Endogenous R&D networks when labour unions have preferences over wages and employment

Rickman, N and Zikos, V (2015) Endogenous R&D networks when labour unions have preferences over wages and employment Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 25 (1).

	Text Endogenous R D networks when labour unions have preferences over wages and employment.pdf - Version of Record Restricted to Repository staff only Available under License : See the attached licence file. Download (470kB)
Preview	Text (licence) SRI_deposit_agreement.pdf Available under License : See the attached licence file. Download (33kB) | Preview

Abstract

© 2015 Taylor & Francis We develop a model to analyse the pattern of R&D network formation when unions have relative preferences over wages and employment. Within a three-firm industry, we show that when the unions place a low weight on wages and technological spillovers are low, a partial R&D network that includes two firms but excludes the third emerges in equilibrium. In contrast, when the unions care a lot about wages, a complete R&D network that includes all firms emerges. For all other intermediate levels of union preferences over wages, there is no strong stable equilibrium network. Empirical implications emerge from these findings, which are also discussed.

Item Type:	Article
Subjects :	Economics
Divisions :	Surrey research (other units)
Authors :	Rickman, N and Zikos, V
Date :	2 April 2015
DOI :	10.1080/10438599.2015.1025601
Copyright Disclaimer :	© 2015 Taylor & Francis
Depositing User :	Symplectic Elements
Date Deposited :	17 May 2016 10:54
Last Modified :	24 Jan 2020 12:53
URI:	http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/810725

Actions (login required)

View Item

Downloads