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Strategic behavior in non-atomic games

Barlo, M and Carmona, GMB (2015) Strategic behavior in non-atomic games Journal of Mathematical Economics, 60. pp. 134-144.

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In order to remedy the possible loss of strategic interaction in non-atomic games with a societal choice, this study proposes a refinement of Nash equilibrium, strategic equilibrium. Given a non-atomic game, its perturbed game is one in which every player believes that he alone has a small, but positive, impact on the societal choice; and a distribution is a strategic equilibrium if it is a limit point of a sequence of Nash equilibrium distributions of games in which each player’s belief about his impact on the societal choice goes to zero. After proving the existence of strategic equilibria, we show that all of them must be Nash. We also show that all regular equilibria of smooth non-atomic games are strategic. Moreover, it is displayed that in many economic applications, the set of strategic equilibria coincides with that of Nash equilibria of large finite games.

Item Type: Article
Divisions : Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > School of Economics
Authors :
Date : 13 July 2015
Identification Number : 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.07.003
Uncontrolled Keywords : Nash equilibrium; Strategic equilibrium; Games with a continuum of players; Equilibrium distributions
Depositing User : Symplectic Elements
Date Deposited : 10 Jun 2016 15:54
Last Modified : 10 Jun 2016 15:54

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