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Does risk sharing increase with risk aversion and risk when commitment is limited?

Laczo, S (2014) Does risk sharing increase with risk aversion and risk when commitment is limited? Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 46. pp. 237-251.

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Abstract

I consider a risk-sharing game with limited commitment, and study how the discount factor above which perfect risk sharing is self-enforcing in the long run depends on agents' risk aversion and the riskiness of their endowment. When agents face no aggregate risk, a mean-preserving spread may destroy the sustainability of perfect risk sharing if each agent's endowment may take more than three values. With aggregate risk the same can happen with only two possible endowment realizations. With respect to risk aversion the intuitive comparative statics result holds without aggregate risk, but it holds only under strong assumptions in the presence of aggregate risk. In simple settings with two endowment values I also show that the threshold discount factor co-moves with popular measures of risk sharing.

Item Type: Article
Subjects : Economics
Divisions : Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > School of Economics
Authors :
NameEmailORCID
Laczo, SUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Date : 1 September 2014
Identification Number : 10.1016/j.jedc.2014.06.013
Copyright Disclaimer : © 2014. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Additional Information : © 2014. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Depositing User : Symplectic Elements
Date Deposited : 28 Mar 2017 10:57
Last Modified : 29 Mar 2017 02:08
URI: http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/809820

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