In the early hours of 30 August 2013, the United Kingdom House of Commons voted by a narrow majority of 285 to 272 against the Government’s motion providing, *inter alia*, that the House: ‘Notes that the use of chemical weapons is a war crime under customary law and a crime against humanity, and that the principle of humanitarian intervention provides a sound legal basis for taking action’.¹ The Prime Minister responded as follows:

‘Let me say that the House has not voted for either motion tonight. I strongly believe in the need for a tough response to the use of chemical weapons, but I also believe in respecting the will of this House of Commons. It is very clear tonight that, while the House has not passed a motion, the British Parliament, reflecting the views of the British people, does not want to see British military action. I get that, and the Government will act accordingly.’²

The British Government subsequently announced that the United Kingdom would not participate in a mooted military operation with NATO allies (principally France and the United States of America) against Syria in response to an alleged use of chemical weapons in the Ghouta district of Damascus on 21 August 2013. The operation was subsequently abandoned following an agreement struck by the governments of the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the Syrian Arab Republic on 26 September in which the last undertook to accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention 1993 and devised a programme to disarm its declared stockpile of chemical weapons.³

Against this background, this article assesses the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention after the Syria chemical weapons precedent.⁴ Whereas some commentators have

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¹ HC Deb, col 1426 (29 Aug. 2013).
² Ibid, col 1556.
³ See further UNSC Resn 2118 (2013).
asserted that humanitarian intervention is lawful, probably unlawful or unlawful-yet-legitimate, it argues that the Syria crisis conclusively demonstrates that humanitarian intervention is unlawful. In addition, the article examines a key issue that has yet to be addressed in the literature: the role of consultative parliamentary votes in the UK, the USA and France (‘the P3’) as a constitutional safeguard against aggression. These issues are analysed with reference to subsequent developments concerning the emergence of Islamic State (‘IS’) and ongoing military operations by the USA and its allies in Syria and Iraq.

Humanitarian intervention is defined as the ‘use of force to protect people in another State from gross and systematic human rights violations committed against them, or more generally to avert a humanitarian catastrophe, when the target State is unwilling or unable to act.’ It entails the right of States to use force, individually or collectively, without authorisation by the Security Council or the General Assembly. Substantive criteria that have been proposed for its application include:

- a) the existence of a humanitarian ‘emergency’ or ‘disaster’ or ‘crisis’ or ‘catastrophe’ or ‘necessity’ or ‘tragedy’, usually related to the widespread and gross or egregious violation of human rights of (a part of) the population of a State or to the commission of grave international crimes;
- b) The inability or unwillingness of the territorial State to act to address the situation;


For background, see, e.g. – C Henderson, ‘The Use of Force and Islamic State’(2014) 1(2) Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 209–222.

c) The exhaustion of all other realistically possible remedies, including all peaceful remedies and recourse to the UN Security Council (and arguably also the UN General Assembly under the ‘Uniting for Peace’ procedure), which are unwilling or unable to act;
d) the acceptance of limitations (both in scope and in time) upon the use of force (as the necessary and sole available course of action), confining it to strictly humanitarian objectives that must be expected to do more harm than good, respecting the principle of proportionality.

To these, some add a preference towards multilateral (rather than unilateral, and as second best to collective) action, as well as towards the (relative) disinterestedness of the intervening States and/or organizations.

Although the application of substantive criteria is a pertinent issue, this article focuses upon the test of legality as assessed against the support of States for the doctrine. The continuing support of the UK (and Denmark) for humanitarian intervention, coupled with the fact that the UK remains one of the most militarily-active States in the world, renders an evaluation of the legality of humanitarian intervention a critical issue for future use of force scenarios.

This article first sets out the historical background of humanitarian intervention in order to establish the state of the doctrine prior to the Syria crisis in 2013. Next, it examines the legal positions articulated by States with respect to the abortive Syria operation. Finally, it compares the role of consultative parliamentary votes in the P3 with respect to Syria in 2013 and Islamic State in 2014-2015 as a constitutional check upon executive authority to use force unlawfully. As the main proponent of humanitarian intervention, the article focuses upon this intersection of law and policy in the UK. The article calls upon the British Government to discontinue its support for humanitarian intervention, which the Syria episode has shown to be clearly unlawful. This change of policy should be enacted through a detailed legal framework for the use of force at the forthcoming National Security Strategy review in 2015. A statutory obligation to consult the House of Commons and independent legal advice are critical to provide a robust check on illegal wars, especially in light of the prospective entry into force of the International Criminal Court crime of aggression in 2017.

10 Id, at para 39.
I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

The starting-point is the general prohibition on the use of force in international relations and corresponding duty to resolve international disputes through peaceful means. This ban is subject to two express exceptions: 1) forcible measures entailing the application or authorisation of force by the UN Security Council; and 2) individual or collective self-defence. The Security Council has ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’, for which purpose the Member States ‘agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.’

Whilst the Security Council is the primary actor in international peace and security, it is not the exclusive actor: the General Assembly has claimed the power to act in relation to international peace and security where, due to a veto in the Security Council, the Security Council is incapable of doing so. This power has been invoked on ten occasions, most recently in relation to the occupied Palestinian territories in 2003. Its lawfulness is widely accepted by States and has been affirmed by the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’). For reasons considered below, it is nevertheless rarely employed in practice.

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13 Charter, Arts 2(3), 33(1).
14 Charter, Art 42.
15 Charter, Art 51.
16 Charter, Art 24(2).
19 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep 136 at paras 26-32.
An important question is whether, in the absence of amendment of the Charter to provide for a third exception to the comprehensive prohibition on the use of force, humanitarian intervention can only become law through customary international law. To adopt humanitarian intervention as custom, it must have gained general acceptance prior to the occasion in which it is invoked.\textsuperscript{20} It must have become a ‘settled practice’ over time with reference to the well-known criteria of State practice and \textit{opinio iuris}.\textsuperscript{21} This faces the problem of ‘hierarchy of norms’, whereby the putative customary norm is displaced or trumped by a superior legal norm.

Accordingly, even if humanitarian intervention were to qualify a norm of customary international law, it is contended that the comprehensive prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) of the Charter remains a superior norm.\textsuperscript{22} This prioritisation of norms has three potential bases in general international law: 1) the \textit{lex specialis} rule that prioritises more specific rules over more general rules – in this case, treaty provisions over customary norms;\textsuperscript{23} 2) the effect of Article 103 of the Charter as a supremacy clause, prioritising Charter provisions over other norms of international law;\textsuperscript{24} or 3) the status of the prohibition on the use of force as a \textit{ius cogens} (peremptory or non-derogable) norm.\textsuperscript{25} The application of these rules depends upon legal context, such as the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal applying

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{21} For background, see Wood, ‘First Report on Custom’, above n 7 at 12-17.
\item \textsuperscript{22} The comprehensive prohibition on the use of force should be read together with the prohibition on interference in the internal or external affairs of a State, implicit in Article 2(4), and the Article 2(3) duty to resolve international disputes peacefully. The use of force to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in an internal armed conflict would, absent the consent of the government, breach these duties – see, e.g. – \textit{Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America)}, (1986) ICJ Rep 14 at 88-104 (paras 187-195). See further, e.g. – Klabbers, above n 9.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Ibid at 168-181 (paras 328-360).
\item \textsuperscript{25} Ibid at 188-189 (para 374).
\end{itemize}
them26 and UN membership of the parties. Concordantly, the only avenue to add a third exception to the Article 2(4) prohibition is the Article 108 amendment procedure requiring adoption and ratification by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly, including the Permanent Members of the Security Council.

Proponents of humanitarian intervention have contended that it is possible to ‘flexibly interpret’ Article 2(4) through customary law. For example, Greenwood wrote in relation to the use of force against Serbia:

‘It has been argued that, because the United Nations Charter contains a prohibition of the use of force and no express exception for humanitarian intervention, there can be no question of international law recognising a right of humanitarian intervention. That is, however, to take too rigid a view of international law…While nobody would suggest that intervention is justified whenever a State violates human rights, international law does not require that respect for the sovereignty and integrity of a State must in all cases be given priority over the protection of human rights and human life, no matter how serious the violations of those rights perpetrated by that State.

Moreover, international law is not confined to treaty texts. It includes customary international law. That law is not static but develops through a process of State practice, of actions and the reaction to those actions. Since 1945, that process has seen a growing importance attached to the preservation of human rights. Where the threat to human rights has been of an extreme character, States have been prepared to assert a right of humanitarian intervention as a matter of last resort.’27

This argument is unconvincing due to the fact that the change would be the *accretion* of a third exception rather than the *interpretation* of existing exceptions. However, even if this interpretive method is orthodox, the evidentiary threshold for the identification of humanitarian intervention as a norm of customary international law would be a high one: clear evidence would be required of an intention by States to add a third exception and thereby weaken the comprehensive ban on the use of force. A compelling scenario may be a proposal to amend the Charter adopted by the required two-thirds majority of the General Assembly and defeated by the deployment of a veto.

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26 Ibid at 46 (para 82), 229 (para 452).
Although the doctrine of humanitarian intervention has a long history in international law scholarship, it was only in the 1990s that States began to consider it as an alternative to the two Charter bases for the use of force. Proponents of the doctrine and a few States (e.g. – Belgium) had argued in relation to Kosovo that uses of force in Bangladesh, Kampuchea, Afghanistan, the Central African Empire, Liberia and particularly the ‘no fly zones’ in northern Iraq evidenced such State support. As Gray opines: ‘A certain amount of revisionism in the interpretation of past practice has proved attractive to some States.’

Nevertheless, as Rodley concludes:

“The condemnations by the UN General Assembly of the interventions in Bangladesh, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan are sufficient to deny these interventions the status of evidence of state practice qualifying as custom. The Ugandan intervention, justified by Tanzania on ground of self-defence and, still condemned by the OAU, at best could be offered as an example of the mitigating circumstances principle at work. The same conclusion is the better explanation of the non-condemnation of France’s intervention, again not justified on the basis of a doctrine of humanitarian intervention.”

Thus, in evaluating State practice, two factors are particularly important to evince opinio iuris: 1) the subjective invocation of the State that is action is motivated by a belief of lawfulness at the time; and 2) the expressions of support by other States for that conduct on legal grounds. Originally, British policy was sceptical on humanitarian intervention:

“In fact, the best case that can be made in support of humanitarian intervention is that it cannot be said to be unambiguously illegal...the overwhelming majority of contemporary legal opinion comes down against the existence of a right of humanitarian intervention for three reasons: first, the UN Charter and the corpus of modern international law do not seem specifically to incorporate such a right; secondly, state practice in the past two centuries, and especially since 1945, at best provides only a handful of genuine cases of humanitarian intervention, and, on most assessments, none at all; and finally, on prudential grounds, that the scope of abusing such a rights argues strongly against its creation.”

29 Gray, above n 4, pp 35-37. See also Henrickson and Schack, above n 5 at 134-137.
30 E.g. – Greenwood, above n 27 at 929-930
31 Gray, above n 4, p 49.
32 Ibid.
33 Rodley, above n Error! Bookmark not defined., p 784.
From August 1992 the UK adopted the position that, in the event of a veto in the Security Council, individual States may unilaterally use force (subject to specific criteria\(^{35}\)) to alleviate a compelling and urgent situation of extreme humanitarian distress demanding immediate relief. Whilst the UK invoked the doctrine in the mid-1990s for Operation Safe Haven following the Persian Gulf War, the USA relied upon implied authorisation by the Security Council.\(^{36}\) Yet, when confrontations with Iraqi warplanes occurred during the operation, ‘[t]he preference of the UK and the USA not to enter into discussion of the legal basis of the no-fly zones, but to focus where possible on claims to self-defence, indicates at least an awareness that the doctrine of humanitarian intervention remained controversial.’\(^{37}\)

The aerial bombardment undertaken by NATO members in Kosovo in 1999 was the key test case for the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention.\(^{38}\) Amongst NATO Members, only the UK and Belgium invoked the doctrine to justify their uses of force.\(^{39}\) Not only did other NATO members not invoke it in the Legality on the Use of Force cases\(^{40}\) before the ICJ but some (e.g. – Germany and the USA) even stated that the operation was not to be seen as a precedent for future action.\(^{41}\) Russia, China and the Non-Aligned Movement (‘NAM’) were strongly opposed to the concept of humanitarian intervention without Security Council authorisation.\(^{42}\) In 2000, the G77 declared: ‘We reject the so-called “right” of humanitarian intervention, which has no legal basis in the United Nations Charter or in the general


\(^{36}\) Gray, above n 4, p 37.

\(^{37}\) Ibid, p 38.

\(^{38}\) Henrickson and Schack, above n 9 at 137.

\(^{39}\) Gray, above n 4, pp 42, 45.

\(^{40}\) E.g. – Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, [2004] ICJ Rep. 1307.

\(^{41}\) Gray, above n 4, p 47.

\(^{42}\) Ibid, p 52.
principles of international law.”43 The Independent International Commission on Kosovo commissioned by Sweden concluded that ‘the intervention was legitimate, but not legal’.44

The British Government had asserted that the ‘humanitarian intervention as an exceptional measure on grounds of overwhelming humanitarian necessity, military intervention is legally justifiable.”45 However, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee concluded: i) at the very least, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention has a tenuous basis in current international customary law, and that this renders the NATO action legally questionable; and ii) NATO's military action, if of dubious legality in the current state of international law, was justified on moral grounds.46 These conclusions were reached with the benefit of evidence submitted by distinguished international lawyers.47

In the 2000s, the Canadian-inspired ‘responsibility to protect’ concept48 placed a renewed emphasis upon the central role of the UN collective security system for the protection of civilians in armed conflict.49 States declared at 2005 World Summit:

> ‘Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity...In this context, we are prepared to take collective

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43 ‘Group of 77 South Summit, Havana, Cuba, 10-17 April 2000, Declaration of the South Summit’, para. 54, available at: [http://www.g77.org/summit/Declaration_G77Summit.htm](http://www.g77.org/summit/Declaration_G77Summit.htm) (accessed 13 February 2015).
action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.\(^\text{50}\)

It has been argued that, as the two concepts are fundamentally distinct, the adoption of the responsibility to protect did not negate humanitarian intervention.\(^\text{51}\)

Over the past six years, the Security Council has been the principal forum for collective security action – most notably in the case of Libya (2011).\(^\text{52}\) The prospect of a massacre of rebellious citizens in Benghazi by the Libyan government persuaded a 10-0-5 majority of the Security Council, citing the responsibility to protect, to authorise Member States to take ‘all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian population areas under threat or attack.’\(^\text{53}\) The controversial implementation of the resolution prompted suspicion amongst certain States concerning the possibility of abuse, leading to Security Council paralysis during the first two years of Syrian civil war.\(^\text{54}\)

Until the Syria case, there was no attempt after Kosovo to invoke the doctrine of humanitarian intervention to justify a unilateral use of force. Commentators were divided on the question of legality at the time of the Syria crisis.\(^\text{55}\) Some believed that the use of force would be unlawful\(^\text{56}\) but arguably legitimate,\(^\text{57}\) citing the hierarchy of norms and/or a lack of

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\(^{50}\) UNGA Res. 60/1 (‘2005 World Summit Outcome’) (24 October 2005), paras 138-139. This was affirmed in UNSC Res. 1674 (28 April 2006), OP4.

\(^{51}\) E.g. – Stahn, above n 48 at 120.

\(^{52}\) Vashakmadze, above n 48 at 1216-1218.


supporting practice. Others opined that sufficient practice existed to conclude that humanitarian intervention had customary status and that Article 2(4) can be interpreted flexibly to allow for the addition of a third exception.

It is averred that the use of force against Syria would have been unlawful, which by extension renders the threat of force unlawful. The orthodox interpretation of Article 103 as applicable not only to treaty obligations but also to customary rights would preclude custom from modifying the Charter regime on the use of force without recourse to the Article 108 amendment procedure. Koh’s assertion ‘in the name of fidelity to the U.N. and this rigid conception of international law, leaders would either have to accept civilian slaughter or break the law’ overlooks the fact that there exist two legal mechanisms for collective enforcement action: 1) Security Council action or authorisation; and 2) in the event of a veto, General Assembly authorisation under the Uniting for Peace procedure (most recently employed in 2003 in relation to Palestine) subject to the caveats discussed below.

Furthermore, even if custom can in principle be used as an interpretive gloss upon Article 2(4), it is argued that humanitarian intervention had failed to gain sufficient support

59 See Koh and Bethlehem, above n 5.
61 Koh, above n 5.
62 Binder, above n 18.
from States by the time of the Syrian crisis.\textsuperscript{63} On this point, Sir Daniel Bethlehem QC asserted at the time of the crisis:

‘Although only few of the other NATO States that participated in the Kosovo military action in 1999 came out publicly to explain the legal basis of their action, there can be little doubt that most, if not all, considered that action to be lawful. And, absent any other legal basis for that action, it is evident that the legal basis relied upon by NATO and its participating States – even if not expressed publicly – was that of humanitarian intervention. The Kosovo precedent is therefore a much wider and more robust precedent than is often acknowledged.’\textsuperscript{64}

Sir Daniel offered no substantiation for the proposition that NATO Member States privately invoked humanitarian intervention (even if a privately-expressed private view can constitute\textit{opinio iuris})\textsuperscript{65}. Professor Harold Koh, a former Legal Adviser to the US Department of State, concurred with Sir Daniel’s analysis: drawing an analogy with the customary right of self-defence,\textsuperscript{66} he argued that Article 2(4) permits a customary norm of humanitarian intervention in order to realise the Purposes of the UN. Citing a 1999 paper by Professor Adam Roberts,\textsuperscript{67} he averred: ‘Seventeen other NATO members individually satisfied themselves of the legality of their participation in the operation.’

However, both Bethlehem and Koh overlooked the fact (acknowledged in the Roberts paper\textsuperscript{68}) that the NATO governments ‘generally eschewed the opportunity’ to invoke humanitarian intervention in the aforementioned \textit{Legality on the Use of Force} proceedings. Neither Bethlehem nor Koh acknowledged the considerable opposition to humanitarian intervention expressed by non-NATO States;\textsuperscript{69} focusing on the public pronouncements of the US and UK governments, Koh criticised the omission of the Obama Administration to ‘issue its detailed legal opinion elaborating [the White House Counsel’s] view’ and yet seemingly assumed that the Administration was tacitly relying on humanitarian

\textsuperscript{63} See further Henricksen and Schack, above n 6; Akande, above n 58.
\textsuperscript{64} Bethlehem, above n 59.
\textsuperscript{66} A Randelzhofer and G Nolte, ‘Article 51’ in Simma et al, above n 12 (Vol II), 1397-1428, pp 1401-1406.
\textsuperscript{67} Roberts, ‘NATO’s “Humanitarian War” over Kosovo’, (1999) 41(3) Survival 102-123.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid, at 107.
\textsuperscript{69} See, e.g. – Akande, above n 58.
intervention.\textsuperscript{70} His critique of ‘\textit{per se} illegality’ and his assertion that ‘President Obama did not violate international law by threatening to use force in Syria in the face of a persistent Russian veto’ primarily sought to cast doubt upon the existence of definitive law; he did not posit evidence to sustain the existence of a customary norm. He concluded:

‘Syria is a lawmaking moment. It should be treated that way. International lawyers in and out of government need to discuss and define a narrow “affirmative defense” to Article 2(4) that would clarify the contours of an emerging lawful exception to a rigid rule. The Clinton Administration’s failure to articulate a clear legal rationale for its Kosovo intervention haunts us now. Continuing to threaten military action in Syria without stating a public legal rationale creates a dangerous precedent. In the future, other less-humanitarian minded states can cite Obama’s threat and put their own broad spin on the legal interpretation, to use the murky concepts of humanitarian intervention and R2P for their own self-interested purposes.’

This statement suggests that Koh is conscious of the fact that traditional methods of identifying customary international law through reference to State practice and \textit{opinio iuris} undermine his apology of the US threat of force. Despite his criticism of traditional methods and of the notion of \textit{per se} illegality, he inconsistently emphasises publicly-expressed legal positions by governments for legislation.

Therefore, even if Koh’s argument that humanitarian intervention is not \textit{per se} a breach of the comprehensive ban on the use of force is correct, the absence of publicly-articulated legal positions by States that humanitarian intervention is lawful defeats his ultimate argument of legality. Concurring with the report of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, it is consequently argued that the uses of force by NATO members against Serbia were unlawful. Moreover, the hostile reactions of States to the doctrine confirms that, following the Kosovo operation, it had not gained sufficient support to crystallize into a norm of customary international law\textsuperscript{71} by 30 August 2013.


An additional problem is the divergence of substantive tests for humanitarian intervention put forward by various apologists for humanitarian intervention. The UK Government position is that three criteria must be met for humanitarian intervention to apply:

1) there is convincing evidence, generally accepted by the international community as a whole, of extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale, requiring immediate and urgent relief;
2) it must be objectively clear that there is no practicable alternative to the use of force if lives are to be saved; and
3) the proposed use of force must be necessary and proportionate to the aim of relief of humanitarian need and must be strictly limited in time and scope to this aim (i.e. the minimum necessary to achieve that end and for no other purpose). 72

However, other criteria that have been proposed include the inability or unwillingness of the territorial State to act to address the situation, the exhaustion of all other realistically possible remedies (i.e. – the UNSCUN), multilateral action only (i.e. – no unilateral action) and ‘disinterestedness’ by the intervening States and/or organisations. 73 In addition, there is no consensus on the triggering event of a ‘humanitarian distress/emergency/catastrophe’. 74 Even if there were sufficient State practice supporting the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention, this considerable confusion concerning its substantive criteria undermines the existence of opinio iuris creating a settled practice for customary law.

It should also be emphasised that the rationale for a right of States to use force to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe overlooks the existence of the aforementioned Uniting for Peace procedure. The impression that the veto power in the Security Council can utterly

72 Below n 138.
73 E.g. – Tzanakopoulos and Lowe, above n 10.
74 GrayE.g. – Stahn, above n 4, pp 50-51.6.
frustrate collective security – creating a dilemma of either permitting the humanitarian catastrophe to occur or breaching the law in order to prevent it – is false. The prospective entry into force of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’) concerning the crime of aggression, considered below, reinforces the attractiveness of General Assembly authorisation for forcible measures over that of an unlawful, unilateral use of force.

However, an important caveat is that the Uniting for Peace procedure, as currently formulated, only provides for recommendation of ‘the use of armed force’ in cases of breach of the peace or an act of aggression. The rationale of averting a humanitarian catastrophe, entailing serious breaches of human rights or international crimes within a State (as opposed to an inter-State armed conflict), constitutes a ‘threat to the peace’ but not a ‘breach of the peace’ or an ‘act of aggression’. Although Uniting for Peace does not consequently cover the Kosovo or Syria scenarios, Carswell asserts:

‘[F]rom a strictly legal perspective, it is logically absurd to suggest that the Council’s failure to exercise its primary responsibility following a threat to the peace should dictate any diminishment of the Assembly’s power to address that omission. On the other hand, the Uniting for Peace resolution reflects a political compromise, and it is politics, not law, that imposed such a limitation. In any event, there is no legal obstacle to extending the Assembly’s power to recommend force to include threats to the peace.’

Carswell concludes that Uniting for Peace is unconstitutional in its present form and proposes that it be construed to acknowledge the primacy of the Security Council and the validity of the veto power in order to revitalise the General Assembly’s secondary role in international peace and security as a means to encourage the Security Council to fulfil its primary role.

Concurring with this assessment, the extension of Uniting for Peace to allow for authorisation of forcible measures to address threats to the peace would be a useful reform to

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76 Zacklin, above n 71.
77 N Krisch, ‘Article 39’ in Simma et al, above n 12 (Vol II), 1272-1296, pp 1285-1287; Carswell, above n 17, at 475.
78 Carswell, above n 17, at 476.
79 Ibid, at 456, 479.
‘internalise’ the handling of situations akin to Syria within the UN system. There would be no need to resort to unorthodox legal argumentation techniques in order, as advocated by Koh, to ‘stretch’ the settled meaning of Article 2(4) to provide for a unilateral right to use force, legislated through custom rather than Charter amendment. Rather, States seeking to use force to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe would have a clear path towards legality: authorisation by the Security Council authorisation in the first instance, followed by, alternatively General Assembly authorisation into circumvent the event of frustration through veto. Of course, the implementation of authorised measures is at least as important as their retention – as the controversy concerning the Libya case illustrated.

II. THE LEGAL POSITIONS OF STATES REGARDING THE SYRIA OPERATION

The critical period for States to express their positions concerning the lawfulness of the proposed use of force was from the chemical weapons attack in Ghouta on 21 August 2013 until the disarmament agreement on 21 September during which the use of force was debated in national parliaments, in international fora and in the media. The 67th session of the UN General Assembly opened on 18 September, by which time discussion had shifted from the use of force to diplomacy. Nonetheless, legality was a factor, to varying degrees, in these debates. After examining the legal positions of the UK, USA and France (‘the P3’) the reaction of the international community is appraised.

A. The Legal Positions of the P3

The first significant event was the decision by British Government to seek the support of the House of Commons through a parliamentary motion. The legal position adopted by the Government set out in its summary of 29 August was that the proposed use of force was lawful under humanitarian intervention. According to its two-step approach, the Government
initially sought the endorsement of the House of Commons of the *principle* of humanitarian intervention; following publication of a then-pending UN report concerning whether chemical weapons had been used in Ghouta, it would then seek a second motion supporting its proposed *application* against Syria. As aforementioned, the unexpected rejection of the first motion on 30 August, following some ten hours of debate, prompted the Prime Minister to abandon this plan.

Debate was also held in the House of Lords on 29 August before which a motion was brought by the Government that that House ‘[take] note of the use of chemical weapons in Syria’. Frequent reference was made to the legal grounds for the use of force in that debate, including by a former Attorney General, a former head of HM’s Diplomatic Service and former Leaders of the Conservative Party and of the Liberal Democrats. Following the rejection of the Government’s motion by the House of Commons, the House of Lords adjourned its debate.

In the USA, the question of legality was peripheral. President Obama did not refer to it in his call for ‘authorization for the use of force by the American people’s representatives in Congress’ and Secretary Kerry likewise made no reference to it in his evidence to congressional committees. However, the media reported that the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel had provided a legal opinion to President Obama:

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80 HL Deb (29 August 2013), ‘Syria and the Use of Chemical Weapons’, col 1719.

81 Ibid, cols 1767-1768 (Lord Brennan), 1769 (Lord Thomas of Gresford), 1779 (Lord Phillips of Sudbury), 1780 (Lord Rathbotham), 1782-1783 (Lord Desai), 1791-1792 (Lord Inglewood), 1800 (Lord Cormack), 1807 (Baroness Tonge), 1812 (Baroness Uddin), 1816 (Lord Triesman), 1820 (Lord Wallace of Saltaire).

82 Ibid, col 1739 (Lord Goldsmith).

83 Ibid, col 1730 (Lord Wright of Richmond).

84 Ibid, col 1731 (Lord Howard of Lympne), 1734-1735 (Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hampdon).

85 Ibid, cols 1825-1826.


‘The administration's lawyers have been careful to guide the choice of words used by top officials. Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry, who made a forceful case for military action on Friday, have carefully portrayed al Assad's actions as violating "international norms." That's in part because Syria isn't among the 188 countries, including the United States that signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, the treaty that prohibits the production and use of such weapons.’

The legal opinion has not been published in the Department of State’s *Digest of United States Practice in International Law 2013*.

On 4 September, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed by ten votes to seven the Senate Joint Resolution (‘Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against the Government of Syria in Response to Use of Chemical Weapons’), which stated that ‘the President has authority under the Constitution to use force in order to defend the national security interests of the United States’. It was introduced before the full Senate on 6 September but not brought to a vote. In the Senate debates, neither humanitarian intervention nor the responsibility to protect were referenced.

In France, legality was a more prominent issue than in the USA but less so than in the UK. On 27 August, President Hollande called for an international response, invoking ‘respect for international law’ as an indispensable condition for the use of force and as the best guarantee for preserving collective security:

‘Yet, international law must evolve with the times. It cannot be a pretext for permitting the perpetration of mass massacres. It is why I recognise the principle of “the responsibility to protect” civilian populations as adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2005.’

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91 *Congressional Record*, Senate, 159(117), 9 September 2013 (S6273-S6284); 159(118), 10 September 2013 (S6305-S6306, S6312-S6320); 159(119) 11 September 2013 (S6340-S6348, S6367-S6369); 159(122), 17 September 2013 (S6482-S6483). *Congressional Record*, House of Representatives, 159(117), 9 September 2013 (H5409-H5410); 159(118), 10 September 2013 (H5437-H5438, H5440-H5442); 159(119), 11 September 2013 (H5480, H5484, H5493); 159(110), 12 September 2013 (H5532).

This reference to the responsibility to protect was the closest that the Hollande Administration came to a publicly-expressed legal justification during the crisis.\textsuperscript{93}

Neither the then-Prime Minister, M. Jean-Marc Ayrault, nor the Foreign Minister, M. Laurent Fabius, referred to legality in debates held in the National Assembly and the Senate on 4 September 2013.\textsuperscript{94} The Government reportedly furnished the National Assembly with legal advice asserting 'that, legally, they felt that they could take military action without a Security Council resolution.'\textsuperscript{95} However, no such advice has been published.\textsuperscript{96}

In the debate, several deputies opposed the operation due to the absence of a UN mandate.\textsuperscript{97} One observed that the possibility existed of seeking authorisation by the General Assembly through the Uniting for Peace procedure.\textsuperscript{98} The responsibility to protect was cited by one deputy in opposition to the use of force and in support of humanitarian assistance and diplomatic initiatives.\textsuperscript{99} No resolution was put to a vote due to its specific preclusion by Article 35 of the constitution of France.


\textsuperscript{95} House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, \textit{Government foreign policy towards the United States}, oral evidence (3 December 2013), at Q168 and Q175 (Mike Gapes MP). However, Mr Gapes stated in email correspondence with the author that he had ‘got his information from media reports’.


\textsuperscript{97} Ibid, M. Christian Jacob (Président du groupe Union pour un Movement Populaire), M. Jean-Louis Borloo (Union des démocrates et indépendants), M. Paul Giacobbi (Radical, républicain, démocrate et progressiste), M. André Chassaigne (Président du groupe Gauche démocrate et républicaine).

\textsuperscript{98} Ibid, M. Jean-Louis Borloo (Union des démocrates et indépendants).

\textsuperscript{99} Ibid, M. André Chassaigne (Président du groupe Gauche démocrate et républicain).
B. The Legal Positions in the International Community


At the G20 summit of 5-6 September 2013, the UN Secretary-General averred that ‘any decision [to act] “should be taken within the framework of the UN Charter, as a matter of principle.”’\footnote{‘At G20 summit, Ban, UN-Arab League Envoy push for political solution to Syria crisis’, UN News Centre (24 September 2013), available at: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45780&Cr=syria&Cr1=g20&Kw1=syria&Kw2=&Kw3=#.UyLUi5gupIU (accessed: 13 February 2015).} The heads of government of Brazil, India, Argentina, China, South Africa, and Indonesia joined President Putin to oppose as unlawful any military action without a UN mandate.\footnote{‘G20 Syria divide: World’s largest nations speak out against US-led strike’, Russia Today (6 September 2013), available at: http://rt.com/news/g20-against-syria-strike-527/ (accessed: 13 February 2015).} Whilst 11 of the 20 participants (Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey, the UK and the USA) signed a joint statement circulated by the White House in support of its position, that statement was
‘carefully crafted to omit the controversial crux of the American plan: punitive airstrikes on Syria, to be led by the US, quite possibly without UN backing’.

The Arab League called upon the UN to act as several members reportedly opposed a military operation without a UN mandate. Although the Non-Aligned Movement did not make an explicit statement on the aborted use of force in Syria, at its last summit in August 2012 it reaffirmed its opposition to ‘toutes actions militaires unilatérales, ou usage ou menace d’usage de la force contre la souveraineté, l’intégrité territoriale et l’indépendance des pays non alignés, lesquelles constituent des actes d’agression et des violations flagrantes des principes de la Charte des Nations Unies, dont celui de la non-ingérence dans les affaires intérieures des États’. In the General Assembly, a number of delegations chose to criticise the proposed operation in both direct and oblique terms; some cited the responsibility to protect, emphasising the central role of the UN for the use of force.

On 5 December 2013, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 68/38 (2013) by a vote of 127-5-52 (USA, UK, Israel, Micronesia and Palau against) in which it, \textit{inter alia}: ‘Requests the States parties to the relevant instruments on weapons of mass destruction to


\footnotesize{107} UNGA First Committee, 68th Session, 3rd Meeting (7 October 2013) at 5-8.


\footnotesize{109} 5th Meeting (24 September 2013), UN Doc. A/68/PV.5 at 10 (Brazil), 24 (Chile), 50 (South Africa), 55 (Sri Lanka); 6th Meeting (24 September 2013), UN Doc. A/68/PV.6 at 5 (Austria), 15 (Iran); 7th Meeting (24 September 2013), UN Doc. A/68/PV.7 at 2 (Switzerland), 11 (Argentina), 21 (Sweden), 40 (Italy); 9th Meeting (25 September 2013), UN Doc. A/68/PV.9 at 13 (Poland), 16 (Swaziland); 10th Meeting (25 September 2013), UN Doc. A/68/PV.10 at 12-13 (Bolivia), 21-22 (Trinidad and Tobago); 11th Meeting (27 September 2013), UN Doc. A/68/PV.11 at 7 (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines); 12th Meeting (27 September 2013), UN Doc. A/68/PV.17 at 5 (Sudan), 18 (Venezuela), 18th Meeting (28 September 2013), 7 (Mauritius), 8 (Vanuatu), 16 (Malaysia), 45 (Kyrgyzstan), 19th Meeting (28 September 2013), UN Doc. A/68/PV.19 at 8 (Ireland), 28 (Yemen); 21st Meeting (30 September 2013), UN Doc. A/68/PV.21 at 9 (Syria); 23rd Meeting (1 October 2013), UN Doc. A/68/PV.23 at 5 (Botswana), 9 (Holy See), 19 (Dominica), 25 (Ecuador).

\footnotesize{110} See the statements of Chile, Costa Rica, Estonia, Panama, Poland, Libya, Australia, the Netherlands, Montenegro, the Czech Republic, Finland, Iceland, Botswana, the Holy See and Denmark.
consult and cooperate among themselves in resolving their concerns with regard to cases of non-compliance as well as on implementation, in accordance with the procedures defined in those instruments, and to refrain from resorting or threatening to resort to unilateral actions, or directing unverified non-compliance accusations against one another to resolve their concerns'. The General Assembly also adopted Resolution 68/184 (2013) by a vote of 86-36-61 in which it, inter alia: ‘Reminds the Security Council of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’.

The reactions in the international community reveal that the UK stood nigh-alone in endorsing the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention. First, neither France nor the USA invoked the doctrine. Secondly, neither allied States (save Denmark), NATO nor the EU publicly endorsed the British legal position. Thirdly, many States explicitly opposed it and others (e.g. in the Arab League and the NAM) implicitly did so by supporting the traditional view that the use of force is lawful only in self-defence or with a UN mandate. This is reflected in the emphasis placed upon collective security and peaceful dispute settlement in the Charter and in UNGA resolutions.

III. THE LEGAL ROLE OF CONSULTATIVE PARLIAMENTARY VOTES

Even if, contrary to the arguments considered in Section I, it is legally possible to ‘amend’ the UN Charter through customary international law to add a third exception to the prohibition on the use of force, the distinct lack of support in the international community of States for humanitarian intervention in the Syria episode outlined in Section II supports the conclusion that it has not attained the status of custom. In this context, this section considers the legal role of consultative parliamentary votes in two respects: 1) as a procedural safeguard

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at the domestic level against the commission of the internationally wrongful act of aggression; and 2) irrespective of the first, as an expression of the State’s legal position.

The nexus for this interaction between constitutional law and public international law\textsuperscript{113} is the putative entry into force on 1 January 2017 of the jurisdiction of the ICC over the international crime of aggression.\textsuperscript{114} In comparing the constitutional positions of the P3, consultative parliamentary votes can play an essential role in protecting the national interest and the international rule of law as an independent check upon the executive to avert the commission of aggression. However, the ability of national parliaments to perform this function depends upon, in particular, access to independent legal advice and statutory entrenchment of consultation that is protected by judicial recourse.

A. Consultative Votes in the UK

Inquiries in the past year by Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Constitutional and Political Reform Committee and Defence Select Committee investigating the Syria episode have questioned the modalities of parliamentary consultation and the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention following the international reaction to the Syria operation.\textsuperscript{115} Parliamentary consultation is arguably an issue of the greatest importance for the UK of the P3, not only due to its parliamentary system of government and to the continuing political legacy of the


controversial Iraq War\textsuperscript{116} but also to the fact that the UK and France, unlike the USA, are parties to the ICC Statute while the UK is also the only one of the three to be party to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ.\textsuperscript{117} This leaves the UK more exposed to the possibility of an inter-state action at the ICJ and/or prosecution of its officials at the ICC for aggression.

The consultative parliamentary vote consequently assumes greater importance as a constitutional safeguard against the commission of aggression, amplified by the present inability of domestic courts to adjudicate alleged crimes of aggression.\textsuperscript{118} Should the UK become party to the jurisdiction of the ICC over the international crime of aggression and decline to amend section 50 of the International Criminal Court Act 2001 (c.17) to empower domestic courts to adjudicate it, complementarity\textsuperscript{119} would render accusations of the commission of the crime of aggression admissible \textit{ipso iure} before the ICC. This would run counter to Government policy to ensure the efficacy of domestic criminal procedures and thereby avoid British nationals from prosecution at the ICC for international crimes.\textsuperscript{120} As the UK has yet to ratify the ICC Statute amendments on aggression, an open legal question is whether a State Party that has not ‘opted out’ of the Court’s jurisdiction over aggression under Article 15bis(4) \textit{and} has not ratified the amendments will be bound by it;\textsuperscript{121} unless States Parties come to a consensus on this point, it is likely that it will have to be resolved by ICC

\textsuperscript{116} For background, see, e.g. – M Weller, \textit{Iraq and the Use of Force in International Law} (Oxford: OUP, 2010), pp 189-232.

\textsuperscript{117} The declaration of the United Kingdom accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court is available online at: \url{http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3&code=GB} (accessed: 13 February 2015).

\textsuperscript{118} \textit{R v Jones (Margaret) and others} [2007] 1 A.C. 136 at 162 (para 30, per Lord Bingham of Cornhill). See further R Joseph, \textit{The War Prerogative} (Oxford: OUP, 2013) at 110-156.

\textsuperscript{119} Statute of the ICC 1998, Art 17: ‘Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1, the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where: (a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution’.


\textsuperscript{121} See further, e.g. – C Kreß and L von Holtzendorff, ‘The Kampala Compromise on the Crime of Aggression’ (2010) 8 JICJ 1179 at 1195-1199; N Blokker, ‘A consensus agreement on the crime of aggression: impressions from Kampala’ (2010) 23(4) LJIL 889 at 893-894.
judges in the Pre-Trial Chamber. Although the UK could exercise an ‘opt out’ through a declaration, it stated in 2012:

‘We now have a period to reflect on this issue before any amendment enters into force, following further discussion by the ASP in 2017. In this regard, we note that all the amendments were adopted under Article 121 paragraph 5 of the Rome Statute and accordingly they will only enter into force for a State Party once it has ratified that amendment. It is not, therefore, necessary for a State that has not ratified the amendment on the crime of aggression, and which does not wish to be bound by it, to make a declaration under article 15 bis paragraph 4.’

This runs counter to the logic of an ‘opt out’ provision, which requires a declaration; rather, it is an ‘opt in’ or ‘strictly reciprocal state-consent-based jurisdictional regime’ – an approach rejected at Kampala. It is also reflects discomfort with the invidious position of opting out of the jurisdiction of a court that the UK vigorously promotes.

Furthermore, the consultative vote can also play an important role in defining the legal position of the UK (its *opinio iuris*) concerning the lawfulness of a use of force. As the royal prerogative on the use of force remains intact, it was open to British Government to proceed with their own view concerning the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention. However, the prerogative is qualified by a convention that the Commons ‘should have the opportunity to debate and express its view through a vote, except where there was an emergency and such action would not be appropriate’. Absent such a check, it is constitutionally possible (albeit politically far-fetched) for the monarch – who enjoys no immunity before the ICC to retain independent legal advice and thereafter reject the Prime Minister’s advice to deploy the armed forces on grounds of illegality.

122 Kreß and Holtzendorff, above n 121, at 1214-1215.
124 Kreß and von Holzendorff, above n 121 at 1203-1207, 1212-1213.
125 For background and analysis, see Joseph, above n 118, at 44-109.
127 ICC Statute, Art 27.
128 The monarch has the ‘right to be consulted, the right to encourage, and the right to warn’ (W Bagehot, *The English Constitution* (1867)), which provides the possibility for a material role on the formulation of policy. Although the modern convention has been that the monarch does not exercise the prerogative in a personal
voting in favour of aggression may also find themselves at risk of prosecution, alongside armed services chiefs, though a defence may be that they lack ‘effective control’ over the decision to commit aggression, which is in practice taken by the Cabinet. Both categories of persons were prosecuted for aggression at Nuremberg with mixed results. 129

In this context, the modalities for consultative votes continue to be a fraught constitutional problem:

‘Given the absence of legal restraint on the deployment power under domestic law, the rules of international law on the use of force take on an enhanced significance as the only apparent limitation on the prerogative. Domestic legality does not pre-empt international law. In other words action, which may not be unlawful under domestic law, could be in violation of international law.’ 130

Options under consideration for the clarification of Parliament’s role in the use of force include the transfer of the royal prerogative to Parliament, a requirement for formal accounting of the exercise of the prerogative to Parliament, scrutiny of the exercise of the prerogative by Parliament and the subjection of the prerogative to formal approval by Parliament. 131 However, no resolution has yet been reached on the long-term basis for Parliament’s involvement in the exercise of the prerogative. 132

Indeed, the Government has seemingly sought to weaken the existing convention:

‘The Government remains committed to the existing convention that before UK troops are

capacity since at least the nineteenth century, in practice monarchs have ‘continued to play a material, if hidden, part in the direction of foreign affairs’ – Joseph, above n 118 at 59. In addition, former Chief of the Defence Staff Lord Guthrie has suggested that the Monarch has a reserve power to countermand the Prime Minister in the event of a ‘mad’ decision to deploy nuclear weapons – R Knight, ‘Whose hand is on the button?’ BBC Radio 4 (2 December 2008), available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7758314.stm (accessed: 13 February 2015). The possibility of criminal responsibility for the monarch has never been a factor due to the immunity of the Crown from domestic prosecution as a facet of kingship – Halsbury’s Laws of England (London: Lexis Butterworths, 2014)(Vol 29) at paras 84-86.

131 Ibid, pp 26-43 (paras 60-111).
committed to conflict, the House of Commons should have the opportunity to debate and express its view through a vote, except where there was an emergency or such action would not be appropriate.\textsuperscript{133} The use of the disjunctive ‘or’ replaces the conjunctive ‘and’ in the existing convention, which is potentially significant in providing a future Government with a subjective basis to not consult the Commons. Furthermore, the Government has refused to commit to publish summaries of its legal position, per the Committee’s recommendation, as ‘normal and best practice’: ‘The publication of summaries of the Government’s legal position…will need to be considered on a case by case basis taking into account the confidentiality of the Attorney General’s full legal advice.’\textsuperscript{134}

It is suggested that the present convention that Parliament be consulted prior to the exercise of the prerogative (excluding emergency situations) should be enshrined in statute with the possibility of judicial review in the event of the Government failing to respect it.\textsuperscript{135} Although there are detailed problems to be solved in enacting such a reform,\textsuperscript{136} particularly in relation to judicial review, there is a real need for a constitutional safeguard to deter future governments from committing aggression by providing for parliamentary scrutiny on ‘wars of choice’. In light of the anticipated entry into force of the ICC jurisdiction over aggression, this would improve security for ministers, generals, parliamentarians and even the Sovereign.

\textsuperscript{133} Ibid, p 6 (para 11)(emphasis added).
\textsuperscript{134} HC Defence Committee, \textit{Intervention: Government Response}, above n 45, p 5 (para 10).
\textsuperscript{135} HC Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, \textit{Parliament’s role in conflict decisions}, above n 126, pp 15, 21-22 (paras 29, 48, 50). The Committee’s proposals call for enshrining Parliament’s consultative role through a resolution rather than an Act, specifically to avoid the prospect of judicial review. See also the proposal for a statutory underpinning with a limited ‘backstop’ role for the courts in Joseph, above n 118, at 181-216.
\textsuperscript{136} Joseph proposes that ‘the enactment of a statute which would require the government to obtain in the House of Commons a majority vote in support of deployment of the armed forces, except in identified situations; impose duties on the government to provide Parliament (and the public) with certain information about the proposed deployment; and establish a special joint committee of Parliament to scrutinize the relevant information and exercise a general oversight role over the deployment of forces’ – above n 118, at 181. One reviewer, while approving this specific proposal, does not feel that it fully considers the problem of ‘inadequate government accountability before Parliament’ in the British constitution as a whole – D Jenkins, ‘Publication Review: Joseph, The War Prerogative’ (Jan 2015) PL 188-191, at 191.
However, even if Parliament’s role were to be ensured, access to legal advice is critical to ensure that Parliament’s involvement is informed and effective as a check upon unlawful action.\(^\text{137}\) In this respect, the Note published by the Office of the Prime Minister (‘the Note’) on 29 August 2013\(^\text{138}\) exemplifying the current practice of publishing ‘summaries of legal advice’ is inadequate.\(^\text{139}\) In proposing his motion to the House, the Prime Minister asserted: ‘We have a summary of the Government’s legal position, which makes it explicit that military action would have a clear legal basis [of humanitarian intervention].’\(^\text{140}\)

However, the Note does not constitute ‘legal advice’ in the true sense of the term, namely, as an independent opinion produced by a qualified lawyer who accepts professional responsibility for its contents.\(^\text{141}\) It was neither signed by the Attorney nor attributed to him.\(^\text{142}\) It is consequently best-treated as either the collective view of the Cabinet\(^\text{143}\) (though there is no record of its having been discussed or voted upon in Cabinet) or as the personal view of the Prime Minister. Although it is not clear to what degree the Note is based upon confidential legal advice provided by the Attorney, its value as a definitive statement of the legal position of the UK is diminished by the fact that the Attorney (unlike in the case of Lord

\(\text{137}\) For background on the legacy of the Iraq legal advice, see Joseph, above n 118, at 208-209.


\(\text{139}\) Ms Caroline Lucas MP, Mr Edward Miliband MP and Mr James Arbuthnot MP referred to the ‘summary of legal advice’ in the debate to criticise its lack of detail – HC Deb (29 August 2013) at cols 1426, 1443, 1463. However, Dr Liam Fox MP, Sir Menzies Campbell MP and Mr Andrew Mitchell MP did refer to it for the purpose of substantiation – ibid at cols 1454, 1456, 1462.

\(\text{140}\) Ibid.

\(\text{141}\) Although the Attorney General has a ministerial role, in the provision of legal advice he has been likened, in the words of former Attorney General Lord Morris of Aberavon, as ‘a family solicitor, with the Government as his client’ - HL Select Committee on the Constitution, ‘Waging war: Parliament’s role and responsibility’, above n 130, p 29 (para 71). Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales (9th edition, January 2014), rC15. Although Sir John Hobson was tried by his Inn of Court for professional misconduct in 1963, the Bar Standards Board found in 2003 that it lacked jurisdiction to hear a complaint of misconduct against Lord Goldsmith regarding the impartiality of his legal advice concerning the Iraq War – see Sarvarian, Professional Ethics at the International Bar (Oxford: OUP, 2013) at 39-40 (n 95).

\(\text{142}\) The Prime Minister did, however, inaccurately describe the document as ‘the Attorney-General’s excellent legal advice to the House’ in the course of debate – HC Deb (29 August 2013) at col 1430.

\(\text{143}\) The Cabinet is a committee of HM’s Privy Council, composed of Ministers of the Crown and the collective decision-making body of the Government. Constitutionally, the Cabinet advises the monarch on the exercise of her Prerogative on the use of force.
Goldsmith concerning Iraq and in that of Mr Grieve regarding Libya) did not assume political responsibility for it through a ministerial statement.\(^{144}\) In light of the inadequacy of summaries of ‘advice’ and the lack of support for the idea that legal advice of Attorneys General be provided to Parliament, the pragmatic option would be the commissioning by Parliament of its own legal advice – for example, through a joint select committee.\(^{145}\)

Notwithstanding the conclusions in Section II above, the Government has demonstrated a firm commitment to continue existing policy in support of humanitarian intervention in spite of the negative international reaction and the doubts of Parliament. The Defence Select Committee concluded:

> ‘The legal justification for military intervention will continue to be controversial. We note the Government’s statement that when there is no UN Security Council Resolution for action, there is a legal basis available under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention which would permit the UK under international law to take exceptional measures in order to alleviate a humanitarian catastrophe providing certain conditions are met. We question whether the Government’s position is generally accepted by the international community or the British public. The Government should set out in detail in the next iterations of the National Security Strategy and the Defence and Security Review the principles of its legal position, including its relationship with the UN Charter, international law and the concept of the Responsibility to Protect, on the deployment of UK Armed Forces for intervention operations. This would assist with providing the public with greater information on, and understanding of, the Government’s position on the use of UK Armed Forces rather than waiting to the heat of debate immediately prior to a potential deployment.’\(^{146}\)

The Government replied to the Committee’s conclusion by referencing the evidence of the Right Hon Hugh Robertson MP’s letter to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee:

> ‘Nothing has changed with regard to the basis for the Government’s position, which predates 2000. […] The 2005 World Summit Outcome document is in the form of a non-binding United Nations General Assembly resolution, albeit one that was agreed by consensus and adopted at a high-level political event. It simply indicates a responsibility based on existing legal norms, while going on to express a political readiness to take collective action. The Summit’s adoption of the “Responsibility to

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\(^{144}\) The first question posed to the Prime Minister in the House of Commons debate was ‘why [the Prime Minister] has refused to publish the Attorney-General’s full advice’ – HC Deb (29 August 2013) at col 1426. The Prime Minister replied: ‘There had been a long-standing convention, backed by Attorney-Generals of all parties and all Governments, not to publish any legal advice at all. This Government changed that. With the Libya conflict, we published a summary of the legal advice. On this issue, we have published a very clear summary of the legal advice and I urge all right hon. and hon. Members to read it.’ A ministerial statement carries with it the possibility of ministerial accountability, including the theoretical (though arguably obsolete) possibility of impeachment, last attempted in 2004 against the former Prime Minister, Tony Blair, over the Iraq War – O Gay and N Davies, ‘Impeachment’, House of Commons Library, SN/PC/02666 (16 November 2011) at 4.


\(^{146}\) Ibid, p 29 (para. 49).
“Responsibility to Protect” was politically significant, and one that the Government welcomed and has continued to promote. But the “Responsibility to Protect” as set out in the Outcome Document does not in itself create new legal rights and duties or modify existing ones. And it does not address the question of unilateral State action in the face of an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe to which the Security Council has not responded. Rather, the “Responsibility to Protect” is aimed at making sure that the Security Council does take action.147

Mr Robertson further asserted that humanitarian intervention ‘does not have adverse implications for the UN’ and is not connected to the responsibility to protect doctrine.148 This is reminiscent of the Government’s response in 2004 to similar parliamentary inquiries on the Kosovo operation.149

The Chairman of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee observed that the UK is ‘almost alone among UN Member States’ in opinning that humanitarian intervention is lawful.150 Although there is no sign that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence are contemplating a policy change, pressure from Parliament coupled with lack of support in the international community may prompt a review in the next National Security Strategy in 2015.151 The Strategy should explicitly revert to the pre-1992 policy by rejecting humanitarian intervention as a legal basis for the use of force. In addition, it should set out a detailed legal framework for the use of force based on the following, orthodox grounds: 1) authorisation by the UNSC; 2) in the event of a veto, authorisation by the UNGA under the Uniting for Peace procedure; 3) individual self-defence; or 4) collective self-defence.

B. Consultative Votes in the USA

147 Ibid.
148 Ibid.
149 ‘Letter from the Parliamentary Relations and Devolution Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (July 5, 2004)’ in Wood, above Error! Bookmark not defined.
150 HC Defence Committee, Intervention (Vol. II), above n Error! Bookmark not defined., p 61 (Ev w58).
151 In Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review (Cm 7948, Oct. 2010), para 2.10 states the United Kingdom Armed Forces are deployed ‘only…where justifiable under international law’. In A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy (Cm 7593, Oct. 2010) para 3.32 asserts: ‘Our strategic interests and responsibilities overseas could in some circumstances justify the threat or use of military force. There will also be occasions when it is in our interests to take part in humanitarian interventions.’
In the USA, the position is defined by the War Powers Clause in its constitution. The War Powers Resolution 1973 requires the President to, *inter alia*, consult the Congress ‘in every possible instance...before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities’. Whilst the Resolution has been controversial, the Obama Administration has acknowledged ‘that Congress has powers to regulate and terminate uses of force, and that the War Powers Resolution plays an important role in promoting inter-branch dialogue and deliberation on these critical matters.’ An open constitutional question is whether the President has the power to proceed despite a negative vote by the Congress to authorise the use of force.

In this ambiguous context, there was the clear potential for the President and the Congress to adopt conflicting positions on the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention. Nevertheless, the War Powers Resolution was an ineffective tool in the Syria crisis for the scrutiny of the legal case for the use of force. This is due to three factors: 1) the absence of reference to the doctrine in the Joint Resolution; 2) the fact that the Administration declined to put forward any international law justification for the proposed use of force, including humanitarian intervention; and 3) the almost complete absence of legality as an issue in the congressional debates on the Joint Resolution. Unlike in the UK, the ineffectiveness of the Congress as a brake upon aggression is due not to a weak constitutional position but to its own disinterest in the question of legality itself.

C. Consultative Votes in France

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155 Ibid.
In France, the President is vested with exclusive authority over the conduct of foreign and military affairs.\(^{156}\) This was conceived by Charles de Gaulle to strengthen the Presidency at the expense of the legislature, which had had a stronger role during the Fourth Republic. By Article 35 of the constitution, the Government is required to inform Parliament of a decision to have the armed forces intervene abroad three days after the beginning of the intervention and detailing its objectives; although Parliament may debate the intervention, such debate may not be followed by a vote. However, such intervention is subject to a time limit of four months, following which parliamentary authorisation is required for extension.

Unlike the quite explicit nature of the motion in the House of Commons espousing the principle of humanitarian intervention, there was no occasion for the National Assembly to express its view on the legality of the doctrine. Consequently, the legal position was defined exclusively by the Government which, aside from a stray reference to the responsibility to protect, the Government refrained from advancing a legal justification at the UN or elsewhere. The inability of the National Assembly to act as a check upon the President is due to its constitutional weakness in military affairs, precluding even a consultative vote.

\textit{D. Post-Syria Developments: The Rise of Islamic State}

In the aftermath of the abortive operation in Syria, the rapid military and territorial successes scored throughout 2014 by the armed group formerly known as the ‘Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’, referring to itself since 29 June 2014 as ‘Islamic State’ following its declaration of a new caliphate, sparked fears of the imminent fall of Baghdad and collapse of Iraqi governmental authority. From 8 August, the US government spearheaded military operations by NATO allies (principally the UK, Belgium, Canada, Australia and France), principally

comprising aerial bombardments, against Islamic State in Iraqi territory. On 10 September 2014, the USA expanded its operations to Syrian territory. As of the time of writing, military operations are ongoing.

The USA has hitherto omitted to put forward a legal justification for its operations and the Obama Administration has confirmed that congressional approval for the operations will not be sought.157 Although congressional approval for the Administration’s plan to arm and train Syrian rebels was given on 19 September 2014, US constitutional lawyers remain doubtful of the compatibility of long-term military operations with the War Powers Resolution.158 The USA has not invoked self-defence at the UN and it has not obtained the consent of the al-Assad government of Syria for its airstrikes in Syria – though it has kept it informed of its operations on Syrian territory.159

By contrast and in spite of its defeat in the House of Commons the previous year, the British Government opted to follow the same gambit for political backing through a parliamentary motion.160 The motion explicitly did not ‘endorse UK air strikes in Syria as part of this campaign and any proposal to do so would be subject to a separate vote in Parliament’.161 As with Syria and Libya, the Prime Minister published a ‘summary of legal advice’162 asserting that ‘[t]he government is satisfied that the consent of Iraq in these terms provides a clear and unequivocal legal basis for the deployment of UK forces and military assets to take military action to strike ISIL sites and military strongholds in Iraq.’ Although

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157 Henderson, above n 9, at 211.
159 Henderson, above n 9, at 217-218.
160 HC Deb, col 1255 (26 Sept 2014).
161 Ibid.
the Prime Minister suggested in debate that there were ‘a variety of legal arguments that [could] be deployed’, he based the action exclusively on consent:

‘The Attorney-General has given his advice on the action we propose to take. There is a clear legal base for UK military action to help Iraq defend itself from ISIL…there is no question but that we have the legal basis for action, founded on the request of the Iraqi Government.’

Following debate, in which legality was central, the motion was carried by 524 votes to 43.

As of the time of writing, the Obama Administration had submitted a written request to the Congress to approve the use of force against Islamic State under the War Powers Resolution. Whilst the resolution states that ‘the United States has taken military action against ISIL in accordance with its inherent right of individual and collective self-defense’, the Administration has yet to publish an international law justification. Resolutions and debates in the parliaments of Canada, Belgium and the Netherlands appeared to base their justifications upon the consent of the Iraqi government.

Thus, the ongoing operations against Islamic State are not directly relevant to the question of the legal status of humanitarian intervention as neither the USA nor the UK has invoked the doctrine. Nonetheless, the differing approaches of the two government towards consultative parliamentary votes may be attributable to a number of factors, such as:

1) the legacy of the illegality of the 2003 Iraq war continues to be acute in Britain, yet is a weaker factor in US domestic politics;
2) international law has played a greater role in political debate in Britain concerning the use of force since at least Kosovo, yet is largely invisible in US domestic politics;

163 HC Deb (26 September 2014), Col 1263. See further the House of Commons Defence Select Committee Seventh Report, The situation in Iraq and Syria and the response to al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq al-Sham (DAESH), (27 January 2015) at paras 20-23.
164 HC Deb, cols 1256, 1259, 1263-1264, 1270-1271, 1274, 1279, 1283, 1288, 1290-1293.
167 Ibid, at 220.
3) in a parliamentary system of government, it is theoretically easier than in a presidential system for the legislature to pressure the executive concerning the use of force (e.g. – the fall of Lord Aberdeen’s Ministry through a vote of no confidence in 1855 due to the conduct of the Crimean War), particularly when the government majority is small;
4) there is greater war fatigue in Britain than in the USA, reflected by the greater scepticism of parliamentarians for the use of force in new crises.

Notwithstanding the Cameron Ministry’s continuing resistance to a permanent commitment to parliamentary consultation, as advocated by the select committees and the fact that the parliamentary motion was passed, the parliamentary consultative vote played a crucial role in restricting the use of force to the territory of Iraq. As the legality of that operation is far stronger than the Obama Administration’s operation in Syria, this demonstrates the potential utility of the consultative vote as a check upon illegal wars.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

This article has examined the lawfulness of the aborted use of force against Syria in August-September 2013 in response to the use of chemical weapons in Damascus. In Section I, it has argued that humanitarian intervention, as a matter of law, must be enacted through amendment to the UN Charter rather than customary international law due to the hierarchy of norms. Moreover, even if humanitarian intervention can be adopted through custom, the detailed survey of the opiniones iura of States regarding the abortive Syrian operation in Section II underscores the lack of international support for the doctrine. As set out in Section III, consultative parliamentary votes have the potential to act as a constitutional safeguard against the commission of aggression but their efficacy depends upon a statutory underpinning and independent legal advice in order to enable national parliaments to properly debate the legality of a proposed ‘war of choice’.

The decision of the USA and France to refrain from advancing legal justifications for the proposed operation, coupled with the lack of support from NATO and EU allies,
undercuts the continuing British commitment to humanitarian intervention. Numerous and explicit rejections of the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention by the BRICS and other States in the UN and elsewhere have reaffirmed their longstanding position that the use of force is lawful only with UN authorisation or in self-defence. If humanitarian intervention was legally infirm after the Kosovo episode, the Syria case has placed it on its deathbed. Although the International Law Association Committee on the Use of Force has yet to adopt a position on the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention in its pending project on aggression and the use of force, early scholarly reaction to the Syria operation supports the argument that humanitarian intervention does not have sufficient State support to become a legal basis for the use of force.

The British Government has remained firm in its commitment to the legality of humanitarian intervention; it stands virtually alone in the international community. The rejection of its motion on Syria, coupled with doubts expressed by parliamentary committees in subsequent inquiries, illustrates the rising tide of parliamentary disquiet over the doctrine. This article calls upon the Government to revert to its pre-1992 policy in the forthcoming National Security Strategy 2015. This should be done by setting out a detailed legal framework for the use of force based upon the widely-accepted legal bases of collective security authorisation – on which the responsibility to protect is based – and self-defence.

This does not mean that collective security in response to a grave humanitarian crisis can be utterly frustrated through veto or threat of veto at the Security Council. The possibility remains (with the caveats noted above) of calling an emergency special session of the General Assembly through the Uniting for Peace procedure to seek authorisation for forcible

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169 Henriksen and Schack, above n 5, at 147; Stahn, above n 5, at 35, 45-46.
measures.\textsuperscript{170} It is noteworthy that, whereas forcible measures under Article 42 have been deployed by the Security Council on two occasions, the Uniting for Peace procedure has been utilised on ten occasions and has gained widespread acceptance as a lawful alternative mechanism. Whilst the motivations for the reluctance of NATO members to resort to the Uniting for Peace procedure in the post-decolonisation era are speculative, it is plausible that the \textit{causa causans} is a desire to concentrate power in the Security Council in which the veto power is available.\textsuperscript{171}

Consultative votes by national parliaments have the potential\textsuperscript{172} to serve as a useful constitutional safeguard against the commission of aggression by the State through detailed, rigorous, public scrutiny of the government’s legal position. Such votes should be viewed not only as a means to drum up political support for the use of force but also as a crucial check for legality amidst the drums of war. A statutory underpinning, backed by judicial review, and the provision of independent legal advice – in light of the confidentiality of the Attorney General’s advice – are key. The recalcitrance of the British Government risks the exposure not only of the UK to suit at the ICJ but also of ministers, generals, parliamentarians and even the monarch to prosecution at the ICC from 2017. The effectiveness of international law on the use of force depends not only on international mechanisms for its retrospective enforcement but also upon national safeguards against prospective wrongdoing.

\textsuperscript{170} Uniting for Peace, above n 17, A(1).
\textsuperscript{171} Binder, above n 18 at 455-456 (‘Once the five permanent members of the Security Council (‘P5’) realized that the resolution was a double-edged sword – and indeed threatened their sovereign interests by potentially undermining their own respective veto powers – it was relegated to obscurity’).
\textsuperscript{172} Yet, safeguards can fail, particularly in the face of large government majorities and three-line whips: it was the House of Commons, after all, that voted by 412-149 in favour of the Blair Ministry’s motion to endorse the invasion of Iraq in 2003 – HC Deb, col 907 (18 Mar. 2003).