
Islamist and Nationalistic Attachments as Determinants of Political Preferences in Turkey

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Abstract

In this article we examine the mechanism by which the political opinions of Turkish citizens can be explained on the basis of attachments to Islam and the Turkish nation. Using insights from political psychology we review the dynamic role of these considerations as determinants of political judgements. We explore studies that question the appropriateness of a unidimensional scale of Islamism vs. Secularism in explaining citizens' political placements, and we argue that the two ideologies can influence concurrently the way citizens think about politics. We use data from our survey of 107 Turkish citizens conducted in 2009 to examine whether attachments to Islam and the

nation function as co-determinants of public attitudes. We focus on the political orientations of supporters of the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP). We expect that Kemalist nationalism but not Islamist attachments dominate the considerations of these voters in line with their party's positions. We uncover significant evidence of Islamist considerations in their evaluation of political issues indicating that Islamist and nationalistic considerations co-shape citizens' attitudes.

Key Words

Political ideology, political behaviour, attitudinal orientation, Kemalist Secular Nationalism, Islamism, Religiosity.

Introduction

Historically, Islamism and Kemalist secular nationalism have been the main competitors in the socio-political mosaic of Turkey. Until recently, studies of Turkish politics used the dichotomy of Islamism versus secularism to understand public opinion.¹ In their 2006 study, Çarkoğlu and Toprak empirically

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demonstrate that the boundaries between Islamism and secularism have become more fluid in recent years.² About a quarter of the participants in their study found it difficult to place themselves in either side of the Islamism vs. secularism scale, and instead opted for the middle ground.³ This suggests that for a large proportion of the population the cleavage between Islamism and secularism is no longer meaningful.⁴ If the boundaries of the two ideologies have become blurred, perhaps the public adopts in their consideration of political issues elements of each ideology that are in agreement with their own values and principles.

Our study extends this debate by examining the degree to which citizens use the main components of these ideologies in their everyday political preferences. We focus on attachment to Islam as the main principle of Islamism, and attachment to the nation as the main principle of Kemalism, and measure their impact on four sets of political attitudes: confidence towards political institutions, religiosity and faith, Turkish identity and citizenship, and modernisation. Is the influence of attachments to Islam and the nation polarising, or are citizens driven towards a reconciliatory type of political attitudes? We argue that Turkish citizens do not experience attachment to Islam and nationalism as antithetical; instead both considerations co-shape their issue preferences and political behaviours.⁵

Historically, several studies have identified the conflictual relationship between secularisation and the struggle for the preservation of Islamic authenticity that led to the polarisation of public opinion in Turkey.⁶ Recently, Çarkoğlu has shown that the change in the ideological base of parties taking place in Turkey has an impact on public opinion.⁷ Taniyici also provides evidence that the directional change of the ideological rhetoric as articulated by the pro-Islamist elite has led to the transformation of its main principles promoted by its party advocates.⁸ This has had a direct effect on the electoral basis of the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) as examined by Taniyici. In addition, Başlevent examines the effects of this change on the political behaviour of AKP party supporters: the positive positioning of the AKP towards EU membership coincided with an increase in the electoral support of the party, bringing to the electoral base new supporters belonging to the liberal segments of society.⁹

The above studies set the discussion on these new developments in Turkish politics, and point to potential avenues for the exploration of interesting new trends in aggregate public opinion. But because the focus of these studies remains at the aggregate level, they cannot shed light on the determinants of citizens' considerations as they make

their political choices. In our study, we address this gap by adopting a political psychology approach. Studies in political psychology often show that examining what drives the political preferences of individuals can uncover relationships between ideological inclinations that political science models often consider antithetical.¹⁰ Instead of just looking at the outcome of political preferences, a political psychology approach takes into account the antecedents, motives, considerations, values, and emotions that citizens employ when thinking and making decisions about politics. Political psychology studies focus on the determinants of political judgments, and seek to identify the cognitive and affective map by which citizens make political choices. In our article we examine the role of citizens' attitudes towards Islam and the nation, in order to understand how Turkish citizens reach their judgements on significant issues. Our aim is not to quantify aggregate public opinion, but to understand how citizens arrive at their opinions by internalising the two political ideologies that dominate the Turkish political arena. This individual-level approach is complementary to aggregate studies that

focus on electoral outcomes, and together they allow for a more substantive study of public opinion in Turkey.

Our study complements research that examines the transformation of the political agenda of the main political parties in Turkey, originally documented by Çarkoğlu.¹¹ Our focus, however, is not at the party or elite level, but on the determinants of citizens' attitudes, and in particular the preferences of supporters of the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP). Our analysis explores whether the emergence

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and development of the AKP's agenda has had an effect on CHP supporters, since this party is the main social and political opponent of the AKP. Although the agendas of the

two political parties have fundamental differences, we are interested in their shared influences on individual political attitudes.¹² We measure the extent to which attachments to the nation are complemented by attachments to Islam as they shape considerations for CHP supporters. If Islamism and Kemalist secularism populate opposite ends of the ideological continuum in Turkey, we should not see the influence of Islamist considerations on the opinions of voters that are traditionally driven

by nationalist considerations. If, on the other hand, attachments to the nation share a space with attachments to Islam in citizens' opinions, this is preliminary evidence of the interaction of the two ideologies in citizens' judgments. This is the puzzle that our article addresses and explains.

The contribution of our work is three-fold. First, we engage with scholars that examine the dynamic development of public opinion in Turkey by offering evidence at the individual level. Our political psychology approach focuses on individual opinions to show how they internalise components of the dominant ideological orientations. Rather than looking at aggregate trends and predicting electoral behaviour, we are interested in identifying the determinants of citizens' opinions. Second, we address the debate on the tension between Islamism and Kemalist secularism by offering new evidence of the presence of Islamist considerations in the issue preferences of CHP voters. We argue that attachments to Islam and the nation are intertwined, rather than polarising, pillars of Turkish public opinion, and urge for further investigation of their complex relationship. Lastly, this study expands current public opinion models developed in the West to study societies that function within a different framework and historical background, tradition and political context.

The Turkish Paradigm of the Clash of Kemalist Nationalism and Islamism

To understand the complex contextual framework which affects citizens' ideological and issue preferences, and consequently the nature of the dynamic relationship between Kemalist nationalism and Islamism in Turkey, here we provide a brief overview of the debates around the issues of religiosity, attitudes towards the state, and modernisation, which we examine in detail in our empirical section.

Kemalist Nationalism, Secularisation, and Islamism

The socio-political evolution that is taking place in Turkey today is deeply rooted in the two ideological principles of Kemalist *secularism* and *nationalism*.¹³ The Kemalist ideology with these two pillars aimed at the creation of a new republican state by promoting the homogenisation of society.¹⁴ The influence of Islam on politics, economics, education and culture was seen as the most important barrier towards modernisation.¹⁵ For nationalists, religion is a private issue and the politicisation of religion is undesirable. The "sacrifice" of the domination of religion is the price that Turkey has had to pay in order to move towards a

modern nation-state according to the Western pattern.¹⁶ Therefore, national identity is predominantly *Turkish*, while the Turkish state is the agent that has to be obeyed.

Islamism grew in opposition to the nationalist view of modernisation promoted by Kemalism, and it saw modernisation as a threat against authenticity and traditional values and principles. Islamists developed a sense of obedience towards the state to the extent that it promotes and respects the Islamic values and principles.¹⁷ For Islamists, national identity is primarily *Islamic* and is related to the values and principles of the Turkish nation.¹⁸ According to this belief, religion can appear in both the public and private spheres of the nation-state.

These differences have been the basis for the argument that Islamism and secularisation are at opposite ends of the same continuum. How do Turkish citizens negotiate this relationship? Do they internalise this conflict, adopting only one or the other ideology? After the AKP's electoral win in 2002, the CHP has been using the threat against the Kemalist basis of the republic as a way to delegitimise parties with explicit or implicit connections with the Islamic movement.¹⁹ But the 2010 AKP win in the referendum regarding constitutional reforms opened the path for significant transformations on the role of the

military, social and economic rights as well as several judicial reforms. Can we identify any effects of the directional change that took place in recent years in the narratives of the political advocates of Islamism and secular Kemalism on citizens' political attitudes? To answer this, we need to look into how attachments to Islam and the nation, the characteristic elements of Islamism and Kemalism secular nationalism respectively, have been internalised by Turkish citizens in the current political climate.

When it comes to issues involving religion, the discourse of the dominant political parties was traditionally oppositional.

A number of studies have examined the development of political Islam and the nature and role of the AKP in Turkish politics.²⁰ However, there is a lack of studies examining the impact of the transformation of political Islam on CHP supporters. We argue that if the transformation of the AKP has had an effect on the societal basis of Turkish society, this effect might also be evident in the political preferences of the supporters of the CHP regarding major debates such as support for political institutions, religiosity, national identity and modernisation.

The Determinants of Institutional Support, Religiosity, National Identity, and Modernisation

When citizens evaluate political institutions and organisations, they often identify them as entities that represent the boundaries of particular ideologies. We therefore expect that Islamist and nationalistic attachments should be clearly differentiated when it comes to attitudes towards state-based and international institutions. Nationalistic attachments should generate a critical stance towards an AKP-led state, in line with Kemalist principles, and confidence in the military and the courts as the traditional protectors of the Kemalist inheritance. Islamist attachments should predict favourable attitudes towards the state as well as towards the parliament where the AKP holds the majority of the seats, and also high confidence towards religious leaders.

There are however other areas of Turkish politics where the influences of nationalistic and Islamist attachments might not be as clearly marked: *religiosity*, where attachments to Islam traditionally dominated the debate but have recently become less rigid; *Turkish identity*, where the role of nationalistic attachments traditionally defined political perceptions but have been more relaxed; and *modernisation* where both

elements have been shown to recently share influence in determining public attitudes.

Unlike the traditional Islamic parties, the AKP has not pursued Islamic policies with the aim to transform the state and society under the rule of religion.

When it comes to issues involving religion, the discourse of the dominant political parties was traditionally oppositional. The CHP and its Kemalist state proponents have promoted the complete control of religion by the state and the subsequent marginalisation of religion in the private sphere. The AKP's agenda combines religion with the secular values of Turkey. Namely, it has supported secularism in line with democratic values and freedom rights, with religion working as a social value. Unlike the traditional Islamic parties, the AKP has not pursued Islamic policies with the aim to transform the state and society under the rule of religion. It has, however, promoted Islamic ethics and ways of life in terms of religious values and principles.²¹ For all citizens, religious considerations should be positively associated with Islamist attachments, so that high levels of Islamist attachment would predict high levels of religiosity. However, when we examine the

religiosity of CHP supporters, a group that has traditionally been influenced by the Kemalist nationalist agenda that was oppositional to religion, we would expect nationalistic attachments to have a negative effect on the endorsement of the influence of religion in public life. This is in line with the CHP's agenda that promotes the marginalisation of religion into the private sphere under the complete control of the state. We expect to find that secular principles are associated with high levels of nationalistic attachments which oppose the domination of religion in public life.

Turning to issues of Turkish identity, we expect attachments to the nation to dominate citizens' orientations, particularly to supporters of the CHP. The CHP retains the party's strong historical orientation towards nationalism and secularism while also following the Kemalist inheritance of a state-controlled economy.²² The Kemalist version of nationalism has always been hostile to the politicisation of any other identity besides the state and the nation.²³ For the AKP, national identity is Islamic *and* modern;²⁴ traditional values and principles go hand in hand with the universalist perspective combined with the local. This rationalism does not ignore the religious understanding of life. The "new Turkish citizen" is subject to this mixture of Islamic authenticity and liberal transformation. As Erdoğan stated, the AKP supports a system that

incorporates local and traditional values and principles as well as the universal trends of conservatism.²⁵ For that matter, if the AKP's agenda is successful in reaching the Turkish public, there should be evidence of the influence of Islamist attachments on the attitudes towards Turkish identity even among CHP voters.

When we consider issues such as the preservation of "Turkishness" a discussion of tolerance of *ethnic diversity and minority rights* is inevitable. Kemalism has historically stood against any form of compromise with minority populations; therefore, nationalistic attachments should highlight negative attitudes towards minorities. Islamism on the other hand promotes support of cultural rights of minorities on the basis of their shared Islamic identity. Islamist attachments therefore should be associated with a tolerance towards minorities.

The "new Turkish citizen" is subject to this mixture of Islamic authenticity and liberal transformation.

How citizens perceive Turkey's future is expected to be influenced by both Islamist and nationalistic considerations. As we saw earlier, Kemalist nationalism was the advocate of modernisation in the early days of the republic, promoting

the transformation of the country into a modern and secular nation state. “Turkishness” and the affiliation with the Turkish nation-state were viewed as the mandatory characteristics of modern citizenry.²⁶ Today the AKP and its conservative liberal democratic rhetoric is a proponent of Turkey’s modernisation and Europeanisation project.²⁷ Clear testaments of the influence of AKP to notions of modernisation and progress

are its principle aims to lead the country towards the EU accession with a movement of “Muslim democrats” in which Islam provides a cultural background.²⁸ So when it comes to attitudes towards *internationalisation and modernisation*, we expect attachment to Islam and the nation to share influence at the individual level among CHP supporters. Our expectations are presented in Table 1.

Table 1: Issue Orientations of Kemalist Nationalism and Islamism

	Kemalist nationalism	Islamism
Confidence towards institutions	Confidence towards the judicial system (courts) and military. (positive influence)	Confidence towards the parliament, police and religious leaders. (positive influence)
Religiosity	Low importance of religion in public life. Religion is a private matter, which lies away from the political spectrum. (negative influence)	High importance of religion. Religion has a social value that cannot be overwhelmed by modernisation processes. (positive influence)
Turkish identity	Emphasis on the secular state (positive influence)	Emphasis on traditional values and principles. (positive influence)
Ethnic diversity and minority rights	Against any form of compromising with minority demands. Defend Turkish national unity. (negative influence)	Support towards Islamic-defined unity of the nation. Support cultural rights of Muslim minorities. (positive influence)
Attitudes towards the state	Respect towards the secular basis of state and Kemalist principles. (negative influence)	Respect towards the current government and the state. (positive influence)
Modernisation	Agreement in line with the Kemalist inheritance. (positive influence)	Conservative modernisation in line with the Turkish and Islamic values and traditions. (positive influence)

To summarise, here we examined the conditions under which Islamist and nationalistic attachments share the Turkish political and societal space and apply parallel influence on citizens' considerations. Existing public opinion and political behaviour studies in Turkey mainly provide an analysis of the social and political cleavages that formulate the volatile and fragmented basis of the Turkish electoral body focusing particularly on their impact on voting behaviour and party preferences. The main dimensions examined in the literature are the centre-periphery cleavage, the left-right dichotomy, and Islamism against Kemalist secularism.²⁹ Other studies have looked at the effects of religiosity, the early formation of political inclinations, as well as identity, education, and economic considerations.³⁰ These investigations are important as they set the stage for understanding how citizens reach their judgments, providing the basic explanatory models of voting behaviour and party preference. Our study asks whether attachments to the nation and Islam should be considered as antithetical forces or as co-determinants of voters' political preferences.

Research Methodology and Data Collection

Existing public opinion surveys do not contain measures that would allow us to test our hypotheses, and aggregate

polling data do not allow for individual-level analyses.³¹ To overcome these shortcomings, we collected survey data in August 2009 using self-administered questionnaires which contained measures of attachment to the nation and to Islam and political preferences on several indicators of religiosity, national identity and modernisation. The survey recorded the opinions of 107 Turkish citizens living in Ankara.³²

Survey Location and Sample Characteristics

Based on its electoral returns, the Ankara province appears to be an AKP stronghold.³³ Since 2002, the electoral returns for the AKP in the country's capital have been significantly increasing, and are higher than the electoral returns of the CHP. In contrast, other major cities have a lower percentage of AKP voters and a higher percentage of CHP voters. We administered our survey in Ankara, expecting that the strong electoral position of the AKP would generate high levels of polarisation among CHP and AKP supporters, putting to test the influences of Islamist attachments on their orientations. A second scenario is also plausible: that the high support that the AKP receives in this province might make the influence of the AKP's ideological orientations such as attachment to Islam more evident in the political preferences of CHP

supporters. In our study, about 73% of our participants are CHP voters and the main analyses that follow are conducted only on these participants.

Turkey's population is heterogeneous in terms of the determinants of political orientations such as in ideological levels, religiosity strength and traditionalism.³⁴ We used a large number of initial contacts and tried to ensure that the participants for our study came from different socio-political backgrounds. Because we are interested in identifying the considerations of voters as they reach their political preferences, rather than putting forth arguments about the political orientations of the average Turkish citizen, or providing estimates of public opinion trends, it is not problematic for our study that the sample is not representative of the population. In essence, we are interested in tracing the *process* of decision making, rather than making claims about population averages. We do recognise, however, that generalising our results should be done with caution, keeping into account the characteristics of our sample (middle class, higher educated, mostly male participants, living in Ankara).³⁵

Questionnaire and Measures

The survey contained measures of our two predictor variables, attachment to Islam and the nation. We measured Islamist attachments by the extent

to which participants felt part of the Islamic world and attachment to the nation by the extent to which they felt part of the Turkish nation.³⁶ These two variables captured the main characteristics of Islamism and Kemalist secular nationalism. To identify CHP supporters, we asked which party participants voted for in the last elections. About 67 participants reported voting for CHP and they are the ones we label CHP supporters in the analyses that follow.

Participants were asked whether people should be tolerant of those who choose to live according to their own moral standards even if they are different from their own.

Our survey also contained measures of our dependent variables: confidence towards political actors and institutions, political attitudes on religiosity and faith, national identity, tolerance, respect for minorities, citizenship, and modernisation, which allowed us to test our expectation of the impact of Islamist considerations on a large number of significant political preferences. All employed measures used scales from 0 to 10 to allow for easy comparisons across variables. We asked questions regarding confidence towards different

political actors and organisations in order to determine whether attachments to the nation and Islam favour particular political groups. Here we expected clear differentiations on the basis of political ideology. Specifically we asked participants to indicate how much confidence they had towards religious leaders, the courts, labour unions, political parties, the parliament, police, the armed forces, the EU and the UN. To measure religiosity we asked participants whether they were religious, how important Allah was in their lives, and how important religion was for the country. To measure attitudes towards the state, respondents were asked to evaluate the importance of the country in having strong defence forces and maintaining a stable economy. To measure orientations towards ethnic diversity, we asked whether ethnic diversity enriches life. To measure attitudes towards the rights of minorities we asked whether participants would support granting cultural rights to minority populations. We also examined tolerance towards different groups in society. Participants were asked whether people should be tolerant of those who choose to live according to their own moral standards even if they are different from their own. We also measured opinions towards the perceptions of national identity by asking participants whether certain characteristics should be a requirement for the attainment of Turkish citizenship: having ancestors

from Turkey, being born in Turkey, having adopted Turkey's customs, and being a law-abiding citizen. Attitudes towards modernisation were measured by questions asking whether tradition and modern values should coexist, whether modern values are more important than tradition, and whether modern values should respect tradition. Finally, participants were asked whether they agreed with the statement that people should adjust their behaviour to the changing world.³⁷

Analyses and Findings

First, we examined levels of political confidence to get an understanding of how Islamist and national attachments can reflect attitudes towards political institutions. In examining the average confidence ratings of CHP supporters towards political institutions we noticed significant variability, reflecting the affiliations of CHP voters with particular political groups and institutions. As we see in Table 2, levels of confidence towards religious leaders, the parliament, political parties, the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) were lower than 3 points on a 0 to 10 scale. On the other hand, the armed forces, the courts, and labour unions received higher scores of confidence from 5 to 6 points on the same scale.

Table 2: Average Scores on Political Attitudes of CHP Supporters

	CHP supporters mean (st. deviation)
Confidence: Religious leaders	1.9 (2.1)
Confidence: Parliament	2.3 (2.19)
Confidence: Political parties	2.3 (2.2)
Confidence: EU	2.5 (2.2)
Confidence: UN	2.8 (2.4)
Confidence: Labour unions	4.8 (2.3)
Confidence: Courts	5.4 (2.4)
Confidence: Armed forces	5.9 (2.6)
Importance: Allah in life	6.3 (2.8)
Importance: Religion in Turkey	7.7 (1.8)
Citizenship: Having Turkish ancestors	4.3 (3.3)
Citizenship: Being born on Turkish soil	4.3 (3.1)
Citizenship: Adopt customs	6.3 (2.6)
Citizenship: Abide laws	7.6 (2.4)
Agreement: State is sacred and must be loved and obeyed unconditionally	3.6 (3.1)
Importance: Being a world citizen	7.3 (2.5)
Importance: Giving people more to say in government decisions	8.9 (1.4)
Importance: Protecting freedom of speech	9.3 (1.2)
Importance: Having strong defence forces	7.1 (2.3)
Importance: Having strong economy	9.4 (.9)
Agreement: Ethnic diversity enriches life	8.6 (1.7)
Agreement: Giving cultural rights to minorities	8.6 (1.5)
Agreement: Tolerating different moral standards	9.1 (1.4)
Agreement: Newer lifestyles contribute to the breakdown of society	4.7 (3.0)
Agreement: Modern values are more important than tradition	5.6 (2.5)
Agreement: People should adjust their behaviour to the changing world	6.3 (2.7)
Agreement: Modern values should respect traditions	6.7 (2.8)
Agreement: Modern values should coexist with tradition	8.6 (1.9)

Note: Values are means, standard errors in parenthesis. All variables are measured on 0-10 scales, with 0 indicating lack of confidence, lack of importance, or lack of agreement, and 10 indicating very high confidence, a great deal of importance, or very strong agreement.

Because of the differentiation in the levels of confidence towards these political institutions, we examined the effects of attachments to the nation and Islam on attitudes towards each institution separately by running several regression analyses presented in Table 3. An interesting pattern becomes evident when we examine the significance of the regression coefficients: attachments to the nation predict confidence towards some institutions and attachments to Islam towards others, indicating that it is not just the nationalist orientations that shape CHP supporters' levels of confidence. Islamist considerations also come to mind under specific circumstances and colour the judgments of CHP voters. Characteristically, we see that a unit increase in attachments to the nation among CHP supporters causes a .16 point increase in confidence towards the parliament, but a .47 point decline in confidence towards political parties. A unit increase in attachments to the nation also causes a .40 point decline in confidence towards the EU and a .34 point decline towards the UN. These numbers indicate that among CHP voters, attachments to the nation act mainly as moderators rather than stimulators of political confidence. The negative effects of nationalistic attachments on confidence towards the

EU and the UN are more than double in size compared to their positive effect on confidence towards the parliament.

At the same time we noticed the compensating impact of Islamist attachments on these evaluations. A unit increase in Islamist attachments among CHP voters causes a .13 point increase in confidence towards the EU and .18 point increase in confidence towards the UN. As attachments to Islam become more pronounced for these voters, confidence towards these international institutions is restored to a modest extent. The above effects show the shared but oppositional impact of the two ideologies on evaluations of political institutions. Islamist attachments appear also to affect CHP voters' confidence on their own. A unit increase in Islamist attachments leads to a .14 point decline in confidence towards labour unions, and a .15 point decline in confidence towards the courts showing that when Islamist considerations become salient in the minds of CHP voters, they work against the overall favourable evaluations of these institutions. Interestingly however, this moderating impact of Islamic considerations by .15 points is less powerful than the moderating impact of nationalistic considerations by .40 or more points that we saw earlier.

Table 3: Confidence in Institutions

		CHP supporters	
Confidence in the parliament	Constant	.06	(1.54)
	Attachment to Islam	.19	(.07)
	Attachment to the nation	.16 **	(.17)
	Adj R ²	.09	
	N	67	
Confidence in political parties	Constant	6.04 ***	(1.57)
	Attachment to Islam	.11	(.07)
	Attachment to the nation	-.47 **	(.17)
	Adj R ²	.10	
	N	67	
Confidence in labour unions	Constant	5.50 ***	(1.64)
	Attachment to Islam	-.14 ⁺	(.07)
	Attachment to the nation	-.02	(.18)
	Adj R ²	.02	
	N	67	
Confidence in courts	Constant	5.38 **	(1.72)
	Attachment to Islam	-.015 ⁺	(.08)
	Attachment to the nation	.07	(.19)
	Adj R ²	.03	
	N	67	
Confidence in the EU	Constant	5.57 ***	(1.5)
	Attachment to Islam	.13 ⁺	(.07)
	Attachment to the nation	-.40 *	(.17)
	Adj R ²	.09	
	N	67	
Confidence in the UN	Constant	5.17 **	(1.7)
	Attachment to Islam	.18 *	(.08)
	Attachment to the nation	-.34 ⁺	(.18)
	Adj R ²	.09	
	N	67	

Notes: ⁺ p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Variables recoded in 0-10 scales. Parameter estimates are unstandardised regression coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis.

Next, we examined areas where our theoretical discussion predicts that the influences of nationalistic and Islamist elements would not be clearly separated. First we examined *religiosity*. Here we expected that Islamist attachments would dominate the debate even among CHP voters. Nationalist attachments should be associated with the marginalisation of religion into the private sphere of life. We asked CHP voters to indicate the role of religion in their lives and the intensity of their religiosity. In Table 2 we saw that CHP voters scored an average of 6.3 on a scale of 0-10 when asked how important Allah was in their lives. They also scored 7.7 on a similar scale when asked how important religion was for their country. In addition, when asked whether they get comfort and strength from religion, about 35% answered positively, and 25% identified themselves as a religious person. This shows that religion is an

important issue, and attitudes towards religion should be studied further.

We proceeded to examine the degree to which attachments to the nation and Islam influence attitudes towards religion, and in particular perceptions of the importance of Allah in citizens' lives. Our results from the regression analysis in Table 4 show the pronounced effect of Islamist attachments and the non-significant role of attachments to the nation. This was in line with our expectations: religiosity is an area where the Islamist ideology has ownership. A unit increase in Islamist attachments on a 0 to 10 scale increases perceptions of the importance of Allah in citizens' lives by about .35 points among CHP voters. This indicates that when it comes to issues of religion, attachment to Islam has no party boundaries as it influences the opinions even of the supporters of the party that traditionally places secondary emphasis on religious considerations.

Table 4: Attitudes Towards Religion

		CHP supporters	
Allah important in life	Constant	5.04 *	(1.89)
	Attachment to Islam	.35 ***	(.09)
	Attachment to the nation	-.02	(.21)
	Adj R ²	.18	
	N	67	

Notes: * p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Variables recoded in 0-10 scales. Parameter estimates are unstandardised regression coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis.

Elements of Turkish identity that have been promoted by Islamic voices, such as the preservation of Islamist values and principles, could be seen as relevant even by CHP voters.

The next area we tested involved perceptions of Turkish national identity. Here our expectation was that attachments to the nation should define support for national identity, particularly since we focus on CHP voters. However, elements of Turkish identity that have been promoted by Islamic voices, such as the preservation of Islamist values and principles, could be seen as relevant even by CHP voters. In other words, we expected a shared impact of the two ideologies, each focusing on different elements of the multifaceted concept of Turkish identity and citizenship. First, we asked CHP voters to identify the importance of having Turkish ancestors, being born on Turkish soil, adopting customs, and abiding by the laws of the state. The means reported in Table 2 show the preference of CHP voters for a law-oriented specification of citizenship with scores of 7.6 on a 0 to 10 scale for abiding by the laws. Being born on Turkish soil and having Turkish ancestors received modest evaluations of 4.3 points while adopting customs scored somewhat higher with 6.3 points.

We now turn to Table 5 which presents the regression results that identify the effects of attachments to Islam and the nation on these four components of Turkish citizenship. As we expected, attachments to Islam and the nation influence Turkish identity attitudes, but each affects different components of this complex consideration. Islamist attachments are significant predictors for seeing Turkish ancestry as important, being born in Turkey, and adopting customs. A unit increase in Islamist attachments leads to about a .20 point increase in these attitudes. On the other hand, attachments to the nation are a significant predictor of the opinion that following the law is what makes a good Turkish citizen. A unit increase in attachments to the nation, on a 0 to 10 scale, leads to a .55 point increase in this opinion. To recap, both considerations influence different aspects of thinking about what constitutes the identity of the nation. While attachments to Islam promote perceptions of citizenship that highlight tradition, ancestry and customs, attachments to the nation prime more state-oriented notions of citizenship. Notably, when significant, the size of the effect of nationalistic attachments is more than double of that of Islamic attachments, pointing to the dominant role of nationalistic considerations in the way CHP voters make up their minds about Turkish citizenship.

Table 5: Elements of National Identity

		CHP supporters	
Citizenship: having ancestors	Constant	2.62	(2.36)
	Attachment to Islam	.23 *	(.11)
	Attachment to the nation	.08	(.26)
	Adj R ²	.04	
	N	67	
Citizenship: born on soil	Constant	5.47 *	(2.25)
	Attachment to Islam	.20 +	(.10)
	Attachment to the nation	-.23	(.25)
	Adj R ²	.04	
	N	67	
Citizenship: adopt customs	Constant	3.95 *	(1.87)
	Attachment to Islam	.18 *	(.09)
	Attachment to the nation	.18	(.20)
	Adj R ²	.05	
	N	67	
Citizenship: abide by laws	Constant	2.32	(1.62)
	Attachment to Islam	.10	(.07)
	Attachment to the nation	.55 **	(.18)
	Adj R ²	.16	
	N	67	

Notes: + p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Variables recoded in 0-10 scales. Parameter estimates are unstandardised regression coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis.

Related to the idea of what constitutes a “true” Turkish citizen are attitudes towards the state, government and political participation. As we saw in Table 2, CHP voters have strong preferences towards protecting free speech and giving people more say in government decisions, scoring on average around 9 points on 0-10 scales. Here the opinions of CHP supporters appear to be homogeneous, as indicated by the high means and low standard deviations of these items. CHP voters also consider it important to be a world citizen, scoring on average 7.3 points on a 0-10 scale. On the other hand, they do not place much emphasis on obedience towards the state. To the statement “the state is sacred; it must be loved and obeyed unconditionally” the mean response was only 3.6 points on a 0-10 scale.

Table 6 presents the regression coefficients of national and Islamist attachments for each analysis. Here the effects of attachments to the nation and Islam depend on the attitude under consideration, and we can identify the shared influence of the two ideologies on these complex orientations of CHP supporters. First, we notice that here the opinions of CHP supporters were homogeneous; as in the case of giving people more say in governmental decisions, and protecting freedom of speech, any variability in responses is negatively predicted by Islamist attachments. A unit increase in Islamist attachments causes a .12 and .09 point

decline in these attitudes, showing that tension can exist in the ideological orientations of CHP supporters. When attachments to Islam penetrate political preferences, they play a moderating role on otherwise strongly held political opinions.

Islamist attachments are also statistically significant determinants of self-perceptions of being a world citizen. A unit increase in Islamist attachments causes a .15 point change. This finding is in line with the universalist approach followed by the AKP, but what is interesting here is that its influence holds even among CHP voters. We see that where opinions among CHP supporters are not strongly held, as with obedience towards the state, it is national attachments that appear to be a significant and positive predictor. A one unit increase in national attachments predicts a .61 point increase in obedience towards the state. The effect of nationalism again is in size three times larger compared to the effect of Islamic attachments, when the regression coefficients are significant. Nationalistic attachments are dominant and salient considerations in matters of obedience towards the state. The importance of giving people more say in government affairs and protecting freedom of speech is moderated by Islamic considerations, but only weakly. On these questions, the average responses of CHP voters show high favourability, evident in the high mean scores of these questions in Table 2.

Table 6: Attitudes Towards the State, the Government and Political Participation

		CHP supporters	
Obeying the state	Constant	-1.79	(2.23)
	Attachment to Islam	-.02	(.10)
	Attachment to the nation	.61 **	(.24)
	Adj R ²	.09	
	N	67	
Giving people more say in government decisions	Constant	9.95 ***	(.95)
	Attachment to Islam	-.12 **	(.04)
	Attachment to the nation	-.06	(.10)
	Adj R ²		.09
	N	67	
Protecting freedom of speech	Constant	10.02 ***	(.87)
	Attachment to Islam	-.09 *	(.04)
	Attachment to the nation	-.04	(.09)
	Adj R ²		.05
	N	67	
See myself as world citizen	Constant	3.80 *	(1.79)
	Attachment to Islam	.15 +	(.08)
	Attachment to the nation	.32	(.20)
	Adj R ²	.06	
	N	67	

Notes: + p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Variables recoded in 0-10 scales. Parameter estimates are unstandardised regression coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis.

A similar observation can be made regarding issues of national politics, where we see that different considerations are determined by Islamist and national attachments. We asked participants to rate the importance of making sure that Turkey has strong defence forces and maintains a stable economy as a matter of top priority for the country for the next 10 years. Both questions were on 0-10 scales where 0 was not at all important and 10 was very important. As we saw in Table 2, the economy was considered as very important, with a score of 9.4 points out of 10, while on the issue of strong defence, CHP supporters on average gave a score of 7.1 points.

We see the positive effect of nationalistic attachments as evidence of the influence of the Islamist considerations of recognition and tolerance towards minorities on the political ideology of CHP voters.

Table 7 shows the results of the OLS regression analyses of attachments to Islam and the nation on the economy and defence. Attachments to Islam are a significant negative predictor of attitudes towards economic growth. A unit increase in Islamist attachments causes a .07 point decline in the importance of the economy. This is a modest negative

effect and points to one more area where opinions among CHP voters showed homogeneity, and are moderated by Islamist considerations. This might be because since 2002 the economy has flourished under the watch of the AKP government, and thus Islamist considerations make the importance of the economy somewhat less salient in voters' minds. Where opinions of CHP supporters had more variability, as in the case of the importance of defence forces, attachments to the nation and Islam had antithetical impact. A unit increase in Islamist attachments predicted a .13 point increase in the importance of strong defence forces while a unit change in attachments to the nation had a negative effect of .59 points. Again we notice that when significant, the effect of nationalistic attachments is much stronger than the effect of Islamic considerations. This is not a surprise since nationalistic attachments are more salient considerations for CHP voters than attachments to Islam. We see the mild positive effect of Islamist attachments as evidence that CHP supporters recognise the significance of defence forces in securing the country's position in the neighbourhood but also in the European and global arena. The strong negative effect of attachments to the nation when it comes to defence forces might be due to memories of the past military coups and their negative implications for the public life and broader societal stability.

Table 7: Important Political Issues

		CHP supporters
Strong defence forces	Constant	11.89 *** (1.57)
	Attachment to Islam	.13 (.07)
	Attachment to the nation	-.59 *** (.17)
	Adj R ²	.16
	N	67
Maintaining a stable economy	Constant	8.89 *** (.67)
	Attachment to Islam	-.07 * (.03)
	Attachment to the nation	.09 (.07)
	Adj R ²	.07
	N	67

Notes: + $p < .1$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. Variables recoded in 0-10 scales. Parameter estimates are unstandardised regression coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis.

A related set of attitudes involve citizens' orientations towards other groups in society. In Table 2 we saw the average responses of CHP voters on issues of ethnic diversity, minorities, and tolerance. We asked whether ethnic diversity enriches life, and whether CHP voters approved of granting cultural rights to minorities and tolerating different moral standards. The average responses among CHP supporters showed high agreement with scores of 9.1 and 8.6 on the 0-10 scale. In Table 8 we examine the ideological origins of these attitudes with a set of OLS regressions and found that attachment to the nation is the main determinant while Islamist considerations are non-significant. A

unit increase in attachments to the nation increases agreement in allocating cultural rights to minorities by .40 points, and appreciation of ethnic diversity by .31 points. Promoting tolerance for different moral standards also increases but at a slower rate of .24 points. These effect sizes follow the same trend of the impact of nationalistic considerations on political attitudes, they are however somewhat milder than the effects of nationalism we noticed in the previous tables. These results also might seem surprising given the traditionally hard Kemalist line towards minorities. We see the positive effect of nationalistic attachments as evidence of the influence of the Islamist considerations of recognition

and tolerance towards minorities on the political ideology of CHP voters. Earlier in our theoretical discussion, we talked about the potential impact of one ideology on the other over the recent decades. Although we were not able to

test hypotheses regarding the over-time development and cross-influence of the two ideologies, we see this as a sign of the bridging of the tension between the nationalistic and Islamist approaches towards minorities.

Table 8: Attitudes Towards Ethnic Diversity, Integration and Tolerance

		CHP supporters	
Ethnic diversity enriches life	Constant	5.78 ***	(1.19)
	Attachment to Islam	.00	(.05)
	Attachment to the nation	.31 *	(.13)
	Adj R ²	.05	
	N	67	
Cultural rights to minorities	Constant	5.30 ***	(1.00)
	Attachment to Islam	-.07	(.05)
	Attachment to the nation	.40 ***	(.11)
	Adj R ²	.16	
	N	67	
Tolerance for different moral standards	Constant	6.94 ***	(.97)
	Attachment to Islam	-.00	(.04)
	Attachment to the nation	.24 *	(.11)
	Adj R ²	.05	
	N	67	

Notes: + p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Variables recoded in 0-10 scales. Parameter estimates are unstandardised regression coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis.

Finally, we examined attitudes towards *modernisation*. As we noted earlier, a political debate that has been favourably addressed by Islamist and nationalistic agendas is the active engagement with Turkey's modernisation. We expect that attachments to the nation and Islam both contribute to the support of modernisation, modern values and lifestyles. In Table 2 we saw that CHP voters do not support the statement that "lifestyles contribute to the breakdown of society". Average response on this question was just 4.7 points on a 0 to 10 scale. Agreement was high with the moderate statement that modern values should coexist with tradition (8.6 points) while agreement with more polarising statements such as "modern values should respect tradition" and "modern values are more important than tradition" received weaker support of around 6 points. These responses show that CHP supporters are in favour of moderate options when it comes to modernisation.

To identify the origins of their considerations we regressed attachments to Islam and the nation on opinions towards modernisation. The findings in Table 9 show that Islamist attachments have a positive influence on CHP

supporters, while attachments to the nation have a negative influence, and generate reservations towards change. More analytically, a unit increase in Islamist attachments contributes a .15 point increase in the opinion that modern values should coexist with tradition. The effect of Islamist attachments doubles to .27 points when predicting a preference for modernisation over tradition among CHP voters. This is evidence of the influence of the AKP's modernisation agenda in the considerations of voters of the opposition party. Turning to the effect of nationalistic attachments, we see an even stronger negative impact of .35 points, indicating disapproval in emphasising modern values over tradition. This reservation is also expressed in the statement that "newer lifestyles contribute to the breakdown of society" where nationalism is a strong positive predictor with .58 points. Again we notice the difference in the salience of the effects of Islamic and nationalistic attachments. And although the effects of nationalism are stronger than those of Islamic attachments, we cannot say that modernisation considerations are monopolised by attachments to the nation. Both ideological considerations contribute to political preferences,

Although the effects of nationalism are stronger than those of Islamic attachments, we cannot say that modernisation considerations are monopolised by attachments to the nation.

one positively with mild effects and one negatively with stronger effects, interacting and calibrating political opinions. This is one more example

of the interrelationship of the two ideologies, rather than the monopoly of one or the other in determining political preferences.

Table 9: Attitudes Towards Modernisation

		CHP supporters	
Emphasize modern values more than tradition	Constant	7.66 ***	(1.71)
	Attachment to Islam	.27 **	(.08)
	Attachment to the nation	-.35	(.19)
	Adj R ²	.19	
	N	67	
Modern values coexist with tradition	Constant	7.74 ***	(1.34)
	Attachment to Islam	.15 *	(.06)
	Attachment to the nation	.03	(.15)
	Adj R ²	.06	
	N	67	
Newer lifestyles contribute to breakdown of society	Constant	-.56	(2.12)
	Attachment to Islam	.03	(.96)
	Attachment to the nation	.58 *	(.23)
	Adj R ²	.06	
	N	67	

Notes: † p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Variables recoded in 0-10 scales. Parameter estimates are unstandardised regression coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis.

Conclusions and Discussion

In our study we measured the impact of Islamist and national attachments on a series of political attitudes related to traditional values as we captured them

in our survey in 2009. Our work follows from studies conducted in 2006 which for the first time identified evidence of ideological fluidity in Turkish public opinion in regards to Islamist and nationalistic attachments. We caution

the reader that our sample is not representative of the Turkish population and we particularly oversampled CHP supporters living in Ankara. However, we think the significance of our findings lies in the identification of the processes by which citizens reach their judgements, rather than the representativeness of the judgements themselves for the whole population.

Our analyses study the effects of attachments to the nation and Islam on CHP voters' confidence towards political institutions. We find evidence that the old conflicts between Islamism and Kemalism still play an important role in Turkey. Some polarisation is present, manifested particularly in the "selective" confidence ratings we identified towards specific political institutions and actors. We also found that nationalistic attachments do not monopolise the considerations of CHP supporters when it comes to assigning confidence. For example, Islamist attachments were significant determinants of confidence towards the parliament among CHP supporters.

We also examined considerations regarding religiosity, national identity, tolerance, and modernisation. Again what is interesting is that we do not find attachments to the nation to be the sole determinant of the political opinions of CHP supporters. Instead, we see the influence of attachments to Islam as being a significant predictor of several political

orientations, occupying significant space in the political considerations of CHP voters, either by moderating the effects of attachment to the nation, or at times defining these citizens' preferences. Characteristically, we find that Islamist attachments have significant influence on attitudes towards religion, elements of national identity such as having Turkish ancestors and adopting Turkish customs, and attitudes towards modernisation such as emphasising modern values more than traditions. This is evidence of the shared influence of the two ideologies in shaping the opinions of those who vote for the CHP party.

We expect that attachments to the nation and Islam both contribute to the support of modernisation, modern values and lifestyles.

These pronounced effects of Islamist attachments on the opinions of CHP supporters demonstrate that in Turkey the two traditionally oppositional forces of Islamist and national attachments find the ground to exist at the individual level. We cannot assume the domination of one ideological space over the other; rather it becomes apparent that the common citizen perceives and internalises each of the two ideologies concurrently. Our study sheds light on this dynamic relationship by applying

a systematic political psychological approach. By tracing the considerations that come to mind when citizens decide on political issues, we come closer to identifying how citizens internalise the ideological and political tensions in Turkey. To probe even deeper into the interconnectedness of the two political orientations, data collection can take the form of a qualitative study using in-depth interviews or focus groups of the target population. This will allow for more detailed and information-rich accounts of how citizens experience cognitively and affectively the tensions and interactions of the two ideologies.

An additional extension of this work would be to examine changes over time in the ideological placement of the supporters of the conservative liberal democracy of the AKP and the social democracy of the CHP. As argued by Başlevent and his colleagues, the ideological orientations of AKP supporters and political Islam have been changing in line with the party's liberal transformation towards a conservative democratic agenda.³⁸ We can hypothesise a similar process is taking place among CHP voters, preliminary evidence of which is evident in our study. This cannot be tested with the data available

here. It can be explored with longitudinal data measuring the political opinions of CHP voters, and modelling the effects of attachments to the nation and Islam over time as determinants of citizens' political preferences.

Our study provides a preliminary take in understanding these complex dynamics and explaining citizens' political attitudes, and it opens further avenues of research in Turkish public opinion. The next step is to apply our model using nationally representative samples of voters and also extending the analysis to examine the attitudes of AKP supporters. While the governing party has changed its formal position towards the EU and

We cannot assume the domination of one ideological space over the other; rather it becomes apparent that the common citizen perceives and internalises each of the two ideologies concurrently.

the country's foreign relations, it would be interesting to study more extensively the expectations and determinants of the opinions of its voters. It is our hope that this research will stimulate scholars of Turkish public opinion to probe further for answers to these questions by investigating both quantitatively and qualitatively the structure of political responses at the individual level using tools that highlight the psychological mechanisms of political decision making.

Endnotes

- 1 Ali Çarkoğlu and Melvin J. Hinich, “A Spatial Analysis of Turkish Party Preferences”, *Electoral Studies*, Vol. 25, No.2 (June 2006), pp. 369- 392.
- 2 Ali Çarkoğlu and Binnaz Toprak, *Religion, Society and Politics in a Changing Turkey*, TESEV Publications, 2007, at http://www.tesev.org.tr/UD_OBJS/PDF/DEMP/RSP%20-%20Turkey.pdf [last visited 26 February 2011].
- 3 Ibid. For the corresponding findings please see p. 33 and figure in p. 42.
- 4 Ibid. Interestingly they point out that “After being told that that the terms ‘Islamists’ and ‘Secularists’ were often used in Turkey and that ‘0’ means ‘secular’ and ‘10’ means ‘Islamist’ on a scale of 0-10, 20.3% of the respondents defined themselves as ‘secular’, 48.5% as ‘Islamist’ and 23.4% placed themselves in the centre of these two extremes. However as shown by the answers given to some of our questions, the wing that we can describe as ‘secular’ consists of almost 30% of the people, which enables us distinguish between the secularists and the Islamists” (pp. 32- 33).
- 5 Hakan M. Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- 6 Haldun Gülalp, “Globalization and Political Islam: The Social Bases of Turkey’s Welfare Party”, *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (August 2001), pp 433-448; Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, “The Logic of Contemporary Turkish Politics”, *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (September 1997).
- 7 Ali Çarkoğlu, “The Turkish Party System in Transition: Party Performance and Agenda Change”, *Political Studies*, Vol. 46, No. 3 (1998), pp. 544- 571.
- 8 Saban Taniyıcı, “Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey: Islamist Welfare Party’s Pro-EU Turn”, *Party Politics*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (July 2003), pp. 463-483.
- 9 Cem Başlevent, Hasan Kirmanioğlu and Burhan Şenatlar, “Party Preference and Economic Voting in Turkey (Now that the Crisis is Over)”, *Party Politics*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (May 2009), pp. 377-391.
- 10 Feldman, Stanley, “Values, Ideology and the Structure of Political Attitudes”, in David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy and Robert Jervis (eds.), *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 477- 508.
- 11 Çarkoğlu, “The Turkish Party System in Transition”, pp. 544- 571.
- 12 For a detailed review of the positions of AKP and CHP we direct the reader to the party manifestos and programmes. The political programme of the AKP is available online at <http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/akparti/parti-programi> [last visited 25 July 2012]. The political programme of CHP is available online at <http://www.chp.org.tr/en/wp-content/uploads/chpprogram.pdf> [last visited 25 July 2012]. For a discussion of the main ideological differences between these political groups in Turkey see Ali Çarkoğlu, “The rise of the new

- generation of pro-Islamists in Turkey: the Justice and Development Party Phenomenon in the November 2002 Elections in Turkey”, *South European Society and Politics*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (April 2003), pp. 123- 156. For studies on AKP see Hakan M. Yavuz (ed.), *The Emergence of a New Turkey, Democracy and the AK Parti*, Utah, The University of Utah Press, 2006; Hakan M. Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009. For studies on the CHP see Sinan Ciddi, *Kemalism in Turkish Politics, The Republican People’s Party, Secularism and Nationalism*, Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics, Routledge, 2009.
- 13 Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey*, p. 25; Çiler Dursun “The Struggle Goes On: The Discursive Strategies of the Islamist Press in Turkey”, *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2006), pp. 161- 182.
 - 14 Birol Akgün, “Twins or Enemies: Comparing Nationalist and Islamist Traditions in Turkish Politics”, *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 2002), pp. 17-35.
 - 15 James G. Mellon, “Islamism, Kemalism and the Future of Turkey”, *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2006), pp. 67-81.
 - 16 Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey*, pp. 14- 44; Ciddi, *Kemalism in Turkish Politics*, pp. 13- 29.
 - 17 Akgün, “Twins or Enemies”, pp. 17-35.
 - 18 Mellon, “Islamism, Kemalism and the Future of Turkey”, pp. 67-81; Mehmet, Özey, “Turkey in Crisis: Some Contradictions in the Kemalist Development Strategy”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (February 1983), pp. 47-66.
 - 19 Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey*.
 - 20 Ibid., Yavuz (ed.), *The Emergence of a New Turkey*.
 - 21 Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey*.
 - 22 Sultan Tepe, “A Pro-Islamic Party? Promises and Limits of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party”, in Yavuz (ed.), *The Emergence of a New Turkey*, pp. 107- 135.
 - 23 Some argue that this rigid nationalistic approach along with the difficulty to integrate the need of a number of societal fragments of Turkish society that were in favour of religious freedoms in the secular republic left the party far behind in terms of electoral and public support. Ziya Öniş, “Turkish Modernisation and Challenges for the New Europe”, *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Autumn 2004), pp. 5- 28.
 - 24 “In Turkey ‘Islamic’ is someone who seeks a prominent role for Islamic ethics and practices in the organisation of the everyday life”: Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey*, p. 5.
 - 25 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, “Conservative Democracy and the Globalization of Freedom”, Speech at the American Enterprise Institute, 29 January 2004, in Hakan M. Yavuz, *The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti*, Utah Series in Turkish and Islamic studies, The University of Utah Press, 2004, pp. 333- 340.
 - 26 Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey*.

- 27 Graham Fuller, "Turkey's Strategic Model: Myths and Realities", *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Summer 2004), pp. 51-64.
- 28 Ian O. Lesser, "Turkey: 'Recessed' Islamic Politics and Convergence with the West", in Rabasa Angel, Cheryl Benard, Peter Chalk, Christine Fair, Theodore Karasik, Rollie Lal, Ian Lesser and David Thaler (eds.), *The Muslim World after 9/11*, USA, Rand, 2004, pp. 175- 203.
- 29 On the centre-periphery discussion, see, Şerif Mardin, "Centre-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?", *Daedalus*, Vol. 2 (1973), pp. 169- 191. On the left-right cleavage see Ali Çarkoğlu, "The Turkish Party System in Transition", pp. 544- 571. On the dichotomy between Islamism and Kemalist secularism see Çarkoğlu, "The Turkish Party System in Transition", pp. 544- 571; Taniyici, "Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey, pp. 463-483.
- 30 On religiosity, see, Üstün Ergünder, "Changing Patterns of Electoral Behaviour in Turkey", *Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Dergisi*, Vol. 8-9 (1980-1), pp. 45-81; Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "Elections and Party Preferences in Turkey: Changes and Continuities in the 1990s", *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (October 1994), pp. 402-424; Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "The Shaping of Party Preferences in Turkey: Coping with the Post-Cold War Era", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, Vol. 20 (Spring 1999), pp. 47-76; Cem Başlevent, Hasan Kirmanioğlu and Burhan Şenatlar, "Voter Profiles and Fragmentation in the Turkish Party System", *Party Politics*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (May 2004), pp. 307-324. On the early formation of political inclinations see Yusuf Ziya Özcan, "Determinants of Political Behavior in Istanbul, Turkey", *Party Politics*, Vol.6, No. 4 (2000), pp. 505-518. On *ethnicity, education, and economic status*, see, Başlevent, Kirmanioğlu and Şenatlar, "Voter Profiles and Fragmentation in the Turkish Party System", pp. 307-324; Başlevent, Kirmanioğlu and Şenatlar, "Party Preference and Economic Voting in Turkey", pp. 377-391; Kalaycıoğlu, "Elections and Party Preferences in Turkey", pp. 402-424.
- 31 For example the World Values Survey asks questions about politics and society in a general way, without a clear focus on Turkish society, at <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/> [last visited 18 July 2012].
- 32 We used a snowball sample starting with 10 initial contacts. Each participant then put us in contact with other people from their environment. This technique allowed us to build trust with respondents since our initial contacts referred the participants that followed. Snowball sampling is a special non-probability method which relies on referrals from initial subjects to generate additional subjects. Most commonly it is being used in studies which aim to produce specific measures to be tested in larger samples. Although estimates have to be done cautiously, snowball and respondent-driven samples can provide asymptotically unbiased estimates. See, Matthew J. Salganik and Douglas D. Heckathorn, "Sampling and Estimation in Hidden Populations Using Respondent-driven Sampling", *Sociological Methodology*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (December 2004), pp. 193- 239; Tom A.B. Snijders, "Estimation on the Basis of Snowball Samples: How to Weight?", *Bulletin de Methodologie Sociologique*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (September 1992), pp. 59-70. See also Alan Bryman, *Social Research Methods*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008.

- 33 According to the 2002, 2007 and 2011 general elections the AKP had a strong victory in the whole country. The province of Ankara received a large share of the AKP vote. In 2002 AKP received 38.11 % (820,260) of the vote share in Ankara, while the CHP only received 28.04% (603,385). In 2007 the electoral difference between the two parties was more pronounced, with the AKP receiving 47.52% (1,168,742) and the CHP receiving 27.97% (687,869). In 2011, the AKP received 49.20% (1,466,284) and the CHP received 31.37% (934,999). These results are in sharp contrast with electoral gains of the two parties in other large provinces such as İzmir or smaller ones such as Edirne and Muğla where the CHP received consistently higher vote shares than the AKP. For more details please refer to the 2002 and 2007 electoral results at http://www.belgenet.net/ayrinti.php?yil_id=14 [last visited 15 June 2012], and the 2011 electoral results at <http://secim.haberler.com/2011/ankara-secim-sonuclari/> [last visited 15 June 2012].
- 34 We should note that residents of urban centres on the coast are distinct from the population living in the eastern parts of the country and our results should be considered under this light. A cross-sectional survey however would not guarantee a representative sample. Given the poor response rate figures of representative public opinion surveys at about 25-35%, it is questionable whether a truly “national” sample would be acquired even with such efforts implementing random sampling.
- 35 It was not our intention to have a random representative sample, and as such it is not balanced in terms of gender, age, and education. About 63% of our participants are male; 44% are between 30-40 years old, and 43% are between 20 and 30 years. In addition, 51% have completed university level education, 81% are employed, 68% identify as middle class and 42% has monthly income of 750 to 1,500 Turkish Lira.
- 36 Participants used 11-point scales from -5 to 5 (where -5 means strongly disagree and 5 means strongly agree) to indicate agreement with the statement “I see myself as part of the Islamic world” and “I see myself as part of the Turkish nation”. For the analyses that follow all items have been recoded on 0 to 10 scales for comparability.
- 37 Similar items (confidence towards institutions, religiosity, attitudes towards the state, ethnic diversity, modern values and traditions, citizenship) appear in the 2005 World Values Survey. The questionnaire is available at <http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSDocs.jsp> [last visited 28 June 2012]. Items on minority rights appear in the 2008 European Values Survey which is available at <http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/evs/surveys/longitudinal-file-1981-2008/dataanddocumentation/> [last visited 28 June 2012]. Items on tolerance towards different moral standards and agreement on adjusting moral behaviours appear also in the 2004 *Questionnaire of the American National Election Study* (ANES), at <http://electionstudies.org/study/pages/2004prepost/2004prepost.htm> [last visited 29 June 2012].
- 38 Başlevent, Kirmanioğlu and Şenatlar, “Party Preference and Economic Voting in Turkey”, pp. 377-391.