanks, 1000 TOW Anti-Tank missiles and 24 M-901s Tank destroyers underline the shift in Pakistan’s strategic focus to fighting a mechanised land army. The Soviet Union had spent the first few weeks of 1980 pouring its forces into Afghanistan. Some 60,000 troops across five divisions; three of them motorised and one airborne (Fisk, 2005, p. 47). While much the substantial body of equipment transferred via Pakistan to Afghan rebels remains classified, many of the officially recorded weapons were sent to facilitate Pakistan’s forwarding of similar weapons to the Mujahedeen. For example, the stinger anti-aircraft missiles sent to Pakistan in 1985 were part of a deal made by Zia whereby the ISI would deliver 100 to the Mujahedeen on the condition his forces were given 100 of their own (Richelson, 1995, p. 412).

In this period, the annual levels of students attending International Military Education and Training Programs more than double from those seen in the 1970’s. Training was conveyed by proxy to Afghan rebels, as Pakistani officers trained by US forces to use the new equipment would in turn train Afghan fighters (Kuperman, 1999, p. 235) (Neuman, 1987, p. 1047). The strategy appeared to pay dividends within a short space of time. The immediate success of the missiles in downing aircraft forced Russian and Afghan forces into abrupt changes in aerial strategy, forcing attacks on rebel territory to be conducted from greater distances with less accuracy (Richelson, 1995, p. 414). Both in the military and the media, the stinger was seen as the ‘silver bullet’ against Soviet occupation. It was triumphantly celebrated with the claim that it had forced the Soviet politburo to begin its withdrawal planning within two months of its introduction to the battlefield, and thereby forcing the eventual end of the Soviet operations in 1988 (Kuperman, 1999, p. 220) (Richelson, 1995, p. 414).
While the sheer volume and diversity of anti-aircraft equipment transferred to Pakistan in the period may speak to the popularity of the strategy, there were good reasons for Pakistan to seek to improve its own air defences. As the Mujahadeen began to make gains in Afghanistan, Afghan and Soviet aircraft would increasingly follow the rebels back across the border into Pakistan and conduct raids in many parts of the North-West of the country (Cronin, 1989, p. 213). The spill over of the conflict in this manner was one of the prime motivators of the Junejo government to seek the most expedient end to the war (Rizvi, 2000, p. 201).

As the Afghan conflict wound down, Pakistan’s approved transfers from the US shifted focus back to the purchase of naval equipment, indicating a return to its classical role in US South Asia strategy as an anti-Soviet naval presence in the Indian ocean (Goldrick, 1997, pp. 54-55).

One of the most controversial purchases made by Pakistan in the Reagan aid period were the advanced F16 fighter jets which Pakistan had used to defend its airspace against Soviet/Afghan incursions (Kerr, P.K. & Nikitin, M.B., 2013, p. 10). However it was feared that the jet had potential ‘dual use’ capability, meaning it could act not only as an aerial attack vehicle but with minor modifications could be used to deliver a nuclear weapon to a neighbouring state (Levy, A. & Scott-Clark, C., 2007, p. 232). This potential was of significant concern in the context of the tensions between Pakistan and India. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and...
the implementation of the Pressler amendment that sanctioned Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, the US not only sanctioned further sales to Pakistan, but embargoed 28 F-16s that were on order (Kerr, P.K. & Nikitin, M.B., 2013, p. 10). The Pakistan government had paid some $658 million to US defence contractor Lockheed Martin for planes it did not receive (Fair, 2011). The incident, coming within the wider context of military sanctions, would be a significant grievance in Pakistani security relations with the US for many years to come (Ibid.).

**PAKISTAN EXPENDITURE**

The significance of the impact of US aid to the military/security state infrastructure in Pakistan in the period can only be understood when taken in conjunction with two other factors; Pakistan’s own defence expenditure and the foreign aid provided by other states. While data on Pakistan’s expenditure data is only available from 1988, it is possible to make a rudimentary comparison with annual aid transfers that were temporally proximate. Annual US aid contributions throughout the Reagan programme were equivalent to roughly 10% of total Pakistan Military Expenditure in 1988. The total Reagan aid programme was close to the total Pakistan military expenditure of 1988; $3.8 billion to $4.1 billion in constant 2009 dollars.

![Figure 7 US Military Aid and Total Pakistan Military Expenditure (Constant 2009 Dollars)](image-url)
While it is difficult to ascertain the impact of military aid on Pakistan’s military expenditure, the period following the program sees decline in both total spending as a proportion of GDP and of the total Pakistani budget in real terms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Expenditure (Constant 2009 $Millions)</th>
<th>Expenditure (% of GDP)</th>
<th>Expenditure (% Total Budget)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>4,185</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>4,198</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>4,430</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>34.49</td>
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<td>6.4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>31.86</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
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<td>4.9</td>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>4,802</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>5,137</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>23.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8 Pakistan Military Expenditure in dollars, as Per Cent of GDP and as Per Cent of Budget (1988-2000)
Pakistan’s important geo-strategic position meant that it attracted support from other states that sought to have influence on the Middle East and Asia. For China, Pakistan had been a significant partner in its efforts to balance against both Russia and India in the region (Rizvi, 2000, pp. 108-09). As such, it had made large transfers of military equipment to Pakistan from the 1960’s onwards. While maintaining a consistent level of support throughout the Cold War, China’s weapons were less advanced and of a much lower quality than that of the US - in many cases providing cheap copies of Soviet weaponry (Dutta, 1998, p. 101). Making purchases of equipment from other states that had catalogues of Soviet weaponry functioned as an important strategy in disguising the origin of support for the Mujahedeen as it was imperative that neither the US nor Pakistan were implicated directly. ISI agents acted as CIA proxies to make purchases of aging Soviet equipment from China, Egypt and Turkey (Yousaf, M. & Adkin, M., 1992, pp. 83-84). Estimates of between 10,000 and 65,000 tonnes of such equipment flowed through Pakistan into Afghanistan between 1982 and 1987 (HRW, 1994, p. 9). This contributed directly to the ‘Kalishnikov culture’ that would profoundly affect Pakistan’s domestic security in the 1990’s (LaPorte, 1995, p. 183), as shall be seen in the following section.

Pakistan’s border with Iran had also made it an attractive ally to Saudi Arabia, which had transferred substantial amounts of aid to develop the Pakistan Sunni religious movement within the state (Nasr, 2000, p. 142). With the onset of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, substantial amounts of Saudi funds were transferred to support the Mujahedeen. As with the US, while Pakistan was an important node in the network of support for Afghan fighters, it was also a recipient, with Saudi’s entering an unofficial arrangement whereby US military aid financing to Pakistan would be matched with Saudi contributions (Kuperman, 1999, p. 228).
DISTRIBUTION OF VIOLENCE

Without comparative data for the periods of the Zia regime it is not possible to say whether transition from military dictatorship to democracy was particularly turbulent in terms of political violence generated. Relative to the other periods for which comparative data does exist, the period would appear to be one of the calmer points in the entire period accounted for by the BFRS dataset, with rates of political violence reaching their lowest point in 1992 (Figure 9).

Figure 9 Frequency of Incidents of Political Violence (1988-99)

² NB: All data discussed in this section has been compiled from my own analysis of the BFRS dataset (Bueno de Mesquita, E.B. et al., 2013) unless otherwise stated
The popular electoral victory achieved by the PPP under the leadership of Benazir Bhutto may have contributed to an atmosphere of progress and political reconciliation within the state, with a party that had been the victim of much state antagonism and repression winning a controlling majority. The electoral outcome (37.6% for the PPP to 29.6% for the NDA) may substantially understate the actual popularity of the new civilian government as the military and ISI, fearing a landslide, had worked to undermine the PPP’s campaign. For instance, a presidential decree barred those without national identification cards from voting which disproportionately affected the PPP’s base including women, and the poor (Shah, 2014, p. 167) while the ISI provided funding to PPP’s opponents across the country (Rizvi, 2011, p. 8). It is therefore possible that the stable, and even declining, trend in political violence reflected a certain degree of success in transitioning from military dictatorship to popular civilian governance. However, when violence occurs in this period, it is intense and highly concentrated along particular geographic and political-ethnographic fault lines that indicate that whatever success democratisation enjoys, there were serious repercussions for the security of particular populations.

Figure 10 Total Deaths from Political Violence (1988-99)
THE MID 1990’S SPIKE

The declining trend in the early 90’s was interrupted with significant increases in violence in the middle of the decade. The large upsurge can be explained by the eruption of political violence occurring in Karrachi in the mid-90’s, in what is known as the Karachi crisis. As can be seen from an analysis of the geographic distribution of violence, the province of Sindh accounts for over half of all political violence recorded in the BFRS data set within the period 1988-1999 (Figure 11). Isolating the most violent year, 1995, shows that Sindh is the location for some 87.8% of incidents of political violence (Figure 12). Within Sindh, 89.8% of all incidents occur in Karachi (Figure 13). As such a large portion of the violence occurred in and around Karachi and thus much of the analysis in this section will focus on explaining its prevalence.

KARACHI AND SINDH

Political violence in Sindh, and specifically in Karachi has evolved out of the social tensions established by the violent birth of the state itself. The mass exodus of Muslims from India to Pakistan following partition created its own ethnographic split. The term “Mohajirs”, meaning refugee in Urdu, refers to those Pakistanis who have fled to Pakistan since its inception and encompasses nearly 10% of the overall population. As the initial capital of Pakistan, Karachi was the focal point for a majority of Mohajir migration in the decades following partition. The influx of such a large population created a steady increase in tensions with the native Sindhi population and indeed, the Pakistani state itself. This was apparent in important political junctures, such as the 1964 Presidential elections when the Mohajir had overwhelmingly supported Fatimah Jinnah, sister of Ali, over the Gohar Ayub Khan, son of the military ruler. The population suffered a violent backlash from the state for going against the established political-military elite. Riots resulting from the restriction of Mohajir language (overwhelmingly Urdu), increasing Mohajir activism and violent repression by police and state security forces added to mounting political tensions throughout the 70’s and 80’s.
<table>
<thead>
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*Figure 11 Frequency of Incidents by Province (1988-1999)*

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*Figure 12 Frequency of Incidents by Province (1995)*
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*Figure 13 Frequency of Incidents by Cities within Sindh (1995)*
In 1988, while the PPP was enjoying a popular victory at the national level, the Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM) won landslide municipal election victories in Hyderabad and Karachi. The MQM had established itself as the political wing of Mohajir resistance in the mid 1980’s and now wielded considerable power in urban Sindh. It had a large body of militant activist support amongst a population that was young, educated, underemployed and angry with a political hierarchy that continued to treat them as second class citizens.

Pakistani political parties had a strong sense of regional identity, particularly the PPP which established itself amongst the rural Sindhi population, and treated the refugee population with suspicion. The MQM provided a disenfranchised population, that had little in the way of cultural or geographic common heritage with a
platform to reject ‘regional nationalism’ in favour of more idealistic view of a homogenous Pakistani
nationalism that they saw as more in line with the state’s founding ideals (Ahmar, 1996, p. 1033).

Despite tensions within Sindh, progressive elements of both parties saw an opportunity for cooperation
between the MQM and PPP, both as a way to integrate a community that had been isolated from Sindhi
society (from the Mohajir perspective), and to present a strong balance against Punjab based political parties
(from the Sindhi nationalist perspective) (Haq, 1995, p. 998). In December 1988, the MQM agreed to enter into
coalition government, giving an important 13 national assembly seats to an otherwise narrow PPP majority.
The arrangement proved short lived, not only because of disingenuousness on the part of the PPP, but from
escalating tensions in Sindh (Ibid).

On 30th September, 1988 in an incident known as ‘Black Friday’ or the ‘Hyderabad Carnage’, Sindhi militants in
jeeps opened fire indiscriminately at several cross-roads in Mohajir areas of Hyderabad, killing dozens of
people (Verkaaik, 2004, p. 79). In response, Mohajir’s attacked Sindhi populations in Karachi the following day
with an estimated two hundred people dying over the course of the two day eruption of violence (ibid.). In
May 1990 in Hyderabad, a demonstration led by Mohajir women and children was brutally crushed by police
officers resulting in the deaths of 60 demonstrators- again, violent reprisals were carried out in Karachi,
resulting in over 130 more deaths (Haq, 1995, p. 999). The increasing frequency of such incidents led many
Mohajirs to believe they were no longer safe in rural Sindh or the other provincial urban centres, leading to an
even greater concentration of their numbers in Karachi (Verkaaik, 2004, p. 79).

At the national level, the relationship between the MQM and the PPP had become untenable. By October
1989, the MQM had left the coalition and had supported a vote of no confidence in Bhutto’s government,
throwing its support behind the Islamic Democratic Alliance (IDA), the huge conservative alliance led by Nawaz
Sharif (Haq, 1995, p. 999). The swing in support is understood to have been facilitated by ISI (Rizvi, 2010, p.
110). The IDA won a slender victory over the PPP in a campaign that has since been found to have attracted
over £10 million in ISI funding for PPP rivals (The Guardian, 2012). The new relationship would not be much
more fruitful for the MQM, who quickly found themselves the target of a military crackdown due to their
increasing political autonomy within Sindh.
As violence against Mohajirs mounted, the MQM increasingly became a paramilitary presence in cities, eastbalishing ‘decoits’; self-policed enclaves of urban Sindh (Fair, 2005, p. 119). The failure of the party to establish itself as a political ally to either PPP or IDA governments further increased the perception of the MQM, and Mohajirs generally, as a community cut adrift from the rest of Pakistani society. Accordingly, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif ordered the military to come up with an operation to restore security in Sindh by cracking down on terrorist and criminal elements. The resulting ‘Operation Cleanup’ was in effect more a sustained campaign of violence against government opposition with both the PPP, in rural areas, and MQM in the cities (Rizvi, 2010, p. 105). The military, despite being uncomfortable facilitating the power struggle of a civilian administration, took to fighting MQM activists to re-establish control over large swathes of urban Sindh.

The administration of Nawaz Shariff was almost as short lived as that of Benazir Bhutto. The PML allied Islamic Democratic Alliance facilitated a move to consolidate civilian power by moving to change the constitutionally derived power of the President to dissolve a sitting government. The bid failed, not least due to declining support among the military for Shariff’s domestic security policy. It also resented the failure of the administration to prevent the termination of military assistance from the United States under the Pressler Amendment, and it’s placement on the State Department watch list for countries sponsoring terrorism; thus locking Pakistan out of the US commercial arms market (Rizvi, 2010, p. 105). The constitutional crises that erupted in the struggle between President Khan and Prime Minister Sharif led eventually, under pressure from the army, to the resignation of both and a new round of elections. In October 1993, Benazir Bhutto and the PPP were returned to power.

Throughout the early 90’s, the military conducted continuous operations to counter the dominance of the MQM in urban Sindh. Using paramilitaries to support one wing over the other, the military managed to split the MQM into two wings, the MQM-H and the MQM-A. In-fighting between the group spread and Karachi became increasingly divided into sectors controlled by different MQM factions, the PPP and the state. Armed violence had become more dramatic, with militants attacking police stations and vehicles with bombs and
rocket propelled grenades (Fazila-Yacoobali, 1996). New propaganda newspapers appeared, creating competing narratives and apportioning blame for daily incidents of violence occurring in the city (Ibid).

Bhutto’s return to power did little to quell tensions in the Sindh. The failure of the MQM to agree a provincial power sharing deal with the PPP, the factionalisation of the MQM into competing paramilitary powers, and the persistent manipulation of actors by the army and intelligence forces through both violent repression and clandestine support, produced a violently anarchic situation (Haqqani, 2005, p. 234). (LaPorte, 1995, p. 183).

Karachi in 1995 was seen as cauldron of violent political conflict to rival Beirut and Sarajevo.

All of these conflicts were facilitated by the massive influx of cheap weaponry that had poured into Afghanistan during the war, and now in turn poured across the border into Pakistan (LaPorte, 1995, p. 183). A ‘Kalashnikov culture’ overtook Karachi as these weapons empowered a range of non-state actors involved in a plethora of intersecting and competing ethnic, criminal and political networks (Wilke, 2001, p. 27) (The New York Times, 2001). The continuing draw of the city for migrants meant that existing sectarian tensions between native Sindhis and Mojahirs were supplemented by increasing numbers of Pathans, Beharis, and the large Afghan refugee population (LaPorte, 1995, p. 183). The lawlessness of large parts of the city facilitated the rise of organised crime that extorted different sectors of the population through intimidation and violence. For her part, Bhutto used the crisis as means to use the military to further crack down on the MQM, having PPP workers identify prominent members of the party as the criminals and insurgents responsible for Karachi’s chaos (Haqqani, 2005, p. 234). The military went along with the crackdown in large part due to their belief that violence in the province was the result of Indian agitation in retaliation for similar clandestine operations carried out by the intelligence services in Indian controlled Kashmir (Ibid).
The period also saw growing concerns, both domestically and internationally, relating to the security of women in Pakistan (HRW, 1999) (Tomar, 2001, p. 125). The ‘Zina’ offences detailed in the Hudood Ordinance introduced by Zia had far-reaching implications for the security of women. As Human Rights Watch observed in 1999, increased social control of women was an important part of the military strategy in courting the religious right (HRW, 1999, p. 21). Alterations to the criminal statutes regarding rape placed an almost insurmountable evidential burden on any potential prosecution i.e. four men of Muslim faith and good reputation must witness actual penetration (Mehdi, 1997, p. 102). A lesser charge is available if this evidential burden cannot be met, but it is executed solely at the discretion of the sitting judge (Ibid.). The criminalisation of adultery also created significant weakness in the law relating to sexual violence. Due to the proximity in the description of the act of adultery and the act of rape in the ordinances, a woman could put forth a claim of rape only to be accused of adultery herself; a crime carrying a potential 10 years custodial sentence and 30 lashes of a whip (Mehdi, 1997, p. 107).

The result is that women were at significantly increased risk from sexual violence in post-Zia Pakistan. Men were less likely to be charged for the crime, and women were less likely to report it. Within this time period the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan estimated 8 women were raped every 24 hours, with at least half of that number being minors (Tomar, 2001, p. 125) (HRW, 1999, p. 30). Beyond its legislative structural facilitation, state actors were also implicated as perpetrators with a 1989 study indicating as many as 43% of women in custody reporting experiencing sexual exploitation by the police (Mehdi, 1997, p. 106). Rape in police custody became a common occurrence, as did the granting of pardons in exchange for sexual favours (Tomar, 2001, p. 126). In 1994 Karachi and Lahore both created Women’s Police stations in response to the growing numbers of complaints of custodial abuse, but these initiatives were drastically under funded (HRW, 1999, p. 45).

Gangs and political factions that had gone to war with each other in areas such as Karachi had used sexual violence as a means of social control, placing women between at threat from front lines and the police forces ostensibly there to protect them. The state also did little to address the continued practice of ‘Honor Killing’,
with senior members of police dismissing a continuing trend of women dying under suspicious circumstances from immolation as resulting from ‘defective stoves’ (HRW, 1999) despite some 215 cases of such cases being reported in Lahore in 1997 alone (Ibid, p.1). While honor killings were thought to be prevalent within Pakistan during this time, there is very little in the way of reliable data that can testify to their frequency (Knudsen, 2004, p. 2).

RISE OF SECTARIANISM

The second most violent province in Pakistan in this time period, accounting for roughly a third of all incidents (Figure 11), was Punjab. Gradually, throughout the 1990’s, Punjab became a hub for the burgeoning problem of sectarian violence between Sunni-Deobandis and Shias (Grare, 2007, p. 129). Zia’s Sunni orientated Islamification process had already created a divide between the two communities within Pakistan, and tensions continued to grow even after the regime was replaced by civilian administrations (Rafiq, 2014, p. 16).

In Punjab in particular, a growing population of Sunnis who had gained wealth while working in the Arabian gulf states and had been exposed to Wahhabism, returned with an appetite for a more reactionary Sunni politics (Murphy, 2013, p. 127). These returning Sunnis resented the position of Shia landlords that controlled large swathes of rural Punjab, giving support to militant sectarian political groups, the foremost of which was Sipah-e-Sahaba(SSP) (Grare, 2007, p. 130). Between 1990 and 1997, Suni militants killed over 581 Shia and injured over 1600 in a wave of assassinations, bombings and mosque attacks (Murphy, 2013, p. 128). In 1996 an even more radical offshoot of SSP, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ,Army of Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, founder of the SSP) established itself with the aim of having Shia declared kafirs, non-Muslims, and to have foreign religions driven from Pakistan. The group was given strong financial backing from Saudi supporters (Murphy, 2013, p. 130).

In 1997 alone there were 193 deaths from sectarian violence, a marked increase from previous years. In response, Prime Minister Sharif launched a crackdown against militants in Punjab. According to claims made by Pakistani human rights activists and echoed by both the Amnesty International and the US State Department, Sharif’s operation was in effect a campaign of extra-judicial killing by state security forces. It was alleged that hundreds of people with links to various sectarian organisations were murdered in faked or staged
police ‘encounters’ such as road stops or burglaries (BBC, 1999) (United States Department of State, 2000). However, the LeJ was able to find safe haven by moving across the border to Afghanistan, where they enjoyed support from the Taliban despite their status as quasi-proxy entity of the Pakistani military (Kak, 1998, p. 1123). In response to the crackdown, LeJ came close to killing Prime Minister Sharif with a roadside bomb in January 1999 (Rafiq, 2014, p. 21). Later that year, Sharif was overthrown in a military coup by General Musharraf. The minor efforts towards political reconciliation that had begun to have traction during Sharif’s administration, were jettisoned.

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Figure 15 Frequency of Event Types within Punjab (1988-1999)
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*Figure 16 Frequency of Attacks in Punjab by Party Responsible (1988-1999)*
INCIDENTS AND ACTORS

While the BFRS data is successful at giving an indication as to the general trends in the geographic and temporal distribution of violence, the question of establishing the typology and identity of the various participants is a little more ambiguous. Throughout the time period, the vast majority of violence is categorised as assassination (Figure 17, which is defined within the BFRS as “an attempt by a nonstate entity intended to kill a specific individual” (de Mesquita, E.B. et al., 2014, p. 9). The definition is necessarily broad and indeed much of the violence carried out within Sindh and Punjab in the time period involves attacks on specific individuals based on their political activities. However, it leaves significant ambiguity around the identity of the actors involved. In Karachi in particular, accounts from the period describe the daily appearance of bodies, brutally tortured and murdered, with a large degree of contestation regarding responsibility for such deaths (Fazila-Yacoobali, 1996). This phenomenon seems common in contemporary urban conflict zones from Mexico to Iraq, where lines between ‘low intensity conflict’ and ‘high intensity crime’ become blurred (Leiken, 2012, p. 3). The contestation seems particularly problematic when we take the definition of assassination to preclude the actions of state forces. The record of violence carried out by the army is particularly low in the BFRS account, despite the fact that Operation Clean-up is known to have authorised direct military action against political targets in the areas of most intense violence throughout the mid 90’s. Even if we accept that accounts of direct action against political violence are low in number, it is also clear that a substantial portion of the state’s military action was carried out by paramilitary forces. The US State Department’s own assessment of Karachi violence concluded that many political of the political assassinations attributed to competing political factions had been carried out or facilitated by state security forces (United States Department of State, 2000).
<table>
<thead>
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Figure 17 Frequency of Event Types 1988-99
Figure 18 Frequency of Incident Types in Sindh 1988-99

Figure 19 Frequency of Incident Types in Punjab 1988-99
The geographic distribution of violence may also have had a significant impact on the accuracy of the data. While the patterns showing the location of Sindh’s violence are fairly clear due to its largely urban origins, Punjab’s violence is much more normally distributed across the province. The largest urban centre, Lahore, accounts for roughly a third of the violence experienced within the area, indicating rural insecurity was a bigger problem in Punjab. It may also go some way as to explaining why, despite a strong body of qualitative accounts covering the sectarian violence in the province, relatively little of the violence in the BFRS dataset is directly attributed to sectarian actors. Nearly half of all violence within Punjab is attributed to unknown actors (Figure 16). This may be an effect of the lack of penetration by journalists into the rural areas where much of the violence occurred- or it may be an effect of the complex web of state and non-state actors involved in political and sectarian murders which wilfully obfuscated their responsibilities for individual attacks. It is, most likely, some mixture of both of these elements.

(4.5) CONCLUSION

The US Pakistan strategic relationship in the period is complex and tied to major geopolitical changes in the region that heralded, amongst other things, the end of the Cold War. There have been fluctuations but a common pattern emerges in the period of the case study, and the time leading up to it. Notwithstanding the array of differing contexts in which aid policy is decided in each case, the US has in recent history, been more inclined to giving military aid to Pakistan’s military regimes than it has to civilian administrations. While it would seem that this is merely a result of changing strategic realities, it nonetheless has had the effect of providing an important degree of external support and legitimisation for the military at a time when it was profoundly reshaping the political character of the Pakistani state.

While there was a great deal of instability within the state between 1988 and 1999, the centres of violence were, by measure of the data, quite heavily concentrated in specific areas. Of the three main sources of political violence identified, all have a structural relationship to the nature of the Pakistan as a political entity, or to the particular reform agenda implemented by the Zia military government. As the area accounting for the vast majority of violence, Sindh, and more specifically Karachi, reflects one of the central features of Pakistani
political history- its division from India. The political tensions that exist between the Mohajir population, and other sections of the political hierarchy in the country are perhaps a reflection of the scars wrought by the nation’s turbulent birth. But the continuation of violent confrontations in the contested space occupied by Mohajir political groups and the state, indicates a determination both by civilian and army executives to treat the contestation of Sindh as national security problem, with a military solution. Aggressive military engagement to attempt to implement stability in the ‘ungoverned space’ that was Karachi in the mid-90’s seems to have had a profoundly detrimental human security impact. Perhaps more problematically for the broader picture of human security, the reforms established under Zia such as the Hudood Ordinances, Zina laws and the normalisation of sectarian privilege, not only generated greater insecurity in this time period, but would continue to cause significant problems in the next one.
CHAPTER 5

CASE STUDY 2: MILITARY AID AND HUMAN SECURITY 2000-2011

(5.0) INTRODUCTION

The following chapter represents the second case study period of the thesis. As with the first case study, the first two sections will establish the political context for both the donating and recipient state while the last two sections contribute an analysis of the specifics of aid policy and human security.

In Section 1, Pakistan’s security environment will be discussed in relation to both domestic and international contexts. It will outline the tumultuous period following the coup that brings Pervez Musharraf to power and as well as exploring the political tensions arising from the military’s return to executive control. In particular, the tensions with India and problematic strategic relationship with the US before 9/11 will detailed.

In Section 2, the overall shift in US foreign policy as it transitioned from the pre to post 9/11 context will be discussed in terms of their relationship to both Pakistan and the wider world. The nature of the American engagement with Pakistan immediately after the attacks is of particular significance in developing an understanding of how the new strategic relationship was conceptualised, what its boundaries and qualifications were, and to what extent these aims were actualised.

The military aid basis of the new relationship will be detailed in Section 3, providing a breakdown of known aid programs from the US as well as the details of Pakistani arms purchases made from US manufacturers in the time period. Pakistan’s own expenditure on defence will be analysed in conjunction with incoming military aid, as well as levels of foreign assistance and sales emanating from Pakistan’s other strategic allies.

Finally, Section 4 will offer a detailed analysis of the factors affecting human security in the time period. The second case study period is distinctive for a substantial upturn in levels of insecurity within the state, with violence increasing in frequency and intensity across a number of areas in a more diffuse manner than seen in
the first case study. The rise in organised anti-state violence will be explored in terms of its impact for the broader population, as will the large scale military responses of the state in the time period.

(5.1) SECTION 1) PAKISTAN SECURITY: ISSUES AND STRATEGY

(5.1.1) DOMESTIC CONTEXT: REESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY CONTROL

When Musharraf seized power in October 1999, he did so in the context of one of the most dangerous flashpoints in the post-Cold War age. Pakistan and India’s close brush with all-out war over Kargil had brought the world’s attention back to the longstanding conflict between the two countries, now armed with formidable nuclear arsenals. Having been at the centre of the planning of the Kargil operation himself, it was difficult to see how India would react with anything other than deep suspicion (Ganguly, 2000, p. 6).

In February 1999, India and Pakistan had entered high level peace talks in an attempt to limit the potential for conflict between the two nuclear states. Measures to reduce unintentional provocation were discussed that included a military command hotline; sharing of information regarding nuclear production capabilities and mutual agreements to prevent such installations being targeted; advance warning about major troop redeployments; plans to stop air space violations and a joint ban on the production or use of chemical weapons (Blood, 2002, p. 9). The ‘Lahore Declaration’ was a much vaunted indicator of détente in India-Pakistani relations, although the perception of Sharif and his Indian counterpart Bihari Bajpai growing closer was deeply resented by many influential actors in Pakistani politics (Malik, 2001, p. 363).

According to then high-ranking members of the Pakistani military, the peace talks indicated an attempt by Sharif to restrict the army’s control of the state (Siddiqa, 2007, p. 97). They occurred in the context of the resignation of two army service chiefs, and the removal of Article 58 (2) of the 1973 constitution granting the president the right to dissolve the National Assembly, which had been previously used by the military to curtail civilian control (Koithara, 2004, p. 92) (Siddiqa, 2007, p. 106). As an Urdu speaking Mohajir overseeing an army that was predominantly Punjabi-Pashtun, even Musharraf’s appointment by Sharif was seen as an attempt to limit the influence of the Army Chief of Staff on the executive, by undermining his authority within the military
hierarchy (Haqqani, 2005, p. 248). After Kargil, tensions mounted as many suspected Sharif would launch an inquiry that would place blame on the army high command and allow for steps that would permanently establish civilian authority over the state (Siddiqa, 2007, p. 97).

Sharif’s approach failed to shield the office of the prime minister from military control, and as it became clear that another military coup was being formulated he attempted to pre-empt this action by moving to ‘retire’ Musharraf while the general was on a trip to Sri Lanka on the 12th October 1999 (BBC, 2007). The military refused to acknowledge orders from the Sharif’s new army Chief of Staff, ISI director, General Ziauddin. Within hours the 111th Infantry Brigade, nicknamed ‘the Coup Brigade’ for its part in Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s overthrow, had moved to capture state buildings and broadcast facilities in Islamabad (Shah, 2014, p. 243). Sharif’s house was surrounded and the Prime Minister was taken into military custody. Within 17 hours of Sharif’s attempt to fire Musharraf, the state media had announced the prime minister’s dismissal from office (BBC, 2007). He would be found guilty of hijacking over his attempts to prevent Musharraf’s plane returning to Pakistan and sentenced to life imprisonment (subsequently lessened to an agreement of exile) (Shah, 2014, p. 186). The immediate aftermath of the coup saw a crackdown on political opposition, the arrest of politicians and the banning of public of demonstrations (Murphy, 2013, p. 139).

The rise in corruption under Sharif and Bhutto’s administration had established some legitimacy for the military coup, but the military had not been able to agitate enough discord in the population to incite popular demonstrations and strikes of sufficient size to trigger his resignation, as had been the strategy in previous attempts to remove sitting civilian governments (Malik, 2001, p. 372). The woeful performance of the Pakistani economy, which made it one of the most impoverished and underdeveloped countries in the world at the time, was a significant factor in establishing popular legitimacy for the coup as historically, the economy has performed better under military regimes than civilian ones (Koithara, 2004, p. 92). Sharif himself had admitted that under civilian governance the non-military institutions of the state had decayed, and had even asked the army to take control of public utilities such as the water and power agency, and the education system in an attempt to stem endemic corruption (IISS, 1999, p. 1). This popular perspective did not however account for the fact that one the largest burdens on the economy was the massive indebtedness of the state, 80% of which had accrued under military regimes; and with the military receiving 40% of the budget at the time, it was a situation that seemed unlikely to change (Ganguly, 2000, p. 6).
Whatever the popularity of the move to unseat Sharif, the task of justifying the move internationally would be more complicated. Aware of the deep unease with which the modern international community saw army coups, Musharraf made a concerted effort to make the takeover less militaristic than previous iterations, giving himself title of ‘Chief Executive’ and rejecting the characterisation of his rule as ‘martial law’ (Shah, 2014, p. 187). He regularly stated that the goal was never to have permanent military governance, stating that the “armed forces have no intention to stay in charge any longer than is absolutely necessary to pave the way for true democracy to flourish in Pakistan (Ibid).” Promises were made to keep a free and open press, civilian politicians and activists were given roles within the governing ‘National Security Council’, and prominent members of civil society were invited to contribute to various reform strategies (The Independent, 1999) (Murphy, 2013, p. 138).

In reality, Musharraf was pushing to consolidate military control of the state (Rashid, 2009, p. 51). Once again, the ISI would be instrumental in maintaining the army’s preferences within the political institutions of the country, helping establish a new right wing political party to serve as the face for the military government, the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid e Azam Group) (PML-Q) (Shah, 2014, p. 191). The intelligence agency capitalised on the turmoil gripping Sharif’s PML-N and used coercion, blackmail and bribery to attract members to the new party (Ibid). The ISI’s corruption investigation unit, the National Accountability Bureau, used the information accrued on politicians to attain their support for the actions of the military government (Rashid, 2009, p. 52). Throughout the formative years of it’s rule, the military would also use significant amounts of money to buy favour from the public, paying for public demonstrations of support and the transporting of voters to polling stations (Shah, 2003, p. 26).

Musharraf declared himself President in 2001, announcing the formal dissolution of the national assembly and the stepping down of the placeholder head of state, President Rafiq Tarar (BBC, 2001). Elections were announced for 2002 that would be heavily restricted in favour of pro-army parties, as well as a referendum that sought to give Musharraf a five year mandate to serve as President. The result was a 98% vote in favour of Musharraf, from a 70% turnout – suspected to have been the result of widespread rigging (Talbot, 2002, p. 312).
Despite the shallow legitimacy held by the regime, Musharraf nonetheless set about establishing a much-needed program for reform of Pakistan’s state institutions (Murphy, 2013, p. 139). Taking as his inspiration Atatürk’s Turkey, Musharraf sought changes to the social cultural and economic makeup of the Pakistani state (Lau, 2007, p. 1300) (Jones, 2003, p. 19). He made early successful strides into decentralisation of government, and had attempted to liberalise education and improve representation for women, minorities and the poor (Murphy, 2013, p. 139) (Talbot, 2002, p. 323). Such reforms were not just seen as necessary for the basic functioning of the state, but also were increasingly vital in addressing the growing radicalisation of conservative religious forces in the country.

But even minimal efforts towards civil society reform encountered strong resistance from the landed aristocracy and Islamist groups that formed the backbone of the military regime’s support (Talbot, 2002, p. 322). In April of 2000, it was announced at a human rights convention that in order to counteract spurious or malicious usage, all blasphemy cases would be subject to a preliminary investigation by a Deputy Commissioner before being escalated to prosecution (CSW, 2000). Human rights campaigners hailed the announcement as a step in the right direction, as many charges under the blasphemy laws carried the threat of significant jail terms and even the death penalty (Ibid). This fairly modest proposal for reform was met with uproar. A coalition of Islamist parties organised a large protest for the 19th of May, but three days before it had even started, Musharraf announced the abandonment of the reforms (Jones, 2003).

Protests against the military takeover of power on the other hand, did not enjoy as much success. In December 2000, the Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD) had been established, largely at the behest of the PML-N and PPP, to challenge the rule of the military (Talbot, 2002, p. 322). The organisation quickly became one of the Musharraf regime’s principal domestic political targets and was attacked by the state based on measures contained within ‘Maintenance of Public Order’ ordinances that banned strikes, protests, processions and any speech broadly deemed “prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public order” (HRW, 2002). On May 1st 2001, a year on from the protests that had defeated Musharraf’s proposed reforms, Police in Karachi cracked down on ARD protestors using baton charges and tear gas, arresting some 300 people. They joined some 850 ARD members who had been detained in Sindh in previous weeks, with many more to come as demonstrations critical of the government in any way were targeted by the police (Ibid).
Musharraf’s regime existed in a thin space between the advertised political reformer who had promised fundamental change to the status quo, and the entrenched elite from which it derived its authority. The balancing act required in negotiating this space was not merely a domestic concern, but was also the primary determinant of Pakistan’s foreign policy. It was imperative for the Musharraf regime to portray itself internationally as amenable to rapprochement with India, while appeasing those in both the military, and the political hierarchy who sought no strategic concessions with their eternal competitor (Talbot, 2003, p. 199).

(5.1.2) INTERNATIONAL SECURITY CONTEXT: INDIA, AFGHANISTAN AND THE PARADIGM SHIFT OF 9/11

KASHMIR

Pakistan and India’s arms race had stood in marked contrast to the assumed ‘peace dividend’ that was predicted to characterise the post-Cold War period (Ferreira, 2005, p. 510). The continued tensions over Kashmir were a significant source of concern for western powers, particularly the US (Kapur, 2005, p. 144). While the initial conflict in Kargil had been costly in lives (some 1100 are estimated to have died (Blood, 2002, p. 9)), India claimed that a further 5000 militants, soldiers and civilians had been killed in Jammu and Kashmir by the end of 2000 (ibid). By 2000 the military build-up between Pakistan and India had led to the two states becoming the 9th and 4th largest army’s in the world respectively (Faruqui, 2000, p. 50).

While India boasted a 1.2 million strong force, Pakistan’s 600,000 soldiers represented a far greater portion of its society (Ibid). Pakistan also significantly outspent India by proportion of GDP, and had nearly bankrupted itself in the process, particularly in its negotiation of the nuclear program which had made the state all but dependent on foreign economic assistance (Malik, 2001, p. 364). However, the shield of mutually assured destruction allowed Pakistan to prosecute it’s proxy conflict with India in Kashmir by means of militant Deobandi jihadists such as Jaish-e-Mohammad(JeM), Harket-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). These groups which had been facilitated by the Pakistani military and ISI for years, could conduct terrorism
and attacks against Indian forces while shielding the state from explicit, although strongly suspected, responsibility (Swami, 2006, p. 190)(Bajpai, 2003, p. 113).

India too had realised that the nuclear ‘deterrent’ actually provided some room for tougher strategic engagement, due to the unlikelihood of either country wilfully escalating reaction to military exchanges with their opponent up to the scale of an all-out war (Kapur, 2005). In the wake of Kargil, India drew up a policy of coercive diplomacy that outlined various limited military actions that could be taken against Pakistani forces near the border with Kashmir to compel the state to cease aggressive behaviour (Sankaran, 2014)(Kalyanaraman, 2002, p. 479). Primarily, India considered seizing thin slices of territory from Pakistan in the event of further aggression or terrorist acts, in order that the Pakistani military did not see such actions as being ‘costless’ simply by way of the existence of nuclear deterrent (Ibid)(Kapur, p.148).

This strategy was promptly tested when, on 13th December 2001, militants with connections to LeT and JeM conducted a brazen assault on the Indian parliament in Delhi (Fair, C.C. & Chalk, P., 2006, p. 16). Five gunmen approached the building in a car with official markings and began a 30 minute firefight with security staff after being challenged at the gate (Jones, 2003, p. 28). Six members of security as well as a gardener were killed, along with the gunmen. While no group took responsibility for the attack, the Indian government assumed the involvement of Islamic militants with links to Pakistan (Schaffer, H.B. & Schaffer, T.C, 2011, p. 151). Coming in the immediate wake of 9/11, there was significant public pressure for India to react in a similarly strong fashion to the US (Jones, 2003, p. 28). Over 200,000 Indian troops amassed on the LoC and demanded the shutting down of terrorist training camps, prompting a concerted diplomatic intervention by the US to prevent another major outbreak of hostilities in Kashmir (Schaffer, H.B. & Schaffer, T.C, 2011, p. 253). The mobilisation, known Operation Parakram, would keep Indian troops on high alert for the next ten months (Kalyanaraman, 2002).
Even before the attacks of 9/11, Pakistan had been under increasing international pressure for its support of another quasi-proxy force, the Taliban. The ISI had helped create the Taliban out of the competing factions that arose in the aftermath of the Soviet occupation and subsequent civil war, using it as a bulwark against the potential establishment of any pro Delhi government in Kabul (Fair, C.C. & Chalk, P., 2006, p. 15) (Maley, 2000). The great fear within the military leadership was that India would seek to gain a foothold within Afghanistan, thus effectively surrounding Pakistan and making the nightmare scenario of annexation all the more likely (Faruqui, 2000, p. 50). Thus Afghanistan was seen as the ‘second theatre’ of the Indo-Pakistani conflict (Maley, 2000). Throughout the 1990’s, Pakistan’s military had supported both the Taliban and those members of the Mujahedeen who sought to conduct Jihad in Kashmir by supplying military equipment to training camps in Afghanistan (Fair, C.C. & Chalk, P., 2006, p. 27).

After the coup, the relationship became even more difficult to defend, as global civil society became increasingly outraged at what they saw as a brutal, racist, misogynistic regime in Afghanistan (Murphy, 2013, p. 139). At the strategic level, the Taliban’s support for Al Qaeda within Afghanistan was increasingly intolerable to the US in the wake of the 1998 embassy bombings and the attack on the USS Cole. It had been Afghanistan’s training camps that had been bombed in response to those attacks, and the discovery of Kashmir militants with connections to Pakistani intelligence among the dead further increased the pressure on Musharraf to distance himself from the Taliban (The New York Times, 2001). While he engaged in criticism of the harshness of the religious conservatism of the regime, he refused to abandon the Taliban, such was their perceived strategic importance in balancing against India (Murphy, 2013, p. 139). All of these factors added to the image of Pakistan as a diplomatic liability in the eyes of many western states (Rashid, 2009).

The attacks on the US on September 11th radically changed Pakistan’s value in relation to US strategic objectives and allowed Musharraf the potential to realise a vision for its security priorities that would allow it to negotiate the difficult space between its tough stance on India, and its involvement in a war against radical Islamist militants. He outlined 5 conditions through which Pakistan would support the US and its war against Al Qaeda:
“(1) that Pakistan’s armed forces should not be pressed to engage in military action outside of
Pakistan’s borders (in Afghanistan or Iraq); (2) that the coalition should seek to minimize
“indiscriminate” killings of innocents; (3) that any post-Taliban government in Kabul should be friendly
to Pakistan, that the Afghans themselves should choose it, and that Afghanistan’s ethnic demography
(meaning Pashtun majority) should be factored into its composition; (4) that the Kashmiris’ struggle
for self-determination should not be defined as terrorism and the Kashmiri guerrillas’ struggle not be
made a target of a broad coalition crackdown on regional terrorism; and (5) that there should be no
international move to disarm Pakistan’s nuclear and missile defences (Wirsing, 2010, p. 72)”.

These conditions gave Musharraf space to balance competing strategic priorities at both the international and
domestic level. In essence, he could trade support for the Taliban in Afghanistan to prevent the designation of
Pakistani Islamist groups in Kashmir as targets for the war on terror. While it was clear that the west expected
Pakistan to terminate support for such groups, there wasn’t an insistence that they be eliminated by the state,
a prospect that would pose serious problems for Musharraf’s domestic base of support. Military intelligence
began to carefully select radical groups with which it believed it could risk continuing to work with, and
targeted those with whom it could not (Fair, C.C. & Jones, S.G., 2010).

Accordingly, in a major speech in January 2002, Musharraf stated that ‘no organisation would be allowed to
perpetuate terrorism behind the Kashmir cause’. He outlined groups such as LeT that would be banned, with
arrests of several prominent militant leaders following. Their release a few weeks later indicated the cosmetic

While the pressure from the international community had certainly caused Musharraf to reign in the militant
organisations to the level of ‘moderated Jihad’, even the military had begun to fear that the radical Sunni
groups within the state were beyond control (Fair, C.C. & Chalk, P., 2006, p. 16). This became apparent after
Lashar-e-Toiba linked gunmen attacked an Indian military base in Kashmir killing 31, including civilians and
army family members (Kapur, 2005, p. 149). The attack caused a major international crisis and again inched
India and Pakistan towards an all-out conflict, prompting diplomatic interventions from the US, Britain and
Russia (Talbot, 2003, p. 200). The thin space in which Musharraf would operate his foreign policy, between
proxy militants and counter-terrorism alliance with the US, would remain narrow throughout the lifetime of his
regime. But whilst some Islamist leaders had supported Musharraf’s engagement with the US War on Terror for the sake of Kashmir, for other groups, Pakistani cooperation made his regime, and the state, a target for a new wave of political violence (Talbot, 2003, p. 201) (Ibid).

(5.2) SECTION 2) UNITED STATES SECURITY: ISSUES AND STRATEGY

(5.2.1) DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONTEXT OF US FOREIGN POLICY

With the changing of administrations in the US, foreign policy had taken on a somewhat ambiguous character. President Clinton’s time in office had been characterised by active interventions into the post-Cold War world in order to attempt to create a sense of order in the unipolar moment. But as Walt observed, without the Soviet Union the US had found itself in a position of ‘unprecedented preponderance’ (Walt, 2000, p. 64). With an economy 40% larger than its nearest rival, a military budget larger than the next six biggest spenders (four of which were close allies) and the world’s leading technological innovator (Ibid) the US had the power to affect change in any number of ways, but very little prescription as to where to start. This preponderance may be reflected in the significant debate that occurs in the time period over Clinton’s humanitarian interventions, both hailed as indications of the benevolence of American power (Kagan, 1998) and as evidence of its incessant imperial ambition (Bricmont, 2006).

Condelezza Rice, writing in her capacity as foreign policy advisor to the Bush campaign in 2000, seized upon the confusion of purpose by stating that “the United States has found it exceedingly difficult to define its ‘national interest’ in the absence of Soviet power” (Rice, 2000, p. 45)."

“The process of outlining a new foreign policy must begin by recognizing that the United States is in a remarkable position. Powerful secular trends are moving the world toward economic openness and more unevenly-democracy and individual liberty. Some states have one foot on the train and the other..."
Some states still hope to find a way to decouple democracy and economic progress. Some hold on to old hatreds as diversions from the modernizing task at hand. But the United States and its allies are on the right side of history” (Rice, 2000).

The sentiment expressed in the initial outlines of a Bush foreign policy were, appropriately for the wider context, quite vague. And while the invocation here of Fukyama’s ‘end of history’ thesis indicates a tendency towards a more zealous vision of American ideological supremacy, the practical recommendations did not differ significantly in scope from those of the previous administration. Namely, there would be a focus on opening new markets and avenues for trade, maintaining important strategic relationships, continuation of a relatively high defence budget for the potential projection of force, and strengthening diplomatic engagement with Russia and China (Ibid).

As with many facets of American politics, 9/11 changed everything. In the War on Terror the Bush administration found the clarity needed within which to frame American Foreign policy in the new century. The complexities that had characterised Clinton’s intervention, the moral ambiguity of projecting overwhelming military force in failed states, melted away as a traumatised American public provided a mandate for the aggressive prosecution of a war with a clear moral framework. As Rice herself would later tell an audience at the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, the post 9/11 period had presented an ‘enormous opportunity’ to reassert US global leadership in a manner not seen since the end of the Second World War (Budd, 2013, p. 167).

As has been discussed in much of the critical terrorism studies literature, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 an entire industry of counter-terrorism commentary came into existence, the likes of which had not been seen before (Winter, 2010). Idea’s such as Samuel Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilisations’, which had been subject to heavy scholarly criticism on first release in the 1990’s, became a bestseller and key cultural touchstone (Bottici, C. & Challand, B., 2006, p.222). The US media became fixated on the grave threat posed by an ‘evil other’, presenting a word where the US was at risk of total devastation from the barbaric machinations of a plethora of terrorist groups (Kellner, 2004). Potential threats were identified as arising from a wide variety of sources, and new measures were drafted by the state to deal with them. The creation of a Department for Homeland Security was expedited in response to the attacks, and by October 26th, the Patriot Act- which gave
massive new powers to the state in terms of monitoring and prosecuting an its domestic security program—was signed into law (Kam, C.D. & Kinder, D.R., 2007, p. 320). Critics would maintain that in introducing such policy in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the Bush administration was able to capitalise on the fears of the American public to advance a radical political agenda that would not otherwise have been possible, as the entire country shifted into a war footing (Harvey, 2007, p. 25) (Kellner, 2004, p. 47) (Kam, C.D. & Kinder, D.R., 2007).

Consequently, 9/11 not only radically changed the dynamics of US politics but had a significant impact on the economy. Aside from the direct and indirect costs of the attacks themselves, which the OECD estimated amounted to some $500 billion, there were reverberations throughout many sectors of the economy (Rhee, 2005, p. 443). In the immediate aftermath, fears abounded that US markets, which were still recovering from the deflation of the so-called ‘dot.com bubble’, would be severely damaged by the shock and uncertainty generated by the attacks. The concerns that new uncertainty would restrict new investment led to the federal reserve taking interest rates to nearly 1% and holding them there for the next three years (Altman, 2009, p. 4). These low interest rates, combined with a high degree of liquidity would go on to play a significant part in the 2008 financial crisis by fuelling a rise in sub-prime loans from cheap credit (Ibid).

The dramatic impact of 9/11 on the US and the wider world was difficult to fully appreciate in the immediate aftermath. What was clear, was that the Bush administration had found the new framework for American leadership in the new century. The language of the 2002 National Security Strategy described a unique moment in which the US could act to defend peace, and spread the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world (Bush, 2002). But despite the criticism that the US would receive over the coming years for acting unilaterally, the document also stressed the importance of building a network of likeminded allies through which this strategy could be accomplished.

As Holland observes, this new vision for Bush’s foreign policy could be surmised in one key sentence, delivered within the President’s address to the nation the night following the 9/11 attacks: “We will make no distinction between the terrorists and those who harbour them” (Holland, 2012, p. 2). However, as the complex strategic relationship with Pakistan would demonstrate, the distinction between allies and those who supported radical Islamic militants would not be readily apparent.
THE MUSHARRAF PROBLEM

The Clinton administration had viewed Pakistan with increasing frustration towards the end of the 90’s. The Kargil incident had been extremely costly for Pakistan’s credibility as Washington had held Pakistan to be the aggressor in the incident, further cementing the perceived pivot towards India as the main ally in South Asia (Sidhu, 2007, p. 193). What little strategic value the US government placed on its relationship with Pakistan seemed to drain quickly in the midst of the political turmoil emanating from its historic ally (Guihong, 2003).

When Pervez Musharraf took control of Pakistan in a military coup there was confusion over how to react in the US. While the State Department sought sanctions, the Department of Defence argued that no punishments should be applied lest the already poor strategic relationship between US and Pakistani military be further compromised (Rashid, 2009, p. 48). In any event, having already restricted much of the military aid to the country, the only other major steps would have been to cut off Pakistan from IMF economic assistance, a move NSA advisor Samuel Berger maintained at the time would have caused the collapse of the country (Ibid). As it stood, the coup automatically made Pakistan subject to new sanctions under Section 508 of the Foreign Assistance appropriations act, on top of the sanctions already due to its nuclear weapons program (Kronstadt, 2009, p. 34).

The care which Musharraf and the army took to give a framing of legitimacy to his regime was carried out with an eye to Pakistan’s deteriorating diplomatic relationship with the US (Swami, 2006, p. 190) (Guihong, 2003, p. 146). Throughout the 1990’s, significant ground had been lost to is neighbour in terms of courting US favour as it became clear that India’s diminishing relationship with Russia, and growing economic capacity increasingly made it an invaluable regional ally (Zoellick, 2000, p. 71) (Schaffer, 2002, p. 33). The US maintained relations with the Musharraf regime, largely for reasons of security strategy, despite the apparent conflict with US
interests apparent at the heart of the military regime now running the country. The implication of the ISI in the hijacking of an Indian airliner by Kashmiri militants (Jones, 2003, p. 29) (Talbot, 2003, p. 198) and the openness within which senior Al Qaeda members operated in the country (Rashid, 2009, p. 48) raised serious questions about the compatibility of US foreign policy and the Pakistani security state. American security experts feared that the main lesson Pakistan had taken from the Afghan war, was that low intensity conflict by Islamic insurgents could successfully force large military powers from a particular area- a strategy the US did not want to see used against a major ally (Tellis, 2004, p. 111). The backlash from exiled politicians such as Benazir Bhutto, who declared the Pakistani army ‘infected by extremists’ linked to the Taliban (Ibid, p. 52) crystallized the diplomatic difficulties faced by the Musharraf regime.

The Bush administration seemed to cement the Clinton policy of pivoting towards India in its early foreign policy (Schaffer, 2002). Seeing the economic potential from the vast Indian market, it moved to strengthen diplomatic and trade ties with Pakistan’s existential rival (ibid). From a security standpoint, it reigned in US demands for India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and sought the relaxation of sanctions that had been implemented after India’s 1998 nuclear tests (Guihong, 2003, p. 153). Importantly, it did not move to relax similar sanctions in play against Pakistan. Instead the US focused its efforts in trying to get Pakistan to distance itself from the Taliban in Afghanistan (Schaffer, H.B. & Schaffer, T.C, 2011, p. 34).

9/11 AND AFGHANISTAN

Such efforts became less of a diplomatic mission than stark ultimatum in the hours after the attacks of September 11 th , 2001. According to declassified documents, two days after the attacks Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage met with the head of the ISI, General Mahmoud Ahmed, and told him that ‘Pakistan must either stand with the United States in its fight against terrorism or stand against us (National Security Archives, 2001).’ In the 15 minute meeting, Mahmoud professed Pakistan’s unqualified support for US objectives and denied the ISI’s, now well documented, support for the Taliban. The newly appointed ambassador delivered a similar message to Musharraf, who also accepted US objectives in rooting out Al
Qaeda, but warned that the US needed to be prepared to maintain stability in Afghanistan, and that Islamabad wanted ‘a friendly government in Kabul (National Security Archive, 2001(a)).’

As had been pushed for by the US, Musharraf made a public speech stating that Pakistan gave its full support in the hunt for the terrorists responsible for the attacks. However, Musharraf was at pains to avoid admitting to, or detailing, any actual military assistance that Pakistan would give to such a mission, stating that it would continue to act in conformity with its support for the state of Afghanistan (New York Times, 2001). If the wording felt weak to international observers, Musharraf had legitimate justification for disguising the extent of Pakistan’s facilitation of American operations- as shortly after bombing began, police and paramilitaries found themselves in pitched battles with thousands of protestors at Shabaz air force base, which had been made available to US forces (The Guardian, 2001(a)).

In private audience with Deputy Secretary Chamberlin, Musharraf went further than he had in his public statement, accepting US objectives without condition, raising only ‘security and technical issues that need to be addressed’ (National Security Archive, 2001(a)). He promised that Pakistan would cease all logistical support for Bin Laden emanating from the state and to stop Al Qaeda members at the border (Schaffer, H.B. & Schaffer, T.C, 2011, p. 137). Also, that Pakistan would provide blanket access to its airspace, as well as territorial access when necessary, and that it would continue to share intelligence information on Al Qaeda operatives. Finally, Musharraf promised that Pakistan would cut ties with the Taliban, if it saw evidence that implicated Bin Laden and the Taliban continued to refuse to hand him over (ibid). These points broadly reflected the demands outlined by Armitage to Mahmoud in the weeks previous.

As the US prepared to launch a major military operation against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, senior government officials in Pakistan attempted to limit the scope of American action in order to prevent full scale regime change. Attempting to act as a broker between the US and the Taliban, Mahmoud delivered the US’s non-negotiable demands to Taliban leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar (National Security Archive, 2001(b)). Those were; that the Taliban hand over Bin Laden to the ICJ or extradite him, that they hand over 13 top Al Qaeda associates, and that they close all training camps (ibid). Mullah Omar did not dismiss the demands, but maintained that the Taliban’s credibility would be fatally undermined if they handed over Bin Laden to the west without evidence of his complicity in the attacks (Greiner, 2015, p. 89). The US was unwilling and, as it
happened, unable to produce solid evidence linking Bin Laden to 9/11, but maintained that the evidence for Al Qaeda’s responsibility was clear and self-evident. Over the next week, Mahmoud continued negotiations, but as the Taliban stalled, seeking Bin Laden’s ‘voluntary departure’, the US prepared for an assault on Afghanistan. In a memo to the President on the 30th of September, Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld indicated the US was moving beyond consideration of a limited operation to capture Bin Laden:

“If the war does not significantly change the world’s political map, the U.S. will not achieve its aim/ There is value in being clear on the order of magnitude of the necessary change. The USG [U.S. Government] should envision a goal along these lines: New regimes in Afghanistan and another key State (or two) that supports terrorism (To strengthen political and military efforts to change policies elsewhere (National Security Archive, 2001(c))).”

The ISI chief pleaded with the US, maintaining that if the Taliban lost power, Afghanistan would return to warlordism, flying in the face of the administration’s own objectives not to get sucked into a protracted nation building exercise (National Security Archive, 2001(d)). Despite last ditch efforts by the Taliban to have Bin Laden expedited to Saudi Arabia (a move the Pakistani military was extremely supportive of), on 7th October, the US launched Operation Enduring Freedom (Guardian, 2001(b)). With the failure to reach a negotiated handover of Al Qaeda personnel, Pakistan ceased diplomatic support for the Taliban and began supporting US operations in Afghanistan (National Security Archives, 2001(d)). Beyond the support for the air campaign outlined by Musharraf, Pakistan sent two infantry brigades, intelligence corps and Special Forces to the Afghan border to capture fleeing Al Qaeda members (Fair, C. & Jones, S.G., 2011, p. 167). Some 4000 frontier corps were used to patrol the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, an area that could provide safe haven to militants crossing the border(Ibid).

When Colin Powell met with Musharraf in mid-October, it was in the context of markedly improved US-Pakistan relations. He hailed the regime’s abandonment of the Taliban, the freezing of terrorist assets and the quelling of anti-western protests without unwarranted force (National Security Archive, 2001(d)). He assured Musharraf that moves to relax sanctions relating to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons were underway, and stated that as long as moves towards elections and a calming of the situation in Kashmir continued, congressional support for an enhanced relationship would be forthcoming(Ibid). Indeed, in the months following 9/11 the
Bush administration made a number of moves that would provide Pakistan with considerable relief from sanctions and debts, along with an influx of direct economic aid (Schaffer, H.B. & Schaffer, T.C, 2011, p. 140). On top of this, as covered in the following section, the Pakistani army, as a key component in the ‘global war on terror’ was in line to receive an enormous new military aid package.

(5.3) SECTION 3) US MILITARY AID TO PAKISTAN

(5.3.1) US MILITARY AID AND THE WAR ON TERROR – ‘IMPLEMENTING THE BUSH DOCTRINE’

Despite a growing reputation for unilateralism in its foreign policy, strategic alliances were a key part of US foreign policy under the Bush administration (Bush, 2002, p. 5)(Table 3). Central to any construction of an alliance were plans for close interaction in security operations between the US and its allies (Ibid). The two central planks of such interaction were the expansion of US military presence in overseas countries, and the expansion of military assistance to develop the capacity of various state and non-state actors who could act as partners in the prosecution of the global war on terror. Aid was formulated as a mechanism of support for actors of varying identities in two broad ways. Firstly, as Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld made clear in the initial stages of the conflict, aid was to be made available to non-state actors mutually opposed to those regimes that the US saw as representing a threat or source of support for terrorists.

“The U.S. strategic theme should be aiding local peoples to rid themselves of terrorists and to free themselves of regimes that support terrorism. U.S. Special Operations Forces and intelligence personnel should make allies of Afghanis, Iraqis, Lebanese, Sudanese and others who would use U.S.

3 NB: All data discussed in this section relating to arms sales and defence expenditure has been compiled from my own analysis of the Stockholm Intitute for Peace Research’s arms trade registry (SIPRI , 2014 a) and its database of military transfers and spending (SIPRI, 2014 b) unless otherwise stated.
equipment, training, financial, military and humanitarian support to root out and attack the common enemies (National Security Archive, 2001(c))”

This strategy would play a central role in the eventual overthrow of the Taliban in Operation Enduring Freedom, with the US providing support for anti-Taliban groups that broadly coalesced under the so-called Northern Alliance.

The secondary, and more broad geostrategic function for US aid in the War on Terror, was to bolster the capacity of allied states to fight against terrorist threats, or other states that posed a threat to the US or its interests. The US enjoyed a large degree of international support for its military operations following 9/11, with some 136 countries offering some form of assistance, 90 countries participating in counter terrorist operations, and some 27 countries participating in Operation Enduring Freedom (Tertais, 2004, p. 138). But as focus shifted away from specific terrorist networks to the state centric ‘axis of evil’, international commitments of military support significantly reduced. Many long standing strategic allies and partners such as Germany, France and Russia came to actively oppose what was seen as a destabilising turn in US foreign policy (Tarnoff, C. & Lawson, M.L, 2011, p. 61). While some 49 countries publically supported the US invasion of Iraq, only 16 actually committed military forces (Tertais, 2004, p. 138).

The ‘threat nexus’ perceived by the US was seen to encompass any state that the was suspected of sponsoring terrorism and had the capacity to build or acquire weapons of mass destruction and grew to include Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria (Squassoni, 2006, p. 8). The US fell back on what were seen as tried and trusted allies who could be relied upon to support global policy regardless of the growing diplomatic backlash to the perceived geostrategic revisionism apparent in in America’s negotiation of the war on terror (Ikenberry, 2002). Foreign military financing operations between 2002 and 2005 outlined over 70 states that would be in line for funding, with Israel, Egypt, Pakistan, Jordan, Turkey and Colombia taking the most substantial shares (Bureau of Resource Management, 2003, pp. 75-77) (US Department of State, 2005). Both Afghanistan and Iraq would also become major recipients in 2002 and 2003 as the US attempted to re-build the security capacity of those states.
Table 3 Presidential Proposal for Department of State and International Assistance Programs (Office of Management and Budget, 2002, p. 229)

Presidential Proposal for Department of State and International Assistance Programs

- Targets military and economic assistance to sustain key countries supporting the United States in the war on terrorism;
- Trains foreign law enforcement and armed services to improve their counter-terrorist capabilities;
- Attacks narcotics trafficking in source countries through training, equipment and law enforcement cooperation;
- Provides employees at U.S. diplomatic missions with safe, secure, and functional facilities;
- Promotes democracy and protection of human rights throughout the world;
- Maintains strong U.S. leadership in funding the international HIV/AIDS prevention and care campaign;
- Affirms America’s tradition of international humanitarian relief for refugees, displaced people and victims of disasters;
- Increases the U.S. commitment to preserving the world’s tropical forests and promotes environmental sustainability;
- For the first time, links U.S. support for international financial institutions to performance;
- Ensures continued U.S. leadership in responding to threats to international peace and stability through peacekeeping activities; and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International Security Assistance</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Military Financing, grants and loans</td>
<td>3,568</td>
<td>3,716</td>
<td>3,847</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic Support Fund</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>2,254</td>
<td>2,334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-Mining, and Related programs</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Security Assistance</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, International Security Assistance</td>
<td>6,368</td>
<td>6,528</td>
<td>6,760</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 Federal Budget Allocations for International Security Assistance (Clemens, 2004, p. 457)
FMF disbursements were supplemented by the Economic Support Fund (ESF), which while not categorized as military aid, is a form of economic assistance donated with the aim developing the security infrastructure of the recipient state or relieving a stressed economy of a strategic ally (Apodaca, 2013) (Schoultz, 2014, p. 101). It has historically been used as a secondary mechanism in US military aid programs, with money being transferred from the State Department, separate from straightforward development funds usually distributed by the chief development arm of the US government, USAID (Schoultz, 2014, p. 101). Funding for training (IMET), peacekeeping, de-mining and other more minor security operations also continued to be made available for US partner states (Clemens, 2004, p. 457).

Beyond these existing mechanisms for distribution of military aid, the Defense Appropriations Act of 2002 created a new source of funding, by opening access to the Defense Emergency Response Fund to partners in major American strategic operations. The Coalition Support Fund (CSF) was ostensibly available to offset some of the costs incurred by the 49 nation ‘coalition of the willing’ engaged in various aspects of the war on terror (US GAO, 2007, p. 3). In reality, as the recipient of 81% of CSF in its first few years, the fund acted as massive extension to existing US military aid to Pakistan (US GAO, 2008, p. 19). As a source of funding aimed to directly to support US military operations, CSF comes under the direct authority of the Department of Defense, rather than the Department of State, and is thus not classed as foreign assistance (Congressional Research Service, 2015).
(5.3.2) US MILITARY AID TO PAKISTAN

As US Pakistani relations became more reconciliatory in the urgent atmosphere of 9/11’s aftermath, the Bush administration made changes to several areas of policy to facilitate a renewed strategic partnership. Over the course of September and early October 2001, the US announced initial aid packages worth some $1 billion, with an immediate $500 million appropriation to the Pakistan Treasury for balance of payment support (Schaffer, H.B. & Schaffer, T.C, 2011, p. 140) (The New York Times, 2001). These funds were intended to help relieve economic stress on Pakistan in exchange for its participation in US Afghan operations, to aid in securing the border, conduct of anti-terrorism operations and support for Afghan refugees (HRW, 2002). On October 16th, both houses of congress authorised the waiving of restrictions applicable to Pakistan for its continued development of nuclear weapons, the 1998 nuclear tests and the 1999 military coup (Blood, 2002, p. 11). In July 2002, the administration alerted congress to the first arms sales to Pakistan in over a decade (Ibid).

While the US also intervened on a number of economic areas in this period, including facilitating the disbursement of $135 million in IMF loans (Momani, 2004, p. 47), the opening of access to US arms was a significant victory for the Musharraf regime, as the disbarment of the Pakistani military from making such purchases were among the main factors in declining military support for Sharif’s government in 1990 (Rizvi, 2010, p. 105). As such, foreign military sales agreements from the US to Pakistan jumped from zero in 2001, to $24 million in 2002 and to $164 million in 2003 (DCSA, 2008, p. 4).

In June 2003 President Bush met with President Musharraf at Camp David in order to set a structure for US-Pakistani strategic relations for the coming years. President Bush announced his intention to seek congressional approval for a 5 year $3 billion aid package that was, ostensibly to be half economic, half military assistance (Kronstadt, 2007, p. 3). The addition of coalition support funds however, meant that the aid actually delivered to Pakistan would be heavily weighted towards supporting the activities of the military (Congressional Research Service, 2015). With Economic Support Funds in the form of direct cash balance of
payments relief for the government accounting for much of the economic aid, a substantial majority of US financial support was thus geared towards supporting the military regime and its security capacity (Ibid).

As time progressed, support for Pakistan became more politically contentious in Washington. While the 9/11 commission report had identified it as one of the most important allies in the war on terror, significant questions had grown amongst intelligence experts about the sincerity of Pakistan’s anti-terrorism campaign (Beehner, 2006). The persistent accusations of collusion between sectors of the military and violent Islamist groups made support for Pakistan evermore politically contentious (Ibid). In an echo of the Presidential guarantees of good behaviour that had been necessary for the Reagan-Zia relationship, so too did congress stipulate that further aid to Pakistan from FY 2008 would be reliant on the President certifying that Pakistan was “making all possible efforts” to end Taliban activities on Pakistani soil (Kronstadt, 2007, p. 4). Despite these growing concerns, the Bush administration maintained strategic aid and access to US arms for the remainder of its time in office.

Both the Bush administration and the reign of Pervez Musharraf came to an end within a few months of each other, and incumbent President Asif Ali Zardari maintained that “Pakistan has the will to confront violent extremism and terrorism, but we need American support to do it (The New York Times, 2009)”\(^\text{3}\). Despite persistent concerns of Pakistan’s collusion with US designated terrorist organisations, the new administration of Barack Obama did not substantially change the dynamic of strategic assistance. After meeting in the White House with Army Chief of Staff General Ashfaq Kayani, the administration announced an extension to the Bush era military aid program (The Washington Post, 2010). The deal would be worth some $2 billion in military aid, not including Coalition Support Funds, and would see an increase in Foreign Military Financing funding from $200 to $300 million (Ibid) (US GAO, 2011).

What would become the ‘Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act’ or ‘Kerry-Lugar bill’, also proposed a substantial increase in funds for improving civil society institutions. The administration maintained the act provided a structure for a new type of relationship with Pakistan, one that addressed both its lack of economic development and the deep unpopularity of the US among the population (Indyk, M.S., Lieberthal, K.G. & O’Hanlon, M.E., 2013, p. 101). But the mechanisms within the bill designed to bypass central government to target projects on the ground led to serious criticisms from Pakistani political elites and the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program or Account</th>
<th>FY 2002-2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Counternarcotics Fund</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Military Financing</td>
<td>2455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Military Education and Training</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement</td>
<td>642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund</td>
<td>1900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Security Related</strong></td>
<td><strong>5710</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Survival and Health</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Assistance</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Support Funds</td>
<td>5705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Aid</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights and Democracy Fund</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Disaster Assistance</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration and Refugee Assistance</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Economic Related</strong></td>
<td><strong>7556</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coalition Support Fund Reimbursements</strong></td>
<td><strong>9999</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>23265</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 Direct Overt U.S. Aid Appropriations and Military Reimbursements ($Millions) to Pakistan Fiscal Years 2002-2009 (Congressional Research Service, 2015)
military, which portrayed the bill to the domestic population as being rife with conditionality and thus as an infringement of state sovereignty (Ibid, p.102). This perception might have been fuelled by particular stipulations within the Act, which required the US President to certify that 1) Pakistan was cooperating with the US in efforts to dismantle its nuclear supplier networks 2) That the government of Pakistan was making significant efforts towards combating terrorist groups and that military/intelligence support for such groups has been terminated 3) Guarantees that the military was not subverting the judicial or political process in Pakistan (US GAO, 2011, p. 4).

In total, the US would pledge over $23 billion in direct overt aid to Pakistan between 2002 and 2011 (Congressional Research Service, 2015). Of this figure, nearly $16 billion related to direct financial support for the Pakistani military (Congressional Research Service, 2015). Of the economic based aid given, some 85% came in the form of Economic Support Funds, cash transfers to the state which subsidised state expenditure (Kronstadt, K.A. & Epstein, S.B., 2013, p. 11).
While the Pakistani army used Foreign Military Financing to buy a number of useful items for counterterrorism operations, a substantial portion of the funding was used for ‘big ticket’ items; major pieces of high tech weaponry. The F16A fighter aircraft and assorted components seen in Table 6 would account for nearly half of all sales from 2000-2011. Also purchased under FMF:

- Eight P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft and their refurbishment (valued at $474 million, four delivered, three of which were destroyed in a 2011 attack by Islamist militants);
- At least 5,750 military radio sets ($212 million);
- 2,007 TOW anti-armor missiles ($186 million);
- 6 AN/TPS-77 surveillance radars ($100 million);
- 6 C-130E Hercules transport aircraft and their refurbishment ($76 million);
- The Perry-class missile frigate USS McInerney, via special EDA authorization (65 million for refurbishment; now the PNS Alamgir);
- 20 AH-1F Cobra attack helicopters via EDA ($48 million for refurbishment, 12 delivered); and

As can be seen from the above, a substantial majority of funding went towards the purchase of major high tech weapon systems that had been unavailable to Pakistan on the open market for the period of sanction under the ‘Pressler Amendment’. Much of the equipment fulfils a dual use potential, in so far as they could be either used to fight against insurgents, or in support of a conflict with a major military power. Certain items, such as the Perry Class missile frigates, offer little in the way of supporting counter-insurgency as they are primarily designed for anti-aircraft and anti-submarine operations, neither of which are capabilities held by insurgent forces (Polmar, 2005, p. 161).

The majority of Coalition Support Funds are geared towards supporting Pakistan’s operations in the North West (FATA), where Pakistan was seen as a key ally in engaging retreating Taliban and Al Qaeda forces and
providing support to US operations in ‘Af-Pak border’ region (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013, p. 78). Both the Pakistani army and the semi-paramilitary Frontier Corps operate in the region to achieve these objectives for which the US has a standing agreement to cover costs (Markey, 2008, p. 10).

In its study of use and oversight of Coalition Support Funds, the US Government Accountability Office found that Pakistan was receiving between $80-100 million a month from CSF (US GAO, 2008 a, p. 14). The significant costs attributed to Pakistan’s use of Coalition Support Funds attracted State Department scrutiny. Investigations into the legitimacy of claims led to a marked increase in deferred or rejected reimbursements as many costs presented by the Pakistani military were held to have insufficient connection to operations relating to the war on terror (Ibid). For example, Pakistan had claimed over $200 million for provision of radar services in FATA between 2004 and 2007, but had further claims deferred that year after the State Department comptroller found insufficient detail had been produced to justify the costs, considering militants in FATA had no air attack capability (US GAO, 2008 a, p. 10). Other claims such as $45 million for roads and bunkers that could not be evidenced, or $3.7 million in navy maintenance costs for a fleet of less than 20 vehicles indicated that there may be a significant problem with misallocation of CSF money (Ibid, p. 13). The US embassy in Pakistan announced in 2008 that it feared that as much as 70% of CSF, some $5.4 billion, had been misappropriated by members of the Pakistani military (The Guardian, 2008).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Volume</th>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Year of Order</th>
<th>Year of Delivery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>6V-53</td>
<td>Diesel APC Engines</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2005-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Bell-205/UH-1 Huey-2</td>
<td>Helicopter</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Cessna-208 Caravan</td>
<td>Light transport Aircraft</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>Paveway</td>
<td>Guided Bomb</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>CT-7</td>
<td>Turbo Prop Aircraft Engine</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
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<td>T-37B</td>
<td>Trainer Aircraft</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2009-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
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<td>Combat Helicopter</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Bell-412</td>
<td>Helicopter</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2004-05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>BGM-71 TOW</td>
<td>Anti-Tank Missile</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2006-08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>C-130E Hercules</td>
<td>Heavy Transport Aircraft</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2005-07</td>
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<tr>
<td>300</td>
<td>AIM-9L/M Sidewinder</td>
<td>Short Range Air to Air Missile</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>AN/TPS-77</td>
<td>Mobile Three Dimensional Air</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2008-09</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Search Radar</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>F-16A</td>
<td>Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2005-08</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>P-3CUP Orion</td>
<td>Anti-Submarine Warfare Aircraft</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2007-12</td>
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<td>50</td>
<td>RGM-84L Harpoon-2</td>
<td>Anti-Ship MI Surface to Surface Missile</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2006-07</td>
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<td>500</td>
<td>JDAM</td>
<td>Guided Bomb</td>
<td>2006</td>
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<td>M-109A5 155mm</td>
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<td>2006</td>
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<td>1600</td>
<td>Paveway</td>
<td>Guided Bomb</td>
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<td>TF-50</td>
<td>Gas Turbine for Fast Attack Boat</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2007-08</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>AAQ-33 Sniper</td>
<td>Advanced Targeting System</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quantity</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Model/Version</td>
<td>Start Year</td>
<td>End Year</td>
</tr>
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<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
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<tr>
<td>500</td>
<td>AIM-120C</td>
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<td>2007</td>
<td>2010-13</td>
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<td>3198</td>
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<td>Anti-Tank Missile</td>
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<td>F-16C Block-50/52</td>
<td>Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2010</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>Anti-Ship MI Surface to Surface Missile</td>
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<td>2009</td>
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<td>Bell-205/UH-1 Huey-2</td>
<td>Helicopter</td>
<td>2008</td>
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<td>Bell-209/AH-1F Cobra</td>
<td>Combat Helicopter</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2010</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Bell-412</td>
<td>Helicopter</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>DB-110</td>
<td>Aircraft Based Reconnaissance System</td>
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<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>2010</td>
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<td>20</td>
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<td>Armoured Personnel Carrier</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>AIM-9L/M Sidewinder</td>
<td>Short Range Air to Air Missile</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6 US Arms Transfers to Pakistan 2000-2011
(5.3.4) PAKISTAN EXPENDITURE

Whilst Pakistan’s military expenditure has increased year on year since 1988, it has fallen over time as a percentage of total expenditure, as can be seen in Figure 21 and Figure 22. As Shah has noted, US foreign assistance in the first few years of the war on terror substantially enhanced the state’s strained spending capacity (Shah, 2014, p. 189). With international sanctions limiting access to markets, the state had been in a state of deep economic crisis (Hussain, 2004, p. 14). Together, military expenditure and the servicing of interest accrued on its $42 billion debt was accounting for 65% of all state spending (Datta, 2010, p. 72). The fact that Pakistan was able to avoid significant cuts to its defense budget is testament both to the power of the military in general, and the depth of popular fear of India (Pew Research, 2010) (Ibrahim, 2009, p. 21). With access to US arms markets reacquired, the military spent a substantial amount of its own money purchasing more ‘big ticket’ items from US defence companies:

- 18 new F-16C/D Block 52 Fighting Falcon combat aircraft (valued at $1.43 billion);
- F-16 armaments including 500 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles; 1,450 2,000-pound bombs; 500 JDAM Tail Kits for gravity bombs; and 1,600 Enhanced Paveway laser-guided kits, also for gravity bombs ($629 million);
- 100 Harpoon anti-ship missiles ($298 million);
- 500 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles ($95 million); and

While technically these purchases are funded by Pakistan itself, the early stages of Economic Support Funding provided by the US State Department came in the form of direct cash transfers to the state (US GAO, 2009, p. 38). Some $1.6 billion was transferred in this manner, which while officially intended as support for debt servicing, in effect was a subsidy for all state spending (Ibid).
(5.3.5) OTHER STATES

While Pakistan purchased arms from 14 other states apart from the US between 2000 and 2011, there is little record of official military aid programs being conducted by other countries. The states with the most significant transfers in the period were Sweden, France and China. France has sold submarines and Mirage jets...
and helicopters to the Pakistani military, while Swedish defence firms have sold missile technology (SIPRI, 2014a). China is, and has always been, the most significant strategic partner for Pakistan next to the United States. By the measure used by SIPRI, China has actually supplied slightly more than the US in dollar terms over this period, although this is largely due to the fact that US transfers are recorded as beginning in earnest only in 2005 while China has engaged in lower levels, but more consistent arms transfers (SIPRI, 2014b).

China has supplied substantial military assistance to Pakistan in the past, notably after the 1971 war with India, and it is thought to have been key in the development of Pakistan’s nuclear program (Fair, 2014, p. 190). And whilst its trade relationship has been substantial, its aid program to Pakistan is not thought to be as large as the United States’ (The Guardian, 2012). The lack of clarity on its policy is understandable, as China published its first ever white paper on foreign aid only in 2011. According to the paper, while Pakistan has pledged an enormous amount of aid from China in the form of loans for large-scale infrastructure projects, (some $65 billion), only 6% of this is thought to have actually been delivered by 2011 (Wolf, C., Wang, X., & Warner, E.,
2013, p. 38). By some estimates, Chinese aid to Pakistan between 2004 and 2009 was as little $217 million, or an average annual aid donation of just $36 million, compared to the United States’ $2 billion yearly average in the same period (Kabraji, 2012, p. 16).

In the midst of the diplomatic fallout between the US and Pakistan over the circumstances relating to Osama Bin Laden’s death, China made a public announcement to immediately provide Pakistan with 50 JF-17 fighter aircraft at no cost (The New York Times, 2011). While the move was widely seen as an effort to capitalise on the tensions between Washington and Islamabad, the substantially smaller aid actually delivered in the time period would indicate that the US was still Pakistan’s most important strategic benefactor in 2011 (Kabraji, 2012, p. 16).
(5.4) SECTION 4) HUMAN SECURITY IN PAKISTAN

(5.4.1) DISTRIBUTION OF INSECURITY

The general trend in the post-9/11 period of Pakistan is one of increasing political violence and destabilisation. While violence persisted in the most populous provinces of Sindh and Punjab as it had in the 90’s, it increased substantially in other areas such as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Baluchistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The wider geographical distribution of violence can be generally attributed to the spill over of violence from the Afghan conflict, large scale military operations against violent anti-state groups and the increase in sectarian and political violence by Islamist militants.

Figure 23 Frequency of Incidents of Political Violence (2000-11)

NB: All data discussed in this section has been compiled from my own analysis of the BFRS dataset (Bueno de Mesquita, E.B. et al., 2013) unless otherwise stated
The general political context of the period is one of increasing uncertainty. The leadership of General Pervez Musharraf had been initially quite popular due to a perception of pervasive corruption within the previous civilian administrations of the 90’s and as the most respected public institution, the military was generally seen as a means of restoring integrity to government (Adeney, 2008, p. 43). Musharraf’s secular credentials earned him a reputation as a moderate amongst both the liberal leaning elite in Pakistani politics, as well as among the broader international community.

The realities of the burgeoning ‘War on Terror’ however, meant that the Pakistani military were split in their need to act as a strategic partner to the United States to counter violent Islamic extremists, and the knowledge that they needed such groups in order to maintain their aggressive strategic posture with India. Thus while many extremist groups were denounced or outlawed in Pakistan, many were given leeway and even support by the military to continue operations. Violent radicalism spread throughout the state, and increased dramatically within this time period as attacks against the state, political parties and religious minorities grew across a broad swathe of Pakistan.

![Total Deaths from Political Violence (2000-11)](image-url)

Figure 24 Total Deaths from Political Violence (2000-11)
The Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (FATA) are a collection of self-governing districts that have enjoyed a degree of relative autonomy from the Pakistani state since its inception, having never been fully subjugated under British Colonial rule (Kronstadt, K.A. & Katzman, K., 2008, p. 10). Tribal councils govern the districts and the security arm of the state exists officially only in so far as the Frontier Corps, a paramilitary group supported by the Pakistani military, patrol and monitor the long porous border with Afghanistan (Fair, C. & Jones, S.G., 2011, p. 167). Rule of law, decisions on arbitration and punishment are determined by tribal council, and security or law enforcement is made by lashkars, the militias that police tribal districts (Kronstadt, K.A. & Katzman, K., 2008, p. 8). FATA thus has a delicate relationship with central government. Its quasi independence was recognised and guaranteed by Muhammad Ali Jinnah at partition, and as such, the paramilitary forces patrolling the Afghan border being one of the few state security elements permitted in the region (Markey, 2008, p. 11).

With the onset of the United States’ ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan, the border territory between Afghanistan and Pakistan became crucial to US efforts to capture or kill Al Qaeda personnel. The combination of a huge military deployment and poor intelligence, meant that within two days of fighting in Afghanistan the US had exhausted much of its military target list- and thus began bombing empty Al Qaeda camps from which fighters had long since fled (Barzilai, 2014, p. 47). By December, US intelligence understood that most Al Qaeda members were attempting to flee Afghanistan through the FATA and focused much of their efforts to capture or kill its members in the Tora Bora mountain region close to the Pakistan border (Fair, C. & Jones, S.G., 2011, p. 167).

As US operations in Afghanistan continued over the next few months, the area also saw an influx of Taliban fighters who sought to use the Pakistan border region as launching base for attacks against NATO forces. As per the strategic agreements made between the US and Pakistan in the aftermath of 9/11, the US pressured Pakistan to deploy a significant military presence to FATA in an attempt to capture fleeing Al Qaeda personnel. (Kronstadt, K.A. & Katzman, K., 2008).
Pakistan deployed between 70 and 80,000 of its forces comprising largely of paramilitary frontier corps, supplemented with several thousand regular and special military forces (Tellis, 2008, p. 9). ‘Operation Al Mizar’ was launched as a large scale cordon and search effort that sought to identify and detain members of Al Qaeda, targeting many people of non-native Pashtun heritage (Ibid). The military appealed to the local Ahmadazai Wazirs to deny refuge to foreign fighters, but these requests were broadly rejected by many tribesmen who had built up a good relationship with foreign militants since the Soviet Afghan conflict (Javaid, 2011, p. 175). Such demands were also dismissed as a ‘charter of demand [sic] not from Pakistan government, but from US government’ (Ibid, p.176). Some 700 suspects were captured and turned over to the United States, leaving intelligence organisations satisfied that the operation had been effective in both disrupting Al Qaeda operations, and displacing active personnel further from the border (Khan, 2012, p. 132) (Tellis, 2008, p. 10). By the end of 2003, the Pakistani military had declared victory in its operations in the territory, as Al Qaeda’s deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri issued a fatwa calling for the death of President Musharraf (Khan, 2012, p. 132).

Figure 25 Incidents of Political Violence in FATA (2000-11)
In this period, the Pakistan military focused on attacking Al-Qaeda targets while turning a blind eye to Afghan Taliban networks re-established in Pakistan (Tellis, 2008, p. 14). While there was general consensus amongst Musharraf and the military hierarchy that Al-Qaeda must be rooted out and destroyed, the view of the Taliban was more nuanced, with an inclination towards seeing them as a political group who’s ‘hearts and minds’ needed be won over if any tolerable stability were to be achieved in Afghanistan (Tellis, 2008, p. 16).

Despite the apparent early successes, NATO supply convoys from Pakistan to Afghanistan continued to be attacked in the border territory by the Taliban and other militants. Such attacks would present a significant problem for US operations in Afghanistan as 80% of cargo and 40% of fuel was being transported via Pakistan (Nawaz, 2009, p. 10). The US pushed Pakistan to commit a larger body of its regular military forces to search and destroy missions in the region, and in March 2004 the army moved into South Waziristan in force. The move was deeply unpopular amongst the tribes in the area, constituting a violation of the promises made by Jinnah that the military would never be used to deal with problems in the area (Markey, 2008, p. 11). Immediately, the army found itself in pitched battles, not only with Afghan based militants, but with tribal fighters who saw the action as an invasion. At the start of the campaign, in just one battle with 400 tribal fighters near Wana in South Waziristan, the army lost 93 soldiers, killed 55 fighters and captured 149 more (Kilcullen, 2009, p. 238). Tribes across the region were now in open revolt against the government and denounced Musharraf as a puppet of the US. (Roy, K. & Gates, S., 2014). This year also saw the beginning of drone assassinations conducted by the US, the vast majority of which have occurred within North and South Waziristan (Rogers, 2010, p. 28).

While the government engaged in several rounds of peace-making over the coming years, the US maintained that these settlements, which involved a return to self-policing by the tribes, merely consolidated the space established by Taliban and other militant groups now opposed to both the US and Pakistan (Markey, 2008, p. 11). Indeed, the military campaigns by Pakistan had fuelled the growth of the Pakistan Taliban, which was violently opposed to the Pakistani government and began conducting terrorist attacks, kidnappings and assassinations against the shrinking number of tribal councils openly loyal to the state (Synnot, 2012, p. 115) (Roy, K. & Gates, S., 2014, p. 127). As such, the ISI took increasing interest in providing support to groups that were not yet aligned with the Pakistan Taliban, attempting to foster internal divisions that distracted attention from actions by the state (Nawaz, 2009, p. 18).
Seen widely as the product of both Pakistan’s military operations in FATA and the Northwest Frontier Province, and the drone campaign launched by the US, the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP) launched an enormous campaign of political violence across Pakistan from its base in South Wazirstan (Fair, C.C. & Jones, S.G., 2010, p. 25) (Nawaz, 2009, p. 18). In retaliation, the military launched its ‘Swat Offensive’ October 17th 2009, a major operation using 3 divisions, 2 Special Services Group, Helicopter, Fixed Wing Aircraft, Tanks and Artillery in an attempt to clear out the TTP strongholds of Sararogha, Makin and Laddah (Fair, C. & Jones, S.G., 2011, p. 72).

While the military claimed victory in December of 2009 after taking control of the territories, the fact that they had been met with relatively little resistance in many areas indicated that the Pakistan Taliban was mimicking its Afghan namesake, splintering in the face of large-scale military operations only to regroup later (Ibid). As such, despite the military victory, the TTP has continued to conduct a protracted and spectacularly violent campaign against the state, in many cases using suicide bombings to attack government, police and military targets. It gained global attention in July 2010, after it claimed responsibility for an attempted car bombing in Times Square, New York. Its most notorious attack to date was the 2014 attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar in retaliation for military operations in North Waziristan and Khyber (The New York Times, 2014). It was the worst terrorist attack in Pakistan’s history resulting in the deaths of 145 people, 132 of which were children (BBC, 2014).

The effect on of the struggles between the military and various armed groups in FATA and the NWFP on civilians has been dramatic. In 2010, FATA experienced a third of all suicide bombings in what would be the worst year for such attacks (Murphy, 2013, p. 151). In that year alone, some 1300 civilians are estimated to have been killed directly or indirectly by various militant attacks (Rogers, 2010, p. 23). The BFRS data makes clear the growing intensity of political violence during the time period (Figure 25). The military campaign of 2009 is estimated to have displaced over 3 million people, the largest such displacement since partition (Rogers, 2010, p. 16). The displacement relates directly to the tactics used by the military, in which vast areas were cleared of civilians, then bombarded with airstrikes and artillery, followed by a sweep by ground forces (Roy, K. & Gates, S., 2014, p. 127). The army has maintained that this approach was effective in minimizing non-combatant deaths, but the lack of access necessitated by such a strategy means that reliable figures for civilian casualties do not exist.
The manner in which the Pakistani army defines civilians, militants and militant supporters are ambiguous enough to raise serious questions about how many civilians have died in the conflict (Rogers, 2010, p. 25). The Pakistan Institute for Peace studies has maintained that between 2007 and 2011, as many people died from military attacks as from militant violence (Crawford, 2013, p. 134). It also maintains that some 12,000 people on all sides have died in the fighting between 2001 and 2012, while stressing that such numbers are both difficult to verify and impossible to fully disaggregate in terms of military, militant or civilian constituency (Ibid).

While not capable of giving a definitive account, the BFRS data indicates a massive increase in assassinations and terrorist attacks, on top of the huge increase in state versus militant violence (see Figure 26 and Figure 27). The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan and Human Rights Watch have documented numerous incidents of extrajudicial killings by state and paramilitary forces of suspected militant supporters. After the Army took control of the Swat Valley capital city of Mignora, hundreds of bodies began appearing in the streets, many having being blindfolding, tortured and executed (The New York Times, 2009). While locals maintained the army was responsible, army officials denied the accusations stating: “There are no extrajudicial killings in our system...if something happens, we have a fool proof accountability system (Ibid).” Human Rights Watch subsequently discovered evidence that security forces operating in and around Mingora, had conducted up to 300 extra-judicial killings between February and March 2010 alone (Rogers, 2010, p. 27).

US military aid has been specifically earmarked for supporting Pakistani operations in this area, with congressional reports on security capacity building identifying the 6 C-130 large transport aircraft, 20 Cobra Attack helicopters, 26 Bell transport helicopters and the many thousands of radio, night vision and body armour purchased with FMF grants specifically to support these operations (Kronstadt, K.A. & Katzman, K., 2008, p. 13). In 2008 a program for training and equipping the Frontier Corps was established, building on existing programs that have doubled the size of the elite Special Service Group and Pakistan’s Air Assault units, which are the groups among the forefront of such large scale incursions (Ibid).
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Figure 26 Political Violence Event Type in FATA (1988-99)
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 27 Political Violence Event Type in FATA (2000-11)

PUNJAB

With the largest population (over 53%) and the base for much of the military high command, political elites as well as most industry, Punjab is held by many Pakistanis to be dominant in Pakistani politics; both geographically and as an ethnic sub-divide (Haleem, 2010, p. 468). The idea of the ‘Punjabisation of Pakistan’ is
a common theme in political debate, as is the perception that the centrality of Punjabis to the running of the country makes for a ‘monolithic region’, unified under an umbrella of privilege (Talbot, 2002). The dominance of ethnic Punjabi in the military has even been posited as a possible driver of anti-state violence by other groups (Haleem, 2010, p. 467). There are however, many serious political divisions within the region, and one of the most dangerous in this time period has been increasing tendency towards violent religious sectarianism.

Punjabi politics has for years been dominated by PML-N, which has relied on its constituency of ethnic Punjab voters to secure large majorities in the provincial assembly, and close to a third of seats in the national assembly (Blank, J., Clary, C. & Nichiporuk, B., 2014, p. 33). Despite the support that they have received from the military in the past, extremist religious organisations have failed to make an impact with Punjab parliamentary politics, leading to the establishment of groups inclined towards direct action (Talbot, 2002, p. 61).

While the contemporary roots of the sectarian divide can be traced back to the early 80’s schism between Zia’s Sunni leaning Islamification drive, and the perceived threat from the Shia based revolutionary movement in neighbouring Iran, the material reality of inequality also facilitated the tension in Punjab and the wider Pakistani state (Behuria, 2004, p. 159). As has been discussed in the previous case study, Punjab has a problematic division of land resources, with a minority Shia group holding a substantial portion of the best land in the Province (Grare, 2007, p. 131). This feudalistic arrangement is a common political grievance across Pakistan but in particular in Punjab where it drives the broader sectarian narrative espoused by radical Sunni religious groups. Militant groups had been established to challenge the Shia landlords, who in turn created their own militant groups in response (Rafiq, 2014, p. 27). This feudal system has been one of the foundations for tension, and is what initially made sectarianism a predominantly (but not exclusively) Punjab phenomenon (Grare, 2007, p. 132) (Nasr, 2000, p. 140).

Violence had begun to escalate significantly in the late 90’s, leading Nawaz Shariff to take some steps towards prioritising it as a state security concern and thus immediately prompting an assassination attempt by militants connected to Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (The Guardian, 2002). Thus, in the post-9/11 context, Musharraf was forced to acknowledge the dangerous divisions arising from hard-line religious movements in the country. But of the $100 million fund established to reform and modernize Islamic seminaries in the country (much of which came
from US economic aid), Musharraf had spent a mere $4 million in his entire time in office (Rafiq, 2014, p. 23).

While relatively few madrassas are thought to be involved in sponsoring or facilitating international terrorism (Bergen, P. & Pandey, S., 2006, p. 122), they did play an important mobilising role for the regime, steering public opinion over the threat from India, producing propaganda and recruiting for Jihad (Grare, 2007, p. 134). Musharraf did make a point of publically denouncing and banning some Sunni and Shia militant groups such as Sipah-e-Muhammad, Sipahi Sahaba and Lashkari Jhangvi but many other groups were ignored or let off with a warning, leaving critics to label the approach half hearted (Talbot, 2002, p. 324). Perhaps more significantly, parent organisations of militant groups, were not sanctioned, nor were many organisations that simply changed name or distanced themselves from militant activities by developing a political wing (Ibid). Of the 600 members of these organisations arrested in raids following the announcement of the bans, none were actually charged with a crime (Ibid).

The Musharraf regime engaged with these organisations for both political and strategic reasons. In the 2002 assembly elections, Musharraf recognised ‘Sanads’ of the Madrassahs as equivalent to a university degree, thus making Mullahs eligible to stand for election (Shah, 2005, p. 620). A grand parliamentary coalition of Mullahs, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) was formed from of broad base of extremely conservative, and sectarian, Islamic parties (The Guardian, 2005) (Murphy, 2013, p. 145). With MMA winning a wide distribution of seats across the state, the strategy mitigated against provincial majority victories for the PPP and PML and bolstered support for Musharraf in the national assembly (Shah, 2005, p. 620). Ironically, the MMA was popular largely due to virulent opposition to the US invasion of Afghanistan (Murphy, 2013, p. 145). In this regard, Musharraf’s facilitation of them was suspected to be a warning to the US of the potential for fundamentalist rule in Pakistan if it were not for the military government (Shah, 2005, p. 621).

Strategically, these organisations facilitate the appetite for continued fighting against Indian forces in Kashmir with groups like LeT recruiting from a pool of radicalised, predominantly Punjab deobandis (Shah, 2005, p. 621). The civilian political elite has also recognised the political necessity of interaction with sectarian political groups, due to the strength of their influence at local levels. Tellingly, Nawaz Shariff and his PML-N party has entered into alliance with the SSP in Punjab (Rafiq, 2014, p. 24) while the PPP has relied on its support to achieve national assembly majorities in the past (Grare, 2007, p. 140).
The effect of the normalisation of extremist sectarian divisions in Pakistani society has been profound, with rates of violence of this type exploding over recent years (Figure 28). While there has been a growth in the low level violence of property attacks and political assassinations of individuals, there has been an evolution in spectacular indiscriminate bombings that target large crowds. In October 2004, two bomb blasts on separate days at a Shia mosque in Sialkot killed 71 and injured 200 (Baixas, 2008, p. 22). In May 2005, 25 people were killed and 100 injured when a suicide bomb attack on a large council gathering at the Bari Iman shrine in Islamabad (Ibid). While Punjab has been the birth place for sectarian violence, the phenomenon has spread to other provinces, particularly with the explosion of sectarian violence post 2007, with attacks in Baluchistan and Sindh eclipsing Punjab for the first time (Rafiq, 2014, p. 32).

Perhaps more dangerously, Punjab based militants gained worldwide attention when they eventually attacked India directly. On November 25th 2008, 10 members of LeT infiltrated and attacked central Mumbai. In a chaotic and violent rampage that would last some 4 days, the gunmen attacked several hotels, a train station, a Jewish outreach centre, a hospital and a cinema (Kronstadt, 2008, p. 1). In total, 164 people were killed and
hundreds more were injured (Ibid). The incident drove India and Pakistan to the precipice of another major war - not least due to the fact that both western and Indian intelligence agencies concurred that at least some elements within ISI were actively supporting the group at the time (Tankel, 2009, p. 82) (Murphy, 2013, p. 153) (Kronstadt, 2008, p. 5). A further indictment against Pakistan was that despite being one of the first groups banned by Musharraf, Lashkar-e-Toiba was known to operate openly in Punjab without interference from authorities (Murphy, 2013, p. 153). (Ahmar, 2008)

BALOCHISTAN CONFLICT

Balochistan has had a troubled relationship with the wider Pakistanti state for several decades. Suffering from a chronically weak provincial administration where a parliamentary executive governs essentially without an opposition to challenge decisions, and with little sway in the national assembly or executive (Sial, S. & Basit, A., 2010, p. 5). The imbalance in power can perhaps be seen as a structural reflection of the suspicion with which the Baloch population is viewed. Balochistan, which is ethnically mostly Baloch and Pashto, had by and large sought independence after partition, having little in the way of ethnic or cultural ties to the wider Pakistani identity. In August 1947, the territory was forcibly annexed by the nascent Punjabi dominated government of Islamabad (Kupecz, 2012, p. 99).

The region is mineral rich, housing large deposits of mineable ore that yields copper and gold, and the many large gas deposits located along the western border with Iran supply over half of Pakistan’s gas needs (Sial, S. & Basit, A., 2010). Its location also makes an area of vital geo-strategic importance to Pakistan as it is a natural transit site for gas pipelines towards Iran or Turkmenistan (Aslam, 2011, p. 189). Balochistan has however, seen very little in the way of financial return for the energy it supplies to the wealthier parts of the country and has itself suffered a dearth in developmental investment. It accounts for a small, and historically declining, portion of national GDP of less than 4% (Kupecz, 2012, p. 99). Resentment at the perceived exploitation and underrepresentation of the province has existed for several decades with a major war breaking out during Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s administration between the army and Baloch separatists after the Provincial government
was dissolved by the state (Majeed. G, & Hashmi, R.S., 2014, p. 325). The conflict was costly in terms of lives and drove a deep wedge of distrust between the state and the provincial population.

Under Musharraf, new plans were announced to maximise the development of the gas reserves in the region, with huge exploration and processing operations designed with the aim of increasing output (Aslam, 2011, p. 195). The announcement met with protest and resistance from various political organisations that opposed any further extraction of resources when the province was still owed huge amounts in debt from central governments over previous decades (Sial, S. & Basit, A., 2010, p. 10). The Pakistani military has been treated warily by the population, with minor attacks on state infrastructure and personnel being commonplace over the throughout the early 00’s (Aslam, 2011, p. 195).

Such tensions were exacerbated with the onset of the Afghan war, as many Pashtun fled intense areas of fighting in the Northwest. Militants also fled into Balochistan, seeing it as a potential haven from attack by the US and Pakistan forces (Kupecz, 2012, p. 104). This has led to tensions between the Pashto and Baloch communities as elements of the Taliban and Al Qaeda established themselves in the province, thus attracting more attention from the security forces (Ibid). In January 2005, protests erupted following allegations that a local doctor had been raped by an army captain and his men (Siddiqi, 2012, p. 51). When protesting tribal groups attempted to interfere with the gas supply lines, the military launched a violent crackdown. Fighting broke out between the Frontier Corps and Marri and Bugti tribesmen who fiercely opposed further pushes by the state into the territory.

A low level insurgency kicked off, which escalated severely in December 2005, when rockets were fired at a paramilitary barracks near Kohlu, while it was being visited by General Musharraf (Sial, S. & Basit, A., 2010, p. 17). The military responded with an incredible display of force, although it has since been acknowledged that the operation was planned ahead of the attack on Musharraf (Ibid). The army surrounded and cut off the area of Kohlu and began a massive aerial bombardment campaign using artillery, jets and helicopters.
Political Violence in Balochistan (1988-2011) (Aslam, 2011, p. 195). The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) pleaded with both the state and the UN to end the conflict which according to their investigation, violated international and domestic law due to evidence of chemical weapons being deployed by the military, and the disproportionately large civilian cost of the campaign (HRCP estimated as many 85% of those killed were women and children) (Bansal, 2006, pp. 52-53). When the most intense fighting eventually subsumed in 2007, the HRCP reported some 50,000 civilians had been driven from their homes. A UN report into the conflict, estimated that as many as 8-10,000 had died due to the exodus, having been blockaded by the military and left without food shelter or medical services (Aslam, 2011, p. 196). As with many other instances of protracted fighting in the country, reliable figures on the violence are not easily attainable, BFRS data is again merely an indicator, but the reporting of this conflict has been particularly poor in Pakistan (The Guardian, 2011). The relative invisibility of state violence to the media while in negotiation of major conflict is evidenced in the distribution of violence by actor for Balochistan between 2000 and 2011, where a mere 3.2% of political violence is attributed to military or paramilitary forces in the midst of large mobilisations (Figure 30).
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*Figure 30 Distribution of Violence by Actor in Balochistan (2000-2011)*
The political struggle of the Balochs against the state has gained traction amongst other ethnically non-Punjab communities around the country, reflecting the national frustration with a perceived ethnic elitism and the centralised distribution of power (Bansal, 2006, p. 53). In turn, the Pakistani state has retained a hardened stance regarding Baloch grievances for many reasons, not least of which is the perception that India has had a hand in funding separatists in the region- which according to Wikileaks cables, US intelligence appears to concedede is actually happening, in retribution for operations in Kashmir (Kupecz, 2012, p. 106) (The Guardian, 2011). In the same way that has occurred in FATA, low intensity conflict continues, and similar questions have arisen about the behaviour of security forces in the region. A Guardian investigation (2011) revealed a large number of bodies appearing in the streets of towns and cities in Balochistan; tortured and executed in a manner extraordinarily similar to those described in Mignora earlier in this case study.

On top of these sources of insecurity, Balochistan has too been victim to major instances of sectarian violence in this period. In July, 2003 some 53 people were killed and dozens were injured when a Shia mosque was attacked with gunfire and a suicide bomb in the Baloch capital, Quetta (Baixas, 2008, p. 22). In March 2004 in Quetta, a group of SSP activists apparently attacking in tandem with the police, attacked a Shia procession leaving 47 dead and 150 injured (Ibid). In March 2005, in a small village in the Jhal Magsi district, a large bomb attack on a Shia gathering killed 50 and wounded over 100 (Ibid).

SINDH-KARACHI

Having been the site of the most serious political violence in the mid 90’s, Sindh saw a decreasing share of violence towards the end of the decade. Violence had spiralled out of control due to a range of factors, including ethnic political differences, the huge influx of refugees and drugs from Afghanistan, as well as the criminal organisations who took advantage of these conditions to gain wealth and power (Gayer, 2007). The largest singular political conflict arose from the struggle between the Mohajir population, its main political
force the MQM, and both Sindh’s political establishment and the military, which cracked down with extreme violence on the group.

A potent stabilising factor was the alliance between the governing PML under Shariff, and the MQM, which drew its power from the Mohajir population of Pakistan. That alliance, like so many previous, eventually fell apart over differences relating to adoption of Sharia law and the heavy handedness of the military (Gayer, 2007, p. 515).

However, the new military regime held some potential for reconciliation in this particular area of tension as Musharraf himself was a Mohajir. Indeed, the announcement that Pakistan would ban particular radical Islamist groups in the wake of 9/11 was met with a great deal of support with the MQM (Ansari, Z.A. & Moten, A.R., 2003, p. 385). In many ways, the Mohajir of Sindh identified itself as the anti-thesis to Punjab; secular and inclusive, as opposed to the perceived highly conservative and sectarian values permeating elsewhere.
(Gayer, 2007, p. 541). The continued rivalry between the conservative religious parties such as Jamaat-e-Islami and the MQM was cemented as the former helped establish Muttahida Majlis-e-Ama (MMA), an alliance of religious political groups opposed to Pakistan’s adherence to US foreign policy, while the latter held massive “anti-terrorism” rallies in Karachi, in support of US operations.

![Figure 32 Citizen's Police Liaison Committee Data on Killings in Karachi (1994-2011) (Gazdar, 2011)](image)

MQM and religious groups maintained low intensity political violence throughout the time period (Baixas, 2008, pp. 27-28), but political violence in Sindh did not reach the intensity seen in the mid 90’s (Figure 31). Indeed, as can be seen from the Citizen’s Police Liaison Committee data, there has been a dramatic drop in lethal violence within Karachi from their mid 90’s peak (Gazdar, 2011, p. 2). Although it has experienced less than other Provinces, Sindh has not been immune to the types of large scale sectarian attacks being seen in other parts of the country at the time. One of the worst was the double attack on Karachi on May 7th and May 31st, where Lashkar-e-Jhangvi suicide bombers attacked two Shia Mosques killing 47 people (Baixas, 2008, p. 22). And while there has been an upward trajectory in violence in the post-Musharraf years, this is reflective of a broader pattern of violent instability in the period, which will be covered in the next section.
Many of these intersecting security problems within the state converged in 2007 in a series of events that would shake the military’s grip on power and give a broader indication of just how unstable the Pakistani state had become in recent years. Throughout 2006, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan had made legal enquiries into the disappearance of some 400 people in the midst of the Balochistan conflict, with the suspicion falling on the ISI for interning citizens without trial or due process, or worse (Ghias, 2010, p. 995).

The Supreme Court, acting under Chief Justice Chaudhry, made a demand to the Ministry of Interior to present 40 persons identified in the HRCP report (Ibid). After initially denying any such persons existed, the Ministry later admitted to finding 20 persons (Ibid). In March 2007, the HRCP made another legal enquiry into the whereabouts of 148 people, which Chaudhry forwarded to the government (Ibid). The next day, Chaudhry was summoned to Musharraf’s official residence where, in the presence of Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, the President attempted to dismiss the Chief Justice for “misuse of office.” Allegations of corruption and nepotism were outlined in an attempt to trigger Chaudhry’s voluntary resignation, but the Chief Justice refused.

Legal experts opined that as a more activist Supreme Court under Chaudhry began investigating several major corruption cases, the incremental damage to the sitting regime became a threat to Musharraf’s hopes of running for President in the 2008 elections with the missing persons case acting as a mere catalyst (Ahmed, 2009). Moreover, Musharraf’s retention of the position of Army Chief of Staff while running for the Presidency could easily be found unconstitutional by the supreme court, thus potentially barring his way to retaining his extremely powerful position (Ahmed, 2009, p. 528). In response to the attack on Chaudhry, a huge protest movement broke out in cities across the country led by judicial staff, judges and solicitors known as the ‘Lawyers Movement’. The crisis was followed closely with an announcement by the government of draconian new media laws that gave the state the ability to restrict live broadcasts, seize private property from media organisations, and terminate broadcasts deemed unacceptable (Mufti, 2007). On March 16th, security forces stormed the headquarters of GEO, one of the country’s largest private news networks, after the station
covered the lawyer’s movement demonstrations live (Ibid). Tear gas was fired and journalists were attacked. The lawyer’s movement campaign went on for several weeks, garnering huge international attention and facing significant violence from the police along the way. The Chief Justice was reinstated in July and continued to hear missing persons cases for the next several months (Ahmed, 2009, p. 527).

THE RED MOSQUE

A further crisis began almost immediately, this time relating to the increasingly untenable contradictions arising from the state’s relationship to Islamic militancy. The fears of a creeping ‘Talibanisation’ of Punjab, the influx of radical Sunni politics, were realised when activists from Lal Masjid (the Red Mosque) began a series of demonstrations and attacks on persons and institutions that were deemed ‘obscene (Khan, 2008, p. 146)’. Video and music shops were destroyed, women of ‘immoral character’ were abducted and visiting foreigners were attacked in a campaign for ‘social purification (Murphy, 2013, p. 147)’.

The demonstrations and attacks were particularly visible due to the Mosques’ situation amongst the major political institutions in the heart of Islamabad. Indeed, the proximity of the location spoke to the political significance of the centre to Pakistani politics, having received funding from the ISI to recruit fighters for Jihad against the Soviets and India (The Nation, 2007) (The New York Times, 2014).

The Red Mosque had also gained international notoriety when links were drawn between it and individuals responsible for the 7/7 bombings in London (Murphy, 2013, p. 147). Embarrassingly for the government, investigations were hampered when the police and military were denied access by baton wielding female students (Ibid). The security forces backed down, fearing even then that a serious injury or death amongst one of the faithful could have far reaching consequences (Ibid). Pressure continued to mount for a crackdown on the Mosque, especially as Abdul Aziz began to openly call for suicide attacks, large-scale desertion from the security services, and for soldiers who died in the fighting in Balochistan and FATA to be denied customary Islamic burial (Cloughley, 2010, pp. 103-104).
When the group abducted several Chinese women from a massage parlor, the Chinese government pressed Musharraf to take action against the Mosque’s leadership (The New York Times, 2014). For a week over a 1000 people barricaded themselves within the building, many of whom were women and children (although the military contended they were ‘hostages’) (Khan, 2008, p. 147). On July 3rd, as it became clear that an attack from the armed forces was coming, many of those inside left the Mosque, including Aziz who the security forces maintain they found attempting to escape in the crowd dressed in a Burqa (BBC, 2007). After a week of further negotiations, the army launched a full scale special forces raid on the compound, killing 150 people within the compound and losing 12 soldiers in the process (ibid). The incident had a unifying effect on anti-state militants, with many previously competing organisations across the North West Frontier Province and FATA coming together to form Tehreek-e-Taliban (the Pakistan Taliban) in direct response to the massacre (Khan, 2012, p. 133). The group would be responsible for many devastating terrorist attacks against the state over the next several years.

THE ASSASSINATION OF BENAZIR BHUTTO

With the presidential elections of 2008 looming large over Pakistani politics, Benazir Bhutto made a dramatic return from exile to announce her candidacy as an alternative to continued military rule under Musharraf. The regime was in a state of disarray at the time, as Musharraf began preparations to contest the elections, his fight with the judiciary escalated dramatically as the Supreme Court moved to deem Musharraf’s candidacy unconstitutional (Ahmed, 2009, p. 531). In a brazen response, Musharraf declared emergency powers, suspending the constitution citing “increasing interference by some members of the judiciary in government policy (Ghias, 2010, p. 986).” All private television networks were taken off air, telecommunications were restricted, political dissidents were arrested as the army physically surrounded the Supreme Court (Murphy, 2013, p. 155).
The situation did not bode well for a stable transition back to civilian administration. An attempt was made on Bhutto’s life almost immediately after she arrived from the airport to her first rally. Over 130 people were killed when two bombs exploded in the crowd, but Bhutto herself was not injured (BBC, 2007). Bhutto and her husband, Asif Ali Zardari immediately implicated Musharraf and the ISI in the attack, claiming as she had before arrival in the country that if she were to be assassinated, Musharraf should be blamed (Ibid).

Despite this deep-seated suspicion, Bhutto and Musharraf received strong encouragement from the British and American governments to work together to boost the secular credentials of a new democratic executive in Pakistan, that could balance against the perceived threat of militant Islamism in the country (Synnott, 2009, p. 69). A reluctant agreement was sketched out, with Musharraf arranging for outstanding criminal charges against Bhutto and her husband to be dropped (Ibid). In working together towards the new elections, Bhutto expected to be made Prime Minister in the likely case of a PPP national majority vote, with Musharraf retaining the title of President as long as he agreed to relinquish his position as Army Chief of Staff - which he did in November 2007 (New York Times, 2007).

Any arrangements made were prevented from coming to fruition as on December 27th, Bhutto was assassinated in a gun and suicide bomb attack on her motorcade in Rawalpindi. PPP supporters went on a rampage, as many of Musharraf’s political opponents immediately blamed him for the attack (Murphy, 2013, p. 156). In what he would later claim was an a necessary ‘crowd control measure’ that would prevent further agitation of PPP supporters, the Rawalpindi chief of Police, Saud Aziz, ordered the crime scene be hosed down before investigators arrived, thus massively hindering the investigation (Muñoz, 2013).

While the military maintained the attack had been ordered by Baitullah Mehsud, head of the Pakistan Taliban, Mehsud vehemently denied involvement (Muñoz, 2013). A UN investigation accused Musharraf and the military of negligence, having failed to construct an adequate protection force after rejecting offers from British and American private security firms such as Blackwater (Farwell, 2014, p. 35). In January 2011, former police chief Aziz and his deputy were charged with security breaches for hosing down the scene (The Guardian, 2010). They have consistently maintained that they acted under directions from the intelligence services, a contention which the UN’s investigation into the incident has strongly supported (Ibid).
The growth in capacity of anti-state militants in the chaotic period surrounding the decline and end of Musharraf’s reign led to a significant increase in political violence. Having won the 2008 election, the PPP had opted to install Benazir Bhutto’s husband, Asif Ali Zardari to position of head of party and thus, the person who would take the role of President. Having a notorious reputation for corruption, and popularly seen as a member of the feudal aristocracy, much of Zardari’s political capital was based on the popularity of his late wife, limiting his ability to make a significant impact on the overall approach to dealing with political violence in the country (The Guardian, 2012) (Central Intelligence Agency, 2010). On the other hand, the new Army Chief of Staff and former head of ISI, General Ashfaq Kayani, was an extremely popular figure with a huge degree of political influence within Pakistan and solid relations with the United States (Central Intelligence Agency, 2010) (Fair, 2011, p. 582). Despite the end of military executive control, civilian administrative capacity was still extremely weak, both in structure and agency, leaving the military with a substantial degree of operational freedom in execution of the internal security agenda (Fair, 2011, p. 585).

In January 2008, militants operating under Mehsud seized an army fort in South Waziristan, and urged other groups to attack the military across the country (Khan, 2012). In a public interview, he condemned the army for harming ‘the people and Muslims with its weapons’ (Fair, C.C. & Jones, S.G., 2010, p. 59). The army responded by launching Operation Zalzala (Earthquake), using the 14th division in an attempt to destroy Mehsud’s network in several areas in South Waziristan. For the next several months, towns and villages in the area where hit with artillery and aircraft bombardment, with areas deemed to be in support of the Pakistan Taliban razed to the ground with bulldozers (some 4000 houses in January alone) (Fair, C.C. & Jones, S.G., 2010, p. 61). The Operation displaced some 200,000 civilians from the area, and despite and prospective truce being offered by the TTP, violence between the state and the militants continued to escalate (Singh, 2015, p. 24). By 2010, some 22-27000 fighters were thought to be in alliance with the Pakistan Taliban (Qazi, 2011, p. 5).

The Obama administration took a somewhat different approach to Pakistan’s anti-state militants. With encouragement from both Pakistan and the US, tribal militias were formed in an attempt to fight against the
TTP, with USAID agreeing a deal of $750 million for investment in the area in exchange for security cooperation (US GAO, 2010, p. 1). The program had a threefold objective: 1) to improve economic and social conditions in FATA 2) to extend the legitimacy of the Pakistani state in FATA 3) to support permanent, sustainable change in FATA (Ibid, p.9). The program struggled with accountability problems and a deteriorating security situation (Ibid, p.26). A factor that may have exacerbated the inhospitable security environment for its development programs was that in the midst of hugely destructive operations such as ‘Zalzala’, militants would tell locals that the army was fighting at the behest of the Americans (Fair, C.C. & Jones, S.G., 2010, p. 60).

The problem the state had with such aspersions was that they were to a certain extent true. As the US military and CIA drone campaign began to gain notoriety in FATA in the Summer of 2009, the US was also coordinating with the Pakistani military in aggressive ‘search-and-clearance’ operations conducted by the Pakistani military in South Waziristan (Khan, 2012, p. 134). The aggressive nature of such operations, which have resulted in extensive property demolitions, internment and shoot-on-sight’ curfews in major cities in the Swat Valley (Ibid), have done little to quell violent anti-state resentment as can be seen by the huge increases in political violence by militant groups across the country.

(5.4.2) DISTRIBUTION OF ATTACKS BY ACTORS

The following is a breakdown of the violence recorded in the dataset by actor, then cross referenced by geographic distribution to account for the major sources of insecurity as outlined in the case study thus far. The majority of acknowledged political violence is attributable to 4 main sources

1) Non-state Militants (Islamist/Sectarian/Ethnic/Other)

2) State (Military/Paramilitary/Police)

3) Civil Unrest (Riots/Violent Political Demonstrations)

4) Foreign Actors (US/Indian/Afghan)
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Figure 33 Frequency of Attack by Party Responsible (2000-2011)
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<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
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Figure 34 Frequency of Event Type (2000-2011)
Various militant violence accounted for the largest portion of incidents by aggregate grouping (Figure 33). As discussed above, this violence was carried out by a variety of different groups for different purposes. The class of ‘other’ accounts for much of the anti-state violence that arose towards the end of the Musharraf era, with the majority of such attacks distributed between 2007 and 2011. This category is defined as attacks that are the result of militant activity but a specific group has not claimed responsibility (BFRS, 2011, p. 11). A further disaggregation of ‘other’ militant violence by province shows that nearly half of such attacks occur in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where the Tehreek-e-Taliban and other anti-state groups evolved and established themselves in the border territories with Afghanistan (Figure 35).

Balochistan accounts for a fifth of such attacks, which may be attributed to the anti-state campaign of the separatist movement, or tribal groups resisting state pushes into the territory. Sindh also accounts for a sizeable portion of attacks, arising from continued political infighting between the MQM, the PPP and other rival political actors in Karachi and other urban areas.

Similarly, violence conducted by Islamist/Sectarian militants occurs overwhelmingly in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (73.2%), attributable to acknowledged attacks by various anti-state or sectarian Islamist groups such as Lashkar-e-Toiba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba (Figure 35). Punjab accounted for a further 20%, reflective of the growing sectarian climate within the province as discussed above. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Balochistan and Sindh account for almost all ethnic militant violence, with the Baloch conflict accounting for 75% on its own (Figure 37).
<table>
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*Figure 35 ‘Other’ Militant Violence by Province (2000-2011)*

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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 36 Islamist/Sectarian Militant Violence by Province (2000-2011)*
STATE SOURCES

As has been discussed in other parts of the case study, state sources of political violence are notably low relative to other groups. Military Paramilitary and Police forces are responsible for just 8.4% of all recorded violence in this section (Figure 33). Considering the sheer size and scope of military and paramilitary operations in the country, this seems to indicate a serious problem in media accounting for state violence. To take one example of a data-point that would seem problematic when assessed in the context of the time period, ‘selective violence’ by Military/Paramilitary/Police accounts for a mere 1.6% of incidents. Selective violence is defined in the coding of the dataset in the following manner:

“These may include incidents where a newspaper reports that a political activist is picked up by the intelligence services and detained and beaten overnight (e.g. “Advocate Ghulam Nabi of the Peshawer High Court was allegedly picked up by personnel of an intelligence agency in three vehicles near the NWFP assembly, and released after a severe overnight thrashing. He is associated with Jamaat-i-Islami and a critic of the army and intelligence agencies.” 14 September 2007. )”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td>Balochistan</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>73.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sindh</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>407</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 37 Ethnic Militant Violence by Province (2000-2011)
Considering the number of political assassinations in areas of FATA, Khyber and Balochistan that have been speculatively attributed to the state, this would seem like a particularly low figure. As was discussed in the previous case study, the lack of proof or acknowledgement connecting the state to such killings mean such cases are attributed to ‘unknown’ actors, which account for a third of all violence in the time period (Figure 33). Breaking down military and paramilitary violence by province also hints at significant underrepresentation. Sindh has recorded just 16 incidents of violence by military or paramilitary forces, despite the significant presence of the Pakistan Rangers as the main ‘peacekeeping’ force for Karachi’s tumultuous political environment (United States Institute for Peace, 2011, p. 16). Similarly, Balochistan has just 65 incidents recorded, at a time when the Army conducted a counter-insurgency operation large enough to displace 50,000 people.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balochistan</td>
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<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>57.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>57.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPK</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>76.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>98.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindh</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1436</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 38 Military/Paramilitary Violence by Province (2000-2011)*
Public unrest in the form of violent political demonstrations or riots account for nearly a fifth of all violence in the time period. It is attributable to a variety of different actors including political parties, student groups, religious movements and unions. As the location of Pakistan’s largest urban centres, and the vast majority of the population, it is unsurprising that Sindh and Punjab together account for 82% of all such incidents. The frequency of these events are fairly normally distributed throughout the time period, indicating that unrest is a fairly consistent aspect of Pakistani politics. While major flashpoints, such as the ‘lawyer’s movement’ gained international attention, the year itself was not unusual in terms of the frequency of riots or political demonstrations that caused violence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AJK</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balochistan</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>5.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>GB</td>
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<td>.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPK</td>
<td>443</td>
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<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>36.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sindh</td>
<td>2534</td>
<td>46.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
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<td>.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5509</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 39 Political Demonstration/Riots by Province (2000-2011)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>civil society group/campaign group</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foreign party (india)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gang</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>informal group (ethnic)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>informal group (islamist/sectarian)</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>informal group (other)</td>
<td>2081</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intelligence agency</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>militants (ethnic)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>militants (islamist/sectarian)</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>45.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>militants (other)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>45.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>military/paramilitary</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>45.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>48.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>police</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>48.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>political party</td>
<td>747</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>62.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>professional union/alliance</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>67.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>religious party</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>72.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>student group</td>
<td>468</td>
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<td>81.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tribal group</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>90.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unaffiliated individual</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>90.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>5509</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 40 Violent Demonstrations/Riots by Actor Responsible (2000-2011)*
FOREIGN ACTORS

The number of attacks attributed to foreign actors is relatively large (nearly 6% of the total political violence measured in the period) and reflects the political turmoil Pakistan experiences on both its Eastern and Western borders. The attacks attributed to India almost all occur between 2000 and 2003, at the height of the post-Kargil tensions between the countries that also saw major attacks by Kashmir based militants. Much of these incidents are actions by the Indian military that had an impact in Pakistan such as the significant amount of shelling across the LoC during India’s intense mobilisation at the border in 2002. While there has been consistent suspicion within Pakistani media regarding India’s clandestine support for violent actors within Pakistan, these attributions don’t make it into the BFRS dataset in any substantial way. The small amount of Afghan incidents are largely the result of skirmishes between Afghan based militia and Pakistan forces manning border security checkpoints.

The US attributed attacks are interesting, as they are almost all the result of drone strikes in the tribal areas (Figure 33 & Figure 34). The fact that 253 strikes were recorded in the media, despite the fact that the program was ostensibly carried out in secrecy throughout the time period, is an indication of just how much interest there was on the issue within the country. The fact that there was almost as many recorded drone assassinations (1.3%) as there were incidents of selective military, paramilitary or police violence (1.6%) indicates a political prioritisation of violence depending on actor, considering the extent of selective state violence which human rights organisations have reported on in the time period. Also invisible to the drone assassination data, is the level of culpability of the Pakistani state. Not only did Musharraf approve of a program of drone assassination on Pakistani soil in 2004, according to Wikileaks cables his successor General Kayani actually requested an increase in the number of attacks (Shah, 2014, p. 101) (Tribune, 2011). Indeed, one of the first well-publicized assassinations was that of Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the Pakistan Taliban and the person the military maintained was responsible for the killing of Benazir Bhutto (Enemark, 2011, p. 218). The drone, which killed Mehsud and 11 other people including his wife and her parents, was likely
launched from a private-military contractor run secret airbase within the country, which also had the Pakistan military’s blessing (Ibid).
CHAPTER 6

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: A TALE OF TWO TEMPORALITIES

(6.1) INTRODUCTION

This Chapter will draw together the findings of both case studies and attempt to disaggregate typologies, characteristics and patterns of insecurity into a singular comparative analysis. The central hypotheses for the study will be tested against the findings of the two case studies in order to understand what patterns of predicted political behaviour best correlate with the available data on violence and to investigate the potential impact foreign security aid may have had in levels of that particular type of violence. Each hypothesis has been assigned certain predicative indicators that are attainable from within the dataset and each one of these indicators will be measured against levels of military aid received in the time period.

The hypotheses for the study are as follows:

1) Reliance on an external state for provision of security capacity may lead to challenges to authority of the state or the undermining of the state’s monopoly on the use of force.
2) Reliance on an external state for provision of security may raise questions of legitimacy amongst the public, fuelling widespread protest or political instability.
3) External support may facilitate a more proactive security state, leading to increased militarisation of security problems and potential increases in violence by the state. This may in turn fuel grievances and political legitimacy issues covered in hypotheses 1 and 2.

There are several indicators within the BFRS dataset that can be isolated and used to investigate potential associative relationships with political violence and levels of foreign military aid. The first hypothesis, with its focus on the potential challenge from violent non-state actors, will be measured against violence by militant groups. The prediction is based on a theorised relationship between levels of foreign strategic support and the recipient state’s domestic legitimacy. As the case studies have revealed, militants are the source of a substantial body of the violence experienced in Pakistan in recent history and can be broadly categorized
under two types; ethnic militancy, and Islamist/sectarian militancy (Figure 41). Both of these strands of militant violence will be assessed in terms of the political context of their frequency and distribution, as well as the relationship they have to levels of military aid.

The second hypothesis involves the potential rise in violent political resistance and unrest emanating from the population more broadly. As has been seen in cases of mass unrest in the Arab Spring, there is significant potential for heavy security states to experience political backlash from a mass mobilisation of the population (Ashour, 2013). In cases such as Egypt’s, the perception of the security state relying on foreign support was a major catalyst for protest and increased the perception of illegitimacy of the military hierarchy (Lahlali, 2014). Pakistan’s history in the time period is replete with both major mass political movements that have challenged the state executive, as well as smaller scale disruptions and incidents of unrest. While not all political demonstrations are violent, Pakistan’s restrictive laws regarding threats to public and private property have a tendency to generate heavy handed responses, particularly in cases where demonstrations are critical of the state itself. As such, BFRS data capturing riots and violent political demonstrations can give a broad indication of trends in public unrest in the time period. These levels will be assessed in conjunction with distributions of military aid to examine whether unrest has any correlation with periods of high foreign security investment.

The third and final hypothesis deals with the state itself, whether the intensity of its violence shows any correlation with foreign military aid distributions, and to assess to what extent state violence plays a role in the exacerbation of insecurity investigated under hypotheses 1 and 2. While there are problems in the measurement of state violence due to potential problems in undercounting, as well as in disaggregation of security actors, there is nonetheless requisite data to give broad indications of trends. The rates of violence attributed to the police, military and paramilitary forces will be explored for potential patterns relating to both military aid and other types of insecurity. The changes in these indicators over time will be situated in the context of both the shifting strategic priorities of military and civilian governments within Pakistan throughout both time periods, as well as overarching aims of US foreign policy in the region.

It is important to re-stress that this analysis is an exploration of patterns of violence and their relationship to the political context of the two periods, and cannot provide evidence of definitive causative relationship. To establish causation, either a more in-depth qualitative analysis of high-level decision making in specific
strategic circumstances, or a larger n statistical study of military aid in a multitude of controlled circumstances would be required. Instead the study will show whether increases in military aid correlate with increases/decreases of a variety of different types of political violence. This data will be presented within the context of the case study research in order to provide a potential explanation for the movement in levels of violence and to analyse how such movement relates to the delivery of military aid.

(6.2) TESTING HYPOTHESIS ONE: NON STATE ACTOR VIOLENCE

The proliferation of violent non-state militancy within Pakistan has had a profound impact of the security of the population in recent history. The previous decade in particular has seen a substantial increase in both sustained, low level conflict, and large catastrophic attacks which together have resulted in the deaths of many thousands of people. The exceptional violence of incidents such as the Peshawar school massacre in 2014 has united many sectors of the public behind the military in favour of aggressive measures to root out and destroy anti-state organisations such as the Pakistan Taliban (The Express Tribune, 2014). While such groups have come to particular prominence in recent years, the two case studies presented here have shown that the phenomenon is the product of a series of intersecting political developments at both the national and international levels.

While both case studies have given a contextual indication that militant violence has a relationship to the nature of Pakistan’s external strategic partnership with the US, to what extent does the data gathered provide evidence linking military aid and rates of militant violence? From a surface level analysis of the information gathered within the two case studies, levels of militant violence have indeed been much larger in the second period of study, where high levels of external military aid are recorded, than in the previous period when sanctions were in place (Figure 41). If we take into consideration the fact that while pledges for a new round of military aid were made by the US in 2002, the first deliveries actual transfers began in 2005 the correlation may seem even stronger.

This correlation will necessarily generate a broad range of competing explanations and thus a much deeper analysis is required. In order to understand the strength of contextual evidence supporting the relationship
proposed in the hypothesis it is necessary to disaggregate the data as much as possible to generate more targeted testing. This is broadly achieved here by splitting the analysis into consideration of ethnic and Islamist/sectarian militancy separately, utilising the case study research to establish the strength of the potential relationship between violence and aid in both cases.

Figure 41 All Militant Violence Vs Military Aid Levels (1988-2011)
While there has been a large amount of ethnic militant violence in Pakistan, it is highly concentrated within the second time period. Even within this period, the vast majority occurs in the middle of the decade, reflecting the fact that much of this type of violence relates to the conflict in Balochistan between various political actors, local government, the state and the ethno-separatist militias. While the 2005-2007 conflict arose from political factors existent since the inception of the Pakistani state, the increased military presence has been a source of exacerbation (Haqqani, 2005, p. 175). A significant amount of political tension also arose from the large flow of Pashtun refugees fleeing the conflict in FATA and Khyber. Inter-ethnic violence became a fairly common occurrence as those seeking refuge were treated with suspicion due to their perceived links with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Militants involved in the Afghan war did travel to the area, taking advantage of the relatively slight state presence to regroup and even stage attacks on NATO supply convoys traveling through the country towards Afghanistan.

Figure 42 Ethnic Militant Violence Vs Military Aid (1988-2011)
The resultant increase in the presence of military and paramilitary forces caused tensions to rise and the frequency of clashes between the state and tribal militants increased. ‘Flashpoints’, such as the rocket attack on Musharraf, gave the army justification to conduct a massive military crackdown on the area. A large military incursion, supported by an intense barrage of air attacks devastated large areas of the territory, resulting in several thousand deaths and anywhere between 50,000 and 200,000 internally displaced persons (IDMC, 2006, p. 5).

The newly established line of military aid from the United States may have had a significant effect on the nature of Pakistan’s response to growing resistance to the state in Balochistan. American F-16 jets and Cobra helicopters were used in the bombardment of the territory (SIPRI, 2014 a) (Le Monde, 2006). The US has provided artillery cannons and shells, which have been used punitively against towns and villages to deter further anti-state action (SIPRI, 2014 a) (Schofield, 2012). While specific transfers made after the resumption of military aid in the 2000-2011 period, agreements had been made for new transfers of F-16s, cobra attack helicopters and artillery had been made by the time the conflict had begun in earnest (SIPRI, 2014 a). If the army did not have new equipment in hand at the time, it had been given assurances that new stock would be delivered in the near future.

The over-zealousness of the military reaction could be put down to an attempt to try to quell the spread of instability around the country at a time where the state was facing a multitude of challenges in ungoverned spaces within its territory. However, the record the state has for violently putting down resistance movements in Balochistan suggests that other factors may have been involved in the decision to intervene with such a magnitude of force (Schofield, 2012).

As was discussed in Case Study 2, Balochistan is an area of prime natural resource wealth, holding large deposits of gas, copper, oil and gold (Harrison, 2013). Pakistan’s reliance on the area has been a major source of grievance for the local population. Equally, the knowledge that much of Pakistan’s energy security is tied to the territory has meant it remains a strategic priority for the state. Looking at the conflict retrospectively, the importance in the military terminating any potential political uprising or burgeoning independence movements can be seen in the increasing interest the territory receives from foreign mining firms. In 2006, in the midst of the conflict, Canadian/Chilian mining group Tethyan Copper Company was granted licence to mine copper and
gold in the Chagai district. The project was estimated to have a potential yield of some $500 billion in raw materials (The National, 2014). China has recently announced plans to invest some $46 billion into developing resource abstraction facilities and transportation infrastructure in the territory, including the construction of a deep-water port in Gwadar for which the Chinese state has taken ownership (Reuters, 2015) (Forbes, 2010).

Thus, the campaign by the Pakistani army to use overwhelming force to punish separatist militants and deter future civilian and militant movements for independence can be seen as a reflection of the strategic importance of the territory itself. While some have posited the argument that the particular viciousness of the attack may be a result of an ethnically Punjabi military behaving differently towards the Baloch population than it would in other territories (Schofield, 2012), the material importance of the area to the state is likely one of the key factors in the persistence on a military rather than political solution. As the historian Selig Harrison put it “if it were not for the strategic location of Baluchistan, and the rich potential of oil, uranium and other resources...it would be difficult to imagine anyone fighting over this bleak, desolate and forbidding land (Wirsing, 2008, p. 3).”

While there are broad correlations across the time periods between when military aid is distributed and when ethnic militancy increases, there is little indication of a substantive relationship between the two other than that the operations US military aid were designed to support played an exacerbating role. The influx of fighters from other parts of the country may have precipitated a confrontation between the Baloch tribes and the state, by attracting the attention of the military to the area, but the ‘foreign’ character of aid did not play a role in the legitimacy problem in the area. The legitimacy crisis in Balochistan is instead the result of deep cultural historical rifts between the native population and the nascent Pakistani state.

There is however, some indication that the magnitude and severity of the state response to Baloch resistance was affected by the type of aid donated by the US. The fact the relatively high tech equipment supplied by the was at the forefront of the barrage, indicates that this is not simply an ‘internal matter’ as Undersecretary of State Burns described, but a matter of human security in which the US is materially ingrained.
Levels of Islamist militant violence in Pakistan were relatively low up until the late 90’s, despite the significant political Islamification drive by the Zia regime in the 1980’s (Figure 43). There are several possible explanations for the delay in the onset of violent backlash against the state, despite the existence of many similar grievances upon which violence is currently justified. Military aid has interesting correlations with levels of violence, and help explain the transition of militant attention from foreign theatres to the domestic one.

It was certainly not the case that the Islamist movement did not have the capacity for violent resistance during Zia’s reign, or immediately after. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan did however provide something of a foreign outlet. As a hub for clandestine operations across the border, militant recruitment took place across a variety of Pakistan’s religious political networks and madrassahs at the behest of both the state (Cohen, 2003, p. 15) and foreign governments such as Saudi Arabia and the US (Asher, 2012, pp. 4,21).
While international support may have decreased after Zia’s reign, Afghanistan continued to present an outlet for militancy (Wilke, 2001, p. 23). The refusal of both the US and Pakistan to support a transitional government in Afghanistan led to a continuation of the fighting even after the Soviet Union’s withdrawal. Various militant organisations and warlords staked claims on territory and continued to fight a brutal civil war for control of the state throughout much of the 90’s.

As the declassified US intelligence record shows, the ISI spent much of the 90’s building the structure for what would become the Taliban amongst these competing militant organisations, in an attempt to ensure a pro-Pakistan government in Kabul ‘that would provide strategic depth with regard to India’ (National Security Archive, 2007). US and Canadian intelligence organisations were aware of significant transfers of economic and military aid throughout the 1990’s from various sources within the Pakistani military and government, to the Taliban network (Ibid). As Singer points out, the domestic religious network in Pakistan continued to be a significant source of personnel for the Taliban campaign with the Haqquania Madrassah allegedly sending its entire student body across the border to support its stalling 1997 offensive (Singer, 2001, p. 4).

With the perceived success of the Mujahadeen’s resistance against Soviet occupation, many officers in the Pakistani army were convinced that the approach could be mirrored in the struggle against India (Rizvi, 2000, p. 246). As such, Kashmir became another outlet for militant organisations operating within Pakistan. Religious networks, such as those centred around the Lal Maj Mosque in Islamabad, recruited fighters for operations in the disputed territory with the full knowledge (and in many cases direct support) of the security services. The Kashmir issue, which for many decades had been characterised as an independence struggle, now saw a huge influx of Islamist militants seeking a Pakistani nationalist infused sectarian war against Hindus, many of whom are native to Kashmir (Zahab, 2008, p. 134) (Evans, 2010, p. 24). The influx corresponded to a dramatic rise in violence across Kashmir throughout the 1990’s, with militants attacking both military and civilian targets (Evans, 2010, p. 26).

Thus, for much of the 90’s, Afghanistan and Kashmir presented outlets for Islamic militants to conduct Jihad without significantly affecting Pakistan’s domestic security. But as the power of Islamist political organisations grew within Pakistan, it also began to identify targets inside the country, with violence between Sunni and Shia groups increasing towards the end of the decade. From the contextual perspective of the case studies, and
with a view to how rates of Islamist/Sectarian violence have changed across both time periods, this period represents perhaps the most important missed opportunity in terms of addressing or interrupting this type of militancy.

It was at this point, in the late 90’s, that Nawaz Sharif and the PML acknowledged the nascent political power of Islamist politics. While religious conservatives groups had been fostered by the army as a means of balancing against civilian power grabs, so too did the civilian political leadership now attempt to secure their backing, making pledges to adopt Islamist policies. However, the PML’s landslide election victory in 1997 meant that the Islamist political groups were no longer needed to attain a governing majority (Staniland, 2015, p. 774). Subsequent attempts by the PML to then suppress Islamist parties in parliament merely added to the perception that the civilian administration was cynical and corrupt, providing further fuel to a narrative that fostered violence resistance. Despite Sharif’s attempts to establish the PML as the party of political Islam, he could not assert control over the local level actors, with several districts in the Northwest Frontier Province adopting Shari’a as the law of the land in January 1999 (Jan, 1999, p. 705). After years of political support from the state, parliamentary suppression of radical Islamist groups had little impact on their ability to wield power at the local level, where the momentum of anti-state groups continued to build (Ibid).

Some of the rise in internal sectarian violence may be attributable to the burgeoning proxy conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia. One of the early indications that sectarian violence was getting out of control came in 1997 after a bomb attack against several leaders of the Saudi linked sectarian group, Sipah-e-Sahaba. The group responded by burning Iranian cultural centres in Lahore and Multan (Nasr, 2000, p. 164). Later that year five Iranian military attaches were assassinated in Rawalpindi (Ibid). When Sharif made moves to address the problem by banning sectarian militant groups and forging peace talks between the two communities, an attempt was made on his life (Stern, 2000, p. 124). But as Sharif viewed the problem posed by such groups as a challenge to political authority rather than in the wider context of security, he had no qualms in using other, perhaps more dangerous Islamist groups such as Lashkar-e-Toiba, to attempt to counter them (Cohen, 2003, p. 15). Musharraf viewed the problem in a similar light, trapped between recognising a threat to security posed by such groups, and their utility in the maintenance of military power both domestically and in Kashmir.
As Haqqani has put it, during the most critical period in the development of the militancy threat, the army continued to see the primary challenge to its authority as coming from civilian governance, and thus also attempted to co-opt Islamist politics to counter it (Haqqani, 2004, p. 91). Musharraf’s attempt to wield the threat of radicalism as a bargaining tool against both the US, and domestic political challengers, signified a catastrophic underestimation the political autonomy of such groups. The army was, in effect, trapped by ingrained institutional ideology. Just as it could not help but see its chief political challenge as coming from civilian governance, so too could it not help but view the largest security threat as coming from India, rather than burgeoning domestic militancy. Thus, despite Musharraf’s acknowledgement that some groups needed to be banned, and that the domestic threat needed to be addressed, the army nevertheless continued to facilitate militants in order to maintain capacity for its longstanding proxy conflict with India.

The re-establishment of the strategic relationship between the US and Pakistan in the post-9/11 period, and the delivery of military aid packages contingent on Pakistani support for ‘the War on Terror’, was the clearest indication to these groups that even a highly conservative military run Pakistan state would not be congruent with their political objectives. From the perspective of the network of anti-state militants that would form the Pakistan Taliban, the logic of turning on the state was clear. As Staniland observes “In Pakistan, the entire point of the state was to protect south Asia’s Muslims” (Staniland, 2015, p. 782).” The raison d’etre of both the Pakistani government and its army was to protect the religious identity of the people, not to facilitate a war against fellow Muslims on behalf of an imperial western master. A state that lent itself to such ends was seen as necessarily illegitimate, and from the perspective of this particular brand of radical, sectarian Islamic politics, a target for attack and eventual overthrow.

While there has been a range of debate about the extent to which civil institutions such as madrassah’s have been a factor in the rise of Islamic militancy (Nasr, 2000) (Stern, 2000) (Singer, 2001) (Ali, 2009), or whether they account for no greater amount of militancy than other education sources (Anrabi, T. et al, 2009) (Bajoria, 2009), the political climate that has fostered the norm of violent Jihad against potential enemies was consistently facilitated by various political and state institutions since the Zia regime. But while the civilian political parties have recognised the necessity of courting Islamist and Sectarian politics as a reality of any push to attain power, it has been the military, more than any other single institution that has created that reality. This a key factor in assessing the impact of foreign investment in the military infrastructure of the state in
contemporary history. Regardless of how the particular types of aid have been utilised by the military, the programs have been an important source of support in key moments of recent political history. As the single most powerful institution in the country, the army has been materially reinforced and politically legitimated by its image as a partner of the United States, both in the war against 'communist expansion', and in the war on terror. But the foundations upon which the former conflict was fought, has to a certain extent provided the structure for the current one. As such, the logic of further militarisation, of a problem generated by militarisation, becomes increasingly problematic the further one appreciates the historical evolution of insecurity in the country.

The data indicates a correlation between military aid investment and Islamist/Sectarian violence. While it cannot categorically reveal a direction of causation, to an extent, the direction is not relevant. The contextual analysis reveals something of a symbiotic relationship between the two. The narratives upon which Pakistan’s domestic religious militancy are based harness foreign intervention to legitimate themselves. Thus the US prerogative to militarise the threats it perceives to itself, or its hegemonic influence, help generate a feedback loop, whereby violent radicalism feeds upon that which the US is most likely to contribute in situations of uncertainty; namely militarism and financing for militarism.

While this ourubrous-like relationship, whereby insecurity is fed by the methods designed to starve it, could be seen from problem solving perspectives as merely something to be improved upon or more effectively deployed in other contexts, the fallout in this particular case has been severe. The explosion in militancy in recent years has had a profoundly detrimental impact on human security in the state. While the rise in violence by non-state militants has been devastating, so too has the military response, which itself further propagates the legitimacy crisis that fuels radical violence (as shall be seen in the analysis hypothesis 3). As an ex- senior Pakistani military officer remarked at a recent conference, ‘we can never get rid of terrorism, because we have counter-terrorism’. There are certainly grounds within the analysis presented here to support this perspective.
Pakistan has a lively public political space and is prone to sustained periods of public resistance, unrest and protest. It was posited from the outset that both the legitimacy issues arising from perceptions of reliance on external support, and the potential aggressiveness of the security state may give rise to the kinds of grievances that fuel protest. There are several recent high profile cases that would indicate that these factors might contribute to unrest in this manner. As studies of the Egyptian revolutionary movement of 2011 have shown, the characterisation of Hosni Mubarak as a ‘puppet’ ‘traitor’ and ‘agent’ was a central theme in the language of demonstrators (Lahlali, 2014, p. 8). Imran Khan, the leader of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and one of the largest popular political movements of recent years, has himself characterised the Arab Spring in this manner, describing it as a rejection of ‘a powerful US-backed regime’ by a population that had ‘long grown resentful of colonial interference and Western hegemony’ (Khan, 2011 a, p. 81).

Figure 44 All Riots & Violent Political Demonstrations Vs Military Aid (1988-2011)
The legitimacy problem from perceived foreign sponsorship does not only relate to the United States. The MQM have recently been at the centre of public controversy after a report by the BBC suggested the party had received funding from India, and hinted that militants in the organisation had received training from Indian intelligence (BBC, 2015). The party claimed the story was a fraudulent attempt to undermine their credibility indicating just how effective the label of ‘foreign stooge’ can be in Pakistani politics.

Likewise, the potential aggressiveness of an externally backed state security apparatus may have generated wide-spread resentment amongst the population. This can again be evidenced within examples from the Arab Spring movement, where according to a Brooking’s institute study, uprisings were principally sparked by the brutality of the security sector in almost every single country where they occurred (Ashour, 2013). Repressive state violence was at the centre of Pakistan’s most well-known mass political demonstration; the lawyer’s movement. While the protests were essentially a challenge to Musharraf’s attempt to reign in the judiciary the international attention given to the demonstrations, and the violent state crackdown that accompanied them, drew criticism across both Pakistan and the wider international community.

However, as can be seen from the distribution of recorded riots and violent political demonstration (Figure 44), there is no correlation with levels of military aid received by the state, nor is there a particularly notable difference between levels of unrest and periods of military or civilian administration. While the fact that the lowest levels of unrest are seen after the longest period of civilian rule in the entire period of the study (and the highest levels are seen just after the coup) may indicate just how disruptive a return to military dictatorship has been, violent mass demonstrations have been ubiquitous in recent history.

There are many possible explanations for the normalized distribution, but the key basis for any understanding is an appreciation for the vitality of Pakistani political culture. Violent demonstrations and incidents of unrest occur for a great many different reasons in different parts of the country and at a multitude of different scales(Figure 45). While most of the more sizable mass demonstrations are usually geared towards affecting a change in government policy, much of the low-level public unrest is the result of inter-ethnic and sectarian rioting/public violence. The battles between various political factions in Karachi both at the height of crisis within in the city in the mid-90’s, and the more protracted political violence that has occurred throughout the two case study periods, is testament to the general social fractiousness of Pakistani society. And while this
fractiousness can certainly be influenced by the relationship of the state to foreign actors, much of the tension is born out of the many social, cultural and economic problems facing the population.

As has been clear from the many turbulent administrations in recent history, the reputation for corruption attained by many civilian governments has meant that there has been no shortage of public unrest in periods of non-military rule. Imran Khan’s massive Tsunami movement in 2011 drew 100,000 participants in Karachi and gained international notoriety due to its critical view of US drone attacks. But the crux of the campaign focused on the corruption of Asif Zardari’s government and the general ‘graft’ that cripples Pakistani society from the top down (The Express Tribune, 2011). Despite a strong social media campaign and promising numbers of attendees at rallies, the campaign somewhat fizzled out after the PTI underperformed in the general election (although Khan has since claimed this was the result of widespread vote rigging) (The Guardian, 2013).

Figure 45 Distribution of Riots & Violent Political Demonstration by Party Responsible (1988-2011)
Another relevant factor in the lack of association between unrest and external military support is the centrality of the army in Pakistani history and culture. A Pew poll taken at the height of the controversy over the killing of Osama Bin Laden in 2011, and the strong implications of involvement by the military in aiding the Al-Qaeda leader in evading capture by the US, revealed that 79% believed that ‘the army was a good influence on the country’ (The Express Tribune, 2011). The same poll also found that the 94% of the public felt the country was going in the wrong direction, even though the army was still one of the single most powerful institutions in shaping policy after the return to civilian rule (Ibid).

Despite the many occasions where the Pakistani military had been found categorically to be behaving in ways that were harmful to Pakistan’s international image or to regional stability, the population has nevertheless consistently backed it to provide for its security. While this may be taken as an artefact of the nation’s tragic and still relatively recent birth (and the existential fear of India that has existed ever since) it may account for the difference in the political characterisation of the military that separates it from the experiences of other highly militarised societies that have rejected army rule (Brass, 2003, p. 72)(Mayaram, 1997)(Haque, 1995, p. 190).

That is not to say that the population does not challenge embedded authority within the state. Throughout the time covered by the case studies there have been many significant public movements that have attempted wholesale change of the political structures of society. The Shia protests against the introduction of the Zakat, the demonstrations by Mohajirs against state violence in Karachi, the ‘lawyers movement’ and most recently the Tsunami movement, are all examples of mass action taken by the population to challenge existing power structures. The military has itself experienced protest, in the form of the ‘Movement to Restore Democracy’ and ‘Alliance to Restore Democracy’ that protested the regimes of Zia and Musharraf respectively, but the subsequent crackdowns did not trigger the kind of spread of action or sustained discontent that were seen in the Arab spring cases.

And while these successive waves of movements can appear to crash fruitlessly against the shore of a well embedded elite power structure, they continue to arise at regular intervals. Indeed, looking at the distribution and the political context for mass movements in the country speaks to just how wrong the central hypothesis
for this section was; public resistance does not occur in Pakistan because of frequent brutal crackdowns by the state, but in spite of them.

(6.4) TESTING HYPOTHESIS THREE: RISE IN VIOLENCE INVOLVING THE STATE

Violence conducted by the state is a complex, dynamic and multifaceted phenomenon, presenting a wide range of structural, behavioural and normative political problems that prevent any kind of singular narrative arising to explain it or its impact on wider society (Jarvis, L. & Lister, M., 2014, p. 51). The limitations of this study, in focusing on macro trends in violence by actors across time, necessarily close off an understanding of the many nuanced differences between various sectors of the state security apparatus and how they behave. The distribution of violence involving police, paramilitary and military are quite different, with military/paramilitary related incidents clustered into large spikes in the second case study period (Figure 49), while incidents involving the police are more evenly distributed throughout both periods (Figure 48).

![Figure 46 Violence by Police/Military/Paramilitary Vs Military Aid (1988-2011)](image)
There is good anecdotal evidence from case study research that suggests that the military behave differently in relation to the ethnic makeup of the populations amongst whom they are operating. Likewise, the behaviour of police forces, and their relationship to the population, will be different in the major urban centres of the country such as Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad than they are in the less populated rural territories. The roles fulfilled by state actors can substantially change based on location and circumstance. Paramilitary forces like the Frontier Corps are a border patrol force when operating in FATA and Khyber, but have fulfilled a peacekeeping role in major cities like Karachi when they have been experiencing high levels of violence or instability. Thus it is impossible to make insightful comment on the behavioural impact that the macro level political context of military aid has had on the many individual components that make up the security state.

A further, and perhaps more immediate issue with attempting to categorically assess the impact of foreign security assistance on macro state behaviour vis a vis violence, is the problem with coverage that has been discussed throughout various parts of both case studies. The state security sector has at times been suspicious by its absence in the data, in a number of specific times and geographical areas where a substantial body of academic and investigative research by respected bodies such as the UN and Human Rights Watch, have indicted there have been significant acts of state violence. Massive campaigns of aerial bombardment, punitive destruction of property, and the day-to-day violence, detention and extrajudicial killing that is described by various witnesses is not well accounted for in the data, particularly in relation to military and paramilitary forces (Figure 49). A certain amount of discrepancy is attributable to the overarching problems of measuring violence through media sources, which can only ever capture a portion of all occurring violence. Like all actors that appear in the data, frequencies of violence give a rough approximation of the severity and geographic distribution of incidents, rather than an exhaustive account. Unlike other actors however, the Pakistani state, and particularly the military, have both the capacity to control reportage of certain events, and a demonstrable willingness to violently censor the press when it comes to issues it deems relevant to national security (Mufti, 2007).

With these caveats taken into consideration, there are still interesting movements within the state related political violence data that illustrate the domestic security implications of foreign military assistance. In the first case study period, violence conducted by state parties was fairly normally distributed, apart from the peak arising in the middle relating to the Karachi crisis. Police, military and paramilitary forces were responsible for
a high number of extrajudicial killings, and also incurred significant casualties themselves while battling MQM-Haqiqi, the Haq Parast Group and other organisations in 1995, a year that saw an estimated 2000 deaths alone (Ahmar, 1996, p. 1035).

![Figure 47: Incidents Involving Police/Military/Paramilitary Vs Military Aid (1988-2011)](image)

However, while the late 90’s also saw a dramatic increase in sectarian related violence attributable to the growing influence of both Sunni and Shia militant groups, overall levels of violence were declining from the mid-decade peaks. State violence reached particularly low levels at the turn of the decade (almost non-existent in 2000, again indicating reliability problems) experiencing some growth after Musharraf came to power and accounting for the cross border tensions with India and the substantial operations in FATA and Khyber to support US operations in Afghanistan.

Levels of violence by the state are changeable throughout the first few years of the second case study period, with dramatic increases coming in the middle of the decade, which, as stated in the case study, is the point at which military aid transfers begin in earnest and equipment and financing is actually being delivered. It is after this point that the two major sources of state violence in the time period occur; the operations against the
Baloch ‘uprising’, and the broader counterinsurgency war against anti-state militants. Both of these campaigns have had a huge impact on the territories affected, producing thousands of casualties and millions of displaced persons while, in the case of operations in FATA/Waziristan, achieving very little in terms of concrete strategic gains (Fair, C.C. & Jones, S.G., 2010, p. 125).

The military has over the course of its history, conducted counterinsurgency operations using a number of different strategies, all of which can be facilitated in different ways by the type of military aid transferred by the United States. The Routledge Handbook of Counterinsurgency lists four particular operational methodologies employed by Pakistan in attempting to counter challenges from non-state actors:

1. **The Conventional-Establishment approach uses military force to hunt the insurgents and the police to re-establish order (Karachi)**

2. **The Punitive-Militarist Approach, where pacification is achieved through terror rather than a political solution (East Pakistan, Balochistan, Khyber-Pakhtunkwa)**

3. **The Technological-Attritive approach which is a genocidal application of force**

4. **The Liberal-Reformist (approximated by counter-terror operations in the Punjab 1994-7) approach involves the use of the military and police forces within a broader socio-economic and political strategy, and is the preferred strategy NATO and the United States would like to see Pakistan adopt (Schofield, 2012).**

All four of these approaches have been encountered within the discussion of state behaviour in the two case study periods. The first and last are characteristic of operations carried out under civilian administration and are referred to as enjoying moderate ‘success’ in dealing with violent actors (Abbas, 2009, p. 15). The other two approaches have characterised some of the more heavily militaristic operations and, as will be explored below, are either considered to have been ineffective or downright harmful to the security of the affected population.

Firstly, the Conventional-Establishment approach, as it was deployed in Karachi in the 1990s, came in the context of a protracted urban conflict and was hugely detrimental to human security. While Karachi had become an extremely dangerous city, overrun by warring political militants and criminal groups, the addition of an attempted crackdown by the state served only to inflame the tensions in the city (Kartha, 1997). The
switch from military to paramilitary forces in 1994 attempting to reassert control pre-empted a massive upsurge in political violence. The state’s campaign of extra-judicial killings stoked backlash from groups like the MQM, who were the primary target, prompting further violent retribution against state targets (Ahmar, 1996, p. 1035). The back and forth between the state, militant groups and gangs cost several thousand lives in 1994-5(Ibid). While the situation in Karachi became more stable as the 90’s wore on, stability was largely achieved through the imposition of a strong police and paramilitary presence in the city and the use of military courts that forwent due process and evidential burdens to hand down quick, harsh sentences to persons suspected of being associated with targeted groups (Jan, 1999, p. 306).

The Karachi Crisis however, as the largest single source of insecurity in the largely civilian administered first case study period, was as much a result of civilian political failures as military ones. Much of the insecurity stemmed from the struggle for power that occurred between the MQM, as representative of the Mohajir population of urban Sindh, and the PPP, as representative of the established political power of the rural areas (Haq, 1995). The PML has also had turbulent relationship with MQM, attempting to co-opt the group to build a parliamentary power base and resorting to violently combative relationship when such attempts collapsed. It is worth noting that the worst period of violence in Karachi came under the second PPP led government of the period.

As the period of civilian governance corresponded with a period of strategic isolation from the US, the external influence of military aid is not as much of a factor in understanding state behaviour in this instance. However, as numerous studies have shown, the proliferation of vast amounts of small arms into Afghanistan and the border territory by the US and Pakistan in the 1980’s aid program played a significant role in the levels of violence seen in Karachi in the mid 90’s (Gayer, 2007) (Wilke, 2001) (Kartha, 1997). As the drug trade, gang’s, militias and political parties fought for survival, the easy availability of cheap small arms massively increased the lethality of political instability.

Perhaps significantly, the state’s Karachi operations were not particularly sophisticated in terms of the technology or equipment needed to execute them, with the most advanced equipment required being the armoured vehicles used by police and paramilitary forces to negotiate the city, of which several hundred had been transferred from the US in the Zia period (The Independent, 1995). For the most part the police were
underfunded, under resourced, and unable to cope with the level of violence plaguing the city. When the paramilitary rangers were brought in with their more advanced weaponry, the problem escalated as armed actors turned to using explosives and rocket propelled grenades to deal with the military escalation (Karthya, 1997, p. 77). For its part, beyond returning small arms fire with other groups, the state responded to the violence by using abductions, torture and extrajudicial killings on suspected militants (US Department of State, 1996). As the US State Department’s own investigation into Pakistan’s human right’s abuses at the time found, many attacks against militia groups were staged by the police and paramilitary in order to disguise what were effectively street executions (Ibid).

The Liberal-Reformist approach has been hailed as a more successful counterinsurgency strategy, although examples are relatively limited. The early stages of the civilian led administrations responses to sectarian militancy in the mid 90’s are cited in several cases (Abbas, 2009, p. 17) (Lalwani, 2009). Sharif in particular is thought to have achieved a significant interruption of sectarian militant activity by launching a mass crackdown on such organisations in Punjab between 1997 and 1999 (Kamran, 2008, p. 11). While they did appear to
achieve some moderate success despite the proliferation of violent sectarian politics within the country in the period, Islamist violence was not out of control in the way it would be in later years (Figure 43). The fact that the strategy relied on mass arrests of suspected individuals might however provide some challenge to its conceptualisation as a ‘liberal’ or ‘reformist’, but it did avoid substantive increases in the militarisation of the problem and at least indicated a determination to acknowledge the problem politically and to make steps to treat sectarian violence as a security priority. But moderate success in treating the problem as a criminal issue under the jurisdiction of law enforcement does draw attention to the missed opportunities for the state in approaching internal security issues in an alternative, less militaristic manner. The lack of inter-agency cooperation between the ISI, the civilian-run Intelligence Bureau, the Federal Investigation Agency and the police has been continually highlighted as an area that, with improvement, could deliver a more nuanced response to potentially violent criminals (Abbas, 2009, p. 15). The US has made provisions for building police capacity a central part of the economic assistance delivered via the Kerry-Lugar bill, but as yet, institutions that may provide a viable civilian countermeasure to militant organisations, such as the Federal Investigation Agency, remain chronically underfunded and ineffective (Fair, C.C. & Jones, S.G., 2010, p. 128).

Both the Technological Attritive and Punitive Militarist approaches have similar strategic characteristics and are more evident in the second time period than in the first. What Schofield is describing when he refers to Technological Attritive, is the use of technological superiority in the deployment of overwhelming force with the aim of depleting an area of a problem population. The description of the approach in terms of ‘genocidal’ application of force is not to say that the strategy is some overt attempt at destroying an entire population, but the undermining of a society through attrition. The definition is derived from the writing of the great Pakistani political scholar, Eqbal Ahmad, who was describing the US approach to counterinsurgency in Indo-China. In that case, the population faced “long-haul, low-cost” aerial bombardment in order to pacify a problem population (Ahmad, 2006, p. 45). The technological superiority of the state granted limited consequences for the intervening party, who could strike from long range with aerial weapons while being exposed to little threat from the targeted groups.
There are certainly hints of this type of logic at play when looking at Pakistan’s operations against the Baloch population, although on a vastly smaller scale than anything experienced in Indo-China. In a relatively short but intense aerial campaign, the state went ‘full throttle’ in attacking political targets it deemed connected to the Baloch nationalist movement, despite many such targets having limited or tangential ties to such politics (IPCS, 2006, p. 2). Journalists, activists and human rights organisations, including the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, detailed the use of indiscriminate aerial bombardment against towns and villages in the territory that were deemed to harbour political targets (IPCS, 2006, p. 2) (UNPO, 2010, p. 4) (AHRC, 2011, p. 54). The campaign was conducted by 20 US supplied Cobra helicopter gunships and four squadrons of F-16 jet fighters (Washington Post, 2006). As part of the renewed military aid program, the US agreed the transfer of 20 Cobra attack helicopters under the category of Excess Defense Articles, i.e. surplus equipment approved for export (Congressional Research Service, 2015) (DCSA, 2015). The deal also included $48 million for refurbishment of Pakistan’s Cobra fleet (Congressional Research Service, 2015). A total of 14 F-16 fighters were also transferred as Excess Defense Articles, valued at some $1.43 billion, but this purchase was ostensibly
funded by Pakistan itself (although the various cash support mechanisms outlined in the case study should be kept in mind)(Ibid). Asked by members of Pakistan’s Human Rights Commission for comment at the time, Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns stated the Balochistan campaign was an internal matter and would not be raised by the US with Musharraf (Washington Post, 2006).

The more common approach for Pakistan’s counterinsurgency operations in the second time period could be characterised under the description of punitive militarist, insofar as this was the perceived strategy during the time of the state’s largest bouts of violence in 2008-2010 as it conducted huge operations against anti-state militants in the north west. Pakistan had relatively little experience of fighting major counter insurgency wars in its own territory up until its participation in the War on Terror. With the exception of some parts of the Al-Mizan offensive which had produced significant casualties and displacement in FATA, operations against Islamist militants in the North West of the country were of a relatively low intensity up until 2008 (IDMC, 2006). Operations such as Zalzala (Earthquake) represented huge mobilisations that used ground forces and air power to clear large sections of South Waziristan in the wake of the first successful attacks against the military by the Pakistan Taliban (Khan, 2012, p. 133). Over 200,000 people were displaced by the fighting, and the immediate result was a dramatic increase in the size of the Taliban network, and a massive proliferation of attacks across the country (Ibid, p.135).

Several other large scale military operations followed between 2008-10, with the army embracing a “punitive” deterrent strategy in the hopes of breaking political support amongst the tribes for Baitullah Mehsud and the Taliban network generally (Roggio, 2009). Large-scale aerial bombing campaigns and artillery bombardments were used to clear areas suspected of housing militants (Aziz, 2008, p. 3) (Khan, 2012, p. 129). Once again, US equipment was central to the missions conducted by the Pakistani military, with F-16s flying over 300 missions in the Swat Valley, and 100 missions in South Waziristan, between May and July 2009 alone (New York Times, 2009). American made artillery and Cobra attack helicopters were also used to support the incursions by the armed forces, with the US airforce playing a supporting role by using drones for surveillance and having air force personal upgrade the F-16s involved in the fighting (Ibid).

State violence also occurred on a smaller scale in these operations, with the army taking up an occupying role in areas such as the Swat valley, where the Pakistan Taliban’s influence was thought to be greatest. Human
rights organisations such as Amnesty International documented day-to-day systematic abuse of the population with arbitrary detention, torture and extrajudicial murder a common occurrence for civilians suspected of having links to the Taliban (Amnesty International, 2012). Shoot-on-sight curfews were imposed in major towns in Swat such as the capital city of Mingora (Dawn, 2009). Confirmation of the discovery of mass graves by groups such Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan indicated that the state was quietly prosecuting an intense campaign of political violence against suspect members of the population (The Guardian, 2011).

The sheer scale of the operations in the territory attracted global attention to Pakistan’s deteriorating internal security dynamic, causing Pakistan Taliban leader Baithullah Mehsud to proclaim to the international media that the operations had been hugely beneficial to the organisation: “When Nek Mohammad was our leader in 2002, no one had even heard of us. But Look at us today! We number in thousands and the whole world knows us. We are lucky that the Pakistani and the US tactics helped us develop into an invincible force (Aziz, 2008, p. 3).” Mehsud, whom ISI chief Pasha had once described as a ‘patriot’, had been the obsessive focus of much of the military response, with the army operating under the assumption that killing the leader would break the back of the insurgency (Siddiqa, 2010, p. 156). In reality, after he was assassinated by drone strike in 2009, the leadership was simply transferred to Baithullah’s relative and protégé, Hakilmullah Mehsud, who retaliated by unleashing an enormous wave of suicide bombings across the country (Independent, 2013).

The Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies’ survey of the population in the wake of the military operations suggest that the potential counter productivity of heavy military action isn’t just limited to the raised profile of militants. With 80% of those asked opposing such operations and 20% describing the insurgency as a direct result of Pakistan’s participation in the ‘War on Terror’ it seems that large scale punitive operations have a negative impact on prospects for political resolution of the conflict for populations in the affected areas (Khan, 2012, p. 136).

The scale of the violence in these operations also mounted pressure on the US to wield its influence as Pakistan’s military benefactor to raise the issue of widespread human rights abuses in FATA. The Obama administration announced that it would withhold training of Pakistani military personnel until some of the concerns regarding the army’s operations in the region were addressed, causing a significant political backlash.
within the military hierarchy and government (The Telegraph, 2010). It is not clear how sincere the attempt at emphasising human rights issues was on the US part, with many Pakistani officials claiming it simply part and parcel of the public relations sparring occurring between both countries in the wake of the unpopular drone campaign and the killing of Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad (Ibid). More importantly, with the announcement of the training suspension coming a mere two days after Secretary of State Clinton claimed the United States “has no stronger partner when it comes to counter-terrorism efforts against the extremists who threaten us both” in the process of asking congress for new military aid package worth $2 billion (The Telegraph, 2010) (Wall Street Journal, 2010). As the Wall Street Journal recorded, of negotiations for a new round of military assistance:

“U.S. officials, although they denied that the increased aid was part of an explicit deal to get Islamabad to mount a ground offensive in North Waziristan, said they hoped increased Pakistani military capabilities would translate into increased action on the ground...’It would seem natural that they could become more aggressive’ in the tribal areas, said one American official (Wall Street Journal, 2010).”

Thus despite the preference for a more liberal, civilian institutional response to the threat posed to Pakistan by Islamist violence (Schofield, 2012), the US has continued to support the militarisation of responses to insecurity. This approach has been facilitated via substantial military aid packages by both Republican and Democratic administrations within the US, and endorsed and conducted by both military and civilian executives in Pakistan. It has been renewed despite a lack of evidence for reductions in political violence experienced by the population in the wake of such large-scale interventions and, on the contrary, substantial contextual evidence that such operations fuel precisely the grievances and narratives upon which anti-state violence is justified.
The above exchange perhaps best encapsulates the substantial contradictions in the relationship between the military assistance strategy of the US and the security problem faced by the population of Pakistan. While it is acknowledged by the US that the manner with which the army conducts major operations has been hugely problematic in human security terms, it nonetheless sees military aid as a form of direct encouragement for Pakistan to build an even more aggressive military response to what is, effectively, a crisis of political legitimacy in large areas of the country. As can be seen from the data, the influx of military aid has not corresponded to an improving security situation for the population in the periods where it has been deployed. To the contrary, it is associated with rising levels of violence, particularly with regard to Islamic militancy.

The rise of Islamic militancy itself has been fostered paradoxically by attempts to build the security infrastructure of the state. While the military’s fixation on utilising conservative religious politics as a framework for justifying its own centrality in the state’s political hierarchy is a product of Pakistan’s history, it cannot entirely be separated from the influence of foreign support, particularly from the US. The influx of money and arms from the US in the 1980’s built a shadow economy, upon which many members of the military became very wealthy, and powerful (Kartha, 1997). It also further centralised the military as the Éminence grise of Pakistani politics, acting as gatekeeper to executive authority even through periods of civilian administration. It afforded the military unfettered ability to build the capacity of radical militants in order to wage proxy war against India, a behaviour it has ironically, appropriated from the US. In turn, this normalised the use of violence by radical religious groups to achieve their vision of a new political reality. This strategy, played out over several decades, has been monumentally destructive to both the national political infrastructure, and the security of the population.

For its part, responses to foreign military aid have not correlated with patterns of mass unrest amongst the population. Unrest, uprising, and violent political resistance have been a constant feature of Pakistani politics in recent history and, unlike many other forms of violence explored in this study, their relatively even distribution throughout both time period is perhaps testament to the significant governance failures of both civilian and military administrations. The most recent mass political movements in the case study, such as the
PTI’s post-Arab Spring inspired Tsunami have been notable in relation to the guiding hypotheses of the study for their rejection of US interference in Pakistani politics, and for the markedly different approaches of the political leadership of the movement to the problem of political violence. The PTI, the secular progressive Awami National Party (ANP) and even local elements of the PPP, have engaged the leadership of the Pakistan Taliban in order to build the foundations for a political settlement to the conflict (Aziz, 2008, p. 3). They have been witheringly critical of both the US and the Pakistani military for continuing to conduct military operations and assassinations in the midst of attempts at political negotiations, even as the ANP itself has suffered devastating attacks at the hands of the Pakistan Taliban (Ibid).

State violence, as has been mentioned previously, is a complex multifaceted phenomenon which cannot be fully understood through its interaction with a single variable such as levels of foreign military assistance. However, as can be seen by the contextual assessment of US engagement with the Pakistani military, foreign assistance is intended to facilitate an aggressive state response to the problem of Islamic militancy in Pakistan, and to that extent the data and analysis presented here indicated that it was successful. However, the research also indicates that the program has been counterproductive, both in terms of achieving a loyal, stable, strategic partner in Pakistan, and more importantly, in the security outcomes for the population. Tough military responses by the state are not associated with an improvement in security for Pakistanis, and if anything, there is evidence indicating that major punitive military operations have increased the frequency and intensity of militant violence. Building the military capacity of a state with serious political legitimacy problems has also had detrimental effects on minority populations who seek a certain degree of political autonomy, such as the Balochs. Again, the contextual assessment of the data indicates foreign assistance has facilitated an aggressive military response to what is fundamentally a problem of political representation and regional autonomy.

An interesting side point is that the largest waves of violence by both state and militant actors came after the return to civilian administration, indicating that the pursuit of more aggressive military tactics are not necessarily the result of the military holding executive power, as might perhaps have been predicted. In several cases across both time-periods, civilian administrations have overseen substantial domestic uses of military force. Whether this indicates that civilian administrations are just as likely to militarise security
problems as military governments, or whether the army’s political power lends it enough operational freedom to shape responses regardless of what administration is in power, is of course up for debate.

It is important to reiterate, that the cycle of state violence and Islamist militancy are deeply intertwined and it is not possible as a result of the methodology of this study to imbue causation in violence relating to both of these actors. It is possible to view state violence as a response, with US encouragement, to the growing threat of militancy within the country, just as the opposite is also potentially true; violence by other parties can be seen as a response to the more aggressive behaviour of a state that is seen as beholden to a foreign power and lacking internal legitimacy. Establishing the direction of causation in a convincing manner would take a more in-depth qualitative analysis of decision making within the Pakistani army and militant groups at the time and is beyond the scope of this study. What is clear is that despite many of the justifications for the strategy, rises in military aid are associated with rises in levels of violence perpetrated by the state, and the also by the violent non-state actors to which it is opposed.
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION: OBSERVATIONS FOR TWO AUDIENCES

(7.1) INTRODUCTION

This concluding section will outline the main contributions of the thesis for two key audiences outlined in the introduction. Firstly, some of the observations arising from the attempt to deploy human security as a critical policy analysis tool. While the project has been conceived of, and executed primarily as an empirical analysis of a policy problem area, it nonetheless has some important insights into methodological approaches to the practical application of a human security study program derived via its restrictive formulation for the purpose of this study.

For the policy orientated audience, the study has found evidence to suggest that on a broad range of areas, the US military aid program in Pakistan has been both costly and counterproductive. It has failed to achieve the basic aims established by the foreign policy strategies within which it is situated, and may propagate security problems into the near future. From a ‘problem solving’ perspective, the study has highlighted potential danger areas in using this particular type of aid strategy to achieve security or stability building objectives in states affected by significant levels of political violence, or within the context of contingent state legitimacy. There are also useful observations for the more critically orientated scholarship on intervention. The study hints at a symbiotic relationship between foreign interventions, the reproduction of hegemonies at multiple levels and the production of counter-hegemonic forces are described in terms of their relationship to the military aid program. While not being directly responsible for creating a political landscape in which massive insecurity affects large swathes of the population, the study has highlighted the role aid plays in reinforcing actors and institutions which propagate violence and instability. The study thus has useful contributions for those interested in challenging the political legitimacy of such interventions.

Finally, the limitations of the study and potential avenues for further research to strengthen its findings will be discussed. In particular, strategies for new research that will both broaden the scope of the study to include more countries and enhance generalisability, as well to enhance the depth of understanding in the particular case of Pakistan will be highlighted.
The aim of this study has been to assess a specific aspect of foreign security policy, one that has the potential for increased utilisation in future conflicts, using a critically derived metric. Human security provided a useful measurement perspective for the study, in so far as it escaped the confines of strategically focused national security, while espousing core principles that have been normalised, in theory if not in practice, within a large body of states within the international system (Micheal, M.S. & Marshall, L., 2007, p. 9). This aspect is important, as it would seem that the further research deviates from a critique based on recognisable values established in political institutions, the less policy relevance such a critique will enjoy (Jentleson, 2002). Thus, while it would be possible to critique military aid transfers on a critical theory basis (e.g. from an emancipatory or anti-imperialist perspectives) framing the critique in the more cosmopolitan language of human security opens other useful lines of critical appraisal. In particular, it can provide a means of refocusing policy analysis along the lines of the question “does it do the job?” for which it is ostensibly designed for the relevant populations affected by the program (McDonald, 2007, p. 254). The extent to which the post-Cold War humanitarian interventionist discussions have, however ambiguously, internalised much of the language of human security is evident in the population centric justifications for major foreign policy initiatives (Chandler, 2003). The language of human security therefore provides a useful avenue for critique by taking seriously justifications such as those used in the case Pakistan, that aid is designed to make the state “more secure, more stable, more prosperous, more democratic (US Department of State, 2015)”. 

Taking pronouncements on the human security credentials of policy as a basis for analysis not only provides a good grounding for policy relevant critical analysis, but also goes someway to addressing one of the major methodological critiques of human security; the question of operationalisation. Even when taking the narrow ‘freedom from fear’ definition of human security, the problem of determining what areas of insecurity are and are not within the purview of a particular study have made the approach unattractive to much security scholarship. Deploying human security as a critical policy analysis tool, allows the policy itself to dictate the frames of reference for the study. It limits the assessment of policy to areas that it can be reasonably expected to affect in some way, thus sidestepping the potential analytical weakness in comparing specific policy against general principle. If the military aid program to Pakistan is justified on the grounds that it should make the
population more secure against non-state actor violence, then it is reasonable to measure that policy against such violence— as opposed to the ‘shopping list’ of social, cultural or development aims for which human security, as an analytical framework, is generally criticised (Krause, 2004, p. 367).

Limitations presented by the availability of data will also be a factor in narrowing potential research avenues. The BFRS dataset has been an incredibly useful tool for gathering a picture of political violence in Pakistan, doing so in a manner that can help researchers operate within the framework of a critical security or human security agenda. It did this primarily by collecting data on all political violence recorded by the most reliable media outlet across all sectors of the population including violence against armed actors and the state. Despite the potential problems with the measurement of state violence discussed within the case studies, this approach helped illustrate broad trends in political violence across the country within the time period, while also allowing the researcher to disaggregate by actor, ethnicity and geography to illustrate a variety of experiences and effects.

The combination of these factors, the determination of specific policy outcomes, identification of metrics related to those outcomes and the availability of data on those metrics, provide a compact reflection of human security’s utility in research. Deploying it in this restrictive manner may indicate that better human security research can be done from a more reflexive perspective rather than a prescriptive one i.e. by reacting to existing or proposed policy.

(7.3) THE PROBLEM SOLVING VIEW: OBSERVATIONS FOR THE POLICY ORIENTATED AUDIENCE

The area of principal importance for the critical assessment of a program such as military aid is in the determination of its success based on its established goals. The longstanding justification for military aid in Pakistan is to make it a more secure state, to combat terrorist organisations in the country, and to fulfil the broader remit of almost all military aid programs by helping build a network of effective allied states (US Department of State, 2015) (Kronstadt, K.A. & Epstein, S.B., 2013, p. 1) (Bush, 2002, p. 6). These relatively specific security aims, which while quite traditionally strategic in their outlook do not necessarily contradict human security concerns, are the areas that have been tested within the case study against the available data.
on political violence. The data, supported by case study research, has suggested that military aid as means of perpetuating foreign security has been, in this case, highly counterproductive. This can be understood across three basic areas.

Firstly, the policy failed on its own terms. As has been shown in the analysis, the influx of military aid from the US has not correlated with an increase in stability within the state, nor with decreasing levels of political violence. Violence by terrorist organisations grew substantially along with the reestablishment and growth of US military aid to Pakistan. There have been several reasons for this but amongst the most important is that the attempts to encourage the Pakistani security state into a crackdown on the various radical militant organisations that the state itself helped develop, has served only to convince such groups that the state has lost legitimacy and is thus ripe for attack. As groups like the Pakistan Taliban coalesced around a firm anti-state agenda, the US backed operations by the state have seemed only to further strengthen and enlarge the organisation. Thus the use of military aid in Pakistan as a means of enticement to engage with violent non-state actors has created something of a feedback loop, whereby the pursuit of security aims have generated further insecurity.

The second problem area through which we can view military aid is through the generation of ‘moral hazard’. Throughout the entire period of history analysed in the case study, the Pakistani security state has pursued agendas that are majorly contradictory to US strategic goals. From the development and subsequent proliferation of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program in the 1980s, to the continued support for favoured Jihadist groups during the War on Terror, Pakistan has always pursued its own security objectives regardless of their alignment with US policy. In the process, it has been rewarded handsomely with access to American arms and substantial cash grants with which to make major purchases. While major diplomatic instances have caused interruptions in the flow of military aid, they have not been terminal. Even in the wake of the diplomatic fallout from the US operation to kill Osama Bin Laden, who was suspected to have enjoyed at least some level of support from Pakistani intelligence to evade capture, military aid suspension lasted less than two years before being quietly restarted (The Guardian, 2013). The moral hazard problems are further magnified when taken in the context of the knowledge of widespread corruption, as a report by the Belfer Center made clear:
“The great majority” of the Coalition Support Funds given by the United States to reimburse Pakistan for counterterrorism operations was reportedly diverted to the Ministry of Finance, with only $300 million reaching the Army in the financial year ending 2008. This is evidence of corruption at the highest level. The result is that, after eight years of funding, many Pakistani troops in the FATA lack basic equipment such as sufficient ammunition, armored vests, and shoes. For many years, U.S. officials ignored clear evidence that the military was not using U.S. funds to further U.S. foreign policy objectives (Ibrahim, 2009, p. 6).”

Military aid, in this case, has demonstrably failed as a means to entice good behaviour from a partner state and, due to the continuation of bad behaviour after suspensions, may have even encouraged further deviations from desired outcomes.

The third and final problem area perhaps adds a level of obfuscation to the moral hazard issue. Military aid has, since its formalisation in post-WWII US policy, been seen as a means of building regional security networks. Building the security capacity of partner states increases the strategic reach of the donating power, providing a means of shaping geopolitics through a range capable and loyal allied states. While loyalty may be contingent on the supply of an enhanced military capacity that conveys a benefit to the recipient state for its own security, the material rather than ideological basis for a strategic relationship may undermine the resilience of the alliance. The rise of China as the major regional power in Asia has naturally complicated the US’s strategic relationship with Pakistan. The significant investment by China in Pakistan’s infrastructure and the promise of future major transfers of both economic and military aid has undermined the US’s bargaining position and possibly exacerbated the moral hazard problem. The donation of 50 fighter jets to Pakistan in the midst of the diplomatic fallout from the Bin Laden raid, indicates the willingness of China to exploit rifts between the two states to draw Pakistan into closer strategic partnership (The New York Times, 2011). This may fatally undermine the ability of the US to use military aid as a means of pressuring Pakistan into actions it doesn’t see as fully compatible with its own geostrategic objectives. Furthermore, it undermines the utility of the promise of transfer of material goods to secure loyalty, rather than say cultural or ideological commonalities, due to the continued potential to be ‘outbid’ by a competitor.
The primary critique of the military aid program as regards Pakistan is the same whether discussing the problem for the policy focused audience or from a human security perspective; the program has not contributed to a more stable or secure Pakistani state and has instead correlated with substantial increases in political violence. But while the policy focused analysis may view the program as being merely counterproductive, in this case due to the nature of the US’s relationship with radical Islamist groups in the region, the more critical approaches may generate broader systematic explanations for why the program might generate more violence than it prevents. One of the driving narratives of the war on terror has been derived from a redeployment of Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilisations thesis, that portrays Islamist violence as a totality, an inescapable feature produced by the combination of innate radicalism and the inconsolable differences between western and Islamic societies (Chen, 2010, p. 106). Critical perspectives have consistently rejected such characterisations and have instead attempted to explain political violence in terms of the historical and political contexts that has given rise to a plethora of grievances across the non-western world (Gunning, 2007) (McDonald, 2007) (Jarvis, L. & Lister, M., 2014). In particular, scholars operating under the umbrella of critical terrorism studies have sought to challenge assumptions about the nature of terrorist violence, attempting to reorient approaches to its study by appreciating that the goals of most ‘terrorist’ organisations are inherently political and nationalist in character, as opposed to being driven by puritanical zealotry (Jackson, 2007, p. 417).

As has been seen in the case studies presented here, Islamic militant groups conduct violence on the basis of a range of grievances and political objectives, which while understood in many policy circles as existing in alignment with a diffuse international religious terrorism network, are a product of the specific circumstances of Pakistan, and the relationships such groups have to the state. Networks such as the Pakistan Taliban, represent a collection of diverse actors, many of which are domestic tribal groups that reject the legitimacy of the state and its monopoly on violence, either nationally or in particular regions, for a variety of reasons. Violence arising from this rejection of state legitimacy is by no means a product of religious identity, as has been shown in this study, a wide variety of actors defined by their secularism and/or ethnicity have also engaged in political violence throughout the period studied. In this sense, non-state actor violence can be
understood as a product of the wider crisis of sovereignty (Nef, 2002), governability (Mitchell, 2010) and legitimacy (Benhabib, 2014) that affects many parts of the world within the context of contemporary globalisation.

Such reformulations of the nature of non-state actor violence contribute to a better understanding of motivations and potential outcomes, and gives traction to critical narratives regarding the cycles of violence produced by the deployment of policies such as military aid. Violent non-state actors can be seen as occupying a counter-hegemonic space (Evans, 2011), in this case resisting a dual layer of mutually reinforcing hegemonic influences. Primarily, this resistance is to the state, historically constituted and populated by a dominant ethno-religious class, and controlled by a relatively small elite section of society within that dominant class. This elite has, throughout Pakistan’s history, proved difficult to influence or change beyond a narrow range of political debates that are relatively innocuous to embedded interests. Beyond any normative evaluation of political violence or resistance, the stagnancy and corruption of Pakistani politics, the perseverance of crippling poverty and under-development, create conditions where violent resistance to the state are a relatively unsurprising phenomenon. This is to say nothing of the Pakistan’s own direct support for various militant groups throughout the period of the study,

Exacerbating this crisis of legitimacy for the state, is the secondary and much broader influence of the global hegemon; the United States. As the case study research has shown, transfer of weapons and finances to terminate resistance can and do facilitate the very narrative developed by non-state actors to continue to violently resist. At various times, the state’s need to use violence to establish legitimacy with the global hegemon has directly undermined its legitimacy with sections of its own population. This in turn encourages further violence in a perpetual cycle that generates insecurity from attempts to establish security, both by Pakistan and the United States. Perhaps the most pertinent recent example of this phenomenon can be seen in the Peshawar school massacre. The Taliban claimed the attack, the worst in the nation’s history, was a response to the ‘ferocious’ military operations launched by the army in Waziristan, which the US has continually pressured Pakistan to conduct using military aid as a direct enticement (Wall Street Journal, 2010) (Guardian, 2014) (The Express Tribune, 2014). The Peshawar massacre has prompted further punitive airstrikes in the region, destroying large swathes of towns and villages thought to be loyal to the Pakistan Taliban and
displacing thousands more people from their homes in the process (Guardian, 2014) thus setting the state for another rotation in the cycle.

The militarisation of the response to Pakistan’s security problems has acted both to side-line any alternative political settlements that might be achieved, such as those attempted by smaller alternative political parties like the ANP or PTI, but also reproduces the military’s hegemonic position in Pakistani society. Military aid, as a means of blanket support for the armed forces either through capacity or large capital transfers, directly or indirectly facilitates continued investment in the armed forces throughout periods of major economic turbulence and over other priorities, facilitating both a consistently high level of defence spending and the maintenance of the military’s control over large swathes of the economy. This has further embedded the army as the single most powerful force in the state, massively curtailing the potential for immanent change in Pakistani society.

Even moderate challenges to military power, posed by actors who are themselves members of the political elite, are not tolerated. This was most clearly evident in 2014 when Prime Minister Sharif was reprimanded for having been found to have delayed a military offensive in Waziristan by attempting to engage in minor political negotiations with the Pakistan Taliban (Wall Street Journal, 2014). This, along with his deeply unpopular attempts at improving diplomatic relations with India and the continued pursuit of a trial of Pervez Musharraf, led to the military seizing control of all security related decision making in what has been referred to as a ‘soft coup’ (Siddiqa, 2014). While the dispute between the military and the executive may have led to a significant curtailing of civilian power in the state, it is worth noting that the crisis came to a head off the back of mass activism. In the midst of the dispute tens of thousands demonstrators occupied space in Islamabad and demanded the resignation of the prime minister and new elections, with PTI leader Imran Khan denouncing Sharif as a US stooge and claiming his electoral victory was the result of massive fraud (The Guardian, 2014). The army responded with a large security operation around the protests, and installed itself as the mediator in negotiations between the protestors and the state (ibid).

While the period of tension eventually subsided, it raised further questions about the potential for progressive change in Pakistan, illustrating again the difficult landscape that any popular movement faces in attempting to challenge or change hegemonic power structures affecting the country both domestically, and internationally.
Domestically, new movements must circumnavigate a political landscape dominated by a highly corrupt embedded elite, both within the civilian and military leadership. Beyond this, as has been shown both in the immediate example, and through several others in the case study, the military is the ultimate king maker in the country. No political movement can hope to attain or maintain power without support from the armed forces, which due to a range of factors relating to the political identity of that institution, massively restricts the spectrum of viable politics in Pakistan. It is in the context of this already difficult landscape that foreign support for the military should be viewed within critical perspectives. Foreign aid itself is not the determinant of embedded elite politics in the country, and indeed can only be seen to have made minor material contributions. But the political empowerment that comes from foreign legitimation, the pressure exerted to encourage militarisation of political problems, and the potential for empowerment and enrichment of particular individuals via direct payment or corruption, all have the potential to profoundly impact the macro security conditions of the country. Critical scholarship, activists and interested policy makers should challenge the inherent legitimacy of such programs and pursue evidence based critiques that attempt to provide a broader context of their impact on the affected society, in whose interest foreign interventions must eventually be justified.

(7.5) LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH

LIMITATIONS: CHOOSING AND FRAMING SUBJECTS

The act of foreign intervention, in whatever form, necessarily raises a great deal of political problem areas. Different features enjoy greater salience depending on whether a study adopts an economic, racial, gender or ethno-religious lens. In this case, human security has been used as a lens through which to view political violence, and for this to be taken as an indicator of success or failure of the intervention. This has necessarily meant that the study has focused on broad themes of population security, generating three hypothesis that sought to build an understanding of macro changes in the security landscape, including freedom from violence by non-state actors, violence by the state, and indications of popular activism or civil unrest. Other framing
devices would have doubtlessly highlighted different metrics to build an understanding of the impact of military aid, but based on both the theory approach and the limitations of available data, these areas seemed to hold the best potential for the yielding policy relevant findings.

While the case study research has uncovered interesting interactions between foreign support for the military state, and the normalisation of brutalisation of women, ethnic/religious minorities and migrants, the study at many times used general trends in all violence experienced by the population, which includes members of the security services and non-state militants as victims of violence. There are two reasons for this. Primarily this has been due to the fact that available data restricts more nuanced understandings of macro-level security policy. Violence against women in Pakistan for instance, has been socially institutionalised by successive administrations throughout much of the case study period, save for only very recent attempts under civilian administrations to repeal some of the worst legislative protections for violence (ICG, 2015). Violence by both the state and non-state actor against women appears to be seen so trivially as to go unrecorded. Legislative attacks such as the Zina ordinances made it more difficult for men to be prosecuted for crimes against women and more likely for an accusing woman to be charged with a crime, and thus had a massive deterrent effect on the reporting of violence (Tomar, 2001, p. 125) (HRW, 1999, p. 30). At the domestic level, the problem is potentially worse with hundreds, perhaps even thousands of cases of honor killings known to have been misclassified as accidents, suicides, disappearances or other unexplained incidents throughout both case study periods, without even touching upon non-lethal acts of abuse (ibid).

Unfortunately, there seems to be little hope of illustrating general trends in political violence against many specific subpopulations at these times with any sense of accuracy, due to at least some general social acceptance of such violence, and the lack of systematic attempts to record it. The BFRS dataset itself does not record data on the gender, religious or ethnic identity of specific victims, although this is understandable due to the methodological approach of using media sources, which do not always contain such information, especially in mass casualty events.

The selection of framing devices not only affects what subjects to study, but also the broader ontological and epistemological boundaries of the study. While the analysis presented in this thesis may be seen as lacking engagement with the discursive elements that have been central to much security studies scholarship in
recent years, it has not completely forgone an ideational understanding of security in favour of the material. Rather, despite the nature of security capacity transfers being inherently material, this study suggests that military aid has had an important role in shaping the ideational basis of Pakistan’s security environment. Indeed, from the outset, the study has invoked Haqqani’s description of Pakistan’s national security tripod (Islam, Suspicion of India and Support from the US) as a central framing device of the military elite’s ideology (Haqqani, 2005, p. 43). More specifically, one of the clearest outcomes of the case study is the argument that the US provided support to the Pakistani military, while it was normalising a radical, highly conservative vision of Islam as an organising mechanism for Pakistani society. Not only was material aid a factor in the normalisation of this particular view of political Islam, but it would later become a rallying point for the most violent Islamist groups in the country to begin targeting national institutions, and the wider population, as the legitimacy of the state became contested. This study has not presented a vision of specific amounts of aid generating specific levels of resistance, but rather, that the existence of strategic aid can, and in this case did, help fuel a wider political legitimacy crisis. The contextualisation presented in the study suggests that the idea of military aid, and what it represents, has had a far greater impact on human security than the material transfer of capacities ever could.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH: BROADENING AND DEEPENING

While some of these limitations are difficult to address due to restrictions regarding reliable data or access to various insecure regions, there are two major limitations relating to the breadth and depth of understanding of the problem that can and will be addressed by further research. Firstly, one of the inevitable consequences of the methodological approach of the study is to significantly limit generalisability. Even with an approach that had utilised a number of different cases representing the experience of several countries engaging in similar security practices and relationships, applying the findings of such a comparative analysis in an attempt at explanation or prediction in other cases would be problematic for a range of reasons discussed within the methodology chapter. The generalisability problem is perhaps exacerbated by choosing a ‘within-case’ comparative analysis that sought to explain difference within a multi-case setting derived from a singular
state’s experiences. While the case may have interesting findings on a range of issues relating to foreign aid strategies, violence and security, it’s a highly contextualised account that can only provide limited insight into the potential experiences of other states engaging a military aid relationship under different circumstances.

One way of improving the generalisability of the findings is to engage in a much broader, but necessarily shallower study on how military transfers affect actor behaviour by using a large-n statistical study of states receiving military aid, and using a wide variety of different metrics to assess impact. This would provide both a broader picture of how military aid impacts security, whether other factors explain violence better and whether Pakistan’s experiences are unique, or at the extreme end of recognisable trends. The State Department and the Defence Security Cooperation Agency holds a significant body of publicly available data on financial transfers and licences of equipment approved for export since the year 2000 (US Department of State, 2015) (Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 2015). Enquiries to the State Department have revealed that these section 655 reports on FMF direct commercial sales authorisation have not yet been catalogued in a singular dataset, thus potentially yielding a valuable new body of information for research on arms transfers well beyond the immediate focus of this study. While this may have been the optimal approach for research on this subject in the view of positivist orientated political science scholarship, this case study has provided an insight into the potential problems in attempting to understand military aid within such a broad framework.

Primarily, many aspects of foreign strategic assistance are, by their nature, covert. As the case studies here have shown, the financial measures recorded under foreign military financing are only a portion of the total amount of economic or material transfers conducted by a state when engaged in a security assisting role. Furthermore, while this has been found to have been true of the US case, other states such as China and Russia, who are thought to be major contributors to covert proxy wars around the world at the moment, reveal extremely little about the amount of military capacity they donate to allied states. While such studies have the potential to give valuable insight regarding general trends and the potential to discover relationships between aid and other variables, this approach will be replete with its own limitations regarding the accuracy of any model of aid and conflict derived by this method.

The second major limitation for the study arises from the broad focus of the research within the single case, which assess the trajectory of violence and political responses to it from national and regional data. This forgoes a more nuanced understanding of how military aid, as a policy, influences the decision making process.
within the military or security apparatus and thus a better causative understanding of how aid strategy affects policy in the recipient state. Increases in violence by the state may correlate with increases in military aid, but this does not prove causation and indeed, many other factors are likely to be as important in explaining rises in state violence in these periods.

A potential avenue to improve the depth of the study in this regard, would be to engage with current and former members of the Pakistani military and use structured interviews to get a more in-depth picture of the direct impact of military aid transfers on the behaviour of the armed forces. Senior military officials may gave insight into the impact on strategy at the national level regarding questions such as whether, or how, aid affects prioritisation of security problems, to what extent it encourages the targeting of specific areas or populations, and whether it affects the strength of force used by the state. Conducting interviews at different levels should yield a variety of insights into the dynamic impact of foreign aid across the security state. In particular, interviews with those who have participated in the US foreign forces training program (IMET) may yield valuable insights regarding not just how transfers of capacity affect state behaviour, but also how transfer of knowledge, ideas and contrasting military culture impact the behaviour of the state security apparatus on the ground. Interviews with military personnel could be balanced against those from members of the population of who have experienced the kinds of large-scale counterinsurgency operations launched by the Pakistani military in the previous decade, thus maintaining a population centric framework for assessing policy impact while maintaining a human security context for the research. Such research has the potential to contribute to a wide variety of security research agendas and a further much needed balance to existing counterinsurgency research by assessing similar policy areas but through a population centric lens (Gunning, 2007, p. 368).

(7.6) CONCLUSION

This study has been an attempt to understand broad problems through the exploration of specific ones. While military aid may be a relatively small factor in international politics, it has shown the potential to have a disproportionate impact on a range of areas both in the immediately affected states and beyond. It is an
indicator of both the strength of strategic relationships, but also of the determination a donor state has to seek military solutions to political problems. It is the militarisation of conflict, the innate support for state violence and the interventionist nature of the strategy that contribute to the central danger for a recipient state; namely the undermining of perceived autonomy, and thus legitimacy. Throughout the case study various actors have challenged administrations in Pakistan based on the perception that they are beholden to foreign interests. The fact that the military, the primary beneficiary of military aid, has had such a key role in crafting the kinds of religiously infused nationalism that drives violent reactions to this weakened legitimacy, is an important context to understand when measuring the success of such interventions.

The titular invocation of the Ouroboros, the snake that eats its own tail, is perhaps an apt description for security policy that holds the potential to generate the insecurity it is intended to mitigate. Cyclical patterns can only be altered by interrupting acts, which are contingent on the perspective of the audience. Be they merely those who seek evidence that an endeavour actually functions on its own merits, or those who seek to instil policy with more substantive human centric normative conditionality, or for those who seek to directly confront the fundamental legitimacy of interventionism. This study has hopefully provided meaningful findings for consideration by all three.
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