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Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring

Carmona, GMB and Carvalho, L (2016) Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring Journal of Mathematical Economics, 63. pp. 131-138.

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Abstract

We consider discounted repeated two-person zero-sum games with private monitoring. We show that even when players have different and time-varying discount factors, each player’s payoff is equal to his stage-game minmax payoff in every sequential equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that: (a) in every history on the equilibrium path, the pair formed by each player’s conjecture about his opponent’s action must be a Nash equilibrium of the stage game, and (b) the distribution of action profiles in every period is a correlated equilibrium of the stage game. In the particular case of public strategies in public monitoring games, players must play a Nash equilibrium after any public history.

Item Type: Article
Divisions : Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > School of Economics
Authors :
AuthorsEmailORCID
Carmona, GMBUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Carvalho, LUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Date : 23 February 2016
Identification Number : 10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.02.005
Uncontrolled Keywords : Repeated games, Two-person zero-sum games
Depositing User : Symplectic Elements
Date Deposited : 10 Jun 2016 15:46
Last Modified : 10 Jun 2016 15:46
URI: http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/810994

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