Intermediate Preferences and Behavioral Conformity in Large Games
Carmona, GMB (2009) Intermediate Preferences and Behavioral Conformity in Large Games Journal of Public Economic Theory, 11 (1). pp. 9-25.
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Motivated by Wooders, Cartwright, and Selten (2006), we consider games with a continuum of players and intermediate preferences. We show that any such game has a Nash equilibrium that induces a partition of the set of attributes into a bounded number of convex sets with the following property: all players with an attribute in the interior of the same element of the partition play the same action. We then use this result to show that all sufficiently large, equicontinuous games with intermediate preferences have an approximate equilibrium with the same property. Our result on behavior conformity for large finite game generalizes Theorem 3 of Wooders et al. (2006) by allowing both a wider class of preferences and a more general attribute space.
|Divisions :||Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > School of Economics|
|Date :||February 2009|
|Identification Number :||https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.01394.x|
|Additional Information :||This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Carmona GMB Intermediate Preferences and Behavioral Conformity in Large Games. Journal of Public Economic Theory 11(1):9-25, which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.01394.x. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.|
|Depositing User :||Symplectic Elements|
|Date Deposited :||01 Jul 2015 16:13|
|Last Modified :||01 Jul 2015 16:13|
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