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Truth-tracking judgment aggregation over interconnected issues

Bozbay, I (2015) Truth-tracking judgment aggregation over interconnected issues [Working Paper]

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This paper analyses the problem of aggregating judgments over multiple interconnected issues. Voters share a common preference for reaching true collective judgments, but hold private information about what the truth might be. Information conflicts may occur both between and within voters. Following Bozbay, Dietrich and Peters (2014), we assume strategic voting in a Bayesian voting game setting and we want to determine voting rules which induces an e cient Bayesian Nash equilibrium in truthful strategies, hence lead to collective judgments that e ciently incorporate all private information. Unlike in judgment aggregation problems with two independent issues where it is always possible to aggregate information efficiently, efficient information aggregation is not always possible with interconnected issues. We characterize the (rare) situations in which such rules exist, as well as the nature of these rules.

Item Type: Working Paper
Subjects : subj_Economics
Divisions : Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > School of Economics
Authors :
Bozbay, I
Date : 12 June 2015
Copyright Disclaimer : Copyright The Author 2015
Uncontrolled Keywords : judgment aggregation, private information, efficient information aggregation, strategic voting
Depositing User : Symplectic Elements
Date Deposited : 17 May 2016 10:54
Last Modified : 17 May 2016 10:54

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