Comparative Analysis of French and British Public Opinion on the EU, 1992-2001

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ABSTRACT

Public opinion on European integration has been studied extensively. However, much of the work has been conducted on an aggregate national level or individual level across nations without taking detailed account of the specificities of each member state, even though these distinctive features can be essential to explaining public views. The dissertation offers a comprehensive, comparative analysis of French and British public opinion on the EU from 1992 to 2001, in a period of significant changes brought out by integration. In particular it examines the effects of national and individual utilitarian appraisals on EU support and considers whether attachments to particular socio-economic models structure preferences for EU policy. By extensively reworking and testing Eurobarometer data, the thesis corrects some previous distortions, offers a more rigorous treatment of the effect of utilitarian explanations on EU support than past research has done and provides some methodological enhancements. It is thus demonstrated that in a context of increased visibility and politicisation of the EU in France and the UK, utilitarian appraisals played an ever-increasing part in moulding attitudes towards the EU, while affective EU support eroded – especially in France, where it had been more developed. The significant drop in support for EU membership and for further integration in France and the United Kingdom resulted from discontent with the perceived contribution of the EU to national and individual economic and social situations. This also reflected the fact that majorities in both countries favoured a change in the political direction of the EU to cater for their own policy concerns. The French preferred a widely integrated EU based on regulated capitalism with a high level of social protection, where the principle of European preference was enforced. The British preferred a model of loose intergovernmental association of nations, where neo-liberalism and free trade rules prevailed. In the light of these findings the dissertation concludes that EU policy makers need to devise flexible modes of integration whilst achieving positive outcomes in the socio-economic sphere if they are to satisfy both national publics.
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1- INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

The process of European integration is today at an advanced stage. The European Union’s institutions, through their regulatory power over commercial, economic and social activities, largely influence the environment in which firms, public institutions and individuals evolve. Thus the EU’s decisions are not only more and more visible but can have far reaching consequences on people’s lives, from the monetarization of the Euro (and its consequences, for example, on pricing decisions), planned EU enlargement, standardization of technical product and process norms to European citizenship. The decisions of the EU sometimes arouse public interest and often represent fertile grounds for the expression of passions by the opponents and supporters of European economic, political and social integration. Discussion fora about the future of the EU abound, some organized by the EU institutions themselves, prompted perhaps by *esprit démocratique* but also by concern over the lack of public enthusiasm for European integration.

Support for the European integration process is not unanimous across Europe, as recent polls have shown from Denmark to Italy, but also in France and the United Kingdom. European civil society seems to be divided between pro-integrationists and anti-integrationists, pro-Euro and anti-Euro. The legitimacy of the EU is a field in which many writers have engaged (see for example Beetham and Lord (1998), Gabel (1998)). However the study of public opinion on EU integration has frequently been conducted on an aggregate national level or individual level across nations but without taking into much consideration the economic, political, cultural, social and historical specificities of each member state, which can influence opinion. The present study of British and French public opinion stems from this necessity and reality.

The choice of Britain and France as the focus for this research is justified by the similarities and differences that they share. These differences and similarities are as true today as they were in the study period. As far as the similarities are concerned, they include the fact that these are two large member countries of the EU both in
terms of population, political and economic power. They both have approximately 60 million inhabitants in 2005 (Eurostat, 2007) and have similar GDP per head, $28223 and $27048 for the UK and France respectively in 2005\(^1\) (OECD, 2007a). They contribute to the EU budget in the proportion of around 17% for France and 12% for the UK\(^2\) (The European Commission, 2007) and have the same voting rights and number of representatives in the institutions of the European Union. They are also both old members of the European Union although France is a founder nation of the European Community. They both have networks of bilateral and multilateral links with other states, including countries associated with their respective colonial pasts. Furthermore, in both Britain and France there are deep political divisions between pro- and anti-European currents of opinion – as evidenced by national or European elections and referendum results as well as by general political debate and commentary in the media, although the opposition to European integration in France is now more confined to the political periphery.

France and the United Kingdom nevertheless diverge in a number of respects. They have different economic and social traditions, one more collective (France) and the other one more individual (the United Kingdom). Thus the government sector in France accounts for 54.5% of the wealth produced against 44% in the UK (as a percentage of GDP) in 2005 (The European Commission, 2006); France counts a higher number of civil servants and higher tax pressures – 45.7% for France against 38% for the UK as a percentage of GDP in 2005 (The European Commission, 2006) – and the French central government intervenes more in the economic and social sphere – for example the working week limited to 35 hours. The Index of economic freedom – using factors such as trade policy, fiscal burden of government, government intervention in the economy, monetary policy, capital flows and foreign investment, banking and finance, wages and prices, property rights, regulation and informal market – confirms this state of affairs by placing France at the 44\(^{th}\) world rank and the United Kingdom at the 5\(^{th}\) world rank in 2006 (The Heritage

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1 These figures are calculated at the price levels and purchasing power parities (PPPs) of 2000. When measuring the GDP per inhabitant in current prices and PPPs, the differential between the United Kingdom and France is greater: respectively $32860 and 30266 in 2005 (OECD, 2007b). In terms of GDP per head, the United Kingdom has caught up with France at the end of the study period and overtook it afterwards. Both countries’ GDP per capita remains though relatively comparable.

2 This relies on gross contributions to the EU budget and does not take account of receipts received back from the communities, for example in the form of European funding.
Foundation – The Wall Street Journal, 2007). Furthermore, according to Hofstede (1991) following his research on IBM employees in different countries, Britain appears more individualistic (ranked 3rd with a score of 89) compared to France (ranked 10/11th with a score of 71). In addition, France has a relatively high power distance (score of 68) for a developed country, compared with a score of 35 for Britain.

The selection of Britain and France is also motivated by the fact that they have different records of economic, social and political outputs over the last fifteen years, and European elections are frequently the object of discussion focusing on domestic issues rather than European ones, more especially in France. Thus for example, the unemployment rate in France is higher than in the United Kingdom, 9.7 and 4.8 respectively in 2005 and has been higher for the last fifteen years – and even for most of the last two decades (Eurostat, 2007). The economic difficulties in France were associated with frequent changes of governments and political majorities in the same period, this contrasting with the relative political stability in the United Kingdom. Moreover the different national economic, social and political records of the two nations may be at the source of the differences in public attitudes to European integration, which represent one of the overarching hypotheses in the present research, namely that dissatisfaction with national institutions and their outputs may motivate support for European integration.

The differences between British and French public opinion towards EU integration are particularly interesting as the French public is more in favour of EU membership and further integration but more opposed to EU enlargement than the British. Furthermore, despite these differences, both publics include substantial opposition to, and support for, EU membership and further integration. The data below illustrate this in the study period (Eurobarometer, 1992-2001):

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3 Power distance refers to the degree of inequality between people in physical and educational terms (i.e. from relatively equal to extremely unequal). Thus, the lower the power distance in a society is, the more individuals will expect to participate in the organizational decision-making process (Hollensen, 2004).

4 Please see tables in appendix 1.1.
Support For EU Membership

Figure 1.1: EU Membership: Good Thing - Bad Thing 1992-2001

In the United Kingdom, 43% of respondents say EU membership is a good thing and 25.2% a bad thing (differential of +17.8) compared to 54.3% a good thing and 14.6% a bad thing in France (differential of +39.7). The differential between the two countries is in favour of France, that is to say +21.9. Furthermore the respondents who say that EU membership is neither good nor bad are similar in percentage in both countries, 31.1% (France) and 31.8% (United Kingdom).

Source: Eurobarometer
Country Benefit From EU Membership

Figure 1.2: Country Benefit From EU Membership 1992-2001

In the United Kingdom, 35.8% of respondents answered that the UK benefited and 42.9% that it did not benefit (-7.1) from EU membership compared to 46.1% benefited and 33% not benefited in France (+13.1). The differential between the two nations is again favourable to France, that is to say +20.2. The percentage of respondents who answer “Don’t Know” to this question is relatively similar – but high – in both countries, that is to say 20.9% and 21.3%.

Source: Eurobarometer
In the United Kingdom, 29.8% of respondents are for the Euro and 57.6% against (differential = -27.8%) compared to 62.8% for the Euro and 30% against in France (+32.8%). The differential between the two nations is favourable to France and particularly high with +60.6. However, the percentage of respondents who answer “Don’t know” to this question is higher in the United Kingdom than in France, 12.5% versus 7.2%. 
• Enlargement: For or Against

Figure 1.4: Support for EU Enlargement 2000-2001

In the United Kingdom, 36.3% of respondents are in favour of European enlargement and 34.6% against (+1.7) compared to 37% in favour and 48.2% against in France (-11.2%). The differential between the respondents in the United Kingdom and France is thus +12.9%, with the former being more in favour of EU enlargement. However the percentage of people who answer don’t know is higher in the United Kingdom than in France, 29.1% versus 14.8% respectively.

Source: Eurobarometer

This question is only available in 2000 and 2001.
In the United Kingdom, 29.9% of respondents are of the opinion that enlargement is a priority for the EU against 53.4% not a priority (-23.5) compared to 18.1% a priority and 75.3% not a priority in France (-57.2). The differential between the respondents in the United Kingdom and France is thus -33.7, with the latter seeing enlargement even less of a priority for the EU.

Respondents in both nations do not consider enlargement as an EU priority. However the percentage of people who answer don’t know is higher in the United Kingdom than in France, 16.6% versus 6.6% respectively.

* This question is only available from 1997 to 2001.
Preference For European Unification Speed

Figure 1.6: Desired European Unification Speed 1992-2001

The mean for the United Kingdom’s preferred European unification speed is higher than for France, respectively 3.92 and 3.20 (1 equals “runs as fast as possible” and 7 “standstill”). This indicates that British citizens wish to see EU integration proceed slower than French citizens. Furthermore the mean for British respondents is beyond the mid-point (that is to say 3.5) while the one for French respondents is below the mid-point.

These results confirm the common assumption that the United Kingdom seems more eurosceptical than France, although in both nations, there is a significant coexistence of pro- and anti-European feelings among citizens, corroborated by the last European election results which saw both pro- and anti-European political parties in
France and the United Kingdom obtain parliamentary representation (Mellows-Facer et al, 2004). The fact that citizens in the United Kingdom seem rather more eurosceptical and those in France rather more pro-European highlights the importance of a systematic, thorough-going comparison between the related public opinions towards European integration, especially given that France and the United Kingdom are of similar political, economic and population size.

The choice of the study period, that is to say from 1992 to 2001, is justified by the fact that this period coincides with significant developments in the European integration process made possible by inter alia the Treaty of Maastricht, the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Treaty of Nice. These treaties bringing significant changes in the lives of European citizens from the monetarization of the Euro (and its consequences for example on pricing decisions), planned EU enlargement, standardization of technical product and process norms, ...to European citizenship and embryonic European home affairs policies. The selection of this ten year period is also motivated by the fact that the related countries, that is to say France and the United Kingdom, have had a different record of economic, social and political outputs in the related period and European elections are frequently dominated by discussions on domestic issues rather than European ones, in France but also in the United Kingdom. It is motivated by the fact that ten years is an adequate period to appreciate the effects of perceived and actual national economic, political and social output records of the related member states on French and British citizens’ opinions about European integration but also to appreciate the nature and direction of the European changes (considering their sheer importance) on people's lives. The ten-year period is adequate to carry out time-series analysis. As this study is solely based on the period from 1992 to 2001, extrapolation of conclusions and implications drawn from the current study to the post 2001 period should be exercised with caution.

1.2 Research Objectives

Breaking away from much of the previous research which followed a cross-national perspective, the present research takes full account of the national cultural,
historical, economic, social, and political specificities which shape public opinion on European integration. It aims to study and explain the differences between British and French public opinion in the period from 1992 to 2001. It will investigate and test whether the utilitarian argument at individual and national levels and citizens’ preferences for particular social and economic models explain support for European integration. More specifically, public satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the performance of national institutions and its hypothesized relationship with support for European integration (hypothesis I) will be examined, as will the citizen’s individual benefit extracted from European integration (hypothesis II). Furthermore, the hypothesized relationship between citizens’ preferences for regulated capitalism and support for integration in the case of France, and the hypothesized relationship between citizens’ preferences for neo-liberalism, coupled with opposition to integration in the case of the United Kingdom (hypothesis III) will be studied. The research aims to explore and understand these contrasting views on Europe so that it can make some small contribution to policy-direction within the EU. As this study is solely based on the period from 1992 to 2001, the application of conclusions and inferences drawn from this study to the post 2001 period should be exercised with caution.

1.3 Thesis Structure

The present thesis consists of 8 chapters. Chapter one outlines the research problem, its importance, the rationale behind the study and the research objectives. Chapter two critically reviews the European integration process from the perspective of political actors and citizens. The completion of the single European market and the Maastricht Treaty marked the end of the permissive consensus in member states. European integration and its policies became, from the 1990s, more visible, politicized and contested by political parties, social movements, interest groups and citizens. Citizens’ attitudes towards the European Union are nevertheless developed in the national economic, political, historical, social and cultural contexts, and are more utilitarian than affective. EU support is thus conditional on the economic, social and political performance of the nation state, rather than on the performance of EU institutions themselves. Furthermore, citizens develop values and policy
preferences in the political order of their country, which will influence their EU attitudes – more specifically, drawing comparisons between the political order or policies of their country and the political order or policies of the European Union.

Chapter three discusses and justifies the methodology. Besides the novelty of doing a systematic Franco-British comparative study in the period from 1992-2001 – relying on creative hypotheses – the present thesis corrects some previous distortions, offers a more rigorous treatment of the effect of utilitarian explanations on EU support than past research and provides some methodological enhancements. Thus, the effect of utilitarian explanations is considered in relation to evaluations both of current EU membership and of further European integration at both the individual and aggregate data levels. Evaluations of current EU membership are measured through the use of both EU benefit and membership dependent variables which provide a more accurate and discriminating appraisal of current EU membership support, capturing in the process a fuller range of underlying attitudes. The utilization of the seven point future integration dependent variable specifies views in a more precise way than the dependent variables used in other studies. Where possible, middle category answers (“don’t know” and “neither good nor bad”) are also integrated into the statistical treatment – providing methodological enhancements in comparison with earlier research. The mixture of aggregate and individual data level analyses involving a range of diverse data, combined with the mutual reinforcement and complementarity of hypotheses tested in the study, is not only suited to the objectives and purpose of the research but also enhances its validity. Moreover, the present analysis incorporates not only the study of attitudinal patterns (that is to say citizens’ perceptions of European and national economic, social and political factors) but also of the relationship between actual economic, social and political data (such as, for example, inflation rate, GDP growth rate, crime rate and social expenditure per head of population) and integration support. Finally, another benefit of the current research is that it encompasses meticulous and exhaustive statistical modelling and subsumes original variables (or new ways of operationalising variables) in the analysis: for example integration of immigration, crime, bureaucracy, tax burden in hypothesis I, incorporation of varied subjective economic performance evaluation variables in hypothesis II, and
integration of a comprehensive range of policies operationalised in a novel manner with directional content of policies in hypothesis III.

Chapter four presents an analysis of the background economic, social and political environments in France and the United Kingdom. This analysis revealed that both France and the United Kingdom see a role for the EU but that they each have a different view of what form the EU should take. This reflects their dissimilar national economic, social, societal and political experiences in the study period. Thus French public opinion showed relatively strong support for European integration in the period from 1992 to 2001. Nevertheless, this support fluctuated with France’s economic and social difficulties – especially from 1992 to 1997 and from the second part of 2000 – and with the perceived role played in these difficulties by European integration – more particularly, by the development of the EU on a model that was deemed too liberal, deregulated and excessively open to world competition. Utilitarian assessments seemed to increasingly erode affective feelings towards integration. As regards British public opinion, it was and still is less well disposed towards European integration than its counterparts in other EU countries (including France) and the tendency increased from 1992 to 2001. The growing reluctance with regard to the United Kingdom’s EU membership – and more especially towards further European integration – can be explained by a perceived divergence of the EU economic and social model with the predominant British model of free markets, individualism, national sovereignty and national interest. It can also be explained by the comparative success of the British model which was perceived to be threatened by a European Union that was deemed undemocratic, bureaucratic, more interventionist and somewhat value disenhancing, but also by the perceived threat that the EU brought to British national identity, and by the lack of real party competition on European integration.

Chapters five, six and seven present the analyses of data and the discussion of results. It is thus seen that in the context of France and the United Kingdom, utilitarian appraisals play a part in forming citizens’ opinions about the EU and that citizens use national proxies to express attitudes towards the EU. Amidst the greater visibility and politicisation of the EU issue in the study period, utilitarian assessments gained increasing importance. In chapters five and six, relationships
were thus found between citizens’ EU support and the performance of national political institutions in socio-economic, societal and political terms (hypothesis I), and between citizens’ support for integration and individual benefits extracted from European integration (hypothesis II) in both the French and British contexts.

Both countries in the study period experienced a significant drop in support for EU membership and for further European integration, although the fall was lower among French respondents. This significant drop was the result of discontent with the perceived contribution of the EU to the national and individual economic and social situation. It reflected the fact that both countries favoured a change of political direction of the EU to cater for their own policy concerns. The analysis of findings for hypothesis III in chapter seven confirms this. Hence, whilst the results of hypotheses I and II have demonstrated that the utilitarian argument can certainly be a vector of support for current EU membership and future European integration in both the French and British contexts – more so in the French case – this vector of support is ultimately defined by the principle of subsidiarity and the type of EU model French and British citizens favour. For the former, it is defined by a preference for a widely integrated EU based on a regulated capitalist model with a high level of social protection, and where the principle of European preference is espoused, whereas for the latter the preferred model is a loose intergovernmental association of nations where neo-liberalism and free trade rules prevail.

Finally, chapter eight sets out the conclusions, political and policy implications, research limitations and recommendations for future research. The results of the present research have highlighted the fact that much of the previous research has offered an excessively simple view of the relationship between citizens and the EU. The nature of EU support itself – current EU membership and further European integration examined separately – the specific policy aspect considered – for example crime level, unemployment and corruption – and the domestic economic, cultural, historical, social, political environment in which these are interpreted and connected, have not been considered sufficiently. Although individuals may not have a sophisticated knowledge of the EU, they are able to use information shortcuts from their social and political environment to express their attitudes towards the EU. The literature has perhaps over-emphasized the influence of political parties on
voters. The growing visibility and impact of the EU on citizens in the 1990s increasingly enabled citizens to be less dependent on party cues and to see for themselves the policy consequences of European integration. The utilitarian argument can certainly be a vector of support for current EU membership and future European integration in both the French and British contexts – more so in the former – but this vector of support is ultimately demarcated by the subsidiarity principle and the type of EU model favoured by French and British individuals.

In the light of the findings in this thesis concerning the primacy of the utilitarian dimension in public opinion and the problem of compatibility between the types of European integration models favoured by different national publics, EU policy makers need to undertake the daunting task of devising flexible modes of integration which satisfy different national publics but also achieve positive outcomes in the economic, social and societal sphere. The interaction between these two complementary legitimators of European integration is made more complex by the nature of the relationship that they entertain with one another. The relationship between performance and European integration model type is one of only partial compensation between each element, as both are complementary to the legitimacy of the EU for national publics. Thus a deficiency in the type of integration model followed can be partly offset by performance, and vice versa. The relationship between the related criteria of EU legitimacy is also one of partial displacement for national public opinion: resolving a legitimacy deficit in one area can displace the problem onto another – thus resolving a performance problem by extending the EU’s scope into adjacent functional areas or increasing the use of majority voting in the council of ministers may exacerbate a legitimacy deficit in the type of European integration model favoured by national publics. Furthermore, managing the EU justification criteria is made even more difficult by the fact that the size of membership of the EU entity and the scope of its authority are continually changing. The management of these dilemmas requires skilful public policies with national populations – rather than intra-European elites – as the addressees of legitimacy claims.
2- LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction and Hypotheses

The conundrum of whether the European Union (EU) is or will be a real community of Europeans, among both proponents and opponents of European integration is recurrent nowadays. The existence of such a community is especially significant as it conditions the viability and perenniality of the European integration project itself. If it is difficult to justify the existence or foundation of this community on the basis of a common ethnicity (Smith, 1992) or on the basis of social communication\(^7\) alone (Deutsch, 1966; Deutsch et al., 1967), Howe (1995) contends that community is bound by primarily the individual’s belief that others are of the same community and in this echoes Parsons’ proposal (1966) that in a modern liberal society the ideas binding a people are increasingly detached from the concrete elements of their lives. Howe (1995) points out that the emergent European loyalty comes from the instrumental integration, still ongoing,\(^8\) and the incremental acquisition of important trappings of statehood by conferring rights that define people as Europeans, for example the rights to work and reside in other EU countries, the emergent European constitution. The instrumental integration is tantamount to the utilitarian EU support of the general public demonstrated by Gabel (1998a).

Howe (1995) acknowledges the fact that the conditions for acceptance by people of European integration revolve around the degree of affinity between communities – reflected in ethnic ways, social mores and political values – and the balance of power within the proposed union, the latter being judged more important. For European nations, the fear of cultural, economic and political obliteration is markedly reduced by the absence of a hegemon. Lijphart (1977:55-62) has raised the same point with respect to plural societies within states: the distribution of power and more specifically the absence of a dominant power, can have a decisive

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\(^7\) Social communication is here understood as the ability to communicate effectively over a wide range of subjects with members of one large group rather than outsiders.

\(^8\) In other words, nations and people participate in the EU project by virtue of their mutual self-interest.
influence on the sense of security of minority groups, this determining ultimately their co-operation or intransigence.

The EU is at an advanced stage of integration and encompasses a myriad of policies, from the environmental policy, social policy, agricultural policy, industrial and transport policy to economic and monetary union (EMU) and even the embryonic foreign policy and home affairs. Yet it seems propitious here to examine how citizens determine their attitudes towards European integration and explore how the political order and policies of the citizens’ member state influence citizens’ attitudes towards European integration. This chapter shows that amidst a greater visibility, politicisation and protest regarding European integration and its policies in the 1990s, citizens’ attitudes towards the European Union are developed in the national context, and are more utilitarian. Furthermore it is argued that citizens develop values and policy preferences relating to the political order of their own country, which will influence their EU attitudes. More specifically citizens draw comparisons between the political order and policies of their own country and the political order and policies of the European Union. This chapter has informed the development of the following hypotheses which will be tested in chapters 5, 6 and 7:

- Research Question I: Is there a relationship between citizens’ support for integration (or opposition to integration) and citizens’ dissatisfaction with national political institutions’ performance (or satisfaction with national political institutions’ performance) in socio-economic, societal and political terms?

It is hypothesized:

$H_1$ There is an inverse relationship between citizens’ levels of satisfaction with national political institutions’ performance – pertaining to the national economic, political, social and societal situation – and citizens’ support for European integration in France and the United Kingdom (thus, the higher the satisfaction with national performance, the lower the support for European integration).
• **Research Question II:** Is there a relationship between citizens’ support for integration and citizens’ individual benefits extracted from European integration?

It is hypothesized in the context of both France and the United Kingdom:

\[ H_{II} \text{ There is a relationship between citizens’ support for integration and citizens’ individual benefits extracted from European integration} \]

• **Research Question III:** Do inclinations towards a socio-economic model structure EU policy preferences of French and British citizens?

It is hypothesized:

\[ H_{III} \text{ While a preference for ‘regulated capitalism’ is associated with support for EU integration in France, a preference for a ‘neo-liberal’ socio-economic model is associated with opposition to EU integration in the United Kingdom.} \]

### 2.2 European Integration: From the Permissive Consensus to its End

#### 2.2.1 Permissive Consensus and Electoral Connection

As Slater (1982) implies, national politics matters in the relationship between publics, elites and the European community. As an after-effect of the second world war, there has been a high affective sentiment of the general public towards western European integration from the 1950s which also coincided with a period of strong economic growth. This period was marked by a permissive public consensus about Europe coinciding with “consociationalism” – in other words consensus politics – of the national elites in the building of Europe. From the 1960s, there was however less consensus among European Community (EC) elites (between national elites and pan-integrationists), an example of which would be the French opposition to the United Kingdom’s (UK) entry in the EC and the increased use of majority voting at the community level.
On the side of public opinion, there has been a lack of interest and ignorance about the EC from the outset. Thus, many scholars (Inglehart, 1971; Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970; Moravcsik, 1991; Stavridis, 1992) have argued that political elites have been able to pursue unification because the European public has been generally positively predisposed towards integration as EU policies were perceived as too technical and had minimal direct impact upon individual citizens. The public opinion therefore favoured integration but hardly knew what it was. Even with the greater visibility of the Community with time, that is to say with more European policies, the institutional structure of the Community – especially the increasing importance of the Council and defence of national interests – has continued to orientate the public to expect results from their national governments, this may have contributed to less public interest for the community.

Religion as Support of EU integration

Nelsen et al. (2001) found that religious identity and commitment affect EU support. Running regression analyses with Eurobarometer data from the 1970s through to the 1990s, they found that catholics have been far stronger supporters of European integration than protestants, especially nominal (attend church once a year or never) and conventional (attend church a few times a year) adherents, and that the devout (attend church once a week or more) in both religious traditions have been more in favour of the integration process than have nominal adherents. This is explained by the fact that the clergy in both denominations is more pro-European.

The effects of religion appear to survive both longitudinal and intensive cross-sectional analyses incorporating alternative explanations for support for the EU, that is to say religion works in concert with other influences such as political engagement (knowledge and interest), partisanship, ideology, post-materialism, and socio-demographic variables. This finding may be important for France and the United Kingdom, in the sense that France is predominantly a catholic country and

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9 Church attendance being considered as a strong indicator of religiosity (Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere, 1995).
the United Kingdom a protestant country, and as such religious attachment of each nation can partly explain their respective attachment to European integration.

Although Christianity may be "dramatically universalist" (Tinder, 1989:233), 16th century events still shape the way protestants conceive of Christian unity. The struggle against roman spiritual and political hegemony fostered the reformation’s reliance on the nation state, created a distrust of international Catholicism and encouraged a link in the protestant mind between national sovereignty and true religion. Fogerty (1957) and Haas (1958) asserted that European integration in the 1950s was largely a Christian Democratic project led by devout catholics such as Konrad Adenauer, Robert Schuman and Alcide de Gasperi while more recently devout catholics such as EU Commission President Romano Prodi (Balzan, 1999), Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio Guterres (The Economist, 1999) and former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (Schlaes, 1997) have supported further European integration. It must be noted that religious sentiment, in particular catholic sentiment, in Europe is today slowly declining (Jagodzinski & Dobbelaere, 1995) as is its political and social role (Leroy & Lyman, 1995) and as such may erode the Europeanist sentiment of citizens. It must be noted that Eurobarometer semi-annual surveys have ceased to collect data on the religious belonging and practice of European citizens inter alia to take account of the decline of religion in Europe. However other factors such as the utilitarian perspective as discussed later in the literature review, may also be used by citizens as a justification for support for further integration and this increasingly in the future considering the decline of the catholic religion among citizens.

**Electoral Connection Theory**

Using 1989 European Election studies,\(^1\) it has been found that political parties tend to embrace positions on EU integration in line with the average position of their voters (Van der Eijk and Franklin, 1991). There were however some discrepancies between MSI (Italy), PCF (France), Regenboog (Green-Left alliance in the

\(^{1}\) European Election studies are surveys of voters and of party elite/candidates carried out at election time, just after the European Parliament election.
Netherlands), FN (France) and their electorates, the latter displaying more pro-European positions.

Echoing Van Der Eijk and Franklin’s (1991) results, using European Election Studies of 1979 and 1994 and relying on the responsible party model, Schmitt and Thomassen (2000) showed that on the grand direction of EU policies (easy issue/policy ends), party voters and party elites share similar views on the question of more or less integration (strong correlations of 0.83 (for 1979) and 0.84 (for 1994) were reached). Party voters were found a little less integrationist than party elites as they are also a little less on the left than party elites. This contrasts with policy means (specific EU policies) where voters are less in agreement (correlations of 0.50 according to specific policies) with party elites because they are not as well informed and knowledgeable about the likely consequences of a particular EU policy – for instance Economic and Monetary Union, Open Borders – they are thus more insecure about change of the status quo. Using elites’ and voters’ views on the European integration dimension in 1979 and 1994, concurrent observations at the other level are the best predictor: for instance elites’ integrationist views in 1994 are associated with voters’ integrationist views in 1994 and vice-versa. On the left-right dimension, the determinants of voters’ views in 1994 are the previous elite positions (here 1979); in other words left-right orientations of voters are shaped not by current but former elite positions. The implication of this finding is that voters are more likely to learn their party’s left-right position at some earlier point, in a politically formative phase (socialization effect). With regard to integrationist views, using standardized regression estimates, it was found that voters seem to have a somewhat stronger impact on party elites than vice-versa (that is to say 0.51 against 0.21), reflecting in this the work of Carruba (2001) around election time.

The critique that one can formulate about these results is that the surveys used – that is to say European election studies – are carried out around election time, just after the European Parliament (EP) elections, political parties thus adapting their manifestoes (in EP elections) to voters’ views as they are afraid of sanction votes. This being said, in national elections, inexplicably, voters’ views are explained by former (not current) party elite views. The responsible party model is used as the framework for Schmitt and Thomassen’s (2000) research. Schmitt and Thomassen’s
writes “this model assumes that competitive and cohesive parties exist; that voters have policy preferences and perceive the policy options on offer correctly; and that voters in the end base their electoral choice on these preferences. If these conditions are met, the process of political representation should result in a close match between the preferences of party voters and the policies of parties”. These assumptions are perhaps partly unrealistic, especially if two elements are taken into consideration: party euroscepticism is at the periphery of politics, at least in France; and the lack of knowledge of voters on EU handicaps their interpretation of what is on offer.

Some researchers (Slater, 1983; Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995), echoing studies on American public opinion on foreign policy issues (Rosenau, 1961; Converse, 1964; Neuman, 1986) have found that citizens lack interest in and a sophisticated knowledge of the integration process, which suggests that public opinion regarding integration is superficial and transitory. However individual citizens use readily available informational cues and short-cuts from their social and political environment to infer their own policy preferences (Conover and Feldman, 1989; Popkin, 1991; Kuklinski and Hearn, 1994; Huckfeldt et al., 1995; McKuen et al., 1989; Page and Shapiro, 1992 and Erikson et al., 2002). The mass media, politicians and interest groups supply the public with cheap information by condensing complicated political information into simple and easily understood messages. Given that the media and national elites generally focus on the national implications of issues and more specifically on the benefits and costs of integration, national public support for integration may vary with national differences in the value of European integration – the research of Gabel and Palmer (1995) shows this. As hypothesized later in the literature review, this also means that if the media and political elites are reticent towards integration for economic and social reasons, the public may also be more sceptical about the EU: the UK may be an example of this.

Using Eurobarometer data from 1977 to 1992 and party manifesto data, Carruba (2001) found that Stimson’s (1991) “policy mood” theory applies to European integration, that is to say there is an electoral connection between political elites and

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12 Party manifesto data was measured by the percentage of pro-European statements minus the percentage of anti-European statements in election year.
public opinion on European integration issues, the former conforming close enough to public preferences – although the strongest determinant of party position is short term economic impact (exports/imports per industry weighted by the fraction of the given nation’s employment in that sector) and relative EU budget transfers. It must be noted that on average the political elites are found to be more pro-European than public opinion. The elites, while respecting the electoral constraint, use the slack available to promote integration.

Wessels (1995) using party platform positions and a number of survey measures (such as EC membership and European unification questions) over the period from 1973 to 1991, also found an electoral connection at election time although position of party on European integration can influence party supporters’ view on it when mobilizing their supporters. However Wessels (1995) problematically relies upon lags – party supporters’ evaluation of membership and of European unification was just considered nine months before election, and three months before and after the election – to show the possibility of reverse causation, that is to say political party influencing public opinion’s position on integration. This is known as cue taking theory (political elites shape weakly held preferences through their policy positions). However if cue-taking is occurring, previous election platforms would contaminate the findings for the current period. This stresses the importance of political parties’ mobilizing their supporters at election time and beyond as a vector of support for European integration as EU issues are generally not high on the list of priorities of citizens although, if there is a belief that national economic and social issues can be helped by European integration, it is hypothesized that citizens’ support will happen.

The weakness of Carruba’s (2001) study is that the study was done until 1992. Yet 1992 with the Maastricht Treaty marks the end of the permissive consensus. This raises questions: did the political elites stop paying attention to post 1992 popular preferences? If so, why would they do this when public interest was high? Or, did the increasing salience of EU policy after 1992 reduce the slack in electoral constraint, and did the elites simply not compensate adequately for that fact? Was European integration, as pursued, tantamount to a politically correct project which was increasingly distant from citizens’ aspirations?
2.2.2 End of Permissive Consensus and Pro-European Stance of Party Elites

The politicisation of the completion of the single European market in 1993 and the project of economic and monetary union in 1992, both with direct economic and social implications on electorates’ lives, aroused the interests, concerns or enthusiasm of the political world, socio-economic circles and the civil society. This politicisation of the European integration issue coincided with a generally poor socio-economic situation in Europe. The Maastricht Treaty was subject to ratification votes in a number of member states. The ratification process was directly submitted to the electorates via a referendum in some countries like Ireland, Denmark and France or submitted to a parliament vote in countries like the United Kingdom and Germany. The Maastricht Treaty was advertised quite broadly in member states and was the source of divisions within and between political parties and industrial circles. The domestic political situation also inspired these divisions. The ratification itself by referendum was difficult in countries like France which narrowly ratified the Treaty or Denmark which first refused the ratification, only to ratify it later under a different format. The ratification process was also difficult in countries such as the United Kingdom, which ratified the Treaty via the parliamentary route. The United Kingdom, where the government at the time was headed by John Major, had subjected the ratification of the related Treaty to a vote of confidence in order to secure a positive vote.

These divisions left durable marks on political parties but also on the electorates towards the European integration process. Thus Aspinwall (2002) has shown that public opinion except for foreign policy did not account very much for the position of national governments on EU matters at the 1997 intergovernmental conference on the future of the EU. Public opinion came well behind party preference and party ideology. Party preferences (on EU integration) appeared as the first determinant with ideology as the second determinant of government preferences. Public opinion seemed only to influence governmental preferences on integration for foreign policy and defence because of historical and cultural theories of preference formation. The national experience is salient here. In the other domains, public opinion seemed to have little influence on governmental preferences on integration, this state of fact
may be linked to the fact that the electorate is uninterested in and uninformed about community affairs and thus follow the lead of their preferred party as suggested in the British case (Nugent, 1992). Wessels (1995) also suggests that parties are responsible for mobilizing the support of their constituencies on European integration.

The use of datasets collected at different times is though moreover a methodological weakness in Aspinwall’s (2002) research. For public opinion data, Aspinwall (2002) used 1997 Eurobarometer survey, for party preference data he relied on Ray’s (1999) expert survey of level of party support for integration carried out to 1996 and finally for party ideology Huber and Inglehart’s (1995) expert survey placing parties in Left-Right space carried out in 1993 was utilized.

*The Dimensionality of the EU Policy Space eclipsing the Independence-Integration issue*

Using manifesto studies between 1979 and 1994, Hix (1999a, 1999b) identified two salient dimensions within the EU to explain party position, namely left-right positioning on socio-economic issues and independence and integration. Nevertheless Hix (1999a, 1999b) has shown that since the early 1990s in the wake of Maastricht, the main European political parties, that is to say PES (socialists), EPP (Christian Democrats) and ELDR (liberals), do not compete on the integration-independence dimension. Thus they all, especially the socialists, have moved to adopt a pro-European stance. There has been a will from these parties to stabilize the system and safeguard acquired party groups’ positions although there are differences between party elites and party members regarding European integration views.

The core of EU politics is a triangular party system where Liberals (ELDR) and Christian Democrats (EPP) are differentiated on the libertarian-authoritarian dimension with the former focusing on democracy issues and the latter on moral issues; and Liberals (ELDR), Christian Democrats (EPP) and Socialists (PES) divide on intervention and free market issues. Conservatives, especially the British Conservatives, stood further to the right and were preoccupied with independence issues. Therefore, in the European political space, alliances between two or more
political groups materialize depending on the issue and the salience of the particular issue.

To echo this, Attina (1990), Kreppel (2000), Noury (2002) and Kreppel and Tsebelis (1999) have shown a high level of political group cohesion with European Parliament members voting according to ideology – that is to say party group membership – and not according to nationality. Aspinwall (2002) echoed this and found, using expert surveys – relying on Ray’s (1999) data for party preferences and Huber and Inglehart’s (1995) data for ideology – that left-right ideology is a better predictor than nationality of party views on integration. Thus as (party) ideology goes away from the political centre, party views become more eurosceptic. There were though small differences between left and right but a move to the left was found to be more anti-European than a move to the right.

However Ray (1999) in an expert survey of party positions confirmed that parties on average, became increasingly pro-European over the period 1984-1996 but also showed the salience of the issue as well as underlined the existence of intra-party divisions. Hix et al. (1999) have shown through an analysis of roll-call votes that both the left-right and the pro-/anti-Europe dimensions are salient in EU politics but that the voting behaviour in the European Parliament is structured more by the first dimension. The location of parties on the traditional left-right dimension is primarily defined by redistributive socio-economic issues rather than by regulatory and European issues.

However Pennings (2002), through a thematic content analysis of national party and European party groups’ manifestos at the 1999 European Parliament elections, disagreed with Hix (1999a) and argued that the EU policy space varies on more dimensions than the left-right and independence-integration dimensions, advancing for example the ethical and environmental issues. He also found significant programmatic differences between and within European party groups. Thus, the Christian Democrats (EPP), being a mixture of centre and right political parties, divided on social conservatism and social service expansion; the liberals (ELDR) are not homogeneous over the democracy issue; the socialists (PES) appear more cohesive than the Christian Democrats (EPP) but the differences tend to be small.
while social conservatism – including law and order and social harmony – is a source of division within the Socialists (PES), the Christian democrats (EPP) and the Liberals (ELDR). To deal with these divisions, a middle-of-the-road policy is pursued by each European party group and its individual common platform. The three most centrist party groups show significant differences between their election manifestos, especially on social conservatism and democracy issue, accounting for 13.1% of variance (tested with factor analysis) and 12.8% respectively.

The literature presents somewhat contradictory views on party group cohesiveness relying on three types of cohesiveness, namely organisational cohesiveness (expert opinions), voting cohesiveness and programmatic cohesiveness. The degree of cohesiveness of one and the same party can differ depending on the type selected although the three main European political groups do not appear to compete on the integration-independence dimension. As discussed later in the literature review, the lack of competition between the mainstream parties on this dimension is reflected in the national arena of member states such as France and the United Kingdom although for the latter the Conservatives have embraced a more eurosceptic stance on European integration since 1997 compared to the Labour Party – the latter tries to avoid exposure on this issue fearing internal divisions and unpopularity and focuses rather on domestic issues.

2.3 Increased Salience of EU Issue and Policies

For the past fifty years, the European Union and its predecessors have helped to shape the politics of constituent countries. In the era following the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty, the EU has been altered into a multilevel polity in which European issues have become important not just for the member states’ governments but also for political parties, political groups, interest groups and citizens within those states. The EU has become a more openly contested arena for political parties, interest groups and social movements (Hooghe and Marks, 1999; Imig and Tarrow, 2001; Marks et al., 1996). Domestic contestation to trade negotiation is driven by sectoral economic interest. Thus Moravcsik (1998) argues at length that government policy on European integration mainly amounts to the
efforts of producer groups – employers in import and export competing sectors – to achieve advantageous trade policies. European integration can also be viewed as an extension of domestic politics. In other words, domestic politics influences and is influenced by European integration. Traditionally for foreign policy issues, there is more freedom of action granted to governments as voters have no clear preferences but relations between the EU and its member states are fast ceasing to be seen by citizens as low salience foreign policy matters (Van Der Eijk and Franklin, 2002).

2.3.1 Cognitive Mobilization Surpassed

Research on public opinion in the USA found that the dynamics of attitude formation are different for particular sections of the population (Zaller, 1992; Sniderman, 1993, p.224; Knight, 1985 and Stimson, 1975). The constraints on citizens’ choices over particular issues, for example self-interest, ideology and values, affect citizens’ political judgments differently depending on their political awareness, cognitive skills and information. Cognitive mobilization refers to a citizen’s ability to process information at a high level of abstraction relying on a high level of political awareness and well developed skills in political communication (Inglehart et al., 1991; Hewstone, 1986; Inglehart, 1970a; Inglehart, 1970b). It is tantamount to the ability to understand the abstract process of EU integration, associated with people with a higher level of education and more well informed about the EU (Inglehart, 1970a; Inglehart, and Reif, 1991; Janssen, 1991). As cognitive mobilization increases, the European Union and the topic of integration become more familiar and less threatening (Inglehart et al., 1991; Janssen, 1991) and as a result, support for integration increases. Inglehart et al. (1991) even argued that cognitive mobilization could account for the evidence in support of the human capital and income hypotheses: in other words, those with higher status occupations and incomes tend to be better educated, better informed about politics and more politically active than the rest of their compatriots. Gabel (1998a) – using the questions frequency of political discussion (highest integration support found for “occasionally” answer), frequency of persuasion (highest integration support found for “rarely” response) and the EU membership variable as the dependent variable as in studies done before – refuted the cognitive mobilization theory by finding that
cognitive mobilization is related to integration support in a curvilinear manner, as citizens with the highest level of cognitive mobilization express relatively low utilitarian support.

Hix (1999b) found that education, age and information about the EU are indicators of support for the EU, especially the latter (stronger than the other two). Higher level of education and information about the EU increased support for the EU until 1992. Then in 1992, utilitarian interests became stronger determinants of support for integration in the 1990s, perhaps because of the onset of recession and the concomitant decline in post material values. Furthermore policies such as the completion of the single European market in 1993 and the monetarization of the Euro have made European integration more visible to citizens, a European integration initially involving negative activities of removing tangible barriers to trade and involving, in the 1990s (up to today) the construction of joint policies in ever salient areas. Citizens can thus perceive some of the concrete social, political and economic consequences of these policies on their life and on the national social, economic and political situation. Although knowledge about European integration varies from one citizen to another one but also from one member state to another one, citizens tend to take cues and short-cuts from political actors, media and self-involvement communities (for example workplaces) in the member state where they reside. These consequences are often instrumentalized by political parties and media to convince citizens to support a particular stance on European integration.

The Stability Pact pertaining to EMU influences for example the management of social and welfare policies of member states through the limitation of public deficits. Thus the refusal to adopt the Euro by the Swedish electorate by referendum in 2003 was partly motivated by the fear (instrumentalized by the Swedish Social Democratic Party to entice a “no” vote to the Euro) that EMU would jeopardize the generous social policies followed by Sweden’s successive governments (The Times, 15 September 2003). This reason along with the fear of loss of national sovereignty, national identity and cultural identity, also motivated the Danish refusal to adopt the euro in 2000 (Buch and Hansen, 2002).

13 The Danish electorate has been found to have the best developed views on European integration (Van Der Eijk and Franklin, 2002).
The increased visibility of European policies together with its accrued politicisation in countries such as France, Denmark and the United Kingdom has made the European issues more salient although especially at election time for national and European elections, there is a tendency of mainstream political parties especially in the case of France and the United Kingdom to circumvent the European issues to focus on domestic issues to avoid divisions both within political parties and in the sympathizing electorates (Van Der Eijk and Franklin, 1996). The focus on domestic issues at European elections can also be interpreted as a lack of saliency and will be discussed later in the literature review. Furthermore the influence of parties on their supporters can be to this extent important. Political parties can influence their supporters for low saliency issues in the short-term and can also do so for high saliency issues in the long term but this depends on the endurance of citizens’ preferences (Franklin, 2002; Swenson, 2002).

The saliency issue is also linked to whether the verdict at referendums on European integration, as in the case of Denmark, is contaminated by domestic issues such as the popularity of incumbent governments proposing the referendum (Franklin, Marsh and McLaren, 1994; Franklin, Marsh and Wlezien, 1994; Franklin, Van Der Eijk and Marsh, 1995). Svensson (2002) contested the notion of such contamination. Voting at national elections also has an impact on European integration in so far as national representatives participate in European councils, and the electorates may be conscious of this. Thus three studies by Evans (1998a; 1999a and 1999b) demonstrated that voters’ perceptions of the Conservative Party’s position on European integration influenced its electoral support during the 1990s. Evans (1998a; 1999a) showed that voters’ perceptions of the Tories’ mismanagement of the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) crisis hurt the Tories’ electoral support. Evans’ (1998a; 1999b) and Scheve’s (1999) studies indicated that EU issues even serve as a new electoral cleavage in the United Kingdom and France. Evans (1998a; 1999b) demonstrated that at the 1997 British national elections, voters’ positions on the EU were independent of the traditional determinants of vote

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14 The EU has a triumvirate for EU decisions, which consists of the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission.
choice, namely the left and right dimension, and that voters’ support for EU membership influenced their vote choice in national elections.

Scheve (1999) showed that at the 1997 British general election and 1995 French presidential election vote choice depended on the proximity of a party’s position on EMU to that of the voter, independently of the left-right dimension. In the French case, this issue was responsible for the success of the Front National and other small parties in the first round of the elections. Clark and Hallerberg (2000) and Della Sala (1997) moreover described how with a quasi-fixed exchange rates system (such as ERM) and fixed exchange rates system (such as EMU), national governments forfeit control of their monetary policy. These systems and their implications have been publicized in the media and the electoral results seem to indicate that the electorates have taken these into account when voting. Furthermore in a study based on 1996 Mega-survey Eurobarometer data, Gabel (2000) found that citizens’ support for EU membership has an effect on party choice at the next general election controlling for left/right positioning in France as in most other EU member states except the United Kingdom. The main limitation of the related study is that it was only done at one point in time.

2.3.2 Saliency of the European Domain and Public Responsiveness to Policy Change

Franklin and Wlezien (1997) have found, in their study of Eurobarometer data from 1971 to 1994, that with the advancement of integration, citizens are more responsive to policy. In other words as the salience of the European domain has increased, public responsiveness to policy has followed. Citizens have adjusted their relative preference for European policy according to their preferred level of policy and European policy itself. Therefore the salience of the policy domain will also act on the citizens’ preferred level of policy and by extension on their relative preference for European policy. The announcement of the creation of a single European market and the launch of a single currency can have an effect on public opinion before they are actually implemented. The immediacy of the public’s response to policy change is quite striking though it has been found in other domains (Wlezien, 1995; 1996). Thus, in the United States, it was shown that decisions to increase or reduce
Public spending in salient areas have measurable effects on public opinion over the course of the policy-making process itself long before the actual expenditure is increased or is reduced (Wlezien, 1996). However the methodology used by Franklin and Wlezien (1997) has important weaknesses in the sense that the European policy variable is measured in quantitative terms and not in qualitative terms - the end of the period studied though coincides with two important events in European integration - the salience of the EU issue is thus assimilated with time. Furthermore the unification variable used in the related research, is perhaps not the best measure of public preference for greater or lesser degree of unification as it is also a measure of preferred form of unification.

Protests in the streets about European integration are also an element of salience of EU policies. Although protests involving domestic issues and policies represent still the large majority of protests, there has been a growing share - superior to 5% - of protests involving the EU, European issues and policies from 1984 to 1997, these protests having especially increased since the Maastricht Treaty (Imig, 2002). This 5% figure is probably an underestimate in so far as Imig (2002), in his research, chose a conservative operationalisation of European protest in which a media report had to link - within the first sentence - a protest with the EU. It is also suggested that actors still think in national terms as claims are often made against national domestic targets although national institutions may be directly or indirectly influenced by the policies followed by the EU.

Imig (2002) also shows that the largest proportion of contentious politics surrounding European integration involves occupational groups, farmers and workers in particular. For a discussion of the growing euroscepticism of French farmers in the 1990s, please see Thompson (2003). Furthermore there is a clustering of European protests around left political causes and in opposition to the European integration project which suggests that in the eyes of those groups which are launching direct action, further European integration is relevant in so far as it influences domestic and economic life. People have fought to protect their jobs and families against restructuring that they fear will threaten their way of life. The dispute here is perhaps limited to social movements and therefore influence its members and sympathisers but is also of a nature to influence citizens in general as
these protests are well publicized. Citizens are more prone to be attentive to information which may affect their livelihood.

Furthermore the saliency of the EU, for national governments – more especially in the case of the United Kingdom and France – is reflected by the fact that they each have a centralized national EU policy unit, which coordinates their responses to the EU (Lequesne, 1993, 1996; Harmsen, 1996; Wright, 1996). Cole and Drake (2000) have even emphasized the increased Europeanization of the French polity, especially in the second period of the 1990s. Ladrech (1994:70) defined Europeanization as “an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organisational logic of national politics and policy-making”. Jospin’s government was willing to trade subsidiarity for sovereignty and thus refused to isolate Europeanization from a broader domestic agenda of reforms. Europeanization under Jospin’s government took the form of an independent variable – inflicting change in policy areas such as the opening of the telecommunications, air transport and energy markets – and represented a source of emulative policy transfer and learning such as EMU permitting it to copy the German monetary policy management (Cole and Drake, 2000). Nevertheless Jospin suspected the European central bank of neo-liberalism and tried to counterbalance it with employment programmes. There were also, at times, attempts by both the plural left and the political opposition led by Chirac to shift the blame for unpopular decisions on to Brussels, for example for the high VAT rate for restaurant services. The Europeanization of the French polity can echo a salience of the European domain for citizens as they are induced to see the relevance of European integration on the management of the political, economic and social spheres and thus the effects on their lives.

2.4 Primacy of the National Perspective over EU Issues and Policies

2.4.1 Domestic Politics Matter in European Elections and Referendums about European Integration

In a Eurobarometer aggregate level study from 1973 to 1997, Christin and Hug (2002) found that constitutional provisions for referendums, as in Ireland and
Denmark, led to citizens being more supportive of European integration. They argued that voters should be more satisfied with policy outcomes if a referendum is allowed – in the case of required referendums or non-required referendums initiated by political opposition – until the next treaty. The rationale behind this is that when a government has to submit a European treaty to popular vote – referendum – it provides a ratification constraint to government (Putnam, 1988) and provides more bargaining power to government (Schneider and Cederman, 1994; Milner, 1997).

Christin and Hug’s (2002) result echoes the research of Gerber (1996, 1999) – for referendums on parental notification laws for teenage abortions and the death penalty – which found that referendums lead to policies closer to the voters’ preferred policy. Similarly Christin and Hug (2002) results suggested that voters more strongly support European integration immediately after a referendum vote: they thus found positive results for the United Kingdom’s 1975 referendum, and the Danish 1986 and 1992 referendums. These results echo Dalton and Duval’s (1986) research, which found a link between public events – more specifically for UK accession referendum and the 1979 European elections – and support for European integration although the effect decreases month after month after the impact. Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) and Gabel and Palmer (1995) also found that referendums in the UK (1975), Denmark (1986) and Ireland (1987) and the 1979 European elections lead to more support for European integration.

The limitations to Christin and Hug’s (2002) research are that they rely on scant empirical evidence and that policies decided on in a referendum are assumed to be represented solely in one-dimensional space by voters. It is though likely that Treaties on European integration are perceived by voters in more than one dimension and include elements that only remotely relate to the content of the treaty. Several studies reported that opinions toward European integration correlate with partisan allegiance. Left/centre/right ideology and party loyalists are found to vote in accordance with the party position (Hug & Sciarini, 2000; Gallagher, 1996; Pierce et al., 1983), including voting at referendums. However many voters have been found to ignore the position of their political party over integration issues, division within political parties – in the case of factions – helping to explain this (Svensson, 1984).
In addition to partisanship, recent research has focused on incumbent popularity and voter assessment of government performance as a relevant variable influencing public support for European integration (Franklin, Marsh and McLaren, 1994, 1995; Franklin, Van Der Eijk and Marsh, 1995). The latter study concerned the Maastricht Treaty referendum rejection in Denmark, which reflected rejection of incumbent government rather than independent judgment of the electorate on integration issues. The mass tends to be uninformed & disinterested to form independent opinions on integration issues and shows a willingness to endorse the elite-driven integration project dependent on trust vested in them. Hug & Sciarini (2000) in their analysis of European integration referendums suggest however that this relationship depends on the institutional context and is stronger if the referendum is binding and is initiated by government.

Franklin, Marsh and McLaren (1994) argued that referenda are fought for partisan advantage. The preoccupations of national parties being their prospects at forthcoming national elections, they tend to leave governments to push for ratification of European treaties, this turning the treaty ratification into a contest of popularity of governments and other heads of state. In the cases of France, Ireland and Denmark, referenda over the Maastricht Treaty further illustrated this. Mainstream national parties were divided into factions over European issues, so they tended to avoid discussing them in public and shifted to short term national issues rather than long term European considerations. Consequently the 1992 French referendum was nearly rejected, partly due to unpopularity of Francois Mitterrand, while Ireland found a majority to ratify the Treaty on European Union partly because of the popularity of its government and the first Danish one (in 1992) was rejected because of the Danish government’s unpopularity (Van Der Eijk and Franklin, 1996). It would be though misleading to discount completely the electorates’ suspicions or preferences towards or against the Treaty on European Union.

Svensson (2002) objected to the characterisation of Danish voters made by Franklin and others who expounded the thesis that on issues of low salience, referendum votes tend to follow party lines. He found evidence that the Maastricht Treaty was
an issue of high salience to Danish voters – implying that they have a well-
developed opinion about European integration – who have decided on the issue
alone at successive referendums and therefore ignored any role for the popularity or
lack of popularity of governments in the referenda result. Franklin (2002),
following Svensson’s critiques, refined his position and contended that the extent to
which the verdict rendered by a referendum called by the government is
contaminated by the government standing depends on:

1. The extent to which voters bring to bear deep-seated knowledge and enduring
   preferences.

2. The extent to which non-government parties are united in opposition to
government’s position on the referendum proposal.

3. The closeness of the political balance of forces on the question at issue: in the
case of a close fought contest, the contamination of the result is likely.

It must be noted that the British ratification of the Treaty on the European Union via
the parliament in 1993 was also subject to the influence of the domestic political
process with most Labour Members of Parliament although in favour of the Treaty
voting against, leaving the Conservative government to obtain virtual unanimity
(within the Conservative parliamentary ranks) in favour of the Treaty15 (Franklin
and Curtice, 1996). What must be kept in mind is that in referenda, the government
has a specific role in putting a referendum before the people and/or making public
recommendations on how to vote, and this action itself can increase the probabilities
that voters see these as opportunities to support or oppose the incumbent
government. Schneider and Weitsman (1996) called this the punishment trap.

Lately, the 2005 referendums on the EU constitution in Spain, Luxembourg, France
and the Netherlands exemplified this. Government parties are eventually crucial in
securing a majority in favour of EU Treaty revisions as significant proportions of
opposition party supporters go to the “No” side whether mainstream opposition
parties’ leaderships campaign in favour or against the EU Treaty. While the Spanish
and Luxembourg government parties succeeded in mobilizing the majority on which

15 Prime Minister Major only secured a positive vote for the related Treaty by subjecting it to a vote
of confidence in his government.
they had come to power and won the referendum, the French and Dutch government parties failed to do so and lost the referendum (Crum, 2007).

*European Elections and Domestic Concerns*

If the results of referendums on European Integration can be as much linked to support for national governments as to support for the EU (Franklin et al., 1994, 1995), evidence has also been offered that European Parliament elections are second order elections in which voters express domestic concerns (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Van Der Eijk and Franklin, 1991, 1996), and that national concerns remain important elements in individual citizens’ evaluations of the EU (Gabel & Palmer, 1995; Anderson, 1995; Anderson & Kaltenthaler, 1996). Lancelot (1986) summarized the conditions in which voters participate more actively in elections when they perceive the political utility of their vote, which presupposes:

1. that the problems appear important to them.

2. that they have the possibility of choosing among several options.

3. that political competition influences the designation and orientation of political power.

When viewed in this manner, European elections represent the least favourable conditions for participation because Europe’s problems are not at all or very little known or understood and thus cannot be perhaps perceived as important. The complexity of European institutions and the lack of understanding of the functions of the parliament may not give the electorate the impression that they are bestowing any form of power on those they elect.

European elections are perhaps not really European themselves as the processes they display are national political processes (Van Der Eijk and Franklin, 1996). Thus they play no role in deciding who governs the country (Reif, 1985) although the European Parliament has currently more power than it used to have before the 1990s. The same party system animates them with generally the same political parties although there are some exceptions such as in Denmark where some parties
proposed European policies and only competed in European elections. The concerns, which are appropriate to national elections, will affect behaviour in European elections – incumbent national government parties usually suffer losses due to public disapproval of government performance – and they are generally seen by the electorate as a means to give an electoral warning to the main parties (Reif, 1985; Van Der Eijk and Franklin, 1996).

This may partly explain why small parties often do better in European elections than in national elections. It is thus interesting to note that in the European elections of 1989, 1994, 1999 and 2004, in France, more radical parties in the political periphery have done well: Front National in 1989, 1994 and 2004, Philippe De Villiers’s Mouvement Pour La France in 1994, 1999 (the latter election was fought along side Charles Pasqua) and 2004 often campaigning on national issues (Ysmal and Cayrol, 1996; Benoit, 1997; Grundberg et al., 2000; Mellows-Facer et al., 2004). The electoral system in place – proportional representation system – favours the representation of small parties as the voter is liberated from strategic constraints – the so called useful vote – and the influence of local leaders. It is thus revealing that in the 1989 European elections more people voted for the Front National than if it was a general national election (Ysmal and Cayrol, 1996). In the context of the United Kingdom, the Greens did well in 1989 and the UK Independence Party in 1999 and 2004 but it is the main opposition party to the government of the day which have done especially well – Labour in 1989 and 1994, Conservatives in 1999 and to a lesser extent 2004 (Butler and Westlake, 2000; Mellows-Facer et al., 2004). European Parliament elections serve as a marker and can even change the dynamics of future national elections: thus if European Parliament elections are before and close to national elections and if governing parties attract fewer votes than expected in European Parliament elections, governing parties will also attract less votes at subsequent national elections (Gabel, 2000).

In most countries European elections are not fought on European issues because most mainstream parties within EU member states agree that European unification is beneficial to their country and therefore wish to de-politicize the European issue. This attitude is also motivated by the fear of the parties’ leadership to expose the divisions within the related parties. It is thus symptomatic that the single currency
was little or not at all discussed in the political campaigns pertaining to the 1994 European elections, this despite the fact that it was often one of the first opportunities post Maastricht Treaty for the electorate to give an opinion on this issue of significant importance for the member states (Van Der Eijk and Franklin, 1996). In the case of the United Kingdom, uncharacteristically European issues played a role in the 1989 European elections. This was so because the European issue – more specifically the Social Charter – identified with an existing traditional national issue of division between the Labour Party and the Conservative Party, that is to say the role of government in guaranteeing social conditions for all. It is also an issue, which was perceived by the electorate as having a direct influence on their life. It must be noted that economic concerns of people, lack of popularity of the incumbent government, the politicised division of the Conservatives on the Social Charter and concern for the environment also played a role in the related elections (Franklin and Curtice, 1996).

Another political determinant of integration support is the degree of domestic opposition and support for democratic capitalism. Gabel (1998) used the variables pro-stability and threat to stability to test this at the aggregate level. He found that there were no significant differences in integration support between supporters and opponents of democratic capitalism when the threat to democratic capitalism is zero. However among the supporters of democratic capitalism, the level of utilitarian support for integration is positively related to the level of public threat to democratic capitalism in their nation at that time if these parties that oppose democratic capitalism represent a minority of the electorate.

Ray (2003a) found that the relationship between incumbent support and pro-European Union attitudes is a conditional one, which appears primarily when referendums are held on European topics or during European Parliament election years. At other times, there is a weak positive relationship between incumbent support and support for the current European Union – perhaps because the current

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16 The pro-stability variable was operationalized as a dummy variable: 0 for opponents and 1 for supporters of democratic capitalism based on the following Eurobarometer question: “who would you vote for if there was a general election tomorrow?”.

17 The threat to stability variable was operationalized in the same way as the pro-stability variable (for each point, 0 or 1) multiplied by the percentage vote won at the last two elections.

18 The country’s EU membership evaluation question was used here as the dependent variable.
EU empowers political parties and preserves the political and economic status quo (Gabel, 1998a) –, and a significant negative relationship between incumbent support and support for further integration of the EU.¹⁹

These findings highlight the importance of national parties in the mental calculus of voters and for the latter a relatively sophisticated understanding of the political consequences of the institutions of the European Union. Thus for referendums on the European Union, some supporters of incumbent government wish to avoid embarrassing political party (ies) but for questions of further integration, they appear reluctant to risk weakening the national executive through political reform. Ray (2000) had previously established for EU-level policy-making, that individuals who enjoy advantageous national policy outcomes, tend to oppose European-level policy in those areas of greatest interest to them. Along the same line, Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) found that the more influence individuals feel they have over their national governments, the slower their desired pace of integration. This can be especially important from the point of view of France and the United Kingdom with both different objective and subjective – latter tantamount to voters’ opinions on these – economic, social and political results.

However Ray’s (2003a) results ascertained, as Dutch and Taylor (1997) did, that factors such as party positions on European integration and ideology are more important than incumbent support. Only when support and opposition to Europe are quite evenly balanced, can incumbent government support make a meaningful difference. In an analysis of expert party positions and public opinion on European integration – based on year 1984, 1988, 1992 and 1996 –, Ray (2003b) found that political parties do influence their partisan on the issue of European integration but that this effect is conditional and independent of European elections and referendums. The influence of a political party on their electorate on the issue of European integration is a function of the issue saliency to the party, internal party unity on the related issue, the level of disagreement among political parties on the related issue, individual’s party attachment and interest in political matters. It must be noted that coinciding with party splits arising from the acrimonious Maastricht

¹⁹ The unification question and desired speed of unification question were used here as dependent variables.
Treaty debate, the effect of party unity on the electorate was not significant any longer in 1992 and gave way to the EU issue saliency. A key weakness of Ray’s (2003b) research is though that current EU membership and further integration have not been dissociated and treated separately in the analysis.

2.4.2 Socialisation Process and Nested Identities

The socialisation process and nested identities of member states can contribute to explain citizens’ support for European integration. Thus the length of membership of a country in the European Union (EU), through the socialization process, is one of the most powerful determinants of general integration support, both at the individual level and the level of countries (Anderson & Kaltenthaler, 1996; Anderson & Reichert, 1996). The timing of EU entry and length of membership – the latter echoing Inglehart’s and others’ study – explain variation in national public support for European integration. Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996) found that the timing of entry was the most important predictor of support for integration before unemployment and length of membership respectively. This seems to indicate that the circumstances of membership (operationalized as the level of support for EU integration when entered in the EU) and length of membership (with the exception of unemployment for the latter) are more powerful predictors of support for the EU than economic conditions. However the authors indicate that there is a levelling off of support in the EU for the older EU members which may make the effects of domestic economic conditions more important in the future (post 1993) to explain support for EU integration. Furthermore differentiation by dimensions of integration can also be important: thus the focus on EU economic and military cooperation was viewed positively by German public opinion but negatively for European political union, that is to say the establishment of an EU government (Rattinger, 1994).

The degree of identification with Europe must be differentiated from the study of support for European integration although these two issues are related. It is thus logically and empirically possible to identify strongly with Europe but not see a need for the development of a supranational political structure. A contrario it is also possible to strongly support European integration without strongly identifying with
Europe. The identification with Europe may also obviously lead to support for European integration, this is tantamount to the affective dimension to European integration. In a case study of Spain, Medrano and Gutierrez (2001) found that in line with Turner’s and Tajfel’s social identity theory (Turner, 1975; Tajfel, 1981, 1982; Turner, Sachdev and Hogg, 1983) and Lawler’s identity preference theory (1992), the more positive the images of Europe are, the greater the degree of identification with Europe. They also demonstrated that confirming Calhoun’s and Brewer’s nested identities theory,²⁰ regional and national identities are compatible with a European identity in Spain when they are not portrayed and seen as threatening each other.

In line with Angelucci (1993), Vetik (2003) and Kritzinger (2003) who pointed out that attitudes towards the EU are developed in the national economic, political, historical and cultural context, the role of positive group images in fostering identification with groups, that is to say Europe, and compatibility of nested identities depends on them not being portrayed as threatening each other, the national context in which these identities are constructed is crucial. The national media, and the political and economic circles may play a crucial role here. In Medrano’s and Gutierrez’s (2001) research, it was shown how historically up until today the European Union has been portrayed in the national context as a political, economic, social and cultural model to break away from the Franco dictatorship. It must be noted that confirming Janssen’s (1991) study, the related researchers also found a positive relationship between education, cognitive mobilization and European identity.

National Identity and European Integration

The premise of social identity theory is that “who one is” depends on which groups one identifies with. This brings about a group loyalty which can be extremely powerful in shaping views towards political objects (Massey, 2002; Sears, 1993 and Sniderman et al., 2004). The strongest territorial identities are national and such identities can constrain preferences towards European integration. National identity

²⁰ Calhoun’s and Brewer’s nested identities theory relates to the individual’s need for differentiation and inclusion/equivalence.
can be defined as “the intensity and the type of the relationship towards the nation” (Blank et al., 2001:7). Further insight into the concept of national identity is brought by Tsygankov (2001:15) who defines national identity as “a cultural norm that reflects emotional or affective orientations of individuals toward their nation and national political system”.

National identity relates therefore to an individual’s intensity of positive attachments to her/his nation. The stronger the bond that an individual feels towards the nation, the less likely that individual will approve of measures that decrease national influence over economics and politics. The growth in the scope of the European Union in the realm of economics, politics and culture, which have previously been under the sole control of the nation-state, impinges on this view of the nation. The concept of national sovereignty is here predominant, and more particularly the loss of sovereignty brought about developments towards a single currency and the establishment of a European Central Bank and the European Court of Justice, a common foreign and defence policy, as well as the harmonisation of certain policy areas such as sales taxes but also the increased primacy of European law. As discussed in chapter four, the political discourse of party factions and political parties in France and the United Kingdom focuses partly its opposition to European integration on grounds of threats to national identity and sovereignty.

21 The greater integration of the European security and defence policy during the period from 1998 to today – with the development of common political, military institutional and operational capabilities, including the concept of European military assistance and solidarity clause in case of armed conflicts, terrorist attacks or natural or man-made disaster enshrined in the project of European constitution – but also the emergence of important international foreign and security issues from 1999 (more strongly from September 2001) – such as the Kosovo war in 1999, terrorist attacks of September 2001 (in the USA), March 2004 (in Madrid) and July 2005 and 2007 (in the United Kingdom), and the Iraq War (from 2003) – are likely to have increased the salience of foreign, security and defence policy issues for national publics. This may make the further development and realization of a European foreign, security and defence policy more difficult today – especially for particular policy decisions, for example, involving the deployment of military troops – as national publics will increasingly act as a constraint on the development and realization of the related policy. The fact that decision-making in the field of foreign, defence and security policy is subject to unanimity rule in the EU, may well reinforce this constraint as national publics are provided with ample channels of influence to constrain European integration in this field via their respective national governments (Oppermann and Hoese, 2007). However, a key weakness in Oppermann and Hoese’s (2007) analysis is that the latter is rather descriptive and solely conceptual.

22 More specifically factions within RPR/UMP or even PS and political parties in the political periphery such as MPF, FN, RPF, MDC, PC in France, and factions within the Labour Party and the Conservative Party (from 1997, the leadership of the Conservative Party adopted though a more eurosceptic stance) and political parties in the political periphery such as the United Kingdom’s Independence Party in the United Kingdom.
In much of the literature, national traditions have been used to explain different levels of EU support between member nations (for example Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Deflem and Pampel, 1996) but the inclusion of measures of national identity in statistical analyses to explain EU support is more rare: Kaltenthaler and Anderson (2001) – the latter in the context of support for the common currency – McLaren (2002, 2007a, 2007b), Carey (2002), Luedtke (2005), Llamazares and Gramacho (2007),23 De Vreese and Boomgarden (2005), Christin and Trechsel (2002), Marks and Hooghe (2003), De Vries and Van Kersbergen (2007), Hooghe and Marks (2005) and Kostakopoulou (2001). While De Vreese and Boomgarden’s (2005), Luedtke’s (2005), Kessler and Freeman’s (2005), Lahav’s (2004) and McLaren’s (2002, 2007a24) studies have demonstrated the link between anti-immigration sentiments, general hostility towards other cultures and reluctance about European integration, the relationship between importance of national identity and reluctance about European integration was shown by Kaltenthaler and Anderson’s (2001), Carey’s (2002), Christin and Trechsel’s (2002), Luedtke’s (2005), Marks and Hooghe’s (2003), De Vries and Van Kersbergen’s (2007), McLaren’s (2007b), Kostakopoulou’s (2001) and Hooghe and Marks’ (2005) studies. De Vries and Van Kersbergen (2007)25 even found that exclusive national identity and the vote share of eurosceptic rightwing extremist parties interacted and decreased EU support. Hence, the electoral strength of these parties was found to mobilize citizens’ feelings of exclusive national identity against the EU and the integration process. Along the same line, they uncovered that both citizens’ feelings of economic anxiety and of exclusive national identity decrease EU support. 

23 Llamazares and Gramacho (2007) unearthed a relationship between citizens’ views of the EU – not EU support itself – and exclusive national identity in Greece, Portugal and Spain. More specifically, they found that eurosceptic views are conditioned by fears that the EU threatens national cultures. This result is remarkable considering that there are no strong partisan divisions regarding European integration, and that no radical right has attained electoral success in Southern Europe.

24 McLaren’s (2007a) research relates to EU enlargement. She has found that public opinion’s opposition to Turkish membership of the EU is based on the perceived threat of Turkey to national economic and social resources but also to national culture and way of life (of EU countries). Mass migration from Turkey to some of the EU member states was found to amplify these perceived threats.

25 De Vries and Van Kersbergen’s (2007) analysis was though only carried out using Eurobarometer data from one year, namely 2003.
National identity with its corollary of economic and political values plays an important role in citizens’ attitudes to EU accession and integration in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. Vetik et al. (2006) and Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2006) have found that Central and Eastern European citizens are much more likely to make judgments about European integration based on their underlying political and economic values than on expected material payoffs. Instrumental explanations of EU support are thus preceded by value-based explanations there. Citizens’ economic and political values in central and Eastern Europe, unlike in the West, are often incompatible with markets and to some degree with liberal democratic values pursued by the EU. In this perspective, citizens in post-Communist societies continue to endorse economically socialist ideals (Fuchs and Roller, 1998; Miller et al., 1995). These values nourish euroscepticism in the related nations. The EU for some Central and Eastern European citizens is considered as a Western hegemonic aggression against their values and therefore a threat to the national identity of their country. This feeling of aggression is facilitated by the facts that CEE member states are economically, socially and politically weaker than older EU member states, and that the EU joining terms for CEE nations have been dictated by the EU (Watson, 2004; Ellman, 1997). As a result of this, the identity balance between oneself (CEE nations) and the other (the EU) is clearly tilted towards the identification need with the other (the EU) and totally away from the differentiation need from the other. This identity imbalance triggers a reactive identity to reinforce the collective worth of oneself (CEE nations) against the other (the EU), taking the form of euroscepticism (Vetik et al., 2006). If France and the United Kingdom are not in the same economic, political and social situation as CEE nations, the question of the type of EU model pursued and its compatibility with French and British individuals’ underlying socio-economic preferences arises. The relationship of the type of EU model pursued with instrumental explanations of EU attitudes also deserves examination.
2.4.3 EU Support and the Utilitarian Perspective

2.4.3.1 Post-materialism Surpassed

Citizens’ priorities are of two types: concerns about economic and physical security (materialist values) and concerns about human rights, the environment and quality of life issues (post-materialist values). Economic prosperity and peace, after the Second World War, have superseded class-based materialist values with post-materialist values such as environmentalism, women’s and minorities’ rights, democratic participation and nuclear disarmament (Inglehart, 1977a). Because younger age cohorts – also better educated and more highly paid individuals – are more post-material, Inglehart (1970b and 1977b) proposed that support for European integration should be higher in younger groups. However most recent studies (Janssen, 1991; Andersson & Reichert, 1996; Gabel, 1998a) have reported that age has no effect and post-materialistic values no or little effect on evaluations of EU membership. Thus, Anderson and Reichert (1996) found that materialists in later member states for the years 1982, 1986 and 1990 were more supportive of European integration while for the years 1982 and 1990 post-materialists in the original six member states were supportive of European integration.

Gabel (1998a) – using the Eurobarometer question: what should be the nation’s goal? Maintaining order; fighting rising prices; protecting freedom of speech; giving people more say in government decisions – discovered that materialists are more supportive of integration than post-materialists. As Anderson and Reichert (1996) implied, changes in national and international political and economic environment and changes in EU integration stance across time may influence the importance (or non-importance) and significance of these factors and others as predictors of citizens’ support for EU integration. For the terminology, it must be noted that the terms “Post-materialist values” would be referred to today as sustainability values.

The approval of materialism as an element of support for European integration orientated the researchers to explore the utilitarian perspective of support for the integration process. It therefore implied that the explanations pertaining to the utilitarian perspective posited that citizens’ attitudes towards integration are not stable. Dalton & Eichenberg (1991) posited that citizens’ support for integration
reflected evaluation of his or her personal and national economic situation. However both Inglehart and Dalton & Eichenberg’s theories have not fared particularly well under empirical scrutiny (Anderson & Reichert, 1996; Inglehart et al., 1991; Janssen, 1991). Much of the evidence is methodologically suspect, questions for example were not checked for validity and the associations also rarely controlled confounding factors.

Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) found that inflation was the most important predictor of support for European integration followed by intra-EC export trade. The direction of the coefficients for these variables denoted that the higher the inflation rate is, the lower support for European integration there is and that the higher a country’s exports to other EU countries – in percentage of total export – are, the more support for European integration there is. Unemployment and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) index were not statistically significant although they were in the predicted direction. But the authors claimed that in the aftermath of Maastricht, the debate about the community’s role in promoting national growth, increasing awareness of the economic importance of the EC may encourage citizens to place greater weight on the community’s growth and employment performance. In a more recent cross-national aggregate study covering the period from 1973 to 2004, Eichenberg and Dalton (2007) found nevertheless that the effect of inflation and intra-EC export trade on EU membership support was no longer statistically significant in the post-Maastricht period (1992-2004). Eichenberg and Dalton (2007) connected this result with the lack of cross-national aggregate citizens’ support for the EU integration of education, cultural, currency management and health and social policies. They thus argued that this was a sign that in evaluating EU membership, citizens were not only concerned about the evaluation of their country’s national economic performance but also by distribution matters, and more especially by the effect of EMU and the Euro – with its budgetary implications – on the welfare state.

26 The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP); VAT financing of revenues and European Monetary System (EMS) have an impact on prices. 27 Unemployment and GDP index were also found not statistically significant in the related period. 28 And even decline during the period of most drastic decline in support for EU integration generally (1991-1994). 29 One of the key weaknesses of the cross-national aggregate analysis of Eichenberg and Dalton (2007) is that they only considered a limited number of independent variables – not always
Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996) in their study of public opinion from 1973 to 1993, found that unemployment and inflation respectively were the two most important economic factors before GDP growth. Gabel’s work (1998) contradicted these results, finding an inverse relationship. Dutch and Taylor’s (1997) results based on a national aggregate level study from 1973 to 1989, contradicted these results. They found that when the relationship between national economic conditions and EU support was controlled with the elite-driven diffusion effect\(^{30}\) – using in the process a lagged EU support variable – there was very little evidence to suggest that macro-economic fluctuations affect support for the European Union. Lagged EU support variable was found to be statistically significant but Log GDP per capita,\(^{31}\) incumbent government support, UK incumbent government support, unemployment and inflation were not found to be statistically significant. Dutch and Taylor (1997) argued that it was because the EU was not involved in shaping monetary and fiscal policies at the time of the study and conceded that if the researchers focused on subjective measures of economic performance, the results may be different.

For the purpose of the present study, it is propitious to examine first whether EU support itself in France and the United Kingdom has increased or not throughout the nineties – if it is so, a lagged EU support variable should be used – and second to test whether there is a relationship between EU support and macro-economic performance, controlling for incumbent government support. This control is probably less necessary in the period studied – that is to say the nineties – insofar as the EU has a greater influence on the economic policies followed by national states, following the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty. However the national states retain a role in the economic policies followed, both through the EU influence they can exert via the European council and through their own national policies. Citizens

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\(^{30}\) National elites became increasingly pro-European in the 1980s, which affected the electorates’ view on EU integration.

\(^{31}\) Parametric statistics require normally distributed variables. As the variable GDP per capita was not normally distributed, it was transformed into the logarithm (Log) of GDP per capita to satisfy this requirement.
may be conscious of this as economic decisions tend to be well publicized in the media. It is also possible that because the issue of integration may be too abstract and difficult to understand, citizens use national proxies.

Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) also showed that the insularity of the UK decreased the level of support for the EU compared to other countries like the Netherlands or even France in the 1980s which became more pro-European than earlier, that is to say than in the 1960s. It must be noted that according to them, European Parliament elections – especially the first one in 1979 – and referendum years coincided with stronger support, explained partly by the fact that the media talked more about European integration. Furthermore they reported that net return from the EC budget had no impact on public opinion, except for the United Kingdom. It must be though noted that Anderson and Reichert (1996) found that for both the original six member states and later member states, net EC budget return was a significant positive predictor of EU support.

2.4.3.2 Utilitarianism at the Fore

Gabel (1998a) demonstrated that public support for integration is linked to a utilitarian perspective – although a minority affective perspective is also recognized – based on the economic and political consequences of integration and individual gains drawn from it. Gabel (1998a) terms this the policy appraisal model. In contrast with Eichenberg and Dalton (1993), Gabel (1998a) contends that citizens evaluate EU membership according to its commercial benefit regardless of general economic conditions. Nevertheless, he has also shown that citizens’ appraisal of the general actual national economic situation can also play a role in the evaluation of integration itself, this will be discussed below. Gabel made three assumptions:

1/ The structure of public attitudes towards integration
Gabel contends that EU citizens structure their attitudes towards integration according to the Eastonian model of public support for governing institutions (Easton, 1975, 1965): that is to say affective allegiances to institutions and utilitarian appraisals of institutional outputs and performance.

32 Years measured were 1982, 1986 and 1990, without supplying details for each individual country.
2/ Citizens in utilitarian appraisals are self-interested. International political
economies shape domestic politics which impact on people’s interests (Eichengreen

3/ EU citizens form these utilitarian appraisals without a sophisticated understanding
of the economics and politics of integration. EU citizens are thus generally
uninformed and unconcerned about EU integration and EU politics but citizens use
cheap information, in their social and political environment, information stemming
from informed elite, interest groups, associates and the media.

Gabel’s analyses support two important conclusions:

Firstly, few EU citizens – that is to say 15 to 20% – demonstrate strong affective
allegiances to the EU but affective support is generally stable over time. According
to Easton (1975), affective support derives from socialization and from accumulated
positive utilitarian appraisals of governance. He (1975:445) also conceded “If
discontent with performance continues over a long enough time, it may gradually
erode even the strongest underlying bond of attachment”.

Secondly, due to low levels of affective allegiances, utilitarian evaluations should be
an important determinant of most citizens’ level of support for European integration.
Depending on their socio-economic situation – including education, income,
occupational skills and proximity to intra-EU borders – citizens differ in their ability
to benefit from the primary consequences of integrative policy. The market
liberalization pertaining to the EU integration offers more opportunities for people
with human and financial capital. It must be noted that Gabel (1998a) also tested the
intra-professional differences and found that the lower the relative wages for
unskilled workers were between countries, the more the utilitarian support is high.
The rationale here is that with the EU, there are more opportunities of movement
and more to gain from integration. He also found that the higher the skills of
professionals and executives are, the more support for integration there is. The
rationale for this is that with higher skills come greater productivity and in turn
greater opportunities with integration. Utilitarian evaluations are increasingly
related to support for integration as affective supranational allegiances weaken. It
must be noted that sectoral interests can also play a role. Thus, in the context of the 2000 Danish referendum on EMU and the Euro, it was found that public sector employees tended to vote against the adoption of the Euro compared to private sector employees as they perceived that EMU through the Stability Pact and policies of tight monitoring and control of public deficits would threaten their jobs. It was also found that while the worker and white-collar vote – the latter tending to vote in favour of EMU and the Euro – is significant on its own (Jacobsen et al., 2001), if the private and public sector employment is included, it cancelled out the effect of worker and white-collar vote (Buch and Hansen, 2002). Hooghe et al. (2007) echoed Gabel’s results and found that occupation shapes attitudes on EU membership – individuals with human capital being more supportive of EU membership. However, they found that this effect is only direct to some degree as the effect of occupation on EU support is mediated by income, attitudes towards economic protectionism, attitudes towards immigrants and national pride. Hooghe et al. (2007) also uncovered that the effect of occupation (and identity) on EU support varies across countries. Political framing by political parties influences the related effect. This effect is thus found greater when political entrepreneurs succeed in connecting feelings of economic and cultural threat with latent unease about European integration. Hooghe et al. (2007) report that referenda may provide opportunities for such entrepreneurship.

In his research, Gabel (1998a) used confirmatory factor analysis and linear regression models with Eurobarometer survey data. Survey questions identified as utilitarian questions incorporated evaluation of EU membership & national EU benefit, and for the affective survey questions, European identity, EU solidarity and European unification – although the latter was also found to subsume a utilitarian component. He also examined if utilitarian and affective attitudes correlate with specific integrative measures such as single European currency and common defence. In his research on France and Germany, Schild (2001) echoed Gabel’s findings when he uncovered a positive correlation between the sense of European identity and one’s evaluation of the country’s EC membership. This is in contrast with national identity, which tends to be more affective-based.

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33 Hooghe et al. (2007) used 2003 International Social Science Survey data and structural equation modelling in the process.
Macro-economic models of expectations

As indicated earlier, it must be noted that there are also macro-economic models of expectations which hypothesize that support for EU membership is influenced by the economic performance of member states, measured in terms of GDP growth, unemployment and inflation, although empirical evidence to date has not consistently supported such models (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993, 2007; Anderson and Kaltenthaler, 1996). Support for EU integration has been found to co-vary with the level of trade with other EU countries, as well as net national returns from the EU budget and CAP subsidies for farmers (Anderson and Reichert, 1996) but Eichenberg & Dalton (1993) found that the net return from the EU budget had no impact on public opinion support except for the United Kingdom. This latter study is important in the sense that contrary to Gabel’s study (1998a, b) who focused solely on the effects of market liberalization – that is to say individual competitiveness – the redistributive, protectionist, and socio-democratic commitments of the EU – for instance structural funds – can play a part in the support of opinion for EU integration. Thus in the context of Ehin’s (2001) empirical study of public support in Central and Eastern European countries to join the EU, it was found that poor people and unemployed people supported EU membership.

Hence Dutch and Taylor (1997) in their aggregate-level research based on Eurobarometer data from 1973 to 1989, found that at the regional level of a country, regions with a higher average education and higher regional GDP per capita offered a higher EU support. They even demonstrated that taking into account the elite-driven diffusion effect through a lagged EU support variable, regions with a higher average education, a lower regional unemployment rate and a higher national unemployment rate were more supportive of EU membership whereas to a lower extent than without the elite-driven diffusion effect. As a result the theory of comparative advantage seems to justify EU support but decline with the elite driven diffusion effect witnessed in the 1980s. Furthermore they found that targeted

34 The Lagged EU support variable was found to be statistically significant as well, and have the largest unique effect on EU support.
spending – that is to say EU’s regional development funds – did not bring more EU support. In fact the regions receiving these funds were less supportive of European integration. Nevertheless, in the context of Northern Ireland, McGowan and O’Connor (2004) found that the receipt of European structural funds contributed to a more positive public view of the EU in this region than in the United Kingdom as a whole. McGowan and O’Connor (2004) conceded that the bordering and historic links of Northern Ireland with one of the strongest supporters of European integration, namely the Republic of Ireland, also played a key part in the more positive attitudes of Northern Irish citizens towards the EU.

Gabel (1998a) found that the economic reliance on economic interdependence explains EU support more now although in older member states, external and internal political concerns still count but less so with time passing by. He found that controlling for length of membership and macro-eco aggregates – such as real GDP, inflation, unemployment – does not modify the results and still sees economic interdependence and World War II deaths per capita explaining support, although the effect of the latter on EU support declines with time. Gabel (1998a) showed that citizens’ appraisal of the general national and personal economic situation can also play a role in the evaluation of integration. Thus, consistent with Dalton and Eichenberg (1991), Carey (2002), Gabel and Whitten (1997), Llamazares and Gramacho (2007), McLaren (2007b), Hooghe and Marks (2005) and Vreese and Boomgarden (2005), it was found that positive perceptions of national and personal economic conditions increased the level of utilitarian support but that considering the objective national economic situation – measured by unemployment, inflation and GDP growth – poor macro-economic conditions lead to increased level of support for integration – this independent of length of EU membership of countries. The latter research outcomes contradicted the results elicited by Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) and Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996) who uncovered a positive relationship between good national economic conditions and level of support for integration. George (1985) offers a potential explanation for this finding: European integration is economically appealing because economic conditions are bad. 

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35 Economic reliance on economic interdependence was measured by EU trade balance and EU trade dependence indicators. External and internal political concerns were respectively gauged by World War II deaths per capita and strong political opposition to democratic capitalism.
European national leaders have found it increasingly difficult to control their economy in the context of the globalisation of market trends and have had to endure unacceptable levels of inflation, unemployment and growth. Closer economic integration with other EU nations is seen as a way of regaining some of this lost control over their economies and therefore the national elites influence mass opinion to support European integration under these conditions.

There is a paradox in the sense that citizens increase their level of support when they perceive that the economy has improved but decrease their support when economic conditions have actually improved. It is possible that citizens, in forming evaluations of the national economy, consistently misperceive economic conditions. Alternatively traditional measures of economic conditions, namely unemployment, inflation and GDP growth, may not capture aspects of the economy relevant to citizens’ evaluations of economic conditions. These results are comparable to the ones obtained by Sanchez-Cuenca (2000), that is to say the worse the opinion of national political institutions, the more need for Europe and therefore the more support for integration and vice-versa. These outcomes are perhaps especially relevant to the study of the United Kingdom and France as one country (the former) appears to be doing better economically speaking and is more eurosceptic than the other one (the latter).

2.4.3.3 Influence of the Nation-State on Individual Support for the European Union

Kritzinger (2003) demonstrated that the nation-state is a key actor in increasing or decreasing support for European integration. In other words, rejoining Gabel (1998a), Sanchez-Cuenca (2000), Van Kersbergen (2000), Anderson (1998), Janssen (1991), Hooghe and Marks (2005), Vreese and Boomgarden (2005) and Dalton and Eichenberg (1991), citizens’ perceptions of national economic and political factors influence the level of support for European integration. This implies that citizens do not assess the performance of European and national level separately but tend to use national proxies to express attitudes to the European Union. The evaluation of European institutions and the EU is thus endogenous or conditional upon the evaluation of the nation-state in terms of its economic and political performance because citizens lack an understanding of the European political system and
knowledge regarding the EU: the EU is seen as too distant, too complicated, too abstract to be understood independently. Attitudes towards the EU are developed in the national economic, political, historical and cultural context (Angelucci, 1993). This contrasts somewhat with Gabel (1998a), Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) and Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) who believe that citizens use information shortcuts to understand the EU and form independent views: EU events and policies determining and influencing citizens’ attitudes towards European integration.

According to Kritzinger (2003), the European integration support is therefore conditional on the economic and political performance of the nation-state but this process in the case of France and the United Kingdom, was found to have a negative relationship for political factors, that is to say that when citizens’ are unhappy with the political performance of the nation-state, they support European integration and vice-versa. The related process was found to show a positive relationship for economic factors, that is to say that when citizens perceive the national economy to be performing well, they will increase their support for European integration. It must be noted that for Germany and Italy, the processes for economic and political factors were found to exhibit a negative relationship, that is to say when citizens’ are unhappy with the economic and political performance of the nation-state, they support European integration.

The national environmental context contributes greatly to shaping public opinion’s stance towards European integration and the nature of European treaties plays a part in this. In other words, people’s EU opinions are likely to be shaped by the political and economic environment that significant EU treaties also help to create. Thus, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) was perceived as having greater impact on people’s lives and as eroding national sovereignty, and coincided with a period of economic and social difficulties which culminated in a decrease of aggregate EU support in the post Maastricht era (Ciftci, 2005; Eichenberg and Dalton, 2007). Brinegar and Jolly (2005) also argued that citizens’ attitudes towards European integration are influenced by their country’s configuration of political-economic institutions, factor endowment and other national contextual influences in a study based on 1996 Eurobarometer data. Citizens thus make socio-tropic evaluations of the EU by taking into account how the outcomes of choices made under their home
institutions will be affected by greater European integration. They thus found that the citizen’s skill level mainly affects support for European integration through the frame of national contextual factors, such as factor endowments and varieties of capitalism. Low-skilled workers in economies with an abundance of low-skilled labour (such as Belgium, Spain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and the United Kingdom) were found in the related study to welcome European integration, whereas low-skilled citizens in nations with a scarcity of low-skilled labour (such as Denmark, Germany, France, The Netherlands, Austria, Finland and Sweden) are likely to be more eurosceptical because protection benefits the owners of scarce factors of production. Low skill (high skill) endowment was defined there as whether the country’s percentage of the population completing secondary education is below the EU mean (above the EU mean). Albeit using different data and not all the same countries, Hooghe et al. (2007) also found support for the factor endowment theory, with individuals with higher levels of human capital in countries where skilled labour is abundant being found to be more supportive of EU membership.

Brinegar and Jolly (2005) uncovered that low skilled workers in residual welfare states (such as the United Kingdom), in conservative Christian welfare states (such as France although the latter has a more mixed political economy) and especially in social democratic welfare states (such as Sweden) tend to support European integration more than high skilled workers in the related welfare states. These results were justified by the following: residual welfare states’ high skilled workers are more eurosceptical because of a preference for lower taxes; high skilled workers in social democratic states are more eurosceptical because of a fear for their more generous welfare states which permit investment in specific skills and high economic openness; and high skilled workers in Christian welfare states fear that their investment in specific skills will be threatened by further European integration but this to a lower extent than the same individuals in social democratic welfare states as they represent the median welfare state in Europe. Furthermore, Brinegar and Jolly (2005) unearthed that the general effect of ideology is even more

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36 Hooghe et al. (2007) used 2003 International Social Science Survey data. Data from the following countries were used in the related analysis: Slovak Republic, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Portugal, Spain, France, Switzerland, Finland, Austria, Sweden and Norway.
dramatically conditioned by the national context than skill. Thus they discovered that support for European integration fell significantly as respondents’ ideology shifts to the right in residual welfare states and increases significantly as respondents’ ideology shifts to the right in social democratic welfare states. In conservative Christian welfare states, the decrease for EU support was found to be rather weak as respondents’ ideology shifts to the right. European integration was therefore considered as a perceived threat to the welfare state in existence for individuals with right ideological opinions in residual welfare states and those with left ideological views in social democratic welfare states.

Whilst studies such as Ciftci (2005) and Brinegar and Jolly (2005) attempt to account for the influence of national context on individual-level factors towards European integration attitudes and are valuable to identify common denominators of EU support across nations, they do not take into account sufficiently the cultural, historical, economic, social, societal and political specificities of each nation which can be however key to explain public opinion’s views about European integration. As a result, these inter-country approaches can only give a too broad, imperfect and sometimes inaccurate explanation of individual attitudes toward European integration. Thus, as discussed in chapter six, the results obtained by Brinegar and Jolly (2005) for skill level and factor endowment as for skill level and welfare state type are found to be contradicted by the present study in the context of the United Kingdom and France. Schmidt (2006) and Taggart (2006) – the latter in the context of the 2005 Dutch and French referendums on the European Constitutional Treaty – have moreover underlined that a full understanding of European politics required an understanding of all distinct, individual countries. The present study acknowledges this reality and pays tribute to it.

2.4.3.4 Political Basis of Support for European Integration

Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) proposes the theory that popular support for European integration is the consequence of the interplay between supranational and national politics. Thus by demonstrating that support for the EU is dependent on national

37 Support for the EU is measured here by the variable, desired speed of European integration.
economic corruption index and social expenditure – controlling for GDP per capita of country – and at the individual level, dependent on trust in national government and EU commission, on perceived people influence on decisions by national government and EU institutions, and finally on perceived EU membership benefit for country, he contends that the higher citizens’ opinion of the functioning of supranational institutions and the lower that of national institutions, the greater the support for integration. This is explained by the lower the opinion of the national political system, the lower the opportunity cost of transferring sovereignty to Europe. The study was done both at the aggregate and individual level. It must be noted that the measure of national economic corruption used is only economic and therefore does not include abuse of political influence – for instance misuse of or excessive centralization of power. His detailed conclusions are the following:

1/ Support for integration will be highest when the national variables are at their minimum values and European variables at their maximum values.

2/ Support will be second highest when the national and the European variables are at their maximum values.

3/ Support will be second lowest when the national and European variables are at their minimum values.

4/ Support will be lowest when the national variables are at their maximum levels and European variables at their minimum ones.

When the national EU membership benefit variable\(^{38}\) intervenes in the prediction, for each of the four cases, support for integration should be greater when the benefit variable takes its maximum value than when it takes its minimum one. This theory is especially interesting in the sense that France is a more corrupted country than the UK as per national economic corruption index, has higher means of desired rhythm of EU integration\(^{39}\) than the UK but higher social expenditure than the latter. This will necessitate testing. In addition other national and supranational trust and democratic indicators – such as for example national unemployment rate,

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\(^{38}\) Question: country benefited from EU membership?

\(^{39}\) This indicates that French citizens wish to see EU integration proceed faster than British citizens.
crime, tax rate and bureaucracy – could be added to the analysis. The related theory supports the view that European identity does not exist in itself and cannot be used to justify European integration at the individual level but rather lends support to the view that European identity seen as a collective will to integrate Europe is based on complex economic and political calculations. The creation of a demos – understood as a sense of being involved in a common project and forming part of a single community – is therefore endogenous to these calculations rather than exogenous to the EU institutions.

However Wood (2002) through Germany shows the gap between the German elite and the mass about the European integration process. If the SPD-Green coalition government advocated and organised the development of European citizen democracy through an extension of petition rights and referendum to different public fields, the right was however not extended to EU issues and thus no referendum was organised on the Euro or on the EU enlargement (a parallel can be drawn here with France). The German electorate’s opposition to enlargement parallels the decrease in support for the EU. There is thus an increasing disillusionment with politics and the workings of representative democracy on domestic issues and extended to EU issues. This situation may be mirrored in France.

2.4.3.5 Theory of Double Allegiance

The theory is based on a utilitarian or evaluative perspective of attachment to EU integration. European integration depends on a double allegiance, consisting of a primary allegiance to the nation state and its political allegiance based on Rokkan’s (1975) theory of state formation consisting of 4 phases:

- I/ Penetration or state formation – political, economic and cultural unification at the elite level;

- II/ Standardization or nation building – masses incorporated in the developing system (widespread feelings of identity with the political system);

- III/ Participation – increasing participation of people in the political system, extension of political rights;
 Redistribution – expansion of the state through extension of social rights. It relies on a trade-off between security (and prosperity) offered by the state – that is to say territorial, physical, psychological (sense of belonging), economic and social support – and support and allegiance of people. A secondary allegiance, derived allegiance to the EU, exists only to the extent that European integration helps enable nation states to provide the resources upon which primary allegiance hinges. EU integration cannot depend on European identity as in the national state case and thus cannot be paralleled with Rokkan’s theory of state formation as it is elite-driven.

Milward (1997:11) defines allegiance as “the range of all those elements which induce citizens to give their loyalty to institutions of governance, whether national, international or supranational”. Van Kersbergen (2000:5) reformulated it from the public’s point of view as “the willingness of a national public to approve of and support the decisions made by a government, in return for a more or less immediate reward or benefit to which the public is entitled on the basis of it having rendered approval and support”. Allegiance is superior to legitimacy as the latter is incapable of maintaining allegiance.

EU support has declined since 1991 because of worsening expectations about national economic and social security – the vote in European elections is moreover dominated by domestic issues as discussed above. Van Kersbergen (2000) notes that it may be difficult to preserve double allegiance via social policy as an instrument of statecraft, when the European welfare state regimes are increasingly embedded in the internal market and the two-tier system of European social policy-making. Three kinds of constraints are already restricting national social policy-making: 1/ obligations in international law to enable cross-border mobility of labour; 2/ growing interdependence with actors in other national systems; 3/ competition between national systems for mobile production factors (Streeck, 1996).

Streeck (1995, 1996) sees “neo-voluntarism” emerging as the central characteristics of the post-welfare state social policy regime in Europe. Neo-voluntarism can be tantamount to a lower grade of social policy to fit with market imperatives. Neo-voluntarism is a type of social policy that tries to do with a minimum of compulsory modification of both market outcomes and national policy choices, that is to say
minimal supranational regulation and re-regulation and high horizontal
interdependence. Streeck (1995:424) adds "neo-voluntarism allows countries to exit
from common standards if their polity or economy will not sustain them".
Moreover, further integration and in particular, monetary union through monetary
rigidity, stability pact and interdependence, can threaten national welfare states and
so, more especially the double allegiance.

2.4.3.6 Micro- and Macro-level Economic Expectations Model to Explain Support
for the Euro

Van Everdingen & Van Raaij (1998) explain support for the Euro in terms of the
expected macro-economic effects of the Euro on unemployment, inflation, and
economic growth, and in terms of the expected micro-level effects on individual
savings, job security and personal income. They find that attitudes towards the Euro
appear to be positively influenced by expectations of both macro- and micro-level
gains. In a 1994-1997 Eurobarometer aggregate level study of citizens’ attitudes
towards the common European currency policy, Kaltenthaler and Anderson (2001)
found that attitudes towards the single currency were driven by collectively based
considerations of the costs and benefits associated with it as well as the interaction
of European-level politics and the domestic politics of member states. For the
former, pre-EMU inflationist countries, countries with high pre-EMU
unemployment and high intra-EU trade,40 and for the latter, younger countries (in
terms of year of formation of nation state and national history) and older member
states of EU and EMS are found to be more supportive of EMU and the single
currency – political and socialization perspective. It must be noted that using the
other dependent variable – that is to say currency decided by the national
government or jointly within the European Union –, the independent variables have
the same effects – except the intra-EU trade variable which is no more significant –,
but are weaker than with the other dependent variable. The reason may be that
EMU and the single currency as a dependent variable is a more specific question
making respondents’ general predispositions more clearly split.

40 The effect for intra-EU trade on EMU and the single currency was found though to be modest.
The results elicited here are consistent with the ones of Gabel (1998a) and Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) and confirm that the decision to support the adoption of EMU and the single currency relies on a self-interested calculus focused on the well-being of the nation state. Thus, if the nation shows poor economic performance, the support for the EU and its policies is greater and vice-versa, this even when controlling for length of EU membership and age of nation state (which moreover also have their own unique effect). The latter two variables relate to the socialization process and nationalistic feelings.

2.4.3.7 Rational Choice Institutionalist Perspective

Hix (2007) has recently tried to sketch the basis of a rational choice institutionalist framework for understanding parties' citizens' and interest groups' attitudes towards the EU. He contends that actors' support for European integration is a function of expected policy outcomes: an actor will form an opinion about the EU on the basis of whether action at the EU level will produce policies that are closer to his or her preferred policies than existing policy outcomes at the domestic level. He adds that party leaders and interest groups are much better informed than citizens and therefore cue citizens about how EU actions relate to their own preferences. Hix (2007) advances six propositions which, he believes, are valid across countries:

1/ voters and parties on the extreme left and extreme right are more likely to be eurosceptic than are centrist voters and parties;

2/ citizens and interest groups who support governing parties are less likely to be eurosceptic;

3/ where a member state's domestic policy regime is to the left (right) of the European average, voters and parties on the left (right) are more likely than voters on the right (left) to be eurosceptic, and vice versa;

4/ voters and parties in domestic systems that have majoritarian systems of government are more likely to be eurosceptic than voters and parties in domestic systems with consensus systems of government;
voters and parties on the left were more eurosceptic in the 1970s, 1980s and 2000s, whereas voters and parties on the right were more eurosceptic in the 1990s;

voters, parties and interest groups in large member states have become more eurosceptic;

While Hix (2007) provides a utilitarian framework to attempt to explain actors’ views about European integration, his global approach has a number of weaknesses. Hix’s (2007) analysis is rather descriptive but he does acknowledge that his approach is too simple to explain all the relationships that shape actors’ views. His cross-national analysis does not take into account adequately the specificities of each national member state which may influence actors’ opinions on European integration. Some of his proposals travel badly across countries: the research results of the present thesis substantiate this. Proposition 2 is less true in the United Kingdom context as Labour and Conservative parties incorporate a substantial number of party supporters and interest groups which are eurosceptic. Proposition 3 works a little better for the United Kingdom than for France. Despite the fact that the latter’s domestic policy regime is to the left of the EU average, left voters and parties but also right voters and parties (in mainstream parties) in France tend to support the EU although they wish to see a greater place for social policies and regulated capitalism at the European level. In turn, despite the fact that the United Kingdom’s domestic policy regime is to the right of the EU average, right voters and parties but also centre and to a lesser extent left voters and parties (in mainstream parties) in the United Kingdom tend to be more reserved towards European integration. Proposition 4 is less applicable to France. French voters and parties are thus not more eurosceptic than voters and parties in countries such as Austria, Finland or Germany which have domestic systems with consensus systems of government. In addition, although both France and the United Kingdom have domestic majoritarian systems of government, French voters and parties (in mainstream politics) are significantly more pro-European integration than British ones. Proposition 5 does not quite square with France and the United Kingdom as not only British right voters and parties but also British centre and even to a lesser extent left mainstream parties and voters have grown more eurosceptic through the 1990s and early twenty-first century. French right mainstream party leadership
tended to be in favour of European integration and has grown even more so in the second part of the 1990s and early twenty-first century. French Left mainstream party leadership, whilst being pro-integration, wish to see the EU adopt a more regulated capitalism as centre and right mainstream parties do. Furthermore in the 1990s and early twenty-first century, French mainstream left and right (as centre) voters are not so much against European integration but in favour of an integrated EU along the line of regulated capitalism.

Another limitation of Hix’s (2007) perspective is that it tends to be too party-centric and under-estimate voters’ own opinions on European integration. Hix (2007) thus over-emphasizes the influence of political parties on voters. The growing visibility and impact of the EU on citizens from the 1990s have increasingly enabled citizens to be less dependent on party cues and see for themselves the policy consequences of European integration. A further flaw of Hix’s (2007) framework is that it over-focuses on utilitarian explanations of parties and voters’ attitudes to the Europe issue and leaves other contributory factors aside.

2.5 Dimensionality of the EU Political Space

Comparativists explore European integration as an extension of domestic policies. They take domestic politics as their point of departure and inquire into how domestic politics influences, and is influenced by European integration. The application of comparative models to European integration has thus directed interest towards how existing patterns of domestic contestation structure orientations on European integration. An important building block is Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) argument that political actors have an incentive to interpret new issues in light of existing cleavages such as the Left/Right ideological dimension. The rationale behind this is that it is costly for political parties to abandon existing cleavage structures as parties attract ideologically motivated activists, they build strong institutional ties to particular constituencies and develop reputations for particular programmes and policies (Marks and Wilson, 2000; Scott, 2001). It is also easier to achieve a stable political equilibrium in a political space that is dominated by a single dimension due to the median voter theorem than in multidimensional political
spaces (Hinig and Munger, 1997). Decision-makers tend to interpret new information in light of what they already know, implying a tendency to accommodate new issues to old cleavages (Steenbergen and Lodge, 1998). In this section, the dimensionality of the EU political space is analysed from the position of a variety of actors to assess whether the dimensionality of EU political space is actor-specific or not and therefore establish the nature of contestation in the EU and a fortiori in France and the United Kingdom.

2.5.1 Dimensions that Structure Citizens’ EU Policy Preferences

2.5.1.1 Hooghe-Marks Model

Using confirmatory factor analysis of Eurobarometer survey data, Gabel and Anderson (2002) found that citizens structure their EU policy preferences according to the Hooghe-Marks model. The Left/Right dimension in the economic – laissez faire-intervention – and social – Libertarian-Authoritarian – sphere and the national sovereignty/integration dimension are related to each other. Thus Left positions on the socio-economic dimension are related to supranational positions on the sovereignty dimension to form a policy characterized by regulated capitalism. By extension, right positions on the socio-economic dimension are related to national independence positions on the sovereignty dimension to form a policy characterized by neo-liberalism (Hooghe and Marks, 1999). Although this was not tested across time and perhaps there are differences for each member state, it appears propitious to test it in the context of France and the United Kingdom as successive governments in France for the last twenty five years have intervened more in the economy and regulated more social aspects (for instance labour markets) and also especially in the 1990s have been more in favour of European integration. This contrasts with the successive governments in the United Kingdom, which from the Thatcher years to the twenty-first century, have been more inclined to liberalize the economy and de facto deregulate markets, reduce social rights to bring more flexibility to labour markets and show more reservation in the European integration process. In other words, the regime in France can be qualified as regulated capitalism and the one in the United Kingdom as neo-liberalism. Besides political
parties, social movements, interest groups and media can also play a role in influencing the electorate.

2.5.1.2 Theory of Political Order and Policies of the Member State and Perceptions of Political Order of the EU as Determinant of Attitudes to the EU

Some earlier studies have found that the impact of political values on EU attitudes is slight with notable cross-national differences (Anderson and Reichert, 1996; Gabel, 1998a; Steenbergen and Scott, 1998). In her study of 1994 Norwegian referendum results, using principal component analysis, Saglie (2000) proposed as determinants of the attitudes to the EU, the importance of the political order and policies of the member state and how the perceptions of the EU’s political order and policies compare with this. This could explain why political parties with similar ideologies have divergent opinions about the EU but more globally this could explain why people, across and within countries, have different attitudes towards the EU. Saglie (2000) advocates that cross-country research on attitudes to the EU should rely on voter perceptions, elite discourse and the policies and political orders of individual member states and the EU.

At the 1993 Norwegian national election, one year before the referendum, the EU issue was salient and became a domestic issue (Aardal and Valen, 1997) but not through the mechanisms described by Franklin, Marsh and Wlezien (1994:117) who claimed “In domains of low salience such as foreign policy, we might expect opinion to be coupled to those on domains of high salience, such as governments’ handling of the economy”. Norwegian accession was discussed as a domestic issue because the choice between membership and outsideship would affect several domestic policies. The popularity of parties did not lead to a “yes vote” at the referendum. In the context of the 1994 accession referendum in Norway, Saglie (2000) showed a polarisation of attitudes to the EU across political parties between the Yes and No camp with a standardization of arguments used within each camp (across parties). There was no confrontation between the left and the right but social

41 In the political order of his/her land, the citizen develops values and policy preferences, for instance social democracy which advocates equality, redistribution and government regulation of the market.
democratic arguments were more present in the referendum campaign. He also demonstrated that cross-pressured voters agree with some arguments used by their political party – as influenced by elite discourse of their party. It must be noted that the anti-EU stance in Norway is not limited to the political periphery but is the fact of well-established political parties from the political centre (Saglie, 2000). A parallel can be drawn with the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom.

In a study done at the aggregate level, Hooghe (2003) analysed variation in patterns of EU support across EU policies. Elites – both European and national elites – were found more enthusiastic about European integration than citizens. Nevertheless when particular policy areas – that is to say how authority should be distributed between the EU and national governments – were examined, the answer was less equivocal. Elites and public opinion were found to be similar in that they were not in favour of Europeanizing high spending policies such as health, education or social policy as this could destabilize vested interests and disrupt policy delivery – distributional logic. Yet Hooghe (2003) found that citizens contrary to elites wished to counterbalance the single market policies with its corollary of insecurity and uncertainty borne out of increased competition, with Europeanisation of employment policy, social policy, cohesion policy, environment and industrial policy. Elites were found not to agree with this and only wished to Europeanize policies along the line of a functional rationale – that is to say where positive externalities can arise out of it as for example currency, third world aid, immigration, environment and defence management. In the related study, it must be noted that the United Kingdom, contrary to other nations, was found to be the least favourable country to Europeanize the social model – the latter concerns social inclusion, employment, environment, research and regional policies. This result may be linked to the influence of policies of more neo-liberal nature that British citizens have been used to since the Thatcher era. The demand for social protection in other countries – and thus regulated capitalism – may come from particularly citizens who have skills that are specific to a particular firm, industry or occupation: with high asset specificity, individuals are more vulnerable to labour volatility arising of the single market (Iversen and Saskice, 2001). Two of the main research

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42 Those who have opinions on EU accession in disagreement with their political party.
limitations of Hooghe’s (2003) study are that datasets with different years were used in the analysis\textsuperscript{43} and that the model was not tested across time.

In a study from 1990 to 1994, Voessing (2005) analysed inter-nationality variation in patterns of citizens’ EU support across a composite index of eight EU policies ranging from currency to security and defence, including education, environment, press standards, health, science and foreign policy. Significant differences across national publics were found on the desired scope of EU activities as on ideological opinions. Preferences towards the desired scope of EU activities varied though more strongly across national publics than towards ideological views. This study also found a decline in the importance of nationality and the corresponding cross-national differences over time. Furthermore, while Great Britain was uncovered as on the right of the ideological spectrum and more opposed to supranational regulation, France was revealed as on the left of the ideological spectrum and more in favour of EU regulation.

2.5.1.3 Gender Gap Theory

Nelsen and Guth (2000) have found that a modest (statistically significant) gender gap exists in the EU as a whole, with women being less enthusiastic about the EU than men. The largest statistically significant gaps are found in Sweden, Norway, the United Kingdom and Ireland. Mean EU support of women in France is also smaller than men but it is not statistically significant. Using measures of political distance, women’s values, ideology, economic vulnerability and national tradition to explain male and female attitudes to the EU, women’s attitudes are more sensitive to knowledge about the EU\textsuperscript{44} and to economic pessimism – traditional role of women as care givers worried about market liberalisation – than men’s. Men’s attitudes are determined more by interest in politics – and thus more sceptical about the EU – traditionalist values, ideology and working class status. Welfare state benefits do not seem to push respondents in one direction or the other (not statistically significant).

\textsuperscript{43} 1996 for the national elite survey; 2001-2002 for the European elite survey and 2000 for the citizens’ survey (Eurobarometer).

\textsuperscript{44} They tend to have less knowledge about EU and domestic politics.
Nelsen and Guth (2000) also examined differences that emerge when respondents are grouped by welfare states. Langan and Ostner (1991), Leibfried (1993) and Duncan (1996) identified four welfare states, namely the Scandinavian model, the Latin Rim model, the Bismarckian model (France’s model) and the Anglo-Saxon model (the UK’s model). The Bismarckian model maintains the traditional roles of male worker and female care-giver through preference for money transfers over service provision and for families over individuals. The Anglo-Saxon model gives women the choice of staying home or competing on the same terms – but without the same resources – as men in the labour market.

A few interesting differences in welfare types and gender evaluations of the EU were uncovered. Thus, traditionalist values have a negative influence on EU support for men in the Bismarckian regimes and for both genders in the Anglo-Saxon regimes, where defending traditional family values is often tied to defending national autonomy. Family size – examining the number of children – has a positive influence for both genders in the Bismarckian countries but a negative influence among Anglo-Saxon males. The political distance theory – measured by interest in politics, interest in EU politics, knowledge of EU politics and TV news usage – holds for both the Anglo-Saxon and Bismarckian regimes. In both the Anglo-Saxon and Bismarckian countries, economic pessimism works in a negative direction for both genders but to a greater extent for men than for women. The conundrum, in the context of the United Kingdom, is to establish whether the social policy promoted by the EU is perceived by British citizens as giving them more economic security and translates itself into more support for the EU.

2.5.2 Dimensions that Structure Political Parties’ Positions

2.5.2.1 National Parties and EU Positions

According to Johansson and Raunio (2001), the following factors can influence national party positions on European integration:

- Basic ideology linked to economic policy. This has to do with the degree of interventionism wished in the economy. Hence, for example, Social Democrats who
were initially predominantly opposed to or lukewarm about European integration as they viewed it as neo-liberal, became increasingly pro-integrationist during the 1990s. Social Democrats supported the Economic and Monetary Union and favoured the strengthening of the EU’s social agenda. This reflected their shift towards the political centre – particularly in economic policy – and their gradual realization that Keynesian economic policies at the national level were not sufficient to combat the excesses of capitalism (Cafruny, 1997; Geyer, 1997; Johansson, 1999; Ladrech and Marliere, 1999).

- Public opinion. National parties are attentive to core party supporters and interest groups.

- Factionalism. Parties can be internally divided over European issues, both at the elite and rank and file levels. Such internal dissent can lead to factionalism or issue groups. Hine (1982:38-39) defines factions as “solidly organized, disciplined, self-aware groups, enjoying a relatively stable and cohesive personnel over time”. Issue groups instead seek to influence the way in which power is exercised (by others) on given questions. Perhaps in the context of European integration, the latter is more current.

- Leadership influence. The views of the party leader may have a strong influence on the official party line and party supporters. Research has indicated that the policies of the party leadership, for example on whether to join EMU, can wield considerable influence among the rank and file, persuading them to follow the elite opinion (Wessels, 1995). This is partly explained by the lack of knowledge of party supporters on EU matters, this enticing them to look for advice or cues from party leaders. In France, Mitterrand used his position to pursue his European goals (Guyomarch, 1995; Wood, 1997). In the United Kingdom, successive Labour leaders, Neil Kinnock, John Smith and Tony Blair were crucial in converting their party from open hostility to the community to “constructive engagement” (Daniels, 1998).

- Party competition. The main priority of national parties is domestic policies. Government parties are expected to be more pro-European. Anti-EU postures may
weaken the chance for political parties of gaining government office (Christensen, 1996, 1998).

- Trans-national links and membership of europarties discussed later in the literature review.

- The development of integration. Considering the increased importance of the European Union, parties can hardly afford to ignore the Union any more. Parties may re-evaluate their policy depending on whether they view the Union as an opportunity to achieve their objectives – as discussed above with the social democrats –. The integration is also shaped by events happening outside the union, which have an impact on the European policies of national parties. Thus, the dismantling of the Soviet Union and the increasing economic globalisation may have contributed to Finnish parties becoming warmer to joining the European Union.

In their analysis of Sweden and Finland from 1990 to 1999, relying on party documents, parliamentary votes, statements by leading party figures, public opinion surveys, direct observation and interviews, Johansson and Raunio (2001) found that the strongest explanatory factors of party responses to European integration were for Finland, party competition and leadership influence, and for Sweden, public opinion and factionalism. Furthermore, focusing on government-opposition dynamics, Raunio (2007) showed that in Nordic EU countries, euroscepticism has been kept out of the political party mainstream by institutional factors, such as the use of direct democracy (referendums), and the channelling of eurosceptical voting into European Parliament rather than national elections.

Using Eurobarometer and expert survey data from 1984 to 2002, Steenbergen et al. (2007) have found that party elites both respond to \textit{(bottom-up effect)} and shape \textit{(top-down effect)} the views of their supporters. These effects were found to work together strongly:

- when the EU issue is salient to the party;

\footnote{Especially in Sweden and Denmark.}
- when there is low intra-party dissent;

- when parties incorporate a large number of opinion leaders (operationalised by constituents who are interested in politics and with a power of persuasion);

- when inter-party dissent on the EU issue is high (albeit bottom-up effect is here stronger);

- in proportional representation political systems (albeit bottom-up effect is here stronger) and in non-election years.

Furthermore Steenbergen et al. (2007) uncovered that party supporters influenced their party elites:

- when the issue salience to the party is low;

- when there is high intra-party dissent;\(^{46}\)

- when the country has a EU referendum.

Finally Steenbergen et al. (2007) found that the mass-elite linkage has declined over time for mainstream parties and justified this by the fact that mainstream parties attract fewer opinion leaders. They contended that this problem could be sorted out if these parties had more able leaders or took clearer policy positions. However one can wonder whether this connection is not the result of the fact that citizens increasingly understand the consequences of European integration and develop independent views on it.

In line with Ray’s (2003b), Evans and Butt’s (2007) and Steenbergen et al.’s (2007) findings, Gabel and Scheve (2007) found that internally divided parties weaken the influence of the party cues on their supporters. Nevertheless, while Ray (2003b), Evans and Butt (2007) and Steenbergen et al. (2007) explained this effect by the fact that partisans more or less ignore noisy signals from their parties, Gabel and Scheve

\(^{46}\) This result was moreover echoed by Evans and Butt’s research (2007) who found that in the 1990s, intra-party division on the EU issue as the reversal of the position of the main political parties – Labour and the Conservative Party – on the related issue have contributed to an increasingly voter-driven process to EU attitudes.
(2007) contended that party supporters take their cue from those elites in the party who share their interests, values and political predispositions as suggested by Zaller’s (1992) account of elite influence on opinion formation. Gabel and Scheve (2007) unearthed that independent of inter-party variability on the EU issue, intra-party dissent increases variation in support for integration among party supporters. In other words, intra-party dissent drives substantial dispersion of opinion rather than congruence towards the party’s official position on European integration. This finding is especially important in the context of the current research: the growing internal party dissent in mainstream parties such as the Conservative Party up to 1997 and to a lesser extent in the Labour Party, RPR and PS cumulated with a greater inter-party variability on the EU issue (especially in the United Kingdom) may have contributed to a greater politicisation of the EU issue and the expression of eurosceptic views contaminating in turn public opinion.

Using an expert survey, Hooghe et al. (2002) found that Left-Right and new politics dimensions structure contestation on European integration among national political parties. Thus, as far as the Left-Right dimension is concerned, as political parties move away from the political centre, especially those on the extreme left and right, they tend to adopt eurosceptic positions. The rationale for this is twofold:

1. As Scott (2001:6) writes “within the constraints imposed upon them... each party attempts to strategically manipulate the European integration issue...to meet its goals”. Thus, parties that are unsuccessful in the existing structure of political contestation, that is to say parties with weak electoral support or those that are locked out of government, have an interest in restructuring contestation.

2. The second reason is ideological. The EU being primarily a market liberal project mitigated by some measures of regulated capitalism, extreme parties do not only contest EU policies but the EU construct itself. The radical left is eurosceptic, anti-system and perceive the EU as a capitalist bloc with capitalistic goals – market deepening. Even with a regulated capitalism, the EU will not provide the kind of policies radical leftists deem essential to curb market forces: that is to say public control over capital inflows, extensive public investment in industrial policy, a statutory right to work and a reduction of the working week.
Social democratic parties used to be more eurosceptic in the 1980s but have become more in favour of European integration in the 1990s as they perceive European integration as a means to advance social democratic goals in a liberalizing world economy (Hooghe and Marks, 1999; Katz and Wessels, 1999; Ladrech, 1997). Thus in 1984, the largest pool of euroscepticism – measured according to electoral strength – came from social democratic parties, the British Labour Party being among those. Nowadays, social democratic parties support European integration although there are factions within and outside these parties who are doubtful of European integration and of its hindrance of national sovereignty. There is thus a faction within the British Labour Party which is for instance against the adoption of the Euro. Along the same line, Jean-Pierre Chevenement broke away from the French Socialist Party because of inter alia his disagreement over European integration and the Euro and formed a new political party called Mouvement Des Citoyens. The recent 2005 referendums on the EU constitution have moreover shown that Social Democrat opposition parties (but also other mainstream parties such as Christian Democrats and Liberals) have followed their pro-integration ideological orientations and joined the government on the side of the EU Treaty even though they were liable to factionalization, especially in France with the Parti Socialiste (Crum, 2007).

Furthermore centre right and right political parties support European integration but oppose environment, cohesion and employment policies that regulate capitalism (Hooghe et al., 2002). Hooghe et al. (2002) observed that the new politics dimension, represented on the left by the GAL pole and on the right by the TAN pole, explains more national party positions on European integration than economic left-right. While the GAL pole combines greenness (or ecology), alternative politics (including participatory democracy) and libertarianism, the TAN pole combines support for traditional values, opposition to immigration, and defence of the national community. The TAN pole is summarized by Hooghe et al. (2002) as the traditional/authoritarian/nationalism pole. New right parties are highly eurosceptic. For new right parties, European integration combines several threats to the national community, that is to say immigration, foreign cultural influences, cosmopolitan and international elites, and also reduces the authority of national states – reduced
The radical right champions national sovereignty, supports intergovernmentalism, and rejects the supremacy of EU law over national law. The views of the radical right on Europe are an extension of their basic orientation. In the words of Le Pen (cited in Shields, 1995:27) “my European program is an exact extrapolation of the national program of the Front National”. National Front rejects Schengen rules and wants to re-establish full French control over its borders to keep out international crime, immigration and terrorism. This is echoed by French Gaullist Charles Pasqua (Rassemblement Pour La France) and Philippe de Villiers (Mouvement Pour La France) (Flood, 1997; Hermet et al., 1998; Messina, 2001). Euroscepticism is also linked to traditional values. The EU through the EU Charter of Fundamental rights at the Nice intergovernmental conference, is seen as threatening the natural family and the Christian heritage.

It must be noted that when Conservatives display a TAN inclination – that is to say defend national culture, national community and national sovereignty against the influx of immigrants, against competing sources of identity within the state and against external pressures from other countries and international organisations – they tend to be eurosceptic. The British Conservative Party and the French Gaullists to a lesser extent tend to display such an inclination (Baker et al., 1997; Flood, 1997; Sowemimo, 1996). Based on a content analysis of newspaper data in national election campaigns of the 1990s and early twenty-first century in six European countries, Kriesi (2007) partly echoed this research outcome and uncovered that euroscepticism among political parties is not only essentially guided by opposition politics (in other words, strategic political considerations), but also by ideological considerations. Thus he found that Conservatives and/or the new populist right, especially in the United Kingdom and Switzerland, have restructured party competition by mobilizing themselves against European integration, and articulating this euroscepticism in economic terms as much as in cultural terms. This new cleavage has been particularly successful in the United Kingdom and Switzerland as it resonates with deep-seated national anxieties. In line with the mass-elite linkages...
demonstrated by inter alia Ray (2003b) and Steenbergen et al. (2007), the salience of European integration in a given country is though not independent of the mobilization efforts undertaken by Conservatives and the new populist right.

The GAL pole – especially the French Greens – has itself become more integrationist as it touches environmental protection, strengthening of democracy (via the European Parliament) and liberalization of immigration law.

2.5.2.2 EU Political Groups and EU Positions

Based on a study of manifestos of four European political groups – PES (Party of European Socialists), ELDR (European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party), EPP (European People’s Party) and EFGP (European Federation of Green Parties) – at the European elections of 1979, 1984, 1989, 1994 and 1999, Gabel and Hix (2002) uncovered that the EU political space is similar to the domestic left-right dimension in content. Thus, on economic issues on the EU agenda, the differentiation between EU political groups is based on left-right ideology. However on the speed and nature of European (economic) integration, the differentiation between European political groups is less consistent. All groups have, at some point across the twenty-year period in the study, supported European integration. Thus, while European Socialists have become more pro-integration in the second period of the study, the European Christian Democrats and Conservatives have become less so in the same period. Over the twenty-year period, Gabel and Hix (2002) found that the Hix-Lord model with its two unrelated dimensions of Left-right and independence-integration applied:

- Left anti-integration – PES in 1979 and EFGP in 1999
- Left pro-integration – European Socialists in 1999
- Right pro-integration – EPP and ELDR in 1979
- Right anti-integration – EPP and ELDR in 1999

They also found that the Hooghe-Marks model – regulated capitalism (PES) and neo-liberalism (EPP and ELDR) – worked in 1999. The main limitation of Gabel and Hix (2002) analysis is that not all parties are members of a European political
group (political groups such as the Front National are excluded from the analysis) although most of the key players in the political world belong to such a European group. Another limitation is that internal conflicts within European political groups are ignored in the study of European party manifestos.

In a study based on roll-call votes of members of the European Parliament for the third legislature (from September 1989 to July 1994) and a large part of the fourth legislature (from September 1994 to December 1997) for any types of decisions (assent, cooperation, consultation, etc.), Noury (2002), partly echoing Gabel and Hix’s (2002) research, demonstrated that there are two dominant dimensions in the European Parliament voting space where legislators vote according to political party affiliation. The first one is left-right dimension and the second one is pro- and anti-European integration. These two dimensions were found to be stable and represented more than 90% of legislators’ voting outcomes. In addition, it was found that there are two additional dimensions which are related to national identity – namely one dimension linked to the British legislators’ more reserved political position on European integration that the researcher called Euroscepticism (although the Dutch and Scandinavian legislators’ political positions were not too far from them) and the other one linked to the North-South cultural division in Europe. However these two additional dimensions are characterized by less explanatory power and more instability. Noury’s (2002) research results have thus shown that European Parliament legislators vote more and more according to their political party affiliation rather than according to their national delegations. The French legislators seem here to be more affected by this than the British ones, which can have consequences on the respective electorates and their preferences and vice-versa.

The ideological differences between European political groups are sometimes even put aside. Thus Kreppel (2000), having studied roll-call votes of members of the European Parliament from 1987 to 1996, found that socialist (PES) and largely Christian Democratic party groups (PPE) formed frequent voting coalitions. These two groups vote together especially on final proposals rather than amendments. Kreppel (2000) justifies this grand coalition by technical and pragmatic reasons.
Voting rules\textsuperscript{47} and a general desire to increase European Parliament power through unified action\textsuperscript{48} have explained partly this coalition. Though it must be kept in mind that the coalition is not formed a third of the time regardless of reading or procedure (co-decision or cooperation). Depending on the legislative subject – for instance legislation on workers and workplace –, some cooperation does not happen as there are ideological disagreements between political groups. The change of majorities at the European Parliament since the 1999 European elections partly modified the coalition: thus the largely Christian Democrat group (PPE), which gained the majority of seats in 1999 has rotated with the Liberals (ELDR) to have the president of the European Parliament in their rank. These two events seem to give substance to the technical and pragmatic reasons for the formation of such coalitions but also to ideological reasons, the Liberals on the economic aspects may be closer to the positions of the largely Christian Democrat group (PPE) than the socialist group (PES).

2.5.3 Convergence in the Structure of EU Positions

As Marks and Steenbergen (2002) imply, the positions of political actors, be they national parties, European political groups, social movements or ordinary citizens – the latter are not though generally opinion leaders on EU issues – are structured rather than random. There is also a convergence in the structure of EU positions. Thus, the left-right dimension underlies opinions, stances and behaviour of citizens, social movements and political parties. A second dimension – a new politics dimension – emerges as a powerful predictor of national party positions on European issues (Hooghe et al., 2002). However this dimension is highly correlated with the Left-Right dimension and therefore lends support to the Hooghe-Marks model (Hooghe and Marks, 1999, 2001) of EU political space although it is also consistent with the one-dimensional model, that is to say Left-Right and Independence-Integration forming one dimension but with Left-Right element being dominant. The convergent patterns in the structuring of EU positions suggest that

\textsuperscript{47} That is to say absolute majority required for second round of co-decision and cooperation procedures.

\textsuperscript{48} The European Parliament is most influential when it presents a unified front to the other EU institutions.
parties, citizens and social movements evolve in a common space, which is the minimum requirement for political representation. Furthermore, as far as the nature of Left-Right is concerned, it was found that EU positions of national political parties are explained by both economic Left-Right and Libertarian-Authoritarian Left-Right. However Libertarian-Authoritarian Left-Right appears a more important dimension (Hooghe et al., 2002). Authoritarianism is closely associated with nationalism, and euroscepticism has a nationalistic branch.

2.5.4 Euroscepticism in France and in the United Kingdom

2.5.4.1 Definition and Nature of Institutional Euroscepticism

Euroscepticism is an encompassing term that “expresses the idea of contingent or qualified, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration” (Taggart, 1998:366). Euroscepticism carries the meaning of doubt and distrust on European integration and became of current use in Britain and in France in the 1990s. Now it is a trans-national phenomenon as it is used in other European countries. Euroscepticism is an old phenomenon, which especially came to light in the EC accession debate of Britain, Denmark and Greece in the 1970s and early 1980s but also came to light under the De Gaulle years, the latter being opposed to a highly integrated, federal superstate in favour of a loose, confederal Europe of nations (Burban, 1993; Fysh, 1997; Shields, 1996). A renewed impetus of Euroscepticism appeared over the debate of the Maastricht Treaty – and continues today – which transferred an important aspect of national sovereignty, that is to say monetary sovereignty, to a supranational body. The Maastricht Treaty provided the catalyst to opposition to European integration and further integration (Franklin, Marsh and McLaren, 1994). Euroscepticism has given rise to claims of a legitimacy crisis in the EU in terms of democratic deficit, issues of transparency and accountability of decision-making processes, appropriate balance between intergovernmental and supranational competencies, respective spheres of EU, national and sub-national governance, impact of EU issues on domestic policies and national party systems and questions of collective identity (Hix, 1998; Hedetoft, 1998; Schmitt and Thomassen, 1999; Beetham and Lord, 1998; Banchoff and Mitchell, 1999).
Euroscepticism is not an ideology as it does not offer a comprehensive, potentially universalisable view of man and society. It is though rather a component of other ideologies, and not an ideology as such as it encompasses negative ideas about EU integration. In other words it raises issues and uncertainty about the EU. Within the framework of utilitarianism, popular level of euroscepticism fluctuates with political, economic and social circumstances. However euroscepticism can live without the utilitarian concept. Euroscepticism – expression of neo-nationalist school of thought – is a broad church from the extreme right to the extreme left. It cuts across traditional divisions and creates paradoxical affinities as it has to do with the future of nations and make common cause. Flood (2002) notes that there are different degrees and kinds of euroscepticism:

- A/ stop further integration

- B/ revisionism:

1. Can be to reverse integration
2. Can be for member state withdrawal from the EU
3. Not entering the EU

There are no watertight compartments as far as these positions are concerned, they evolve with time. Euroscepticism is not to be confounded with reformist views. The latter are committed to EU integration and its continuance but want improvement. Taggart (1998) offers an alternative view of euroscepticism with the following three different positions towards the EU:

1. Integration itself opposed (including the EU).
2. Not opposed to EU integration in principle but considers it to be too inclusive – European countries are too diverse. Often framed in terms of “states-rights” (Bogdanor, 1989).
3. Not opposed to EU integration but considers it to be too exclusive (geographical and social exclusion).

In the same way, Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002:7) distinguish between two types of euroscepticism, hard and soft:
“Hard euroscepticism is where there is a principled opposition to the EU and European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their countries should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived”.

“Soft euroscepticism is where there is not a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that national interest is currently at odds with the EU’s trajectory”.

These definitions have the merit of distinguishing among varieties of eurosceptic thought but tend to ignore positive attitudes about the EU. However Conti (2003) expands Taggart and Szczerbiak’s (2002) groupings in a more positive direction, identifying two forms of pro-EU integration, namely *functional Europeanism* where there is no principled support for European integration but rather pragmatic approval of the EU, and *identity Europeanism* for a principled commitment to European integration. Furthermore Kopecky and Mudde (2002), building on the distinction between European integration as an ideal, and the European Union as an existing set of institutions, describe euroscepticism as one of four ideal types produced by intersecting orientations towards the European Union – EU optimism/pessimism – with orientations towards the idea of European integration – Europhilia/Europhobia. This produces four ideal types: Euroenthusiasts who support both the EU and the ideal of ever closer union; Eurejects who oppose the ideal of integration and the reality of the EU; Europragmatists who do not support integration but view the EU as useful; and Eurosceptics who support the idea of integration but not its realization through the current EU. This conceptualization has the great advantage of separating out Europe from the actual EU and thus inscribes itself into an evolutionary perspective of European integration which reflects current political debates, as for example the ones around the potential harmonisation of taxes across Europe or the entry of Turkey into the EU.

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Building on Taggart and Szczerbiak’s (2002) categories of hard and soft euroscepticism, Lees (2004) adds three additional dimensions of eurosceptic contestation:

- Opposition to the deepening integration process – such as reactions to real or perceived threats to nationhood and national sovereignty, critiques of institutional performance or opposition to the outcomes of particular policy areas – and hostility to the widening of the European Union – enlargement issues based on social and economic concerns and/or ethno-cultural ones.

- Sustained or heresthetic nature of eurosceptic contestation. The former entails eurosceptic ideas forming an integral part of a political party’s programmatic identity while the latter involves the adoption of eurosceptic ideas by otherwise pro-European parties for short-term tactical reasons (Lees, 2002; McClean, 2001 and Riker, 1982).

- Eurosceptic contestation officially sanctioned by the leadership of a political party or confined to a faction of it.

Lees’ categorisation of party-based euroscepticism seems more specific than previous groupings of euroscepticism. A key limitation of the model used by Lees (2004) is that only contestation of current/signed EU treaties are retained as eurosceptic contestation, ignoring in this the evolutionary nature of European integration necessarily instrumentalized by political parties.

Wessels (2007) studied the inter-relationship between euroscepticism and European identity.49 Using Easton’s concept of political support, Wessels (2007) found that European identity is a strong buffer against euroscepticism. However, this does not imply that individuals that identify themselves with the EU cannot be eurosceptics. Thus, Wessels (2007) identifies three types of eurosceptics:

- Critical Europeans who combine EU identity with scepticism. Critical Europeans demand improvements of the EU.

49 This study was though not done across time and relied on EOS Gallup Europe Post European elections 2004 data.
- Adamant eurosceptics who combine euroscepticism with no attachment to the European political community. Adamant eurosceptics demand a stop or end to European integration.

- Eurosceptics who are indifferent towards the European political community and who view EU performance negatively.

Wessels (2007) uncovered that eurosceptics amounted to 32% of European citizens and there were more adamant eurosceptics than critical Europeans. Nevertheless, a great variation across countries was found, ranging from 46% (eurosceptics) in Great Britain – 28% in France\(^50\) – to 10% in Luxembourg. Finally, he unearthed that eurosceptics of any type were less politically informed, less interested in politics, and less educated than the average citizen but conceded that if public discourse about European integration\(^51\) becomes negative, even the most receptive, politically active, and politically capable citizens may turn their backs on European integration. Only their European identity may prevent this for a while.

Krouwel and Abts (2007) argue that the concept of euroscepticism is inappropriate for grasping the complexity of EU attitudes at the mass level, and offer an alternative two-dimensional conceptual framework to deal with the variety of citizens’ attitudes towards Europe. This conceptualisation combines both the targets and the degree of popular discontent towards the EU and European integration. The first axis differentiates between attitudes towards the authorities, the regime and the community, while the second axis differentiates attitudes according to their degree of reflexivity\(^52\) and negativism. By combining these two dimensions, a sliding scale of political attitudes is charted, which runs from trust in the main political institutions and goals of the EU, via scepticism to more negative orientations ranging from political distrust, cynicism and alienation. Krouwel and Abts' (2007) conceptualisation of euroscepticism tends nevertheless to over-emphasize the

\(^{50}\) Great Britain was found to have 29% of adamant eurosceptics versus 6% of critical Europeans and France, 13% of adamant eurosceptics versus 8% of critical Europeans.

\(^{51}\) Discourse in the media, school and of opinion leaders.

\(^{52}\) The degree of reflexivity includes three elements: a) the level of monitoring of the political environment, b) the degree of openness to evaluating relevant information and c) the extent of differentiation between the targets.
rejection of European integration altogether as the sole manifestation of extreme political views.

Variation of euroscepticism (different versions) depend in which ideology it is embedded – between and within left and right, differences between left and right between France and the United Kingdom. But areas of common ground across the ideological spectrum include the following (Flood, 2002):

- the EU on the way to becoming a superstate absorbing independence of its member states.

- the EU seen as undemocratic, bureaucratic, inefficient and largely unaccountable to the people of its member states but making it more democratic not considered as the solution because it would involve further transfer of national sovereignty.

- EMU and European central bank considered economically ruinous and remove member states’ control of their finances, taxation and national economies.

- consider it unacceptable that European laws have primacy over national laws and political activism of the European Court of Justice reinterpreting treaties and other European legal instruments in a federalist direction.

- regard as unacceptable to base a common foreign and security policy on qualified majority voting (QMV). This could lead to division – different national interests and lives of nationals of member states involved in these fields. See as undesirable that Western European Union should be subsumed as the integrated defence arm of the EU.

- judge that obsession with deepening integration increases difficulty of widening (could have political, economic and ethnic chaos in central and eastern Europe).

- advocate a community of free independent nations engaged in cooperative intergovernmental relationships with each other and the rest of the world.

Euroscepticism of the left attacks the EU on the grounds of its commitment to liberal capitalism, deregulation, free trade and globalisation. It is also hostile to American
economic power and the EU’s acquiescence to a neo-liberal world order. It opposes
the EU’s subordination to American military domination of the world and is more
generally against the EU adopting any role in defence policy (other than
peacekeeping duties) in virtue of its anti-militarism. Finally, the left is attached to
national sovereignty. Euroscepticism of the right and extreme right focuses heavily
on defence of national sovereignty and of intergovernmentalism. The right (except
some neo-corporatist groups on the neo-fascist ultra-right) denounces its insufficient
liberalism, its excessive regulation and intervention, attack the Schengen Treaty and
the opening of internal borders – which is linked to the immigration problem which
in turn is linked to welfare problems, jobs, dilution of national culture and
immigrants’ integration problem –, defend national identities against EU
homogenisation. There are differences between the British right – atlanticist, pro-
NATO, free trading beyond the EU and in favour of enlargement – and the French
right – perhaps more anti-American, European or national protectionist and anti-
NATO. In the second part of the 1990s, the hyperglobalist eurosceptical strand
within the British Conservative Party has moreover reinforced its position in the
party objecting to further European integration and even pointing to a renegotiation
of the United Kingdom’s position in the EU. This opposition to European
integration is rooted in the belief that the EU is a threat to the preservation of British
sovereignty, national identity and the traditional liberal global order (Baker et al.,
2002).

Taggart (1998) identifies four ways in which euroscepticism manifests itself in
Western European political parties:

- Single issue Eurosceptical parties
- Protest based parties with Euroscepticism
- Eurosceptical factions in existing parties
- Established party with Eurosceptical position

Examples of the first category include the MPF, RPF & IE, MDC in France and UK
Independence Party in the UK. FN, MNR, PC and Greens in France belong to the
second category as the Green Party in the UK. In the third category, Labour in the
UK and the Conservative Party until recently will enter into this category. Finally
the current Conservative Party and the Democratic Unionist Party in the UK belong to the last category. Euroscepticism as an ideological appendage to a more general systemic critique seems to be the most pervasive form of party based euroscepticism in Europe, more especially in France. Taggart (1998) and Sitter (2001) argue that protest parties use their position on the EU as one means to differentiate themselves from the established parties, that ideology plays a part in euroscepticism (national versus global views; collective versus individual views but some exceptions, regionalists are pro-European) and that eurosceptic factions within dominant parties can be explained by ideological, organisational or leadership factors as reflected by Hine (1982) and Graham (1993).

Party-based euroscepticism is a reflection of government-opposition competition. Party positions on EU integration reflect party strategy in the pursuit of policy, office and votes (Sitter, 2004). Euroscepticism is a distinctly marginal phenomenon, rarely encountered in the political mainstream of the EU 15. Ideological extremity from political centre appears as the best predictor of a political party’s position on European integration – the more away from political centre, the more eurosceptic the party is – followed by incumbency – socialization effect: party in power becomes more pro-European – and vote share – the more votes the political party attracts, the more pro-European it is likely to be (Ray, 2004, 2007). However, it must be noted that the following parties in the United Kingdom and France represent outliers departing from this model: the UK Independence Party (hard eurosceptic party but is located on the ideological centre of the political scene), the Conservatives (soft eurosceptics with a pro-European minority attracting a large share of votes), the Labour Party (short of being pro-European but has large share of votes and is in office), and the RPR – now called UMP (pro-European party with a eurosceptic faction, currently in office and attracting a large vote share).

However, in May 2004, the leadership of UMP adopted a more eurosceptic stance under the influence of party members who voted no to the entry of Turkey in the EU and pronounced themselves for a referendum on the EU constitution. The adoption of eurosceptic ideas by this otherwise pro-European party was nevertheless for
short-term tactical reasons – and thus of heresthetic\textsuperscript{53} nature – to reduce the number of votes going to MPF, RPF&IE and especially FN at the European elections of June 2004. The government headed by Jean-Pierre Raffarin (and subsequently by Dominique De Villepin) as Jacques Chirac, French President, remained though favourable to both European projects during and after the 2005 referendum campaign on the EU constitution. Over the same timescale, for similar tactical reasons, Tony Bair, British Prime Minister and Leader of the Labour Party, had first decided, under the pressure of the unpopularity of the project of European constitution and the increased popularity of Conservatives’ views on Europe in the UK, to submit the final project of constitution to referendum and to defend in the preparation of the final draft of the European constitution a less euro-expansionist position. After the “no vote” in the French and Dutch referendums on the EU constitution, the British Labour government declared the current EU constitution proposal dead.

The first-past-the-post (FTP) electoral system in the United Kingdom seems to shape EU politics in the UK rather than perhaps historical experience, domestic economic and social interests to explain British attitudes towards the EU. Building on Aspinwall (2000), Hix and Lord (1997) and Taggart (1998), Usherwood (2002) shows that the FTP electoral system leads to anti-centrist views on Europe of governmental political parties as opposed to proportional electoral systems which keep anti-EU views at the periphery of the political scene – in other words not in government. The John Major government in the period 1992-1997 epitomized this phenomenon, exacerbated by the problem of a small parliamentary majority. Moreover, Aspinwall (2004) argues judiciously that the level of democratic legitimacy in European policy-making is higher under the FTP electoral system than it would be under a proportional representation electoral system as the former ensures the participation of both eurosceptics and europhiles in the development of government preferences on European integration. Aspinwall (2004) nevertheless concedes that the negative political rhetoric on integration – used by party leaders to help manage the factions in their party – may well influence British public opinion.

\textsuperscript{53} The late William H. Riker invented the term “heresthetic”. Heresthetic can be defined as “the art of setting up situations – composing the alternatives among which political actors must choose – in such a way that even those who do not wish to do so are compelled by the structure of the situation to support the heresthetician’s purpose” (Riker et al., 1996:9).
towards a more negative view of European integration. Whilst party management constraints partly explain British governments’ preferences on integration, Aspinwall (2004) tends to largely disregard the influence that public opinion may have on these preferences. The rather descriptive methodological approach followed by Aspinwall (2004) appears though a weakness.

In the UK, the anti-European views are not only present in governmental parties but are also present in cross-party or apolitical movements – like for example the Conservative Bruges Group, the European Foundation, New Europe Group, Business for Sterling – which facilitate a clearer individual positioning on Europe and a greater mastery of the European issues but fail to show a united front because of the diversity of backgrounds of those opposing EU integration and a continual change of organisational structures. This externalisation of the debate on European integration leads to a radicalisation of political views. However despite this radicalisation of views on European integration at the level of movements and to a lesser extent of parties, public opinion remains more ambivalent, placing Europe as not the most important issue although in the period 1997-2001 becoming the third or fourth most important issue behind the NHS, Education and unemployment. According to more recent (2007) polls, the importance of Europe as an issue for public opinion has though decreased (Mori, 2007).

2.5.4.2 Euroscepticism and Public Attitudes

The heartland of support for European integration is to be found among the generally more informed classes (Evans, 1995; Evans, 1999b; Gabel, 1998a and Hix, 1999b). However, opposition to the EU in Britain is not just confined to the ill-informed. According to the EU knowledge quiz scores (Evans, 1998b), it is the case that people who want Britain to leave the EU are less informed than those who do not. Those who want Britain to stay in the EU but try to reduce the EU powers are

54 Yet Aspinwall (2004) admits that the party management variable cannot explain that although Tony Blair had a large parliamentary majority in 1997 and 2001 – and could therefore bypass the eurosceptic faction in his party –, he did not take Britain into the Euro. Aspinwall (2004) points out that some combination of resistance by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Gordon Brown), media hostility and a negative public opinion may be able to account for the reluctance of Tony Blair to take that step.
more informed than those who either wish to increase the EU powers or those who wish to have full integration. The media may be a source of influence on citizens’ political attitudes. Dalton et al.’s (1998), Herr’s (2002) and Bartels’ (1993) studies have thus found that the media influenced political attitudes, particularly voting preferences in the US. Research in the British context has also found that the media asserts influence on political attitudes and behaviour but that these effects are relatively small (Norris et al., 1999; Newton and Brynin, 2001). On media influence on attitudes towards European integration, Norris (2000) uncovered that when an attentive public receives extensive media coverage of an issue that displays a consistent directional bias, the media are likely to have an impact sufficient enough to change public attitudes at the aggregate level. Norris (2000) found a strong association between negative press coverage of monetary union and decreasing levels of aggregate support both for the Euro and the EU in general. Norris (2000) did though qualify this conclusion by pointing out that the direction of causality in the relationship between media coverage and aggregate public attitudes on monetary union could not be established.

However Carey and Burton (2004) unearthed that during the 2001 British General Election campaign, the media and the main political parties had small independent effects on public attitudes towards EU membership and the potential adoption of the single currency. These effects were found greater when voters received the same messages from both their party and their newspaper. More specifically, Carey and Burton (2004) discovered that the pro-EU press (such as The Independent) had less influence in affecting the attitudes of its readers than the anti-EU press (such as The Sun, The Star, The Daily Mail and The Times) with its readers, especially for the issue of the adoption of the single currency. This was explained by the hard eurosceptic line that the anti-EU press took on the single currency which contrasted with the lack of intensity of support of the pro-EU press for the Euro. In connection with this argument, Carey and Burton (2004) found that the effects on public attitudes were the greatest when Conservative identifiers received confirmatory influences by also reading an anti-euro newspaper.

uncovered that negative media coverage on government and political leaders influenced negatively public views on the overall performance rating of political leaders, this especially for politically less involved respondents, and contaminated the Euro referendum vote. These results are also echoed by Brettschneider et al. (2003) who found that media coverage on the Euro focusing first on the Euro-Dollar exchange rate decrease from the beginning of 1999, and then on the advantages of the Euro at the end of 2001 influenced public opinion’s evaluation of the Euro in Germany, first negatively and then positively. Nevertheless Brettschneider et al. (2003) unearthed that although citizens’ attitudes towards the Euro were influenced by the media, citizens were even more strongly influenced by their general opinions of the European Union. Along the same line, in the context of Denmark, De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2006) unearthed that citizens exposed to a considerable level of news coverage with a consistent positive evaluative direction on the EU enlargement endorsed the media view. In the related research, prospective economic evaluations, incumbent government support, age and anti-immigration attitudes were though found more important predictors of EU enlargement support.

De Vreese (2007) showed how exposure to specific and different news media content led to differential changes in EU attitudes for different individuals. Drawing on experimental data, panel surveys and media content analyses in Denmark and the Netherlands, De Vreese (2007) thus demonstrated how news media, by framing Euro-politics as an arena for strategically operating, self-serving politicians,55 can fuel public Euro-cynicism and -scepticism. However, this effect was found to be conditional upon the pervasiveness of strategically framed news reporting, and depend on the level of political sophistication56 of the individual. In the Netherlands where there was a high level of strategically framed news reporting, it was found that individuals with a high political sophistication were more likely to be cynical and sceptical about European integration. A contrario, in Denmark where there was a low level of strategically framed news reporting, individuals with a low political sophistication exposed to EU news were more likely to be cynical and critical about European integration.

55 Strategic news reporting is defined as news that focuses on winning and losing, is driven by “war and games” language, emphasizes “performers, critics and audiences”, focuses on candidate style and perceptions, and gives weight to opinion polls (Jamieson, 1992).
56 In other words, on the level of political interest of the individual.
Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom is partly driven by the media giving more coverage to eurosceptic ideas, partly reflecting the divisions on European integration in British political parties. Anderson and Weymouth (1999) and Seymour-Ure (2002) moreover underlined the overwhelmingly eurosceptical nature of the British press, which contrasts with the more pro-European nature of the French mainstream press (De Vreese et al., 2006; Grundberg et al. 2000; Perrineau and Ysmal, 1995; Kriesi, 2007). This situation echoes the increased politicisation of the EU membership debate and the decline in EU support in Poland in the late 1990s which coincided with the appearance of more eurosceptic political forces with the help of some large media such as radio Maryja, although the increased politicisation of the EU membership was focused not so much on EU entry itself but on the conditions of entry of Poland in the EU. The decline of EU support in Poland was due to socio-economic concerns of the electorate partly exacerbated by Polish governments’ attempts to shift the blame for unpopular decisions on to Brussels (Szczerbiak, 2001).

Taggart (1998) underlined the fact that there is little relationship between public level of euroscepticism and public support for euroscepticism. Thus, in France, protest parties command more votes than public opposition to European integration (as evidenced by eurobarometer surveys), domestic concerns explaining more support for these protest parties whereas in the UK it is the reverse although since 1997, the Conservative Party has taken a more eurosceptic stance. This relative lack of popularity of European integration in the UK may reflect the way British history education is unravelling (Daddow, 2004, 2006). The latter tends to present an uncritical view of national history – supported by politicians such as Margaret Thatcher and the correlated relative inactivity of British historians in the public sphere to question British history – this helping to serve the construction of national identities via the glorification of imperial, martial and royal history. Thus history education taught in the UK focuses on the period to around the second world-war much more than contemporary history. Somewhat echoing Daddow (2006), Smith (2006) follows a historic long term perspective and explains English euroscepticism by the strong sense of national identity of England which derives from its insular, geographical situation, the early development of a centralised English state, the
concomitant growth of a unified English legal system and especially national protestant covenentalism. He argues that it is the fusion of a dissenting religion (Protestantism) with a national identity that was tightly knit with a monarchical state of its own that proved crucial for the subsequent shaping of English attitudes to Europe, as well as to outsiders in general. Contrary to France, English Protestantism opposed the dominant ecclesiastical international hierarchy and doctrine of the time (Catholicism) and a long time thereafter. This dissenting, oppositional national religion tied to the masthead of a sovereign nation, became the defiant symbol and expression of that absolute sovereignty, breaking away from the trans-territorial realm of Catholic Christendom. Despite the weakening of the catholic spiritual roots in Europe, Catholicism continues today to shape European identity-consciousness and influence perceptions of Europe (including France) in relation to others. Catholic Christendom, even through its more secular contemporary versions, embraces cultural diversity within unity. It preaches in the process the values of liberty under the rule of law but also of diversity within an overarching unity – a conception that can lead to the increasing subordination of national sovereignty, if not identity, to a supranational and trans-territorial European Union under a bureaucratic High Authority, in which each of the levels of loyalty and identity play their allotted roles. It is a conception that accords well with the old French ideal of a grande nation with its mission civilisatrice and its post-revolutionary ideals of exporting liberty, reason and enlightenment across the continent.

2.6 Conclusion

The completion of the single European market and the Maastricht Treaty marked the end of the permissive consensus. European integration and its policies appeared from the 1990s to be more visible, politicised and contested. To this extent, the politicisation of the completion of the single European market in 1993 and the project of economic and monetary union in 1992, both with direct economic and social implications for electorates’ lives, aroused the interest, concern or enthusiasm of the political world, socio-economic circles and civil society. This politicisation of the European integration issue coincided with a generally poor socio-economic situation in Europe. Citizens’ attitudes towards the European Union are nevertheless
developed in the national context. They are also more utilitarian. Thus, citizens assess the economic, social and political performance of the nation state to express attitudes towards European integration rather than evaluate the performance of EU institutions themselves. In other words, EU support is conditional on the performance of the nation state.

Furthermore citizens develop values and policy preferences in the political environment of their country, which will influence their EU attitudes. More specifically, they draw comparisons between the political order and policies of their country and the political order and policies of the European Union. As found in the context of CEE nations, citizens’ underlying political and economic values and policy preferences seem to moderate the relationship between utilitarian appraisals and EU attitudes. Although France and the United Kingdom are not in the same economic, political and social situation as CEE nations, the question of the type of EU model pursued and its compatibility with French and British individuals’ underlying socio-economic preferences arises. The relationship of the type of EU model pursued with instrumental explanations of EU attitudes also deserves examination.
3- METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

As discussed in the previous chapter, the core aim of this thesis is to investigate how British and French citizens structure their opinions and preferences on EU integration with particular focus on utilitarian arguments. This will be investigated by carrying out a statistical analysis of Eurobarometer data surveys for the period from 1992 to 2001. This chapter justifies and details how the research will be managed. Thus, firstly, the research approach will be discussed. Secondly, the pros and cons of Eurobarometer data surveys will be examined. Thirdly, methodology used by previous studies will be reviewed. Fourthly, the selection and operationalization of variables will be considered. Finally the selection of statistical tests and Eurobarometer data will be deliberated.

3.2 Research Approach

For the purpose of the current study, secondary data in the forms of books, academic journal articles, Eurobarometer data and other public opinion survey data in the United Kingdom and France, official governmental and para-governmental data such as economic and demographic data have been used. These data offer a number of advantages. According to Ghauri et al. (1995), the first and the foremost advantage of using secondary data is the enormous saving on time and money. These data can at times be of higher quality than could be obtained by an individual study such as this one (Stewart and Kamins, 1993). This is especially true in the context of Eurobarometer survey data, which are collected bi-annually in a rigorous manner – although their limitations are discussed below – and hence provide here the possibility of undertaking longitudinal studies: this is of particular importance for the present research questions and objectives. Secondary data have permitted us to set the present research in context and generate the research hypotheses and even triangulate this study’s findings. Finally secondary data generally provide a source of data that is both permanent and available in a form that may be checked relatively
easily by others (Denscombe, 1998). This means that the data and individual research findings are more open to public scrutiny.

Nevertheless secondary data subsume some disadvantages. Thus they may have been collected for a purpose that does not match the researcher’s need or the secondary data may enable the researcher to answer the research question or address the research objectives only partially. Other disadvantages include aggregations and definitions used in the secondary data, which may be unsuitable; access to secondary data, which may be difficult or costly; no real control over data quality; and initial purpose of the secondary data researcher may affect how the data are presented (Saunders et al., 2003). For the latter, the culture, predispositions and ideals of those who originally collected and collated the secondary data will have influenced the nature of these data at least to some extent. Hence, for instance, Eurobarometer data and the reports drawn from them by the Directorate-General Press and Communication of the European Commission tend to be rather subjective in the self-selection and interpretation of results but this is not surprising considering that the European Commission is not unbiased or neutral on European integration questions as discussed below. It must be though noted that despite showing some drawbacks, much of previous research has used secondary data as these represented the best alternative for analyses aimed at explaining cross-national, cross-temporal and cross-sectional public opinion’s views on European integration. This is also true in the present research, for which secondary data were fully adapted to the research objectives and research problem at hand and as such were considered as the best option.

3.2.1 Quantitative and Qualitative Research

Ghauri et al. (1995) summarize the differences in the emphasis between qualitative and quantitative research methods:

- Quantitative methods may be used when the emphasis is on testing and verification; there is a focus on facts and/or reasons of social events; a logical and critical approach is put forward; when the research design deals with a controlled environment; the research is based on a hypothetical-deductive method and focuses
on hypothesis testing; there is a generalization by population membership; an
objective “outsider view” distant from data is favoured; the study is particularistic,
analytical and results oriented.

- Qualitative methods place emphasis on understanding; focus on understanding
from respondent’s/informant’s point of view; observations and measurements are
carried out in natural settings; the research orientation is explorative; there is a focus
on interpretation and rational approach; a subjective “insider view” and closeness to
data are favoured; the research is process oriented and a holistic perspective is
promoted; and there is generalization of the results by comparison of properties and
contexts of individual organism.

For the purpose of this research, quantitative research methods are adopted for the
reasons mentioned above but more specifically because the research is of a
hypothetical-deductive nature as it aims to test theories developed by other
researchers to see whether they apply to the French and British contexts. These
theories have not though been researched extensively, as for example hypothesis
(H3), which has not been tested across time and for specific countries and individual
policies. Similarly, hypothesis (H1) about dissatisfaction/satisfaction with social,
economic and political performance of national institutions influencing public
opinion has also been tested in a very limited way, that is to say with no testing for
specific countries, across time and limited policy variable considered. Hypothesis
(H2) about the relationship between citizens’ support for integration and citizens’
individual benefits extracted from European integration has also not been tested in
the individual contexts of France and the United Kingdom. Therefore the research
undertaken here is of an explanatory and exploratory nature. The generalisation of
the results obtained to population membership as the statistical verification of results
are here critical and as such warrant the use of quantitative research methods
(Curwin and Slater, 2002; Dewhurst, 2002). Secondary data are used in the study.
A quantitative analysis of Eurobarometer data together with economic, social and
political data from other national and international public sources is thus carried out.
The related analysis is done both at the aggregate and individual data levels in line
with the research hypotheses which test the effect of both national and individual
utilitarian arguments on European integration support. The mixture of aggregate
and individual data level analyses – involving a range of diverse data – as the reinforcement – between one another – and complementarity of hypotheses tested in the study are not only suited to the objectives and purpose of the research but also enhance the validity of the present research. Such a hybrid research procedure is known as triangulation and recommended in research (Ghauri et al., 1995; Saunders et al., 2003).

3.3 Eurobarometer Data Surveys

Researchers have used Eurobarometer surveys to analyse public opinion about European integration as they enable them to avoid potential problems associated with the measurement of citizen opinions: that is to say variations in question across independent studies; irregularity in the timing or frequency of surveys; or changes in sampling frame or survey procedures. Since the early 1970s, the EU has monitored public opinion in its member nations with coordinated, semi-annual surveys of public attitudes towards the community and the political issues facing Europe. Thus, the Eurobarometer surveys regularly ask a series of identical questions about public support for the EU and the integration support. The reasonably large samples, their national representativeness and the perenity of the sampling procedure used by Eurobarometer are also an advantage for comparative opinion research. The Eurobarometer surveys use a multi-stage stratified random sampling method targeted at resident population aged 15 years and over in each of the member states. In each country, a number of sampling points are first drawn with probability proportional to population size (for a total coverage of the country) and to population density. Sampling points were thus drawn from each of the regional administrative units after stratification by individual unit and type of area (in terms of metropolitan, urban and rural areas). Following this, in each sampling point, a starting address is drawn at random and additional addresses randomly selected as Nth address. In each household, a respondent is drawn at random and interviewed face-to-face in her/his home in the appropriate national language. In each member state, a national weighting procedure (marginal and intercellular weighting) is utilised to introduce minimum gender, age and region in the iteration procedure.
Another benefit of eurobarometer surveys is that they subsume general public opinion surveys aimed at specific target groups as well as the public at large, and qualitative surveys are also sometimes conducted in member states. Another positive aspect is that there are thus questions which are present in all EB surveys as the membership evaluation and benefit questions or demographic questions such as age, sex and education or questions which appear frequently in EB surveys as for example Europe’s perceived and desired speed questions. There is also a relative variety in the formulation of response in the EB questionnaires although it can be improved: there are few choices and rejection questions, few ranking questions and few word/open questions, which indicate a methodological bias. Yet Eurobarometer questionnaires do incorporate closed-ended questions, which facilitate the statistical treatment of the data. The Eurobarometer surveys enable the researcher to facilitate and carry out cross-sectional, cross-national and cross-temporal research, which is particularly important for the present study on French and British public opinions from 1992 to 2001.

Nevertheless eurobarometer surveys have disadvantages. Firstly, there are a number of questions with a dichotomous nature in a transparent or hidden manner – for instance trust in institutions question or priority/not priority areas for European policies, in favour or against EU enlargement including for some of the dependent variables such as benefit question – which can lead to a caricature of opinions. There is also perhaps an excessive use of the “Don’t Know” category, which provides an escape route to respondents and thus can give a better picture of the EU for European decision-makers. This is particularly striking for the membership evaluation question where the “Don’t know” category adds to the “Neither good nor bad” one and thus can neutralise a part of negative opinions about the European Union. A Likert scale or a continuous rating scale would be more useful here.

There are also questions which lead to centralized responses as for instance the question about the introduction of the Euro – “On 1st January 2002 the (national currency) will be replaced by the Euro. Do you think it is …?” – with a rating scale containing a very good thing, a fairly good thing, a neither good nor bad thing, a fairly bad thing, a very bad thing and don’t know. The adjective “fairly” is though subjective. It is revealing that this middle category is dropped when respondents are
asked about how comfortable they are with using the Euro with a rating scale incorporating very comfortable, fairly comfortable, not very comfortable, not at all comfortable and don’t know. This issue is though not all the time present with more important questions, as for example with the following question – Do you totally agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or totally disagree with each of the following statements about the introduction of the Euro? The introduction of the Euro will ...(for example create more jobs)". It must be hence noted that the body, which orders the EB surveys – the European Commission – and interprets its results – the Directorate-General of the European Commission – are not independent institutions but have an interest in preparing and presenting results in line with their pro-European views. The reports on survey results prepared by the directorate-general of the European Commission are symptomatic with a clear focus on positive results – the one favourable to European integration. The benefit question and the membership evaluation questions are also questions, which are close to one another in meaning but are written in such a way so as that more respondents’ positive answers come out. This is particularly evident for the questions about Europe’s perceived and desired speed with a rating scale from “standstill” to “runs as fast as possible” which is subjective and more likely to elicit opinions on the plus side of EU integration. The question about the current occupation of the respondent contains an extensive range of distinct categories which is perhaps not so advisable although the regrouping of categories is possible for statistical treatment.

The mode of administration of the EB questionnaires via in-home interviews is arguable in the sense that the proper respondent can be selected in the household but the presence of the interviewer in the home of the respondent may reduce the respondent’s anonymity and generate socially desirable answers, especially for a sensitive subject such as opinions about European integration. The level of data measurement in the EB surveys tends to be nominal and ordinal rather than interval and ratio which can as a result restrict at first glance the use of parametric statistics and orientate the researcher towards non-parametric statistics. The benefits of non-parametric statistics are that they require fewer assumptions than their parametric counterpart, exempli gratia they do not make assumptions about the underlying population distribution, that is to say the variable’s distribution does not need to be normal. The latter assumption is not such an issue when using EB surveys as the
sample size tends to be large: inferences for means using the t distribution assume that the data have a normal distribution – Central Limit Theorem (Grimm, 1993). Non-parametric tests tend to be less sensitive than their parametric cousins and therefore may fail to detect differences between groups that actually do exist. Yet, if the data are based on a nominal scale and/or an ordinal scale, and the latter cannot be considered as continuous, and other assumptions of parametric techniques are not met, non-parametric techniques are recommended.

However there are some variables in the surveys (like the question about the desired speed of building Europe) which can be considered as strictly continuous, although the measured scale is ordinal, if the number of categories is large (seven or more although the figure seven is somewhat arbitrary) and the data meet the other assumptions of the parametric test (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; Agresti and Finlay, 1997). If it is more powerful to achieve measurement at a higher level as this will contain more discriminating information, it is customary in the social sciences – including the research produced in the topic area – to treat variables as continuous when they have fewer ordinal categories than seven as the property that is crucial to the application of multivariate parametric procedures is not the type of measurement so much as the shape of the distribution, that is to say the normality of the distribution (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; Curwin and Slater, 2002; Dewhurst, 2002). Under these conditions for hypothesis I, II (the latter only with desired speed dependent variable) and III, parametric statistics will be used in the present research. Overall, EB data offer a number of advantages which clearly outweigh its weaknesses and are especially suited to the present unfunded cross-national, cross-sectional and cross-temporal study.

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57 Normal probability distribution is used to describe a symmetrical, bell shaped curve, which has the greatest frequency of scores in the middle, with smaller frequencies towards the extremes. Multivariate normality is the assumption that each variable and all linear combinations of the variables are normally distributed. When the assumption is met, the residuals of the analysis are also normally distributed and independent (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001).
3.4 Critique of Methodology used by Previous Studies

3.4.1 Aggregate Level Data Analysis

In the article of Eichenberg and Dalton (1993), they employed a Dependent variable which is intrinsically binary (net support: good thing – bad thing expressed in percentage) for a study at the aggregate national level.\textsuperscript{58} This may invalidate the use of multivariate linear regression – they used GLS (for cross-section)/ARMA (= autoregressive moving average) analysis – as this dependent variable is not continuous itself but as indicated above it may be treated as such: the shape of the distribution of the variable, as well as other parametric test assumptions, are moreover more important than the level of measurement of the variable. Another weakness of the methodology of Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) is that the “neither agree nor disagree” category, that is to say “neither good thing nor bad thing” category, is left out of the analysis but in some EU countries, this category is important, especially when it is considered that this category may be linked with a lack of familiarity with the process of European integration in some countries such as the United Kingdom.

Another weakness of the methodology used by Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) is that it does not recognize that the state of national economies is not only affected by the European Union, but for example by global recession. It follows from this that the EU should be judged in terms of the policies it enacts and which influence the state of national economies. The methodology used by Gabel and Palmer (1995), in a study though done this time at the individual level, recognized this by incorporating a control variable – Has your country benefited or not from EU membership? – with the questions of evaluation of the national economic situation (though measuring respondents’ perceptions over past twelve months rather than actual economic condition), WWII deaths per capita and cross-sectional data (for example income and education), although there are some multicollinearity problems between EC benefit question and cross-sectional data (many respondents associate their nation’s benefit with their own benefit). It must be noted that when the question about respondent’s perceptions about the national economic situation is not used, this

\textsuperscript{58} The same dependent variable was moreover used in Eichenberg and Dalton’s (2007) latest cross-national aggregate analysis.
control variable is not used and the former replaced by objective measures of national benefits, for instance EC trade percentage and EC trade balance.

In the aggregate level study of Christin and Hug (2002) on referendums and citizens' support for European integration, they used the percentage of good thing as the dependent variable for the period from 1973 to 1997 across nations and used a number of dummy variables. Focusing on one response category in the dependent variable used here, is problematic because variations in responses in the other categories are not reflected (Gabel and Palmer, 1995). However the authors found a high correlation (.97) between net support and absolute support.\(^5\) In addition dummy variables for the period of time the related countries were under a popularly approved treaty (Denmark and Ireland for all periods; France from 1993 to 1997 before new treaty: that is to say the Amsterdam Treaty) were utilised. To measure the instantaneous effect of referendum, a dummy variable including all semesters for all countries in which a referendum occurred was applied. This study was not done at the individual level or regional level. The justification for using control variables is slim. Other independent variables used include inflation, unemployment, GDP growth and intra-EU exports.

Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996) used three questions separately as dependent variables in their aggregate data level analysis, namely

- For or against efforts to unify Western Europe, using only percentage of respondents answering “for”;
- Country’s membership of EC, using only percentage of respondents answering “good thing”;
- Very sorry, indifferent and relieved EC scrapped, using only percentage of respondents answering “very sorry”.

While this operationalisation takes into account the middle category score and thus corrects one of the weaknesses in the methodology of Eichenberg and Dalton (1993), only one category (positive evaluation of integration) is retained for the

\(^5\) Net support is measured by the difference between the percentage of good thing minus the percentage of bad thing as for the study of Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) while absolute support is operationalized by the percentage of good thing.
analysis, which at best represents a partial result. Furthermore, the underlying scale of each dependent variable considered is not strictly continuous (from 3 to 4 point scales) but as indicated above they may be treated as such – the shape of the distribution of the variable, and other parametric test assumptions, are moreover more important than the level of measurement of the variable – which warrants the use of parametric statistics such as the GLS regression model used in the analysis. Along the same line, there are also some independent variables, like the timing of (EU) entry of country with only three categories: that is to say the original six countries are assigned a value of 3, late joiners (Portugal, Spain and Greece) a value of 2 and middle joiners (United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark) a value of 1. It must be noted that the attribution of this coding (values to countries) rests on a presumption that at any given point in time over the period from 1973 to 1993, support levels are highest for the original six countries, somewhat lower among the most recent members and lowest among those countries that joined in the 1970s. The length of (EU) membership is itself measured by adding 0.5 for each subsequent semi-annual Eurobarometer survey for which a country has been a member of the EU over the related study period.

A strength in the methodology is that the analysis was carried out over a time period of more than 20 years, that is to say from 1973 to 1993, and a greater number of countries were included, namely twelve – compared to only eight for Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) over a time period of 1973 to 1988 – which allow them to mirror better the business cycle and thus facilitate the examination of whether the support for integration is correlated with macro-economic indicators. This may explain why Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996) found significant effects for unemployment and inflation (for the EU membership evaluation) when Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) only found significant effects for inflation. In addition, the economic aggregates used in the study, namely GDP growth, unemployment and inflation, are measured in the twelve months prior to the month the Eurobarometer survey was conducted. This may be both a strength and a weakness. A strength because respondents may make an evaluation of the integration based on the evaluation of the general economic situation in their country of residence relying on definitive and widely published data, economic data for the past year (lag for publication of annual figures) which may have already influenced their daily life. Nonetheless, it is also a
weakness in the sense that respondents may make their opinion about the general economic situation in their country based on present daily life evidence but also information and data reported in the media, especially newspapers, television and radio, and by the elites (for example political parties) which tend to comment on actual current situation and the near future (economic forecasts). For the purpose of this research, the second assumption is retained and economic aggregates of the year in which Eurobarometer surveys are conducted, will be used. Kaltenthaler and Anderson (2001) used the same approach. The studies carried out tend to be more global and less individual, and not take care of the particularities of each member state to explain the support for the EU integration. The present study will address this in the context of France and the United Kingdom.

The merit of the aggregate level study of Kaltenthaler and Anderson (2001) is that it analyses the respondents’ support for a specific policy question (support for EMU and a single currency) rather than public support for integration as a whole. To do so, they used two questions, one asking respondents whether the currency should be managed by the national government or jointly within the EU, and the other one asking respondents whether they are in favour or against EMU and a single currency. The latter question is a more specific question and inclined to uncover the opinions of citizens towards EMU. The sequential use of these questions allows the researchers to compare the results to these two questions and check the validity of responses as the question becomes more specific to EMU. However, as for example Eichenberg and Dalton (1993), the dependent variable used is also binary and not continuous itself: Kaltenthaler and Anderson (2001) utilized only the positive answer to the question and transformed this as a percentage (percentage of people who says “yes” to the question).

Another strength of the study by Kaltenthaler and Anderson (2001) is that they have carried out multivariate regression analyses taking into account not only monetary policy variables (length of membership of EMS; inflation; Central Bank independence) and economic aggregates (intra-EU trade; unemployment) but also political variables (government position on EU; length of EU membership and age of nation state) which can influence public opinion on the EU and its policies. Thus previous research – that is to say Eichenberg and Dalton (1993); Gabel and Palmer...
had established that national traditions and particular historical experiences could influence public opinion about integration. The age of nation state variable is especially important here as it can measure the sense of attachment to the national state and its correlated national identity in the sense that the longer a nation state has existed, the more opportunity there is for a strong national identity to develop and become meaningful for its citizens as the citizens accumulate a common historical experience. The relatively short reference time period used in the research, namely from 1994 to 1997, limits somewhat the validity of the research and will require further research to confirm the results.

The methodology used by Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) is interesting in the sense that the dependent variable that he used can be considered as strictly continuous and can warrant the use of parametric statistics if test assumptions are respected, including the concomitant use of this dependent variable with interval or ratio level data – that is to say economic aggregates – as in the related study at the aggregate level. The related dependent variable is desired integration speed question with a seven point scale – the average score per country was taken for the aggregate level analysis – and has the merit of specifying views in a more precise way than the dependent variables used in other studies, such as the evaluation of membership or unification question. The question asks directly about integration, unlike the membership indicator, which refers to the benefits of a country being in the EU, which is a narrower issue. It is also positive that the perceived and desired rhythm of integration are measured, this enabling the researcher to examine and separate the factual and evaluative dimension of integration. The disadvantage of using this dependent variable is that it does not measure the degree of support for integration. However if a respondent declares a preference for a rapid integration, it goes without saying that he or she supports integration. This reasoning is perhaps less valid for a respondent preferring a low speed of integration (one to three point chosen on the scale) as a person can be in favour of integration but desire a low speed of integration. This objection can though lose a large part of its substance when considering that a quite small minority of respondents choose a value under four. This objection also assumes a degree of sophistication on the part of the respondents not warranted with most citizens’ limited knowledge and interest in European affairs. In addition the related dependent variable appears to be correlated
moderately with other dependent variables used in other studies like the EU membership evaluation.

The analysis of Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) contains weaknesses – further weaknesses and benefits of Sanchez and Cuenca’s analysis will be commented on in the next section on individual level analysis. Thus only one survey (EB 44.1, 1995) has been used in the research, which as a result limits the value of the results obtained and requires further analysis with other data. The author also carried out an individual level analysis to confirm the results done at the aggregate level and did an ordered logit analysis but seemed to have mixed aggregate level data (that is to say corruption) and individual level data (for example trust in institutions, influence on institutions, desired speed) which is for the least arguable. The aggregate level data as the adjective implies, relies on an average of responses, which is de facto more consensual and general and thus cannot account for the unique response of an individual, and put on a par with individual level citizens’ responses.

Dutch and Taylor (1997) in their aggregate-level analysis of Eurobarometer data from 1973 to 1989 have used a lagged EU membership variable in their regression analyses to capture the growing elite consensus in favour of European integration during the 1980s – referred as elite-driven diffusion. This elite diffusion effect was first observed with the curve of EU support through the related years and with a rising intercept in the same years. What is also interesting in the research approach of Dutch and Taylor (1997) is that they have controlled the relationship between EU support and economic performance of the country with the incumbent support – question used “If there were a general election tomorrow, which party would you support?” – as it was considered that the EU had little direct role in creating national economic conditions, especially in the eyes of citizens. In the study period of the present research, it can be argued that the EU has a greater role in the economic and social policies followed by member states – influencing in the process their national fiscal and monetary policies – especially after the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties. This also echoes citizens’ perceptions, and as such this control may not be necessary. Nevertheless it can also be contended that national governments still retain a role – albeit a restricted one – in the management of their economy especially in the eyes of the electorates. Thus the incumbent government control
variable will also be used to observe its effect. One of the main weaknesses of Dutch and Taylor’s (1997) analysis is that they have not tested the effect of subjective economic evaluation – in other words, national economic performance perceptions of people – on EU support. Furthermore, Dutch and Taylor (1997) also carried out a multivariate analysis of regional-level data. The object of the present research is to uncover and contrast the British and French citizens’ national attitudinal patterns towards EU integration, and thus makes redundant such a regional-level study. It can be though useful to retain some regional variables in the analysis.

In the research approach of Hooghe (2003), the operationalisation of the functional, distributional and social model variables is worthy of note. Hooghe (2003) relying partly on Wessels and Kielborn’s (1995) research on ordinal European functionality of policies firstly classified policies according to their externalities or economies of scale – one for policies with low externalities (education, health and employment policy); two for policies with medium externalities (regional policy, social policy, research and development) and three for policies with high externalities (or scale economies) (environment, defence, foreign policy, third world aid, immigration, currency and agriculture). It must be noted that Hooghe (2003) had reclassified regional and social policies to the second category because they can create negative externalities – thus for example differential national public investment may divert private investment and create social problems in neighbouring countries. Secondly the distributional variable was created by assigning a score to each policy as a function of average government spending as a percentage of GDP for the fourteen largest countries in 2000, relying on data compiled from the Commission of the European Communities for the bulk of policies, from OECD for third world aid, from extrapolations from national accounts for foreign policy, currency and immigration policy. Five categories were thus created from less than 0.1% of GDP (first category) to superior or equal to 4.5% of GDP (fifth category). Finally the social model was structured as a dummy variable – coded one for the five policies singled out as central to regulated capitalism (employment, social inclusion, regional policy, environment, research and development) and zero for the remaining policies.
Hooghe (2003) utilized as dependent variable the national average response (per country) to the following question: “For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (nationality) government, or made jointly within the European Union?”. This dependent variable is binary and as such the treatment of this variable with parametric statistics, as highlighted earlier, is problematic. Furthermore the related researcher does not seem to have used the “Don’t know” answer, which could have been treated as the middle category albeit as conveyed earlier it is not a perfect measure but it is linked to the weaknesses of Eurobarometer data. In Hooghe’s (2003) research, the questions used in the national elite survey and European elite survey are similar to the Eurobarometer question but differ slightly in that they incorporate a 10 point scale and allow respondents to indicate, in addition to the direction, the degree of support or opposition: “To what extent should each of the following policy areas be decided at the national or regional level and to what extent at the European level? We have a scale from 1 to 10...the scores in between allow you to say how close to either side you are (towards 1 = more in favour of the policy being decided at the national or regional level; towards 10 = more in favour of the policy being decided at the European level)”. Two further research limitations of Hooghe’s (2003) study are that datasets with different years were used in the analysis – 1996 for the national elite survey; 2001-2002 for the European elite survey and 2000 for the citizens’ survey (Eurobarometer) – and that the model was not tested across time, both of these necessarily limiting the value of the results elicited in the related study.

A weakness of many of the researches reviewed is that the dependent variables used tend not to be aggregate variables but yet the related variables are tested with economic aggregate variables. A fairer approach is to test the relationship of an aggregate dependent variable with aggregate variables, which will be done in this research. An aggregate level study, whilst useful, is also of limited value as it focuses on the aggregation of opinions and calls for a study at the individual level, in the full sample of citizens to confirm results obtained in the aggregate level study. Hence, in the current research, an individual level analysis will also be carried out.
3.4.2 Individual Level Data Analysis

3.4.2.1 Individual Benefit and EU Support

A strength of the analysis carried out by Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) is that in the individual level analysis, the explanatory variables, trust in institutions (Commission and national government) and influence on institutions (national government and European institutions), are selected rather than the satisfaction with national or European democracy variables which are quite general. All these measures are though unsatisfactory as they fail to gauge the performance of the political actors (in other words the people running the country). The first two variables measure the approval of the regime institutions while the other two measure the regime performance (Linde and Ekman, 2003). It can be though hypothesized that citizens do not actually dissociate the performance of institutions from that of political actors and tend to place the latter as the overarching player. Besides certain researchers such as Anderson (1998), Ray (2003a), Gabel (1998a) – support for party of prime minister (president in France) for the latter – and Dutch and Taylor (1997) – the latter in a study at the aggregate level – have identified and utilized an incumbent government support variable. To do so, they used the following question “If there were a general election tomorrow, which party would you vote for?” and transformed it into a dummy variable with a code of one given for supporters of the government (governing parties) and zero otherwise.

It is also useful that the political variables used by Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) plus the EC/EU benefit question are used at the same time in the analysis, controlling for the effect of each other as the evaluation of European integration for respondents is complex and subject to several sources of proxies. However the coding of “don’t know” as the middle category for example for the benefit question or trust in institutions, is though arguable as mentioned above although the author claimed that there was no change in results by not incorporating the related category. It must be noted that the selection of the trust in government variable is also consistent with the incumbent popularity argument (Franklin, Van Der Eijk and Marsh (1995); Hug and Sciarini (2000) and Ehin (2001), the latter in the context of Central and Eastern European countries). The masses are thus often too uninformed and uninterested to
form independent opinions on integration issues, their willingness to endorse the elite driven integration project is partially dependent on their overall trust in national elites.

As discussed in the literature review, Gabel (1998a) in his book entitled “Interests and Integration: Market Liberalization, Public Opinion and European Union”, has tested utilitarian support for integration. In the methodology that was used, there are a number of strengths and weaknesses. The first positive point is that he examined via a confirmatory factor analysis, the covariation patterns between the dependent variables of support for European integration and de facto identified latent and underlying factors. This enabled him to identify the measures of utilitarian and affective support. It must though be noted that the “don’t know” category was arbitrarily coded as the middle category in the questions such as EC national benefit, EC solidarity and European unification. A respondent who answers “don’t know” to a question may not belong to this mid category and may have no opinion on the issue, which is different to the implicit neither in favour nor against positioning used in this coding. However “don’t know” answers in questions such as the benefit question where there was no other middle category, were found to express lack of support for the EU (Anderson and Smith, 2004). The use of “don’t know” category in the confirmatory factor analysis is also justified by the fact that a binary variable would be problematic if used with such a statistical procedure. Following the factor analysis, Gabel (1998a) used rightly the dependent variable (evaluation of membership) with the highest factor loading to test whether integration support has a utilitarian perspective. However as mentioned above, the related Eurobarometer question is perhaps too vague and broadly worded to be a precise measure of utilitarian support, this underlining the limitation of factor analysis.

Another positive aspect of Gabel’s research is that the study was carried out over a long period from spring 1975 to spring 1992. The research carried out by Gabel (1998a) also relies on multivariate analyses both at the individual and aggregate levels, and de facto circumvents the results validity issues found with research carried out by for example Inglehart et al. (1991), Feld and Wildgen (1976), Hewstone (1986) and Handley (1981) with much of the evidence consisting for these of bivariate analyses, which may conceal intervening or spurious relationships.
Gabel (1998a) has used a number of controlling variables to look at their effect on other explanatory variables and their unique effect on utilitarian support at both the individual and aggregate level.

Although in Gabel’s study (1998a), the dependent variable used – membership evaluation with a three point scale coded from 0 (bad thing), 1 (neither good nor bad) to 2 (good thing), standardized in percentage – contains less discriminating info, it can still be treated as continuous as discussed above and therefore employed with OLS regression models. It must also be noted that the author claims to have done an ordered probit analysis, which gave the same results. It must be noted that Gabel (1998a) is using the same dependent variable, calculated in the same manner in both the individual and aggregate level data. For the latter he does not take the average, which is for the least an arguable practice. In addition, limited response categories on the dependent variable necessarily impose some restrictions on how well respondents can express their attitudes and some respondents may interpret the meaning of the categories slightly differently, which may in turn deflate the explained variance $R^2$, although Gabel’s analysis aimed to estimate the relationship between the explanatory variables and the dependent variable, and not maximize explained variance. A study aiming at maximizing inter alia the amount of variance in the dependent variable (integration support) accounted by the explanatory variables, in other words a profiling of the pro-European and the eurosceptic, may be itself propitious. It must be noted that some of the assumptions of the parametric tests used (e.g. normality, linearity, independent observations) are not discussed in Gabel’s book but it is true that in most of the research literature on the topic of interest, few researchers comment on the assumptions of the tests used. The respect of these assumptions is though necessary to warrant the use of tests like OLS regression models. There is also a tendency to multiply the use of dummy variables in the analysis but this is partly related to the poor design of the Eurobarometer surveys commented upon above.

In the study of Gabel and Palmer (1995), a dependent variable constructed from responses to two questions was employed – three point scale country’s membership evaluation (good, neither good nor bad and bad thing) and four point scale western Europe unification (very much/to some extent for – against) which are summed,
standardized by the maximum possible total and multiplied by one hundred, this forming an effective seven point scale. However for 1976 and 1977, the European unification question is replaced by a three point scale, desired speed of unification question as it was not available for the related years. A benefit of using the related two survey questions is that a more precise and discriminating measure of EU support is created, capturing the full range of underlying attitudes, that is less plagued by the statistical problems associated with measurement error (Gabel, 1998b). The related Eurobarometer questions on their own may be too vague and broadly worded to be precise measures of the different types of public support, that is to say affective and utilitarian support. Furthermore a weakness in Gabel and Palmer's research (1995) is that they are testing individual level data with some aggregate level data (although some are measured per capita like World War II deaths and EC trade balance; EC trade percentage is not per capita), practice, which is in essence open to question.

Along the same lines as Palmer and Gabel (1995), Nelsen et al. (2001) in demonstrating in an individual level study that religion, in particular Catholicism, can influence support for integration, have relied on dependent variables constructed from adding responses to several questions, checking prior to this whether responses to questions were loading one another by carrying out principal component analyses. Some of these indexed dependent variables incorporated a combined five-point scale (for 1998, used answers to evaluation of membership question and EC benefit question). Others relied on a seven point scale or more (for 1994, 5 questions were used: evaluation of membership; for or against unification; country benefit; desired pace of integration and sorry if the EU was scrapped). However, there are two main issues with these constructed dependent variables. Firstly, the individual questions mixed in the index measure different sorts of public evaluation (affective, utilitarian or pace of integration) which may not help the analyses, especially when the purpose of the current study is to uncover whether the evaluation of the EU depends on the performance of the nation state and may therefore concern more utilitarian support than a generalized measure of support for the EU.60 Secondly, there is a paucity of data concerning the simultaneous availability of these individual questions in

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60 It must be noted that other studies such as ones by De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2005) and Hooghe and Marks (2005) have also used such indexed dependent variables.
Eurobarometer surveys, which makes the comparability of results between periods difficult. It must be noted that from 1995, evaluation of membership, EC benefit and pace of integration are the questions, which are the most available in the surveys. With explained variances ranging from 7.6% to 28% in their regression analyses, although measured at the individual level, the multivariate analyses carried out tend not to optimise explained variance (the latter being a research objective of the related researchers), possibly because of some over-fitting with the full models of 1994.

The approach taken by Nelsen and Guth (2000) to explore gender differences in the support for European integration (individual level analysis) has the advantage of also using an indexed dependent variable (for or against unification; evaluation of membership; Country benefit and Sorry if the EU was scrapped), the latter being the product of reliability and principal component analyses. Yet, as mentioned above, this may also be a weakness and difficult to apply with regard to the paucity of data. It must be noted that the related researchers have also used indexed variables for some independent variables such as traditional gender role variable. Though the validity of the results obtained in that study is limited as it relied on one cross-national survey, namely, Eurobarometer 42 (1994). The retention and coding of “Don’t know” in the dependent variable is also contestable as indicated above.

Kritzinger (2003) in her cross-sectional research, to demonstrate that public support for integration is endogenous to the national economic and political performance of the related member state, recognized partly that political support should be measured by creating new scaled political variables to gauge political support at the national and European level. Thus, for the political support at the national level, Kritzinger (2003) relied on the questions “satisfaction with the way democracy works in your country?” and “rely or not on each of the following institutions to make sure that the decisions taken by this institution are in the interest of yourself? the national government and the national parliament?”. It must be noted that Kritzinger (2003) did not report the reliability of the newly created variable.

What is positive in the methodology used by Kritzinger (2003) is that she has used exogeneity tests to look at whether the European factor is endogeneous (in other
words dependent on) to national economic and political factors and has taken this into account to build three stage least squares regression models.\textsuperscript{61} It is also positive that (independent) variables were created from different questions, this permitting her to rely on several questions’ responses to form a construct and also build, in the process, continuous variables necessary to use parametric regression models although the reliabilities for these created variables were not reported.\textsuperscript{62} The dependent variable selected for Kritzinger’s research, namely “For or against unification of Western Europe” (four point measurement scale) whilst being limited in terms of discriminating information can be treated as continuous. In addition Kritzinger has claimed to have used other dependent variables such as membership indicator, dissolution indicator and a scale of these questions and found very similar results.

A major limitation to Kritzinger’s research results pertains to their validity as the related study relies solely on one data survey, namely EB 42 (1994) and calls therefore for further research to confirm her results although the availability of similar data is here an obstacle. Another limitation in Kritzinger’s research, is that only attitudinal questions, that is to say citizens’ perceptions, regarding national and European factors (economic, political and social factors) are tested, and as a result, the relationship between actual economic, social and political data and integration support (aggregate level study) is ignored. Kritzinger’s study is limited to four countries, namely Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and France but provides a wealth of comparisons in the sense that the four countries have inter alia somewhat different public attitudes to European integration from enthusiasm to euroscepticism, differences in public attitudes to national structures and types of states. It is especially interesting that the two countries, France and the United Kingdom on which the present study is carried out are included here.

Anderson and Reichert (1996) have used OLS regression models with the dependent variable “EU membership” which has a three-point ordinal scale. Assumptions of

\textsuperscript{61} The last stage of the regression models was destined to apply a Generalized Least Squares procedure (= Weighted Least Squares regression procedure) to deal with heteroscedasticity present in the data and produce unbiased estimates although the transformation of data would have provided more efficient estimators.

\textsuperscript{62} A reliability analysis is carried out to ascertain whether diverse items (questions) measure the same underlying construct.
test were moreover not commented on. They also used in the same analysis aggregate (EU trade and net EU budget return) and individual level data (age, gender, income, education, farmers, and post-materialism), which is for the least an arguable practice. What is interesting in the procedure followed by Anderson and Reichert (1996) is that in testing whether countries and individuals that benefit from the European integration process are significantly more supportive of the EU, they test the data per year (that is to say year 1982, 1986 and 1990 tested separately) and do not pool data cross-sectionally or at the aggregate level in a time-series manner as they argue that national and personal economic benefits can have time-variant effects on citizens' support for integration. This procedure is thus justified by three reasons: The object of investigation – European integration and the EU as an organisation has evolved and is evolving through time; the national and international economic and political context in which European integration takes place is also evolving; and finally countries which have joined the EU at different times and with different political and economic motivations may not react similarly to economic costs and benefits resulting from the integration context. This procedure has the merit of making possible and easy comparisons between years.

**Objects of Political Support**

Linde and Ekman (2003) have shown that the survey item “satisfaction with the way democracy works” is an indicator of support for the way the democratic regime works in practice. Norris (1999a, 1999b, 1999c) building on the work of Easton (1965; 1975) thus distinguished five levels or objects of political support: The political community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions and political actors. The question “satisfaction with the way democracy works” gauges the regime performance rather than the performance of political actors in the related countries. However respondents may not dissociate clearly between the performance of the regime ("satisfaction with the way democracy works" question), the approval of the regime institutions (trust or no trust in institutions questions) and the performance of political actors (people running the country). It goes without saying that these domains also influence each other mutually, so the dissociation is not easy to extricate nor totally possible considering their mutual interdependence.
Thus it should be noted that the perceived performance of a regime has to do with what the regime delivers and what it does not deliver (what it refrains from doing). As Lipset (1959), Easton (1965; 1975) and Almond and Verba (1963; 1980) have pointed out, the support for the political regime and a fortiori for political leaders is built on a record of acknowledged regime performance or systems outputs over the long term. Systems outputs are not only of an economic and social nature (economic growth, employment...) but also have to do with the regime’s capacity to maintain order, to maintain the rule of law and to otherwise respect human rights and the democratic rules of the game. This implies that there are bridges between the effectiveness of regime and its legitimacy. A successful political and economic development generates a reservoir of goodwill that can be used to cover minor or temporary setbacks in the system’s ability to produce outputs. This aspect can be especially important in the case of the United Kingdom and France as they have witnessed a different economic, social and political outputs record in terms of, for example, unemployment, taxation or public order over the last 15 to 20 years which can be considered as long term and may have a role to play in citizens’ support for European integration. It concerns the real measurement in these domains, that is to say the actual outputs or outcomes, as well as citizens’ perceptions of these. The “satisfaction with the way democracy works” item has the weakness of being influenced by the political-ideological orientations of the respondents and as such dissatisfaction with democracy measured by this item may not be necessarily motivated by actual political outcomes. Thus persons who voted for a party that made it to government – that is to say the winners – tend to be more satisfied with democracy than those who voted for a party that did not make it into the government – that is to say the losers. Winners are supposedly more likely to believe that their government is interested in and more responsive to their needs and thus are more inclined to be more satisfied than the losers with the performance of the government (Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Fuchs et al., 1995). Party Preference and ideological orientation of individuals as tested before, also influence support for integration by themselves. It must be noted that if electoral preferences on EU integration are influenced by party position – and the demographic profile of each respondent – party position on European integration is also influenced by electoral preferences on EU integration, as demonstrated by Carrubba (2001) with the use of a two-least
squares regression model. Ray (2003a) has shown that the relationship between EU support and incumbent government support is context dependent and therefore mediated by a range of variables such as party positions on EU integration, left-right ideology, ideological extremism, party attachment and economic situation of the respondent but also by proximity to European referendum and European Parliament elections.

In actual terms, within the political support framework proposed by Norris (1999a, b, c), it is sensible to postulate that citizens use different proxies, objects of political support to assess the performance of the national authorities to deal with the economic, political, and social issues that the country undergoes without distinguishing clearly between the specificities of each (this, depending on citizens’ knowledge of and interest in the national political environment). In the EB surveys, there are questions which measure political support in terms of the political community (“proud to be a citizen of this country?”), regime performance (“satisfaction with the way democracy works in our country?”), regime institutions (“trust in institutions?”). Moreover these questions are applied to both the related country and the European Union as a whole but these questions are not present in all surveys. As noted above there are no indicators of the approval of political actors in the Eurobarometer series nor of the regime principles although the question “If there were a general election tomorrow, which party would you vote for?” used by some researchers such as Anderson (1998), Ray (2003a), Gabel (1998a) and Dutch and Taylor (1997) may help to gauge the approval of incumbent political actors. However this indicator is not optimal in the sense that this support is also conditioned by the existence and nature of the political opposition to the incumbent government and then the political game, and not entirely by the approval of policies per se followed by the incumbent government and its behaviour. Also it is possible to gather approval ratings for political leaders in polls published and take the yearly average, although this would conflict with the use of individual data for the reasons mentioned above. Linde and Ekman (2003) have also underlined that to gauge political support, there should be questions which not only measure the five indicators of political support but also there should be several questions for each indicator. It is also a limitation of the EB series as the measurement of each
dimension tends to rely on one question, and questions are not always available across years.

**National and European Identity and Image**

What is interesting in Medrano and Gutierrez’s study (2001) is that although it is about nested identities, they use questions with more discriminating information than Eurobarometer questions, that is to say they often use ten point scales or index scales, addressing in the process some of the weaknesses in the phrasing of Eurobarometer questions. They use questions to uncover the compatibility of the European identity with national and regional identities such as “Image of Europe in political, economic and social terms”, degree of “Identification with Europe”, degree of “Identification with Spain” and degree of “Identification with the Autonomous Community”, cumulated with an analysis of the discourse of the national Spanish political actors on Europe. This is certainly important in the context of the United Kingdom and France as Europe tends to be portrayed by related national political actors and the media in a different way.

In Eurobarometer surveys, there are questions – though not always available across years – about whether people watch the media, how fairly the media cover European affairs, whether respondents are interested in European and national politics, how often respondents think themselves as European – it must also be noted that the Eurobarometer question “how often do you think of yourself as European?” is awkward as identity is not something one usually thinks about but adequately differentiates individuals according to their degree of identification with Europe. EB surveys also subsume the following questions “In the near future do you see yourself as …?” (coding 1 = Nationality only; 2 = Nationality and European; 3 = European and Nationality; 4 = European only) and “People may feel different degrees of attachment to their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to your country or to Europe” (very attached; fairly attached; not very attached; not at all attached) which are clearly about community and identity, in particular sense of inclusive or exclusive identity and attachment to the country and Europe, and have been used in recent research studies to monitor their influence on European integration (Hooghe and Marks, 2005; Carey, 2002; Luedtke, 2005).
There is a need in the current research, to build on this and investigate whether and to what extent the national identity concern and its compatibility with Europe moderate the relationship between European integration support and utilitarianism, and what role national political actors and national institutions play in this. The terms identity and image have here a broad meaning and cover the national and European socio-economic and political dimensions.

Furthermore in his research on France and Germany, Schild (2001) has shown a relationship between sense of European identity and one’s evaluation of the country’s EC membership – this contrasting with the sense of national identity being more affective-based. To do this, he used Eurobarometer data from 1982 to 1999. He first looked at a series of correlations between pride to be a national of a country and self-perceptions as a French or German and/or as a European. The questions used were the following: National pride question: “Would you say that you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud or not at all proud to be French or German?” (coding 1 = not at all proud; 2 = not very proud; 3 = fairly proud; 4 = very proud); Self-perceptions as a French or German and/or as a European: “In the near future do you see yourself as …?” (coding 1 = French/German; 2 = French/German and European; 3 = European and French/German; 4 = European only). He also correlated these questions with the unification question, membership benefit question and membership question.

3.4.2.2 Structuring of Individual EU Policy Preferences

The way individuals structure their EU policy preferences has been much less researched. Thus, Gabel and Anderson (2002) conducted a confirmatory factor analysis of Eurobarometer data of citizens’ preferences regarding existing EU policy areas and therefore left out Eurobarometer questions related to creation of new policies but it is true that some of the EU policies in the question selected for the study concern policies that were not fully developed at the time when data was collected, that is to say in 1996. The question selected by Gabel and Anderson (2002) in EB 44.2 BIS “Some people expect the European Union to become more active than now in certain policy areas. For each of the following, please tell me if you consider it a key priority or not: a to y” has the merit of covering a broad range
of policy areas of EU policy authority from monetary union, crime, immigration, employment programmes, environment protection, equal opportunities to common defence policy and as such can gauge citizens' preferences in these domains. While the list does not exhaust all EU policies, it did include policy areas that are useful to test how citizens structure their EU policy preferences in the economic, political and social fields. The policy statements also generally indicated a policy direction, not simply a policy area, for instance they were asked whether “intervening more firmly in possible conflicts” is a priority. The related survey question chosen by Gabel and Anderson (2002) has, however, the weakness of not directly measuring the respondents’ agreement with the EU policy as they are asked whether the policy is a priority – measuring de facto both salience and direction of each policy statement as Gabel and Anderson (2002) acknowledged. The fact that the respondent’s choice of priority policies is not limited helps to reduce this problem and as a result respondents are not constrained explicitly to prioritise among policy statements and can advance their directional preference regarding each policy statement.

A further weakness is that the question’s response scale used has only three categories, namely “not a key priority”, “a key priority” and “Don’t know”. It does not include directly an intermediate category that captures indifference regarding the policy statement. The “Don’t know category” may capture some of this indifference and as such was retained in the analysis of Gabel and Anderson (2002). This resolved partly the problem of conducting a factor analysis with a dichotomous variable but such an analysis would ideally require a quantitative variable which is a rare occurrence in the Eurobarometer data. Gabel and Anderson (2002) do not moreover comment on the assumptions of the related test. The analysis and results of Gabel and Anderson (2002) on the structure of citizens’ attitudes and the EU political space is also not tested across time. The analysis was for the European electorate as a whole and had the drawback of not examining the structure of attitudes within member states.

In their studies, Hooghe (2003) and Voessing (2005) have used an EB question which asks respondents how they want to distribute authority between the EU and national governments for specific policies. The merit of this question is that it provides a measure of EU policy preferences, tapping therefore utilitarian support
and enabling it to measure the EU’s output legitimacy for individuals. While Hooghe’s (2003) research takes into account a number of policies (thirteen) in her analysis ranging from agriculture to social inclusion, the analysis is at the aggregate level – policies are not analysed individually – and only inter-group variation between national and European elites and public opinion as a whole were studied. Voessing’s analysis (2005) involved using a composite index of eight policies ranging from currency to security and defence and examined the differences in scores between public opinions in eleven countries. In the same analysis, differences on ideological opinions between public opinions in the same countries were reviewed separately. The main weakness of Voessing’s (2005) and Hooghe’s (2003) studies is that public preferences towards the scope of EU policy-making are not tested and analysed together with the directional content of policies. This will be tested across individual policies and time for France and the United Kingdom in hypothesis III.

3.5 Selection and Operationalization of Variables

3.5.1 Selection and Operationalization of Variables for Hypothesis I

Hypothesis I aims to study the relationship between EU support and national political institutions performance in socio-economic, societal and political terms in the French and British contexts. The study is done at the aggregate level and based on twelve nations including the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Ireland, Greece and Denmark. British models subsume a dummy variable comparing the United Kingdom to the other EU countries while French ones incorporate a dummy variable comparing France to the other EU countries. These dummies permit us to see whether the level of EU support in France and the United Kingdom is higher or lower than in other EU countries but also allow us to measure the effects of economic, social, political and socio-economic variables on EU support controlling for these dummies. They therefore enable us to see whether these independent variables have an effect on EU support in the French and British contexts.
3.5.1.1 Dependent Variables

Two dependent variables were used, one measured support for current EU membership and the other one measured support for future European integration.

Current EU Membership Evaluation

The current EU membership dependent variable is constructed from answers on the following two questions:

- “Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)’s membership of the European Union is …?” (1/ a good thing; 2/ neither good nor bad; 3/ a bad thing)

- “Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (OUR COUNTRY) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?” (1/ benefited; 2/ don’t know; 3/ not benefited)

Two variants of the first current EU membership dependent variable were used. Both consisted of an aggregate composite score of these two questions but one integrated the “don’t know” response in the benefit question and the other one did not. The rationale behind keeping “Don’t know” response – and recoding it as a middle category in the benefit question – in the first variant dependent variable is justified by the fact that it can help to capture the opinion of people who feel their country has neither benefited nor not benefited from EU membership – and not only those who have no opinion on the issue – in the absence of such an option in the response categories proposed to respondents. The fact that “don’t know” responses represented over 20% of responses in the benefit question – against 7 or 8% of answers in the good thing question – seems to corroborate this.

The choice of the compound dependent variables is motivated by the fact they measure utilitarian support (and recognised as such by earlier research literature), are available across years – in the study period – and provide a more precise and discriminating measure of EU support, capturing a fuller range of underlying attitudes that are less plagued by the statistical problems associated with measurement error. The composite dependent variable has good internal consistency with a Cronbach’s Alpha of .868 and .856 for respectively scale without
“don’t know” answers in benefit question and the one with “don’t know” answers in benefit question (please see appendix 3.1), and as such measure the same underlying construct.

**Future European Integration Support**

The future European integration dependent variable is operationalised by using the following question:

- “Which corresponds best to the speed of building Europe you would like? n°1 is running as fast as possible, n°7 is standing still”.

The related dependent variable has a seven point scale – the average score per country was taken for the aggregate level analysis (hypothesis I) – and has the merit of specifying views in a more precise way than the dependent variables used in other studies, such as the European Unification question, and is available across the study period.

**3.5.1.2 Independent Variables**

The independent variables which will be tested, are regrouped into four themes in line with the literature and hypothesis I aiming to test utilitarian explanations. The present research uses economic aggregates, political and societal indicators of the year in which Eurobarometer surveys are conducted. The rationale for this is that respondents form their opinion about the general economic, political and societal situation in their country based on present daily life evidence but also information and data reported in the media and by the elites (for example political parties) which tend to comment on actual current situation and the near future (for example economic forecasts).

**Socialisation Theory and EU Support**

The variables timing of (EU) entry and length of (EU) membership account for the socialisation theory. In line with earlier research, length of membership variable is gauged in years whilst timing of entry is operationalised by giving a code of 3 to founding EC nations (France, Germany, Benelux and Italy) who initially started EU
membership with a higher enthusiasm for EU integration, a code of 2 to late joiners (Portugal, Spain and Greece) who started membership with a lesser enthusiasm for EU integration and finally a code of 1 for middle joiners (United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark) who started membership with an even lesser enthusiasm for EU integration. It must be noted that these two variables are not tested together in the same models as they are highly correlated with one another (multicollinearity problem), which would inflate the size of error terms and weaken the regression analyses (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001).

**Economic and Social Sphere and EU Support**

The following socio-economic variables are tested:

**Inflation** – Annual consumer price variation, Source: European Commission (2002).


**Intra-EU Trade Dependence** – Intra-EU exports plus intra-EU imports divided by two as a percentage of GDP at market prices, Source: European Commission (2002).

**Intra-EU Trade Balance** – Intra-EU exports minus intra-EU imports as a percentage of GDP at market prices, Source: European Commission (2002).

**Unemployment** – Unemployment rate (Eurostat Definition), Source: European Commission (2002).

**Social Expenditure per Head** – Total Expenditure on Social Protection per Head of Population in ECU/EURO, Source: Eurostat/ESSPROS (2006).

**Total Tax Burden** – Current Tax Burden (Total Economy) in percentage of GDP, figure from 1995 with ESA 95 definitions, Source: European Commission (2003). Total Tax Burden is a variable which to my knowledge has not been tested before the present research.

**Bureaucracy** – Extracted from annual World/Global Competitiveness Reports (various years), figures were standardised (divided by maximum score of scale –
scale was reversed for 2000 and 2001 figures – and multiplied by 100), Source: Institute for Management Development (various years). Bureaucracy is a variable which to my knowledge has not been tested before the present research.

Societal Sphere and EU Support

National Economic Corruption – Level of National Economic Corruption, Source: Transparency International (various years). Although the measure of national corruption used here is only economic and therefore does not include abuse of political influence – for instance misuse of or excessive centralization of power – national economic corruption is usually more current than abuse of political influence and the indicator used is available across countries and years. The higher the figure, the less corruption there is in a country.

Crime per Head of Population – Crime per Head of Population (recorded by the police), Source: Barclay and Tavares (2003). Crime is a variable which to my knowledge has not been tested before the present research.

While studies have demonstrated the link between anti-immigration sentiments, general hostility towards other cultures and reluctance about European integration (De Vreese and Boomgarden (2005); McLaren (2002)), immigration and its link with European integration is a variable which has not been tested on the aggregate level before the present research. Immigration indicators investigated here consist of three variables:

Foreign Population Inflows – Inflows of foreign populations into EU countries in thousand, Source: Eurostat (2006a); OECD/SOPEMI (Various Years). Figures for Greece from 1999 to 2001 are not available, despite approaches to the Greek home office and immigration research centre.


Since most countries do not have accurate figures on immigration and emigration and given the public sensitivity of the information, these figures need to be taken with caution.

National Identity – Aggregate score taken from dichotomous national identity variable where the value of one is given to respondents with exclusive national identity (nationality only) and zero otherwise (all other categories). Recoded from Eurobarometer question: “In the near future, do you see yourself as (1) nationality only, (2) nationality and European, (3) European and nationality, and (4) European only?”. This question was selected as it is about community and identity (in line with literature) and is available across years.

Political Sphere and EU Support

Incumbent Government Support – Composite score from questions: “On the whole, are you very satisfied (1), fairly satisfied (2), don’t know (3), not very satisfied (4) or not at all satisfied (5) with the way democracy works in (our country)?” and “if there was a General Election tomorrow, which party would you vote for?” (the latter with one given for supporters of the government (governing parties), two for don’t know and three otherwise), figures were standardised (scores were added, then divided by maximum score of combined scale and multiplied by 100). Middle category answers (that is to say “Don’t Know”) were only used in composite score when “Don’t Know” response was considered in benefit dependent variable. The results for the incumbent government support variable were no different with or without integrating this middle category.

Referendum Years – Years of referendum were coded 1 (France, 1992; Denmark, 1992, 1998 and 2000; and Ireland, 1992, 1998 and 2001) and otherwise coded 0 for all other years and countries.

European Elections Years – Years of European elections (1994 and 1999) were coded 1 and otherwise coded 0 for all other years.
3.5.2 Selection and Operationalization of Variables for Hypothesis II

Hypothesis II aims to study the relationship between citizens’ support for integration and citizens’ individual benefits extracted from European integration in the French and British contexts. The study is done at the individual level and done separately for French and British samples.

3.5.2.1 Dependent Variables

Two types of dependent variables were used, one measured support for current EU membership and the other one measured support for future European integration.

**Current EU Membership Evaluation**

Two dependent variables with each two variants were used to test current EU membership evaluation, as follows:

- “Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)’s membership of the European Union is …?”
  
  First variant: answer coded 0 for neither good nor bad & a bad thing and answer coded 1 for a good thing
  
  Second variant: answer coded 0 for a bad thing and answer coded 1 for a good thing

- “Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (OUR COUNTRY) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?”
  
  First variant: answer coded 0 for don’t know and not benefited and answer coded 1 for benefited
  
  Second variant: answer coded 0 for not benefited and answer coded 1 for benefited

The rationale for selecting the two dependent variables and retaining “don’t know” responses in the benefit question developed in Section 3.5.1.1 applies here. Thus
these variables both gauge utilitarian support, are available across years – in the study period – and provide a more precise and discriminating measure of EU support, capturing a fuller range of underlying attitudes. The retention of “don’t know” responses in the benefit question is justified by the fact that it can help to capture the opinion of people who feel their country has neither benefited nor not benefited from EU membership – and not only those who have no opinion on the issue – in the absence of such an option in the response categories proposed to respondents.

The two dependent variables – good thing and benefit variables – are tested separately as the study is carried out here at the individual data level – inter-item correlations and reliability (scale) results between the two dependent variables are lower (albeit still high) than at the aggregate level (please see appendix 3.2) – and it is itself valuable to examine whether there are any differences in the results between citizens’ appraisal of current EU support involving the benefit variable and the good thing variable. The benefit question is a relatively more precise question which may accentuate the stress on utilitarian feelings for individuals. Anderson and Smith (2004) thus found that citizens tend to be even more critical of European integration when responding to the EU benefit question.

The coding of the dependent variables – that is to say the regrouping of the middle category with “not benefited” or “a bad thing” responses – is motivated not only on statistical grounds – to avoid the problem of empty cells or inadequate expected cell frequencies which would weaken the logistic regression statistical analysis – but also by the fact that hypothesis II primarily aims to analyse whether individual utilitarian reasons explain or not people’s support for current EU membership in the French and British contexts. “Don’t know” and “neither good nor bad” answers in the membership and benefit questions were also found to express lack of support for the EU (Anderson and Smith, 2004). The analysis here does not attempt to fully explain all individual attitudes – “don’t know” answers were thus not taken into account in the operationalisation of desired speed and good thing variables as they only represented around 10% of all answers and a middle category in these variables was already retained – but incorporated the middle category of the dependent
variables which provides some methodological enhancements compared to previous research.

**Future European Integration Support**

The future European integration dependent variable is operationalised by using the following question and coding of answers:

- “Which corresponds best to the speed of building Europe you would like? n°1 is running as fast as possible, n°7 is standing still”.

The related dependent variable has a seven point scale and has the merit of specifying views in a more precise way than the dependent variables used in other studies, such as the European Unification question, and is available across the study period.

**3.5.2.2 Independent Variables**

The independent variables which will be tested, are regrouped along four themes in line with the literature and hypothesis II aiming to test utilitarian explanations. To avoid the problem of zero cells or inadequate expected cell frequencies which would weaken the logistic regression analysis, the effective categorisation of each variable was organised according to the statistical significance of categories with one another on the dependent variable – in other words whether they have a significant effect on the dependent variable.

**Subjective Economic Performance Evaluation and EU Support**

The following question was used to operationalize the three variables below: “What are your expectations for the year to come, will (next year) be better, the same or worse, when it comes to …?”

- Expectations over coming 12 months for Economic Situation in Country
- Expectations over coming 12 months for Employment Situation in Country
- Expectations over coming 12 months for Financial Situation of Household
The justification for selecting citizens’ subjective economic performance evaluation over the next twelve months (rather than just in the past twelve months) is that respondents tend to form their opinion about the general economic situation and their personal situation on the present situation and the near future rather than just on the near past. This question is also useful as it enables the respondent to compare the current year with next year’s expectations. Furthermore these variables were available largely across years in the study period, which was not the case for the other type of variables.

Demographic and Socio-Economic Characteristics of Individuals and EU Support

Income – Question D29 on harmonised income groups has been used as it facilitates the comparison between British and French individuals. Respondents are asked to take into account the total income of their household (inclusive of all private and public incomes). Income groups consist of “- -“ (lowest income group), “-+”, “+” and “++” (highest income group).

Education – Question D8 has been employed to operationalise the education variable. It incorporates the following groups: “up to 15 years”, “16 – 19 years”, “20+ years” and “still studying”.

Occupation – Question D15a was operationalised in two ways. The first variable compared together middle and high managers, professionals (inclusive of employed ones) and students (coded 1) versus rest (shop owners, farmers/fishermen, manual workers, clerks, unemployed, retired or unable to work through illness) and housewives) (coded 2). The justification for this is that the category coded 1 are expected to support EU integration as the market liberalization pertaining to the EU integration offers more opportunities for people with human and financial capital. The second variable compared separately professionals and general management (coded 1), manual workers (including supervisors) (coded 2), students (coded 3), unemployed (coded 4), middle managers (coded 5), and clerks (coded 6) against retired or unable to work. The latter was chosen as the reference category as it includes the largest number of respondents and retired or unable to work people tend to be more reluctant towards European integration as they are concerned about the
effects of European integration (especially economic integration) on their welfare (especially on health and pensions). Statistical models integrating the seven category occupation variable are labelled “+” in addition to the model number. For models incorporating the future European integration dependent variable, 6 dummy variables are used with retired or unable to work as the control category (coded 0) and each occupational group assigned a code of 1.

Materialism/Post-Materialism – The following question was used: “what should be the nation’s goals? (1st choice; 2nd choice)” Maintain order and fight rising prices coded as 1 (corresponding to materialist values); protect freedom of speech and give people more say in government decisions coded as 2 (corresponding to post-materialist values). This procedure was replicated for the first and second choice expressed by individuals.

Proximity to intra-EU Borders – Regions bordering the EU were coded 1: for the United Kingdom (Wales, South East and South West and Northern Ireland) and for France (Champagne-Ardenne, Picardie, Haute-Normandie, Basse-Normandie, Nord Pas de Calais, Lorraine, Alsace, Franche-Comté, Bretagne, Aquitaine, Midi-Pyrénées, Rhone-Alpes, Languedoc-Roussillon, Province-Alpes-Cote d’Azur and Corse); other regions were coded 0: for the United Kingdom (Scotland, North Yorkshire & Humberside + North West, East/West Midlands + East Anglia, and Greater London Council) and for France (Ile-de-France, Centre, Bourgogne, Pays de la Loire, Poitou-Charentes, Limousin and Auvergne). The disadvantage of these regions is that they are relatively broad and may make it more difficult to capture intra-EU proximity utilitarian assessment but this is the best regions variable available in Eurobarometer – the combined regions variable has even broader regions categories.

EU Knowledge, Political Ideology, Cognitive Mobilisation, Media Use, Age, Gender and EU Support

EU Knowledge – The following question was used: “....how much do you feel you know about the European Union, its policies, its institutions?” answers were coded as 1 for respondents who know it very and quite well, and coded as 2 for respondents who know it not very well and not at all. This variable measures
subjective knowledge. Measures of objective knowledge were not available every year and consisted of different knowledge questions (varying in difficulty from one Eurobarometer survey to another) which made it somewhat less reliable to infer and compare knowledge of respondents across years. The effect of subjective and objective knowledge on the dependent variable was moreover very similar.

Political Ideology – Ideological views of respondents with left, centre and right categories.

Cognitive Mobilisation – It is operationalised by two variables:

Political Discussion Frequency – using the question “When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally, or never?”

Political Persuasion – employing the question “When you hold a strong opinion, do you ever find yourself persuading your friends, relatives or fellow workers to share your views? Does this happen often, from time to time, rarely, or never?”

Media use – Operationalised by the following question: “Do you read the news in daily papers everyday, several times a week, once or twice a week, less often or never?”

The choice of newspaper reading is justified by the fact that it is consistently listed in Eurobarometer data as one of the most important sources of information about the EU for citizens in Europe. More than watching television or listening to the radio, daily newspaper reading enhances political interest and knowledge, local political participation and a more integrated understanding of political issues (McLeod et al., 1999; Guo and Moy, 1998; Holtz-Bacha and Norris, 1999; Schultz, 2003; and Peter and De Vreese, 2003). Despite the decline of newspaper readership in the recent past – especially for young readers –, newspaper readership remains important (Lauf, 2001) and as such has been retained as a variable in the present testing.

Gender – Female and male categories

Political Sphere and EU Support

Incumbent Government Support – Composite score from questions: “On the whole, are you very or fairly satisfied (coded as 1), don’t know (coded as 2), not very or not at all satisfied (coded as 3) with the way democracy works in (our country)?” and “If there was a General Election tomorrow, which party would you vote for?” (the latter with one given for supporters of the government (governing parties), two for don’t know and three otherwise). Middle category answers (that is to say “Don’t Know”) were only used in composite score when “Don’t Know” response was considered in benefit dependent variable. The results for the incumbent government support variable were no different with or without integrating this middle category.

Referendum Years – Year of referendum was coded 1 (France, 1992) and otherwise coded 0 for all other years. This variable was only used for French samples as the United Kingdom did not have any referendum in the study period.

European Elections Years – Years of European elections (1994 and 1999) were coded 1 and otherwise coded 0 for all other years.

3.5.3 Selection and Operationalization of Variables for Hypothesis III

Hypothesis III aims to study the relationship between socio-economic model inclinations and EU policy preferences in the British and French contexts. The study is done at the individual level.

3.5.3.1 Dependent and Independent Variables

The individual answers to the following question were used to operationalize the dependent variables and test hypothesis III: “For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (nationality) government, or made jointly within the European Union?”

This question is asked for the following policy areas: regional policies, social inclusion, employment (fight against unemployment), environment, research,
currency, humanitarian aid, foreign policy, immigration and asylum, police, anti-drug policy, urban and juvenile crime prevention, agriculture, defence, culture, health policy and education. In Eurobarometer data, please note that there are no social inclusion questions from 1992 to 1997, no regional policy and agriculture questions from 1992 to 1994, no anti-drug question in 1992, no police and urban & juvenile crime prevention questions from 1992 to 1998. The virtue of the related question is that it provides a more fine-grained measure of preferences for individual policies, in other words it taps policy specific, utilitarian support. The question is also available across years. The question does not always give a direction for the policy itself but certain policies are based in political ideology – for example market regulation and redistributive policies – especially when tested with left, centre and right ideological views of respondents (the independent variable).

The analysis aimed to broadly and primarily examine whether French and British individuals with left or centre or right ideological views (including extreme left and right) are in favour or not to transfer policies to the EU as a consequence of a preference for a particular socio-economic model: as such individuals with extreme left and right ideological opinions have been preserved and included with those with left and right views in the analysis. This approach is also justified for statistical reasons: more balanced sample sizes are obtained which enable us to detect differences if they exist (and avoid therefore Type II errors). Furthermore the means of individuals interviewed with extreme left or right ideological views are also examined and compared to those with left or right ideological views to see whether they are in favour or not of the transfer of policies to the EU, the power of the test (need to be at least 70% to be ok and 80% to offer a good power) in this situation may not be sufficient – due to very unequal sample sizes – to detect though whether the difference is statistically significant. The statistical difference between individuals interviewed with extreme left or right and left or right ideological opinions on the transfer of policies to the EU tends though to be generally small which limits the importance of a statistical difference if it arises. Please note that for the testing with left, centre and right, the ideology variable with the harmonised categories was used – respondents are grouped in tertiles of the approximately one third placing themselves most left, the approximately one third most right, and the centre, for each country. For the testing with individual extreme ideological
categories, the ideology variable with 10 categories (from 1 (left) to 10 (right)) was used: categories were regrouped as follows, 1 to 2 (classified as extreme left), 3 to 4 (left), 5 to 6 (centre), 7 to 8 (right) and 9 to 10 (extreme right).

"Don’t Know" answers were not included in the testing as they always represent less than 9% of all answers and often much less than that. Integrating “Don’t Know” answers in the testing would have also obscured the interpretation of the national means, in other words whether citizens were or were not in favour of a transfer of a policy to the EU. Furthermore, integrating “Don’t Know” answers in the testing did not alter the essence of the results.

3.6 Selection of Statistical Tests and Eurobarometer Data

The Eurobarometer data surveys used for the statistical analyses are the following: EB 56.2, EB 54.1, EB 52.0, EB 50.0, EB 48.0, EB 46.0, EB 43.1, EB 42.0, EB 40 and EB 37.0. This choice of data is motivated by the availability of required questions to test the hypotheses in the period of study. The primary goal in building the regression models as for ANOVAs analyses was to examine the unique effects of independent variables on the dependent variable, maximising the explained variance in the regression analyses coming only as a secondary goal. Furthermore, regression models were also designed to avoid multicollinearity problems, which would inflate the size of error terms and weaken the regression analyses (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). National weights – weight special United Kingdom, weight special United Kingdom and Germany, weight result from target and Euro weight 12 – are used to make the national samples more representative of the total populations, prior to testing the data.

3.6.1 Selection of Statistical Tests for Hypothesis I

To test hypothesis I, cross-sectional aggregate-level data from 1992 to 2001 were pooled. As aggregate-level data are used, time series problems (that is to say autocorrelation) of pooled models of panel data are applicable to the present statistical design (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; Stimson, 1985; Beck and Katz,
1995). Autocorrelation patterns have been first examined and then suitable ARIMA models have been used to deal with autocorrelation problems and test the hypothesis.\textsuperscript{63} Upon identification of autoregressive processes, ARIMA models were run – and diagnosed – using Cochrane-Orcutt, Prais-Winsten and Maximum-Likelihood estimation methods. Results using Cochrane-Orcutt estimation method are presented in the appendix. Very similar results were obtained with Prais-Winsten and Maximum-Likelihood estimation methods.

In order to avoid the parameter estimates suffering from bias associated with any time- or nation-specific effects (fixed effects), regression model residual means for each nation and year were checked and in the case of nations and years with large residual means – not close to zero – the model was re-estimated with dummies for these. As customary in the social sciences, where appropriate, results were accepted with very minor variable distribution deviations from normality (residuals distribution not significantly different from normality) and as such did not invalidate the analyses. The transformation of variables did not improve model fitting\textsuperscript{64} and obscured results interpretation, and as a result transformed variables were not used. Models respected all regression assumptions and best models were retained. The sample size, namely 120 cases, has limited the number of variables which could be used simultaneously in each model but was adequate to satisfy the objectives of the present analysis (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; Miles and Shevlin, 2001). Even for the largest models, that is to say models 27, 27.7, 28, 28.8, 29 and 29.9, the size of the sample, namely 120 observations (or 110 for models 27 and 27.7), is enough to achieve a high level of power and detect large effects (Miles and Shevlin, 2001).

3.6.2 Selection of Statistical Tests for Hypothesis II

To test hypothesis II, cross-sectional individual-level data from 1992 to 2001 were pooled for French and British samples separately. As individual-level data are used, time series problems (that is to say autocorrelation) of pooled models of panel data

\textsuperscript{63} Model building in pooled cross-sectional time series analyses is an iterative process: the final model is the result of a series of diagnostic estimations and re-estimations.

\textsuperscript{64} In some cases, transformed variables improved model fitting very marginally (for example with some of the M28.8 and M29.9 models) but results were very similar with or without transformed variables.
are not applicable to the present statistical design, which pools a series of independent cross-sections (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; Stimson, 1985; Beck and Katz, 1995). In order to avoid that the parameter estimates suffer from bias associated with any time-specific effects (fixed effects), regression model residual means for each year were checked and in the case of years with large residual means – not close to zero – the model was re-estimated with dummies for these. The rationale for selecting two different statistical tests (one parametric and the other one non-parametric) to test current EU membership variables and future European integration is explained below.

**Current EU Membership Evaluation**

The use of logistic regression as the statistical tool for the analysis of current EU membership is determined here by the dichotomous nature of the dependent variables used (please refer to section 3.5.2.1). Logistic regression is a useful tool as it enables us to differentiate between groups of respondents and compare the likelihoods that they support current EU membership. Logistic regression is a relatively flexible method in the sense that it makes no assumptions about the distributions of the predictor variables. Thus, in logistic regression, the predictors do not have to be normally distributed, linearly related – logistic regression assumes though a linear relationship between continuous predictors and the logit transform of the dependent variable – or of equal variance within each group although multivariate normality and linearity among the predictors may enhance power, because a linear combination of predictors is used to form the exponent. Logistic regression is especially useful when the distribution of responses on the dependent variable is expected to be non-linear with one or more of the independent variables.

The sample size was adequate to satisfy the objectives of the present analysis (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; Field, 2005). However, in models 17 (especially those without “Don’t know” answer) and for the seven category occupation variable, the samples tend to be smaller and as such due to not enough cases for some variables and variable categories, models may not be able to detect small effects. However, as standard errors were not unreasonably large in this case, model results
were reliable. Models respected all regression assumptions and best models were retained.

Future European Integration Support

The use of multiple parametric regression (ordinary least squares regression) as the statistical tool for the analysis of future European integration is determined here by the continuous nature of the seven point scale dependent variable used (please refer to section 3.5.2.1). Multiple parametric regression is likely to be more powerful than logistic regression when the outcome is continuous and the assumptions regarding it and the predictors are met (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; Field, 2005). The sample size required for a seven point dependent variable is also less onerous for multiple linear regression than for multiple logistic regression. In any case, the sample size was adequate when using the former to satisfy the objectives of the present analysis (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; Field, 2005). Furthermore the dependent variable has been transformed (square root transformation) in all models so as to improve model fitting and better respect regression assumptions. Models respected all regression assumptions and best models were retained.

3.6.3 Selection of Statistical Tests for Hypothesis III

To test hypothesis III, cross-sectional individual-level data from 1992 to 2001 were pooled for French and British samples separately. As individual-level data are used, time series problems (that is to say autocorrelation) of pooled models of panel data are not applicable to the present statistical design, which pools a series of independent cross-sections (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; Stimson, 1985; Beck and Katz, 1995). In order to avoid that the parameter estimates suffer from bias associated with any time-specific effects (fixed effects), ANOVA model residual means for each year were checked.

ANOVAs were used rather than MANOVAs to test hypothesis III as correlation between DVs varies from $\sim.2$ to $\sim.6$ (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). To control for familywise Type I error across multiple ANOVA tests, a Bonferroni adjustment was used for the main effect (Pallant, 2001). For post hoc analyses, Tukey test and
Games-Howell test (the latter where necessary) outcomes were also reported. Other post hoc tests such as Bonferroni, Gabriel and Hochberg were also run and similar results were found. Sample size was adequate to satisfy the objectives of the present analysis (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; Field, 2005). Models respected all ANOVA assumptions.

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the research approach followed in the current study. Quantitative research methods are thus adopted because the research is of a hypothetical-deductive nature as it aims to test theories developed by other researchers to see whether they apply to the French and British contexts. Eurobarometer survey data are used as they offer a number of advantages which clearly outweigh their weaknesses and are especially suited to the present unfunded cross-national, cross-sectional and cross-temporal study.

Besides the novelty of doing a Franco-British comparative study of the period from 1992 to 2001 – relying on creative hypotheses – the present thesis corrects some previous distortions, offers a more rigorous treatment of the effect of utilitarian explanations on EU support than past research has done and provides some methodological enhancements. Thus, the effect of utilitarian explanations is considered in relation to evaluations of both current EU membership and further European integration at both the individual and aggregate data levels. Current EU membership is gauged through the use of both EU benefit and membership dependent variables which provide a more precise and discriminating appraisal of current EU membership support, capturing in the process a fuller range of underlying attitudes.

The use of the seven-point future integration dependent variable specifies views in a more precise way than the dependent variables used in other studies. Where possible, middle category answers ("don't know" and "neither good nor bad") are also integrated in the statistical treatment, providing in the process some methodological enhancements from what has been done previously. The mixture of
aggregate and individual data level analyses involving a range of diverse data, combined with the mutual reinforcement and complementarity of hypotheses tested in the study, is not only suited to the objectives and purpose of the research but also enhances its validity. Moreover, the present analysis incorporates not only the study of attitudinal patterns (that is to say, citizens' perceptions of European and national economic, social and political factors) but also assessment of the relationship between actual data and support for integration. Finally, another benefit of the current research is that it encompasses meticulous and exhaustive statistical modelling and subsumes original variables (or new ways of operationalising variables) in the analysis.
4- COMPARATIVE BACKGROUND CHAPTER ON FRANCE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

4.1 Introduction

France and the United Kingdom are comparable nations in terms of population, economic and political power, both older members of the EU but have had a different relationship with European integration, especially in the study period. France is a founding member of the European Community and has traditionally played a key role in the integration of Europe. In the period from 1992 to 2001, European integration has not been though free from critiques in France especially in periods of greater national economic, social and societal difficulties. The United Kingdom has had traditionally an ambivalent relationship with European integration, especially in the period from 1992 to 2001 where the politicisation of the EU issue has been possibly the greatest. European integration and its compatibility with the British dominant economic and social model are often subject to question. In this chapter, the approaches towards European integration and political rapport de force in France and the United Kingdom will be firstly discussed. Secondly, the national economic situation and politicisation of the EU issue in France and the United Kingdom will be examined. Finally, French and British public opinion on European integration will be reviewed.

4.2 Approaches towards European Integration and Political Rapport de Force in France and the United Kingdom

France has been much more in favour of European integration than the United Kingdom in the study period (as indeed before) but the United Kingdom’s reputation for being a reluctant European may be somewhat over-stated as in some areas such as the development of the European single market, British governments – both Conservative and New Labour governments – have been positively enthusiastic. This enthusiasm for this area of European integration was justified as it connected with British state policy preferences and was seen as both in the interests of the
United Kingdom and as potentially strengthening it by increasing the likelihood of key objectives, such as those in the realm of market liberalisation being attained (Geddes, 2004; Rosamond, 2002). Not unlike France – with though a different economic, social and European policy preference – the political polarisation towards European integration but also towards economic and social policy between the British mainstream political parties has incrementally disappeared from the 1970s to the beginning of the 21st century. This culminated in the United Kingdom in a party preference for neo-liberalism and a free trading, competitive EU organised in an intergovernmental manner. In France, political polarisation towards European integration – though more limited than in the UK65 – but also towards economic and social policy between the French mainstream political parties has also incrementally disappeared from the 1970s to the beginning of the 21st century. This culminated in France in a party preference for regulated capitalism and a widely integrated EU according to a regulated capitalism model. France and the United Kingdom have thus played a different role in the integration of Europe as political leaderships within those two countries have a different conception of what the EU should be: in other words, they are each in favour of a different type of Europe. France pursued the objective of a widely integrated EU according to a regulated capitalism model while the United Kingdom preferred the EU to be a loose intergovernmental association of nations where neo-liberalism and free trade rules prevail.

4.2.1 European Integration at the Heart of French Policy-Making and Society and France at the Heart of European Integration

4.2.1.1 France Co-Engine of European Integration and Broad Party Political Consensus in Favour of European Integration in France

France has always been at the heart of the integration of Europe – as one of the initial co-founders of the European Community – and as such has played a historic role in this from the creation of the community for steel and coal in 1951, the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the Single European Act in 1986, the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 or the Treaty of Nice in 2000. France and its political actors from Schuman, Monnet, Delors, Mitterrand to Chirac and Jospin,

65 RPR has become more pro-integration in the 1990s following the stance of UDF and PS political parties.
have always privileged the deepening of European integration over the enlargement of the EU – albeit with the EU institutional reform in the late 1990s, the latter was also pursued – preferring an economic and political union of Europe to a purely free trade European zone. France’s partnership with Germany was often key to the integration of Europe and reflected an economic and political bargaining between these two countries. France and Germany played a key role in the elaboration of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and the Treaty of Nice in 2000 but from 1996 this partnership underwent tensions and frictions pertaining to the financial consequences of the BSE crisis for the European Union, the stability pact – and the inherent constraints that it put on the economic and social policy of France – and to the growing and greater weight of Germany in the EU partly as a consequence of the Treaty of Nice. These tensions cumulated with the traditional reluctance towards European integration of some states such as the United Kingdom have brought about relatively mediocre steps towards further European integration in Amsterdam and Nice (Bonnefous and Amouroux, 1998, 2001, 2002).

Successive French governments have actively participated in all new common European policies – and often co-initiated these policies – such as for example Schengen agreements on internal border controls, Economic and Monetary Union, Social Chapter, immigration, asylum and civil law EU legislation. Thus, under acute French insistence, a charter of fundamental social rights for workers was adopted in Strasbourg in December 1989, despite British opposition to it and its opting out. On 19 June 1990, Germany, France and the Benelux countries signed the Schengen Convention on free movement of people aiming to suppress internal border controls. The European Union Treaty – also known as Maastricht Treaty – was signed on 7 February 1992 in Maastricht and took effect on 12 November 1993. This treaty was exceptionally significant for its extension of policy competencies and the significant overhaul of the architecture of the Communities. It aimed to put in place by stages an Economic and Monetary Union – the latter with a British opt-in. It instilled a European citizenship; created a common foreign and security policy organised on an intergovernmental basis; granted new or extended competencies to the community in the social field – a social chapter (the latter with a British opt-out) – but also in the environment, research and technological development, industrial, culture, health and transport domains. It also increased the power of the European
Parliament and the domains where qualified majority voting rather than unanimity in the European Council could be used (Beitone et al., 1995). The Treaty of Maastricht exemplifies best the economic and political bargaining between Germany and France, the European partners of Germany, and especially France, have subjected the German reunification and its consequences to the resolute and definitive anchoring of Germany to Europe by the Treaty of Maastricht and its inherent economic and monetary union. In return, Germany has accepted EMU and the single European currency in exchange for a political cooperation (will to put in place a common foreign and security policy; an institutional reform and an enlargement to the east of Europe) giving Germany a role lost after the second world war (De Boissieu, 1997). With the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, Schengen agreements became EU competence as immigration policy, political asylum policy, visas policy, judiciary cooperation in the field of civil law and European external border control dispositions – with opt-out for the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland – although these policies were subject to unanimity voting for a minimum of five years after the Treaty of Amsterdam took effect (Bonnefous and Amouroux, 1998).

The French political executives in the period considered – and presented to the electorate – European integration as a way to achieve economic and social objectives for France. Mitterrand exemplified this by declaring on 12 April 1992 (Bonnefous and Duroselle, 1993:51): “the success of France and Europe are indissociable to me”. After the victory of the right (UDF-RPR) at the 1993 legislative elections, Mitterrand had even declared that he would not appoint an anti-European prime minister and chose a pro-European one, namely Mr Balladur. Along the same line, Chirac appointed two pro-European prime ministers (and both partisans of the “Franc fort” policy) in 1995 and 1997, namely Mr Juppe and Mr Jospin. Furthermore, in his declaration to dissolve the national assembly and call for new legislative elections on 21 April 1997, Chirac justified this step inter alia to face in a better position the European commitments of France, that is to say to qualify for the single currency. The 1997 dissolution was indeed motivated by the need to curb further public deficits as these were in 1996 and anticipated in 1997 well above the needed 3% of GDP as prescribed by convergence criteria of EMU. In the following years, Prime Minister Jospin did ensure that France qualified for the Euro by increasing corporate tax and savings tax.
The continued implementation of the “Franc fort” policy adopted from 1983, with the prevalence of monetary policy over budgetary policy (with an inherent tight monetary control) enabled France to have a relatively low inflation and a stable currency which in turn aimed to improve France’s competitiveness internationally. EMU and the single currency – with the adjustments to the Stability Pact under inter alia French insistence (discussed below) – followed for them this logic and aimed to stimulate economic growth and employment. In other words, the economic and social success of France was deemed to depend on European integration, and to this effect, from 1992 to 2001, the consensus among leaderships of French mainstream political parties in favour of European integration grew even closer although European integration limited the traditional interventionism of the state in the economic and social sphere – albeit relatively important when compared with other EU countries such as the United Kingdom. This involved more specifically a renunciation of planning and sectoral industrial policies, a disengagement from the state in competitive public sector with privatisations – that even the Jospin government accepted albeit in a smaller way than the Balladur and Juppe governments – and a greater opening of French markets to international competition – for example in telecommunications, airline and electricity industries – under the actions of the European Union (Crozet et al., 1997; De Boissieu, 1997; Bonnafous and Duroselle, 1993, 1994 and 1995; Bonnafous and Amouroux, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002).

This consensus in favour of European integration was accompanied by a growing consensus, among governments of the left as well as of the right, on the economic policy to follow. The European economic and monetary engagements of France have indeed limited the capacity of French governments to intervene in the economy and placed the French state in a more regulatory role rather than in a direct industrial and economic development role but have not removed completely the traditional interventionism of French governments. Thus, in the related period, governments of the left as well of the right have not decreased so much public expenditure but

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66 In 17 years from 22 March 1983 to 1 January 1999: French Franc was only devalued once on 6 April 1986, by 3% against the Deutsch Mark (Europa, 2006).
67 The state interventionism and centralisation is though traditional and old in France with it dating back to Colbertism in the ancient regime and Jacobinism of revolutionary era.
increased tax to curb public budgetary deficits. They have also shown a commitment to a high level of social protection including the building of social accommodation – albeit greater under the Jospin government with for example the medical cover for all (CMU) and family allowance from the first child – and taken initiatives for the EU to adopt a European social model, a commitment to public work programmes – though on a much smaller scale than in the preceding decades – and have tended to treat unemployment socially rather than economically – failing therefore largely to attack the rigidities of the job market. For the latter, governments of the period have decreased social contributions on low salaries, put in place subsidised employment programmes especially for young workers and long term unemployed and accepted more or less the sharing of jobs via the alteration of working time, the Jospin government (1997-2002) made this compulsory for large and medium companies (Cole et al., 2005). Levy (2005) called this the “social anaesthesia state” whose central mission has been to pacify and demobilize the potential victims and opponents of economic liberalisation, thereby permitting the French economy to reorganize on a more market rational basis. Overall, the liberalism implemented by successive French governments during the period appeared nevertheless relatively moderate, all accepting the European and international constraints on France and limiting the state interventionism in the economic and social sphere. Nonetheless these governments tried to recapture some of their traditional economic and social state interventionism at the European level for example by lobbying the EU to adopt an economic government to counterbalance an independent European central bank, by pushing the EU to adopt a social Europe with a renewed impetus on growth and employment (Bonnefous and Amouroux, 1998, 2001, 2002). This approach had the benefit of limiting dissension within mainstream political parties and the growing unpopularity of the European project for public opinion which appeared amidst acute and continuing national economic and social difficulties. French successive governments – and leaderships of mainstream political parties – in the study period preferred an EU which promoted regulated capitalism, a high level of social protection and upheld the principle of European preference although this preference came somewhat under

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68 There is here moreover a certain historical continuity as the establishment of a Franco-German Council in the late 1980s aimed to counteract the German economic and financial influence on the ERM and on France’s economic policy.
attack with the monetarist stance of EMU and the management of the single currency, the political opposition of some EU members such as the United Kingdom which supported a more liberal, market oriented European impetus and the international political and competitive constraints.

4.2.1.2 Elections and Politicisation of EU Issue among French Mainstream Political Parties

The growing consensus on European integration between the leaderships of the mainstream parties explained the lack of politicisation of the EU issue in the first part of the 1990s. Yet the persistence of a difficult economic and social situation as the persistence of minority eurosceptic movements within mainstream parties but also beyond, and the greater impact of Europe on the French economy and society, and search for influencing the EU towards more interventionism in the economic and social sphere have contributed to an increased politicisation of the EU issue in the second part of the 1990s and early 21st century.

1993 Legislative Elections and 1995 Presidential Election: A Lack of Politicisation of the EU Issue

Europe was not central to the political debates at the 1993 legislative elections won by a landslide by the UDF-RPR-Divers Droite with 484 members of parliament versus 91 for PS-PC (Habert et al., 1993; Bonnefous and Duroselle, 1994). This relative lack of importance of European integration among the political debates – partly because the leadership of the main parties namely PS and UDF-RPR displayed relatively similar positions on Europe during the campaign – is reflected in the motivations of vote at the related elections (CSA, 21 March 1993): Europe only arrived in sixth position as a vote motivator after employment, education, crime, social inequalities and immigration.

Chirac won the 1995 presidential election with 52.6% of votes versus Jospin, 47.4% of the votes. The 1995 campaign was again marked by the main candidates speaking little about Europe and focusing their campaign on unemployment, social inequalities, social protection and purchasing power. The main candidates namely
Jospin, Chirac and Balladur displayed relatively similar positions on Europe during the campaign. They were all in favour of further European integration, of the Franc fort and the single currency – Chirac only came though more clearly in favour of the franc fort on 19 April 1995 – and of a social Europe. Le Pen had a hostile position to the single currency and further European integration but focused little on European integration in the campaign (Bonnefous and Amouroux, 1996). The relative lack of importance of European integration among the political debates is reflected in the motivations of voting at the related elections (Ifop-Liberation, 27 April 1995): Europe only arrived in tenth position as a vote motivator after unemployment, social inequalities, purchasing power, immigration, social protection, reduced working hours, education, defence of “acquis sociaux” and place of France in the world. European integration was a little more present in the 2002 presidential campaign especially at the second round of the election between Chirac and Le Pen but the key issues of the campaign reflecting the broad consensus in favour of European integration of the mainstream candidates were not unlike the ones of the 1995 election and were respectively unemployment, crime, social inequalities, pension funds and immigration – European integration only came in 10th position (Lewis-Beck and Wendell Miller, 2004). European integration played an increased role in the 2007 presidential campaign although it remained relatively secondary. The key issues of the campaign echoed those of the 1995 and 2002 elections, and were respectively unemployment, social inequalities, purchasing power, crime and immigration. European integration only arrived in 16th position as a vote motivator (CSA-CISCO, 22 April 2007). However in the political debates pertaining to the 2007 presidential election, the issue of European integration was linked with national identity, protectionism, delocalisations, employment, the value of the Euro and purchasing power in mainstream politics as in peripheral politics. As such the ranking of European integration and therefore its importance was there undervalued.

1994 and 1999 European Elections and 1997 Legislative Elections: European integration takes relatively more importance in the political debates

Although the year 1994 (and second part of 1993) was marked by a movement towards euro scepticism in public opinion coinciding with a relatively poor economic
and social year, the debate on European integration at the 1994 European elections campaign was inconsistent and the latter focused more on domestic problems such as unemployment undoubtedly because of the proximity of national elections in 1995 but also because of divisions on Europe within political parties and political alliances. The support for the Europe of Maastricht in the four pro-Maastricht party lists, namely Radicale, UDF-RPR, Generation Ecologie and PS, tended to be somewhat cautious and their programmes unclear and ambiguous. Thus, Baudis (Perrineau and Ysmal, 1995:211), leader of the UDF-RPR list declared, “Maastricht is a fight of the past” and “the Maastricht Treaty is a relatively mediocre text, too complicated and which says on the convergence of economies some dangerous things”. On 10 November 1994, Millon (Perrineau and Ysmal, 1995:212) in an interview in Le Monde envisaging his candidacy at the 1995 presidential elections, conceded: “it is impossible to have an unclear or ambiguous message on Europe” and “yet the differences of opinion which appear presently in the majority (UDF-RPR) undoubtedly demonstrate that a unique candidate would have to use this ambiguous language – we have seen this language at the last European elections...”. The UDF-RPR list lead by Baudis obtained 25.58% of the votes (28 Members of European Parliament (MEPs)) challenged by an anti-Maastrichtian UDF dissident, De Villiers (12.33% of the votes and 13 MEPs) (Perrineau and Ysmal, 1995). The PS list obtained 14.49% of the votes (15 MEPs) while Energie Radicale list elicited 12.03% of the votes (13 MEPs) (Perrineau and Ysmal, 1995). Despite the climate of greater euroscepticism in public opinion in 1994 as indicated above, the anti-Maastricht lists – De Villiers (12.33%), Le Pen (10.52%) (11 MEPs), Wurtz (6.88%) (7 MEPs), Chevenement (2.54%), Laguiller (2.77%) and Gonstat (3.95%) – totalled only 39% of the votes which demonstrated somewhat the importance of domestic issues in the vote at the 1994 European election (Perrineau and Ysmal, 1995). This was further substantiated by a Sofres Poll (April 1994) which showed that 66% of people would vote at the 1994 European elections on the basis of French problems (attitude towards the government and economic and social policy) against 27% on the basis of European problems, a clear decline from the 1989 European elections which were relatively more centred around European problems (38% for latter and

69 In the BVA/RTL/Le Monde poll of September 1993 (BVA, Sept 1993) the no to Maastricht represented 56% versus 44% for the yes and in the Louis Harris poll of April 1994 (Louis Harris, April 1994) the same represented 51% versus 49%.
51% for French problems). European integration (16%) came though as the second most important vote motivator at the 1994 European elections, quite far though behind unemployment (28%) (Ifop, 12 June 1994).

European integration – as the management of the economy and the role of the state – occupied a more important place at the 1997 legislative elections although the theme of Europe varied in intensity and clarity during the campaign (Le Monde, 1997). As discussed above the dissolution of the national assembly was partly motivated by the need to make further efforts to curb public deficits and satisfy convergence criteria pertaining to Maastricht. These elections coincided with a relatively poor economic and social situation and record unpopularity of the executive, namely Chirac (President) and Juppe (Prime Minister) with 56% of people interviewed unsatisfied with Chirac in April 1997 (31% satisfied), 61% of people interviewed unsatisfied with Juppe (27% satisfied) (Ifop/Journal du Dimanche, April 1997). The unpopularity of the executive reflected partly a series of unpopular measures taken by the executive in 1995 and 1996 to reduce the public deficits and qualify for EMU and the single currency: inter alia TVA (VAT) increase from 18.6% to 20.6%; abandonment of promised tax reduction; unilateral freeze of civil servants’ salaries; increase in Contribution Sociale Generalisee (CSG) (generalised social contribution) from 2.4% to 3.4%; decrease in Livret A (savings product) remuneration and rise in hospital fees. According to a poll of Ipsos-Le Point (March 1997) 66% of people interviewed wished the president, Chirac, to change his economic policy, and 43% wished the president, Chirac, to change both his prime minister and the economic policy. Furthermore 43% of people did not agree that the preparation of France’s European commitments justified the dissolution of the national assembly versus 40% who agreed and 17% without opinion but 48% agreed (versus 40% disagreed and 12% without opinion) that the dissolution would permit a change in the economic policy (CSA-Le Parisien Libere, 22 April 1997).

The novelty in the 1997 legislative elections is not that the leaderships of the mainstream parties, namely the PS and UDF-RPR, were in favour of European integration as they have been so during the study period although at varying degrees – leadership of PS and UDF have been relatively more pro-European than RPR – but that the divide in economic policy subject to the European integration constraint had
lessened even further. Both PS and UDF-RPR leaderships were unwilling to diminish real public expenditures so as to qualify for the single currency – and limit further the traditional interventionism of the state – but willing to increase taxes to do so. Both PS and UDF-RPR leaderships were in favour of the single currency but wished a softening of the EMU convergence criteria to give more room for growth and employment in European integration. They were both in favour of a social Europe. Both UDF-RPR and PS leaderships thus made France’s adoption of the single currency conditional upon the adhesion of Italy and Spain to EMU in the first joining circle; conditional upon the creation of a European economic government, and were therefore disputing the ability of the European central bank to decide freely the monetary policy for the eurozone; conditional upon the signature of a pact on solidarity and growth; and objected to the overvaluation of the Euro compared to the dollar. This echoed public support for the single currency subject to the abandonment of the economic austerity policy – 60% of respondents agreed with this statement versus 24% who disagreed (CSA, May 1997). It is in this sense that one should interpret the fact that respondents placed European integration only as the 14th most important vote motivator at the 1997 legislative elections, inter alia after employment, social inequalities, social protection, education, crime, corruption, immigration, salary increase (CSA, June 1997). The 1997 legislative elections were won by the left: socialists (23.51% of the votes and 250 members of parliament (MPs)); communists (9.92% of the votes and 36 MPs); radical-citoyen-verts (33 MPs) versus the right, UDF (14.23% of the votes and 113 MPs); RPR (15.67% of the votes and 140 MPs) and Divers Droite (6.61% of the votes). At the related elections, the FN obtained 14.95% of the votes but no members of parliament (Perrineau and Ysmal, 1998).

European integration took a more central role at the 1999 European elections although the political campaign had been pushed to one side by the Kosovo conflict and Corsica problems – Bonnet Prefect scandal – until the last two weeks of the campaign. Thus the visibility of the 1999 European elections campaign of May and June 1999 in the TV news coverage was twice as weak as in the 1994 European elections campaign and five times as weak as in the 1997 legislative elections campaign. During the 1999 elections campaign, the political positions on European integration were though structured by the opposition between those in favour of
European integration – UDF, RPR, PS and Verts – and those in favour of national sovereignty – RPF (Rassemblement Pour La France), FN, LO-LCR, CNPT (chasse, nature, pêche et tradition), MNR (Mouvement National Republicain) and to a lesser extent PC (the latter was no longer opposed to Maastricht but wished to keep the EU as it is with though more room for social policies). On the right ideological spectrum, the results were marked by the success of the anti-Maastricht RPF (Pasqua-De Villiers List) (13.06% of the votes and 13 MEPs) which came before the two mainstream pro-Maastricht right parties (UDF, 9.29% of the votes and 9 MEPs, and RPR, 12.82% of the votes and 12 MEPs). The RPF campaigned on the economic, cultural, societal and social dangers of European integration for France and advocated a drawing back of European integration in many domains and a return to national sovereignty, this much in common with the FN which also advocated in addition the national preference for French and European nationals for jobs, accommodation and social help. Adding the scores of the FN (5.70% and 5 MEPs), CNPT (6.78% and 6 MEPs), MNR (3.28% and no MEPs) to the one of the RPF, the right anti-European votes outweighed the right pro-European ones but further adding to this the scores of the left anti-European ones – LO-LCR (5.18% and 5 MEPs) and PC (6.78% and 6 MEPs) –, anti-European votes were nevertheless outweighed by the pro-European ones of the UDF, RPR, PS and Verts (Grundberg et al., 2000).

As far as the pro-European lists were concerned, while the electoral platforms of the UDF and Verts were more exhaustive and precise – with proposals on inter alia education, environment, fishing policy, agriculture, culture, regional policy – the electoral platforms of the PS and RPR were briefer, vague and moderate, undoubtedly to hide or limit the disagreements and dissidence on European integration within each respective party. Despite European policy and European questions being more present in the debates, national problems were also present – as political parties sought to instrumentalize the European elections nationally. Thus 52% of people interviewed confessed that they voted according to European stakes rather than national stakes (36%) (and 12% without opinion) at the 1999 European elections (CSA/Le Parisien, 16 June 1999). Social inequalities, crime, European integration, immigration, national economic situation, environment and personal economic and social situation were respectively the most important vote motivators at the 1999 European elections (CSA/Le Parisien, 16 June 1999). Amidst a more
limited interventionism of the French state in the economic and social sphere and economic, social and societal problems that European integration partly contributed to creating, eurosceptic ideas surfaced within and outside parties as discussed in section 4.3.

4.2.2 Perennial Contesting and Politicisation of the EU Issue in the United Kingdom

4.2.2.1 Key Events in Contesting and Politicisation of EU Issue in the United Kingdom

The British contesting and politicisation of the EU issue is not a relatively new phenomenon uncovered in the 1990s but dates back to the 1950s when the United Kingdom stood aside from the first steps of European integration – amidst scepticism about its supranational stance – and more particularly from the UK’s entry into the EC in 1973 (George, 1998; Hay, 2002; Geddes, 2004). Thus the following events chronicle this:

- The non-participation of the United Kingdom in the early movement of European integration in the 1950s and 1960s which was deemed supranational and departed from the British preference for trade liberalisation within intergovernmental structures. The United Kingdom’s interests were seen as lying elsewhere. Its European vocation remained contested by compelling claims from the Commonwealth, from the special relationship with the USA, and from political relations and trading patterns that were more global than strictly European.

- Two years after the UK’s EC entry (1975), a referendum was held on continued EEC membership.

- The Labour Party’s commitment to terminate British EC membership at the 1983 General Election as the EC was construed as being in the way of Labour’s desire for an increased governmental interventionism in the economic and social sphere.

- Periodic disputes about the size of the British contribution to the community budget. Thus following the Conservative 1979 electoral victory, the Thatcher government adopted an aggressive negotiating posture within the EC’s
intergovernmental institutions over the issue of British contribution to the community budget with an eventual settlement of this problem at the Fontainebleau European Council of 1984, which paved the way for the completion of the community’s internal market. The British rebate obtained at the related summit is still today subject to political debate and argument with the United Kingdom’s European partners.

- An enduring refusal to join the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) although it finally culminated in the eventual entry of the pound sterling in October 1990, albeit much to Prime Minister Thatcher’s reluctance. John Major played a key role in persuading her to do so with a view to controlling inflation (Evans, 1999).

- Thatcher government’s running battle with the Delors European Commission.

- Exit of the pound sterling from ERM in September 1992.

- Major government’s tough negotiating posture at Maastricht – Maastricht only endorsed after a vote of confidence in the British parliament in July 1993 – and its policy on non-cooperation within EU institutions at the height of the BSE crisis in 1996.

- Blair government’s refusal to enter EMU and the Conservative Party leadership adopting a more Eurosceptic party line from 1997.

It must be noted that in much of this period, the British press and more generally media tended to rely on caricature to depict the EU and often used “us versus them” language (Wilkes and Wring, 1998; Franklin, 1994; Anderson and Weymouth, 1998; Gavin, 2000, 2001). Newspaper and television coverage partly reinforced zero-sum ideas of national sovereignty with the British government often portrayed as seeking to advance its interests in competition with other member states.

4.2.2.2 Elections and Politicisation of EU Issue in the United Kingdom

At variance with France, the United Kingdom has been more reluctant to support the integration of Europe in the study period (as before) under the Major governments
but also, albeit perhaps to a lesser extent, under the Blair governments – the latter has cooperated more with other EU nations which wanted to progress further along the line of economic, political, social and societal European integration but without necessarily taking part in these new European policies. Major was not alienated by Thatcher’s anti-integrationist stance on Europe and rejected the federalist vision of Europe whilst though stressing that Britain should be at the heart of Europe. At the Maastricht summit of 1991, Major obtained a compromise on EMU, on the Social Chapter and on common foreign policy and justice and home affairs, and was able to elicit an opt-in on EMU and an opt-out on the social chapter. Major also obtained that the common foreign policy and justice and home affairs be organised in an intergovernmental way (Butler and Westlake, 1995). In the study period, Europe did not play a key role in the 1992 General Election but the subsequent events of “Black Wednesday” in September 1992 and growing disquiet over Maastricht, contributed to raising the issue of European integration and especially its link with economic management in the subsequent European and national elections. Polls regarding the European issue thus placed the latter as one of the most important issues for voters in the aftermath of British ERM withdrawal (Ipsos-Mori, 2006).

_Europe Issue Takes Centre Stage Incrementally from 1994 European Elections to 1997 General Election, 1999 European Elections and 2001 General Election_

Confronted with acute party division over Europe following “Black Wednesday” in September 1992 and growing disquiet over Maastricht, Major adopted a more eurosceptic tone – with other British mainstream parties such as Labour and the Liberal-Democrats choosing to focus their political strategies on the government’s poor record especially on domestic issues rather than on the European issue. He vowed to preserve British national identity and sovereignty, denounced the EU’s over-regulation, over-interventionism, excessive protectionism and centralisation ahead of the 1994 European elections. This move aimed at unifying the party. The Conservatives only gained 28% of the votes (18 MEPs) and lost the 1994 European elections to Labour with 44.2% of the votes (62 MEPs) but the turnout was low and the Conservatives had been in government for fifteen years and were vulnerable to mid-term unpopularity. However, the European People’s Party commissioned a Harris poll – results were never published but the main findings leaked out – which
revealed a shift towards euroscepticism (Butler and Westlake, 1995): those who voted tended to be more pro-European than the electorate in general, and Labour and Liberal Democrat identifiers were decisively more pro-European than the electorate as a whole; a majority of Conservative supporters found the tone of the Conservative campaign about right but the general electorate particularly in London and the South-East believed the Conservatives' European policies to be too negative.

In the following European and national elections in the study period, the European issue took a more important role. Europe was thus an issue frequently raised with candidates and took most media space, coming to the fore time and again during the 1997 campaign. Table 4.1 and 4.2 show the pre-eminence of the related issue at the 1997 General Election. The “wait and see” policy on the single currency – joined EMU if it is in the British national interest subject to a referendum – agreed in the Major cabinet in autumn 1996 was under battering from the conservative press, Referendum and UK Independence parties and more seriously from its own candidates at the 1997 General Election. As their constituency addresses appeared, a majority of Conservative candidates were implacably opposed to any possibility of UK entry into EMU. The Times and the Daily Telegraph published daily lists of Conservative candidates who were defying Major’s line on the single currency. The final Daily Telegraph tally, based on 385 Conservative candidates, found only three pro-European statements (please see Table 4.3).

Table 4.1: Relative Prominence of Issues in News Bulletin, 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>BBC1</th>
<th>ITV</th>
<th>Channel 4</th>
<th>Radio 4</th>
<th>All 1997</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitution</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sleaze</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxation</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHS</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pensions</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law and Order</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Table 4.2: Relative Frequency of Issues Raised with Candidates, 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Total Frequency</th>
<th>Conservative Candidates</th>
<th>Labour Candidates</th>
<th>Liberal Democrat Candidates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
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<td>Health</td>
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<td>Education</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pensions</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time for Change</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
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<td>Economy</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sleaze</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law and Order</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Butler and Kavanagh (1997:220)

Table 4.3: Statements of Conservative Candidates for 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Against Any Common Currency</th>
<th>190</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Europe Tone, Not Specific</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Brussels Tone, Not Specific</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Government Line</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Mention of Europe</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Europe</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Butler and Kavanagh (1997:107)

Labour and Liberal Democrats took a more positive, constructive view on European integration but placed more emphasis on other aspects of their campaign such as health, education, crime and taxation. In Blair’s ten point contract with the people in the Labour manifesto, European integration came only tenth and was very general: “We will give the leadership in Europe which Britain and Europe need” (Butler and Kavanagh 1997:99). The Labour party’s position on single currency was moreover remarkably identical to the Conservative government’s one: to “wait
and see" and hold a referendum before entry. Labour won the 1997 General Election with a landslide – 419 MPs (44% of the votes) versus 165 (31% of the votes) for the Conservatives and 46 MPs (17% of the votes) for the Liberal Democrats and formed the next government. The Conservatives may not have lost the 1997 General Election on the key issues: on taxes, levels of public spending and British membership of a single currency, there was not much difference between them and Labour but they lost comprehensively on valence issues – where the parties promote widely shared goals. On such qualities as party unity, competence, newness, trust and integrity, the Conservatives trailed badly (Rose, 1997).

Following the election of William Hague as leader of the Conservative Party on 19 June 1997 (Europe was moreover a key issue in the Conservative leadership contest between William Hague and Kenneth Clark), the Conservative Party moved subsequently to the right on the political chess board. The Conservatives radicalised their position on European integration in stages – basically settling Europe in the eurosceptics’ favour in the Conservative Party – from ruling out joining the single currency in the next parliament (2001-2006), opposing tax harmonisation, favouring a reduction in EU budget and UK budgetary contributions, and retaining the national veto at the 1999 European elections to opposing the European Rapid Reaction Force and making a stand against the ratification of the Nice Treaty at the 2001 General Election – the latter on EU institutional changes with inter alia extension of qualified majority voting (QMV) and preparatory steps for a European Constitution and EU Charter – although it paved the way for EU enlargement that the Conservative Party has traditionally supported. The positions on the European issue of Labour and to a lesser extent of the Liberal Democrats were not so far from those of the Conservatives at these elections (Butler and Westlake, 2000; Norris, 2001). The differences on the Euro between the British mainstream political parties were though more substantive: Whilst the Conservatives were ruling out the Euro for the next parliament, Labour subjected a Euro entry to satisfactory economic conditions – the five economic tests (see Edwards, 2001:189-191) and a referendum – and Liberal Democrats favoured an early entry into the Euro subject to a referendum. Although explicit commitment by the Blair government was made to engage more constructively with its European partners, EMU remained deeply troublesome and divisive (Hay, 2002). The language of public ministerial statements presented EMU
as a largely technical matter, not to be handled with ideological zeal on either side. The then foreign secretary declared (Cook, 1999:5):

“It is a rational approach that puts a cool calculation of the national interest first. It does not make the mistake of a commitment out of romantic affection for Europe to join the Euro, even if the economic conditions were not right. And it avoids the mistake on the other extreme which is to rule out joining the Euro out of distaste for all things European.”

But few doubted that this technocratic language masked potentially damaging divisions within the Labour Party (Baker and Seawright, 1998). Labour and the Liberal Democrats failed again to make the case for the Euro at the 1999 European elections and 2001 General Election, preferring to focus on domestic issues such as education, healthcare and the economy perhaps partly because they were fearful it was a vote loser and Europe was not the most important issue for the electorate as a whole as demonstrated by polls. According to a Mori poll (May 1999) sponsored by the Greens, only 35% were going to vote on the parties’ policies on Europe as against 41% on the way the government was running the country at the 1999 European elections (Butler and Westlake, 2000:134), and electors only placed the European issue as the tenth most important problem facing the country at the 2001 General Election (Echo Research, 2001). A reason for this may be that the differences on Europe between Labour and the Conservatives were not deemed very significant by the electorate (Norris, 2001). Moreover Europe played a smaller role in the 2005 General Election for the same reason (Kavanagh and Butler, 2005).

Nevertheless, Webb (2005) points out judiciously that Europe, as well as immigration and later the Iraq issue, have contributed to an incremental (albeit relatively small) erosion of traditional party loyalties and fostered the growth of protest parties and minor party support. The Conservatives won the 1999 European elections with 36 seats (35.8% of the votes) versus 29 seats for Labour (28% of the votes) and 10 seats for Liberal Democrats (12.7% of the votes). The United Kingdom Independence Party campaigning on an anti-European campaign platform – favouring immediate EU withdrawal – also won 3 seats (7% of the votes) surprisingly. The turnout was though low (barely 23%) (Edwards, 2001:45). In 2001 Labour won another landslide with 413 seats (40.7% of the votes) as against
166 seats (31.7% of the votes) for the Conservatives and 52 seats (18.3% of the votes) for the Liberal Democrats (Norris, 2001).

4.2.2.3 From an Unequal Moderate Support for European Integration to a Greater Euroscepticism in British Mainstream Political Parties

Despite Liberal Democrats’ and Labour’s more open policy towards European integration contrasting with the Conservatives’ strong opposition to it – especially under Hague’s leadership – British mainstream political parties in the study period have largely converged as the 1990s progressed and shared the same focus on liberalisation of European markets, free trade, intergovernmental cooperation, the enlargement of the EU and the search for national interest (Rosamond, 2002; Evans, 1999; Bara and Budge, 2001). It is thus revealing that in the period of study, contrary to France, the United Kingdom has opted out of a number of common European policies such as the single European currency, the social chapter (the United Kingdom adopted it though later in the 1990s under the first Blair government), the Schengen agreements on internal border controls,70 and the EU legislation on immigration, asylum and civil law. Labour government convergence into Europe has been itself relatively moderate with for example the integration of the social chapter into British law, the emergence of common foreign and security policy organised on an intergovernmental basis (defence role of NATO was though preserved under British insistence), the addition of a new employment chapter to the Treaty (of Amsterdam) as well as the inclusion of a new article 13 within the Treaty (of Amsterdam) that greatly extended anti-discrimination measures, the agreement to increase the use of qualified majority voting – for example for the environmental policy – and bolster the role of the European Parliament. The Labour government retained though the national veto for key policy areas such as taxation, national contribution to EU budget, immigration, the opt out from Schengen agreements and the pursuit of European enlargement, and pushed for CAP reform towards more liberalisation.

70 The Labour government decided though later in the 1990s to take part in some aspects of the Schengen agreements, namely police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, the fight against drugs and the Schengen information systems (Europa, 2005).
Another important difference with France is that the United Kingdom, especially after the withdrawal of the pound from the exchange rate mechanism in September 1992, has given less importance to EU developments as a way to achieve economic and social objectives themselves although the liberalisation of European markets and the pursuit of EU enlargement were seen and presented as an opportunity to exploit British competitiveness. In other words, the EU was not seen – and presented to the electorate – by British successive governments as the sole way to achieve economic growth and employment but under the right European conditions – an EU organised around free trade and competition principles – could contribute to it. In opposition to France, the support for European integration in British mainstream political parties, especially Labour and Liberal Democrat parties (Conservative party was comparatively more eurosceptic at the start of the 1990s and grew more so as the decade progressed), was relatively moderate and grew more eurosceptic throughout the decade. The neo-liberal Thatcherite consensus between the main political parties (that is to say Labour Party, Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrat Party) – centred on a reduced role for the government and acceptance of the market – and the perceived inherent divergence with the EU’s more interventionist economic, social and societal model have contributed to making the leaderships of these political parties more eurosceptic in the study period as discussed below. The growing radicalisation of the Conservatives towards the European integration project (from 1997 under Hague’s party leadership) and its increasing echo with public opinion and support in the media – especially in the press – together with internal divisions in the Labour party, the quest for re-election, the comparatively sound economic and social situation of the British economy have also perhaps contributed to limiting the European ambitions of the Labour government and shy away from a clear open debate on European integration.

Contrary to France, the preservation of a close relationship with the USA – and enthusiasm for US style market liberalisation – as to a lesser extent the attachment to the Commonwealth also moderated the European ambitions of successive British governments in the period (Evans, 1999; Clift, 2001; Gamble and Kelly, 2000). Furthermore, a further disparity between France and the United Kingdom is that in the French context, European integration has been much more widely justified by mainstream political parties as a way to securing peace in Europe but also a means
of making the EU take more weight in international political and commercial negotiations. In the British context, these arguments have been much less used by the main political parties on grounds of the cult of British history – including parliamentary tradition – but also because of the British social order which rests on the preservation of a strong community via the development of national identity, and not via the welfare state as in France. European integration which was unwrapping, was often construed as threatening the very British national identity (Evans, 1999; Davies, 1995; Evans and Taylor, 1997).

Although the issue of national sovereignty also resonated with the opponents to European integration in France – but mainly in factions within mainstream political parties and in the political periphery (FN, MNR, MDC, RPF, MPF, CNPT and PC) – this issue was much more instrumentalised in British mainstream politics to oppose the further integration of Europe (George, 1998; Edwards, 2001; Cole et al., 2005). It is partly explained by the fact that the United Kingdom experienced a unique continuity of political history and developed a unique regard for its inherited political forms as a guarantee of its independence. The inherited doctrines of untrammelled parliamentary sovereignty and the sole accountability of the executive to Parliament are hard to reconcile with European supra-nationalism (Skidelsky, 1992; Spiering, 2004). The unease with supranational partnerships is also linked to the one-party British governments not used to sharing power (Papamikail, 1998) but also the United Kingdom’s first-past-the-post electoral system which invites political polarisation between and within the main political parties (Forster, 2001; Papamikail, 1998; Wilks, 1998; Usherwood, 2002; Aspinwall, 2004). Thus, Prime Minister Major declared to the House of Commons on 22 March 1994 (Hansard, 1994):

“We shall not do what the Labour party do, which is to say yes to everything that comes out of Europe, with no critical examination whatever. The opposition would sign away our votes, our competitiveness and our money. The right honourable and learned member for Monklands East (the then Labour Leader John Smith) is the man who likes to say yes in Europe. Monsieur Oui, the poodle of Brussels”.
It is partly on the issue of national sovereignty but also in virtue of the national interest that the successive British governments have thus opted out of a number of European agreements – the United Kingdom kept for example the national veto on taxation, British contribution to the EU, foreign and security policy and constitutional reform. However the United Kingdom and France showed some similarity to the extent that the opposition to European integration used the argument that the diversity of local economic and social circumstances in different EU countries was at odds with the very idea of one common economic and social policy for the entire EU. In the next section, EU issue politicisation and its link with the national economic situation and context will be reviewed.

4.3 National Economic Situation and Politicisation of EU Issue

In both France and the United Kingdom, the politicisation of the EU issue grew from 1992 to 2001 although the EU issue was not always the primary topic of concern for electors and politicians alike. The Maastricht Treaty and perceived socio-economic consequences of European integration – including EMU and the single currency project – have contributed in both these countries to a raising of the issue of European integration in the political debates. If both countries experienced economic and social problems because of their European commitments – for the United Kingdom especially in the early 1990s – the political and economic implications drawn from these differed between France and the United Kingdom.

4.3.1 EU Integration Contributing to France’s Economic, Social and Societal Problems Source of Political Contesting

4.3.1.1 Franc Fort Policy and Maastricht causing National Economic, Social and Societal Difficulties

If the Maastricht Treaty referendum and the closeness of its result in 1992 (discussed below) contributed to politicising the issue of European integration, it is the persistence of national economic and social problems which made the EU issue more predominant in political debates in the second part of the 1990s. The policy of
“Franc fort” first came under intense critique in the first part of the 1990s as France was undergoing a tough, lasting economic recession and was following the monetary policy of Germany. The German reunification had first imposed an expansionary budgetary policy which made it necessary thereafter to stop the inflationary tensions (in Germany) by a drastic monetary strategy based on high real interest rates. France and other EU partners did follow the German interest rates. The high level of these weighed negatively on France’s economic activity by contributing to a fall in investment and consumption. This situation contributed to the failure of France’s economic recovery and created uncertainty in financial markets about EMU before and after the 1992 referendum, which in turn necessitated rises in interest rates to restore confidence and harmed further the French economy – inflation being mastered, France had one of its highest ever real interest rates in this period (Bonnefous and Duroselle, 1992). The quest for Economic and Monetary Union perpetuated subsequently the alignment of France’s (and other EU countries) monetary policy on Germany’s policy. EMU convergence criteria and the subsequent Stability Pact did institutionalise the pre-eminence of objectives of monetary policy, with the retention of five criteria enabling a country to be able to adopt the single currency (Bonnefous and Duroselle, 1992):

- inflation rate had not to be greater than 1.5 point above the average of the three best inflation performances;

- public debt had not to be greater than 60% of GDP and public budgetary deficit had to be no more than 3% of GDP;

- long term interest rate had not to exceed by more than 2 points the average of the three lowest ones;

- the national currency had to have been at least two years without being devalued in the European monetary system;

However, partly thanks to French pressures, at the European Council of Dublin on 13 and 14 December 1996, a slight softening of the convergence criteria for EMU

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71 The “Franc fort” policy aimed to maintain French Franc parity with Deutsch Mark and was implemented from 22 March 1983 to 1 January 1999.
(and subsequent pact of stability) was obtained to include the state of economic growth (Bonnefous and Amouroux, 1997):

- if the public budgetary deficit went over 3% of GDP, the state concerned had 12 months to react; a failure to act could generate a financial penalty of between 0.2% and 0.5% of the related state's GDP;

- Case justifying going over the stated limit: a country could have a public budgetary deficit of more than 3% of its GDP in the case of an annual decrease in its real GDP by more than 2%. On the other hand, if the recession was between 0.75% and 2%, the European council could pronounce itself on the nature of the deficit, either accept this over limit deficit or recommend sanctions if it deemed the deficit to be excess deficit; finally for a decrease in GDP inferior to 0.75%, states could not in principle invoke exceptional circumstances to justify the greater deficit;

The EMU convergence criteria and subsequent Stability Pact meant that France largely subjected the use of budgetary policy to a strict monetary policy: this consequently limited the traditional economic interventionism of successive French governments and opened further the French economy to international competition (Crozet et al, 1997; Hoang-Ngoc, 1996). Despite France's controlling inflation well, it obtained relatively poor economic results especially in the period from 1992 to 1997 and from the second part of 2000 (please see Table 4.4). The aggravation of unemployment, the worsening of the tax burden from a relatively high level in 1992 and the relatively poor economic growth, were particularly patent and served as a basis for criticizing European integration for factions within mainstream political parties and political parties on the periphery as discussed in section 4.3.1.2.

Table 4.4: Selected Economic Aggregates of France

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Inflation (%)</th>
<th>GDP Growth (%)</th>
<th>Unemployment (%)</th>
<th>Total Tax Burden as a percentage of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>45.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>-0.90</td>
<td>11.30</td>
<td>45.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>11.80</td>
<td>46.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>11.30</td>
<td>45.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>11.90</td>
<td>46.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>11.80</td>
<td>46.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Yearly Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Inflation (%)</th>
<th>GDP Growth (%)</th>
<th>Unemployment (%)</th>
<th>Total Tax Burden as a percentage of GDP1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>11.40</td>
<td>46.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>10.70</td>
<td>47.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>9.30</td>
<td>46.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>8.50</td>
<td>46.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note 1: figure from 1995 with ESA 95 definitions

These relatively poor results are only partly explained by the international recession in 1992, 1993 and at the end 2000, and certain politicians such as Seguin, De Villiers, Pasqua, Chevenement, Emmanuelli and Le Pen saw these as the consequence of the governmental insistence that monetary objectives prevail over growth and employment but also the consequence of a liberal policy orientation opening France to globalisation and unfair competition. The European constraints – pertaining chiefly to the “Franco Fort” policy, the EMU convergence criteria and subsequent Stability Pact – on successive governments’ policies was considered as reducing the traditional interventionism of the state in the economic and social arena which was politically perceived by the same as eroding national cohesion as the welfare state was deemed instrumental in fostering a strong community.

#### 4.3.1.2 Anti-European Opposition

At variance with the United Kingdom, the political protests against European integration did not come from the political leaderships of mainstream parties but from factions within them (mainly from Seguin, Emmanuelli and Pasqua) and from political parties on the periphery such as FN, MPF, MDC, PC, MNR, CNPT and RPF. If the anti-European contestation in political currents in mainstream parties and beyond precedes the Maastricht Treaty, it is the Maastricht referendum campaign in 1992 which accelerated anti-European protest (Bonnefous and Duroselle, 1993). Pasqua, Seguin and De Villiers supported by former French prime ministers such as Couve De Murville, Messmer and Debre, joined forces to lead the “No to Maastricht” campaign, condemning the policy of the “Franc fort” and the planned single currency which gave in their views precedence to financial orthodoxy over social preoccupations, bringing about more factory transfers abroad, more
unemployment and less economic growth, and sacrificing national sovereignty – it must be noted that the simple majority of RPR members of parliament (MPs) were opposed to Maastricht, this despite the leadership of the RPR being in favour. Similar arguments with a clear focus on social questions and employment were used by the PC, the Verts and Chevenement – with few other PS MPs such as Emmanuelli – in that campaign. Furthermore, De Villiers together with Poniatowski and Griotteray insisted that voting no to Maastricht was voting against Mitterrand as Maastricht was partly his creation. Le Pen, the far right leader, also denounced Maastricht as of Mitterrand’s progeniture, followed by declaring “With Maastricht, there will be more immigration, more crime, more drugs and more Aids” (Bonnefous and Duroselle, 1993: 85). De Villiers also deplored the greater traffic – in people, drugs, etc. – that Maastricht would bring about.

The “Yes” to Maastricht narrowly won with 51.05% versus 48.95% for the “No” despite the early comfortable lead of the “Yes” in the referendum campaign. The majority of RPR electors (despite the leadership of RPR calling for “yes” vote), FN, PC, extreme left electors, and people with no political affiliation voted “No” to Maastricht (BVA-Liberation, 24 September 1992). It must be noted that rural regions – such as Auvergne, Aquitaine, Bourgogne, Centre, Champagne-Ardennes, Picardie and Basse-Normandie – and regions with old industrial traditions – such as Nord-Pas-De-Calais and Haute-Normandie – voted in majority “No” to Maastricht. It is thus paradoxical that regions receiving most European help under the cohesion hat, either by their status as disfavoured rural regions or by their status as industrial zones in re-conversion have voted in this way but the reasons underlined below explain this. In the same way, the weight of the FN, the fear of the foreigner and of the mafia may explain why Corsica, PACA and Languedoc-Roussillon voted “No” to Maastricht. Individuals in lower socio-professional categories tended to vote “No” to Maastricht whereas individuals in higher socio-professional categories voted yes (BVA-Liberation, 24 September 1992).

Among the reasons which played a role in the “No” vote to Maastricht, loss of national sovereignty came first (57%) followed respectively by leaving France in the hands of Brussels technocrats (55%), fear to see Germany dominate Europe (40%), show one’s discontent to Mitterrand and his government (39%), Maastricht being
deemed expensive and bringing about austerity policy (37%), show one’s rejection of the entire French political class (31%) and the war in the ex-Yugoslavia (28%) (BVA-Liberation, 24 September 1992). These reasons show a discontent as much with the expected economic, social and societal consequences of Maastricht as with the economic, societal and social situation of that time and those deemed responsible for it, and the loss of national sovereignty. Among the reasons which have played a role in the “Yes” vote to Maastricht, ensure peace in Europe came first (72%) followed respectively by deemed indispensable to carry on European integration (63%), fighting better economically against Japan and the USA (51%), fear to see the “No” win (35%), the war in the ex-Yugoslavia (27%), fear to see Germany dominate Europe (21%), support Mitterrand (14%) (BVA-Liberation, 24 September 1992). These reasons show that the “Yes” to Maastricht was primarily motivated by the wish to preserve peace in Europe, pursue further European integration and show greater economic power on the international scene.

The narrowness of the result at the 1992 referendum brought the politicians, in particular those opposed to Maastricht, to underline the social and political fracture that this result testified, and encouraged the anti-Maastricht politicians to pursue their attack on European integration. Thus, on 14 and 16 June 1993, Seguin, in a discourse on European integration and on French economic policy, criticised the liberal, free-trade and internationalist ideological substratum of policies led within the framework of the European economic convergence and symbolised by the Treaty on European Union. On that occasion, Seguin proposed a Europe resting on four pillars: principle of European preference, the maintenance of high levels of social protection, the redevelopment of central and oriental Europe, and the invention of a real solidarity with Mediterranean countries and Africa (Bonnefous and Duroselle, 1994). He went on, evoking a future “social Munich”, by declaring “the employment preoccupation remains undoubtedly second in the choices made, relegated after the currency defence, the public deficit reduction, productivism or the promotion of free trade” (Bonnefous and Duroselle, 1994:74).

The currency crisis within the European monetary system (EMS) over the summer 1993, as well as the new GATT agreements in December 1993 – the latter bringing about the reduction of agricultural subsidies and further opening of European
markets to imports – were opportunities for Le Pen, Chevenement and De Villiers to castigate the failure of European integration – in particular Maastricht – and free trade impetus with its corollary of social dumping which threatened entire sections of French industry (Bonnefous and Duroselle, 1994). The activism of eurosceptic figures cumulated with acute economic and social difficulties of the time coincided with a public opinion being increasingly eurosceptic: thus in September 1993, 56% of people interviewed would say “No to Maastricht” versus 44% “yes” (BVA, September 1993). Despite the dominance of domestic problems at the 1994 European elections, these elections saw a number of anti-Maastricht political lists obtain variable success separately but a relatively strong success altogether especially given the profusion of lists as discussed in section 4.2.1.2. In the related elections, the critique of the anti-Maastricht lists targeted the excessive liberalism of the GATT agreements; factory transfers creating social dumping and resulting from free trade; non-defence of European trade (non-respect of European preference principle); the supra-nationalism; the single currency and its economic and social consequences (thus Chevenement declared that Maastricht was tantamount to massive unemployment); the Brussels bureaucracy; and the development of immigration and crime inter alia favoured by Schengen – the latter three topics were developed by De Villiers and Le Pen –(Bonnefous and Amouroux, 1995; Perrineau and Ysmal, 1995).

The political opposition to European integration continued in the second part of the 1990s although some important changes took place. Politicians such as Emmanuelli, Seguin and Chirac contested any role for the central bank to dictate the economic policy, at the 1995 presidential elections – Chirac though declared himself in favour of the “Franc fort” policy (Bonnefous and Amouroux, 1996). As discussed above, Chirac as well as Jospin pledged a commitment to EMU and the single currency subject inter alia to the establishment of a European economic government. Seguin did not oppose EMU and the single currency any longer but continued to oppose the “Franc fort” policy and the excessive focus on monetary aspects in relation to the convergence criteria. On 24 January 1996, he thus called on Germany and France to adopt a European reflationary policy to ensure a successful shift to the single currency, and he wished the EU would adopt a social and democratic base swiftly. In the second part of the 1990s, Chevenement (MDC)
as well as the communists also came to accept de facto EMU, the single currency and some transfers of competence to Europe in exchange for European guarantees on employment, growth, and the establishment of a social Europe: Both Chevenement (MDC) and the communists as part of the left government in the period 1997 to 2002 thus contributed to further integration in Europe although the rhetoric used by the MDC and the PC is anti-European (Reynie, 2005).

On the right of the political chess board, the pro-European and pro-EMU positioning of Chirac at the 1997 legislative elections has had as a consequence that some of his 1995 electors voted FN because of the Europe issue. Pasqua left de facto the RPR in 1998 on grounds of disagreements on the Europe issue and founded the “Rassemblement Pour La France” (RPF) – a movement with an anti-European positioning – and with De Villiers competed at the 1999 elections on an anti-European platform as discussed in section 4.2.1.2. De Villiers left the RPF on 19 July 2000 over inter alia a disagreement with Pasqua on the political anchoring of this party – Pasqua wished to appeal to both Sovereignists of the left and of the right and De Villiers only to those on the right. As discussed in section 4.2.1.2, political activity against European integration was relatively more important within the right of the political chess board at the end of the 1990s and early 21st century, especially in peripheral parties such as FN, RPF, MPF and MNR although there exists currents within mainstream parties of the right and left which without wanting a scaling back of European integration wish to limit and alter the scope and nature of the expansion of Europe often with a focus on the preservation (and development) of social rights, the need to regulate markets and the preservation of national sovereignty.

Despite the worsening in the economic and social situation (rise in unemployment and relatively poor economic growth, especially from 1992 to 1997 and from the second part of 2000) and a public opinion increasingly preoccupied by the European constraints, the successive governments as well as the leaderships of mainstream political parties pursued their austerity policy with a view to ensuring France qualified for the single European currency. It must be nevertheless noted that

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72 MDC and PC in the government of Jospin de facto participated in European integration and altered somewhat their position.
French successive governments achieved qualification for the latter not so much by decreasing public expenditure – no doubt fearful of a greater popular and political rebellion – but by augmenting tax to curb public budgetary deficits. The French governments further sought to inter alia soothe the popular and political opposition to the single currency and further integration, at the least in the eurosceptic factions within mainstream political parties and in the MDC and PC (both government partners in the Jospin government), by lobbying the EU to adopt an economic government to counterbalance an independent European central bank, by pushing the EU to adopt a social Europe with a renewed impetus on growth and employment. This manoeuvre had the extra benefit of recapturing some of the lost power of public interventionism at the European level. Section 4.4.1 will show that although French public opinion tends to have a relatively strong attachment to Europe, both affective and utilitarian, economic, social and societal concerns pertaining to European integration and the future of the latter moderated this attachment in the study period.

4.3.2 European Integration as a Threat to British Dominant Economic and Social Model (and British Economic and Social Prosperity)

4.3.2.1 Thatcher and Major Eras: Neo-Liberalism and Neo-Conservatism

British membership of the EU has brought about an upsurge of intra- and inter-party debate about European integration combined with the European issue becoming a staple item of popular and journalistic discourse. Prior to the mid-1980s, questions of European integration intruded only periodically (albeit significantly) into British political consciousness. After this period and particularly in the second part of the 1990s, European integration has assumed greater importance in the British political scene. Polls substantiate this (Ipsos-Mori, 2006).

The Thatcher and Major years were marked by an ideological preference for free markets and individualism (Evans, 1999; Davies, 1995; Evans and Taylor, 1997). Thus, in those years a range of policies were followed such as greater labour market flexibility, privatisation of state companies, including public utilities, deregulation, favouring home-ownership (sales of council houses), slimming down of the public
sector, direct tax reduction and curbing of union power. Thatcher and Major also displayed a strong concern with social order which, they believed, was best secured by preserving a strong community (Evans, 1999; Davies, 1995; Evans and Taylor, 1997). The development of national identity – and not the welfare state – was thought instrumental in fostering a strong community.

Thatcher saw European integration advocated by other European nations such as Germany and France and by Delors, President of the European Commission, as threatening the British economic and social model. On 20 September 1988, Thatcher (1993:744-745) delivered a speech at Bruges:

“To try to suppress nationhood at the centre of a European conglomerate would be highly damaging.... We have not rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain to see them reimposed at a European level with a European superstate exercising a new dominance from Brussels”.

It was reported that the first draft of the related speech was far more contentious than the final version but Sir Geoffrey Howe, who was the Foreign Secretary, managed with the assistance of the Whitehall civil service network to have the inflammatory sections removed. There had been attacks upon the inferior colonial record of other European countries and suggestions that they were less attached to liberty than the British (Young, 1998). The protest against European integration was also anchored in the importance of atlanticism especially for Conservative right wingers, the fear about a reunified Germany and the perceived greater trade and investment opportunities available in dynamic Asian economies. Thatcher had a different conception of Europe’s future development and advocated a family of nations in which there would be willing and active cooperation between independent sovereign states rather than a single endeavour. On 30 October 1990, opposed to EMU and the Social Charter, Prime Minister Thatcher declared at the House of Commons (Butler & Kavanagh, 1992:16):

“I do not want the Commission to increase its powers at the expense of the house... Mr Delors said...that he wanted the European Parliament to be the democratic body of the community, he wanted the Commission to be the executive and he wanted the Council of Ministers to be the senate. No. No. No.”
These speeches inflamed divisions in the cabinet which contributed to Thatcher’s nemesis in November 1990 but she along with leading Conservative eurosceptics such as Norman Tebbit continued their divisive influence on the Conservative Party on the European issue in the 1990s. Thus for example, Thatcher and Tebbit called for a referendum on Economic and Monetary Union. Major, who succeeded Thatcher as prime minister on 28 November 1990 was not alienated by the substance of Thatcher’s position on the EC – which struck nationalist chords with conservative members of parliament and voters – but by her confrontational style. In order to blur the differences of opinion on European integration – that is to say the Conservative split over Europe – Major used the twin tactic of rejecting the federalist vision of Europe but stressing that Britain should be at the heart of Europe. At the Maastricht summit of 1991, Major obtained a compromise on EMU, on the Social Chapter and on common foreign policy and justice and home affairs, eliciting an opt-in on EMU and an opt-out on the social chapter. Major also secured that the common foreign policy and justice and home affairs be organised on an intergovernmental way (Butler and Westlake, 1995). Major won the 1992 General Election with a smaller overall majority of 21. Europe as well as defence and foreign policy were part of the 1992 campaign manifestoes of the Conservative Party, Labour Party and Liberal Democrats but did not play an important part in the campaign – they had been so important before under Thatcher leadership and in Maastricht intergovernmental negotiations: taxation, public services provision, United Kingdom devolution and economic management including unemployment – the early 1990s were marked by an economic recession – played a key role (Butler and Kavanagh, 1992).

On 16 September 1992, the pound sterling was forced out of the ERM following a colossal speculative attack on the pound sterling, this episode referred to as “Black Wednesday” (Barrell et al., 1994; Michie, 1998). An overvalued pound sterling – a result of the shadowing of the Deutsch Mark and the Bundesbank’s monetary policy including setting of interest rates – contributed to a deepening and lengthening of the recession in the early 1990s (Evans, 1999). The significance of “Black Wednesday” is that it instantly destroyed the Conservative Party’s reputation as the party of competent economic management (King et al., 1998). The event of “Black
"Black Wednesday" was also decisively important because it raised the issue of European integration and emboldened eurosceptics in the Conservative Party and the press to exert pressure on Prime Minister Major who adopted a more eurosceptic line of conduct towards European integration and more particularly towards Economic and Monetary Union and the single currency as discussed in section 4.2.2. Internal party management became a priority for Prime Minister Major in the context of a dwindling parliamentary majority. The removal of the party whip from a troublesome group of eurosceptic Conservative backbenchers (Teresa Gorman, Teddy Taylor, Tony Marlow, John Wilkinson, Richard Shepherd, Nicholas Budgen and Christopher Gill who even launched their own manifesto on Europe) in November 1994, the challenge to Major’s leadership of the party by John Redwood in July 1995 and further crisis occasioned by the issue of BSE – a world-wide and European-wide ban on British beef – were all manifestations of the chaos wrought by European integration in British politics and more especially in the Conservative Party and government (Baker et al, 1996). The “Black Wednesday” episode was interpreted as a sign that the project of Economic and Monetary Union and the single currency necessitated an economic and social convergence of the countries taking part in it, a convergence between the British neo-liberal Thatcherite model and the continental European prevalent model of regulated capitalism which was considered as more elusive with the passing of time.

4.3.2.2 Blair Era: The Weight of the Thatcherite Heritage and Neo-Liberal Consensus

The weight of successive electoral defeats and the consequent changes in the electorate’s aspirations and economic and social situation pushed Neil Kinnock – Labour leader from 1983 to 1992 – to start to alter the Labour party’s ideological positioning towards the centre ground of British politics, bringing it relatively closer to a market economy stance: abandoning in the process unilateralism, Labour’s opposition of Britain’s membership of the EU, accepting the sales of council houses, coming round to the need for lower taxes and jettisoning the traditional faith of the party in old-style nationalisations (Evans, 1999). Blair, who took office in 1997, went further in the re-foundation of Labour and largely accepted the Thatcherite
inspired reforms of the 1980s and 90s, and embraced the Thatcherite values of individualism, social order and free markets – so as to be able to compete globally – but showed more commitment to public services such as education and health, which is also true for the Liberal Democrats (Blair, 1996; Evans, 1999; Hay, 2002). However Labour, promising to stick with the previous government’s spending plans for the first two years of the parliament, made a relatively slow start to their ambitious plans for the renewal of public services: Brown in his first budget only spent an extra £3 billion. However, on 18 July 2000 in the comprehensive spending review, Brown announced that the public services would receive £43 billion over the next three years, education, health and transport being the main beneficiaries (Edwards, 2001).

As discussed in section 4.2.2.3, despite Blair’s explicit commitment to engage more constructively with his European partners, the Labour government’s engagement towards Europe has been relatively moderate. EMU and the Euro remained more discordant and problematic. The return to economic growth and full employment in the United Kingdom (see Table 4.5), the relatively better economic and social health of the latter compared to other EU nations, as well as the importance of national identity and national sovereignty made the project of EMU and the single currency, and more generally of further European integration far less appealing and popular. These culminated in an increased politicisation of the EU issue in the second part of the 1990s and contributed to a limiting of the European ambitions of successive British Labour governments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Inflation</th>
<th>GDP Growth</th>
<th>Unemployment</th>
<th>Total Tax Burden as a percentage of GDP</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>9.80</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>10.20</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>4.70</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>8.50</td>
<td>36.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>6.90</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>6.20</td>
<td>37.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>2.40</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>Unemployment</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>2.90</td>
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<td>38.6</td>
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<td>2001</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: figure from 1995 with ESA 95 definitions

The growing commitment of the British government to public services – but also the growing consensus on public services among the main political parties – in the late 1990s also made European integration less attractive in this respect. The relative economic, societal and social dynamism of countries in Asia, North America and in Oceania (mainly Australia and New Zealand) – contrasting with the economic and social difficulties of the largest EU nations (other than the UK) committed to further European integration – was interpreted by politicians from the Conservative Party but also increasingly from the Liberal Democrat Party and Labour Party as another sign that the current model of European integration was ill-thought out, and needed re-adjustments towards less interventionism of the state in the economic and social sphere, more intergovernmental cooperation rather than supra-nationalism, more market liberalisation and promotion of free trade (Evans, 1999; Clift, 2001; Gamble and Kelly, 2000). Not unlike Margaret Thatcher who believed the EC required a healthy dose of Thatcherism, New Labour argued that participation in deeper integration depended on other member states modernizing their economies and social welfare systems and adopting economic reforms that mirrored those introduced in the United Kingdom. This became thus a core component of the British Treasury’s evaluation of whether adoption of the Euro would be in Britain’s interests (HM Treasury, 2001).

In an analysis based on official party manifestos from 1945 to 2001, Bara and Budge (2001) showed that a growing consensus emerged between the three main British political parties – Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats – which started in the early 1990s and especially manifested itself in 1997 and 2001. They found thus that these parties had globally evolved towards the centre and centre right of the political chess board – Conservatives were deemed though more to the right than the other two parties. In party programmes and their economic orientation, there is a
neo-liberal Thatcherite consensus between the three related parties, centred on reduced role for government and acceptance of the market. Likewise, in programmes' emphasis on social conservatism, there are still some distinctions (but differences have narrowed acutely in the second part of the 1990s) between the related political parties: this is mainly due to law and order, a topic that the Conservatives have continued to prioritise heavily, but both Labour and Liberal Democrats have markedly increased their emphasis on this area in the 1997 and 2001 elections. On immigration, there are also quite small differences between the parties with Labour moving away from its traditional pro-immigration image in 1997 and 2001 (Saggar, 2001; Amin and Richardson, 1998).

In party programmes' emphases on welfare, there is still a differentiation between Labour, the Liberal Democrats and Conservatives: Labour and to a lesser extent the Liberal Democrats continue to manifest a traditional support in this area – as discussed though above, the expenditure on public services was very moderate in the first Labour parliament in the study period – although the Conservatives have shown greater acceptance of spending on public services in 1997 and 2001. Moreover in the 2005 General Election, the Conservatives have shown an even greater commitment in this area, almost matching Labour’s planned spending (Kavanagh and Butler, 2005). Concerning party programme emphases on Europe, there is a difference in positioning between the main political parties. The Liberal Democrats and to a lesser extent Labour are in favour of European integration. The Conservatives’ distinctiveness occurs in their opposition to European integration, which has grown consistently throughout the nineties (Bara and Budge, 2001). Labour and to a lesser extent the Liberal Democrats have though partly followed the Conservatives’ leadership on Europe in the second part of the 1990s (for example only joining the Euro when the conditions are right and subject to a referendum; retention of national veto for key policy areas such as taxation; national contribution to EU budget; immigration) and have largely shied away, as discussed above, from taking an unequivocal stance on Europe. This is partly because of internal party divisions, partly because of key economic, social and societal policy consensus between the main parties and inherent divergence with the EU more interventionist economic, social and societal model – including the deemed more favourable economic and social situation in the United Kingdom compared to other EU
countries –, but also partly because of unpopularity of European integration with the electorate and the media as a whole, and the quest for re-election. Section 4.4.2 will underline the growing euroscepticism of British public opinion which reflects the political, economic, social and societal environment of the period. In the next section, French and British public opinions on European integration will be contrasted.

4.4 Public Opinion and European Integration

In both the United Kingdom and France, public opinion on European integration has fluctuated with the national economic and social situation, and the perceived consequences that the former has had and could have on this national situation. This implies that public opinion in both these nations relied on utilitarian assessments to derive their views on European integration. This relationship is not exclusive in the sense that particularly for France, public opinion on European integration also depended on an affective attachment to European integration but utilitarian appraisals are taking more and more precedence over the latter.

4.4.1 A French Public Opinion in Favour of European Integration but Concerned about the Type of European Union Built

4.4.1.1 French Public Opinion’s Support for European Integration and the Single European Currency

Although French public opinion was and remained much more in favour of European integration in the study period than the British one, the level of support for European integration in both countries has followed a downward curve – for France especially from 1992 to 1997 and from the second part of 2000, and for the United Kingdom in the aftermath of the pound’s forced withdrawal from the ERM and throughout the study period (latter discussed in section 4.4.2). French public opinion support for European integration in the study period has varied with the economic, social and societal difficulties that France has undergone and the perceived role that European integration – and the type of Europe being built – has
played in these. The level of public opinion support for European integration, albeit overall relatively high in the study period, has dipped from 1992 to 1997 (especially first part of 1997) and to a lesser extent from the second part of 2000 echoing acute economic and social difficulties in France in these periods as discussed in section 4.3.1. If 68% of people interviewed thought that France's membership of the EU was a good thing – versus 6% a bad thing and 21% neither a good thing nor a bad one (5% No Opinion) – in November 1989 (Ifop-Profession Politique, 1 April 1990), and 78% of people interviewed were favourable to European integration – versus 14% opposed (8% NSP/No Opinion) – in September 1992 (CSA-L'Evenement du Jeudi, September 1992), a series of polls confirmed that public opinion became increasingly eurosceptic following the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.

Thus in 1993, 52% of persons questioned wished the government to stimulate economic activity even if it increased inflation rather than maintain austerity policy in pursuance of the Franc Fort policy and EMU commitments – 26% against and 22% no opinion (CSA-Le Parisien, 24 June 1993). In 1994, 51% of people interviewed thought that since the ratification of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the EU had gone in the wrong direction – versus 30% in the right direction. In the same way, 39% thought that the action of the EU, for themselves and their family, had rather negative effects versus 38% positive effects – at the next European elections (in June 1994), 59% of people interviewed moreover wished to express their distrust towards the type of Europe that is being built versus 34% confidence (Ifop-L'Express, 30 April 1994). In 1997, in relation to the economic policy of the government and the budgetary and European constraints, 58% of persons questioned thought that the government should profoundly change its economic policy, 12% were of the opinion that there was no other policy possible, while 20% answered that it was possible to soften the orientations of the government's economic policy and 10% had no opinion (Louis Harris-Valeurs actuelles, 28 April 1997). In 1996, 48% of people interviewed even agreed that a break from European integration should be taken – versus 42% disagreed and 10% no opinion (Louis Harris-Valeurs Actuelles, 7 Oct 1996).
Public opinion's negative feelings towards European integration became greater in 1997 and from the second part of 2000, coinciding with a less favourable economic and social situation in France (Ipsos-Canal Ipsos, 10 Dec 2001; CSA-Liberation, 28 June 2000). Considering the perceived impact of the EU on specific policies, the pattern of scepticism towards the EU is similar with a deterioration in public perceptions of the EU in the period from 1992 to 1996 – poll data for these for 1997, 1998, 2000 and 2001 are not available – and coincide with the period of economic and social difficulties in France (see Table 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 in appendix 4.1). The EU as being built is therefore considered by public opinion as contributing to France’s economic, social and societal problems. From 1992 to 1994 and 1996, there is a worsening in public opinion’s perceptions on the action of the EU on all policies – including agriculture, employment, immigration, social and economic policies (EU action is deemed negative overall for these) – and even on those where EU action is deemed positive overall such as environment protection and maintaining peace in Europe.

In 1999, there is an amelioration in the perceived contribution of the EU to all policies coinciding with a relatively better economic and social environment in France, that is to say the fall in unemployment and greater economic growth although this unemployment remained relatively high compared to other European countries. If the EU is perceived by public opinion as having overall a positive effect on policies such as environment protection, maintaining peace in Europe, youth training & education, economic growth, the EU influence on policies such as unemployment reduction, immigration control, tax decrease, agriculture is still perceived as having a negative impact in 1999. The EU is considered by the public to have a very marginal positive effect on social protection, 47% positive versus 46% (see table 4.8 in appendix 4.1). This slight reversal of perceptions concerning EU action on social protection – the EU was considered by public opinion before this date as having a negative influence on social protection – may be explained by a relatively better economic and social environment in France in 1999 but also by the fact that the EU under inter alia French insistence has made some limited moves on the social agenda.
Moreover on this aspect, public opinion judged that the priority of the EU should be to firstly focus on building a social Europe: 57% of people interviewed placed the establishment of a Social Europe as the priority for the EU followed respectively by the establishment of a Europe of Defence (19%), European Monetary and Financial Union (18%), European Cultural Policy (12%), European Agricultural Policy (12%) and European Political Union (11%) (CSA-L’Humanite, 2 June 1999). The public concern for social protection is further substantiated by the fact that public opinion judged that European integration as it unfolded reinforced the effects of globalisation rather than protected against the effects of globalisation (Ipsos-Canal Ipsos, 10 Dec 2001). The further rise in this feeling in November 2000 and November 2001 – passing from 47% (against 45%) in October 1999 to 50% (against 38%) in November 2000 & 56% (against 33%) in November 2001 – may be explained by the French economic slow down from the second part of 2000.

The prevalence of monetary policy over budgetary policy pertaining to the Franc Fort policy and EMU, and the political agitation over this issue in the discourse of the left and the right in the study period have contributed to the public opinion’s fear about the consequences of the Euro on social policies. Thus 55% of people interviewed thought that with the Euro there will be a diminution in social protection – versus 27% an amelioration and 18% no opinion (CSA-La Tribune, 1 May 1998). For public opinion, the perceived negative impact of the Euro on social protection was deemed even greater in 1997, a period in which the economic and social situation was very poor: 71% of people interviewed judged that the single currency and a common European economic policy will not be conducive to social inequalities reduction, 73% not conducive to a decrease in unemployment and 50% not conducive to a return to economic growth (Louis Harris-Valeurs Actuelles, 28 April 1997).

When considering the issue of the single European currency and EMU itself, the pattern of support among public opinion is similar to the one for European integration as a whole. Thus, in the study period, public opinion has quite clearly supported the single currency and EMU but this support has varied with the economic, social and societal difficulties that France has undergone and the perceived role that the single currency and EMU – and the way to achieve it – have
played in these. The level of public opinion support for the single currency and
EMU, albeit overall clearly in the majority in the study period, has dipped from
1992 to 1997 (especially the first part of 1997 and the second part of 1993) and to a
lesser extent from the second part of 2000 echoing acute economic and social
difficulties in France in these periods as discussed in section 4.3.1.1. The lowest
level of support for the single European currency was reached in April 1997 and
October 1993, namely 49% (see Table 4.9 in appendix 4.1), coinciding in 1997 and
1993 with a very poor economic and social situation with high unemployment and
low economic growth: this cumulated in 1993 with a currency crisis within the
European monetary system (EMS) – pushing the French Franc outside the
fluctuations margins of the EMS. Table 4.10 (in appendix 4.1) also reveals that
positive opinion about the single European currency dropped from 2000 echoing the
economic slowdown in France – including the expectations of an economic slow
down from the second part of 2000 – in this period.

When considering the perceived influence of the single European currency on
specific aspects (see table 4.11, 4.12 and 4.13 in appendix 4.1), public opinion saw
the Euro as mainly having positive consequences on commercial exchanges,
inflation control, currency stability, easing travel and dynamism of the French
economy (the latter in 1998 when the economic situation was relatively better).
Public opinion though regarded the single European currency as principally having
negative consequences on purchasing power, savings, social protection, pensions,
unemployment, identity and national sovereignty of France. It must be noted that in
the 1998 period, the relatively better economic climate in France has contributed to
improving public opinion’s views on the consequences of the Euro for specific
aspects but public opinion remained sceptical on the consequences of the Euro for
employment, salaries and even the sacrifices that people had to make because of the
Euro.

4.4.1.2 French Public Opinion’s Support for Europeanization of Policies

Section 4.4.1.1 has demonstrated that public opinion has been overall in favour of
European integration in the study period from 1992 to 2001 although there have
been some fluctuations in the level of support for European integration during this
period echoing economic, societal and social difficulties in France for which European integration – at least the type of EU being built – is deemed to contribute. French public opinion was thus particularly unhappy with the austerity policy relating to EMU and the single European currency and construed the EU as too liberal, deregulated, excessively open to often deemed unfair world competition, as not giving enough place to social and societal preoccupations in its policies and as partly harming the identity and national sovereignty of France.

Contrary to the United Kingdom, the socialisation effect – concomitant with the continuing pro-Europeanism of mainstream parties in France – partly explains the support of French public opinion for European integration. The feeling of attachment to Europe exemplifies this: 63% of people interviewed felt European from time to time or often – versus 35% rarely or never and 2% no opinion (CSA-La Vie, 2 January 1993). The circulation of the single European currency was moreover viewed by public opinion as the most decisive element further contributing to feeling European: 39% in 2001, 39% in 2000, 46% in 1999 (Ipsos-Canal Ipsos, 10 Dec 2001). Even if European integration tended to be seen as threatening the French identity – albeit the figures are almost evenly balanced (Ipsos-Canal Ipsos, 10 December 2001), public opinion is in favour of transferring some policies to the EU (Sofres-Le Figaro, 8 March 1996) and in favour of decisions in the European Council being taken by qualified majority rather than by unanimity: 67% of people interviewed in favour – versus 30% opposed and 3% no opinion (CSA-Liberation, 28 June 2000). Despite an unfavourable economic and social climate in France in 1996, public opinion was thus willing to transfer some policies to the EU such as industrial policy, unemployment fighting policy, telecommunications policy, foreign policy, immigration policy, environment policy and the use of troops abroad. People interviewed were though opposed to transferring professional training policy, economic policy, social policy, cultural policy and education (Sofres-Le Figaro, 8 March 1996). The unfavourable economic and social climate in 1996 has probably contributed to influencing public opinion’s views on not wishing to transfer to the EU, policies such as social policy, economic policy and professional training: as discussed above, the EU was seen as contributing to France’s economic and social problems via especially Franc Fort policy, EMU but also the concern that the EU was too liberal.
The desire to transfer policies to the EU may be explained by the belief that the EU may be best able to deal with some of these policies – subsidiarity principle – and that French successive governments have failed to deal successfully with these. Unemployment, crime and immigration are at a high level in the study period (European Commission, 2002, 2003; Barclay and Tavares, 2003; Eurostat, 2006a and OECD/SOPEMI, various years) and have been key issues for public opinion at elections (see section 4.2.1.2). If public opinion is critical of some of the agreements in place such as the Schengen agreement and their consequences for immigration and crime, they may believe that the EU, at least the type of EU they favour, would implement a more restrictive policy towards immigration from outside the EU than the French one – France has one of the most liberal immigration policies in Europe. It is revealing here to note that French citizens are not in favour of transferring social, cultural and education policies to the EU as they may perceive that French successive governments have dealt relatively better with these – level of social protection is relatively high in EU terms (Eurostat/ESSPROS, 2006) – and that the national level may be best placed to cater for these but also because they fear a liberal policy path of the EU. French citizens would like the EU to take a more regulated capitalism path, with more interventionism in the economic and social sphere.

4.4.2 An Increasingly Eurosceptic British Public Opinion

4.4.2.1 A British Public Opinion Ever More Sceptical towards European Integration and the Single European Currency

British public opinion was and remained more reluctant towards EU membership and particularly towards further European integration compared to most other EU countries including France, and grew even more eurosceptic from 1992 (especially in the aftermath of the pound’s forced withdrawal from the ERM) to 2001. British public opinion was also opposed to EMU and the single currency and grew even more so throughout the study period. Thus, from 1994, there is a majority of British respondents who are against further transfer of sovereignty to the EU with a view to being closer with it. There was a further progress of eurosceptic ideas in 1997.
concomitant upon the increased politicisation of the EU issue by political parties. The percentage of respondents with no opinion in one way or the other has also fallen significantly in the second part of the 1990s (ICM Research, 2001a).

On the question of whether Britain should leave the EU or not, which is a relatively extreme and binary question, there is a weakening in public opinion support for Britain staying in the EU especially from 1992 and especially 1993 (Post ERM crisis) (see Table 4.14 in appendix 4.2). Across the study period, there is an increase in the percentage of people who are in favour of Britain leaving the EU and people who are uncertain about European integration (Don’t Know answers). The greater politicisation of the EU issue – especially in April 1997 General Election, June 1999 European Elections and June 2001 General Election – has contributed to this. From these data, despite the decrease in support for EU membership, British respondents are still in favour of remaining in the EU (Ipsos Mori, 2003). However, in a poll of February 2001 by Ipsos-Mori (2001), a majority of respondents (50%) would favour a withdrawal from the EU – versus 37% would stay in and 13% Don’t know – if the UK could keep a Free Trade zone with the EU. In the latter poll, a large majority of respondents (84%) felt though that politicians should give them more information with a view to deciding whether to leave or not to leave the EU.

The most important reasons given by British respondents for thinking Britain’s EU membership is a good thing are: “good for trade” (34%), “good to cooperate and avoid isolationism” (14%), “need to/will get left behind/cannot afford not to/too small to survive” (7%), “greater chance of peace and military stronger” (7%), “good for jobs” (5%), “good for the economy” (5%) (ICM Research, 2001b). The single most important reasons given by British respondents for thinking Britain’s EU membership is a bad thing are: “losing national independence” (25%), EU membership not needed (13%), cost too much to belong (11%), losing the national identity (11%), “single currency/keep the Pound” (8%) (ICM Research, 2001b). In the same poll, 59% of respondents agreed that the EU is good for British jobs and trade (versus 21% (disagreed)); 60% agreed that it promotes peace and security in Europe (versus 22%); 66% agreed that the EU makes it easier to live or work in other European countries (versus 15%); 46% agreed that Britain has more influence as part of the European Union (versus 31%). However, 58% agreed that with the
EU, Britain’s national identity is being lost (versus 30%); 38% disagreed that Britain’s EU membership means lower prices e.g. air travel, gas/electricity bills (versus 34%); 51% agreed that Britain pays in more to the EU than it takes out (versus 14%); 61% agreed that Britain is losing the ability to make its own decisions (versus 26%); 67% agreed that the EU is full of red tape and bureaucracy (versus 12%); 44% agreed that the EU makes decisions in an undemocratic way (versus 25%); 57% agreed that with the EU, Britain is pushed around by other countries such as France and Germany (versus 30%). When asked how they feel about their national identity, 66% of respondents felt only British, 20% more British than European, 8% equally British and European, 1% more European than British, 1% only European and 3% don’t know. An important difference between British and French public opinions is that national identity and sovereignty issues are much more important in opposing European integration for the former. British identity is conceived as much less compatible with European identity than French identity partly due to lesser importance of socialisation in the United Kingdom (cult of British history), British mainstream political parties being less in favour of European integration – political elites embracing EU membership as a pragmatic step essentially focused on economic argument without conversion to the symbolism of integration (Wallace, 1997; Schmidt, 2006) – and a different conception of national cohesion – role of the welfare state in fostering a strong community in France versus role of national identity in fostering a strong community in the United Kingdom (CSA-La Vie, 2 January 1993; Ipsos-Canal Ipsos, 10 Dec 2001; Ipsos-Canal Ipsos, 10 December 2001 and ICM Research, 2001b).

When asked which three or four things do you think should be a priority for the European Union to undertake in the future (ICM Research, 2001b), respondents answered the following:

Maintaining peace and security in Europe (47%)
Fighting poverty (46%)
Fighting crime (40%)
Fighting unemployment (40%)
Developing a common approach to asylum and immigration (31%)
Developing and protecting the rights of citizens (30%)
Protecting the environment (28%)
Protecting consumers (18%)
Reforming the way that the EU institutions work (13%)
Welcoming new countries to join the EU (8%)
None of them (4%)
Don’t Know (8%)

Finally when asked “what do you think public services such as health, education and transport are like in other major European countries compared to Britain, do you think they are better, worse or are much the same?”, 42% answered better, 25% much the same and 10% worse (23% Don’t Know) (ICM Research, 2001b).

These results seem to indicate that British respondents are increasingly critical of the EU (the euro poll results below confirm this further). Although the EU is considered as having a beneficial effect on British jobs and trade, and on peace and security in Europe, the EU image is one of an undemocratic, bureaucratic institution taking away Britain’s national sovereignty, endangering Britain’s national identity and not giving value to Britain. The EU is though considered to be able to play a role in inter alia fighting poverty, crime, unemployment and resolving immigration and asylum problems, developing and protecting the rights of citizens – partly in reference to having access to better public services – besides maintaining peace and security in Europe.

On the issue of the single European currency, there is also globally a decrease in the support for a single European currency after 1991 (see Table 4.15 in appendix 4.2). That is to say the trend in favour of rejecting the single European currency has grown larger after 1991. It is particularly interesting to note that the polls in proximity with 1st May 1997 and 7th June 2001 General Elections, 10th June 1999 European Elections show a greater percentage of respondents against the single currency or being uncertain about it (Don’t Know answers). The increase in the opposition to the single European currency is still witnessed in the late 1990s even if the government would urge voters to vote in support of it (see Table 4.16 in appendix 4.2).
British public opinion is sceptical about the single European currency and relies on a utilitarian assessment to judge the single European currency. Thus British public opinion is concerned about the negative impact that the single currency would have on unemployment, interest rates, the control over the setting of tax rates and interest rates and the control over government spending shifting to the European Union, the use of British tax in other European countries, the transfer of Britain’s gold reserves to a European Central Bank and more generally the negative impact that the single European currency would have on the British economy (Ipsos Mori, 14 November 1997). British public opinion is therefore not only opposed to the single European currency on the grounds of loss of national sovereignty and national identity but also because they fear that the single European currency would have a negative impact on the British economic and social model. This must be interpreted in the context of a British economy which is in a relatively better situation than most of the EU in terms of for example employment and tax levels and therefore the fear that the single European currency and EMU would damage the relative economic and social health of the United Kingdom. It is thus revealing to see that British public opinion deemed the single currency had not worked and would not work in the future (Ipsos Mori, 30 September 2000).

However if joining the Euro were to translate itself into economic gains for the United Kingdom and its citizens, British public opinion could be persuaded to vote in favour of the Euro in a referendum on the Euro. Thus, among the main reasons which could persuade voters to vote yes in a referendum on the Euro, “If I was convinced that Britain’s economy had lost jobs, trade-unions and investment by staying out of the Euro” (37%) came first, respectively followed by “If I thought that the Euro had become a successful currency” (27%), “If I thought the Euro will bring cheaper prices” and “If I was persuaded that the Euro will not lead to a United States of Europe with a federal government” (24%), “If the Prime Minister and the Chancellor convinced me that joining the Euro is in the national interest” (22%), “If I thought that the Euro had helped improve Europe’s economy” (19%), “If I thought the Euro would bring cheaper mortgages” (17%), “If I felt that Britain had lost influence in the European Union by staying outside the Euro” (16%), “If Europe’s economy became more competitive” (13%), “If the pound stayed overvalued against the Euro” (11%) and “If the Chancellor’s five economic tests for joining the Euro
were met” (7%) (Ipsos Mori, 2 July 2001). It must be noted that the national sovereignty issue is also important for British public opinion and a Yes vote on the Euro would be subject to the proviso that the Euro would not lead to a federal European government?: “If I was persuaded that the Euro will not lead to a United States of Europe with a federal government” (24%) (Ipsos Mori, 2 July 2001). Furthermore, it is important to note that if it was demonstrated that the Euro had a positive effect on Europe’s economy, it would be conducive to British public opinion voting Yes to the Euro: “If Europe’s economy became more competitive”, “If I thought that the Euro had helped improve Europe’s economy” and “If I thought that the Euro had become a successful currency”. This can be linked to the argument above that Europe’s economy was deemed to be weaker than the United Kingdom’s one and therefore made adopting the Euro less appealing to British public opinion but that if economic circumstances in Europe changed with the Euro, British public opinion would consider adopting the Euro.

Therefore, although British and French public opinions have a different conception of European integration – in other words, what the EU should be – clearly one more integrative than the other, if the EU is deemed to have a positive effect on the national economic and social situation, public opinion in these two countries will support European integration. As discussed in the background section on France, the level of French citizens’ support for European integration and the Euro was higher in periods when the economic and social situation was better, and French citizens are clearly in favour of European integration, especially one oriented towards a social Europe. It is also revealing that British public opinion is less supportive of the EU and against adopting the Euro as it perceives both not to work well and give value to the United Kingdom but if the EU and specifically the Euro were to materialize itself into economic gains for the United Kingdom and its citizens, British public opinion would favour further European integration and could be persuaded to adopt the Euro. In the British context, the economic gains pertaining to further European integration are though subject to the national sovereignty constraint: British citizens would not approve the establishment of a federal Europe.
British Public Opinion Reluctant to Europeanize Policies

Section 4.4.2.1 has shown that British public opinion has grown far less disposed towards European integration from 1992 to 2001. Although the EU was considered as having a beneficial effect on British jobs and trade, and on peace and security in Europe, British public opinion judged the EU to be undemocratic, bureaucratic, too interventionist, somewhat value dis-enhancing and threatening British national identity and sovereignty. The outcomes regarding the Europeanization of policies should be construed in this environment.

There are very few polls which deal with the transfer of national policies to the EU, probably because British public opinion has grown more eurosceptic throughout the decade which made this issue far less important for polling companies. From 1993 to 1996 the level of public opinion support for transfer of national policies to the EU has deteriorated (Ipsos Mori, 3 May 1996). Thus, by 1996, the net support for a common system of legal practice has fallen to 28 points from 43 points in 1993. In the same way, in 1996 the differential in favour of a common system of taxes between member states has fallen to 2 points whilst in 1996 British public opinion did not support the establishment of a Supreme Court of Europe and a single co-ordinated European foreign policy any longer (differential respectively of 3 and 2 points). In 1996 the opposition to transferring more power to the European Parliament from individual national parliaments has grown to a differential of 46 points and the opposition to the establishment of a United States of Europe with a federal government was of a differential of 45 points. Finally, in 1996 British public opinion was still opposed to sterling rejoining the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (differential of 8 percentage points but was of 37 percentage points in the immediate aftermath of the currency crisis in the early 1990s). It is probable that consistent with the further deterioration in British public opinion’s support for the EU in the second part of the 1990s, the British have grown even more opposed to further transfers of sovereignty to the EU after 1996.

Importance of Issues and British Public Opinion

The importance of issues for public opinion throughout the study period brings some insights into the reasons which substantiate the growing reluctance of British public
opinion towards European integration and the Europeanization of policies. When asked what the most important issues faced by Britain each year are and considering the study period from 1992 to 2001, British respondents attached more importance to unemployment and the management of the economy (with peaks in 1992 and 1993) in the first period of the 1990s, and this declined subsequently (Ipsos-Mori, 2006). The improvement in the United Kingdom's economic performance especially in the second part of the 1990s explains this: unemployment has fallen to 5% by 2001 – among the lowest in the EU – and economic growth has improved after 1993 (European Commission, 2002, 2003).

By the 1990s, there was a greater readiness on the part of voters to accept the need for higher taxation in order to fund social and public services (Evans, 1999). Health (NHS) and education whilst always considered quite important by British respondents throughout the period, took even more importance for them from the second part of the 1990s – became then the most important issues facing Britain (Ipsos-Mori, 2006). This is reflected by the level of the United Kingdom's total expenditure on social protection per head of population (in ECU/EUR) which has improved especially in the last few years of the century to become relatively more comparable to France – albeit still lower than France when considering the cost of social provisions (PPS measurement) but above EU average (Eurostat/ESSPROS, 2006). The integration of the social chapter into British law under the first Labour government in the study period as the accumulated government commitments to public services – albeit rather moderate in the first Labour parliament as discussed above – have here played a role. This means that the social argument for supporting European integration is losing substance here as the United Kingdom's social expenditure is above the EU average towards the end of the study period and expenditure on social protection has been pledged by the British government to go up further in real terms in the future (post 2001).

Crime/Law and Order have always been quite important for British respondents throughout the study period, more especially in the first part of the 1990s and from 2000 (Ipsos-Mori, 2006). This reflects a relatively high crime rate per head of population throughout the study period – the highest one in the EU (Barclay and Tavares, 2003). The permeability of European borders – partly resulting from the
principle of free movements of people, services and goods – is perceived as contributing to crime and law and order issues in the UK, the media focus on traffic of arms, drugs and people in Europe contributing to this perception. Race relations/immigration, while considered relatively less important, has assumed more importance for British respondents from the second part of the 1990s, especially from 1999 – it has been even more important for respondents from 2002 to 2006 (often well over 30%) (Ipsos Mori, 2006). This echoes an immigration to the United Kingdom which is relatively high and has accelerated in the late 1990s (Eurostat, 2006a); OECD/SOPEMI, various years). The growing immigration concern may be partly explained by an important flow of European nationals and residents coming to the UK to work given its relatively better economic situation, but also by the media focus on the poor handling of illegal immigration by the EU and other European countries such as in Sangatt, the Channel Tunnel, in the Canary Islands and in Sicily and Southern Italy. It is thus revealing that British respondents place immigration and crime among the policy priorities of the EU (see above).

Europe, beside the ERM crisis and BSE crisis periods, has taken more importance for British respondents in the second part of the 1990s, coinciding with the greater politicisation of the EU issue, its comparative importance is though below the one for Health and Education (Ipsos-Mori, 2006). Taxation and inflation are deemed of little importance for British respondents in the study period (Ipsos-Mori, 2006). For the latter, it is explained by the fact the United Kingdom has relatively low inflation in the study period – the control of inflation improved further in the second part of the 1990s. For the former, it is explained by the relatively low level of taxation as a percentage of GDP in the United Kingdom. Although taxation has increased throughout the period of study, the United Kingdom has low taxation as a percentage of GDP and remains one of the lowest in the EU – just behind Ireland, Spain and Portugal (European Commission, 2002; 2003).

4.4.2.3 British and French Public Opinions: Two Visions of the EU

Overall, despite both public opinions in the United Kingdom and France seeing a role for the EU in for example helping to fight unemployment, poverty, maintain peace and security, fight crime, regulate immigration, protect the environment and
develop and protect the rights of citizens, they have a different conception of what
the EU should be. French public opinion would like the EU to be more integrated
economically and politically, and be organised on a supra-national basis. It is in
favour of transferring a number of policies to the EU such as industrial policy,
unemployment fighting policy, telecommunications policy, foreign policy,
immigration policy, environment policy and the use of troops abroad – this even in a
context of acute national economic and social problems (1996: date of when poll
was carried out) perceived as partly due to European integration via especially Franc
Fort policy and EMU but also the concern that the EU was too liberal – and supports
decisions being taken at qualified majority in the European Council (Sofres-Le
the establishment of a social Europe with a regulated capitalism, a high level of
social protection and one that upholds the principle of European preference, and
therefore an EU which protects its citizens against the effects of globalisation. It
must though be noted that French citizens are not in favour of transferring social,
cultural and education policies to the EU (Sofres-Le Figaro, 8 March 1996) as they
may perceive that French successive governments have dealt relatively better with
these – level of social protection is relatively high in EU terms (Eurostat/ESSPROS,
2006) – and that the national level may be best placed to cater for these. The context
of acute national economic and social difficulties in 1996 (date of when poll was
carried out) for which European integration via especially Franc Fort policy and
EMU was deemed to have contributed may also explain the reluctance of French
public opinion to transfer the social policy and economic policy to the EU. British
public opinion itself prefers the EU to be organised on an intergovernmental basis
and implement free trade and market liberalisation. It is thus strongly opposed to
transferring more power to the European Parliament from the national parliament
and to the establishment of a United States of Europe with a federal government.
More specifically it is against the transfer of foreign policy to the EU, against
sterling rejoining the exchange rate mechanism and against a supreme court of
Europe (Ipsos Mori, 3 May 1996). British public opinion appears though
ambivalent towards a common system of taxes between member states.
Nevertheless it is likely that consistent with the further deterioration in British public
opinion’s support for the EU in the second part of the 1990s, the British have grown
even more opposed to further transfers of sovereignty to the EU after 1996 (date of when poll was carried out). Besides national identity and sovereignty issues, the growing relative reluctance of British public opinion towards European integration can be explained by a perceived divergence of the EU economic, social and societal model with the largely consensual British one which focuses more on free markets, individualism and by the comparative relative success of the British economic, social and societal model – to other EU countries – which is perceived to be threatened by a EU deemed undemocratic, bureaucratic, more interventionist and somewhat value dis-enhancing as discussed above. In line with this, it is particularly important to note that a majority of British respondents (50%) would favour a withdrawal from the EU – versus 37% would stay in and 13% Don’t know – if the UK could keep a Free Trade zone with the EU (Ipsos-Mori, 2001).

4.5 Conclusion

Despite both France and the United Kingdom seeing a role for the EU, they each have a different view of what form the EU should take: this reflects a dissimilar national economic, social, societal and political experience in the study period.

There is relatively strong support in favour of European integration in France in the period from 1992 to 2001 which is the consequence of the socialisation effect, a consensus in mainstream political parties favouring European integration, a relatively low exclusive national identity of French citizens but also the belief that the EU – at least the type of EU favoured: an EU focused on regulated capitalism – can help to tackle some of the key economic, social and societal issues faced by France. In the study period, the support for current EU membership and further European integration has nevertheless fluctuated with economic, social and societal difficulties that France has undergone – especially from 1992 to 1997 and from the second part of 2000 – and the perceived role that European integration – and the type of Europe being built: an EU which is deemed to be too liberal, deregulated and excessively open to world competition – has played in these. This seems to indicate that public opinion views on European integration in France are increasingly the
result of national economic, social and societal assessments rather than affective feelings towards European integration.

The United Kingdom is and remains less disposed towards European integration than other EU countries (including France) and has grown more so from 1992 to 2001. The growing relative reluctance towards the United Kingdom’s EU membership – and more especially towards further European integration – in the study period appears to be explained by a perceived divergence of the EU economic, social and societal model with the British consensus model of free markets, individualism, national sovereignty and national interest. It may well also be explained by the comparative relative success of the British economic, social and societal model – to other EU countries – which is perceived to be threatened by a EU deemed undemocratic, bureaucratic, more interventionist and somewhat value dis-enhancing, but also by the perceived threat that the EU brings to British national identity, and by the lack of real party competition on European integration.
5- ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS FOR HYPOTHESIS I

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the relationship between citizens’ opinion on national political institutions performance and citizens’ view towards European integration (Hypothesis I) is investigated. The analysis of findings and conclusions for hypothesis I are consequently presented below.

5.2 Analysis of Findings for Hypothesis I

Research Question I: Is there a relationship between citizens’ support for integration (or opposition to integration) and citizens’ dissatisfaction with national political institutions’ performance (or satisfaction with national political institutions’ performance) in socio-economic, societal and political terms?

It is hypothesized:

H1 There is an inverse relationship between citizens’ levels of satisfaction with national political institutions’ performance – pertaining to the national economic, political, social and societal situation – and citizens’ support for European integration in France and the United Kingdom (thus, the higher the satisfaction with national performance, the lower the support for European integration).

Statistical outputs are included in the appendices numbered 5.1 A F to 5.48 A F for French models and 5.1 B UK to 5.48 B UK for British models. An example of statistical output, Evaluation of Current EU Membership (Total Score without don’t know) (Model M29.9), is shown below (for full output details for the latter, please refer to Appendix 5.16 A F).
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<td>Standard Error of Rho</td>
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### Cochrane-Orcutt Estimates

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Variables in the Equation:

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5.2.1 Patterns of EU Support

Table 5.1 summarizes the pattern of significance of national variables on the dependent variables, current EU membership (EU benefit and membership) and future EU integration (European integration desired speed preference).

Table 5.1: Pattern of significance of EU Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Effect on Current EU Membership</th>
<th>Effect on Future EU Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dummy Variable for United Kingdom</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Significant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dummy Variable for France</td>
<td>Not Significant</td>
<td>Not Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regression Constant</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Evaluation of Current EU Membership

The dummy variable for the United Kingdom (UK) is significant in all British models, and the direction of the coefficient indicates that the level of support for EU membership is significantly lower in the United Kingdom, controlling for other factors, than in the other EU member states – it must be noted that the dummy UK variable is one of the most important contributors to the explanation of the dependent variable, evaluation of current EU membership in British models (even more so in British models incorporating “don’t Know” answer). It is also revealing that the level of support for EU membership is not significantly higher (or lower) in France than in the other EU countries. The regression constant is also significant in both French and British models with evaluation of current EU membership as the dependent variable, and the direction for the coefficient of the constant suggests that overall there is a significant drop in current EU membership support in the study period (1992-2001) (controlling for France and the UK).
Desired Speed of European Integration

The dummy variable for the United Kingdom is overall significant (it shows though a small effect which cannot be therefore detected in larger models) in British models. The direction of the coefficient for the related variable indicates that the level of support for faster European integration is significantly lower in the United Kingdom, controlling for other factors, than in the other EU member states. It is also revealing that the level of support for faster European integration is not significantly higher in France than in the other EU countries. It must be noted that the regression constant shows a small significant effect (small effects cannot be detected in large models) in all British and French models. The direction of the coefficient for the constant suggests that overall there is a small significant drop in further European integration support (desired speed of European integration) in the study period (1992-2001) (controlling for France and the United Kingdom).

We can therefore infer from these results that British respondents tend to support significantly less current EU membership and further European integration than respondents in other EU member states, and French respondents tend to support current EU membership and further European integration not significantly less or higher than respondents in other EU countries. Furthermore, current EU membership support and further European integration support have significantly dropped in the study period (1992-2001) (controlling for France and the UK). This pattern is echoed in the individual level analysis, current EU membership support and further European integration support have significantly dropped in the study period (1992-2001) for both the United Kingdom and France. The individual level analysis brings further insight through a more detailed analysis of periods (consequent to restricted data availability) as discussed in chapter 6 (Hypothesis II).

It must be underlined that although current EU membership support and further European integration support have significantly decreased in the study period (1992-2001) for both the United Kingdom and France, the drop in support for current EU membership and future EU integration is lower in France than in the United Kingdom – for both individual and aggregate level data analyses. Keeping in mind
the hypothesis, in the next sections, it is now necessary to explain the pattern of EU support in the French and British contexts.

5.2.2 Socialisation Theory and EU Support

Table 5.2 summarizes the pattern of significance of socialisation variables on the dependent variables, current EU membership (EU benefit and membership) and future EU integration (European integration desired speed preference). If an effect is found to be significant, then the relevant variable is a unique contributor to the explanation of the dependent variable.

Table 5.2: Pattern of significance of Socialisation Theory Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socialisation Theory Variables</th>
<th>Effect on Current EU Membership</th>
<th>Effect on Future EU Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Timing of Entry</td>
<td>Significant for French and British Models with “don’t Know (DK)” Answer (small effect) Not Significant otherwise</td>
<td>Significant for British Models Localised Significance for French models</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of Membership</td>
<td>Not Significant</td>
<td>Significant</td>
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</table>

**Timing of EU Entry**

**Evaluation of Current EU Membership**

The timing of EU entry variable tends overall to show a small significant effect on the dependent variable, evaluation of EU membership in French and British models with “DK” answer. The coefficient for this variable is thus significant in model M8K and M9K (British models with “DK” answer), and Model M9K and just outside the significance area for M8K (French models with “DK” answer). The coefficient for this variable is not significant in all remaining models (large models cannot though detect small effects). The direction of the coefficient for the timing of entry variable shows in both French and British models that the circumstances of EU entry show a small significant effect on current EU membership – with “DK”
answer. Thus countries which initially started EU membership with a higher enthusiasm for EU integration – that is to say founding member states of the European Community (EC) (France included) – are showing now in the study period (1992-2001) more uncertainty or even opposition towards EU membership. Conversely those who joined later with a relatively lower initial level of support for European integration – that is to say countries joining the EC in the 1970s and 1980s – are showing more support for EU membership in the study period. The latter may apply to countries such as Greece, Portugal, Spain or Ireland but does not apply to the United Kingdom as the dummy variable for the UK is significant. The direction of the coefficient for the UK dummy variable denotes in all British models that the level of support for EU membership is significantly lower in the UK, controlling for other factors, than in the other EU member states. It was also revealed above that the level of support for EU membership is not significantly higher in France than in the other EU countries. This result on timing of entry variable contradicts somewhat the results of Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996) who found that timing of entry was the most important predictor of European integration before unemployment and length of membership. However they noted a levelling off of support for the EU in the older EU members which may make the effects of domestic economic conditions more important in the future (post 1993) to explain support for EU integration.

**Desired Speed of European Integration**

In French models, timing of EU entry is a significant predictor of desired speed of European integration in model M27 and M29, and is not a significant predictor of desired speed of European integration in model M8, M9 and M28 (but not too far from the significance area). In British models, timing of EU entry is a significant predictor of desired speed of European integration (except in model M9). Overall, the timing of EU entry variable tends to show a significant effect on desired speed of European integration in British and French models. This implies that the circumstances of EU entry matter in the following manner. Countries who initially started EU membership with a higher enthusiasm for EU integration – founding member states of the EC (France included) – are showing in the study period (1992-2001) more support towards further European integration. Conversely those who joined later with a relatively lower initial level of support for European integration –
countries joining the EC in the 1970s and 1980s – are showing less support for further European integration. This is in line with the results elicited for the dummy variable for the United Kingdom. Thus the dummy variable for the United Kingdom was found overall significant (it shows though a small effect which cannot be therefore detected in larger models) in British models with desired speed of European integration, and its direction revealed that the level of support for faster European integration is significantly lower in the UK, controlling for other factors, than in the other EU member states. It was also revealed that the level of support for EU membership is not significantly higher in France than in the other EU countries. The results obtained here are in line with previous findings (for example, Anderson and Kaltenthaler, 1996).

Length of Membership

Evaluation of Current EU Membership

The length of membership variable is not a significant predictor of the dependent variable, evaluation of current EU membership in all British and French models. The results elicited in the present study run counter to previous findings: for example Anderson & Kaltenthaler’s (1996) and Anderson & Reichert’s (1996) results who found that the longer a country has been a EU member state, the more respondents in the country support EU integration. However Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996) conceded that there was a levelling off of support for the EU in the older EU members which may make the effects of domestic economic conditions more important in the future (post 1993) to explain support for EU integration. It appears that this has occurred according to the present study’s results and this is in line with Gabel (1998a) and Easton (1975) who pointed out that affective EU support derived inter alia from the socialisation effect was in minority and that discontent with governance performance over a long enough time would erode even the strongest underlying bond of attachment. For a country like France which has had poor economic and social results (for instance high unemployment) for a number of years, this explanation seems plausible. It was found moreover in the

\[73\] In other words, utilitarianism is more important to explain EU support than affective attachment.
present study that the higher the unemployment in the country is, the more respondents are against current EU membership. This is especially true for France which has a relatively high unemployment rate as discussed later in this chapter.

**Desired Speed of European Integration**

Length of membership is a significant predictor of desired speed of membership in French (except in model M12 but close to the significance area) and British models. The coefficient for the related variable denotes that the longer a country has been in the EU, the more the respondents prefer a faster European integration. This result is in line with previous findings (for example Anderson & Kaltenthaler, 1996 and Kaltenthaler & Anderson, 200174). Therefore France’s longer membership of the EU – with its corollary of process of education about the benefits of the EU and familiarization with the Union’s institutions – drives faster European integration, and conversely the United Kingdom’s more recent EU membership favours a slower European integration. It is worth noting that length of membership is one of the most important predictors of desired speed of European integration.

The results obtained for the socialisation theory variables show an erosion of the socialisation effect on public opinion’s current EU membership. This is particularly important for France as the latter is an old EU member state. As it will be shown later in this chapter, citizens’ economic, social and societal assessments of how the EU is affecting nation states together with the incumbent government support seem more important to explain support for current EU membership. This echoes somewhat Kritzinger’s (2003) and Angelucci (1993) suggestions that citizens use national proxies to express attitudes towards the EU. The socialisation effect remains though important to explain public opinion support for further European integration, along side economic, social and societal assessments of how further European integration can affect nation states as witnessed later in the chapter.

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74 Albeit Anderson & Kaltenthaler (1996) and Kaltenthaler & Anderson (2001) used a different dependent variable in their research. The former used unification of Western Europe as a dependent variable and the latter used EMU and single currency support as a dependent variable.
5.2.3 Economic and Social Sphere and EU Support

Table 5.3 summarizes the pattern of significance of socio-economic variables on the dependent variables, current EU membership (EU benefit and membership) and future EU integration (European integration desired speed preference). If an effect is found to be significant, then the relevant variable is a unique contributor to the explanation of the dependent variable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socio-Economic Variables</th>
<th>Effect on Current EU Membership</th>
<th>Effect on Future EU Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>Not Significant</td>
<td>Significant (small effect)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>Not Significant</td>
<td>Not Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-EU Trade Dependence</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Significant for French Models only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-EU Trade Balance</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Not Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Expenditure per Head</td>
<td>Significant for British Models only</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Tax Burden</td>
<td>Not Significant</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucracy</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Inflation and GDP Growth**

**Evaluation of Current EU Membership**

Overall, inflation is not a significant predictor of evaluation of current EU membership for all French and British models. The direction of this coefficient for French models (with and without “don’t know” answer in the dependent variable) and for British models (with “don’t know” answer) indicates that the more inflation there is, the more respondents support (here though statistically insignificantly) EU membership.
In all French and British models, GDP growth is not a significant predictor of evaluation of current EU membership, and the coefficients for GDP growth for both French and British models reveal that the higher the economic growth in a country is, the more respondents support (here though statistically insignificantly) EU membership.

The results obtained in this study – current EU membership evaluation – for Inflation and GDP Growth refute Eichenberg & Dalton’s (1993), Anderson & Kaltenthaler’s (1996) and Gabel’s (1998a) results in the sense that the related variables are not statistically significant in the present research. However, the direction of the coefficient for inflation obtained here conforms to Gabel’s (1998a) results in the sense that poor macro-economic conditions (high inflation) lead (albeit here statistically insignificantly) to increased level of support for current EU membership. Along the same line, the direction of the coefficient for GDP growth conforms to Eichenberg & Dalton’s (1993) and Anderson & Kaltenthaler’s (1996) results in the sense that high GDP growth leads (albeit here statistically insignificantly) to increased level for current EU membership. The non statistical significance of the inflation and GDP variables elicited in the present study confirms though the results of Eichenberg and Dalton (2007) who found that in the post-Maastricht period 1992-2004, the related variables show no effect on EU membership support.75

A factor which may explain why inflation is here found not to be a unique contributor to the explanation of current EU membership, is that in the period studied (1992-2001) France and to a lesser extent the United Kingdom (especially in the second part of the study period) had a relatively low inflation. As such French and British respondents may not have perceived inflation as an actual problem itself needing to be remedied by inter alia the European Union.

The finding that GDP growth is here not a unique contributor to the explanation of current EU membership (as further European integration, please see below) is

75 Eichenberg and Dalton (2007) did not though use the same dependent variable. Their dependent variable measured the difference between the percentage of survey respondents who feel that their country’s EU membership is a “good thing” minus the percentage who feel it is a “bad thing”.

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somewhat paradoxical as citizens in France and to a lesser extent in the United Kingdom have been subject to messages by national political actors that current EU membership (and further European integration) in the forms of, for example, the single European market and economic and monetary union, are conducive to greater economic growth. This may be so as GDP growth may be a too general and restrictive index of economic well-being – improvements in employment situation and standard of living as used in the individual analysis may be comparatively more concrete. Thus as demonstrated in the individual level analysis, British and French respondents who have better or the same expectations for the country’s economic situation for the year to come are more likely to support current EU membership and favour a faster European integration than those who have worse expectations.

**Desired Speed of European Integration**

In both British and French models, inflation makes a small significant contribution to the explanation of the outcome variable, EU desired speed: this variable is significant in models M8 and M11, and not significant in model M27, M28 and M29 (the last three models cannot though detect small effects). The direction of the coefficient for inflation in all models suggests that when inflation is high in the country, respondents in the country wish to have a faster European integration. The results obtained in this study regarding desired speed of European integration and inflation are in line with Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) suggestions in so far as high inflation leads to desired faster European integration, and run counter to Anderson and Kaltenhalter’s (1996) results in both significance and direction.

In all British and French models, GDP growth is not a significant predictor of desired speed of European integration, and the direction of the coefficient for this variable tends to indicate that the higher the GDP growth in the country is, the more respondents in the country favour (here statistically insignificantly) a slower European integration pace. Regarding the GDP growth variable, although Anderson and Kaltenhalter (1996) did not use the same dependent variable, the results obtained in the present research refute Anderson and Kaltenhalter (1996) results as

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76 Anderson and Kaltenhalter’s (1996) used though Western Europe unification as a dependent variable in their study.
GDP growth is here not significant, and the coefficient for this variable has here not the same direction as in Anderson and Kaltenhaler’s (1996) results.

Inflation is thus found to be a small significant contributor to the explanation of further European integration in both French and British models, and given that France and to a lesser extent the United Kingdom (especially in the second part of the study period) have a relatively low inflation in the study period, this indicates that the low inflation in these two countries is conducive to a preferred slower European integration for both nationalities. This is in line with the results obtained for the evaluation of current EU membership (see above albeit the effect was there found not to be significant), and invalidates therefore the strength of inflation control-related arguments developed by French mainstream political parties and to a lesser extent by some British mainstream political parties and factions to justify further European integration and more particularly EMU in the United Kingdom and especially France. A European utilitarian value for inflation cannot be inferred in the French and British context.

Furthermore in the French context, EMU and the Euro may have been perceived by respondents as bringing rigidities to the national budget and jeopardising inter alia national social expenditure – factions within mainstream parties and non-mainstream left and right parties have moreover instrumentalised this to rally support against further European integration and more particularly EMU and the single currency. This is echoed by the significance and direction of the social expenditure per head variable (please see below). In the British context, British politicians in especially factions within the Conservative Party for the first part of the study period, the Conservative Party leadership (from the end of 1997), and factions within mainstream left parties and non-mainstream political parties have widely publicized the rigidities and threats that EMU and the Euro would bring to British economic management if they were adopted, and the differences between the British economic cycle and economic policies and the continental European ones. It is therefore likely that British respondents have been partly influenced by these arguments.
Unemployment

Evaluation of Current EU membership

As far as unemployment is concerned, it is a significant contributor to the explanation of the outcome variable, evaluation of current EU membership in all British models and in the large majority of French models especially in the ones incorporating “DK” answer. Only in French models M9, M12 and M9K is unemployment not a significant predictor of evaluation of current EU membership. It must be noted that when incorporating the “DK” answer, unemployment becomes a more significant predictor in French models. In all models, the direction of the coefficient for unemployment designates that the higher unemployment in the country is, the more respondents in the country are against current EU membership. The results elicited for the unemployment variable in the present study are consistent with the ones obtained by Eichenberg & Dalton (1993) and Anderson & Kaltenthaler (1996): high unemployment leads to a significantly lower level of support for current EU membership. The present results refute however the findings of Eichenberg and Dalton (2007) who uncovered that unemployment shows no statistically significant effect on EU membership support in the pre- and post-Maastricht periods. A different dependent variable – net EU membership support – was though used in their study.

The results obtained for the unemployment variable may be explained as follows. France has a relatively high unemployment rate in the study period and conversely the United Kingdom has a relatively low one. French political discourse – especially in factions within mainstream parties and in non-mainstream parties of the left and right – in the media tends to stress the idea that the current EU promotes an excessively laissez-faire, free market economic policy – even labelled by some political actors as ultra-liberal – opened to competition from low labour cost countries which endangers French jobs and social protection. British political discourse in the media tends to underline the opportunities that the single European market offer to British firms, who benefit in the United Kingdom from a more favourable competitive, company and job friendly environment and as such can benefit from the single European market. These results are confirmed by the
individual level analysis results for France and the United Kingdom for the employment situation expectations for the year to come, which show that when the respondents have better expectations about the employment situation for the year to come, respondents are more likely to support current EU membership.

**Desired Speed of European Integration**

In French and British models, unemployment is not a significant predictor of desired speed of European integration (except for Model M11D) and the direction of the coefficient for the unemployment variable indicates that the higher unemployment is, the more respondents favour (though statistically insignificantly) a faster European integration. This is in line with Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) suggestions and contradicts Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996) results (in both significance and direction) although the latter did not use the same further integration variable (they used the Western Europe unification variable).

Unemployment is not a unique contributor to the explanation of desired speed of European integration but the direction of the coefficient for the related variable in the French context of high unemployment may be partly explained by the fact that French citizens favour a European integration with a more social and protectionist dimension, relayed by the mainstream political discourse in the media with the promises of higher employment associated with further European integration – for example EMU and the single currency were marketed to the public opinion inter alia in terms of employment gains by most mainstream French politicians. However French citizens may also be somewhat doubtful and cynical about political actors’ promises of better employment as such promises have been made year after year without real improvement. The suspicion of an “ultra-liberal Europe” may be moreover perceived (partly the consequence of such portrayal made by some French left and right wing politicians) by French citizens as bringing a more competitiveness quest, employment precariousness, and depression of salary levels. The results of the individual level analysis confirm this and reveal that when respondents have better expectations about the employment situation for the coming year, respondents are more likely to favour a faster European integration than those who have worse or the same expectations.
British respondents are accustomed to a relatively low unemployment and as such
further European integration may be perceived as adding little to this. In addition,
the mainstream political discourse in the media witnessed by British citizens is also
more heterogeneous with some political actors mainly on the right stressing that
further European integration (for example with EMU and the single currency) will
harm jobs and other political actors mainly on the left and centre who argue it will
strengthen jobs. However, in the individual level analysis, it was found that when
British respondents have better expectations about the employment situation for the
coming year, respondents are more likely to favour a faster European integration
than those who have worse or the same expectations. A further improvement in the
employment situation in the United Kingdom would bring about support for faster
European integration.

Social Expenditure per head

Evaluation of Current EU membership

Social expenditure per head is a significant predictor of current EU membership in
all British models whereas the same variable is not a significant predictor in French
models. In both French and British models, the direction of the coefficient for the
related variable implies that the higher the social expenditure per head is in the
country, the more the respondents are (effect though not statistically significant for
French models) against current EU membership. This result is in line with Sanchez-
Cuenca (2000) results (in both direction and significance for British models but only
direction for French models) although the latter used EU desired speed as the
dependent variable rather than current EU membership. This result is especially
important for the United Kingdom as the level of social expenditure per head tends
to be lower than in other comparable EU member states: nonetheless, over the last
few years in the study period, under the Blair government, these have increased and
become relatively comparable to France – albeit still lower than France when
measured in purchasing power standards (PPS) (Eurostat/ESSPROS, 2006).

77 Social expenditure per head is nevertheless close to the significance area in French models M12
and M12K (with the length of membership variable).
British citizens may perceive the current EU as a way to improve the social expenditure in the United Kingdom with the acquisition of new social rights in the process. Thus, for instance the beneficial aspect of the social chapter, with reference for instance to greater maternity rights for individuals, was well politicized by the Labour leadership. Conversely, French citizens used to higher social expenditure per head may view the EU as adding little to their social rights and even being a threat to their social rights – in line with the fear of an ultra-liberal Europe – albeit the social expenditure (per head) variable is not a significant predictor in French models. However, as seen below, French citizens may feel that national social expenditure (and therefore social rights) are more threatened by the reforms pertaining to further European integration – starting for instance with the full implementation and running of the economic and monetary union and the Euro – than current EU membership.

**Desired Speed of European Integration**

In all French and British models, social expenditure per head is a significant contributor to the explanation of desired speed of European integration, and the coefficient for this variable suggests that the higher the social expenditure per head in the country is, the slower the respondents wish European integration to proceed. This result confirms Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) results. It ensues from this that French citizens used to higher social expenditure per head (relatively high compared to other European countries) may view the furthering of European integration as a threat to their social rights. This perception is frequently reinforced directly or indirectly by the political discourse of some French political parties (particularly on the left but not exclusively) who “suspect” the EU institutions of Ultra-liberalism. British citizens are themselves accustomed to social expenditure per head lower than in France and Germany but higher than in Italy or Spain. However, as indicated above, over the last few years in the study period, under the Blair government, social expenditure per head in the United Kingdom have increased and become relatively comparable to France – albeit still lower than France when measured in PPS.

Thus, on the one hand the prospect of higher social expenditure may be an element which partly drove British citizens to support faster European integration although
this may have lost its essence in the last few years of the study period as the United Kingdom’s social expenditure moved above the EU average towards the end of the study period and expenditure on social protection has been pledged by the British government to go up further in real terms in the future (post 2001). On the other hand, British citizens are also accustomed to less unemployment, more flexible labour markets and greater professional and occupational mobility than all these countries – with reference to the UK’s relative economic results over the related decade – and may view the furthering of European integration as hindering their social mobility: this is reinforced by national British political parties who portray the EU as an institution with a tendency for over-regulation, over-taxation and lack of international competitive perspective (as discussed in the background chapter for the United Kingdom). In both French and British models, social expenditure per head appears as an important contributor to the explanation of desired speed of European integration.

**Intra-EU Trade Dependence and Intra-EU Trade Balance**

**Evaluation of Current EU Membership**

Intra-EU trade dependence is a significant contributor to the explanation of evaluation of current EU membership in all British and French models, and the direction of the coefficient for intra-EU trade dependence implies that the more countries are dependent on EU trade, the more respondents in these countries are significantly in favour of current EU membership. It must be noted that this variable is even more important for France (most important variable in models M9 and M12).

Intra-EU trade balance is a significant predictor of current EU membership for all French models (with and without “don’t know” answer in the dependent variable). This variable tends to be a significant predictor for British models incorporating “DK” answer (except M8K (Timing of Entry) nearing though the significance area) and the following models without “DK” answer: M20bis (Timing of Entry), M11 and M28. In the remaining British models without “DK” answer, this variable is usually just outside the significance area but in the majority of British models without “DK” answer, intra-EU trade balance is a significant predictor of current EU
membership. As a result, the coefficient for intra-EU trade balance tends to be stronger in models integrating "DK" answer in both British and French models, and the coefficient for this variable is stronger in French models than in British models. The direction of this coefficient in all models indicates that the more the intra-EU trade balance is positive, the more respondents in the country are in favour of current EU membership.

The results obtained in the present research for intra-EU trade balance and intra-EU trade dependence conform to previous research results (for example Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Anderson and Reichert, 1996; and Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993). However, for the intra-EU trade dependence variable, the results elicited here run counter to the results of Eichenberg and Dalton (2007) who found that in the post-Maastricht period (1992-2004), intra-EU export exhibits no significant effect on EU membership support. A different dependent variable – net EU membership support – and intra-EU trade dependence (independent) variable were though used in their study.

The United Kingdom and to a lesser extent France tend to be less dependent on EU trade than other European countries (for example Belgium, Netherlands, Ireland, Luxembourg, Denmark, Spain or even Germany), this results in less support in current EU membership due to this. In the British context, public opinion is subject to a political discourse (especially on the right ideological spectrum) tending to underline the lack of economic and social convergence of the United Kingdom with the bulk of the rest of Europe, and on the contrary the economic and social (but also cultural and historical) convergence with Anglo-Saxon markets such as the USA, Australia and Canada (as discussed in the United Kingdom background chapter). In the French context, public opinion is subject to a French political discourse more predisposed to national (but also European) protectionism for economic and social purposes partly in symbiosis with the current EU – for instance protection of European agriculture – although the way the EU is further integrated is perceived by public opinion – and instrumentalised by some political leaders such as Seguin,

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78 Intra-EU trade dependence was measured via the use of intra-EU export percentage. The latter is the percentage ratio of a country's intra-EU exports to its total exports.
Villiers, Emmanuelli, Le Pen, Chevenement and Hue – as increasingly reinforcing the effects of globalisation and therefore eroding this protectionism.

France and the United Kingdom have respectively a marginally positive or negative intra-EU trade balance, and are in an intermediate situation (mid-table) compared to countries with a positive balance such as Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, Ireland, Netherlands, and nations with a negative balance such as Greece, Portugal or Spain. In the case of France, its marginally positive intra-EU trade balance drives current EU support (reinforced by political discourse in the media) and conversely in the United Kingdom its marginally negative intra-EU trade balance inhibits somewhat current EU support. British politicians (particularly in the Conservative Party) have underlined the lack of flexibility of labour markets and over-regulations in many continental European countries as the source of relatively poor economic growth there and as a result the limited market opportunities there.

Desired Speed of European Integration

In all French models, intra-EU trade dependence is a significant contributor to the explanation of desired speed of European Integration whereas in all British models, intra-EU trade dependence is not a significant contributor to the explanation of desired speed of European Integration. In all French models, it means that the more countries are dependent on intra-EU trade, the more respondents in these countries are in favour of faster European integration. The relationship does not work in the UK context and may be partly explained by the fact that the UK has a lower intra-EU trade dependence than France. Some British politicians (especially of the right such as John Redwood) tend to underplay the importance of EU markets for British businesses, for example for the service industry, arguing that North-American markets (and Commonwealth ones) are more important for British businesses and that an economic alliance with North America is therefore more propitious.

In British and French models, intra-EU trade balance is overall a significant predictor of desired speed of European integration.79 The coefficient for this

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79 Intra-EU trade balance is always significant in models with the length of membership variable, and is significant in the majority of models with the timing of entry variable. There is a smaller effect of intra-EU trade balance on desired speed of European integration in models with the timing of entry
variable reveals that the more countries have a positive balance of intra-EU trade, the more the respondents in these countries wish to see a slower speed of European integration.

The results elicited here for intra-EU trade dependence confirm earlier research results (for example Kaltenthaler and Anderson, 2001, although the latter used a different further integration dependent variable – EMU and single currency support –). The results obtained here for intra-EU trade balance are in line with Gabel (1998a) and Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) suggestions that countries with poor economic results support European integration.

It must be noted that both France and the UK show a similar marginally positive or negative intra-EU trade balance as a percentage of GDP and a relatively slower desired speed of European integration contrasting with countries such as Spain, Greece or Portugal with clear negative intra-EU trade balance as a percentage of GDP and a relatively faster desired speed of European integration. In the case of France, French citizens may fear that further European integration will threaten their current trade position as they suspect (this under the influence of political discourse in the media) further European integration will be conducive to more open markets and therefore more European and global competition which will jeopardize the very economic protection and welfare state they are attached to. Furthermore they may feel that France is less well equipped to deal with a perceived largely unfair competition from low labour cost nations often referred to in the political discourse developed by the French left, and even partly on the centre and right ideological scene as “mondialisation sauvage”.

Conversely British respondents, subject to a political discourse (of the right, centre and even partly the left (Labour leadership)) which favours more open and deregulated markets, may feel that a more integrated Europe in tune with this preference – and respecting the subsidiarity principle and national sovereignty 80 – would benefit British firms. The latter moreover benefit in the British context from a more labour and company friendly environment. However British politicians,

\[80\text{ National sovereignty being more important for the hard left and right.}\]
especially on the right of the ideological spectrum, are doubtful of the future economic and social convergence of continental European countries and as such tend to oppose further European integration.

**Tax Burden**

**Evaluation of Current EU membership**

Tax burden is a variable which to the investigator’s knowledge has not been tested before the present research. It is not a significant predictor of current EU membership in both French and British models. The fact that tax burden does not show a significant relationship with current EU membership implies that tax burden is not perceived as important enough to influence evaluation of current EU membership in both the British and French contexts. This may be explained by the fact that in the study period, the United Kingdom and France are not very dependent on EU trade and the effect of tax burden is here seen as minor in the current EU.

However examining the direction of the coefficient for tax burden brings further insight. For British models, the direction of the coefficient for the tax burden indicates that the higher the tax burden in the country is, the more the respondents in the country are statistically insignificantly against current EU membership: the United Kingdom has a relatively low tax burden and as such British respondents may view (statistically insignificantly though) the UK’s relative lower taxes as a way to compete effectively in the current EU. For French models, the direction of this coefficient suggests that the higher the tax burden in the country is, the more the respondents in the country are statistically insignificantly in favour of current EU membership: it seems to denote that French respondents may be unsatisfied with relatively high taxes in France and may view (statistically insignificantly though) the current EU membership as a way to decrease some of the taxes (for example VAT) especially in a context of more restricted current intra-EU competition.

**Desired Speed of European Integration**

In all British and French models, tax burden is a significant predictor of desired speed of European integration, and the direction of the coefficient for this variable
reveals that the higher the tax burden is in the country, the more respondents favour a slower speed of European integration. France has a relatively high tax burden and therefore French respondents may perceive faster European integration negatively as they may feel they have presently a home competitive disadvantage in the European and international context. They may feel that further European integration especially at a fast pace may jeopardize the supportive social policies to which they are accustomed: faster European integration may oblige the French national government to reduce tax – for competitive reasons – via social policy cuts. The United Kingdom has a relatively low tax burden: British respondents may feel that they have presently a home tax competitive advantage in the European and international environment and faster European integration in a free market way may empower this and benefit British interests.

**Bureaucracy**

**Evaluation of Current EU membership**

Bureaucracy is a variable which to the investigator’s knowledge has not been tested before the present research. For both British and French models without “DK” answer, bureaucracy is a significant predictor of current EU membership. Once models integrate “DK” answer, both French and British models show a smaller effect. Thus French models (with “DK” answer) show mostly a significant effect in models M8K, M11K, 27Kbis, M27K, M28Kbis and M29Kbis, and a non-significant effect in models M28K and M29K (albeit there just outside the significance zone). British models (with “DK” answer) show mostly a non-significant effect in models M28Kbis, M28K, M29Kbis, M29K and M11K (though not far from the significance zone for these) and a significant effect in models M8K, M27Kbis and M27K. The coefficient direction for this variable in all these models denotes that the less bureaucracy there is in the country, the more respondents in the country are against current EU membership.

The United Kingdom shows a relatively low bureaucracy level and British respondents may view current EU membership as bringing more regulations and bureaucracy – as underlined by the political discourse of especially the right and
centre – and as such show fewer dispositions towards current EU membership of the United Kingdom. In the same way, France shows a relatively high bureaucracy level and French respondents may view the current EU as enabling the necessary regulation of EU competition, harmonizing laws to avoid “concurrence sauvage” (unregulated competition), and keeping some markets protected from non-European competition and even from the European. They may also view the current EU as reducing or limiting bureaucracy pertaining to intra-EU trade and simplifying in some cases old national bureaucratic business and trade policies, and as such show greater disposition towards the current EU membership of France.

**Desired Speed of European Integration**

In both French and British models, Bureaucracy (variable not tested before) is overall a significant predictor of desired speed of European integration in models with the timing of entry variable, and not a significant predictor of the related dependent variable – albeit relatively close to the significance zone: larger models cannot though detect small effects – in models with the length of membership variable. In all British and French models, the direction of the coefficient for bureaucracy shows that the less government bureaucracy there is in the country, the more respondents support significantly (for models with the timing of entry variable and statistically insignificantly otherwise) faster European integration.

The United Kingdom shows a relatively low bureaucracy compared to other European nations (including France) and British respondents may favour a faster integrated EU in a free market way as a means to capitalise on their home business advantage. Thus the political discourse of the Conservative Party, the Liberal Democrats but also the Labour Party particularly underline the need for the EU to become more business friendly, to deregulate markets, embrace globalisation and flexible labour markets although the former doubts this will happen and warn their electorate accordingly. Along the same line, France shows a relatively high bureaucracy compared to other European countries (including the United Kingdom), and French respondents may view faster European integration as bringing about more deregulation and the further opening of European markets to European and global competition – as denounced by some French politicians of the left but also of
the right – and as such as a danger to their economic well being given their home disadvantage in this field.

5.2.4 Societal Sphere and EU Support

Table 5.4 summarizes the pattern of significance of societal variables on the dependent variables, current EU membership (EU benefit and membership) and future EU integration (European integration desired speed preference). If an effect is found to be significant, then the relevant variable is a unique contributor to the explanation of the dependent variable.

Table 5.4: Pattern of Significance of Societal Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Societal Variables</th>
<th>Effect on Current EU Membership</th>
<th>Effect on Future EU Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Economic Corruption</td>
<td>Not Significant</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime per Head of Population</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Populations Inflows</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Migration</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Asylum Applications</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Identity</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Corruption**

**Evaluation of Current EU membership**

Corruption is largely not a significant predictor of current EU membership in both French (only significant in French model M9K) and British models. The direction of the coefficient for corruption in both French and British models tends to denote that the less perceived corruption there is in the country, the more respondents in the country are against current EU membership. Although the direction of the
coefficient for corruption is in the same direction as in the research of Sanchez-Cuenca (2000), in the present research this coefficient is not significant whereas the latter had a significant effect in Sanchez-Cuenca’s (2000) results. It is though true that Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) used a different dependent variable, desired speed of European integration rather than evaluation of current EU membership. Notwithstanding this, France tends to have a relatively high corruption level and is in effect a more corrupt country than the United Kingdom – the latter has a relatively low corruption level – as per the national economic corruption index, and this may partly (albeit effect is not statistically significant) explain that French respondents show higher levels of support for current EU membership than British respondents. The relationship between corruption and current EU membership is not significant here (therefore not established) because the current EU may not be perceived as being able to alter or influence the pattern of corruption perceived in France or in the United Kingdom.

**Desired Speed of European Integration**

In all British and French models, corruption is a significant predictor of the dependent variable, desired speed of European integration. The coefficient direction for this variable reveals that the more perceived corruption there is in the country, the more respondents desire a faster European integration. This result corroborates Sanchez-Cuenca’s (2000) results, and thus suggests that the relatively high corruption in France – compared to the United Kingdom as per the corruption index – is a factor bringing French respondents to favour a faster European integration. The further integration of the EU through its inherent institutional, political and economic change is perceived by respondents as being able to help fight France’s perceived national corruption. For French respondents who perceive the corruption to be relatively high in France, the further integration of the EU has here a utilitarian value. H1 is therefore here confirmed, that is to say there is a relationship between citizens’ dissatisfaction with France’s corruption and citizens’ support for further European integration.

81 Other nations such as Germany, Denmark, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Ireland also have a relatively low corruption level.
In the same way, for British respondents who perceive corruption to be relatively low in the United Kingdom, the further European integration offers no utilitarian value here and can even be counterproductive. Thus the European institutions are often portrayed as bureaucratic, wasting tax payers’ money and sometimes using funds inappropriately by some British politicians, particularly (but not exclusively) in the Conservative Party. The scandal related to the Santer Commission in 1999 was denounced accordingly. $H_1$ is therefore here confirmed, that is to say there is a relationship between citizens’ satisfaction with the United Kingdom’s relatively low corruption and citizens’ opposition to further European integration.

**Crime**

**Evaluation of Current EU membership**

Crime (per head) is a variable which to the investigator’s knowledge has not been tested before the present research. For all French models, crime is a significant predictor of current EU membership with coefficients a little weaker in models with “DK” answer. For British models, the pattern of significance is more contrasted: the coefficient is significant in models M8, M11, M27, M8K and M11K and not significant in models M27bis, M28bis, M28, M29bis, M29, M29Kbis, M29K, M28Kbis, M28K, M27Kbis and M27K.\(^\text{82}\) Thus, for British models, the effect for the crime variable is not significant in larger models (M20s) as the effect tends to be small and the former given the size of the sample to the number of independent variables cannot detect this. The direction of the coefficient for all British and French models reveals that the higher the crime per head in the country is, the more respondents in the country are against current EU membership. The United Kingdom and to a lesser extent France\(^\text{83}\) have a relatively high crime rate per head of population and the current EU may be perceived by citizens as contributing to it. This may be explained by the Schengen agreements\(^\text{84}\) – the latter for France

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82 The letter “K” in the model numbering indicates that the model integrates “DK” answer. The letter “bis” in the model numbering denotes that the model incorporates the timing of EU entry variable rather than the length of EU membership variable.

83 Both countries are reported to have additionally a substantial number of crimes which is not included in the crime statistics published by their respective interior ministry (home office) but France has an even greater number of these (INHES, 2006; Home Office, 2007).

84 Internal borderless EU for countries taking part in the Schengen agreements.
particularly as the United Kingdom has opted not to partake fully in the Schengen agreements – but also more generally by the freedom of movement for European residents which may be perceived (and portrayed by non-mainstream political parties or factions within mainstream parties) as contributing to increasing crime. Crime per head is one of the most important predictors of evaluation of current EU membership in French models.

**Desired Speed of European Integration**

In both French and British models, crime per head is a significant contributor to the explanation of desired speed of European integration and the direction of the coefficient for this variable, shows that the higher the crime per head is in the country, the more respondents favour a slower speed of European integration. Crime per head is one of the most important predictors of evaluation of current EU membership in both French and British models. Both France and the United Kingdom have a relatively high crime per head and furthering European integration especially at faster pace may be perceived as conducive to the rise in crime. The Schengen free border agreements application (or potential full application in the British context), the freedom of movement of people, goods and money, and the embryonic liberal home affairs policies may contribute to these perceptions. Crime fighting is also associated with an issue of national sovereignty which may resonate with respondents in the United Kingdom and to a lesser extent France. These concerns are also instrumentalised by French political parties (particularly non-mainstream ones but also factions within mainstream parties) and by British political parties (both mainstream and non-mainstream ones).

**Immigration**

Europe has experienced an increase in popularity of anti-immigrant and often anti-eu populist/extreme right political parties. Immigration was identified as one of the top problems facing Europe by 82% of the members of the European Parliament (Lahav, 1997). Towards the end of the study period, immigration was considered one of the most important issues facing the United Kingdom before Europe, the economy, unemployment or taxes (Ipsos-Mori, 2006). Throughout the study period.
immigration has been consistently seen as one of the most important issues facing France – albeit behind issues such as unemployment, social protection and generally crime (Ipsos, 2006).

Evaluation of Current EU membership

Studies have demonstrated the link between anti-immigration sentiments, general hostility towards other cultures and reluctance over European integration (De Vreese and Boomgarden, 2005; Kessler and Freeman, 2005; Lahav, 2004; McLaren, 2002, 2007a and Luedke, 2005) and the link between importance of national identity and reluctance over European integration (Carey, 2002; Christin and Trechsel, 2002; Luedtke, 2005; Kaltenhaler and Anderson, 2001; De Vries and Van Kersbergen, 2007; Marks and Hooghe, 2003; McLaren, 2007b; Kostakopoulou, 2001 and Hooghe and Marks, 2005). However immigration and its link with European integration is a variable which has not been tested on the aggregate level before the present research. Three indicators are here used to operationalize the immigration variable: foreign inflows, net migration and asylum applications. For all French and British models, all these three variables are significant predictors of the dependent variable, evaluation of current EU membership. The direction of the coefficient for these three variables implies that the more immigrants enter into the country, the more respondents in the country are against current EU membership. This may be also explained by the Schengen agreements (especially for France), by the freedom of movement of European and non-European nationals and the embryonic more liberal European Home Affairs policy which may be perceived (and instrumentalized by non-mainstream political parties in France and in the United Kingdom but also by factions within mainstream parties in France and in the United Kingdom) as contributing to increasing immigration in EU countries.

Desired Speed of European Integration

The same three indicators of immigration were regressed against desired speed of European integration. For all French and British models, all the three related variables are significant predictors of desired speed of European integration and the direction of the coefficient for these variables shows that the more immigrants enter the country, the more respondents prefer a slower European integration. France and
the United Kingdom have a relatively high immigration, this confirms the result obtained with evaluation of current EU membership as a dependent variable: immigration pressures seem to be from these results a key driver of negative opinions towards the current EU and further EU integration. In the United Kingdom (for mainstream and non-mainstream political parties) and to a lesser extent France (for non-mainstream political parties and factions within mainstream parties), the control of immigration is seen as an issue of national sovereignty.

Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, French respondents have been unhappy and worried about the level of immigration to France: immigration is one of the key concerns of citizens as discussed in the background chapter on France. British citizens have also placed immigration as one of their key concerns in the related period but more especially in the second part of the study period (see background chapter on the United Kingdom). However, contrary to British respondents, French citizens are more willing to transfer the immigration and asylum policies to the EU than British respondents as substantiated by the individual testing of immigration and asylum policies for hypothesis III. This implies that they feel that immigration has been mishandled by successive French governments and may believe that the EU, at least the type of EU model they favour, would control immigration relatively better, putting in place a more restrictive policy towards immigration from outside the EU than the French one although they are critical of some of the agreements in place such as the Schengen agreements. It must be noted that immigration variables are unique contributors to the explanation of evaluation of current and future EU membership, inter alia irrespective of the sense of national identity of respondents. This is linked to the perception, in France and the United Kingdom, that immigration brings about economic and social costs for countries and citizens. The approach is therefore here partly utilitarian.

85 This is tantamount to the subsidiarity principle which indicates that action should only be taken by the community or Union if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore be better achieved at European level.

86 France has one of the most liberal immigration policies in Europe.
National Identity

In the literature, national traditions have been used to explain different levels of EU support between member nations but the inclusion of measures of national identity in statistical analyses to explain EU support is more rare: Kaltenthaler and Anderson (2001) – the latter in the context of support for the common currency –, McLaren (2002, 2007a, 2007b), Carey (2002), Luedtke (2005), De Vries and Van Kersbergen (2007), Christin and Trechsel (2002), Marks and Hooghe (2003), Hooghe and Marks (2005) and Kostakopoulou (2001).

Evaluation of Current EU membership

For French and British models (especially models with “don’t know” answers), the national identity variable is a significant predictor of the dependent variable, evaluation of current EU membership and the direction of the coefficient for this variable implies that the more interviewees show high feelings of national identity, the more respondents in the country are against current EU membership. This is in line with results of Carey (2002), Kaltenthaler and Anderson (2001), Christin and Trechsel (2002), De Vries and Van Kersbergen (2007), Marks and Hooghe (2003), Hooghe and Marks (2005), McLaren (2007b), Kostakopoulou (2001) and Luedtke (2005).

Desired Speed of European Integration

French and British models show that the national identity variable is a significant predictor of the dependent variable, desired speed of European integration, and the direction of the coefficient for this variable denotes that the more interviewees show high feelings of national identity, the more respondents in the country are in favour of slower European integration. This confirms results of Carey (2002), Kaltenthaler and Anderson (2001), Christin and Trechsel (2002), De Vries and Van Kersbergen (2007), Marks and Hooghe (2003), Hooghe and Marks (2005), McLaren (2007b), Kostakopoulou (2001) and Luedtke (2005). French respondents exhibit however relatively low feelings of exclusive national identity among EU citizens and have the lowest exclusive national identity with Italians, Spaniards and Luxembourgers. In the other end, British respondents reveal relatively high feelings of exclusive
national identity with Danes and Greeks. In the French context, this contributes to explaining the support of French citizens for European integration. There is an affective bond towards the process of European integration – the European identity is often portrayed as complementary to the French one – which has been cultivated by French institutions such as the educational system and reinforced by the media and most French mainstream politicians. In the British context, the strong feeling of national identity – reinforced by an often uncritical view of history in the British educational system (Daddow, 2004; 2006) – contributes to a lower level of support for European integration as the latter is often portrayed as threatening national identity by politicians – especially but not exclusively in the Conservative Party – but also by the media which in majority adopt a more eurosceptic stance. As a result, British citizens have often few social bonds with the EU and the relationship towards the EU reflects utilitarian economic, societal and social appraisals whereas for French citizens utilitarian economic, societal and social appraisals cohabit with affective bonds.

5.2.5 Political Sphere and EU Support

Table 5.5 summarizes the pattern of significance of political variables on the dependent variables, current EU membership (EU benefit and membership) and future EU integration (European integration desired speed preference). If an effect is found to be significant, then the relevant variable is a unique contributor to the explanation of the dependent variable.

Table 5.5: Pattern of Significance of Political Support Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Variables</th>
<th>Effect on Current EU Membership</th>
<th>Effect on Future EU Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aggregate Data</td>
<td>Individual Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent Government Support</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Significant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Variables</td>
<td>Effect on Current EU Membership</td>
<td>Effect on Future EU Integration</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aggregate Data</td>
<td>Individual Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referendum years (variable)</td>
<td>Not Significant</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Election years (EPEL) (variable)</td>
<td>Not Significant</td>
<td>British Sample: Significant (M17); Not significant (M14/M15)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Incumbent Support**

**Evaluation of Current EU membership**

The incumbent government support variable is a significant contributor to the explanation of the dependent variable, evaluation of current EU membership in all French and British models. The direction of the coefficient for incumbent government support suggests that the more confidence in the incumbent government respondents display, the more respondents are in favour of current EU membership. The incumbent government support variable is one of the most important predictors of evaluation of current EU membership in both French and British models (the coefficient for this variable is a little weaker in models incorporating “DK” answer).
The results obtained here are confirmed by the individual analyses for French and British samples. To a certain extent, the results obtained in the present study disconfirm Ray’s (2003a) results in the sense that a strong positive relationship is found in this study throughout the period and not only in European election years or when a referendum is held on a European topic. The present research also confirms results of Franklin, Marsh and Mc Laren (1994), Franklin, Marsh and Wlezien (1994), Franklin, Van Der Eijk and Marsh (1995), Hug and Sciarini (2000) on the influence of the popularity of the incumbent government at referendums on European topics and results of Reif (1985), Van Der Eijk & Franklin (1996) and Franklin & Curtice (1996) on the influence of the popularity of the incumbent government in European elections. The masses may be sometimes too uninformed and uninterested to form independent opinions on integration issues, their willingness to endorse the elite driven integration project is partially dependent on their overall trust in national elites.

Governments in France and the United Kingdom in their political discourse also tend to limit the critique of the current EU, and even justify the current EU to public opinion as incumbent governments are playing a part in the current management of the EU and as such it is more difficult and can be counterproductive for them to criticize the current workings of the EU to which they are a key part. Furthermore, governments aim to reassure public opinion that in the European negotiations they defend national interests. It must be however noted that over the study period, French respondents and to a lesser extent British respondents show a below EU average trust in their governments but it varies from year to year. The critique of the EU is more present in factions within governmental parties and opposition parties: Conservative Party faction in the early and mid-1990s, Labour Party faction, UKIP, Referendum Party in the United Kingdom; RPR and PS faction, MPF, FN, MDC, RPF, PC and extreme left in France.

Desired Speed of European Integration

For all British and French models, incumbent government support is not a significant predictor of the outcome variable, desired speed of European integration. The direction of the coefficient for the related variable reveals that the more
respondents support the incumbent government, the more respondents favour though statistically insignificantly a faster pace of European integration. The British individual analysis confirms that the relationship between incumbent government support and desired speed of European integration is not significant whereas the French individual analysis shows that the relationship between the related variables becomes significant and therefore indicates that the more respondents support the incumbent government, the more respondents favour a faster pace of European integration.

French results contradict Ray’s (2000; 2003a) and Sanchez-Cuenca’s (2000) results who found that supporters of incumbent government appear reluctant to risk weakening the national executive through political reform (European further integration), these researchers establishing in the process that individuals who enjoy advantageous national policy outcomes, tend to oppose European-level policy in those areas of great interest to them. British results also contradict somewhat Ray’s (2000; 2003a) and Sanchez-Cuenca’s (2000) results as no (statistically significant) relationship between the related variables was found. In the French context, the significance (in the individual analysis) and direction of the incumbent government support variable may be explained by the fact that mainstream parties’ leaderships have adopted a more pro-European integration positioning and party supporters may be therefore following the party line. French mainstream governmental political parties (especially PS, RPR/UMP and UDF) in supporting and advocating further European integration underline in their political discourse the economic and social dimension that the EU will have: for instance, the single currency helping to create jobs, social chapter to guarantee fundamental social rights, elaboration of a European constitution with the declaration on rights of citizens.

In the British context, mainstream governmental political parties have a more eurosceptic positioning, reflecting an electorate which is more reserved towards European integration — affective side of the EU less present and largely not cultivated in the UK —, has a greater sense of national identity, place greater emphasis on national sovereignty. This also reflects an electorate which is perhaps

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87 Although from 1997, the Blair governments adopted a less eurosceptic stance, pushing for the EU to be less bureaucratic, regulation- and market-friendly, and competitive.
also reluctant to risk weakening the national executive through political reform which may be detrimental to advantageous national policy outcomes such as employment and purchasing power although no (statistically significant) relationship was found between incumbent government support and desired speed of integration. Thus the mismanagement of the British pound in the ERM in the early 1990s has created economic and social problems in the United Kingdom or, equally, inflation especially in the second part of the 1990s is already relatively low in the United Kingdom and further European integration may be deemed as adding little to this.

In line with Ray’s (2003b), Steenbergen et al.’s (2007) and Kriesi’s (2007) findings, the present research outcomes confirm that political parties have also exercised some influence on their electorate amidst greater levels of disagreement between political parties\(^{88}\) and greater saliency of the EU issue to parties in the study period. Furthermore, in line with Carruba’s (2001) and Steenbergen et al.’s (2007) research outcomes, the relative pro-integration nature of the French electorate has also influenced mainstream parties to be pro-integration. Equally, the relative anti-integration nature of the British electorate has influenced British mainstream parties to be more reserved towards European integration. However, consistent with Steenbergen et al.’s (2007) research, it seems also probable that with the increased visibility and impact of European integration on a citizen’s life in the study period, the mass-elite linkage has declined over time as voters have a greater understanding of the consequences of EU policy on domestic policy and environment. This may be especially true in the French context as despite the pro-European nature of French mainstream parties and media, there has been a significant drop in French citizens’ support for current EU membership and further integration.

**European Election Years (EPEL)**

**Evaluation of Current EU membership**

The European election years (EPEL) variable is not a significant predictor of the dependent variable, evaluation of current EU membership in all French and British

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\(^{88}\) Greater levels of disagreement between political parties take place more in the periphery of French politics and more in British mainstream politics.
models. The direction of the coefficient for the related variable for models without “DK” answer indicates that in European election years respondents are statistically insignificantly more in favour of current EU membership. For models with “DK” answer, the related coefficient denotes that in European election years respondents are statistically insignificantly against current EU membership. Given that the related coefficients do not show statistical significance, this suggests that the level of support for current EU membership is not significantly greater in European election years and therefore disconfirms Dalton & Duval’s (1986), Eichenberg & Dalton’s (1993) and Gabel & Palmer’s (1995) results. The British individual data analysis partly confirms these results but the former through a more detailed analysis of periods (resulting from restricted data availability) brings further insight. Thus the level of support for current EU membership was found significantly lower in the 1994 European election year compared to non-European election years (1992 and 1993) (model M17) due to the economic impact on citizens of the mismanagement of the British pound in the European exchange rate mechanism and the growing disquiet over Maastricht. This is also to a lesser extent due to the increased politicization of the EU issue bringing lower EU support in the 1999 European election year albeit the effect is outside the significance zone (model M15). The French individual data analysis also partly confirms the aggregate data results but through a more detailed analysis of periods (consequent to restricted data availability) it brings additional insight as well. Thus the level of support for current EU membership was found significantly lower in European election years (especially the 1999 one) (models M14 with the EU benefit dependent variable/M15 with the EU membership dependent variable) compared to non-European election years due to the increased politicisation of the EU issue, particularly by factions within mainstream parties and non-mainstream political parties.

The aggregate data analysis results seem to imply that the level of support for current EU membership is not significantly greater in European election years.

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89 The majority of models in the British individual data analysis tend to show that the EPEL variable is not a significant predictor of current EU membership.
90 The majority of models in the French individual data analysis tend to show that the EPEL variable is not a significant predictor of current EU membership.
91 EPEL coefficients in models M14 with the EU membership dependent variable and M15 with the EU benefit dependent variable are short of statistical significance but share the same coefficient direction.
compared to non-European election years and therefore disconfirms Dalton & Duval's (1986), Eichenberg & Dalton's (1993) and Gabel & Palmer's (1995) results. An explanation of this may be that voters may partly perceive European elections as second order elections which are used to express domestic concerns (Reif & Schmitt, 1980; Van Der Eijk & Franklin, 1991, 1996). However, with the increased visibility of the EU in the study period, the individual data analysis results (controlling for socio-economic profiles of respondents) are pointing to an increased politicization of the EU issue in the second part of the 1990s. The increased politicisation of the EU issue was spearheaded by political parties from the political periphery to increasingly the political mainstream (the latter especially in the United Kingdom with the Conservative Party from 1997). In the British context, the economic and social consequences of the mismanagement of the ERM has brought about the start of the discontent with the current EU, which has subsequently continued amidst an increasing politicisation of the EU issue in the second part of the 1990s. The politicisation of the EU issue was though limited in the 1994 European elections as the leaderships of the main political parties (Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats) showed a relative consensus on EU membership and tended not to compete on this. In the French context, the persistence of national economic and social problems92 (that the EU is perceived to contribute to with the Franc Fort policy and budgetary rigidities pertaining to EMU) brought about a consolidation of the discontent with the current EU and an increased politicisation of the EU issue, especially at the 1999 European elections.

Desired Speed of European Integration

EPEL is a significant predictor of desired speed of European integration (except in model M9 and M12 but close there to the significance zone), this being due to a level of EU support for further integration in 1994 being higher than most years after 1994 for French and British samples and also before 1994 for French sample. The direction of the coefficient for this variable reveals that respondents in European election years are more in favour of faster European integration. This result

92 Although the French economic and social climate is relatively better in 1999 than in the period from 1992 to 1997, and at the end of 2000 and in 2001 but the economic and social situation of France is relatively poor in EU terms: thus for example the unemployment rate remains relatively high.
conforms to previous research results (for example Gabel and Palmer, 1995). At European election time, politicians (especially European Parliament candidates) have vested interests in dispersing positive messages about the EU, its policies and the value of further integration. Politicians also come closer to public opinion positions because of the fear of sanction votes. This is in line with Schmitt & Thomassen's (2000), Carruba's (2001) and Wessels' (1995) findings.

The British individual data analysis results are partly in line with the British aggregate level data results – the direction of the coefficient for the related variable is the same in the majority of models albeit the coefficient is not statistically significant. However through the division of periods (resulting from restricted data availability) the individual data analysis delivers further insight. Thus in the 1994 European election year, British respondents were significantly more likely to favour a slower (or standstill) European integration preference than in non-European election years 1992 and 1993 (model M17). As discussed above this is the consequence of the economic impact on citizens of the mismanagement of the British pound in the European exchange rate mechanism (and its eventual exit). The effect of European election years after 1994 (therefore in 1999) on further European integration (desired speed) is not significant any longer as the level of (citizens') support for further integration has not recovered since the effect of the mismanagement of the ERM and continued to go down in the second part of the 1990s. Furthermore, the EPEL results for models other than model M17 may have been affected by the fact that the year 1992 (year of higher further European integration support prior to the ERM mismanagement) could not be included in individual models (other than model M17) as data for some variables was not available. A good part of 1992 is also prior to the mismanagement of the ERM and exit of the British pound from the ERM: Black Wednesday took place on 16 Sept 1992. EB sample data date used for the analysis – reference: model M17 – is March-April 1992 (prior to Black Wednesday).

The French individual data analysis results are partly in line with the French aggregate level data results but through the division of periods (resulting from restricted data availability) the individual data analysis delivers further insight. Thus in the 1994 European election year, French respondents were significantly more
likely to favour a faster European integration preference than in non-European election years 1992 and 1993 (model M17) due to the relative consensus in favour of EU further integration by mainstream political parties – and more generally the campaigning of political parties largely on domestic issues rather than on European integration itself – and consequently the low level of politicisation of the EU issue at the 1994 European elections. In 1999 (but also mostly before and after), the European issue became politicised, especially in factions within RPR and PS, and in political parties such as RPF, MPF, FN, MDC, PC and the extreme left: this explains that the effect of European election years is altogether no longer significant (models M14 and M15) and cancels the effect of 1994 on the mobilisation of public opinion for further European integration.

Referendums

Evaluation of Current EU membership

It must be noted that France has had only one EU referendum (in 1992) and the United Kingdom none, in the study period (1992-2001). It should also be pointed out that the data used for 1992 was collected in March-April 1992 (EB 37.0),93 that is to say four to five months before the actual Maastricht Treaty referendum in France. As such the effect of the referendum on public opinion may be partly limited by this but the Maastricht Treaty was already politicised in the period when the data was collected.

The referendum variable is not a significant contributor to the explanation of the outcome variable, evaluation of current EU membership in all French models. This result contradicts Dalton & Duval’s (1986), Eichenberg & Dalton’s (1993), Christin & Hug’s (2002) and Gabel & Palmer’s (1995) results, which found increased public opinion support for EU integration in referendum years. This may be due to the fact that EU referendums are contaminated by domestic issues and by the popularity of incumbent government. The non-significance of the referendum variable may be explained by the fact that there are other years in the study period (1992-2001) such as 2001 and to a lesser extent 1998 where the level of support for current EU

93 This EB data was selected as contained the required variables.
membership is comparable to 1992 – year of referendum – and economic results (GDP growth and employment) are improving. This explanation is supported by the French individual analysis which shows that the related variable becomes statistically significant and indicates that in a referendum year, respondents are more likely to be in favour of current EU membership: this result may be explained by the fact that only the period from 1992 to 1994 is tested – due to restricted data availability. The result elicited in the individual analysis supports earlier research results.

**Desired Speed of European Integration**

The referendum variable is not a significant predictor of desired speed of European integration in all French models and the direction of the coefficient for this variable tends to indicate that respondents in referendum years are statistically insignificantly in favour of faster European integration. Although this variable is not significant in the present research, the direction of the coefficient for this variable tends to be in the same direction as earlier findings by, for example, Gabel and Palmer (1995). The result obtained here may be due to the fact that EU referendums are contaminated by domestic issues and by the popularity of incumbent government. The non-significance of the referendum variable may be explained by the fact that there are other years in the study period (1992-2001) such as 2001 where the level of support for further European integration is comparable to 1992 – year of referendum – and economic results (GDP growth and employment) are improving. This result is supported by the French individual analysis which shows that the related variable becomes statistically significant and indicates that in referendum years, respondents are more likely to be in favour of faster European integration: this result may be explained by the fact that only the period from 1992 to 1994 is tested – due to restricted data availability. The result elicited in the individual analysis supports earlier research results.
5.3 Conclusion

In both French and British samples, a relationship was found between citizens’ EU support and national political institutions’ performance in socio-economic, societal and political terms. Therefore it can be inferred that public opinion on European integration is related inter alia to utilitarian explanations: in other words respondents use inter alia utilitarian appraisal to form attitudes towards the European Union and its further integration. The EU integration throughout the 1990s has become more visible, more publicized and increasingly politicised, and de facto more present in citizens’ work and private life. Individuals may not all have a very sophisticated view of the European Union but this climate has increased the chance for them to take information shortcuts to express attitudes towards the European Union, and national proxies play here a key role.

The socialisation theory as an explanation of public opinion’s current EU membership support has lived and is giving way to economic, social and societal assessments of how the EU membership is affecting nation states. This echoes somewhat Kritzinger’s (2003) and Angelucci’s (1993) suggestions that citizens use national proxies to express attitudes towards the EU. However, while respondents in older EU member states such as France seem to show more opposition and uncertainty towards current EU membership linked to poor national economic, social and societal results, older EU member states (such as France)\(^{94}\) seem to show more disposition towards the further integration of the EU. In other words, the socialisation theory still plays a role in the further integration of the EU but increasingly poor national economic, social and societal results are starting to erode this affective support.

France has been found to show not significantly lower support for current EU membership and EU further integration than other EU countries whereas the United Kingdom – which has had relatively better economic and social results throughout the period of study – has been found to display a significantly lower support for current EU membership and EU further integration than other EU nations. In both France and the United Kingdom, in the study period (1992-2001), the level of

\(^{94}\) France is found to show an insignificant higher support for EU further integration than other EU countries.
support for current EU membership and further integration has dropped significantly. The drop in support for current EU membership and future EU integration is though lower in France than in the United Kingdom – for both individual and aggregate level data analyses. This may be a reflection that both countries favour a change of political direction of the EU to cater for their own policy concerns as argued later on in the following chapters.

**French Overall Conclusions**

It was hypothesized:

H₁ There is an inverse relationship between citizens’ levels of satisfaction with national political institutions’ performance – pertaining to the national economic, political, social and societal situation – and citizens’ support for European integration in France and the United Kingdom (thus, the higher the satisfaction with national performance, the lower the support for European integration).

For all the variables tested (except corruption for further European integration), hypothesis H₁ is rejected in its stated direction. There is therefore no relationship between citizens’ dissatisfaction with national political institutions’ performance – pertaining to the national economic, political, social and societal situation – and citizens’ support for European integration. Nevertheless as pointed out above, there is a relationship between national political institutions’ performance – in economic, political, social and societal terms – and citizens’ support for European integration. Citizens consider the EU to be contributing to poor national results, and the increased politicisation of the EU issue especially in the second part of the 1990s plays here its role. Factions within mainstream political parties and political parties in the political periphery (FN, RPF, MPF, MDC and PC) criticize moreover the detrimental influence of the EU institutions in France’s economic and social situation: for example the negative influence of European quotas, the unfair global competition on French agriculture and the negative influence of the stability pact on French economic growth and public expenditure. It is thus revealing that the continued relatively high unemployment in France, as well as the relatively high crime and immigration levels there, affect current EU membership support negatively. French citizens fear how a fast European integration, especially a free
market (completely open to world competition), deregulated European Union – earmarked “ultra-liberal” by some politicians – can influence detrimentally social expenditure, the currently positive intra-EU trade balance of France, and the already high level of crimes and immigration. They are afraid that the relatively high French tax burden and bureaucracy may handicap them in such a rapidly integrating European Union. The latter point is especially important as France has a relatively low dependence on intra-EU trade and French citizens may be afraid that the current EU and especially further European integration may be conducive to a further opening of French markets, partly still protected from world competition\(^\text{95}\) and to a lesser extent from European competition. They also consider that France will gain little with a rapidly integrating European Union in terms of inflation as they are already accustomed to a relatively low inflation. French successive governments and mainstream opposition are however in favour of current EU membership and further European integration, and have exercised some influence on their electorate in support of the process of European integration, trying to reassure their electorate about the economic and social benefits of integration – including the preservation of peace and international influence of the EU in world issues. They have also promised their electorate that the EU and France would retain a strong social policy and that the EU was putting in place a regulated capitalism (please refer to background chapter on France (chapter 4)).

The incumbent government support, the socialisation effect and the relatively low exclusive national identity of French citizens partly explain the support of French citizens for current membership\(^\text{96}\) and further European integration but French citizens are preoccupied by the persisting economic, social and societal problems that France is undergoing, and perceive the EU, and more particularly a neo-liberal EU, as contributing to these problems. These perceptions are facilitated by a growing politicisation and political protest towards European integration. Concerning the results of hypothesis III, French citizens with left, centre but also right ideological opinions are though in principle in favour of transferring policies such as employment, immigration and political asylum, social inclusion,

\(^{95}\) World competition is moreover sometimes deemed unfair.

\(^{96}\) The socialisation effect on current EU membership is though giving way to national economic, social and societal assessments as discussed above.
environmental, anti-drug, scientific research, agriculture, currency management, defence, humanitarian aid, regional and foreign policies to the EU. On the evidence examined in this thesis and in the work of other authors, it seems probable that this is so as they perceive that the EU may be best able to deal with these policies – subsidiarity principle – and that French successive governments have failed to deal with some of these. French citizens would like the EU to take a more regulated capitalism path, with more interventionism in the economic and social sphere. It is revealing to note that French citizens are not in favour of transferring health, education and cultural policies to the EU as they may perceive that French successive governments have relatively better dealt with these and that the national level may be best placed to cater for these. French nationals are also against the EU transfer of police and urban & juvenile crime prevention policies as they consider that the national level may be best placed to cater for these, and that the permeability of European borders – partly concomitant upon the principle of free movements of people, services and goods – and the Schengen agreements implementation are perceived by respondents as contributing to crime and law and order issues, without though denying that the EU could play a role in fighting crime.

In addition as demonstrated in the individual level analysis, support for current EU membership can be mobilised when French respondents have better or the same expectations for the country’s economic situation for the year to come, have better expectations about the employment situation for the year to come and have better expectations for their household financial situation for the year to come. Support for further European integration can be also mobilised when French respondents have better expectations for the country’s economic situation for the year to come, have better expectations about the employment situation for the year to come and have better expectations for their household financial situation for the year to come.

**British Overall Conclusions**

It was hypothesized:

H₁ There is an inverse relationship between citizens’ levels of satisfaction with national political institutions’ performance – pertaining to the national economic, political, social and societal situation – and citizens’ support for European
integration in France and the United Kingdom (thus, the higher the satisfaction with national performance, the lower the support for European integration).

For the corruption variable (for further European integration), hypothesis H₁ is accepted. There is therefore a relationship between citizens’ satisfaction with the United Kingdom’s relatively low corruption and citizens’ opposition to further European integration. Further support for the acceptance of the related hypothesis is brought by the non-relationship between incumbent government support and further integration which cumulated with the relatively eurosceptic nature of mainstream political parties is indirectly partly a confirmation that British citizens appear reluctant to risk weakening the national executive through political reform (European further integration), which may be affecting individuals who enjoy advantageous national policy outcomes such as employment and purchasing power. Thus for example, the mismanagement of the British pound in the ERM in the early 1990s created economic and social problems in the United Kingdom, or inflation especially in the second part of the 1990s is already relatively low in the United Kingdom and further European integration is deemed as adding little to the control of inflation. This relative opposition to further European integration is also albeit rooted in a strong feeling of national identity and an emphasis on national sovereignty.

Further support for the acceptance of hypothesis H₁ comes with the European Union being considered as bringing or contributing to problems, or adding little to the United Kingdom’s economic, societal and social situation. Thus in the domains of inflation control and increase in social expenditure – with inherent social rights – the further integration of the EU (and current EU membership for social expenditure) is considered as adding little to these as inflation has been relatively low in the UK especially in the second part of the 1990s and social expenditure has increased to reach a comparable level with countries such as France towards the last few years of the study period – albeit still lower than France when considering the cost of social provisions (PPS measurement) but above the EU average. In the fields of immigration and crime, the current EU and further integration of the EU with its corollary of freedom of movement of European and non-European nationals, and the embryonic more liberal European Home Affairs policy, may be perceived (and
instrumentalized by British non-mainstream political parties such as UKIP, BNP but also by factions within mainstream parties and even the leadership of political parties (such as the Conservative Party from 1997)) as contributing to increasing immigration and crime in the United Kingdom. In the domain of bureaucracy, subject to a political discourse of especially the right and centre underlining the bureaucratic nature of the current EU bringing more regulations, bureaucracy and red tape which would threaten the competitiveness of British businesses, British citizens fear the negative impact that the current EU has on British businesses. Furthermore, the United Kingdom tends to have a relatively low dependence on intra-EU trade and as such the current EU may be considered by British respondents – as reinforced by the political discourse of especially the right – as making a relatively minor contribution to the UK’s economic and social success and contrasting with the publicized (mainly by politicians on the right) trade opportunities with relatively fast growing countries such as Canada, USA, Australia, New Zealand and other countries in the Commonwealth but also increasingly China.

Further support for hypothesis $H_1$ is brought by the results of Hypothesis III which confirm that British respondents do not wish to transfer to the EU, immigration and political asylum, health, education, currency management, police and urban & juvenile crime prevention, employment, defence, cultural, agriculture, social inclusion policies (the latter only for individuals with extreme right ideological views).$^{97}$ British opposition to further European integration and to a lesser extent to current EU membership reflects somewhat a vision of the EU as a too interventionist, bureaucratic, over-regulated, and somewhat uncompetitive and inflexible economic entity$^{98}$ which can threaten British economic growth and social progress accomplished throughout the study period as reinforced by the political discourse of much of the right but also partly of the centre and left. The importance of national sovereignty, a limited socialisation effect and a strong exclusive feeling of national identity bolster this opposition to further integration and to a lesser extent the current EU. British citizens’ opposition to the European Union is not a total opposition to any form of European Union but is grounded on a preference for an

$^{97}$ Individuals with right ideological opinions wish to transfer the social inclusion policy to the European Union only very marginally.

$^{98}$ The political role of the EU is also contested.
EU to embrace free market policies and cooperation between independent nation-states rather than supra-nationalism with its corollary of a super-state. In this perspective, British political discourse in the media\textsuperscript{99} tends to underline the opportunities that the single European market (and a more integrated and expanded Europe organised along a free common deregulated market) offer to British firms – for example in terms of employment –, who benefit in the United Kingdom from a more favourable competitive, company and job friendly environment and as such can benefit from the single European market.

In addition as demonstrated in the individual level analysis (hypothesis II), support for current EU membership can be mobilised when British respondents have better or the same expectations for the country’s economic situation for the year to come, have better expectations about the employment situation for the year to come and have better or the same expectations for their household financial situation for the year to come. Support for further European integration can be also mobilised when British respondents have better expectations for the country’s economic situation for the year to come, have better expectations about the employment situation for the year to come and have better expectations for their household financial situation for the year to come. It must be noted that the coefficients for the related variables are a little weaker in British models than in French models, as such support for current EU membership and future European integration can be mobilised when British individuals have more positive expectations but to a lesser extent than France.

\textsuperscript{99} Especially the incumbent government as playing a part in the current management of the EU.
6- ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS FOR HYPOTHESIS II

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the relationship between citizens’ support for integration and citizens’ individual benefits extracted from European integration (Hypothesis II) is examined. The analysis of findings and conclusions for hypothesis II are therefore presented beneath.

6.2 Analysis of Findings for Hypothesis II

Research Question II: Is there a relationship between citizens’ support for integration and citizens’ individual benefits extracted from European integration?

It is hypothesized in the context of both France and the United Kingdom:

H_II There is a relationship between citizens’ support for integration and citizens’ individual benefits extracted from European integration

Individual level data analysis

It must be noted that Models M17 have smaller samples (especially for France) which may not be able to detect small differences. Pattern of significance and conclusions for incumbent government support, EPEL and referendum variables have been discussed in the aggregate level data analysis (section 5.2.5). Statistical outputs are subsumed in the appendices numbered 6.1 A F to 6.17 A F for French models and 6.1 B UK to 6.16 B’ UK for British models. Please note that models incorporating a seven category occupation variable are marked with a prime. An example of statistical output, Evaluation of EU Benefit (without don’t know) (Model 14 BDNBD), is shown below (for full output details for the latter, please refer to Appendix 6.4 B UK).
## Dependent Variable Encoding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original Value</th>
<th>Internal Value</th>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
<td>Benefitted</td>
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### Categorical Variables Codings

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<th>(2)</th>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td>25-39 years</td>
<td>1116</td>
<td>.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>40 + years</td>
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<td>.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>D1 LEFT-RIGHT PLACEMENT - Harmonised 3 cat</td>
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<tr>
<td>LEFT</td>
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<td>Right</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q5 EXPECTATIONS: FINANCIAL SITUATION</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better</td>
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<td>1.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Same</td>
<td>1735</td>
<td>.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Worse</td>
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<tr>
<td>d29 Income HH quartiles (harmonised) in 2 cat</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- &amp; - +</td>
<td>2340</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>++</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q5 EXPECTATIONS: ECONOMIC SITUATION</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>999</td>
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<tr>
<td>q5.4 expectations: employment lage in land</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1080</td>
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<tr>
<td>Same &amp; Worse</td>
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<td>D8 AGE EDUCATION - RECODED (2 cat)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Up to 19 years</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 + years &amp; still studying</td>
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<td>.000</td>
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<td>subj knowledge question, 2 categories sin DK</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>know very and quite well (1 to 5)</td>
<td>910</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>know not very well &amp; not at all well (6 to 10)</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td>European elections year</td>
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<td>.000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy satisfaction in Country</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very &amp; fairly satisfied</td>
<td>1932</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Not very &amp; not at all satisfied</td>
<td>1577</td>
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<td>occupation of respondents in 2 cat</td>
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<tr>
<td>Professionals (incl. employed ones)/General/Middle MGT/stdt ShopOw/Unempl/ EmpilpoX3,Worker X3, Houswv,farmfish/retir-un ab</td>
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### Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients

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<th>Sig.</th>
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### Model Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>-2 Log likelihood</th>
<th>Cox &amp; Snell R Square</th>
<th>Nagelkerke R Square</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>4358.394a</td>
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<td>.166</td>
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*a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.*

### Hosmer and Lemeshow Test

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<tbody>
<tr>
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### Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Q19 EU MEMBERSHIP = Not benefited</th>
<th>Q19 EU MEMBERSHIP = Benefitted</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Observed</td>
<td>Expected</td>
<td>Observed</td>
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<td>Step 1</td>
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<td>288</td>
<td>279.963</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>243</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>233</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>217.449</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>184</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>197</td>
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### Likelihood Ratio Tests

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<th>Effect</th>
<th>-2 Log Likelihood of Reduced Model</th>
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<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
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<tr>
<td>d10aa</td>
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<tr>
<td>dumreguk</td>
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<td>.019</td>
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<td>epel</td>
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<td>d11.1a3c</td>
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<td>.496</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>d29f2iii</td>
<td>3517.052</td>
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<td>.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>q5.4a2be</td>
<td>3514.347</td>
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<tr>
<td>d15af2su</td>
<td>3505.018</td>
<td>.227</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.634</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The chi-square statistic is the difference in \(-2\) log-likelihoods between the final model and a reduced model. The reduced model is formed by omitting an effect from the final model. The null hypothesis is that all parameters of that effect are 0.

a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the effect does not increase the degrees of freedom.

### Variables in the Equation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
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<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d11.1a3c</td>
<td>.496</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.780</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d11.1a3c(1)</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>.123</td>
<td>.297</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.586</td>
<td>1.069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d11.1a3c(2)</td>
<td>.049</td>
<td>.083</td>
<td>.343</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.558</td>
<td>1.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>q9ww2(1)</td>
<td>.430</td>
<td>.077</td>
<td>31.023</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>q5.3aa</td>
<td>12.559</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>q5.3aa(1)</td>
<td>.395</td>
<td>.116</td>
<td>11.675</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>1.484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>q5.3aa(2)</td>
<td>.327</td>
<td>.106</td>
<td>9.478</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>1.387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>epel(1)</td>
<td>-.051</td>
<td>.082</td>
<td>.384</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.535</td>
<td>.951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>know2(1)</td>
<td>.550</td>
<td>.085</td>
<td>41.569</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dumreguk(1)</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>.076</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.890</td>
<td>1.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d10aa(1)</td>
<td>.101</td>
<td>.075</td>
<td>1.840</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.175</td>
<td>1.107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.563</td>
<td>.186</td>
<td>9.168</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.569</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: d15af2su, d29f2iii, d1.4aa, q5.2aa2c, q5.4a2be, d8aa2cat, d11.1a3c, q9ww2, q5.3aa, epel, know2, dumreguk, d10aa.
### 6.2.1 Patterns of EU Support

Table 6.1 summarizes the pattern of significance of the regression constant with the dependent variables, current EU membership (EU benefit and membership) and future EU integration (European integration desired speed preference) and the direction of the coefficient for the related variables.

#### Table 6.1: Pattern of significance of EU Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Effect on Current EU Membership</th>
<th>Effect on Future EU Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EU Membership</td>
<td>EU Benefit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regression Constant</td>
<td>French Sample:</td>
<td>French Sample:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significant and EU support</td>
<td>Significant and EU support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>decreases (M14 &amp; M15)</td>
<td>decreases (M14 &amp; M15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significant and EU support</td>
<td>Not Significant (M17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>increases (M17)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>British Sample:</td>
<td>British Sample:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significant and EU support</td>
<td>Significant and EU support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>decreases (M15)</td>
<td>decreases (M14 &amp; M15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not Significant (M14 &amp; with &quot;neither good nor bad&quot; category)</td>
<td>Not significant &amp; EU support decreases (M17 but close to significance zone – small differences are not detectable with models 17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not significant (M17 with &quot;neither good nor bad&quot;)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variables</td>
<td>Effect on Current EU Membership</td>
<td>Effect on Future EU Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EU Membership</td>
<td>EU Benefit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>category)</td>
<td>Significant &amp; EU support increases (M14 &amp; M17 without “neither good nor bad” category)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Evaluation of Current EU Membership**

The regression constant tends to be significant in both French and British models with evaluation of current EU membership (EU Benefit and EU Membership) as the dependent variable, and the direction of the constant coefficient suggests that overall there is a significant drop in current EU membership support in the study period (1992-2001) in France and the UK. The individual level data analysis per period (resulting from restricted data availability) brings further insight. It must be nevertheless noted that the drop in support for current EU membership is lower in France than in the United Kingdom – for both individual and aggregate level data analyses. Citizens are even more critical of European integration when responding to the EU benefit question, which accentuates the stress on utilitarian feelings, this confirms Anderson and Smith’s (2004) findings.

**British Sample:**


In the period 1992 to 1994 (M17), it can be inferred that there is a small significant drop in the level of support for current EU membership when British respondents are asked to evaluate whether the United Kingdom has benefited from EU
membership. This is especially true when integrating the middle category “don’t know” in the dependent variable. The drop in EU support is no longer significant when British respondents are asked to evaluate whether the United Kingdom’s EU membership is a good thing. When omitting the “neither good nor bad” category in the response variable, there is a significant increase in the level of support for current EU membership when British respondents are asked to evaluate whether the United Kingdom’s EU membership is a good thing.


There is a significant drop in the level of support for current EU membership (EU Membership and EU Benefit variables). For models 14, this is especially so when respondents are asked to evaluate whether the United Kingdom has benefited from EU membership.

**French Sample:**


In the period 1992 to 1994 (M17), there is a significant increase in the level of support for current EU membership when French respondents are asked to evaluate whether France’s EU membership is a good thing. This increase disappears though when respondents are asked to evaluate whether France has benefited from EU membership. This may be explained by the fact that in the related period (early 1990s), France was experiencing strong economic and social problems partly arising from a poor global economic situation, but also aggravated (and perceived accordingly by public opinion) by the preparation for single currency membership and EMU (and its initial politicisation) with its corollary of prevalence of monetary policy over budgetary policy.

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100 Including ERM problems with the expansion in currency fluctuations margins in 1993.

There tends to be a significant decrease in the level of support for EU membership (EU membership and EU benefit variables).

In the UK context, the economic and social consequences of the mismanagement of the British pound in the ERM (and its ultimate exit from it in 1992) on citizens have brought about more uncertainty about current EU membership, and even the start of discontent with the current EU, which subsequently continued amidst the increasing politicisation of the EU issue in the second part of the 1990s. The politicisation of the EU issue was though limited in the first part of the 1990s including at the 1994 European elections as the leadership of the main political parties (Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats) showed relative consensus on EU membership and tended not to compete on this. In the French context, the discontent with the current EU gained momentum in the second part of the 1990s amidst persisting economic and social problems and the increasing politicisation of the EU issue, the latter especially at the 1997 legislative elections and 1999 European elections.

Desired Speed of European Integration

Models M17, M14 and M15

It must be noted that the regression constant shows a significant effect in all British and French models, and the direction of the coefficient for the constant suggests that there is a significant decrease in further European integration support (desired speed of European integration) in the study period (1992-2001). It must be noted that the drop in support for future EU integration is lower in France than in the United Kingdom – for both individual and aggregate level data analyses.

In the British context, the reasons evoked above, that is to say, the economic and social consequences of the mismanagement of the British Pound in the ERM (and its ultimate exit from it) on citizens in the early 1990s have brought about more uncertainty and discontent about EU membership and by extension about further European integration: a discontent with the EU and its further integration, which has
subsequently continued amidst the increasing politicisation of the EU issue in the second part of the 1990s. In the French context, discontent with the current EU and by extension with further European integration has particularly gained momentum in the second part of 1990s amidst persisting economic and social problems and the increasing politicisation of the EU issue, the latter especially at the 1997 Legislative elections and 1999 European elections. The pact of stability pertaining to EMU and the single currency with its inherent monetary, budgetary and fiscal rigidities was perceived and instrumentalised by non-mainstream political parties and factions within mainstream political parties as contributing to French economic and social problems.

6.2.2 Subjective Economic Performance Evaluation and EU Support

Table 6.2 summarizes the pattern of significance of subjective economic performance evaluation variables on the dependent variables, current EU membership (EU benefit and membership) and future EU integration (European integration desired speed). If an effect is found to be significant, then the relevant variable is a unique contributor to the explanation of the dependent variable.

Table 6.2: Pattern of Significance of Subjective Economic Performance Evaluation Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjective Economic Performance Evaluation Variables</th>
<th>Effect on Current EU Membership</th>
<th>Effect on Future EU Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EU Membership</td>
<td>EU Benefit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expectations over coming 12 months for Economic Situation in Country</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expectations over coming 12 months for Employment Situation in Country</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expectations over coming 12 months for</td>
<td>Not Significant but coefficient</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Subjective Economic Performance Evaluation Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect on Current EU Membership</th>
<th>Effect on Future EU Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU Membership</td>
<td>EU Benefit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Situation of Household</td>
<td>in expected direction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Expectations for the Economic Situation of the Country (for the year to come)

#### Evaluation of Current EU membership

**EU Membership and Benefit Dependent Variables**

The odds in favour of United Kingdom or France EU membership being deemed as a good thing increase significantly when the respondents have better or the same expectations for the economic situation of the country for the year to come compared to those with worse expectations. The odds in favour of United Kingdom or France having benefited from EU membership increase significantly when the respondents have better or the same expectations for the economic situation of the country for the year to come compared to those with worse expectations. It must be noted that the economic situation expectations coefficient is stronger for models without "neither good nor bad" or "don’t know" answers. These results confirm earlier research results (Carey, 2002; Gabel and Whitten, 1997; Gabel, 1998a).

#### Further EU Integration: European Integration Desired Speed Preference

For British and French samples, the expectations in the country’s economic situation (for the year to come) variable is a significant contributor to the explanation of European integration desired speed and the relationship conveys that the more the respondents have worse expectations in terms of the country’ economic situation for the year to come, the slower they wish European integration to go. The related variable is a little stronger in French samples. These results broadly corroborate earlier findings (Hooghe and Marks, 2005; De Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2005 –
dependent variables used are not the same but contain components of further EU integration –).

Expectations for the Employment Situation in the Country (for the year to come)

Evaluation of Current EU membership

EU Membership and Benefit Dependent Variables

The odds in favour of United Kingdom or France EU membership being viewed as a good thing increase significantly when the respondents have better expectations\textsuperscript{101} for the employment situation in the country for the year to come compared to those with the same or worse expectations. The odds in favour of United Kingdom or France being considered as having benefited from EU membership increase significantly when the respondents have better expectations for the employment situation in the country for the year to come compared to those with the same or worse expectations. The expectations for the national employment situation coefficient is also a little stronger for models without “neither good nor bad” or “don’t know” answers. It should be underlined that although the direction of the expectations for the national employment situation coefficient is the same in French and British samples, this coefficient appears more important in French samples. This may be so as the employment situation in France in terms of availability of jobs and average salaries is relatively worse in France than in the United Kingdom. These results confirm earlier research results (Carey, 2002; Gabel and Whitten, 1997; Gabel, 1998a), although these studies used national economic expectations as independent variable rather than national employment expectations.

Further EU Integration: European Integration Desired Speed Preference

For British and French samples, the future country’s employment situation expectations variable is a significant predictor of European integration desired speed. The direction of the coefficient for this variable reveals that the more the

\textsuperscript{101} Except model 14 GD for French sample and model 15 GD for British sample where the pattern of significance is “Better and Same Expectations” versus “Worse Expectations”.

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respondents have the same or worse expectations in terms of the country’s employment situation for the year to come, the slower (the more) they wish European integration to go (or to standstill). These results corroborate earlier findings (Hooghe and Marks, 2005; De Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2005 – dependent variables used in these studies are not the same but contain components of further EU integration, and these studies also used national economic expectations as the independent variable rather than national employment expectations –).

Expectations for Household Financial Situation (for the year to come)

Evaluation of Current EU membership

EU Membership and Benefit Dependent Variables

The household financial situation coefficient tends not to be a significant predictor of the EU membership variable for both French and British models but the related coefficient is in the expected direction. Thus, the odds in favour of United Kingdom or France EU membership being considered as a good thing increase statistically insignificantly when the respondents have better expectations for their household financial situation for the year to come compared to those with worse expectations.

For British samples without a “don’t know” answer, the household financial situation coefficient is a significant predictor of the EU benefit variable. Thus, the odds in favour of the United Kingdom being viewed as having benefited from EU membership increase (statistically) significantly when the respondents have better or the same expectations for their household financial situation for the year to come compared to those with worse expectations. However, when integrating “don’t know” answers to the British samples (model 15 BDDKNBD with media influence and cognitive mobilisation variables), the coefficient for better household financial situation expectations is no longer a significant predictor (not so far though from the significance zone) of the EU benefit variable but the related coefficient has the same direction as for British models without “don’t know” answers: the odds here in favour of the United Kingdom being viewed as having benefited from EU membership increase statistically insignificantly when the respondents have better
expectations for their household financial situation for the year to come compared to those with worse expectations.

For French samples with or without a “don’t know” answer, the household financial situation coefficient is always a significant predictor of the EU benefit variable. The odds in favour of France being viewed as having benefited from EU membership increase (statistically) significantly when the respondents have better expectations for their household financial situation for the year to come compared to those with the same or worse expectations. Therefore the household financial situation variable seems more important as a predictor of EU benefit (dependent) variable in French samples than in British samples: this may be because in connection with the relatively worse national economic and social results in France, the French household financial situation tends to be worse than the British household financial situation.

These results partly confirm (an effect not always significant) earlier research results (Llamazares and Gramacho, 2007; Carey, 2002; Gabel and Whitten, 1997; Gabel, 1998a).

Further EU Integration: European Integration Desired Speed Preference

For British samples, the expectations in the household’s financial situation for the year to come variable is not a significant predictor of European integration desired speed (quite close though to the significance area, .087 > .05) but the direction of the coefficient indicates (statistically insignificantly though) that the worse future expectations respondents have for their household financial situation, the slower they wish European integration to go. However in model 15 (controlling inter alia for media influence and cognitive mobilisation), the coming year household financial situation expectations variable becomes a significant predictor of European integration desired speed. The coefficient is though in the same direction in both models. This implies that the worse future expectations respondents have for their household financial situation, the slower they wish European integration to go. For French samples, the future household financial situation variable is a significant predictor of European integration desired speed. The direction of the coefficient denotes that the more the respondents have the same or worse expectations about
their household financial situation for the year to come, the slower (or the more) they wish European integration to go (or to stand still). These results corroborate overall earlier findings (Hooghe and Marks, 2005 and McLaren, 2007b – dependent variables used in the related studies are not the same but contain components of further EU integration –; Kritzinger, 2003 – although the latter has used an indexed independent variable incorporating personal and national economic expectations, and the dependent variable used is not the same –).

Overall, $H_H$ is accepted. Therefore there is a relationship between citizens’ support for integration (current EU membership and future integration) and citizens’ individual benefits extracted from European integration. In other words, the more British and French respondents have better expectations about the national economic situation, the national employment situation and their household financial situation for the year to come, the more they support current EU membership and the faster they wish European integration to go. It must be noted that the coefficients for the related variables are a little weaker in British models than in French models, as such support for current EU membership and future European integration can be mobilised in both countries when individuals have more positive expectations for the year to come but to a lesser extent in the United Kingdom than in France. As discussed in the aggregate level analysis, British citizens have a strong sense of national identity, place greater emphasis on national sovereignty and benefit from a lower socialisation effect, which moderate the perceived individual and national benefits extracted from the EU.

6.2.3 Demographic and Socio-Economic Characteristics of Individuals and EU Support

Table 6.3 summarizes the pattern of significance of individual demographic and socio-economic variables on the dependent variables, current EU membership (EU benefit and membership) and future EU integration (European integration desired speed preference). If an effect is found to be significant, then the relevant variable is a unique contributor to the explanation of the dependent variable.

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102 McLaren (2007b) has also used a different independent variable, that is to say, perceived personal advantages from EU membership.
### Table 6.3: Pattern of Significance of Individual Demographic and Socio-Economic Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual Demographic and Socio-Economic Variables</th>
<th>Effect on Current EU Membership</th>
<th>Effect on Future EU Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EU Membership</td>
<td>EU Benefit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>British Samples</td>
<td>British Samples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(but more limited</td>
<td>(but more limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>significance for Model 17 (M17)</td>
<td>significance for Model 17 (M17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and third lowest income</td>
<td>and third lowest income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>not significant)</td>
<td>not significant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>French Samples</td>
<td>French Samples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(not significant in M17)</td>
<td>(not significant in M17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation (smaller differences are not detectable*)</td>
<td>British Sample</td>
<td>British sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Localised Significance</td>
<td>Not Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>French Sample</td>
<td>Tend to be significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to be significant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materialism/Post-</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Demographic and Socio-Economic Variables</td>
<td>Effect on Current EU Membership</td>
<td>Effect on Future EU Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EU Membership</td>
<td>EU Benefit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materialism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proximity to Intra-EU Borders</td>
<td>British Sample Tend to be not significant</td>
<td>Tend to be not significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>French Sample Tend to be significant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Income**

**Evaluation of Current EU membership**

**EU Membership and Benefit Dependent Variables**

**British models**

The odds in favour of the United Kingdom membership of the EU being seen as a good thing decrease significantly overall when respondents have an income “--” or “-” or “+” compared to those with a higher income “++”. The coefficient for “-” and “+” is though not significant in models M17 GD and M17 GDNGNB (and just outside significance for “--” for M17GD) but has the same direction as for other coefficients: that is to say the odds decrease versus “++”. Therefore overall, those with greater incomes are more likely to answer that the United Kingdom membership of the EU is a good thing rather than a bad thing or neither good nor bad. Income coefficients for models with “neither good nor bad” are also a little stronger than for models without “neither good nor bad”.

In the same line, the odds in favour of the United Kingdom being deemed as having benefited from membership of the EU decrease significantly overall when respondents have an income “--” or “-” or “+” compared to those with a higher income “++”. The coefficient for “-” and “+” is yet not significant in models M17...
BDNBD and M17 BDDKNBD but has the same direction as for other coefficients: that is to say the odds decrease versus “++”. Therefore overall, those with greater incomes are more likely to answer that the United Kingdom benefited from EU membership rather than not benefited or don’t know. Income coefficients for models with “don’t know” and without the latter show a similar strength.

**French models**

The odds in favour of France membership of the EU being seen as a good thing decrease significantly overall when respondents have an income “--“ or “-“ or “+” compared to those with a higher income “++”. The coefficient for “--“ and “+” is however not significant in models M17 GD and M17 GDNGNB but has the same direction as for other coefficients: that is to say the odds decrease versus “++”. Contrary to British models, albeit the second lowest income (“-”) coefficient being also not significant in models M17 GD and M17 GDNGNB, the second lowest income coefficient (“-“) shows no direction. Therefore overall, as for British models, those with highest incomes are more likely to answer that France membership of the EU is a good thing rather than a bad thing or neither good nor bad. Contrary to British models, income coefficients for models without “neither good nor bad” are also a little stronger than for models with “neither good nor bad”.

As for British models, the odds in favour of France being deemed as having benefited from membership of the EU decrease significantly overall when respondents have an income “-“ or “+” compared to those with a higher income “++”. The coefficient for “+” is nonetheless not significant in models M17 BDNBD and M17 BDDKNBD but has the same direction as for other coefficients: that is to say the odds decrease versus “++”. The coefficient for “-“ is also not significant in models M17 BDNBD and M17 BDDKNBD and the odds slightly increase. As for British models, the odds in favour of France being deemed as having benefited from membership of the EU decrease (statistically) significantly overall when respondents have the lowest income (“--“) compared to those with the highest income “++” for models with “don’t know” (the coefficient for “--“ is not significant in models M17 BDNBD and M17 BDDKNBD but has the same direction as for other coefficients: the odds decrease versus “++”). However it differs from British models when the
odds in favour of France being deemed as having benefited from membership of the EU decrease statistically insignificantly overall when respondents have the lowest income ("--") compared to those with the highest income "++" for models without "don’t know" but the related coefficient has the same direction as in British models. The coefficient for "--" is also not significant in models M17 BDNBD and M17 BDDKNBD but has the same direction as for other coefficients: that is to say the odds decrease versus "++". Therefore overall, as for British models, respondents with greater incomes are more likely to answer that France benefited from EU membership rather than not benefited or don’t know.

The results obtained for current EU membership are in line with Gabel’s (1998a) and Carey’s (2002) results. On the evidence examined and in the work of other authors, it seems probable that citizens on lower incomes perceive the EU as affecting more adversely job market and salaries with greater competition arising from freedom of movement of workers, capital liberalisation and economic integration. In turn, wealthier citizens consider that they benefit from increased investment opportunities as a result of the European Union.

Further EU Integration: European Integration Desired Speed Preference

For British samples, the income variable is a significant contributor to the explanation of European integration desired speed and the direction of the coefficient denotes that the greater the respondents’ income is, the slower they wish European integration to go. This result contradicts somewhat Gabel’s (1998a) and Carey’s (2002) results – albeit not the same dependent variable was used in these studies. This is likely to be so because wealthier British citizens perceive that they benefit from current EU membership but that further European integration moves may go in opposition to their interests, with a more interventionist European governmental stance (departing from British free market policy) with for example greater risk of market regulations and higher taxation (compared to the British national context). Wealthier British Citizens are partly taking cues from the largely eurosceptic British press but also from the national political elites who are more reserved and critical towards further European integration. Conversely, it is plausible that those on lower incomes view the further integration of the EU as
providing more opportunities for social spending (compared to the British context) although towards the end of the study period this is losing somewhat its essence with the United Kingdom social spending per head (including adoption of social chapter) being similar to comparable countries such as France – albeit still lower in real terms than the latter – and the greater spending commitment on public services from the government for the future (please refer to chapter four).

For French samples, the income variable is also a significant contributor to the explanation of European integration desired speed but the direction of the coefficient conveys that the higher the respondent’s income is, the faster they wish European integration to proceed. This result corroborates somewhat Gabel’s (1998a) and Carey’s (2002) findings – albeit not the same dependent variable was used in these studies. This is probable to be so because wealthier French citizens view the further EU integration as serving their interests with a less interventionist European governmental momentum (compared to the French more tightly regulated market policy), with less market regulation and less taxation (compared to the French national context), and with more opportunities to invest their money. Conversely, it is plausible that those on lower incomes consider the further European integration as constraining social spending (compared to French context) – budgetary rigidities related to EMU and pact of stability – and increasing job market competition with a negative impact on salaries.

**Pattern of significance of income variable shows for both France and the United Kingdom that H_{II} is accepted.** As a result, based on income variable, there is a relationship between citizens’ support for integration (current EU membership and further integration) and citizens’ individual benefits extracted from European integration. It must be pointed out that utilitarian appraisals of the EU based on income variable have increased since 1994 for France and to a lesser extent the United Kingdom. Utilitarian appraisals for British individuals on lowest income compared to highest income already existed in period 1992-1994, the mismanagement of the British Pound in the ERM and its economic and social consequences especially on lowest income households explain this. In the British context, the apparent contradiction between individuals with higher income being in favour of current EU membership but against further EU integration is not surprising.
and reflects a self-interested logic. A more favourable competitive, company and job friendly environment in the United Kingdom enable them to benefit from the current EU and its single European market. Yet the further integration of the EU is perceived by them to carry risks of excessive public interventionism, greater market regulations and higher taxation which could threaten their current competitiveness and welfare. Much of the political discourse – including the reservations of the Labour government on further integration topics such as for example the Euro membership – but also the political activism of the largely eurosceptic British press against further European integration reinforce this belief. The results obtained for the daily papers use and incumbent government support variables corroborate this explanation.

**Education**

**Evaluation of Current EU membership**

*EU Membership and Benefit Dependent Variables*

The odds in favour of the United Kingdom or France membership of the EU being considered as a good thing decrease (statistically) significantly when respondents have studied up to 19 years old compared to those studying further. Along the same line, the odds in favour of France or the United Kingdom being viewed as having benefited from EU membership decrease significantly when respondents have studied up to 19 years old compared to those studying further. In both French and British models, the education coefficient is a little stronger in models without “Don’t Know” or “Neither Good Nor Bad” in the dependent variable for both the benefit and the membership variable. It must be noted that the education coefficient tends to be stronger with the membership variable as the dependent variable than with the benefit variable as the dependent variable. The education variable, albeit showing a significant effect in both French and British models, is a little more important to explain current EU support in British models than French ones. These findings corroborate earlier research results (for instance Gabel, 1998a; Hix, 1999b and Carey, 2002). The market liberalization pertaining to the EU integration offers more opportunities for people with human capital.
Further EU Integration: European Integration Desired Speed Preference

For British samples, the education variable is a significant predictor of European integration desired speed in model M14 but the effect is not statistically significant in model M15 and model M17 – the direction of the education coefficient is though the same in M15 (direction albeit neutral in M17). This denotes that the more educated the respondents are, the faster they wish European integration to proceed but the effect is only statistically significant in model M14: therefore this relationship is only found true in model M14. For French samples, the education variable is a significant predictor of European integration desired speed (except model M17 but the direction of coefficient is the same). This denotes that the more educated the respondents are, the faster they wish European integration to go.

These findings for French samples and to a lesser extent for British samples mostly corroborate earlier research results (for example Hooghe and Marks, 2005 – albeit the same dependent variable was not used but included a measure of further European integration –). The present results for further European integration do not however support Brinegar and Jolly’s (2005) findings. The latter found that high skilled workers in low skill endowment countries (such as the United Kingdom), in residual welfare states (such as the United Kingdom) or in conservative welfare states (such as France although the latter has a more mixed political economy) are less supportive of further European integration than low skilled workers in the same. The present research outcomes indicate that further EU integration offers more opportunities for people with human capital but that this is less true in the British context. British respondents, especially those with high skills, show more ambivalence towards greater European integration as they fear that it can mean more tax and less labour market fluidity.

The pattern of significance of the education variable shows for both France and the United Kingdom (to a lesser extent for the latter for further integration) that $H_{II}$ is accepted. As a result, based on the education variable, there is a relationship between citizens’ support for integration (current EU membership and further integration) and citizens’ individual benefits extracted from European integration.
Evaluation of Current EU membership

EU Membership and Benefit Dependent Variables

*It must be pointed out that given the size of the sample for models with the seven category occupation variable (D15cat7VSr), smaller differences may not be able to be detected there.

British data

The occupation variable – professionals, students, or general or middle managers compared to other occupations – tends not to be a significant contributor to the explanation of EU membership or EU benefit. However, when comparing each occupation to retired respondents or respondents unable to work (D15cat7VSr), the coefficient for professionals and general managers becomes a significant predictor of evaluation of EU membership variable (with or without “neither good nor bad” answer) when compared to retired or unable to work respondents (D15cat7VSr): the odds in favour of United Kingdom EU membership being considered as a good thing increase significantly when the respondents are professionals or general managers compared to retired or unable to work respondents. Furthermore, the coefficient for professionals and general managers is not a significant predictor of evaluation of EU benefit variable (with or without “don’t know” answer) but the direction is the same as for models with EU membership variable: the odds in favour of United Kingdom being deemed as having benefited from EU membership increase statistically insignificantly for professionals and general managers compared to retired or unable to work respondents. This result is in line with the results of for example Gabel (1998a) and Gabel and Palmer (1995) – albeit the benefit variable is not used in the two earlier researches –. This seems to reflect the view that individuals with higher occupational status and more marketable occupational skills are more able to take advantage from an open European labour market. It must be noted that compared to retired or unable to work respondents
(D15cat7VSr), the coefficient for students and to a lesser extent mid-managers is not a significant predictor of EU membership or EU benefit, and the direction of this coefficient tends to be negative (odds decreasing statistically insignificantly though) or neutral. The fact that the coefficients for unemployed individuals and manual workers are not statistically significant (and often in neutral or opposite direction), contradicts Gabel's (1998a) and Gabel and Palmer's (1995) results.

French data

The occupation variable – professionals, students, or general or middle managers compared to other occupations – tends to be a significant contributor to the explanation of EU membership or EU benefit in French models. This result is in line with the results of, for example, Gabel (1998a) and Gabel and Palmer (1995) – albeit the benefit variable is not used in the two earlier researches. This seems to reflect the view that individuals with higher occupational status and more marketable occupational skills are more able to take advantage from an open European labour market. When comparing each occupation to retired respondents or respondents unable to work (D15cat7VSr), although the coefficients for professionals/general managers, students and middle managers are often not significant predictors of evaluation of EU membership variable (with or without “neither good nor bad” answer) and of EU benefit variable (with or without “don’t know” answer), the direction of their coefficients suggests that the odds in favour of France EU membership being considered as a good thing or the odds in favour of France being considered as having benefited from EU membership tend to increase (though statistically insignificantly) when the respondents are professionals/general managers, students and middle managers when compared to retired or unable to work respondents.

The pattern of significance of the occupation variable shows for France and to a lesser extent the United Kingdom that H_{11} is accepted. As a result, based on the occupation variable, there is a relationship between citizens’ support for

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103 Given the size of the sample for models with 7 category occupation variable (D15cat7VSr), smaller differences may not be able to be detected here.
integration (current EU membership) and citizens’ individual benefits extracted from European integration.

Further EU Integration: European Integration Desired Speed Preference

For British samples, the professionals-general managers-middle managers-students versus other occupations variable is not significant and tends to show no direction. When comparing each occupation to the retired category, none of the coefficients for each occupation category is significant in the fuller models (model M14 and M15) – unemployed respondents are though significant predictors in model M17 (year 1992, 1993 and 1994) with unemployed interviewees more likely to desire a faster European integration – but the pattern of direction of the coefficients must be noted. Unemployed respondents, students, professionals/general managers, manual workers and clerks are statistically insignificantly more likely to desire a faster European integration than retired or unable to work interviewees. The coefficients for middle managers tend to have no direction.

For French samples, the professionals-general managers-middle managers-students versus other occupations variable is not significant and tends to indicate that professionals, general managers, middle managers and students are statistically insignificantly more likely to desire a faster European integration than other occupations. When comparing each occupation to the retired category, only the coefficient for unemployed interviewees tends to be (statistically) significant compared to retired or unable to work interviewees, and its direction denotes that unemployed respondents tend to be significantly more likely to desire a faster European integration than retired or unable to work respondents. The rest of the coefficients for other occupation categories are not significant. Students (moreover significant in model M17), professionals/general managers and manual workers are statistically insignificantly more likely to desire a faster European integration than retired or unable to work interviewees. The coefficients for middle managers and clerks tend to have a neutral direction.

The results obtained here contradict somewhat the results of for example Gabel (1998a) and Gabel and Palmer (1995) – although not the same dependent variable was used in these studies. Only unemployed French respondents are significantly
more likely to favour a faster European integration but the direction of this coefficient is opposed to the one found by Gabel (1998a) and Gabel and Palmer (1995). It is plausible that this is linked to the relatively enduring poor work prospects and relatively low salaries in France, with unemployed respondents thinking that further EU integration may have a beneficial effect on employment.

The pattern of significance of the occupation variable shows for the United Kingdom and to a lesser extent France that $H_1$ is rejected. As a result, based on the occupation variable, there is no relationship between citizens’ support for integration (further integration) and citizens’ individual benefits extracted from European integration.

Value Orientations (Post-Materialism/Materialism)

Due to restricted data availability, the value orientations variable is only tested with model 17 (period 1992 to 1994).

Evaluation of Current EU membership

EU Membership and Benefit Dependent Variables

The value orientations variable is a significant contributor to the explanation of the dependent variables, EU membership and EU benefit, and the coefficient for this variable – coefficient a little weaker for value orientations 2nd choice for French samples – has the same direction in both British and French models. The odds in favour of France/the United Kingdom EU membership being seen as a good thing or France/the United Kingdom being viewed having benefited from EU membership decrease significantly when the interviewees have materialist values compared to those with post-materialist values. It must be noted that for British samples, not considering “neither good nor bad” and “don’t know” answers in the dependent variable makes the value orientations coefficient a little stronger. For French samples, not considering “neither good nor bad” answer in the dependent variable makes the value orientations coefficient a little weaker.
Further EU Integration: European Integration Desired Speed Preference

For British and French samples, the value orientations variable tends to be a significant contributor to the explanation of European integration desired speed, and the relationship denotes that respondents with post materialist views are more likely to desire a faster European integration. Both results for current EU membership and for further EU integration confirm Inglehart's findings (1970b and 1977b) that post materialists show more EU support and contradict Gabel's (1998a) (the latter found that materialists are supportive of European integration), Janssen's (1991) and Anderson and Reichert's results (1996) (the last three authors found that post materialists have no or little effect on evaluation of EU membership). The results elicited can be explained by the fact that they apply to the period from 1992 to 1994, which is a period for the United Kingdom and to a lesser extent France, which is marked by economic and social difficulties sparked by a poor international economic environment and ERM problems\(^{104}\) and pursuit of economic (fiscal and monetary) austerity policy. In this difficult context, the support for current EU membership and further integration come from people who have a more affective bond with the EU rather than people who benefit individually from EU integration.

As discussed in the aggregate level data analysis, the socialisation effect is also more present in the first part of the 1990s but will become more eroded afterwards with the greater politicisation of the EU issue and the greater importance of national economic, social and societal assessments of how the EU is affecting nation states.

The pattern of significance of the value orientations variable shows for both France and the United Kingdom in the period 1992-1994 that \(H_0\) is accepted. As a result, based on the value orientations variable in the relevant period, there is a relationship between citizens' support for integration (current EU membership and further integration) and citizens' individual benefits extracted from European integration.

\(^{104}\) That is to say mismanagement of the British pound in the ERM (and its eventual exit from it) and widening of currency fluctuations margins for the French franc.
Intra-EU proximity

Evaluation of Current EU membership

EU Membership and Benefit Dependent Variables

For British models, the intra-EU proximity variable tends not to be a significant predictor of the dependent variable, EU membership or EU benefit, except in model M17 BDNBD where the odds in favour of the United Kingdom being viewed as having benefited from EU membership augment (statistically) significantly in non-EU bordering regions compared to EU bordering regions – in model M17 BDDKNBD, this variable is not far from significance zone (.076) and the coefficient has the same direction. In the British context, the intra-EU proximity variable tends not to work and therefore does not support Gabel’s (1998a) findings.

For French models, the intra-EU proximity variable tends to be a significant predictor of EU membership but not of EU benefit. For French models without “neither good nor bad” answer, the intra-EU proximity variable is a significant predictor of EU membership in model M14 and M17GD: the direction of the coefficient for this variable indicates there that the odds in favour of France EU membership being considered as a good thing augment significantly in non-EU bordering regions compared to EU bordering regions. Although the intra-EU proximity variable is not significant in model M15 GD, the direction is the same as in model M14 and M17 GD. For French models with “neither good nor bad” answer, the related variable is also significant in model M14 GDNGNB and just outside the significance zone in model 17 GDNGNB (.052), the direction of the intra-EU proximity coefficient is there the same as in model 14 and 17 GD. Finally in all EU benefit models with or without “don’t know”, the intra-EU proximity variable is not a significant predictor of the dependent variable, EU benefit.

In the French context, for general opinion about France EU membership, the intra-EU proximity variable does not work in the expected direction and contradicts therefore Gabel’s (1998a) findings. However looking more closely at the results, respondents in French wealthier economic areas such as Ile de France or agricultural areas such as Centre, Auvergne, Pays de Loire, Bourgogne, Limousin, Poitou-
Charentes are significantly more likely to answer that France EU membership is a good thing. These are not regions which are close to intra-EU borders but by their nature (key economic centre and agricultural centres) they take actively part in EU trade and as such judge EU membership a good thing although respondents in those regions may not be satisfied with the national economic, societal and social results arising from France EU membership. Yet, there are other economic centres such as Rhone-Alpes where this relationship is not captured. For the benefit variable, the intra-EU proximity variable does not work and therefore does not support Gabel’s (1998a) findings.

Further EU Integration: European Integration Desired Speed Preference

For British and French samples, the intra-EU proximity variable is not a significant predictor of European integration desired speed. Overall, these results do not support earlier research findings (for example Gabel, 1998a). The region categories (in Eurobarometer) may be too broad to capture intra-EU proximity utilitarian assessment.

The pattern of significance of the intra-EU proximity variable shows for both the United Kingdom and France that $H_1$ is rejected. As a result, based on the intra-EU proximity variable, there is no relationship between citizens’ support for integration (current EU membership and further integration) and citizens’ individual benefits extracted from European integration.

6.2.4 EU Knowledge, Political Ideology, Cognitive Mobilisation, Media Use, Age, Gender and EU Support

The related variables are control variables, which do not measure utilitarian assessments themselves (and therefore are not directly related to the hypothesis) but control for the effect of utilitarian variables and give further insight into the pattern of EU support. Table 6.4 summarizes the pattern of significance of EU knowledge, cognitive mobilisation, media use variables on the dependent variables, current EU membership (EU benefit and membership) and future EU integration (European
integration desired speed preference). If an effect is found to be significant, then the relevant variable is a unique contributor to the explanation of the dependent variable.

Table 6.4: Pattern of Significance of EU Knowledge, Cognitive Mobilisation, Media Use Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Knowledge, Cognitive Mobilisation, Media Watching Variables</th>
<th>Effect on Current EU Membership</th>
<th>Effect on Future EU Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EU Membership</td>
<td>EU Benefit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Knowledge</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive Mobilisation:</td>
<td>British Samples</td>
<td>British Samples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of political Discussion</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>French Samples</td>
<td>French Samples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Partly Significant</td>
<td>Not Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of Political Persuasion</td>
<td>British Samples</td>
<td>British Samples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not Significant</td>
<td>Not Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>French Samples</td>
<td>French Samples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Use - Newspaper Reading</td>
<td>British Samples</td>
<td>British Samples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Partly Significant</td>
<td>Partly Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>French Samples</td>
<td>French Samples</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Knowledge, Cognitive Mobilisation, Media Watching Variables</th>
<th>Effect on Current EU Membership</th>
<th>Effect on Future EU Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU Membership</strong></td>
<td><strong>EU Benefit</strong></td>
<td><strong>EU Desired Speed</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Ideology</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Localised Significance</td>
<td>British Sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>French Sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>British Sample</td>
<td>British Sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Sample</td>
<td>Significant with middle category</td>
<td>Significant with middle category</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Sample</td>
<td>Not Significant</td>
<td>French Sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significant with middle category</td>
<td>Significant with middle category</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EU Knowledge**

**Evaluation of Current EU membership**

**EU Membership and Benefit Dependent Variables**

The odds in favour of the United Kingdom or France EU membership being seen as a good thing increase significantly when respondents know the EU very or quite well compared to those who know the EU not very well or not at all. In the same way, the odds in favour of the United Kingdom or France being considered as having benefited from EU membership increase significantly when respondents know the EU very or quite well compared to those who know the EU not very well or not at all. In both French and British models, the EU Knowledge coefficient is a little stronger in models integrating “Don’t Know” or “Neither Good Nor Bad” in
the dependent variable for both the benefit and the membership variable. It must also be noted that the EU Knowledge coefficient is stronger in models with the benefit variable rather than models with the membership variable in both French and British models. However, in both French and British models, the EU knowledge variable is an important predictor of the outcome variable, benefit variable or membership variable. These results confirm earlier research results (for example Gabel, 1998a; Hix, 1999b). As French and to a lesser extent British citizens receive predominantly positive messages from political elites (mainstream political parties) concerning the current European Union, as Zaller (1992) predicted, political awareness determines variation in citizens’ attitudes towards the current European Union.

Further EU Integration: European Integration Desired Speed Preference

For British samples, the EU knowledge variable is overall not a significant predictor (except model M14) of European integration desired speed. Although the relationship is not significant (except M14) and therefore not proven, the direction of the EU knowledge variable indicates though that the less EU knowledge the respondents have, the slower they wish European integration to go. For French samples, the EU knowledge variable is a significant predictor of European integration desired speed. This means that the less EU knowledge the respondents have, the slower they wish European integration to go. These results confirm earlier research results (Gabel, 1998a; Hix, 1999b – albeit not the same dependent variable was used –). In the case of France, this can be explained by the fact that French citizens receive predominantly positive messages from political elites (mainstream political parties) concerning the further integration of the European Union,105 as Zaller (1992) predicted, political awareness determines variation in citizens’ attitudes towards the current European Union. In the case of the United Kingdom, the effect is found not to be significant as political elites (mainstream British political parties) are more divided on the issue of further integration, and as such British citizens do not only receive positive messages about the further integration of

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105 Although in the second part of the 1990s, the EU issue has become more politicised, especially at the 1997 Legislative elections and 1999 European elections (smaller EU Knowledge coefficients in M14 and M15 than in M17 (the latter covering the period from 1992 to 1994)) but the opposition to further integration tends to be in mainstream party factions or in non-mainstream political parties.
the European union. The result obtained for the United Kingdom is in line with Evans’ (1998b) research results. According to the EU knowledge quiz scores (Evans, 1998b), it is the case that people who want Britain to leave the EU are less informed than those who do not. Those who want Britain to stay in the EU but try to reduce the EU powers are more informed than those who either wish to increase the EU powers or those who wish to have full integration.

**Political Discussion Frequency**

**Evaluation of Current EU membership**

**EU Membership and Benefit Dependent Variables**

**British data**

For the UK EU membership models with or without “neither good nor bad” answer and the UK EU benefit models with or without “don’t know” answer, political discussion frequency is a significant predictor of EU membership or EU benefit evaluation. The odds in favour of the United Kingdom EU membership being judged as a good thing or of the United Kingdom being judged as having benefited from EU membership increase significantly when the respondents discuss political matters frequently or occasionally compared to those who never discuss political matters. It must be noted that frequently and occasionally coefficients are a little weaker in British EU benefit models. These results support earlier research findings by Inglehart et al. (1991), Janssen (1991) and Medrano’s and Gutierrez’s (2001), and refute Gabel’s (1998a) results. As cognitive mobilization (political discussion) increases, the European Union and the topic of integration become more familiar and less threatening and as a result, support for current EU membership increases.

**French Data**

For France EU membership models with “neither good nor bad” answer, political discussion frequency is a significant predictor of EU membership evaluation. The odds in favour of France EU membership being judged as a good thing increase
significantly when the respondents discuss political matters frequently or occasionally compared to those who never discuss political matters. However, for France EU membership models without “neither good nor bad” answer, political discussion frequency is no longer a significant predictor of EU membership evaluation but the direction of the coefficients – for both frequently and occasionally – is the same as for models with “neither good nor bad” answer. For France EU benefit models with or without “don’t know” answer, political discussion frequency is not a significant predictor of EU benefit evaluation. The odds in favour of France being considered as having benefited from EU membership increase statistically insignificantly when the respondents discuss political matters frequently compared to those who never discuss political matters. The direction of the coefficient for occasionally versus never is neutral. These results confirm only partly and weakly (as effect is only partly significant) early research results of Inglehart et al. (1991), Janssen (1991) and Medrano and Gutierrez (2001).

Further EU Integration: European Integration Desired Speed Preference

For British samples, the political discussion frequency variable is a significant contributor to the explanation of European integration desired speed, and the relationship conveys that the less respondents discuss political matters, the more they wish European integration to go slower. These findings support earlier research outcomes by Inglehart et al. (1991), Janssen (1991) and Medrano and Gutierrez (2001), and refute Gabel’s (1998a) results – albeit not the same dependent variables were used in these studies. As cognitive mobilization (political discussion) increases, the European Union and the topic of integration become more familiar and less threatening and as a result, support for further European integration increases.

For French samples, the political discussion frequency variable is not a significant predictor of European integration desired speed. The direction of the coefficient indicates, albeit statistically insignificantly, that the less interviewees discuss political matters, the slower (or the more) they wish European integration to go (or to standstill). These findings do not support (effect not statistically significant) earlier research outcomes by Inglehart et al. (1991), Janssen (1991) and Medrano...
and Gutierrez (2001) – albeit not the same dependent variables were used in these studies.

**Political Persuasion**

**Evaluation of Current EU membership**

**EU Membership and Benefit Dependent Variables**

**British data**

The political persuasion – convince friends, relative or fellow workers – variable is not a significant predictor of EU membership or EU benefit evaluation and the coefficient for this variable tends to have no direction. These findings do not support earlier research findings by Inglehart et al. (1991), Janssen (1991) and Medrano and Gutierrez (2001), or Gabel’s (1998a) results.

**French data**

The political persuasion variable is a significant predictor of EU membership with or without “neither good nor bad” answer or of EU benefit evaluation with or without “don’t know” answer. Nevertheless, the direction of the coefficients varies. For EU benefit with “don’t know” answer or EU membership with “neither good nor bad” answer models, the odds in favour of France EU membership being seen as a good thing or France being deemed as having benefited from EU membership increase significantly when the interviewees convince their friends, relative or fellow workers often, from time to time or rarely compared to those who never convince them. For EU benefit without “don’t know” answer or EU membership without “neither good nor bad” answer models, the odds in favour of France EU membership being seen as a good thing or France being deemed as having benefited from EU membership tend to increase significantly when the interviewees convince their friends, relative or fellow workers from time to time or rarely compared to those who often or never convince them. The results with “neither good nor bad” or “don’t know” answer in the dependent variable (that is to say GDNGNB and BDDKNBD models) support earlier research findings by Inglehart et al. (1991), Janssen (1991) and Medrano and
Gutierrez (2001), and refute Gabel’s (1998a) results. The results without “neither good nor bad” or “don’t know” answer in the dependent variable (that is to say GD and BDNBD models) do not support earlier research findings by Inglehart et al. (1991), Janssen (1991) and Medrano and Gutierrez (2001), but are in line with Gabel’s (1998a) results.

Further EU Integration: European Integration Desired Speed Preference

For British and French samples, the political persuasion variable is a significant predictor of European integration desired speed, and the relationship denotes that the less respondents convince friends, the more they wish European integration to go slower. These findings support earlier research findings by Inglehart et al. (1991), Janssen (1991) and Medrano and Gutierrez (2001), and refute Gabel’s (1998a) results – albeit not the same dependent variables were used in these studies. As cognitive mobilization (political persuasion) increases, the European Union and the topic of integration become more familiar and less threatening and as a result, support for integration increases.

Daily Papers Use

Evaluation of Current EU membership

EU Membership and Benefit Dependent Variables

British data

For British EU membership models with “neither good nor bad” answer, the daily papers use variable is a significant contributor to the explanation of EU membership evaluation: the odds in favour of the United Kingdom EU membership being considered as a good thing increase significantly when the respondents read the news everyday, several times a week, once or twice a week or less often compared to those who never read the news. For British EU membership models without “neither good nor bad”, daily papers use variable is no longer a significant contributor to the explanation of EU membership evaluation but the direction of the coefficients is the same as for models with “neither good nor bad”. For British EU
membership models without “neither good nor bad”, the coefficient for several times a week versus never is though significant, and suggests that the odds in favour of the United Kingdom EU membership being considered as a good thing increase significantly when the respondents read the news several times a week compared to those who never read the news.

When using a more specific measure of evaluation of EU membership, that is to say EU benefit with or without “don’t know” answer, the daily papers use variable is not a significant contributor to the explanation of the United Kingdom EU benefit evaluation but the direction of the coefficients tends to be the same as for the United Kingdom EU membership models: the odds in favour of the United Kingdom being seen as having benefited from EU membership increase statistically insignificantly when the respondents read the news everyday, several times a week, once or twice a week or less often compared to those who never read the news. It must be noted that for the United Kingdom EU benefit model without “don’t know” answer, the odds in favour of United Kingdom being seen as having benefited from EU membership increase significantly when the respondents read the news several times a week compared to those who never read the news.

These results show some significant effect of news reading on respondents’ attitudes towards EU membership (mainly for EU membership models) and as such bring some support to earlier research (Bartels, 1993; Dalton et al., 1998; Norris et al., 1999; Newton and Brynin, 2001; Norris, 2000; Brettschneider et al., 2003; De Vreese and Boomgaard, 2006 and Carey and Burton, 2004 – only the latter four articles deal specifically with the influence of the media on attitudes towards European integration –).

French data

For French EU membership with or without “neither good nor bad” answer or EU benefit with or without “don’t know” answer models, the daily papers use variable is not overall a significant contributor to the explanation of EU membership evaluation or EU benefit evaluation. The direction of the coefficients for EU membership with or without “neither good nor bad” answer tends to be neutral whereas the direction
of the coefficients for EU benefit with or without “don’t know” answer suggests that the odds in favour of France being seen as having benefited from EU membership increase statistically insignificantly when the respondents read the news several times a week compared to those who never read the news. These results show no significant effect of news reading on respondents’ attitudes towards EU membership and as such do not support earlier research (Bartels, 1993; Dalton et al., 1998; Norris et al., 1999; Newton and Brynin, 2001; Brettschneider et al., 2003; Norris, 2000 and De Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2006 – only the latter three articles deal specifically with the influence of the media on attitudes towards European integration –).

Further EU Integration: European Integration Desired Speed Preference

For British samples, the daily papers use variable is not a significant predictor of European integration desired speed but the direction of the coefficient for this variable denotes, albeit statistically insignificantly, that interviewees who never read the news are more likely to be in favour of a faster European integration than interviewees who read the news (even irregularly). This result, albeit showing no significant effect, brings some support to research by Anderson and Weymouth (1999) and Seymour-Ure (2002) who underlined the overwhelmingly eurosceptical nature of the British press. It must be added that the British national elites are divided on the European integration issue. The results obtained here also bring support to findings of Hooghe and Marks (2005) who demonstrated that the more national elites are divided on the EU issue, the more the citizens are cued to oppose European integration – the effect being particularly pronounced for citizens who see themselves as exclusively national. The result obtained here, albeit showing no significant effect, also brings some support to Carey and Burton’s (2004) findings. The present reversal of the coefficient direction compared to the results of the current EU membership variable above may be explained by the fact that the eurosceptic British press took a harder eurosceptic line on further integration topics such as the membership of the Euro than the more pro-European British press on supporting further integration like for example on the single currency in the study period. Citizens have partly taken cues from this but also from the

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106 Such as for example The Sun, The Daily Telegraph or The Times.
107 Such as for example The Independent.
national political parties which are more reserved and critical especially towards further European integration. For French samples, the daily papers use variable is also not a significant predictor of European integration desired speed but the direction of the coefficient for this variable reveals that the less respondents read the news, the more they wish European integration to go slower (or to standstill). This finding is in line with the fact that the French press (newspapers with high circulation) tends to be predominantly pro-integration.

Left-Centre-Right Placement

Evaluation of Current EU membership

EU Membership and Benefit Dependent Variables

The odds in favour of the United Kingdom or France membership of the EU being deemed as a good thing increase significantly when the respondents have left-wing ideological views compared to those with right-wing ideological views. However, while the odds in favour of France membership of the EU being judged as a good thing increase significantly when the respondents have centrist ideological views compared to those with right-wing ideological views, the same coefficient is not statistically significant in British models and therefore the relationship is found not true in the latter – the direction of the related coefficient is though in the same direction as in French models. This may be explained by the fact that Centre parties in the UK are not as pro-integration as in France. One must also keep in mind that in the study period, Labour political elites have moved to the centre of the ideological spectrum, Conservative political elites moved further to the right and Liberal political elites to the left (Liberals appearing as the most pro-integration of the British mainstream political parties). Voters have partly taken cues from their political parties but the reverse is also true.

The odds in favour of the United Kingdom or France being regarded as having benefited from EU membership increase significantly when the respondents have left-wing ideological views compared to those with right-wing ideological views. While the odds in favour of France being regarded as having benefited from EU
membership increase significantly when the respondents have centrist ideological views compared to those with right-wing ideological views, the same is not true for British models (coefficient is not statistically significant) – the direction of the related coefficient is though in the same direction as in French models. This may be explained by the fact that Centre parties in the UK are not as pro-integration as in France. One must also keep in mind that in the study period, Labour political elites have moved to the centre of the ideological spectrum, Conservative political elites moved further to the right and liberal political elites to the left (Liberals appearing as the most pro-integration of the British mainstream political parties). Voters have partly taken cues from their political parties but the reverse is also true.

In line with Ray’s (2003b), Steenbergen et al.’s (2007), Gabel and Scheve’s (2007) and Kriesi’s (2007) findings, the relatively high party saliency of the EU issue, greater inter-party dissent (in mainstream parties) and relatively high intra-party dissent\(^\text{108}\) have accentuated the rather eurosceptic influence of political parties and party elites on their supporters in the United Kingdom. In line with Steenbergen et al.’s (2007), Ray’s (2003b) and Kriesi’s (2007) research results, whilst the limited intra-party dissent and the fairly high party saliency of the EU issue\(^\text{109}\) have increased the rather pro-integration influence of political parties on party supporters, the more limited inter-party competition on European integration (competition on the EU issue tending to come from the political periphery) have moderated this influence in France. In agreement with Carruba’s (2001) and Steenbergen et al.’s (2007) research outcomes, the relative pro-integration nature of the French electorate has also influenced French mainstream parties to be pro-integration. Equally, the relative anti-integration nature of the British electorate has influenced British mainstream parties to be more reserved towards European integration. Nevertheless, consistent with Evans and Butt’s (2007) and Steenbergen et al.’s (2007) research, it seems also feasible that with the increased visibility and impact of European integration on a citizen’s life in the study period, the mass-elite linkage has declined over time as voters have a greater understanding of the consequences of EU policy on domestic policy and environment. This may be especially true in the French

\(^{108}\) High intra-party dissent especially in the Conservative Party up to 1997 but also in the Labour Party where some senior politicians in these parties have voiced a discerning tone on European integration with the party leadership.

\(^{109}\) Albeit the EU issue is not used as a party differentiator in French mainstream politics.
context as despite the pro-European nature of French mainstream parties and media, there has been a significant drop in French citizens' support for current EU membership and further integration.

It must be noted that the ideological placement coefficient is stronger for models with the membership variable as the dependent variable than for models with the benefit variable as the dependent variable: this is only true for French models. These results confirm the influence of ideology on evaluation of European integration (see Nelsen et al., 2001; Hix, 1999b; Ray, 2003a, b).

Further EU Integration: European Integration Desired Speed Preference

For British and French samples, the left, centre and right ideological variable is a significant predictor of European integration desired speed and the relationship conveys that the more the respondents have right-wing ideological opinions, the slower they wish European integration to go. These results confirm the influence of ideology on evaluation of European integration (see Nelsen et al., 2001; Ray, 2003a, b; Hix, 1999b).

Age

Younger people have usually more human capital (better educated) and as such should be better placed to seize opportunities pertaining to European market liberalisation.

Evaluation of Current EU membership

EU Membership and Benefit Dependent Variables

EU Membership Dependent variable

For EU membership models with “neither good nor bad” answer, the 15-24 and 25-39 (each versus 40+) variables tend not to be a significant predictor of the outcome variable, EU membership in both French and British models. The direction for the former is though different in British versus French samples: the odds in favour of the United Kingdom EU membership being regarded as a good thing decrease
statistically insignificantly when the respondents are aged 15-24 compared to those aged 40+ whereas the odds in favour of France EU membership being regarded as a good thing rise statistically insignificantly when the respondents are aged 15-24 compared to those aged 40+. The direction for the latter (25-39) is the same in both British and French samples: the odds in favour of the United Kingdom or France EU membership being regarded as a good thing increase statistically insignificantly when the respondents are aged 25-39 compared to those aged 40+.

For EU membership models without “neither good nor bad” answer, the 15-24 (versus 40+) variable tends to be a significant predictor of the outcome variable, EU membership in both French and British models. The direction for the 15-24 variable is also the same in British versus French samples: the odds in favour of the United Kingdom or France EU membership being regarded as a good thing increase significantly when the respondents are aged 15-24 compared to those aged 40+. Furthermore while the 25-39 (versus 40+) variable tends to be a significant predictor of the outcome variable, EU membership in British models, it tends not to be a significant predictor of EU membership in French models. Nonetheless, in both British and French models, the related variable has the same direction, that is to say, the odds in favour of the United Kingdom or France EU membership being regarded as a good thing increase statistically significantly (UK samples) or statistically insignificantly (France samples) when the respondents are aged 25-39 compared to those aged 40+.

**EU Benefit Dependent variable**

For EU benefit models with “don’t know” answer, the 15-24 (versus 40+) variable tends to be a significant predictor of the outcome variable, EU benefit in French models whereas it is not a significant predictor in British samples. The direction for the related variable is also different in British versus French samples: the odds in favour of France being seen as having benefited from EU membership increase significantly when the respondents are aged 15-24 compared to those aged 40+ whereas the odds in favour of the United Kingdom being regarded as having benefited from EU membership being regarded as a good thing decrease statistically insignificantly when the respondents are aged 15-24 compared to those aged 40+. 
For EU benefit models with “don’t know” answer, the 25-39 (versus 40+) variable tends not to be a significant predictor of the outcome variable, EU benefit in both British and French models but the coefficients for this variable have a different direction: while the direction is neutral for British samples, the odds in favour of France being seen as having benefited from EU membership increase statistically insignificantly when the respondents are aged 25-39 compared to those aged 40+.

For EU benefit models without “don’t know” answer, the 15-24 and 25-39 (versus 40+) variables tend to be significant predictors of the outcome variable, EU benefit in French models but the coefficients for these variables are not significant predictors in British models. They also have a different direction: while the direction is neutral for British samples, the odds in favour of France being seen as having benefited from EU membership increase statistically significantly when the respondents are aged 15-24 or 25-39 compared to those aged 40+.

The results obtained in this study in the context of British samples show overall limited significant effect for age on current EU membership (only for EU membership and not EU benefit) and thus somewhat contradict Hix’s (1999b) and Inglehart and Rabier’s (1978) results but are in line with Janssen’s (1991), Anderson and Reichert’s (1996), and Gabel’s (1998a) findings. The findings in this study for French samples tend to show more strongly that age influences current EU membership and therefore support Hix’s (1999b) and Inglehart and Rabier’s (1978) results. Overall, younger British respondents (15-24) seem more reserved (especially with integration of “neither good nor bad” and “don’t know” answers) towards current EU membership than younger French respondents who tend to be more in favour of current EU membership (both compared to older respondents).

Younger British respondents are more reserved towards European integration than older respondents because this generation has been shaped by free market and nationhood values fostered by the successive Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s (values also largely adopted by the successive Blair governments) with the EU being mainly portrayed by British political actors as threatening those very values. The British media and to a lesser extent institutions such as the education system – for the latter with the cult of imperial history (up to the second world war) rather than contemporary history – have reinforced this. In the French context, the reverse is true with most mainstream French political actors, media and
national institutions (including the education system) underlining the positive influence of the EU on French society, including the preservation of peace in Europe.

Further EU Integration: European Integration Desired Speed Preference

For British and French samples, the age variable is a significant predictor of European integration desired speed. The direction of the coefficient for this variable indicates that the older the respondents are, the slower they wish European integration to go. It must be underlined that the age coefficients are stronger in British models than in French models. “Don’t know” answers could not though be incorporated in the dependent variable and represent less than 10% of answers. These results are in line with Hix’s (1999b) and Inglehart and Rabier’s (1978) findings – albeit not the same dependent variable was used in these studies. These results may be explained by the fact that younger people have usually more human capital, are more cosmopolitan and more open to further European integration. The result for British young people and the relative contrast of the result with measurement of current EU integration, may be partly explained by the fact that the question on desired speed of European integration with a rating scale from “standstill” to “runs as fast as possible” is subjective and more likely to elicit opinions on the plus side of EU integration. Furthermore British young respondents may not also be against the principle itself of further European integration (this fits with the cosmopolitan argument) but may be uncertain or against the type of European integration they currently witness.

Gender

Evaluation of Current EU membership

EU Membership and Benefit Dependent Variables

For British samples with “neither good nor bad” answer, the odds in favour of the United Kingdom EU membership being judged a good thing increase significantly when the respondents are male rather than female. The same is not true (related variable is not a significant predictor) with British models without “neither good nor
bad” answer. In opposition to British samples, the gender variable is not a significant predictor of EU membership variable in French samples with “neither good nor bad” answer (or moreover without “neither good nor bad” answer) but the coefficient for the related variable has though the same direction as in British samples. Furthermore, in both British and French samples with “don’t know” answer, the odds in favour of the United Kingdom or France being judged as having benefited from EU membership rise significantly when the respondents are male rather than female. The same is not true (related variable is not a significant predictor) with British or French models without “don’t know” answer.

In the case of the United Kingdom, this seems to demonstrate that female respondents are more uncertain or in opposition to current EU membership – using either EU membership or EU benefit as a dependent variable – than male respondents. This is only true for EU benefit dependent variable (which gives a more specific evaluation of EU membership) for French samples. The results obtained here confirm overall earlier research results (see for example Nelsen and Guth, 2000; Carey, 2002). This may be because women tend to be less interested in foreign policy, have more compassionate and less competitive values, and are more economically vulnerable to economic integration. Thus women in the United Kingdom and to a lesser extent in France – more women work in the United Kingdom than in France (Eurostat, 2006b) – may view the current EU as bringing more competition in the job market and a downward pressure on salaries.

Further EU Integration: European Integration Desired Speed Preference

For British samples, the gender variable is not a significant contributor to the explanation of European integration desired speed. For French samples, the gender variable is also not a significant predictor of European integration desired speed (though just outside the significance zone (.050) in model M14). The gender gap tends to disappear with measurement of further EU integration, these results therefore contradict Nelsen and Guth’s (2000) results but the latter did not use the same dependent variable – they used an indexed dependent variable.
6.3 Conclusion

In both France and the United Kingdom, in the study period (1992-2001), the level of support for current EU membership and further European integration has dropped significantly. The drop in support for current EU membership and future EU integration is though lower in France than in the United Kingdom – for both individual and aggregate level data analyses. A relationship has been found between citizens' support for integration and citizens' individual benefits extracted from European integration in both the French and British context. Through the study period, the utilitarian aspect in the evaluation of current EU membership and further European integration has taken more and more importance. In other words, French and British individuals in their attitudes towards current EU membership and further European integration rely more and more on utilitarian appraisals. Echoing the results of hypothesis I, the influence of the socialisation effect on attitudes towards the EU is declining in favour of utilitarian appraisals in the study period.

Individuals who have higher incomes, better education and higher (more marketable) occupational skills support more the current EU membership in the French and British context – the effect is though weaker in the latter – as these individuals are better placed to take advantage of the opportunities arising from the current EU membership. The same is true for further European integration for France, individuals who have higher incomes, better education and to a lesser extent higher occupational skills tend to be in favour of faster European integration as they perceive they can benefit from it in terms of investment, business and employment opportunities. The same is not true for further European integration for the United Kingdom, British individuals with the same socio-economic characteristics appear more uncertain of or in opposition to further European integration: thus individuals with higher incomes favour a slower European integration; occupational skills show no significant effect on attitudes towards further European integration and education shows a smaller and more limited effect on attitudes towards further European integration.

Demographic control variables bring further insight on the pattern of support towards current EU membership and further European integration. The study of demographic variables show that British individuals tend to be more reserved
towards current EU membership and further integration than French respondents. In the British context, the greater division (and a greater politicisation of the EU issue) of political parties, national elites and media on European integration, the importance of exclusive national identity and national sovereignty, the preference for free market economies and individual responsibility values, and the more favourable economic and social situation of the United Kingdom explain this relative opposition to especially further European integration. In the French context, a political and media environment more in favour of current EU membership and further European integration, a relatively low exclusive national identity, a socialisation effect still playing a role (especially in further integration) – albeit now declining in favour of individual utilitarian appraisals –, and the relatively poor national economic and social situation of France with its inherent consequences for individuals – although as per results of hypothesis I, European integration (and the type of European integration pursued) is partly perceived to contribute to it – explain this relative support for current EU membership and further European integration.

Nevertheless in both the British and French context, support for current EU membership can be mobilised when British and French respondents have better or the same expectations for the country’s economic situation for the year to come, have better expectations about the employment situation for the year to come and have better expectations for their household financial situation for the year to come. Support for further European integration can also be mobilised when British and French respondents have better expectations for the country’s economic situation for the year to come, have better expectations about the employment situation for the year to come and have better expectations for their household financial situation for the year to come. It must be noted that the coefficients for the related variables are a little weaker in British models than in French models, as such support for current EU membership and future European integration can be mobilised when British individuals have more positive expectations but to a lesser extent than France.

Whilst the results of hypotheses I and II have demonstrated that the utilitarian argument can certainly be a vector of support for current EU membership and future

\[110\] Although there has been a greater politicisation of the EU issue especially in the second part of the 1990s but political opposition to the EU tends to come from political periphery.
European integration in both the French and British context – more so in the former –, this vector of support is ultimately delimited by the subsidiarity principle and the type of EU favoured by French and British individuals as confirmed by the results of hypothesis III. For the former, it is delimited by a preference for a widely integrated EU according to a regulated capitalism model with a high level of social protection and where the principle of European preference is espoused, and for the latter by a penchant for an EU to be a loose intergovernmental association of nations where neo-liberalism and free trade rules prevail. This will be discussed in the next chapter.
7- ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS FOR HYPOTHESIS III

7.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the relationship between citizens' inclinations towards a socio-economic model and citizens' preferences towards European integration (Hypothesis III) is tested. The analysis of findings and conclusions for hypothesis III are hence presented below.

7.2 Analysis of Findings for Hypothesis III

Research Question III: Do inclinations towards a socio-economic model structure EU policy preferences of French and British citizens?

It is hypothesized:

$H_{III}$ While a preference for 'regulated capitalism' is associated with support for EU integration in France, a preference for a 'neo-liberal' socio-economic model is associated with opposition to EU integration in the United Kingdom.

The answers to the following question were used to test hypothesis III: “For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (nationality) government, or made jointly within the European Union?” This question is asked for the following policy areas: regional policy, social inclusion, employment (fight against unemployment), environment, scientific research, currency, humanitarian aid, foreign policy, immigration and asylum, police, anti-drug, urban and juvenile crime prevention, agriculture, defence, culture, health policy and education. In Eurobarometer data, note that there are no social inclusion questions from 1992 to 1997, no regional policy and agriculture questions from 1992 to 1994, no anti-drug question in 1992, no police and urban & juvenile crime prevention questions from 1992 to 1998. The virtue of the related question is that it provides a more fine-grained measure of preferences for individual policies: in other words it taps policy specific, utilitarian support. The question is also available across years. The
question does not always give a direction for the policy itself but certain policies are rooted in political ideology – for example market regulation and redistributive policies – especially when tested with left-wing, centrist and right-wing ideological views of respondents. The analysis aimed to broadly and primarily examine whether French and British individuals with left-wing or centrist or right-wing ideological views (including extreme left and right) are in favour or not to transfer policies to the EU as a consequence of a preference for a particular socio-economic model: as such individuals with extreme left- and right-wing ideological opinions have been preserved and integrated with those with left- and right-wing views in the analysis. This approach is also justified by statistical reasons. More balanced sample sizes are obtained which enable us to detect differences if they exist (thereby avoiding Type II errors). Furthermore, the means of individuals interviewed with extreme left- or right-wing ideological views are also examined and compared to those with left- or right-wing ideological views to see whether they are in favour or not of the transfer of policies to the EU. The power of the test\textsuperscript{111} in this situation may not be sufficient – due to very unequal sample sizes – to detect though whether the difference is statistically significant. The statistical difference between individuals interviewed with extreme left- or right-wing and left- or right-wing ideological opinions on the transfer of policies to the EU tends though to be generally small which limits the importance of a statistical difference if it arises.

Note that for the testing with left, centre and right, the ideology variable with the harmonised categories\textsuperscript{112} was used. For the testing with individual extreme ideological categories, the ideology variable with 10 categories (from 1 (left) to 10 (right))\textsuperscript{113} was used.

“Don’t know” answers were not included in the testing as they always represent fewer than 9% of all answers and often much less than that. Integrating “don’t know” answers in the testing would have also obscured the interpretation of the national means, in other words whether citizens were or were not in favour of a transfer of a policy to the EU. Furthermore, integrating “don’t know” answers in the

\textsuperscript{111} The power of the test needs to be at least 70% to be acceptable and 80% to be good.

\textsuperscript{112} Respondents are grouped in tertiles of the approximately one third placing themselves most left, the approximately one third most right, and the centre, for each country.

\textsuperscript{113} Categories were regrouped as follows, 1 to 2 (classified as extreme left), 3 to 4 (left), 5 to 6 (centre), 7 to 8 (right) and 9 to 10 (extreme right).
testing does not alter the essence of the results. ANOVAs were used rather than MANOVAs to test hypothesis III as correlation between DVs varies from ~.2 to ~.6 (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). To control for familywise Type I error across multiple ANOVA tests, a Bonferroni adjustment was used for the main effect (Pallant, 2001). All outputs are free of fixed effects as the standardized residuals tend towards zero. Yearly analyses have been also run and very similar results were obtained. For post hoc analyses, Tukey test and Games-Howell (the latter where necessary) outcomes are reported here. Other post hoc tests such as Bonferroni, Gabriel and Hochberg were also run and similar results were found. Statistical outputs are incorporated in the appendices numbered 7.1 AB UK-F to 7.17 AB’ UK-F. Note that models incorporating individual extreme ideologies are marked with a prime. An example of statistical output relating to Currency Management Policy (1992-2001) is shown below (for full output details for the latter, please refer to Appendix 7.6 AB UK-F and 7.6 AB’ UK-F).

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<tr>
<td>Harmonised 3 cat</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>LEFT</td>
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<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right</td>
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### Descriptive Statistics

Dependent Variable: recod of q30a3 currency (Nat govt or EU decision) without DK as middle category

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<tr>
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### Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances

Dependent Variable: recod of q30a3 currency (Nat govt or EU decision) without DK as middle category

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<th>F</th>
<th>df1</th>
<th>df2</th>
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<td>18243</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
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Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups.

a. Design: Intercept+frauk+d1.4aa+frauk * d1.4aa
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<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Partial Eta Squared</th>
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<th>Observed Power^a</th>
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^a. Computed using alpha = .05

b. R Squared = .150 (Adjusted R Squared = .150)
Estimated Marginal Means of recod of q30a3 currency (Nat govt or EU decision) without DK as middle category

France and UK variable
- France
- UK

D1 LEFT-RIGHT PLACEMENT - Harmonised 3 cat
### Between-Subjects Factors

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Dependent Variable: recod of q30a3 currency (Nat govt or EU decision) without DK as middle category

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### Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variance

Dependent Variable: recod of q30a3 currency (Nat govt or EU decision) without DK as middle category

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Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups.

a. Design: Intercept+ideologyfrauk
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

**Dependent Variable:** recod of q30a3 currency (Nat govt or EU decision) without DK as middle category

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^a. Computed using alpha = .05

^b. R Squared = .150 (Adjusted R Squared = .150)

**Robust Tests of Equality of Means**

recod of q30a3 currency (Nat govt or EU decision) without DK as middle category

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^a. Asymptotically F distributed.
## Multiple Comparisons

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Based on observed means.
* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
7.2.1 Socio-Economic Policies

Regional policy, social inclusion, employment, environment and scientific research are policies that flank the single European market, and can help to distinguish regulated capitalism from neo-liberal capitalism. Health and education, albeit being under-developed at the EU level, are also policies that can reflect socio-economic priorities and as such can help to distinguish regulated capitalism from neo-liberal capitalism. The management of the currency through the setting of interest rates, its influence on public expenditure and on the valuation of the currency can also reflect socio-economic priorities and is also useful to distinguish regulated capitalism from neo-liberal capitalism. In the context of the EU, agriculture through its redistributive nature and protection of farmers can also have social virtues and can distinguish regulated capitalism from neo-liberal capitalism. It must be, moreover, noted that agriculture is one of the oldest and fully fledged EU policies and one which has been the focus of acute European political debates, more especially between French and British politicians. Finally, the humanitarian aid policy and cultural policy, despite being underdeveloped at the European level, are policies which can take a social nature and be influenced by a preference for a socio-economic model and as such can help to distinguish regulated capitalism from neo-liberal capitalism. In Eurobarometer data, note that there are no social inclusion questions from 1992 to 1997 and no regional policy and agriculture questions from 1992 to 1994.

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not significant between Centre, left and right and all in favour of EU transfer (including respondents with extreme left- or right-wing ideological opinions).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>British Sample</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

114 The management of the currency moreover became effectively an EU policy for a number of countries (including France) in the end of the 1990s.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policies</th>
<th>Pattern of Significance and Direction</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policies</td>
<td>Significant between left-centre and right but all favour EU transfer (except extreme right (1.45)). Right though marginally in favour (mean of 1.51) of EU transfer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British and French Samples</td>
<td>Significant except between British left and French right or centre. French overall significantly more in favour of EU transfer than the British.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Policy</td>
<td>French Sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not significant between Centre, left and right and all in favour of EU transfer (including respondents with extreme left-wing opinions). Respondents with extreme right opinions are borderline (1.5032).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Sample</td>
<td>Significant between left and right or centre, and between centre and left or right. All in favour of EU transfer but left and centre significantly more in favour of EU transfer than right (including extreme right and left, the latter though relatively borderline (1.5337)).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British and French Samples</td>
<td>Significant between British left and French left, right or centre, between British centre and French right or centre. British left and centre tend to be significantly more in favour of EU transfer than French respondents but both French and British respondents whatever their ideological views favour EU transfer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Policy</td>
<td>French Sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not significant between Centre, left and right and all in favour of EU transfer (including respondents with extreme left-wing opinions (1.59) but except respondents with extreme right-wing opinions (1.48) who are opposed to EU transfer).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Sample</td>
<td>Significant between left and right or centre, and between centre and left or right. All not in favour of EU transfer (including extreme right (1.29) and left (1.48)) but left (1.47) significantly less opposed to EU transfer than centre.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policies</td>
<td>Pattern of Significance and Direction</td>
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<td></td>
<td>or right.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>British and French Samples</strong></td>
<td>Significant between French respondents of all political opinions and British respondents of all political opinions. French significantly more in favour of EU transfer than British.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environment Policy</strong></td>
<td><strong>French Sample</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not significant between Centre, left and right and all in favour of EU transfer (including respondents with extreme left- and right-wing opinions).</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>British Sample</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significant between left and right or centre. All in favour of EU transfer but left significantly more in favour of EU transfer than right or centre (including extreme right and left, former though relatively borderline (1.5257)).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>British and French Samples</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significant between French respondents of all political opinions and British respondents of all political opinions. French significantly more in favour of EU transfer than British.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scientific Research</strong></td>
<td><strong>French Sample</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not significant between Centre, left and right and all in favour of EU transfer (including respondents with extreme left- and right-wing opinions).</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>British Sample</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significant between left and right or centre. All in favour of EU transfer but left significantly more in favour of EU transfer than right or centre (including extreme right and left).</td>
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<td><strong>British and French Samples</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significant between French respondents of all political opinions and British respondents of all political opinions. French significantly more in favour of EU transfer than British.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Currency Management Policy</strong></td>
<td><strong>French Sample</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Policies</td>
<td>Pattern of Significance and Direction</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not significant between Centre and left, and between left and right but significant between centre and right but all in favour of EU transfer (including extreme left- and right-wing opinions).</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>British Sample</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significant between left and centre and right. All (including extreme right and left) are opposed to EU transfer but left significantly less opposed to EU transfer than right or centre.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>British and French Samples</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significant between French respondents of all political opinions and British respondents of all political opinions. French significantly more likely to favour EU transfer than British.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Policy</td>
<td><strong>French Sample</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not significant between left, centre and right, and all opposed to EU transfer (including extreme left- and right-wing opinions).</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>British Sample</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significant between left and centre and right but all (including extreme right and left) are opposed to EU transfer (difference is though small) but left significantly less opposed to EU transfer than right or centre.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>British and French Samples</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significant between French respondents of all political opinions and British respondents of left-wing political opinions. British left significantly less likely to oppose EU transfer than French of all political views.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Policy</td>
<td><strong>French Sample</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not significant between left, centre and right, and all opposed to EU transfer (including extreme left- and right-wing opinions).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>British Sample</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significant between left and centre and right but all (including extreme right and left) are opposed to EU transfer (difference is though small) but right or even centre.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Pattern of Significance and Direction</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Agriculture Policy</strong></td>
<td><strong>French Sample</strong>&lt;br&gt;Not significant between left, centre and right, and all in favour of EU transfer (right though more marginally, 1.54) (including extreme left but excluding extreme right latter marginally opposed to EU transfer, mean of 1.4754).&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;<strong>British Sample</strong>&lt;br&gt;Significant between left and centre and right but all (including extreme right but excluding extreme left, the latter marginally in favour of EU transfer (1.5165) but no significant difference with left) are opposed to EU transfer but right or even centre significantly more opposed to EU transfer than left (the latter opposed to EU transfer more marginally, 1.49).&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;<strong>British and French Samples</strong>&lt;br&gt;Significant between French respondents of all political opinions and British respondents of all political opinions. French significantly more likely to support EU transfer than British of all political views.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Policies Pattern of Significance and Direction

opinions and British respondents of all political opinions. French significantly more likely to support EU transfer than British of all political views.

Cultural Policy

**French Sample**

Not significant between Centre and left, and between left and right, and marginally significant between centre and right (size of difference is very small): all clearly against EU transfer (including respondents with extreme left- and extreme right-wing ideological opinions).

**British Sample**

Significant between left-centre and right (but size of difference is small) but all clearly opposed to EU transfer (including extreme left and extreme right).

**British and French Samples**

Significant between French respondents of all political opinions and British respondents of right-wing political opinions. Significant between French respondents of centrist political opinions and British respondents of centrist political opinions. Not significant otherwise. French of all political opinions significantly less opposed to EU transfer than British of right-wing political views, and French of centrist political opinions significantly less opposed to EU transfer than British of centrist political opinions.

7.2.1.1 Social Inclusion (1998-2001)

The term “social inclusion” is a francophone term which appeared in the Mitterrand era: its exact meaning, especially in English, may be consequently open to interpretation and give rise to two different understandings of the term. The results obtained here must be therefore taken with caution. Taking into account the ideology of the respondent, French respondents are overall significantly more in favour of transferring the social inclusion policy to the EU than British respondents but the size of the difference tends to be small. All means are above 1.50 and as such all British and French respondents whatever their ideological views (except British citizens with extreme right-wing political views) are in favour of transferring
the social inclusion policy to the EU. The mean for British individuals with right-wing ideological views, namely 1.51, is though borderline.

When examining where the differences occur (see output in appendix 7.1A), there are no significant differences between French respondents with left-wing, centrist and right-wing ideological views on Europeanizing the social inclusion policy: they are all clearly in favour of the Europeanization of the social inclusion policy. There are though significant differences between British respondents with left-wing or centrist ideological views and those with right-wing ideological views on Europeanizing the social inclusion policy: British citizens with right-wing ideological opinions are less likely to favour the Europeanization of social inclusion policy than those with left-wing or centrist ideological opinions but as pointed out above the former are marginally in favour of transferring the social inclusion policy to the EU. British respondents with left-wing and even centrist ideological views are a little more inclined to favour a Europeanization of the social inclusion policy, probably because the EU is perceived as a way to elicit greater social rights but this may be partly losing substance at the end of the 1990s as the Labour government demonstrated more commitment to social public expenditure. It must be noted that there is no significant difference between French interviewees with right-wing ideological opinions – or even with centrist ideological views (Games-Howell test gives the same result as Tukey test) – and British respondents with left-wing ideological opinions on the opportunity to transfer the social inclusion policy to the EU. British respondents with right-wing ideological positions remain the most reluctant to transfer the social inclusion policy to the EU. The results for French respondents may be explained by the fact that although they are critical of the current EU deemed to neglect social aspects, they want the EU to adopt a generous European social policy as a key priority.\textsuperscript{115} In other words they wish to see the establishment of a social Europe. The functionality argument at the European level plays here a role in this as in an integrated Europe, the EU may be considered by French respondents as best placed to harmonize the level of social protection – at a high level – in EU countries and enable European firms to compete on an equal playing field within Europe. Although British respondents with left-wing or centrist

\textsuperscript{115} As substantiated by polls in the study period, see background chapter (chapter four) on France.
political opinions are more inclined to the EU transfer of social inclusion policy with a view to acquiring greater social rights, they are also attached to the relatively high level of employment and social mobility that they have in the British context. As such in line with the political discourse of the leaderships of Labour and Liberal Democrat political parties, they are against the elaboration of a too extensive European social policy which would damage the relatively healthy British economic and social situation.

It must be noted that French interviewees with extreme left- (1.68) and extreme right-wing (1.57) ideological opinions are also in favour of the transfer of the social inclusion policy to the EU. There is no significant difference between French interviewees with extreme left- and left-wing ideological views and between French interviewees with extreme right- and right-wing ideological views. However, the weak power of the test (46.9%) – due to very unbalanced sample sizes – does not though permit it to detect a difference between French interviewees with right- and extreme right-wing ideological opinions, and it is therefore likely that the difference is significant but in any case small.

It must be noted that British interviewees with extreme left-wing (1.60) ideological opinions are also in favour of the transfer of the social inclusion policy to the EU. There is no significant difference between British interviewees with extreme left- and left-wing ideological views on the transfer of the social inclusion policy to the EU. British interviewees with extreme right-wing (1.45) ideological opinions are not in favour of the transfer of the social inclusion policy to the EU but there is no significant difference between British interviewees with extreme right- and right-wing ideological views on this. However, the weak power of the test (40.4%) – due to very unbalanced sample sizes – does not though permit it to detect a difference between British interviewees with right- and extreme right-wing ideological opinions, and it is therefore likely that the difference may be significant but in any case small.
7.2.1.2 Regional Policy (1995-2001)

Taking into account the ideology of the respondent, British interviewees – especially those with left-wing and centrist political opinions – are overall significantly more in favour of transferring the regional policy to the EU than French respondents but the size of the difference is though small. All means are well above 1.50 (approaching or above 1.60) and as such all British and French respondents whatever their ideological views are in favour of transferring the regional policy to the EU. This may be explained by the fact that respondents perceive that transferring the regional policy at the European level can bring positive externalities or economies of scale – including the facilitation of trade – but also perhaps by the relative lower perceived importance of regional policy compared to for example social policy or employment policy for individuals.

When examining where the differences occur (see output in appendix 7.2A), there are no significant differences between French respondents with left-wing, centrist and right-wing ideological views on Europeanizing the regional policy: they are all clearly in favour of the Europeanization of the regional policy. There are though significant differences between British respondents with left-wing ideological views and those with right-wing or centrist ideological views on Europeanizing the regional policy: British citizens with right-wing ideological opinions are less likely to favour the Europeanization of the regional policy than those with left-wing but also centrist ideological opinions. Nevertheless as pointed out above the former are clearly in favour of transferring the regional policy to the EU. It is likely that British individuals with left-wing and centrist political views think that transferring the regional policy to the EU may contribute to an increase in the public expenditure in this area.

It must be noted that French interviewees with extreme left-wing (1.61) ideological opinions are also in favour of the transfer of the regional policy to the EU. There is no significant difference between French interviewees with extreme left- and left-wing ideological views on the transfer of the regional policy to the EU. French respondents with extreme right-wing (1.5032) political opinions are only very marginally in favour of the transfer of the regional policy and there is a significant
difference with French interviewees with right-wing political opinions who are significantly more in favour of the EU transfer of the regional policy. It must be also noted that British interviewees with extreme left-wing (1.67) political opinions are in favour of the EU transfer of the regional policy and there is no significant difference with British respondents with left-wing political views on this. British respondents with extreme right-wing (1.5337) political views are marginally in favour of the EU transfer of the regional policy and there is a significant difference with British respondents with right-wing political opinions who are significantly more in favour of the EU transfer of the regional policy.

7.2.1.3 Employment Policy (1992-2001)

Taking into account the ideology of the respondent, French respondents are overall significantly more in favour of transferring the employment policy to the EU than British ones, and the size of the difference is moderate. French interviewees are in favour of the EU transfer of the employment policy whilst British ones are against it. The mean for British individuals with left-wing ideological views, namely 1.47, is not too far from the mid-point and therefore opposition to the EU transfer for them is minimal compared to British respondents with centrist or right-wing political views.

When examining where the differences occur (see output in appendix 7.3A), there are no significant differences between French respondents with left-wing, centrist and right-wing ideological views on europeanizing the employment policy: they are all clearly in favour of the Europeanization of the employment policy. There are though significant differences between British respondents with left-wing, centrist and right-wing ideological views on Europeanizing the employment policy. British citizens with right-wing ideological opinions or even centrist ideological opinions are significantly more opposed to the Europeanization of the employment policy than those with left-wing ideological opinions: they are though all opposed to transferring the employment policy to the EU. In other words, British respondents with left-wing political views (mean of 1.47) are statistically significantly the least opposed to the EU transfer of the employment policy among British respondents.
One can infer from this that British respondents, whatever their ideological dispositions, are more reluctant to transferring the employment policy at the European level than French respondents. It reflects overall the preference of British citizens towards neo-liberalism and the belief that the European integration favours a more regulated capitalism which would harm the British job market – this belief is moreover cultivated by British centre and right-wing political parties but also to a lesser extent by the Labour government which criticize the over-regulation and inflexibility of job markets favoured by the EU. The reluctance of British respondents to transfer the employment policy at the European level must be interpreted in the context of a relatively low unemployment (below EU average) and greater possibilities of social promotion in the United Kingdom in the study period. British respondents may fear that by transferring the employment policy to the EU, they will lose from this as instrumentalized by the political discourse of British mainstream parties which criticize the excessive economic and social interventionism favoured by the EU. The willingness of French respondents to transfer this policy to the EU may be explained by the relative failure of French successive governments to tackle unemployment and the lack of social mobility but also by the belief that European integration – at least an EU which would put employment at the core of its economic policies – can help to tackle this issue as publicized by mainstream political parties in the second part of the 1990s. The latter lobbied partly successfully the EU to integrate growth and employment as important priorities for the EU and counterbalance the stability pact requirements.

It must be noted that in the French context, only respondents with extreme right-wing views are opposed to the Europeanization of the employment policy (respondents with extreme left-wing views are in favour of it), this though marginally (mean of 1.48). This may be explained by the fact that the EU is portrayed by extreme right political parties as favouring largely unregulated free trade and the openness of French (and European) markets to unfair competition from low labour costs countries, which harm the French economy and its labour market. In the British context, respondents with extreme left- and especially extreme right-wing views are also opposed to the Europeanization of the employment policy.
7.2.1.4 Environment Policy (1992-2001)

Taking into account the ideology of the respondent, French respondents are overall significantly more in favour of transferring the environment policy to the EU than British respondents but the size of the difference is small. All means are well above 1.50 (approaching or above 1.60) and as such all British and French respondents whatever their ideological views are in favour of transferring the environment policy to the EU. This may be explained by the fact that respondents perceive that transferring the environment policy at the European level can bring positive externalities or economies of scale but also perhaps by the relative lower perceived importance – and perhaps more consensual nature\textsuperscript{116} – of the environment policy compared to for example the employment policy for individuals.

When examining where the differences occur (see output in appendix 7.4A), there are no significant differences between French respondents with left-wing, centrist and right-wing ideological views on Europeanizing the environment policy: they are all clearly in favour of the Europeanization of the environment policy. There are though significant differences between British respondents with left- and right-wing or centrist ideological views on Europeanizing the environment policy. British citizens with right-wing ideological opinions or even centrist ideological opinions are significantly less in favour of the Europeanization of the environment policy than those with left-wing ideological opinions: they are though all in favour of transferring the environment policy to the EU. This may be explained by the fact that British individuals with centrist and especially right-wing ideological views whilst they perceive the positive externalities that a European environment policy can bring, are perhaps more concerned that the EU would bring excessive environmental regulations which could harm economic growth and employment. The national sovereignty issue particularly for British respondents with right-wing political views, and more especially for those with extreme right-wing views,\textsuperscript{117} also act as a brake on this EU transfer. Furthermore, it should be underlined that differences between French individuals with right- and extreme right-wing views,

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\textsuperscript{116} Albeit the degree of importance of the environment policy may vary between political ideologies.

\textsuperscript{117} British individuals with extreme right-wing opinions are marginally in favour of the EU transfer of the environment policy (mean of 1.5257).
between British individuals with left- and extreme left-wing opinions as between
British persons with extreme right- and right-wing opinions on the EU transfer of
the environment policy are statistically significant (support EU transfer significantly
less but still support it) but the sizes of the difference are small to very small.

7.2.1.5 Scientific Research Policy (1992-2001)

Taking into account the ideology of the respondent, French respondents are overall
significantly more in favour of transferring the scientific research policy to the EU
than British respondents but the size of the difference is between small and
moderate. All means are well above 1.50 (in effect above 1.60) and as such all
British and French respondents whatever their ideological views are in favour of
transferring the scientific research policy to the EU. This may be explained by the
fact that respondents perceive that transferring the scientific research policy at the
European level can bring positive externalities or economies of scale. This policy
may also be perceived by individuals as more consensual. It must be noted that the
related policy brings the second highest mean for both nationalities (after the
humanitarian aid policy), that is to say there are more citizens’ dispositions for
decisions pertaining to scientific research to be taken at the European level.

When examining where the differences occur (see output in appendix 7.5A), there
are no significant differences between French respondents with left-wing, centrist
and right-wing ideological views on Europeanizing the scientific research policy:
they are all clearly in favour of the Europeanization of this policy. There are though
significant differences between British respondents with left- and right-wing or
centrist ideological views on Europeanizing the scientific research policy. British
citizens with right-wing ideological opinions or even centrist ideological opinions
are significantly less in favour of the Europeanization of the scientific research
policy than those with left-wing ideological opinions: they are though all clearly in
favour of transferring the scientific policy to the EU. This may be explained by the
fact that British individuals with centrist and especially right-wing ideological views
whilst they perceive the positive externalities that a European environment policy
can bring, are perhaps more concerned about the excessive interventionism of the
EU which could disturb the balance of competitive markets. The national
sovereignty issue particularly for British respondents with right-wing political views, and more especially British individuals with extreme right-wing views, also act as a brake on this EU transfer. Furthermore, it should be underlined that differences between French individuals with right- and extreme right-wing views, between British individuals with left- and extreme left-wing opinions as between British persons with extreme right- and right-wing opinions on the EU transfer of the scientific research policy are statistically significant (support EU transfer significantly less but still support it) (see appendix 7.5A’). However, the sizes of the difference are small: they all support the EU transfer of the scientific research policy.

7.2.1.6 Currency Policy (1992-2001)

Taking into account the ideology of the respondent, French respondents are overall significantly more likely to support the transferring of the currency management policy to the EU than British respondents, and the size of the difference is large. French respondents whatever their political opinions approve the EU transfer of the currency management policy whilst British respondents of whatever political views reject it. The socialisation effect, the low exclusive national identity, the support of the leaderships of all mainstream political parties for the single currency and EMU but also the continued relatively poor economic and social situation in France explain the support of French individuals for the EU transfer of the currency management policy. The importance of national sovereignty and national identity, a limited socialisation effect, the lack of clear support and campaigning of the leaderships of mainstream political parties for EMU and the single currency but also the fear that EMU and a single currency could threaten the relatively good economic and social situation in the United Kingdom explain the opposition of British individuals to the EU transfer of the currency management policy.

118 British individuals with extreme right-wing opinions are comparatively less in favour of the EU transfer of the scientific research policy (mean of 1.58).
119 With the integration of growth and employment objectives in the stability pact under French insistence.
120 The functionality argument is though subject to the EU adopting a currency management policy where social aspects are important.
121 The leadership of the Conservative Party opposed though clearly EMU and the single currency from 1997.
When examining where the differences occur (see output in appendix 7.6A), there are no significant differences between French respondents with left-wing and centrist ideological views and between those with left- and right-wing political opinions on Europeanizing the currency management policy. However French individuals with centrist political views are significantly more likely to approve the EU transfer of the currency management policy than those with right-wing political views but the size of the difference is small. This is linked to the fact that centre political parties such as UDF and to a lesser extent the mainstream left party such as PS have taken a more pro-EU and pro-Euro positioning throughout the study period than mainstream right political parties such as RPR. Nevertheless, all French respondents are all clearly in favour of the Europeanization of this policy.

Individuals with centrist political views show the highest mean of support for the EU transfer of the currency management policy followed respectively by those with left-wing political views and those with right-wing political opinions. There are though significant differences between British respondents with left- and right-wing and centrist ideological views on Europeanizing the currency management policy. British citizens with right-wing ideological opinions or even centrist ideological opinions are significantly more opposed to the Europeanization of the currency management policy than those with left-wing ideological opinions: they are though all clearly opposed to the transfer of the currency management to the EU.

Although French respondents with left- or right-wing political opinions are significantly more in favour of EU transfer of the currency management policy than those with extreme left- or right-wing political views (the size of the difference is though small), they are all in favour of the EU transfer of this policy. British interviewees with extreme left-wing opinions are not significantly more opposed to the EU transfer of the currency management policy than those with left-wing political views whilst British respondents with extreme right-wing opinions are significantly more opposed to the EU transfer of the currency management policy than those with right-wing political views. As discussed above, all British respondents with extreme left-wing or right-wing political opinions are a little more reluctant to the EU transfer of the currency management policy.

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122 It includes here French respondents with extreme left-wing political views who are a little more reluctant to the EU transfer of the currency management policy.
123 It includes here French respondents with extreme right-wing political views who are a little more reluctant to the EU transfer of the currency management policy.
respondents are though opposed to the EU transfer of the currency management policy.

7.2.1.7 Health Policy (1992-2001)

Taking into account the ideology of the respondent, British respondents with left-wing political views are significantly less likely to oppose the transferring of the health policy to the EU than French respondents of all political views (non-significant otherwise) but the size of the difference is though small. French and British respondents whatever their political opinions are in opposition to the EU transfer of the health policy. French citizens are not in favour of transferring the health policy to the EU as they may perceive that French successive governments have relatively better dealt with this policy and that the national level – rather than the EU (subsidiarity principle) – may be best placed to cater for this. The subsidiarity principle may also apply to explain British reluctance to transfer this policy to the EU. The fact that, in the second part of the 1990s, the Labour government has also increased its commitment to public services and to the health policy in particular, has reduced somewhat the appeal that a common EU policy, especially for those with left-wing political views, could have on health.

When examining where the differences occur (see output in appendix 7.7A), there are no significant differences between French respondents with left-wing, centrist and right-wing ideological views on Europeanizing the health policy: all French respondents are clearly against the Europeanization of this policy. There are though significant differences between British respondents with left- and right-wing and centrist ideological views on Europeanizing the health policy (the size of the difference tends, nonetheless, to be small). British citizens with right-wing ideological opinions or even centrist ideological opinions are significantly more opposed to the Europeanization of the health policy than those with left-wing ideological opinions: they are though all clearly opposed to transferring the health policy to the EU.

124 Including the Labour government’s commitment to raise health expenditure further in the post 2001 period.
French respondents with extreme right-wing political opinions are not significantly more opposed to the EU transfer of the health policy than those with right-wing political views: they are all against the EU transfer of this policy. Although French respondents with extreme left-wing political opinions are significantly more opposed to the EU transfer of the health policy than those with left-wing political views, the size of the difference is though very small: they are all against the EU transfer of this policy. British interviewees with extreme left- or extreme right-wing opinions are not significantly more opposed to the EU transfer of the health policy than those with left- or right-wing political views: they are all clearly opposed to the EU transfer of this policy.

7.2.1.8 Education Policy (1992-2001)

Taking into account the ideology of the respondent, British respondents of any political opinions are significantly more likely to oppose the transferring of the education policy to the EU than French respondents of any political views but the size of the difference is though small. French and British respondents whatever their political opinions are nevertheless all in opposition to the EU transfer of the education policy. French citizens are not in favour of transferring the education policy to the EU as they may perceive that French successive governments have relatively better dealt with this policy and that the national level – rather than the EU (subsidarity principle) – may be best placed to cater for this. The subsidiarity principle may also apply to explain British reluctance to transfer this policy to the EU. The fact that, in the second part of the 1990s, the Labour government has also increased its commitment to public services and to education in particular,125 has reduced somewhat the appeal that a common EU policy, especially for those with left-wing political views, could have on education. Furthermore in the British and to a lesser extent in the French context (perhaps more so for French citizens with centrist and right-wing political opinions), British and French individuals may view the relative freedom of education to be potentially threatened by an EU transfer.

125 Including the Labour government's commitment to raise education expenditure further in the post 2001 period.
When examining where the differences occur (see output in appendix 7.8A), there are no significant differences between French respondents with left-wing, centrist and right-wing ideological views on Europeanizing the education policy: all French respondents are clearly against the Europeanization of this policy. There are though significant differences between British respondents with left- and right-wing and centrist ideological views on Europeanizing the education policy (the size of the difference is though small). British citizens with right-wing ideological opinions or even centrist ideological opinions are significantly more opposed to the Europeanization of the education policy than those with left-wing ideological opinions: they are though all clearly opposed to the transfer of the education policy to the EU.

French respondents with extreme right-wing political opinions are not significantly more opposed to the EU transfer of the education policy than those with right-wing political views, they are all against the EU transfer of this policy. Although French respondents with extreme left-wing political opinions are significantly more opposed to the EU transfer of the education policy than those with left-wing political views (the difference size is though very small), they are all against the EU transfer of this policy. British interviewees with extreme left- or extreme right-wing opinions are not significantly more opposed to the EU transfer of the education policy than those with left- or right-wing political views: they are all clearly opposed to the EU transfer of this policy.

7.2.1.9 Agriculture Policy (1992-2001)

Taking into account the ideology of the respondent, British respondents of any political opinion are significantly more likely to oppose the transferring of the agriculture policy to the EU than French respondents of any political view (the size of the difference is though between small and moderate). French respondents of any political views are in favour of the EU transfer of the agriculture policy whilst

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126 Due to unbalanced sample sizes, the power of test does not however allow to detect a difference if it exists.
127 Due to unbalanced sample sizes between British interviewees with right-wing ideological views and those with extreme right-wing ideological views, the power of test does not nonetheless allow to detect a difference if it exists.
British respondents whatever their political opinions (except extreme left marginally in favour) are in opposition to it. A reason which may explain the support of French respondents for the EU transfer of the agriculture policy is that they are in favour of the French and European preference principle for agricultural products with a view to satisfying socio-economic goals: that is to say guarantee farmers' income, self-sufficiency and protection against unfair global competition from low labour cost countries. French interviewees believe that the EU is best placed to fulfil this role – subsidiarity principle – although they are increasingly concerned that the EU is increasingly eroding the European preference principle by opening French and European markets to deemed unfair non-EU competition and therefore reinforcing the effects of globalisation as publicized by public figures in the political periphery such as Villiers, Chevenement, Le Pen, Hue or Emmanuelli. It follows from this that French citizens would like the EU to take a more regulated capitalism path, with more interventionism in the agricultural sphere with a view to safeguarding French and European socio-economic interests.

In the context of the United Kingdom, British respondents are opposed to the EU transfer of the agriculture policy as they perceive the common agricultural policy (CAP) to be counterproductive and artificial – sheltering artificially European farmers from international competition – bureaucratic, expensive and not giving value to end consumers. It is important to note that British citizens are subject to an almost unanimous political discourse of the Conservative Party, the Liberal Democrats and, to a lesser extent, the Labour Party which denounces as such the CAP as a too interventionist system disturbing market rules and producing expensive inefficiencies. These political parties tend to support the idea that European agricultural markets should be subject to the law of markets and therefore subject to international competition. The role of the EU for them should be purely to make sure that free competition occurs and that European farmers are enticed to become more competitive.

When examining where the differences occur (see output in appendix 7.9A), there are no significant differences between French respondents with left-wing, centrist

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128 As reinforced by the political discourse of all main French political parties (including extreme right).
129 As substantiated by polls in the study period (see Background chapter (chapter four) on France).
and right-wing ideological views on Europeanizing the agriculture policy: all French respondents support the Europeanization of this policy (respondents with right-wing political views nevertheless support it more marginally with a mean of 1.54). There are though significant differences between British respondents with left- and right-wing and centrist ideological views on Europeanizing the agriculture policy (the size of the difference tends though to be small). British citizens with right-wing ideological opinions or even centrist ideological opinions are significantly more opposed to the Europeanization of the agriculture policy than those with left-wing ideological opinions: they are though all opposed to the transfer of the agriculture policy to the EU but British respondents with left-wing political views oppose it more marginally (mean of 1.49).

French respondents with extreme right-wing political opinions are significantly more opposed to the EU transfer of the agriculture policy than those with right-wing political views (the size of the difference is however small\(^\text{130}\)). French individuals with extreme right-wing opinions are though marginally opposed to the EU transfer of this policy (mean of 1.47). French respondents with extreme left-wing political opinions are not significantly less supportive of the EU transfer of the agriculture policy than those with left-wing political views: Both are in favour of the EU transfer of this policy. British interviewees with extreme left-wing opinions are not significantly more supportive of the EU transfer of the agriculture policy than those with left-wing political views, this despite those with extreme left-wing views showing a marginally supportive mean (1.5165) for the EU transfer of this policy. British respondents with extreme right-wing political opinions are significantly more opposed to the EU transfer of the agriculture policy than those with right-wing political views (the size of the difference is though small): both British respondents with extreme right- and right-wing political opinions are nevertheless opposed to the EU transfer of the agriculture policy.

\(^{130}\) Due to unbalanced sample sizes, the power of the test is quite weak.
Taking into account the ideology of the respondent, French respondents are overall significantly more in favour of transferring the humanitarian aid policy to the EU than British respondents but the size of the difference tends to be small. All means are well above 1.50 (above 1.60) and as such all British and French respondents whatever their ideological views are in favour of transferring the humanitarian aid policy to the EU. This may be explained by the fact that respondents perceive that transferring the humanitarian aid policy at the European level can bring positive externalities or economies of scale but also explained perhaps by the relative lower perceived importance – and perhaps more consensual nature – of humanitarian aid policy compared to, for example, employment policy for individuals. It must be noted that the related policy brings the highest mean for both nationalities, that is to say more citizens’ dispositions for decisions pertaining to humanitarian aid to be taken at the European level.

When examining where the differences occur (see output in appendix 7.10A), there are no significant differences between French respondents with left-wing and centrist and between left- and right-wing ideological views on Europeanizing the humanitarian aid policy. There is a significant difference between French respondents with centrist and right-wing ideological views on Europeanizing the humanitarian aid policy but the size of difference is very small. All French respondents are though clearly in favour of the Europeanization of this policy. There are though significant differences between British respondents with left-wing, centrist and right-wing ideological views on Europeanizing the humanitarian aid policy. British citizens with right-wing ideological opinions or even centrist ideological opinions are significantly less in favour of the Europeanization of the humanitarian aid policy than those with left-wing ideological opinions but the size of the difference is small: they are all clearly in favour of transferring the humanitarian aid policy to the EU. This may be explained by the fact that British individuals with centrist and especially right-wing ideological views whilst they perceive the positive externalities that a European humanitarian aid policy can bring, are perhaps more concerned about an excessive commitment (British tax payers’ money management) of the EU in this area. The national sovereignty issue
particularly for British respondents with right-wing political views (and more especially those with extreme right-wing views) also act as a brake on this EU transfer.

It should be also underlined that there are no significant differences between French respondents with extreme left- and left-wing political opinions, and between British respondents with extreme left- and left-wing political views on Europeanizing the humanitarian aid policy. There are significant differences between French interviewees with extreme right- and right-wing political views on Europeanizing the related policy but the size of the difference tends to be small. They are all in favour of transferring the humanitarian aid policy to the EU.

7.2.1.11 Cultural Policy (1992-2001)

Taking into account the ideology of the respondent, French respondents are overall significantly less in opposition to transferring the cultural policy to the EU than British respondents but the size of the difference is small. All means are well below 1.50 and as such all British and French respondents whatever their ideological views are opposed to transferring the cultural policy to the EU. This may be explained by the fact that respondents perceive that transferring the cultural policy at the European level would bring limited functionality. The cultural policy of a country can also be intimately connected to national identity, which also explains the refusal to transfer this policy to the EU. In addition to functionality reasons, for British citizens, the link with national identity in this refusal is especially important but they, especially those with right-wing political views, may also fear an excessive expenditure commitment of the EU in this policy area. In addition to functionality reasons, for French respondents of all political opinions, this refusal may be partly explained by the link with national identity but also by the fear that the EU expenditure commitment in this policy area would be reduced and fear that more competitive rules at the EU level would apply to a cultural sector deemed different and beyond a market economy mentality. Whilst the results obtained here cannot be directly compared to earlier research results as the present study constitutes a new line of enquiry, these results somewhat endorse the link between importance of national identity and reluctance towards European integration as found by, for

When examining where the differences occur (see output in appendix 7.11A), there are no significant differences between French respondents with left-wing and centrist and between left- and right-wing ideological views on Europeanizing the cultural policy. There is a significant difference between French respondents with centrist and right-wing ideological views on Europeanizing the cultural policy. French respondents with right-wing political views are significantly more opposed to the Europeanization of this policy than French respondents with centrist political views but the size of difference is very small. All French respondents are though clearly opposed to the Europeanization of this policy. There are though significant differences between British respondents with left-wing or centrist and right-wing ideological views on Europeanizing the cultural policy. British citizens with right-wing ideological opinions are significantly more opposed to the Europeanization of the cultural policy than those with left-wing or centrist ideological opinions but the size of the difference is small: they are all clearly opposed to transferring the cultural policy to the EU. It should be underlined that there are no significant differences between French or British respondents with extreme left- and left-wing political opinions, and between French or British respondents with extreme right- and right-wing political views on Europeanizing the cultural policy. They are all in opposition to transferring the cultural policy to the EU.

7.2.2 Foreign Policy, Defence Policy, Immigration and Asylum Policy, Police Policy, Anti-Drug Policy and Urban and Juvenile Crime Prevention Policy

Through the study period, foreign policy, defence policy and immigration and asylum policy have become European policies although their developments on the EU scene have remained rather embryonic. Police Policy, Anti-Drug Policy and Urban & Juvenile Crime Prevention Policy were not European policies as such in the study period although there has been increasing cooperation – including the sharing of files on criminals – between national polices as encouraged by EU institutions. While these policies may not reflect directly socio-economic priorities
and therefore may not be so useful to distinguish regulated capitalism from neo-liberal capitalism, the review of the pattern of public opinions on the EU transfer of these policies will help to derive whether or not (and why) French and British public opinions see a functional value to the EU involvement in these.

Table 7.2: Pattern of Significance and Direction of Foreign Policy, Defence Policy, Immigration and Asylum Policy, Police Policy, Anti-Drug Policy and Urban and Juvenile Crime Prevention Policy variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policies</th>
<th>Pattern of Significance and Direction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Policy</strong></td>
<td><strong>French Sample</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not significant between Centre, left and right and all in favour of EU transfer (including respondents with extreme left- and extreme right-wing opinions).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>British Sample</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significant between left, centre and right. All in favour of EU transfer but left or even centre significantly more in favour of EU transfer than right (including extreme right and extreme left, the former though relatively borderline (1.5128)).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>British and French Samples</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significant between French respondents of all political opinions and British respondents of all political opinions. French significantly more in favour of EU transfer than British.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defence Policy</strong></td>
<td><strong>French Sample</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not significant between Centre, left and right and all in favour of EU transfer (including extreme left but barely (1.5061) and excluding extreme right (1.4268)) but support more marginal especially for right (1.5237).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>British Sample</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significant between left and centre or right. All opposed to EU transfer (including extreme right and extreme left) but left significantly less opposed to EU transfer than right.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>British and French Samples</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significant between French respondents of all political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policies</td>
<td>Pattern of Significance and Direction</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>opinions and British respondents of all political opinions. French significantly more in favour of EU transfer than British.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration and Asylum</td>
<td>French Sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Policy</td>
<td>Not significant between centre and left and significant between right and left or centre (but size of difference is small) but all in favour of EU transfer (including extreme left and extreme right) (marginal EU transfer support for the latter, (1.5088)).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Sample</td>
<td>Significant between left, centre and right. All opposed to EU transfer (including extreme right and extreme left, the latter marginally against EU transfer (1.4897)) but left significantly less opposed to EU transfer than right or even centre.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British and French Samples</td>
<td>Significant between French respondents of all political opinions and British respondents of all political opinions. French significantly more in favour of EU transfer than British.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Policy</td>
<td>French Sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Sample</td>
<td>Not significant between centre, left and right, and all opposed to EU transfer (including extreme left and extreme right).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Sample</td>
<td>Significant between left and right and non-significant otherwise. All opposed to EU transfer (including extreme right and extreme left) but left significantly less opposed to EU transfer than right.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British and French Samples</td>
<td>Significant between French respondents of all political opinions and British respondents of all political opinions. French significantly less opposed to EU transfer than British.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Drug Policy</td>
<td>French Sample</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.2.2.1 Foreign Policy (1992-2001)

Taking into account the ideology of the respondent, French respondents are overall significantly more in favour of transferring the foreign policy to the EU than British respondents (the size of the difference is between small and moderate). All means
are well above 1.50 and as such all British and French respondents whatever their ideological views are in favour of transferring the foreign policy to the EU. This may be explained by the fact that respondents perceive that transferring the foreign policy at the European level can bring positive externalities or economies of scale but also perhaps by the relative lower perceived importance of foreign policy compared to for example employment policy for individuals. Traditionally citizens show more tolerance (and more freedom of action for governments) towards the management of foreign policy issues – except in case of war – than towards the management of domestic issues. The emergence of important international foreign and security issues from 1999 (more powerfully from September 2001) as well as the greater integration of the European security and defence policy in the period from 1998 to today, are though likely to have increased the salience of foreign, security and defence policy issues for national publics. This may make the further development and realization of a European foreign, security and defence policy more difficult today – especially for particular policy decisions, for example, involving the deployment of military troops – as national publics will increasingly act as a constraint on the development and realization of the related policy. The unanimity rule at the EU level may well reinforce this constraint as national publics are provided with ample channels of influence to constrict European integration in this field via their respective national governments.

When examining where the differences occur (see output in appendix 7.12A), there are no significant differences between French respondents with left-wing, centrist and right-wing ideological views on Europeanizing the foreign policy: they are all clearly in favour of the Europeanization of the foreign policy. There are though significant differences between British respondents with left-wing, centrist and right-wing ideological views on Europeanizing the foreign policy. British citizens with right-wing ideological opinions are significantly less in favour of the Europeanization of the foreign policy than those with left-wing or even centrist ideological opinions but the size of the difference tends to be small: they are though all in favour of transferring the foreign policy to the EU. This may be explained by the fact that British individuals with right-wing ideological views (and especially those with extreme right-wing ideological views) whilst they perceive the positive externalities that a European foreign policy can bring, are perhaps more concerned
that a common policy in this area could neglect somewhat the link with the USA and Commonwealth countries such as Australia and Canada which are converging economically and socially with the United Kingdom. The national sovereignty issue particularly for British respondents with right-wing political views also acts as a brake on this EU transfer.

It should be underlined that there are no significant differences between French or British respondents with extreme left- and left-wing political opinions on Europeanizing the foreign policy. There are significant differences between French or British respondents with extreme right- and right-wing political views on Europeanizing the foreign policy but the size of the difference is small. They are all though supporting the EU transfer of the foreign policy. For British individuals with extreme right-wing political views, the support for this EU transfer is though marginal, mean of 1.5128.

7.2.2.2 Defence Policy (1992-2001)

Taking into account the ideology of the respondent, French respondents are overall significantly more in favour of transferring the defence policy to the EU than British respondents (the size of the difference is between small and moderate). All means for French respondents are above 1.50 (except extreme right) and as such all French respondents whatever their ideological views are in favour of transferring the defence policy to the EU (except those with extreme right-wing political views). The EU transfer support for this policy is though more marginal for French respondents with right-wing (1.5237) and to a lesser extent left-wing (1.5487) and centrist (1.5459) political views. All means for British respondents are below 1.50 and as such all British respondents whatever their ideological views are opposed to transferring the defence policy to the EU. In the French context, this may be explained by the fact that respondents perceive that transferring the defence policy to the European level can bring positive externalities or economies of scale. The defence policy is also not seen as a national priority – in a time of peace – compared

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131 And more especially British individuals with extreme right-wing views who are marginally in favour of the EU transfer of the foreign policy (mean of 1.5128).
to other policies such as employment policy, health and education for individuals. However, for French individuals with right-wing political views and more especially those with extreme right-wing political views, the EU transfer of the defence policy is less popular as the latter is associated with the national sovereignty issue and more especially with the preservation of national independence which appeared in the political discourse of the FN, MNR and MPF and to a lesser extent in the one of RPR. For French individuals with extreme left-wing political views, the EU transfer is also less popular as in symbiosis with the discourse of extreme left political parties, the defence policy has for them very low importance in the national context as in the European context – they moreover favour a policy of demilitarisation. In the British context, whilst the perspective of positive externalities or economies of scale in the EU transfer of this policy may have some appeal especially for individuals with left-wing political opinions, the issue of national sovereignty and national independence takes special importance in the refusal to transfer this policy to the EU level, more so for individuals with right-wing (including extreme right) and centrist political views. The emergence of important international foreign and security issues from 1999 (more powerfully from September 2001) as well as the greater integration of the European security and defence policy in the period from 1998 to today, are likely to have increased the salience of foreign, security and defence policy issues for national publics. This may make the further development and realization of a European foreign, security and defence policy more difficult today – especially for particular policy decisions, for example, involving the deployment of military troops – as national publics will increasingly act as a constraint on the development and realization of the related policy. The unanimity rule at the EU level may well reinforce this constraint as national publics are provided with ample channels of influence to constrict European integration in this field via their respective national governments.

When examining where the differences occur (see output in appendix 7.13A), there are no significant differences between French respondents with left-wing, centrist and right-wing ideological views on Europeanizing the defence policy: they are all in favour of the Europeanization of the defence policy. EU transfer support for the related policy is though more marginal for French individuals with right-wing political views. There are though significant differences between British
respondents with left-wing, and centrist and right-wing ideological views on
Europeanizing the defence policy. British citizens with right-wing or even centrist
ideological opinions ideological opinions are significantly more opposed to the
Europeanization of the defence policy than those with left-wing ideological opinions
but the size of the difference tends to be small: they are though all opposed to
transferring the defence policy to the EU.

It must be noted that there are no significant differences between British respondents
with extreme left- and left-wing political opinions on Europeanizing the defence
policy. There are significant differences between French or British respondents with
extreme right- and right-wing political views, and between French respondents with
extreme left- and left-wing political views on Europeanizing the defence policy but
the size of the difference is small. All respondents with extreme left- or extreme
right-wing political opinions\textsuperscript{132} are in opposition to the EU transfer of the defence
policy.

7.2.2.3 Immigration and Asylum Policy (1992-2001)

Taking into account the ideology of the respondent, French respondents are overall
significantly more in favour of transferring the immigration and asylum policy to the
EU than British respondents (the size of the difference is between moderate and
large). All means for French respondents are above 1.50 (including extreme right
but marginal EU transfer support, 1.5088) and as such all French respondents
whatever their ideological views are in favour of transferring the immigration and
asylum policy to the EU. All means for British respondents are below 1.50 and as
such all British respondents whatever their ideological views are opposed to
transferring the immigration and asylum policy to the EU. The opposition to the EU
transfer of this policy is though more marginal for British respondents with extreme
left-wing political views (1.4897).

French citizens are more willing to transfer the immigration and asylum policies to
the EU than British respondents as they feel that immigration is mishandled by

\textsuperscript{132} French respondents with extreme left-wing political views are however marginally supporting the
EU transfer of the defence policy.
successive French governments and that in virtue of the principle of subsidiarity, immigration would be better controlled at the EU level. They feel that the EU – at least the type of EU they favour – would put in place a more restrictive and effective policy towards immigration from outside the EU than the French one, although they are critical of some of the agreements in place such as the Schengen agreements and its consequences for immigration. Furthermore, the importance of national sovereignty and national identity also explains the greater reticence of French individuals with right- and extreme right-wing political opinions towards the EU transfer of the immigration and asylum policy, although they (those with extreme right-wing political views though more marginally so) are in favour to this EU transfer. In the British context, British citizens have also placed immigration as one of their key concerns in the related period but more especially in the second part of the study period. Although British respondents consider that the EU, at least the type of EU they favour, can play a role in the control of immigration and asylum in virtue of the principle of subsidiarity, the importance of national sovereignty and national identity but also partly the mismanagement of illegal immigration in other EU countries such as Spain, France and Italy, and the important economic immigration of European nationals and residents to the United Kingdom in the study period explain their opposition to the EU transfer of this policy. Whilst the results obtained here cannot be directly compared to earlier research results as the present study constitutes a new line of enquiry, these results somewhat endorse the link between anti-immigration sentiments, general hostility towards other cultures and reluctance about European integration (De Vreese and Boomgarden, 2005; Kessler and Freeman, 2005; Lahav, 2004; Luedtke, 2005 and McLaren, 2002, 2007a) and the link between importance of national identity and reluctance about European integration (Kaltenthaler and Anderson, 2001; De Vries and Van Kersbergen, 2007; Carey, 2002; Hooghe and Marks, 2005; Christin and Trechsel, 2002; Kostakopoulou, 2001; McLaren, 2007b; Luedtke, 2005; and Marks and Hooghe, 2003) especially in the British context.

133 Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, French respondents have been unhappy and worried with the level of immigration to France. Immigration is one of the key concerns of French citizens as discussed in the Background chapter (chapter four) on France.
134 France has one of the most liberal immigration policies in Europe.
135 See background chapter (chapter four) on the United Kingdom.
136 One of the priorities of the EU was seen as developing a common approach to immigration and crime (refer to Background chapter (chapter four) on the United Kingdom).
When examining where the differences occur (see output in appendix 7.14A), there is no significant difference between French respondents with left-wing and centrist ideological opinions on Europeanizing the immigration and asylum policy. There is nonetheless a significant difference between French respondents with right- and left-wing or centrist ideological views on Europeanizing the related policy. Although French interviewees with right-wing political views are less likely to support the EU transfer of this policy than those with left-wing or centrist political views, the size of the difference is small and they are all in favour of the Europeanization of the immigration and asylum policy. There are significant differences between British respondents with left-wing, centrist and right-wing ideological views on Europeanizing the immigration and asylum policy. British citizens with right-wing or even centrist ideological opinions are significantly more opposed to the Europeanization of the immigration and asylum policy than those with left-wing ideological opinions but the size of the difference tends to be relatively small: they are though all opposed to transferring the immigration and asylum policy to the EU.

It should be underlined that there are significant differences between French or British respondents with extreme left- and left-wing political opinions and between extreme right- and right-wing political opinions on Europeanizing the immigration and asylum policy but the size of the difference is small. French respondents with extreme left-wing political views and to a lesser extent those with extreme right-wing political views are supporting the EU transfer of the immigration and asylum policy but the support of the latter for this transfer is marginal (1.5088). British respondents with extreme right-wing political views and to a lesser extent those with extreme left-wing political views are opposed to the EU transfer of the immigration and asylum policy but the opposition of the latter to this transfer is marginal (1.4897).

7.2.2.4 Police Policy (1999-2001)

Taking into account the ideology of the respondent, French respondents are overall significantly less opposed to transferring the police policy to the EU than British respondents (the size of the difference is moderate). All means for French
respondents are below 1.50 (including extreme right and left) and as such all French respondents whatever their ideological views are opposed to transferring the police policy to the EU. All means for British respondents are below 1.50 and as such all British respondents whatever their ideological views are opposed to transferring the police policy to the EU. The reluctance of French and British respondents to transfer the police policy to the EU can be explained by national sovereignty concerns as police power is traditionally associated with the duty of the state. It can also be explained by the fact that respondents perceive crime policing to be best exercised at the national level rather than at the EU level. The role of the EU in this policy area is not completely denied as the EU is seen in principle as being able to help fight crime.\footnote{See background chapter (chapter four) on France and the United Kingdom.} However the permeability of European borders – partly concomitant upon the principle of free movements of people, services and goods – and the Schengen agreements implementation\footnote{Or potential full implementation in the British context.} are perceived by respondents as contributing to crime and law and order issues in both these nations. These two issues are somewhat instrumentalised as such by French political parties (particularly non-mainstream ones but also factions within mainstream parties) and by British political parties (both mainstream and non-mainstream ones).

When examining where the differences occur (see output in appendix 7.15A), there is no significant difference between French respondents with left-wing, centrist and right-wing ideological opinions on Europeanizing the police policy: they are all against the Europeanization of the police policy. There are significant differences between British respondents with left- and right-wing ideological views on Europeanizing the police policy. British citizens with right-wing ideological opinions are significantly more opposed to the Europeanization of the police policy than those with left-wing ideological opinions but the size of the difference tends to be relatively small: they are though all opposed to transferring the police policy to the EU.

French respondents with extreme right-wing political opinions are not significantly more opposed to EU transfer of the police policy than those with right-wing political views, they are both against the EU transfer of this policy. French respondents with
extreme left-wing political opinions are also not significantly more opposed to the EU transfer of the police policy than those with left-wing political views, they are all against the EU transfer of this policy. British interviewees with extreme right-wing political opinions are not significantly more opposed to the EU transfer of the police policy than those with right-wing political views: they are all clearly opposed to the EU transfer of this policy. British interviewees with extreme left-wing opinions are significantly more opposed to the EU transfer of the police policy than those with left-wing political views but the difference is small: they are all clearly opposed to the EU transfer of this policy.

7.2.2.5 Anti-Drug Policy (1993-2001)

Taking into account the ideology of the respondent, French respondents are overall significantly more in favour of transferring the anti-drug policy to the EU than British respondents (the size of the difference is between small and moderate). All means are above 1.50 and as such all British and French respondents whatever their ideological views are in favour of transferring the anti-drug policy to the EU. This may be explained by the fact that respondents perceive that the fight against drugs can be tackled more efficiently and effectively at the European level than at the national level.

When examining where the differences occur (see output in appendix 7.16A), there are no significant differences between French respondents with left-wing, centrist and right-wing ideological views on Europeanizing the anti-drug policy: they are all clearly in favour of the Europeanization of this policy. There are though significant differences between British respondents with left-wing and centrist or right-wing ideological views on Europeanizing the anti-drug policy. British citizens with centrist or right-wing ideological opinions are significantly less in favour of the Europeanization of the anti-drug policy than those with left-wing ideological opinions but the size of the difference tends to be small: they are though all in favour of transferring this policy to the EU. This may be explained by the fact that British individuals with centrist and right-wing ideological views (and especially those with

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139 Due to unbalanced sample sizes, the low power of the test, namely 33%, does not though enable us to detect any difference if it exists.
extreme right-wing ideological views) whilst they perceive the functional benefit of a European policy in this field, are perhaps concerned that a common policy in this area could be too liberal. The national sovereignty issue particularly for British respondents with centrist and right-wing political views also acts as a brake on this EU transfer.

It should be underlined that there are no significant differences between French or British respondents with extreme left- and left-wing political opinions on Europeanizing the anti-drug policy. There are significant differences between French or British respondents with extreme right- and right-wing political views on Europeanizing this policy but the size of the difference tends to be relatively small. They are all though supporting the EU transfer of the anti-drug policy. For British individuals with extreme right-wing political views, the support for the EU transfer of this policy is though more marginal (mean of 1.53).

7.2.2.6 Urban and Juvenile Crime Prevention Policy (1999-2001)

Taking into account the ideology of the respondent, French respondents are overall significantly less opposed to transferring the Urban and Juvenile Crime Prevention policy to the EU than British respondents (the size of the difference is between small and moderate). All means for French respondents are below 1.50 (including extreme right and left) and as such all French respondents whatever their ideological views are opposed to transferring the Urban and Juvenile Crime Prevention policy to the EU. All means for British respondents are below 1.50 and as such all British respondents whatever their ideological views are opposed to transferring the related policy to the EU. The reluctance of French and British respondents to transfer the Urban and Juvenile Crime Prevention policy to the EU can be explained by national sovereignty concerns as police power is traditionally associated with the duty of the state. It can also be explained by the fact that respondents perceive crime prevention policing to be best exercised at the national level rather than at the EU level. The role of the EU in this policy area is not completely denied as the EU is seen in principle as being able to help fight crime. However the permeability of

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140 And more especially British individuals with extreme right-wing ideological views.
141 See background chapter (chapter four) on France and the United Kingdom.
European borders – partly concomitant upon the principle of free movements of people, services and goods – and the Schengen agreements implementation\(^{142}\) are perceived by respondents as contributing to crime and law and order issues in both these nations. These issues are somewhat instrumentalised as such by French political parties (particularly non-mainstream ones but also factions within mainstream parties) and by British political parties (both mainstream and non-mainstream ones).

When examining where the differences occur (see output in appendix 7.17A), there is no significant difference between French respondents with left-wing, centrist and right-wing ideological opinions on Europeanizing the Urban and Juvenile Crime Prevention policy: they are all against the Europeanization of this policy. There are significant differences between British respondents with left- and right-wing ideological views on Europeanizing the Urban and Juvenile Crime Prevention policy. British citizens with right-wing ideological opinions are significantly more opposed to the Europeanization of the Urban and Juvenile Crime Prevention policy than those with left-wing ideological opinions but the size of the difference tends to be relatively small: they are though all opposed to transferring this policy to the EU. Furthermore, French respondents with extreme right- or extreme left-wing political opinions are not significantly more opposed to EU transfer of the Urban and Juvenile Crime Prevention policy than those with right- or left-wing political views: they are all against the EU transfer of this policy. British interviewees with extreme right- or extreme left-wing opinions are not significantly more opposed to the EU transfer of the Urban and Juvenile Crime Prevention policy than those with right- or left-wing political views: they are all clearly opposed to the EU transfer of this policy.

### 7.3 Conclusion and Synthesis

Inclinations towards a socio-economic model do structure EU policy preferences for French and British citizens. As demonstrated in the conclusions of the testing of hypothesis I and II, French and British individuals have experienced a significant

\(^{142}\) Or potential full implementation in the British context.
drop in the level of support for the current EU membership and further European integration (drop though lower for French individuals) in the study period (1992-2001), this due to a discontent with the outputs and political direction of the EU. This discontent is the consequence of utilitarian appraisals and ultimately the mark of the type of EU favoured by French and British nationals when interpreted in the national political, historical, economic, social and societal context. Whilst the results of the current research cannot be directly compared to earlier research results as the present study constitutes a new line of enquiry, these results endorse the fact that the national political, historical, economic, social and societal environment helps shape public opinion’s views towards European integration and therefore confirm, for example, Voessing’s (2005) and Ciftci’s (2005) findings. The present results also support the fact that certain welfare states – such as the British more liberal welfare state – are less accepting of EU integration and therefore substantiate, for example, Brinegar and Jolly’s (2005) and Hooghe and Marks’ (2005) findings.

Whilst the EU is criticized in the French context – in much of the political discourse of the left, centre and right – for promoting an excessive laissez-faire, free market economic policy opened to competition from low labour cost countries which endangers French jobs and social protection, French citizens with left-wing, centrist but also right-wing ideological opinions are though in principle in favour of transferring a range of policies such as employment, immigration and political asylum, social inclusion, environmental, scientific research, agriculture, currency management, defence, humanitarian aid, anti-drug, regional and foreign policies to the EU. On the evidence examined here and in the work of other authors (including polls), it seems plausible that they perceive that the EU – at least the EU model type they favour – may be best able to deal with these policies – subsidiarity principle – and that French successive governments have failed to deal with some of these. French citizens subject this competency transfer to the EU adopting a more regulated capitalism path, with more interventionism in the economic and social sphere, privileging employment and social aspects including the principle of European preference. It is revealing to note that French citizens are not in favour of transferring health, education and cultural policies to the EU as they may perceive that French successive governments have relatively better dealt with these and that the national level may be best placed to cater for these. French nationals are also
opposed to the EU transfer of police and urban & juvenile crime prevention policies as they may perceive that the national level may be best placed to provide for these. This needs however to be further investigated.

British opposition to European integration reflects somewhat a vision of the EU as a too interventionist, bureaucratic, over-regulated, somewhat uncompetitive and inflexible economic entity. The political role of the EU is also contested. In this perspective, the EU is deemed to threaten British economic growth and social progress accomplished throughout the study period as reinforced by the political discourse of much of the right but also partly of the centre and left. The importance of national sovereignty, a limited socialisation effect and a strong exclusive feeling of national identity bolster this opposition to European integration. In line with this, British respondents are opposed to the transfer to the EU of a number of policies such as immigration and political asylum, health, education, currency management, police and urban & juvenile crime prevention, employment, defence, cultural (policy), agriculture and social inclusion (the latter only for individuals with extreme right-wing ideological views). British citizens’ opposition to the European Union is not a total opposition to any form of European Union but is grounded on a preference for an EU to embrace free market policies and cooperation between independent nation-states rather than supra-nationalism with its corollary of a super-state. In virtue of the subsidiarity principle, British nationals with left-wing, centrist and right-wing political views thus support the competency transfer to the EU of policies such as environment, scientific research, humanitarian aid, regional, foreign, anti-drug and social inclusion policies.\textsuperscript{143}

**French and British Overall Conclusions**

It was hypothesized:

\( H_{III} \) While a preference for ‘regulated capitalism’ is associated with support for EU integration in France, a preference for a ‘neo-liberal’ socio-economic model is associated with opposition to EU integration in the United Kingdom.

\textsuperscript{143} Individuals with right-wing ideological opinions wish to transfer the social inclusion policy only very marginally to the European level.
Hypothesis III is accepted in the French context. There is therefore a relationship between citizens’ preference for regulated capitalism and citizens’ support for integration. French individuals largely irrespective of their left-wing, centrist or right-wing political opinions\textsuperscript{144} are favourable to transferring a range of policies to the EU, from agriculture to scientific research, including employment, immigration and political asylum, social inclusion, environmental, currency management, defence, humanitarian aid, anti-drug, regional and foreign policies. Many of these policies in the French context reflect socio-economic priorities and inscribe themselves into the pursuit of regulated capitalism. Some of these policies have a redistributive nature – such as agriculture, social inclusion and regional policy – some of these can have a central role in regulating markets for social purposes such as employment and currency management, while others such as environment protection, scientific research, anti-drug policy and humanitarian aid, whilst perhaps more consensual, can reflect a social agenda. French nationals whatever their ideological views are opposed to the EU transfer of health, education and cultural policies as they may perceive that French successive governments have relatively better dealt with these policies and that the national level – rather than the EU (subsidarity principle) – may be best placed to cater for these. Furthermore, the EU transfer disapproval for the cultural policy may be partly explained by its link with national identity but also by the fear that the EU expenditure commitment in this policy area would be reduced. Finally, it is partly explained by the fear that more competitive rules at the EU level would apply to a cultural sector deemed different and beyond market economy mentality.

Hypothesis III is accepted in the British context. There is a relationship between citizens’ preference for neo-liberalism and citizens’ opposition to integration. In virtue of a preference for neo-liberalism and the United Kingdom’s relatively successful national outputs in the study period (but also importance of national sovereignty, national identity and a limited socialisation effect), British individuals largely irrespective of their left-wing, centrist or right-wing political opinions\textsuperscript{145} are

\textsuperscript{144} Differences between those with extreme left- and left-wing opinions or between those with extreme right- and right-wing political opinions also tend to be small.

\textsuperscript{145} British individuals with left-wing political opinions tend to be however significantly less opposed to the EU transfer of policies than those with right-wing or centrist political views. Differences
opposed to transferring a range of policies to the EU, from agriculture to immigration and political asylum, including employment, currency management, health, education, cultural, defence and social inclusion policies (the latter only for individuals with extreme right-wing ideological views). British nationals are in favour of transferring social inclusion (except the above), scientific research, humanitarian aid, anti-drug, foreign and regional policies to the EU as they perceive a functionality argument in doing so. Scientific research, humanitarian aid, foreign and regional policies are perceived to be also relatively less important and perhaps more consensual than other policies such as for example employment and currency management. British individuals with right-wing, centrist and to a lesser extent left-wing political opinions are however concerned about the excessive interventionism and financial commitment that the EU may have in these fields, which could disturb the balance of competitive markets and in turn affect growth and employment. This divergence of views between French and British citizens is the consequence of a different perception of what the EU should be, in other words a divergence on the type of EU model they favour. British nationals are more in favour of neoliberalism rather than regulated capitalism, this affecting their opinions on the process of European integration.

The willingness of French respondents to transfer the employment and currency management policies to the EU\textsuperscript{146} may be explained by the relative failure of French successive governments to address the continued relatively poor economic and social situation in France, more specifically the relatively high unemployment and lack of social mobility. It may also be explained by the belief that European integration – at least an EU which would put employment and social aspects at the core of its economic policies – can help to tackle this issue as publicized by French mainstream political parties in the second part of the 1990s, which lobbied partly successfully the EU to integrate growth, employment and social aspects as important priorities for the EU and counterbalance the stability pact requirements. The

\textsuperscript{146} Only French respondents with extreme right-wing views are marginally against the EU transfer of the employment policy.

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functionality argument\textsuperscript{147} assisted by the socialisation effect and a low exclusive national identity explain the support of French individuals for the EU transfer of the related policies. British citizens with right-wing ideological opinions or even centrist ideological opinions are significantly more opposed to the Europeanization of the employment and currency policies than those with left-wing ideological opinions: they are though all opposed to transferring the employment and currency management policies to the EU. Whatever their ideological dispositions, British nationals are also more reluctant to transferring the employment and currency policies at the European level than French ones. This refusal to transfer those policies to the EU reflects for them the perceived lack of functionality of doing so at the European level, the importance of national sovereignty and national identity, a limited socialisation effect, and the lack of political party support. This refusal to transfer these policies to the EU is anchored in the overall preference of British citizens for neo-liberalism and the belief that the excessive economic and social interventionism of the EU would jeopardize the relatively healthy state of the British economy as instrumentalized by the political discourse of British mainstream parties.

French respondents of any political views are in favour of the EU transfer of the agriculture policy.\textsuperscript{148} A reason which may explain the support of French respondents for the EU transfer of the agriculture policy is that they are in favour of French and European preference principle for agricultural products – as reinforced by the political discourse of all main French political parties (including extreme right) – with a view to satisfy socio-economic goals: that is to say guarantee farmers’ income, self-sufficiency and protection against unfair global competition from low labour cost countries. French interviewees believe that the EU is best placed to fulfil this role – subsidiarity principle –. Nonetheless they are increasingly concerned\textsuperscript{149} that the EU is increasingly eroding the European preference principle by opening French and European markets to deemed unfair non-EU competition and therefore reinforcing the effects of globalisation as publicized by public figures in

\textsuperscript{147} EU considered as best able to tackle employment, management of the currency and the social agenda (subsidiarity principle).
\textsuperscript{148} Except French respondents with extreme right-wing political views who are marginally against the EU transfer of the agriculture policy.
\textsuperscript{149} As substantiated by polls in the study period (see Background chapter on France).
the political periphery such as Villiers, Chevenement, Le Pen, Hue or Emmanuelli. It follows from this that French citizens would like the EU to take a more regulated capitalism path, with more interventionism in the agricultural sphere with a view to safeguard French and European socio-economic interests. Contrary to French respondents, British respondents are overall in opposition to the EU transfer of the agriculture policy. British respondents are opposed to the EU transfer of the agriculture policy as they perceive the common agricultural policy (CAP) to be counterproductive and artificial – sheltering artificially European farmers from international competition –, bureaucratic, expensive and not giving value to end consumers. It is important to note that British citizens are subject to an almost unanimous political discourse of the Conservative Party, the Liberal Democrats and to a lesser extent the Labour Party which denounces as such the CAP as a too interventionist system disturbing market rules and producing expensive inefficiencies. These political parties tend to support the idea that European agricultural markets should be subject to the law of markets and therefore subject to international competition. The role of the EU for them (especially for those with right-wing and centrist views) should be purely to make sure that free competition occurs and that European farmers are enticed to become more competitive. British citizens with left- and especially extreme left-wing opinions may be though partly seduced by a common European agricultural policy which would give some guarantees of income to farmers.

French individuals of any political opinions approve the EU transfer of the social inclusion policy. This may be explained by the fact that although they are critical of the current EU as deemed to neglect social aspects, they want the EU to adopt a generous European social policy as a key priority. In other words, they wish to see the establishment of a social Europe. The functionality argument at the European level plays here a role in this as in an integrated Europe, the EU may be considered by French respondents as best placed to harmonize the level of social protection – at a high level – in EU countries and enable European firms to compete on an equal playing field within Europe. If British respondents with left-wing or

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150 Except British respondents with extreme left-wing ideological opinions who are marginally in favour of the EU transfer of the agriculture policy.

151 As substantiated by polls in the study period, see background chapter (chapter four) on France.
centrist political opinions also see a functionality argument in the EU transfer of the social inclusion policy and are more inclined towards it – with a view to acquiring greater social rights –, they are, like British respondents with right-wing political views, opposed to an extensive European social policy which would damage the relatively healthy British economic and social situation. It is an important point of divergence between the types of EU favoured by French and British respondents.

French respondents of any ideological views support the EU transfer of the regional policy (those with extreme right-wing views more marginally). This may be explained by the fact that respondents perceive that transferring the regional policy at the European level can bring positive externalities or economies of scale – including the facilitation of trade – and as such the EU level may be considered as best to deal with the regional policy especially in the context of one common European market (subsidiarity principle). The relative lower perceived importance of the regional policy – and perhaps its more consensual nature – compared to, for example, social policy or employment policy for French individuals, may also justify this transfer. British individuals of any political views also back the EU transfer of this policy for the same reasons although British individuals with left-wing and centrist political views do more so as they may think that transferring the regional policy to the EU may contribute to increasing the public expenditure in this area.

The EU transfer of the humanitarian aid, scientific research and environment policies is also approved by French respondents of any ideological views as the EU is perceived to be best to deal with issues pertaining to these policies. The latter are also deemed less important compared to policies such as, for example, employment and currency management\(^\text{152}\) and perhaps more consensual. In the same line, British individuals of all opinions approve this transfer of policies for the same reasons but they, particularly those with right-wing and centrist views, are more reluctant to transfer these at the EU level as they are concerned about the excessive interventionism and financial commitment that the EU may have in these fields, which could disturb the balance of competitive markets and in turn affect growth.

\(^{152}\) Albeit the degree of importance of humanitarian aid, scientific research and environment policies may vary between political ideologies.
and employment. This divergence of views between French and British citizens is the consequence of a different perception of what the EU should be, in other words divergence on the type of EU they favour.

French citizens are not in favour of transferring the education and health policies to the EU as they may perceive that French successive governments have relatively better dealt with these policies and that the national level -- rather than the EU (in virtue of the subsidiarity principle) -- may be best placed to cater for these. The subsidiarity principle may also apply to explain British reluctance to transfer these policies to the EU. The fact that, in the second part of the 1990s, the Labour government has also increased its commitment to public services and to education and health in particular,\(^{153}\) has reduced somewhat the appeal that a common EU policy, especially for those with left-wing political views, could have on education and health. Furthermore, in the British and to a lesser extent in the French context (perhaps more so for French citizens with centrist and right-wing political opinions), British and French individuals may view the relative freedom of education to be potentially threatened by an EU transfer.

French and British nationals are opposed to the EU transferring of the cultural policy as they perceive that transferring the cultural policy at the European level would bring limited functionality. In addition to functionality reasons, for British citizens, the link with national identity in this refusal is especially important but they, especially those with right-wing political views, may also fear an excessive expenditure commitment of the EU in this policy area. In addition to functionality reasons, for French respondents of all political opinions, this refusal may be partly explained by the link with national identity but also by the fear that the EU expenditure commitment in this policy area would be reduced. The fear that more competitive rules at the EU level would apply to a cultural sector deemed different and beyond a market economy mentality, may also partly explain this refusal.

British and French respondents whatever their ideological views are in favour of transferring the foreign policy to the EU because of the functionality its offers at the European level but also because of its relatively lower importance compared to other

\(^{153}\) Including the Labour Government’s commitment to raise public services expenditure further in the post 2001 period.
policies such as for example employment, education or health. Traditionally citizens also show more tolerance (and more freedom of action for governments) towards the management of foreign policy issues – except in the case of war – than towards the management of domestic issues.¹⁵⁴ British individuals with right-wing ideological views (and especially those with extreme right-wing ideological views) and to a lesser extent those with centrist ideological views are less inclined to this transfer than British citizens with left-wing ideological opinions. The rationale behind this is that whilst they perceive the positive externalities and economies of scale that a European foreign policy can bring, they are perhaps more concerned that a common policy in this area could neglect somewhat the link with the USA and Commonwealth countries such as Australia and Canada which are converging economically and socially with the United Kingdom. The national sovereignty issue particularly for British respondents with right-wing political views¹⁵⁵ also acts as a brake on this EU transfer.

French respondents are in favour of transferring the defence policy to the EU, except those with extreme right-wing views opposing this transfer, and those with right-wing political opinions or with extreme left-wing political opinions supporting the EU transfer more marginally. The perceived functionality of the related policy at the European level justifies this as the fact that the defence policy is also not seen as a national priority – in a time of peace – compared to other policies such as employment policy, health and education for individuals. For French individuals with right-wing political views and more especially those with extreme right-wing political views, the EU transfer of the defence policy is nevertheless less popular as the latter is associated with the national sovereignty issue and more especially with the preservation of national independence. These issues are instrumentalised in the political discourse of extreme right- and right-wing parties such as FN, MNR, MPF and to a lesser extent RPR. For French individuals with extreme left-wing political views, the EU transfer is also less popular as in symbiosis with the discourse of

¹⁵⁴ The harsher current international political climate may have though contributed to restrict the freedom of action granted to national governments on the management of foreign policy issues, and by extension may itself constrain the further development and realization of a European foreign, security and defence policy today – especially for particular policy decisions. Nevertheless, this needs to be further investigated.

¹⁵⁵ And more especially British individuals with extreme right-wing views, who are marginally in favour of the EU transfer of the foreign policy (mean of 1.5128).
extreme left political parties, the defence policy has for them very low importance in
the national context as in the European context – they moreover favour a policy of
demilitarisation. As far as British respondents are concerned, whatever their
ideological views, they are opposed to transferring the defence policy to the EU. In
the British context, whilst the perspective of positive externalities or economies of
scale in the EU transfer of this policy may have some appeal especially for
individuals with left-wing political opinions, the issue of national sovereignty and
national independence takes special importance in the refusal to transfer this policy
at the EU level, more so for individuals with right-wing (including extreme right)
and centrist political views.

French respondents whatever their ideological views are in favour of transferring the
immigration and asylum policy to the EU\textsuperscript{156} while all British respondents whatever
their ideological views are opposed to transferring the immigration and asylum
policy to the EU.\textsuperscript{157} French citizens are more willing to transfer the immigration and
asylum policies to the EU than British respondents as they feel that immigration is
mishandled by successive French governments\textsuperscript{158} and that in virtue of the principle
of subsidiarity, immigration would be better controlled at the EU level. They feel
that the EU – at least the type of EU they favour – would put in place a more
restrictive and effective policy towards immigration from outside the EU than the
French one,\textsuperscript{159} although they are critical of some of the agreements in place such as
the Schengen agreements and its consequences on immigration. Furthermore the
importance of national sovereignty and national identity also explains the greater
reticence of French individuals with right- and extreme right-wing political opinions
towards the EU transfer of the immigration and asylum policy, although they (those
with extreme right-wing political views though more marginally so) are in favour to
this EU transfer. In the British context, British citizens have also placed
immigration as one of their key concerns in the related period but more especially in

\textsuperscript{156} Including French respondents with extreme right-wing views but more marginal support for the
EU transfer of the immigration and asylum policy for them.

\textsuperscript{157} Including British respondents with extreme left-wing political views but more marginal opposition
to the EU transfer of the immigration and asylum policy for them.

\textsuperscript{158} Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, French respondents have been unhappy and worried with
the level of immigration to France. Immigration is one of the key concerns of French citizens as
discussed in the Background chapter (chapter four) on France.

\textsuperscript{159} France has one of the most liberal immigration policies in Europe.
the second part of the study period. Although British respondents consider that the EU, at least the type of EU they favour, can play a role in the control of immigration and asylum in virtue of the principle of subsidiarity, the importance of national sovereignty and national identity but also partly the mismanagement of illegal immigration in other EU countries such as Spain, France and Italy, and the important economic immigration of European nationals and residents to the United Kingdom in the study period explain their opposition to the EU transfer of this policy.

French and British respondents whatever their political opinions (including those with extreme political views) are opposed to the transfer of police and urban & juvenile crime prevention policies to the EU. French nationals are though significantly less opposed to this transfer than British ones. The reluctance of French and British respondents to transfer the related policies to the EU can be accounted for by national sovereignty concerns as police and urban & juvenile crime prevention policies are traditionally associated with the duty of the state. It can also be explained by the fact that respondents perceive crime fighting and prevention policing to be best exercised at the national level rather than at the EU level. The role of the EU in this policy area is not completely denied as the EU is seen in principle as being able to help fight crime. However the permeability of European borders – partly concomitant upon the principle of free movements of people, services and goods – and the Schengen agreements implementation are perceived by respondents as contributing to crime and law and order issues in both these nations. These two issues are somewhat instrumentalised as such by French political parties (particularly non-mainstream ones but also factions within mainstream parties) and by British political parties (both mainstream and non-mainstream ones).

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160 See background chapter (chapter four) on the United Kingdom.
161 One of the priorities of the EU was seen as developing a common approach to immigration and crime (refer to Background chapter (chapter four) on the United Kingdom).
162 See background chapter (chapter four) on France and the United Kingdom.
163 Or potential full implementation in the British context.
Finally, French and British respondents whatever their political opinions\footnote{164 Including French and British respondents with extreme political views. Nevertheless the support for the EU transfer of the anti-drug policy is more marginal for British individuals with extreme right-wing views.} favour the transfer of the anti-drug policy to the EU. French nationals are though significantly more in favour of this transfer than British ones. The willingness of French and British respondents to transfer the related policy may be vindicated by the fact that respondents perceive that the fight against drugs can be tackled more efficiently and effectively at the European level than at the national level. The significant lower support of British individuals with centrist and right-wing political views for the EU transfer of the anti-drug policy compared to those with left-wing political opinions may be explained by the fact that the former (and especially those with extreme right-wing ideological views) whilst perceiving the functional benefit of a European policy in this field, are perhaps concerned that a common policy in this area could be too liberal. The national sovereignty issue, particularly for British respondents with centrist and right-wing political views,\footnote{165 And more especially British individuals with extreme right-wing views, who are marginally in favour of the EU transfer of the anti-drug policy (mean of 1.53).} also acts as a brake on this EU transfer.
8- CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The present research forms a break with much of the previous research into public opinion on European integration, which followed a holistic, cross-national approach at the aggregate or individual level with a view to uncovering cross-national vectors of explanation. Whilst this type of approach is itself useful and valuable for identifying common denominators of EU support and informing national and EU decision makers, it does not take adequate account of the cultural, historical, economic, social, and political specificities of each nation, which can be the key to explaining public opinion about EU integration. The environmental context of each nation nevertheless contributes greatly to shaping opinion (see for example Taggart, 2006; Voessing, 2005). The present research acknowledged this by carrying out a comprehensive comparative analysis of French and British public opinion on the EU in a period of significant changes brought out by European integration (that is to say from 1992 to 2001). It examined in particular the effects of national and individual utilitarian appraisals on EU support and considered whether attachments to different socio-economic models structure the policy preferences of French and British citizens with regard to the EU.

Besides the novelty of doing a Franco-British comparative study in the period from 1992-2001 – relying on creative hypotheses – the present thesis corrects some previous distortions, offers a more rigorous treatment of the effect of utilitarian explanations on EU support than past research has done and provides some methodological enhancements. Thus, the effect of utilitarian explanations is considered in relation to evaluations of both current EU membership and further European integration at both the individual and aggregate data levels. Current EU membership is gauged through the use of both EU benefit and membership dependent variables which provide a more precise and discriminating appraisal of current EU membership support, capturing in the process a fuller range of underlying attitudes.

The utilization of the seven point future integration dependent variable specifies views in a more precise way than the dependent variables used in other studies.
Where possible, middle category answers ("don’t know" and "neither good nor bad") are also integrated in the statistical treatment. While this has provided some methodological enhancements from what has been done previously, it does not take full account of the "don’t know" answers. Given the modelling of "don’t know" in the present analysis, this does not lead to major distortions in the results but nevertheless the full treatment of "don’t know" answers can be a fruitful line of enquiry in its own right for future research. The mixture of aggregate and individual data level analyses involving a range of diverse data, combined with the mutual reinforcement and complementarity of hypotheses tested in the study, is not only suited to the objectives and purpose of the research but also enhances its validity.

Moreover, the present analysis incorporates not only the study of attitudinal patterns (that is to say, citizens’ perceptions regarding European and national economic, social and political factors) but also assessment of the relationship between actual data and support for integration. Finally, another benefit of the current research is that it encompasses meticulous and exhaustive statistical modelling and subsumes original variables (or new ways of operationalising variables) in the analysis: for example integration of immigration, crime, bureaucracy and tax burden in hypothesis I, incorporation of varied subjective economic performance evaluation variables in hypothesis II, and integration of a comprehensive range of policies operationalised in a novel manner with directional content of policies in hypothesis III.

The present research has confirmed earlier findings (for example Gabel, 1998a; Sanchez-Cuenca, 2000; Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Anderson and Kaltenthaler, 1996; Kritzinger, 2003 and Angelucci, 1993) that utilitarian appraisals play a role in forming public opinion about the EU and that citizens use national proxies to express attitudes towards the EU. However, what the present research has shown is that in a context of increased visibility and politicisation of the EU in France and the United Kingdom in the period from 1992 to 2001, utilitarian appraisals about the EU have assumed increasing importance in moulding citizens’ attitudes towards the EU, increasingly eroding affective EU support – especially in the case of France where the latter is more developed. The socialisation theory as an explanation of public support for EU membership and to a lesser extent for further EU integration is
therefore losing weight and giving way to economic, social and societal assessments of how the EU is affecting nation states and individuals. The significant drop in the level of support for current EU membership and further integration in France and the United Kingdom in the study period – the fall has though been greater in the United Kingdom than in France – is the result of discontent with the perceived contribution of the EU to the national and individual economic and social situations. This is a reflection of the fact that both countries favour a change of political direction in the EU to cater for their own policy concerns.

Thus if the level of support for the incumbent government, the socialisation effect and the relatively low sense of exclusive national identity among French citizens partly explain French public support for current EU membership and further integration, the effect of socialisation on EU support is nevertheless giving way to national economic and social assessments, as underlined above. French citizens are preoccupied by the persistent problems of their country, and perceive the EU, and more particularly a neo-liberal EU, as contributing to those problems. These perceptions feed on, and into, a growing politicisation and protest in relation to European integration.

Nevertheless, regarding the results of hypothesis III, French citizens with left-wing, centrist or even right-wing ideological opinions are in principle in favour of transferring policies such as employment, immigration and asylum, social inclusion, environment, scientific research, agriculture, currency management, defence, humanitarian aid, anti-drug, regional and foreign policies to the EU. On the evidence examined and in the work of other authors (including polls), it seems probable that they view the EU – at least the EU model that they favour – as best able to deal with these policies, while they see successive French governments as having failed to deal effectively with some of them. French citizens would like the EU to move towards a more regulated model of capitalism, with more interventionism in the economic and social spheres. However, French citizens are not in favour of transferring health, education and cultural policies to the EU, perhaps because they perceive that French governments have dealt relatively better with these and that the national level may be most appropriate for them. French citizens

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166 This is tantamount to the subsidiarity principle.
nationals are also opposed to transferring police and urban & juvenile crime prevention policies to the EU, which likewise implies an assumption that the national level is best placed to provide for these. However, this needs further investigation.

British opposition to further integration and to a lesser extent to current EU membership to some extent reflects a perception of the EU as an excessively interventionist, bureaucratic, over-regulated, somewhat uncompetitive and inflexible economic entity. The political role of the EU is also contested. In this stance, the EU is deemed to threaten British economic growth and social progress accomplished throughout the study period. This view is reinforced by the political discourse of much of the right but also partly of the centre and left. The importance of national sovereignty, a limited socialisation effect and a strong exclusive feeling of national identity bolster opposition to further integration and to a lesser extent the current EU. British citizens’ opposition to the European Union is not a total opposition to any form of European Union but is grounded on a preference for an EU embracing free market policies and co-operation between independent nation-states rather than supra-nationalism with its corollary of a superstate.

In this perspective, British political discourse in the media\textsuperscript{167} tends to underline the opportunities that the single European market offers British firms: for example, in terms of employment. Firms can benefit in the United Kingdom from a more favourable, competitive, company- and job-friendly environment and as such can benefit from the single European market. The results of Hypothesis III demonstrate that British respondents do not wish to transfer competency to the EU in a number of policy areas, such as immigration and asylum, health, education, police, urban and juvenile crime prevention, currency management, employment, defence, culture, agriculture and social inclusion (though the latter opinion is held only by individuals with extreme right-wing views). Yet, largely irrespective of their ideological leanings, British nationals support, in virtue of the subsidiarity principle, the

\textsuperscript{167} Especially regarding the role of the incumbent government in the management of the EU at the time.
competency transfer to the EU of policies such as environment, scientific research, humanitarian aid, anti-drug, regional, foreign and social inclusion policies.\textsuperscript{168}

The results of the present research have highlighted the fact that much of the earlier research (for example Sanchez-Cuenca, 2000; Gabel, 1998a and Hix, 2007) has offered too simple a view of the relationship between citizens and the EU. The nature of EU support itself – current EU membership and further European integration examined separately – the specific policy aspect considered – for example crime level, unemployment and corruption – and the domestic environment in which these are interpreted and connected, have not been considered sufficiently. Although individuals may not have a sophisticated knowledge of the EU, they are able to use information shortcuts from their social and political environment to express their attitudes towards the EU.

The literature has perhaps over-emphasized the influence of political parties on voters. The growing visibility and impact of the EU on citizens in the 1990s have also increasingly enabled citizens to be less dependent on party cues and to see for themselves the policy consequences of European integration. The utilitarian argument can certainly be a vector of support for current EU membership and future European integration in both the French and British contexts – more so in the former – but this vector of support is ultimately circumscribed by the subsidiarity principle and the type of EU model favoured by French and British individuals. The French prefer a widely integrated EU based on a regulated capitalism model with a high level of social protection and where the principle of European preference is espoused. The British preference is for the EU to be a loose intergovernmental association of nations where neo-liberalism and free trade rules prevail.

The present research has political implications, policy implications and some predictive value. Among the main political implications of this research is that the EU is increasingly evaluated according to an obligation of (good) economic and social results in the eyes of the British and French citizens, which should materialize at the national level so as to elicit public support for current EU membership and further integration. This implication is even more important and perhaps more

\textsuperscript{168} Individuals with right-wing ideological opinions wish to transfer the social inclusion policy only very marginally to the European level.
worrying in the British context as EU entry and continued membership have been primarily justified by the economic argument. Lack of economic and social achievements may threaten further European integration — as was demonstrated in the 2005 referendum failure on the European constitution in France\textsuperscript{169} (Ipsos-Le Figaro, 29 May 2005). The results of the present research also give some credence to the CIA's prediction (2005) that the EU may even splinter or disintegrate in the long term if it is perceived as failing to generate economic and social progress.

Another political implication of the present research is that British pro-European politicians need to counterbalance the economic argument that they developed for continued EU participation by working with other actors in the education, media, sport and commercial fields, and more generally with civil society, to argue the case for European integration not just on pragmatic grounds but also as a positive value. This would require espousing the notion of compatibility of British collective identity with the European one and the European democratic ideal. In the French context, if the socialisation effect — including the compatibility and affective link of French identity with the European one — provides some cushioning effect for poor economic and social results on public EU support, EU and national decision-makers ought to reflect on actions which may undermine that effect: the potential entry of Turkey into the EU is one illustration of this as it is seen not just as a threat to the economy and society of France and the EU but also as an identity threat (Ipsos-Le Figaro, 27 September 2004; Ipsos-Le Figaro, 9 December 2002; Ipsos-Canal Ipsos, 10 December 2001). The scope and nature of affective EU support may be, moreover, an interesting area for future research in its own right.

The importance of the utilitarian element in public EU support points to the need for a result-oriented and democratically-led EU. Public consultation on EU policy should therefore occur more often and take multiple forms, from the elaboration of the policy to its implementation and monitoring. Respecting the principle of subsidiarity is particularly important in this area and inherently connected with a result-oriented EU.

\textsuperscript{169} The rejection of the EU constitution was also linked to a French preference for a constitution giving more space to social aspects.
In terms of policy implications, this dissertation has demonstrated that French and British citizens back two different types of EU which are at odds with the concept of one integrated Europe with common objectives and policies applying to all simultaneously or at different time periods – a multi-speed Europe is therefore unpropitious here. A multi-track Europe and especially an à la carte Europe appear more relevant to the French and British contexts. An à la carte Europe seems to fit the British public preference best as it is a more minimalist, intergovernmental mode of integration, but a multi-track Europe also offers some appeal for policies where there are strong utilitarian grounds for integrating a particular policy at the European level (see for example Stubb, 1996; Koellicker, 2001 for a categorisation of differentiated integration). A multi-track mode of European integration is suitable to the French context as it can enable France to proceed further along the line of economic and social integration as wished by public opinion without being prevented from doing so or slowed down by the regular decision-making structure of the Union or by particular unwilling nations.

Although differentiated integration could help to deal with the differences between French and British aspirations, the results of this research highlight the difficulty of reconciling the French preference for regulated capitalism with the British one for neo-liberalism and free trade rules at the EU level (coupled with different integration arrangements), although the problem is moderated by the utilitarian element. Managing the gap between the two sets of national preferences at the EU level thus translates into concrete policy choices: for example, European protectionism versus unhampered free trade; expansionary or contractionary public expenditure; strict or soft market regulations; flexible labour market or not; or even foreign policy where the relationship with the United States is a subject of debate.

In the 1990s, the EU-related changes in national policies towards more deregulation, liberalisation – in for example financial markets, telecommunications, air transport and to a lesser extent in agriculture – and (greater) macro-economic discipline affected France relatively more than the United Kingdom. They were often in place in the UK before EU intervention and were also inspired partly by the UK’s own experience. These changes have, nevertheless, been counterbalanced by the emergence of a European social policy (based on the social chapter and the focus on
growth, employment and anti-discrimination measures in European policies) partly influenced by France’s experience. Overall, though, France underwent greater changes in policies and practices as a result of EU actions than the United Kingdom. Yet, British public opinion still perceives the EU as undemocratic, bureaucratic, too interventionist, and value disenhancing. Thus, in effect, the British public sees these changes as not far-reaching enough, whilst French public opinion sees the EU as too liberal, deregulated and excessively open to world competition and perceives these changes as contributing to France’s economic and social problems. The EU seems therefore to be caught between incompatible sets of national preferences, so that the direction of integration to some extent displeases both British and French public opinion. This could itself threaten the sustainability of the EU (and lead to its fragmentation) in the long term, especially if it is not seen to produce positive national economic and social results which could soothe discontent.

Future research may extend the current research into the post 2001 period and apply it to other specific national and even regional contexts. Today’s polls (FT-Harris, 14 March 2007, 25 January 2007) seem nevertheless to confirm the importance of the utilitarian dimension in EU attitudes and suggest a preference for different types of EU model across nations. Thus, according to these polls, there is still relatively strong discontent with the output of the EU in France and the UK, as well as in other EU countries such as Germany, Italy and to a lesser extent Spain. Yet there is a willingness among French, Italian, Spanish, German and to a lesser extent British publics to support greater EU involvement in the economic and social spheres, although preferences concerning the nature and scope of this involvement may vary from one national public to another – especially between France and the United Kingdom.

Given the primacy of the utilitarian dimension in public opinion and the problem of compatibility between the models of integration favoured by different national publics, EU policy makers need to devise flexible modes of integration which satisfy both national publics but also achieve positive outcomes in the economic and social spheres. The interaction between these two legitimators of European integration is made more complex by two factors. Firstly, the relationship between performance and European integration model type is one of only partial compensation between
each element as both are complementary to the legitimacy of the EU for national publics. Thus a deficiency in the type of integration model followed can be partly offset by performance, and vice versa. Secondly, the relationship between the related criteria of EU legitimacy is one of partial displacement for national public opinion: resolving a legitimacy deficit in one area can displace the problem onto another – thus resolving a performance problem by extending the EU’s scope into adjacent functional areas or increasing the use of majority voting in the council of ministers may exacerbate a legitimacy deficit in the type of European integration model favoured by national publics. Managing the EU justification criteria is made even more difficult by the fact that the size of the EU’s membership and the scope of the EU’s authority continue to change. The management of these dilemmas requires skilful public policies with national populations – rather than intra-European elites – as the addressees of legitimacy claims.
REFERENCES


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Appendix 1
## Appendix 1.1

### Table 1.1: EU Membership: Good Thing - Bad Thing 1992-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Neither good nor bad</th>
<th>A bad thing</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td>5180</td>
<td>2969</td>
<td>1388</td>
<td>9537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within France</td>
<td>54.3%</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>45.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UK</strong></td>
<td>4941</td>
<td>3661</td>
<td>2898</td>
<td>11500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within France</td>
<td>43.0%</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>54.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>10121</td>
<td>6630</td>
<td>4286</td>
<td>21037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within France</td>
<td>48.1%</td>
<td>31.5%</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>48.1%</td>
<td>31.5%</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer

### Table 1.2: Country Benefit From EU Membership 1992-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>benefitted</th>
<th>dk</th>
<th>not benefitted</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td>4609</td>
<td>2095</td>
<td>3301</td>
<td>10005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within France</td>
<td>46.1%</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UK</strong></td>
<td>4650</td>
<td>2769</td>
<td>5576</td>
<td>12995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within France</td>
<td>35.8%</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>56.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>9259</td>
<td>4864</td>
<td>8877</td>
<td>23000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within France</td>
<td>40.3%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>38.6%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>40.3%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>38.6%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer
Table 1.3: Support for the Euro 1992-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>France and UK variable *</th>
<th>Q31 EU PROPOSALS: SINGLE CURRENCY Crosstabulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>For</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France and UK variable</td>
<td>Count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within France and UK variable</td>
<td>62.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>27.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within France and UK variable</td>
<td>29.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within France and UK variable</td>
<td>44.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>44.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer

Table 1.4: Support for EU Enlargement 2000-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>France and UK variable *</th>
<th>Q31 EU PROPOSALS: ENLARGEMENT Crosstabulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>For</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France and UK variable</td>
<td>Count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within France and UK variable</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within France and UK variable</td>
<td>36.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within France and UK variable</td>
<td>36.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>36.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer
Table 1.5: Enlargement, Priority for the EU 1997-2001

| France and UK variable * Q31bb EU PRIORITIES: NEW MEMBER COUNTRIES Crosstabulation |
|---------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
|                                  | Priority | DK     | Not a priority | Total  |
| France and UK variable           | Count   |        |                |        |
| France                           | 907     | 331    | 3767           | 5005   |
| % within France and UK variable  | 18.1%   | 6.6%   | 75.3%          | 100.0% |
| % of Total                       | 7.9%    | 2.9%   | 32.7%          | 43.5%  |
| UK                               | Count   |        |                |        |
| 1947                             | 1082    | 3473   | 6502           |
| % within France and UK variable  | 29.9%   | 16.6%  | 53.4%          | 100.0% |
| % of Total                       | 16.9%   | 9.4%   | 30.2%          | 56.5%  |
| Total                            | Count   |        |                |        |
| 2854                             | 1413    | 7240   | 11507          |
| % within France and UK variable  | 24.8%   | 12.3%  | 62.9%          | 100.0% |
| % of Total                       | 24.8%   | 12.3%  | 62.9%          | 100.0% |

Source: Eurobarometer

Table 1.6: Desired European Unification Speed 1992-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q21 EUROP UNIFICATION SPEED - PREFERENCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France N Valid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Deviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK N Valid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Deviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer
Appendix 3
Appendix 3.1

Scale reliability analysis with “don’t know” answer in benefit variable

### Reliability Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items</th>
<th>N of Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.832</td>
<td>.856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Item Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>benefit var with DK</td>
<td>1.6582</td>
<td>.25292</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q17aa DV: good thing</td>
<td>1.4814</td>
<td>.18459</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Inter-Item Correlation Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>benefit var with DK</th>
<th>q17aa DV: good thing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>benefit var with DK</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q17aa DV: good thing</td>
<td>.748</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The covariance matrix is calculated and used in the analysis.

### Item-Total Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Scale Mean if Item Deleted</th>
<th>Scale Variance if Item Deleted</th>
<th>Corrected Item-Total Correlation</th>
<th>Squared Multiple Correlation</th>
<th>Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>benefit var with DK</td>
<td>1.4814</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>.748</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q17aa DV: good thing</td>
<td>1.6582</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>.748</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. The value is negative due to a negative average covariance among items. This violates reliability model assumptions. You may want to check item codings.

### Scale Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>N of Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.1396</td>
<td>.168</td>
<td>.40977</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Scale reliability analysis without “don’t know” answer in benefit variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items</th>
<th>N of Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.851</td>
<td>.868</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Item Statistics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>q17aa DV: good thing benefit variable without DK</td>
<td>1.4814</td>
<td>.18459</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.3027</td>
<td>.14222</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Inter-Item Correlation Matrix**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>q17aa DV: good thing</th>
<th>benefit variable without DK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>q17aa DV: good thing</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>benefit variable without DK</td>
<td>.767</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The covariance matrix is calculated and used in the analysis.

**Item-Total Statistics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Scale Mean if Item Deleted</th>
<th>Scale Variance if Item Deleted</th>
<th>Corrected Item-Total Correlation</th>
<th>Squared Multiple Correlation</th>
<th>Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>1.3027</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>.767</td>
<td>.588</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.4814</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>.767</td>
<td>.588</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. The value is negative due to a negative average covariance among items. This violates reliability model assumptions. You may want to check item codings.

**Scale Statistics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>N of Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.7841</td>
<td>.095</td>
<td>.30750</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3.2

Scale reliability analysis with “don’t know” answer in benefit variable

### Reliability Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>France and UK variable</th>
<th>Cronbach's Alpha</th>
<th>Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items</th>
<th>N of Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>.662</td>
<td>.671</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>.745</td>
<td>.749</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Item Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>France and UK variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q18 EU MEMBERSHIP - GOOD/BAD</td>
<td>1.6024</td>
<td>.72845</td>
<td>9537.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>benefit variable with dk as middle category</td>
<td>1.8609</td>
<td>.89000</td>
<td>9537.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q18 EU MEMBERSHIP - GOOD/BAD</td>
<td>1.8223</td>
<td>.80627</td>
<td>11496.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>benefit variable with dk as middle category</td>
<td>2.0641</td>
<td>.91334</td>
<td>11496.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Inter-Item Correlation Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>France and UK variable</th>
<th>Q18 EU MEMBERSHIP - GOOD/BAD</th>
<th>benefit variable with dk as middle category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q18 EU MEMBERSHIP - GOOD/BAD</td>
<td>.504</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q18 EU MEMBERSHIP - GOOD/BAD</td>
<td>.598</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The covariance matrix is calculated and used in the analysis.
### Item-Total Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>France and UK variable</th>
<th>Scale Mean if Item Deleted</th>
<th>Scale Variance if Item Deleted</th>
<th>Corrected Item-Total Correlation</th>
<th>Squared Multiple Correlation</th>
<th>Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q18 EU MEMBERSHIP - GOOD/BAD benefit variable with dk as middle category</td>
<td>1.8609</td>
<td>.792</td>
<td>.504</td>
<td>.254</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q18 EU MEMBERSHIP - GOOD/BAD benefit variable with dk as middle category</td>
<td>2.0641</td>
<td>.834</td>
<td>.598</td>
<td>.358</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* a. The value is negative due to a negative average covariance among items. This violates reliability model assumptions. You may want to check item codings.
### Scale Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>France and UK variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>N of Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>3.4633</td>
<td>1.977</td>
<td>1.40596</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>3.8864</td>
<td>2.365</td>
<td>1.53799</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Scale reliability analysis without "don’t know" answer in benefit variable

### Reliability Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>France and UK variable</th>
<th>Cronbach's Alpha</th>
<th>Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items</th>
<th>N of Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>.664</td>
<td>.703</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>.712</td>
<td>.772</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Item Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>France and UK variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France Q18 EU MEMBERSHIP - GOOD/BAD</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>.750</td>
<td>7738.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q19 EU MEMBERSHIP - COUNTRY BENEFIT</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>.493</td>
<td>7738.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK Q18 EU MEMBERSHIP - GOOD/BAD</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>.837</td>
<td>9636.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q19 EU MEMBERSHIP - COUNTRY BENEFIT</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>.499</td>
<td>9636.78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Inter-Item Correlation Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>France and UK variable</th>
<th>Q18 EU MEMBERSHIP - GOOD/BAD</th>
<th>Q19 EU MEMBERSHIP - COUNTRY BENEFIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France Q18 EU MEMBERSHIP - GOOD/BAD</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q19 EU MEMBERSHIP - COUNTRY BENEFIT</td>
<td>.542</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK Q18 EU MEMBERSHIP - GOOD/BAD</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q19 EU MEMBERSHIP - COUNTRY BENEFIT</td>
<td>.629</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The covariance matrix is calculated and used in the analysis.
### Item-Total Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>France and UK variable</th>
<th>Scale Mean if Item Deleted</th>
<th>Scale Variance if Item Deleted</th>
<th>Corrected Item-Total Correlation</th>
<th>Squared Multiple Correlation</th>
<th>Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q18 EU MEMBERSHIP - GOOD/BAD</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>0.243</td>
<td>0.542</td>
<td>0.294</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q19 EU MEMBERSHIP - COUNTRY BENEFIT</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>0.563</td>
<td>0.542</td>
<td>0.294</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UK</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q18 EU MEMBERSHIP - GOOD/BAD</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>0.249</td>
<td>0.629</td>
<td>0.395</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q19 EU MEMBERSHIP - COUNTRY BENEFIT</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>0.700</td>
<td>0.629</td>
<td>0.395</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a. The value is negative due to a negative average covariance among items. This violates reliability model assumptions. You may want to check item codings.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>France and UK variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>N of Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>1.207</td>
<td>1.098</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>1.473</td>
<td>1.214</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 4
Appendix 4.1

Table 4.6: Public Opinion’s perceptions about the EU Action on specific policies in 1992 and 1994

The EU has positive effects or negative ones on:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Positive(%)</th>
<th>Negative(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1992¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment protection</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace and security in Europe</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation of world trade</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug fighting</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth training</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth return</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fight against unemployment</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future of agriculture</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of immigration at the Borders</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fight against terrorism &amp; security</td>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic health of companies</td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard of living</td>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social security &amp; pensions system</td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ifop-L’Express (30 April 1994) and Ifop-Capital (3 Sept 1992)

Note ¹: For the survey in 1992, people interviewed were asked to consider the long term positive and negative effect of Maastricht and opening of European borders – single market – on specific policies above.
Table 4.7: Public Opinion’s perceptions about the EU Action on specific policies in 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU has been rather positive or negative for:</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>No Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maintain peace</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment protect</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic development</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price stability</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth training</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everyday life</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social rights defence</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create Jobs</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BVA-Le Point (25 March 1996)

Table 4.8: Public Opinion’s perceptions about the EU Action on specific policies in 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concerning each of the following domains, would you say that the action of the EU has:</th>
<th>Rather positive effects %</th>
<th>Rather negative effects %</th>
<th>Neither one nor the other %</th>
<th>No opinion %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environment Protection</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Growth</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth training &amp; education</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace in Europe</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo conflict Resolution</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Protection</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Reduction</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration Control</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax decrease</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture Future</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ifop-Nouvel Observateur (8 May 1999)
**Table 4.9: Public Opinion’s Support for the Single European Currency**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dec 1991¹</th>
<th>March 1992²</th>
<th>October 1993³</th>
<th>Dec 1995⁴</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In favour</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposed</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Opinion</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Oct 1996⁵</th>
<th>Apr 1997⁶</th>
<th>Oct 1998⁷</th>
<th>May 2000⁸</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In favour</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposed</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Opinion</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Table 4.10: Public Opinion’s Views about the Single European Currency**

Does the single European currency evoke for you something very or rather positive, something rather negative or very negative?:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nov 1998¹</th>
<th>Feb 1999¹</th>
<th>Feb 2000²</th>
<th>May 2000²</th>
<th>Sept 2001³</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very positive</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather positive</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total positive</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather negative</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very negative</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total negative</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Opinion</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ipsos-AFP (10 March 1999)¹; Ipsos-AFP (6 June 2000)²; Ipsos-AFP (10 December 2001)³
Table 4.11: Public Opinion’s Views about the Single European Currency Impact on Specific Issues in 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive or negative consequences of Euro on:</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>None</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>French exports abroad</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation level</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest rates</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchasing power</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everyday life</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savings protection</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment level</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence of France’s economic policy</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social protection</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pensions</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ifop-Geopolitique (3 April 1996)


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In your opinion, the establishment of the euro will have the following consequences?</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No Opinion</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A greater stability of the currency</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A greater dynamism for the French economy</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concerns (‘tracas’) in the everyday Life of people</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra sacrifices for people like Yourself</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The loss of decision power of the French government</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The loss of identity of France</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A domination risk of Germany</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easier travels</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easier commercial exchanges</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sofres-L’ExpanslOn (5 December 1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>No effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaries</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sofres-L’Expansion (5 December 1998)
Appendix 4.2

Table 4.14: EU Membership

If there were a referendum now on whether Britain should stay in or get out of the European Union, how would you vote?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Base:</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>All expressing an opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stay in %</td>
<td>Get out %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975 referendum result</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 1993</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1994</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1996</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 1996</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1997</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-28 April 1997</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1997</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1997</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1998</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
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Source: Ipsos Mori (2003)
### Table 4.15: Joining the Euro

If there were a referendum now on whether Britain should be part of a Single European Currency, how would you vote?

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If there were a referendum now on whether Britain should be part of a Single European Currency, how would you vote?

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Source: Ipsos Mori (2005a)

Table 4.16: Joining the Euro with Government Urge

If the government were to strongly urge that Britain should be part of a Single European Currency, how would you vote?

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Source: Ipsos Mori (2005b)