Politics in the Dark: Risk Perception, Affect and Emotion in Lundahl and Seitl’s

Rotating in a Room of Images

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It is a well-known fact among theatre scholars that the word ‘theatre’ derives from the Greek theatron, meaning ‘a place for seeing’ or ‘a place for viewing’. Maaike Bleeker writes that to see ‘is also associated with insight, revelations, prophecy, second sight, and magic. (…)’ Seeing always involves projections, fantasies, desires and fears, and might be closer to hallucinating than we think.¹ But what happens when theatre takes place in the pitch-black? What insights and revelations occur and what projections and fears are exposed? Significantly, how might immersion in the dark affect an audience and how might this impact on an audience’s capacity to act in relation to their being acted upon? In short, what kind of politics takes place in dark theatre spaces?

I will be looking at the production of risk, affect and emotion in Lundahl and Seiltl’s immersive performance for an audience of one, Rotating in a Room of Images (2007); more specifically, I will be analysing my own experience of this work, addressing how risk perception might contribute to the production of affect and emotion, in turn treating affect and emotion as potential participatory risks. This chapter regards the mining of personal experience in participatory theatre as a useful and potentially informative method for setting about analysis of performer-audience dynamics. As with others in the field approaching this kind of work, I employ a ‘critical intimacy’ in approaching Rotating in a Room of Images ‘from a position of engagement’.² Imbrication within a performance event as a participant does not bar the capacity to make critical observations; eventfulness, after all, is a
fundamental part of both witnessing and examining explicitly participatory and less participatory theatre and performance.

Approaching performance from a position of engagement underscores and values the importance of subjectivity. This is an especially significant acknowledgment in seeking to both represent and analyse an experience of participatory forms of theatre. The experience of *Rotating in a Room of Images* recounted and examined in this chapter stands, I believe, in productive contrast to that of Josephine Machon’s also explored in this part of the book. The productivity of this contrast testifies to what critical intimacy might emblematise; for instance, where Machon reflects on her own anticipatory acts as an audience member in this performance in a context of gentility and trust, I consider such acts in a context of risk by unpacking my own experience of this work. However, the juxtaposition of these chapters is not antagonistic, but complimentary in the context of critically intimate approaches to performance. Attempting to document ‘The Experience’ of theatre is perhaps not as fruitful as contributing to a plurality of experiences, each demanding different critical tools and points of focus.

The first of this chapter’s two primary claims is that risk perception, affect and emotion might be usefully theorised as being entwined in this performance; the second is that a series of restrictions on participatory agency arise from this entwinement that characterise the interrelations between risk perception, affect and emotion as political. Limits on my own capacity to exercise agency will consequently be acknowledged and examined. Perhaps this might provide a sobering counterpart to the freedoms that might otherwise be associated with participatory theatre.

I am interested in how cognitive science, especially cognitive psychology and neuroscience, might inform an approach to theorising these two claims. However, in doing so, I would like
to draw attention to C. P. Snow’s famous 1959 Rede Lecture, ‘The Two Cultures’. In this lecture, Snow identified a split between science and the humanities in Western thinking. He supported equal claims to significance and validity between the two and believed that these claims should find adequate institutionalisation in the educational system. The methodology employed in this chapter bears in mind Snow’s observation and cause which not only remain valid, but increasingly significant in the context of metamorphosing disciplines such as theatre and performance studies, as well as recent threats to those disciplines. There is fruitful space to consider how cognitive science might enrich an approach to, for instance, the production of affect and emotion in performance. However, it is important not to ignore or belittle the value and insight that the humanities have traditionally offered theatre and performance studies. With this in mind, I will be citing research arising from cognitive science over the past forty years, but especially over the past two decades, as a means of informing, but not explaining, an approach to the production of affect and emotion in Rotating in a Room of Images: an approach largely documented in the first section of this chapter, ‘The Production of Affect and Emotion’. My approach to risk perception, detailed in the second section and applied to an analysis of Rotating in a Room of Images, will draw on the psychological research of Paul Slovic, in tandem with Antonio Damasio’s neurological research into decision making. A concluding section evaluates these findings in political terms, drawing on a cognitive reading of agency detection.

The Production of Affect and Emotion

I attended Rotating in a Room of Images at the Battersea Arts Centre’s One-on-One Festival in 2011. On entering the space of this performance, I was asked to wear headphones which whispered instructions, mostly dictating when and where to move in the performance space.
The space itself was made up of sets of white drapes, forming corridors. The lights faded to complete darkness before those whispers encouraged me to stand. When the lights faded back up, the orientation of the white drapes had shifted 90 degrees. The lights faded back to black and the voice in the headphones prompted me to reach out a hand as another hand, that of an unseen performer, took hold, somehow guiding me, the blinded, forward. In moments of light, a pair of performers were visible in varying tableaus and proximities; in moments of darkness, a sense of threat permeated the space, countered only by the hands of unseen others acting as guides. This game of hide and seek, of intermittent light and dark, of metamorphosing spaces, of stumbling and being guided through the pitch-black, continued in various guises for the fifteen minute duration of the performance.

What interests me about this piece was my capacity to act as a participant, in relation to my being acted upon: in other words, a politics of participation. Immersion in pitch-black has the potential to produce affects and emotions which are powerfully felt. In this case, the processes which will become the subject of enquiry are the causes of trepidation and fear which I felt when stumbling forward in the dark. The suggestion is not that fear must have consequently been produced in all other participants (Machon’s chapter in this book suggests as much); rather, the suggestion is that exploring some possible causes of affect and emotion production might usefully contribute to an understanding of the politics of participation in this work. Focus will largely be placed on one aspect of this performance: the experience of movement within a pitch-black theatre space. In particular, fear and trepidation will be identified in terms of affect and emotion, assessing how the production of both might impact on a theorisation of how agency operates. But what is an affect and what is an emotion?

Historically, scholarly responses to these questions demonstrate an endless grasping toward the origins of affective and emotional experience, as well as the deployment of different terminologies and definitions across disciplines and fields. This is also where disciplinary
limitations rear up for the theatre and performance studies researcher largely depending on the retrieval of insights premised on the experiments of others. But what can be offered are working definitions which, following a comment from Rhonda Blair at the Affective Science and Performance symposium which forms the basis of this book, demonstrate not a ‘doing’ of science but a ‘using’ of it. There are methodological issues with this ‘using’, but issues which do not block the productive exploration of insights.

Joseph LeDoux has been influential in examining the production of fear. He suggests that fear results primarily from activation of a part of the brain called the amygdala. It is fear that, for me, at least, was produced in this performance, albeit a mild and even exciting form of fear manifested in trepidation. The amygdala, claims LeDoux, activates behaviours such as freezing, fleeing or fighting, ‘autonomic nervous system (ANS) responses (changes in blood pressure and heart rate, piloerection, sweating), and hormonal responses’ which may include the release of adrenaline into the bloodstream. The ANS and hormonal responses, taken together, are described by LeDoux as ‘visceral’ responses affecting internal organs and glands.

Visceral processes, as described by LeDoux, have a hand in the production of affect and emotion, but they do not tell the whole story. To pinpoint what produced trepidation in Rotating in a Room of Images, it is worth defining and distinguishing affect and emotion. As I hope to demonstrate, this means that a language can be developed which might aid performance analysis while also opening up space to address how cognition impacts on both, especially cognitive processes of relevance to the production of individualised responses.

For Carl Plantinga, visceral processes are the nuts and bolts of affects, defined as ‘felt bodily states’. This is to be distinguished from emotions which, for Plantinga, are ‘a type of affect that involve a higher degree of cognitive processing’ and ‘are clearly identified as intentional
mental states’. It is worth pointing out that this definition does not banish cognition from affective processes, provided that cognition is understood in the broadest possible sense as describing ‘any kind of mental operation or structure’, including and especially those which are unconscious. The word ‘unconscious’ seems to refer here to what John Kihlstrom describes as the ‘cognitive unconscious’; this refers to all mental activity which occurs without our being aware of it. In other words, most cognitive activity is unconscious.

Where affect might be said to constitute a ‘low road’ toward the production of felt bodily states, emotion involves a more complex form of cognitive appraisal. As Mark Johnson suggests, emotional responses are ‘bodily processes (with neural and chemical components) that result from our appraisal of the meaning and significance of our situation and consequent changes in our body state, often initiating actions geared to our fluid functioning within our environment’. So while both affect and emotion are subject to an ‘embodied mind’ – an understanding of mind, briefly, that merges perception with conception – and while both might move us toward some kind of action, the role of appraisal has a much firmer hand to play in the case of emotion.

There are two, related reasons why I have underlined the role of cognition in both affect and emotion. The first reason relates to the political implications. As noted, different degrees of cognitive activity significantly contribute to the identification of affective and emotional sources. But there remains a common cognitive ground to such identification, despite the different degrees of cognition. As Magda B. Arnold and J. A. Gasson suggest, ‘an emotion or an affect can be considered as the felt tendency toward an object judged suitable, or away from an object judged unsuitable, reinforced by specific bodily changes according to the type of emotion’. In other words, both affect and emotion motivate, whether the result is movement or freezing. At this early stage of the chapter, then, a paradoxical quality of agency is introduced, so long as agency can be seen to relate to the wilful motivation to do something
and the capacity to act upon that motivation. However, it should be noted that affect and emotion do not by necessity determine action: there are other conscious and unconscious processes that may interfere with any such determination, even with regard to nuancing reflex and facial expression.\textsuperscript{17}

The second reason, which underlies the first, is a consequence of how individuality is figured in both. I believe it is a mistake to think of either affect or emotion in terms of hard-wiring alone. Damasio acknowledges that emotions, particularly the so-called ‘primary emotions’ that have been the concern of evolutionary biologists and psychologists,\textsuperscript{18} have biologically determined elements as a consequence of evolutionary history, but there is also the ‘reality that learning and culture alter the expression of emotions and give emotions new meanings’.\textsuperscript{19} Individuality and autobiography are not banished from an approach to emotion which draws on cognitive science; quite the contrary. Social experiences should inform enquiry into emotion, addressed in tandem with what Bruce McConachie calls ‘genetic endowments’.\textsuperscript{20}

The same seems to be true of affect, particularly in the light of Arnold’s research into ‘affective memory’. Arnold gives the example of a rider seeing a horse which once threw him or her and how this may cause ‘immediate apprehension in the unlucky rider. These reactions can only be based on the remembered joy or pain’.\textsuperscript{21} It is this kind of remembering that, for Arnold, constitutes affective memory. She goes on to account for how affective memory moves on from a process of remembrance to an imagining of subsequent affective impact and an estimation of its potential harmfulness, either conscious or unconscious.\textsuperscript{22} To sum up: through a set of embodied cognitive processes such as these, affect and emotion are revealed as distinct processes distinguished by the degree of cognitive activity in play, which nonetheless share a common ground in cognition.
There are three points that I wish to highlight in this understanding of affect and emotion: the first is that affect and emotion are potentially entwined, especially given the fact that affective responses are a constituent part of the emotional ‘high road’; the second is that instinctual or evolved processes only tell a part of the story in the generation of affective and emotional responses. Given the insights offered by cognitive science, individuality and autobiography contribute to identifying affective and emotional stimuli, as well as attributing meaning to those stimuli which is likely to impact on how they might be felt. The third point is that both affect and emotion influence thought and behaviour and thus create limits within which agency is likely to operate; the key word here is ‘influence’, as opposed to ‘determine’. Another key word is ‘limit’: agency is not necessarily removed from the equation, it is only tempered.

So how might this apply to Rotating in a Room of Images? My ability to move freely through the space was restricted by the white curtains, implying that there was a path to be followed, as well as a vast number of inputs such as a ‘horizon of expectations’ brought into the space and an awareness of and aptitude for participatory protocol.\(^{23}\) However, I want to focus on how affect contributed to the negotiation of agency in this performance. As demonstrated above, in assessing this contribution it is important to recognise evolved instinct, but it is also important to recognise the impact of affective memory and the inputs of individuality and autobiography that influence what might be identified as potentially threatening or otherwise affectively meaningful.

The closing off of vision promoted an imaginative engagement with an unknown outside, where imagination – that force which, for Johnson, is at the very heart of a meaningful encounter with the world – becomes an affectively resonant factor premised on the cognitive processes of anticipation, expectation, estimation and evaluation.\(^{24}\) In one sense, as darkness descended, my capacity to act upon agency diminished as dependency on an unseen other to
be led through the space emerged. But, in another, by virtue of the fact that I was simply there in the dark, my participation was almost hyperactively creative, producing against the backdrop of darkness a host of imagined stimuli pertinent to the production of affect and emotion and therefore pertinent to the operation of agency. Like the child fearing monsters under the bed at night, I was positioned by the performance in such a way that affective and emotional sources could be called forth from the shadows, ultimately manifested in trips and stumbles through the space.

In the context of pitch-black aesthetic space, affect became something to latch onto, in terms of attention and orientation, despite of its paradoxically disorienting qualities. The invitation to move in pitch-black was met with hesitation, but what emerged from this hesitancy was a nodal point in which affect, its more complex emotional form and a largely imagined outside – one which I go on to identify in terms of risk – appear entwined. I contend that this entwinement can tell us something about the politics of participation.

**Risk, Affect and Emotion**

To grope in the dark in *Rotating in a Room of Images* was to anticipate, or expect and imagine what the future will hold: what if I walked into a wall? What if something were to jump out at me? It was in these moments of encountering an uncertain future that the presence of risk and vulnerability were felt most strongly as something acting on participation. This notion of something that is merely perceived – that is, risk – acting on participation is complex: it relates to a meshing of risk perception, affect and emotion.

Although it might, risk does not necessarily equate to the threat of physical harm. Paul Slovic identifies risk as a phenomenon which is ‘subjectively defined by individuals who may be
influenced by a wide array of psychological, social, institutional and cultural factors’. This means that just about anything can be perceived as risky, provided that perception relates to an evaluation of future-oriented uncertainty. At the heart of risk perception is a ‘distinction between reality and possibility’. It is this distinction, this gap between the present and an anticipated future, which seems to go hand in hand with how affect and emotion are produced in the pitch-black in Rotating in a Room of Images: an imaginative iteration of possibility, in a context of uncertainty, based on affectively and emotionally charged risk perception.

It is useful to borrow an observation of Brian Massumi’s to illustrate how this definition of risk might relate to Rotating in a Room of Images. Massumi asks his reader to think of a suitcase which is suspected to be full of anthrax found at an airport, which turns out to be nothing more than a suitcase leaking flour; nonetheless, the affective and emotional realities produced within individuals by that suitcase, such as fear or anxiety, can bring into being their own material realities in a given environment. These ‘material realities’ may include SWAT teams, news helicopters, road blocks and the like. Massumi’s observation might just as well be applied to Rotating in a Room of Images. An object of risk perception, such as the risk of someone leaping out from the dark, or of walking into a wall, might turn out to be without, or with minimal threat to safety; a group of performers or stage hands who knew exactly where to lead me on a pre-determined path through the space reduced the threat of physical harm to a minimum. Nonetheless, the affective and emotional realities produced, including fear and trepidation, brought into being other material realities in the present. An example here was the manner in which the performer-audience relationship unfolded through fumbles and stumbles as well as my affected carving of routes within the routes which were already designed prior to entering the space. All this supposes that my encounter with risk, as an affective presence culminating in the emotional expressions of fear and trepidation, impacted on interaction: with the performers, but also within the pitch-black space. In other
words, an encounter with risk exerted affective influence not only over participation, but also over the performance given the way that I was subsequently rendered a ‘hyperactively’
creative subject.

What is being dealt with here is a theoretical entwining of risk, emotion and affect: an entwining which finds justification in neuroscience. Damasio recognises that there is a neurological base to risk perception, or at least the capacity to act upon such perception. In different terms, as indicated below, he argues that the human capacity to act effectively on risk perception is partly dependent on a part of the brain that inputs emotion into decisions. He contends that damage suffered by his patients to regions of the brain associated with decision making, including the prefrontal region, produced ‘a disturbance of the ability to decide advantageously in situations involving risk and conflict and a selective reduction of the ability to resonate emotionally in precisely those same situations, while preserving the remainder of their emotional abilities’. Damasio is suggesting that that there are neurological links between risk perception and emotion, manifested in a reduced capacity to make effective decisions in patients suffering from damage to the prefrontal region of the brain.

However, there are also numerous other factors contributing to risk perception. These multiple factors include processing of cultural background, affiliation with socio-political institutions (including personal values and social values), cognitive-affective inputs (including reference knowledge and personal beliefs) and heuristics of information processing. It is the cognitive-affective inputs that are of special relevance to this chapter. Recall Arnold’s example of the rider encountering a horse that has thrown him or her as a means of illustrating affective memory: it now emerges that what was being dealt with in that discussion was risk perception. The perception of risk is what triggered ‘immediate apprehension’.
Revisiting and integrating the observations and claims put forward in this chapter so far: the production of fear or trepidation and perception of risk, in the context of my own experience of *Rotating in a Room of Images*, demanded an appraisal of the dark as being risky. That appraisal may well be strongly influenced by past experiences of the dark, including the emotional resonances attributed to those experiences (following Damasio), as well as those multiple factors impacting on risk perception just outlined. This means thinking about risk perception, affect and emotion not just in terms of hard-wiring, but as processes relating to the individual in numerous and profound ways. It should now also be clear how risk might be approached as being potentially productive of affect in a performance like *Rotating in a Room of Images* and how risk perception, affect and emotion potentially interrelate.

I have already established how affect and emotion influenced agentic capacity: but affect and emotion might also be regarded as risks for participating audiences that subsequently produced comparable effects. By participating in a performance which produced and amplified affective and emotional responses, I was opening up to a submissive diminishment of control over my own behaviour. It is in this sense that I find it useful to think of affect and emotion as risks, provided a partial loss of control is recognised as promoting vulnerability. This political concern is the subject of the remaining section.

**The Politics of Participation in *Rotating in a Room of Images***

The bulk of this chapter has been geared towards establishing how agency functions within specific parameters and how these parameters are contingent on exposure to different inputs, of which we might count the perception of risk in relation to affect and emotion. The remainder of the chapter concerns itself not just with how I, as a participant, was acted upon, but also with exploring one particular space left open for action within these parameters.
As noted after borrowing from Massumi, risk perception does not in the first instance change the material reality of a given environment, but it can change the ways in which that environment is perceived and consequently interacted with; it can provide a stimulus for the participant to alter the creative trajectory of a performance. This observation will now be nuanced by considering how agency might be detected. It may be that an implicitly creative subject is at the heart of agency detection: a point that could well position the detection of agency as an expression of agency.

In *Rotating in a Room of Images*, I found myself anticipating what could appear from the dark. Drawing on cognitive development studies, Justin L. Barrett argues that this kind of anticipatory process is an innate disposition. He comments on this disposition as a need to seek out or attribute agency ‘where further reflection might lead to a different evaluation’, referring to that disposition as the Hypersensitive Agency Detection Device, or HADD.\(^{31}\) Along with the anthropologist Stewart Guthrie, he suggests that such a disposition is likely to have evolved for survival reasons, for it is better to assume that, for instance, a rustling in the bushes is a predator than to forego that assumption and risk attack.\(^ {32}\) In this instance, HADD attributes agency to something in the bush that might not have posed a risk, but that does not stop risk being assumed: an assumption manifested in the production of, for instance, fear and the visceral responses accompanying that production which prepare us for flight or defence. HADD may account for why environments, generally speaking, occasionally seem infused with risk. If the thesis is accepted, then humans are predisposed to render objects of perception as ‘risky’ via an attribution of agency.

It may seem counterintuitive, given this thesis, to claim that agency detection functions also as an expression of agency. However, the plot thickens if this assertion is evaluated in the light of the claims put forward in this paper. We might add to this disposition Arnold’s notion of affective memory, together with Damasio’s recognition of developmental inputs in the
identification of emotional sources and an attribution of meaning to those sources, framed in the light of risk perception, affect and emotion being entwined. Framed as such, then the attribution of agency to uncertain threats is really the projection of an anticipation or expectation. That process of attribution, in a fascinating twist, comes from an affected or emotionally involved anticipating subject. In Rotating in a Room of Images, then, the increasingly fashionable notion in theatre studies, largely derived from Jacques Rancière’s essay ‘The Emancipated Spectator’, of thinking about spectatorship as an implicitly active process is granted weight, but in a way that recognises the corporeality of this activity.33 This assertion does not frame that activity as being the product of instinctual and evolved processes alone – although those processes do have a role to play – but, rather, foregrounds affective memory and individuality as powerful inputs. Acknowledging attributions of agency in a context of uncertainty is itself an expression of agency premised on individuality, especially if affects and emotions triggered by risk perception end up prompting negotiation of alternative courses of action.

In conclusion, in my own experience of Rotating in a Room of Images, acts of anticipation in a context of uncertainty played a vital role, imagining various threats to be lurking somewhere in the unknown: albeit an imagining which may well be premised on amplifying the threat of another person simply being proximate. Risk was perceived as permeating the space, but the perception of this permeation was the consequence of disposition, on the one hand, and imaginatively projecting into that space, on the other. When considered as an affective presence, my relationship to risk was political given the influence it exerted; it controlled as much as spurred thought and action. An encounter with risk perception, affect and emotion, as interrelated phenomena, can consequently be seen as an encounter with the capacity to interact with a given situation: an encounter with the limits of agency, as well as a
potential minimisation of those limits. In other words, risk perception, affect and emotion can be seen to impact on how we might theorise a politics of participation.

Notes

4 Ibid., p.173.
5 In the United Kingdom, at least, the educational system is being significantly influenced by the Research Excellence Framework (REF). The REF is intended as a measure of academic quality in UK higher education institutions (HEI) and attempts to justify public funding in the public interest. At the time of writing, the REF will form the basis of HEI funding decisions following completion in 2014. For the humanities, research results can be difficult to quantify. While the REF may be regarded as an opportunity for humanities subjects to make more use of evidence led-enquiry, it might also be interpreted as a threat to a well-established and valuable set of working practices that are not governed by measurable outcomes.
6 The role of cognition and mind in the primary production and experience of affect, for instance, has proved a bone of contention, particularly in psychology, cognitive psychology and the philosophy of mind. On the one hand are those like Robert Zajonc, who refute that cognition has any role to play in the initial production and experience of affect; on the other are those like Richard Lazarus, who embrace the role of cognition as being primary in relation to bodily response. The social sciences, philosophy and human geography complicate the matter further, for very different uses of terms like ‘affect’ and ‘emotion’ are defined and theorised.
9 Ibid.
11 LeDoux, p.29.
12 Plantinga, p.57.
13 Arnold, p.178. This claim ought to be read in the light of a fairly recent shift in cognitive science towards the notion of embodied cognition, or the embodied mind. This shift does away with the idea largely inspired by the Kantian legacy and the paradigm of rational action, preferring instead a view of cognition and mind that approaches both body and brain as holistically participating in human interaction with an environment. As Mark Johnson has persuasively argued, embodiment is central to how understanding is cognitively structured. Johnson, Mark, The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination and Reason, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987, p.xiii. For more on the paradigm of rational action, see Jaeger, Carlo C., Renn, Ortwin, Rosa, Eugene A., and Webler, Thomas, Risk, Uncertainty, and Rational Action, London: Earthscan, 2001, pp.21-23.
15 Lakoff and Johnson, pp.37-38.
17 Arnold, Magda B, ‘Perennial Problems in the Field of Emotion’ in Magda B. Arnold (ed), Feelings and Emotions: The Loyola Symposium, New York: Academic Press, 1970, p.176. It is also worth noting that theorists of ‘display rules’ governing the production of facial expressions relevant to specific emotions provide space in their reasoning not only for the violation of anticipated expressions, but also advocate the inclusion of
other contingencies relevant to the production of facial expressions: ‘(a) static characteristics of the persons within the situation (e.g., age, sex, physical body size), (b) static characteristics of the setting (e.g., ecological factors, and social definition of the situation (…)), (c) transient characteristics of persons (e.g., role, attitude), and (d) transient regularities during the course of the social interaction (e.g., entrances, exits (…))’. Ekman, Paul, Friesen, Wallace V., and Ellsworth, Phoebe, *Emotion in the Human Face: Guidelines for Research and Integration of Findings*, New York: Pergamon Press, 1972, p. 23.


19 Damasio, *Feeling*, p.51. See also pp.54-57.


21 Arnold, p.174.

22 This underscoring of the role played by cognitive processes is perhaps what contrasts Arnold’s notion of affective memory from Machon’s account of corporeal memory also explored in this volume.


29 Damasio, *Feeling*, p.41.


32 Ibid.

33 This observation picks up on a comment of Liesbeth Groot Nibbelink: ‘I think it is remarkable that Rancière’s distribution of the sensible hardly pays attention to the possibility of corporeal intelligence: knowledge that is present in affects and sensations’. Groot Nibbelink, p.418, original emphasis.