Abstract

This introduction to the special issue on the history of power forwards the anthropological concept of “purification” as a means of drawing together disparate histories of psychology that invoke notions of power. Drawing on the work of Mary Douglas, Bruno Latour, Michel Foucault, and Donna Haraway, I argue for a history of psychology that links the carving up of people up into their properly natural and enculturated parts with keeping people in their place, the purification of interpretation by scientific representation, the maintenance of the body politic of the discipline, and the role of psychology in making up power in modern nation states.

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When psychologists and other scholars are foolish enough to write about “power,” they are at least occasionally wise enough to recognize that they are mucking about with power by so doing (Winter, 1973). At least since Marx and Engels’ *German Ideology* (1978), scholars in the Western tradition have been rightly vulnerable to the criticism that their written opinions can operate as ideological moves that reinscribe forms of power that they ostensibly aimed to undo (Eagleton, 1991). There are particular good reasons to handle the history of psychology's power with caution. Around the topic of power, Roger Smith's question about the impossibility of the history of psychology's subject is not easily answered (Smith, 1988). Tentative answers might reference the forms of statecraft and corporate power with which psychology has been complicit (Rose, 1990); psychological racism (Richards, 1997), sexism (Lewin, 1984), and homophobia (Terry, 1999); the boundary work between subfields that structures persistent tensions, revolutions, and paradigms repudiated (Danziger, 1990; Hornstein, 1992); the export of indigenous North American psychology around the globe as “objectivity” (Brock, 2006); the rise of a psychological view of personhood in the modern world (Herman, 1995); and the “psychologist's advantage” to perform the “God trick” and define the subjectivities of those subjects that she gets to write about (Haraway, 1991; Schiebe, 1988). Such lists as this—however carefully crafted—rightly invite criticisms about the forms of power that are reinscribed by the author's unthinking omissions.

In contrast, when psychologists write about “power,” they often do so in ways that suggest that power has no history at all. Terrence Ball described psychologists' tendency to understand power as atomistic, deterministic—as something “possessed” by people—as a Hobbesian legacy (Ball, 1975). A glance at successive *Handbooks* of social psychology over the 20th century exemplifies Ball's analysis. The index of Murchison's *Handbook* (1935) contains no entries on power, but no contemporary historian could fail to spot power at work in a text organized by chapters on the history of the Negro, Red man, White man, and Yellow man (Cherry, 1995). Twenty years later, Gordon Allport's chapter in Lindzey's *Handbook* (1954) contains no such histories, but cites Hobbes as the original philosopher of “power,” a concept that Allport equates with egoism (Allport, 1954). Allport could point to little
empirical work on power in social psychology, a situation that had changed radically by the time of the 1968 Handbook. By then, experimental studies of power, and typologies such as French and Raven's had become more common in the field (French & Raven, 1960). While discussing the achievements of recent decades, McGuire (1969) seemed unembarrassed about its distance from the substantive issue of power in the “real” world:

Psychologists have largely neglected…. the case of power as it operates in real communities: who wields it, whence does it derive, how is it exercised to influence the attitudes and behavior of community members….Fortunately these substantive issues… have been given considerable attention by sociologists… and political scientists. (pp. 195–196)

Such Whiggish celebrations were typical of experimental social psychology of this period (Samelson, 2000), and in response, Kenneth Gergen deployed historicism to delimit experimental social psychology's claims to know “the social” at all (Gergen, 1973). Yet into the 21st century, the problems that Gergen (1973) identified with experimental social psychology persisted. More recently, together with his colleague Colin Leach, Gergen could point to the failure of political psychologists to engage with social constructionist questions about value neutrality, objectivity, social good, empiricism, and universality in their studies of power (Gergen & Leach, 2001). The North American center of the discipline's knowledge and power is a particularly hostile climate for social constructionism, which is often accepted only when translated to imply that lay people construct their social worlds, but science remains a uniquely valid search for truth (Jost & Kruglanski, 2002). Indeed, the social psychology of Hobbesian power is typical of forms of social science that presume an ahistorical atomistic theory of the human subject (Smith, 1997). Despite recent titles in social psychology on such matters as social dominance (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), legitimacy (Jost & Major, 2001), and corruption (Lee-Chai & Bargh, 2002), it remains the case that social psychologists' accounts of their experiments with power remain detached from work in the history of psychology on the kinds of power that experimental social psychology tends to wield (Lubek, 2000). The Gergen and Leach collection is a rare attempt to break this pattern.

The contributors to the current volume also hope to move on psychologists' conversations about power by looking at the history of the power that psychology has wielded. We hold that a psychological framework cannot serve as a valid means of evaluating political consciousness if that framework is unaware of the degree to which it itself is bound up with power dynamics (see Augustinos, 1999; Jost, 1995). We are explicitly concerned with the idea, often attributed to Foucault (Foucault, 1977)—but common also to feminist (Morawska, 1994), Marxist (Tolman, 1994), deconstructionist (Parker, 1989), antiracist (Gould, 1981), antipsychiatric (Szasz, 1961), and lesbian/gay (Kitzinger, 1987) critical thought—that psychology is a site where power and knowledge are transformed into each other in particularly dense ways in modern worlds. Furthermore, we do not assume that relationships between power and knowledge are identical across historical time, geographical space, or disciplinary investments. Like others, we have responded to the call to abandon the history of psychology with focused studies that work toward a reconstruction of the manifold histories of psychology's power (Danziger, 1991).

The authors of the following articles in this issue have experienced training in different disciplines in the fields of history, psychology, and sociology, which have variously enabled and constrained attempts to historicize psychology's power. Looking past those disciplinary boundaries, we have been engaged in interdisciplinary and counterdisciplinary projects around feminism, sexuality studies, postcolonial studies, and critical studies of science and technology. Within these scholarly and political projects—in contrast to many of our conversations with psychologists—the moment has long passed when direct assertions that knowledge is “socially constructed” can function either as a shocking insight or an unqualified ontological claim (Hacking, 1999). We are under no illusion that we inhabit a moment when historicism is sufficient to make a critical intervention in the history of
psychology's trajectories of power. If psychology was powerless against historicism, then the philosophers of the Frankfurt school would have finished psychology off long before “power” ever became an object of psychology experiments in the second half of the 20th century (Staeuble, 1991). Yet, like historians whose voices are drowned out by nationalists' revisionist histories that lead citizens toward war and genocide, we experience a moral obligation to historicize psychology's power, even if past experience tells us that we are unlikely to effect great change in the present (Hobsbawm, 1997). How might we speak of psychology's power from our locations in fields of forces where psychology's power and psychologists' awareness of it appear to repel each other like polarized magnets?

Psychology and the Politics of Purification

I want to venture the anthropological concept of purification in this introduction as a metaphorical tool that might help here. For the anthropologist Mary Douglas, purification is the attempt to actualize a vision of social order in the material world through ritual practices. All cultures, including Western cultures, are invested in such practices because humans are ritual animals (Douglas, 1966, p. 77). Purification might help to historicize power in ways that psychologists themselves might recognize and engage with, incorporate insights on the history of psychology's power, and move past simplistic claims that psychological knowledge is “socially constructed.” I am not suggesting that purification can serve as an overarching metaphor for all forms of power, and my ambivalence about proposing it centers on the fact that notions of “culture” can obscure forms of domination in both psychology and anthropology (Crehan, 2002; Gjerde, 2004; Gjerde & Onishi, 2000). But, I am cautiously optimistic that purification might open up new ways of understanding psychology's power and perhaps lead to the integration of studies previously considered incommensurable.

Douglas describes purification as an anxious response to category confusion, defining dirt simply as “matter out of place.” Dirt can be handled in a number of ways: it can be actively ignored, morally condemned, constructed as a danger to be avoided, or supplanted with new realities. All of these make up the material world in conformity with culturally particular imaginations of what social order ought to look like. However, the ambiguity opened up by dirt is not necessarily viewed negatively. In most societies, within designated times and places, dirt can become “creative formlessness” and the basis of remaking social order. Sanctioned forms of sexuality are a case in point. Douglas lays the blame for the West's inability to see itself as organized by ritual practices at the door of social sciences that traded in evolutionary narratives of the West's singular historical progress and the endowment of Western science with the power to purify the modern world of its irrational foundations. As part of this story, “ritual” was seen as the province of religion, rendering the ritualistic practices of modern science invisible.

By bringing together the racism of Western anthropology and its failure to consider how its scientific approach is enacted through rituals that put people in their proper places, Douglas' framework that describes Western science as “culture” opens up new ways to consider psychology's past. Central to the history of psychology is the account of how “intelligence” became IQ—a measurable property of individuals—by drawing on ideas about normal development, educational testing practices, strategic engagements between psychologists and the U.S. military, and the crisis of explaining the differential responses of schoolchildren to standardized national education curricula. According to our histories, the relationship between science and democracy was remade, and visibly in crisis, through these developments (Carson, 1993; Danziger, 1997a; Fancher, 1985; Gould, 1981; Hornstein, 1988; Kevles, 1968; Rose, 1996; Sämbelson, 1979; Walkerdine, 1984). The invention of IQ as a universal property of humans during World War I and after in the United States was complicit with the construction of racist psychologies that were anxious about purifying national boundaries, and about protecting an elitist model of social order from those deemed
unfit to participate in it. Evolutionary assumptions about the unique superiority of modern civilized people shielded White IQ researchers from the awareness that their scientific work was cultural after all (Guthrie, 1976; Richards, 1997; Thomas, 1995). But any racism in IQ work was inseparable from researchers acknowledgment of, and resistance to, evidence of the way that the rituals of IQ testing were experienced differently by Black and White children (Morawski, 1997), or relationships between psychological experts and the policing of the boundaries of the nation state (Gould, 1981). By invoking “purification” as a concept through which the history of IQ might be understood, I mean to point out that those of us who prefer to historicize individuals, social groups, methodological practices, and institutional politics are examining different aspects of a common cultural transformation. An old-fashioned ethnographer concerned with that era would have attempted to synthesize those aspects into a single account of the “culture” of psychology of this period. Perhaps we might wonder why it seems difficult to describe science in similarly objectified “cultural” terms.

The cultural approach I'm adopting here should not be confused with an argument that differences in IQ are the results of nurture rather than nature. The transition to this debate about the nature and nurture of intelligence was also about an impurity, whose meaning was debated in ways that Douglas would recognize. For Walter Lippman, IQ was a dirty hybrid of politics and science because it made premature assumptions about natural differences between people. But psychologists in the testing movement lauded IQ as a creative formlessness through which American society could be remade to conform to a rational cognitive elitist imagination. The response to IQ science that suggests that people are instead suited to a socialist society is troubled by the impurity of biologically based differences in ability (Harwood, 1977).

Rather, my position is closer to that of Bruno Latour, who has argued that Western science works in accord with a logic of “purification” that leads modern Westerners to create the disciplinary boundaries that blind us to what modernity is all about (Latour, 1993b). To be modern, in Latour's terms, is to resolutely believe both that science can be free of human social influence, and that politics cannot be enacted by things. Yet modern cultures are also characterized by hybrids, such as holes in the ozone layer, human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)/acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) epidemics, national electricity grids, genetically modified foods, and other phenomena that are determinative of human being, and that pollute the modern categories of the “natural” and the “cultural.” According to Latour, this proliferation of hybrids defines the difference between the modern and the nonmodern and is enabled by the inability of the moderns to hold in mind the translation work of science through which such hybrids come into being, along with science’s promises to purify the world and put everything and everyone in their proper place. Thus, the invisibility of the effects of scientific power defines a modern condition in which “[e]verything happens in the middle, everything passes between the two, everything happens by way of mediation, translation and networks, but this space does not exist, it has no place. It is the unthinkable” (Latour, 1993b, p. 37).

For Latour, modern and nonmodern cultures are different because the proliferation of nature/culture hybrids in modernity is greatly speeded up, and goes unchecked by narratives that entrust science with the task of effecting a break with the premodern past. Latour’s understanding of purification would alert historians of psychology not only to look to ironic resonances between the products of psychological science and the organization of its labor, but also to how psychology incorporates and universalizes modernist notions, such as the view of time as linear, progressive, and in short supply. A single-minded participation in nature–nurture debates about intelligence, of course, fails to accomplish the required double consciousness. Historians might instead understand the peculiar proliferation of nature–nurture debates a propos of intelligence as evidence of Latour’s thesis about modernity. The history of intelligence research might also inform accounts of modernity’s investment in the
future and urgent desire to separate itself from the past (Lawrence, 1999). IQ tests were valuable as a means of sorting people out in rapidly efficient ways in bureaucratic regimes (Hornstein, 1988). Without standardized practices, how else would one derive the intelligence of 1.75 million soldiers during an ongoing war? Or gauge the intelligence of the nation's schoolchildren fast enough to treat them all differently in meaningful ways? Yet to score highly on such tests initially implied evidence of speeded up intellectual development; Stanford-Binet scores were calculated as mental age divided by chronological age after all, and high IQ kids were those who were quickest to recapitulate evolutionary history, and to leave the primitive realm of childhood behind. This valuation of speed also shaped the form of evolutionary racism that IQ scores made real; race differences in test scores largely disappeared when testing practices were not constrained by time (Richards, 1997). By keeping in mind that the translation work of science and its promises to purify the world through ritualistic battles between nature and nurture, the history of psychology might occupy a much more central place in analyses of what modernity is all about.

In suggesting the utility of Latour's work for thinking about the history of psychology, my ambivalence, like that of other feminist and sexuality scholars, concerns the extent to which this approach overestimates its own newness and erases the critiques of modernity offered by those people who have been objectified within its fuzzy boundaries (Epstein, 1996; Haraway, 1997; Hegarty, 2003; Starr, 1991; Wacjman, 2000). Latour's work has deliberately centered on the natural sciences, and he understands his project to be more radical that the analysis of the human sciences because of the resistance of the natural sciences to social critique (Latour, 1993a). Yet, as Haraway notes, Latour's bravado in attacking the “hard problems” of the natural sciences unfortunately mimics rather than contests the masculinist narratives that organize those sciences (Haraway, 1997). Modern and nonmodern societies also appear distinctly different in Latour's account. While Latour describes the modern consciousness as unique, he also admits that “the modern” has only a nebulous boundary with its “nonmodern” compliment, and that this boundary crosses such territories as “madness, children, animals, popular culture and women’s bodies” (Latour, 1993b; p. 100). However, Latour rarely invokes the critical thinking about modernity that emerges from these sites. Once again, the IQ movement points to the limits of a too-close reliance on the notion that modernity, or any other cultural system is a bounded whole that is structured by systematic consensus (Crehan, 2002). One need not navigate the complexifying vocabulary of Latour's work to recognize that the modern consciousness becomes singular by purifying itself of alternative ontologies. African American intellectual traditions, for example, attest to the long-standing recognition that survival in dehumanizing modern knowledge/power networks requires a “double consciousness” that is not captured by the proscribed forms of modernist thought (DuBois, 1903; Gilroy, 1993; Morawski, 1997).

Foucault's later work on sexuality pushes the history of psychology past this point. Foucault focused on the investments of Victorian scientists who were concerned with moral purity in the category of “sexuality” as an explanation of seemingly unrelated forms of deviance. His work simultaneously commented on his own time, providing those who were rendered most impure by modernity—such as prisoners—some strategies for intervening in knowledge/power. Foucault offers us an account of power that moves past the Hobbesian assumptions that continue to inform psychologists’ accounts of power. Resistance to power was described by Foucault as necessary for the operations of power, but also as “mobile and transitory” rather than organized under a single great signifier such as “agency” or “revolution” (p. 96).

If Foucault's constructions of power as without an “outside” and inextricably tied to knowledge have appeared to some psychologists as overly “dark,” and devoid of the possibilities of human agency (Danziger, 1997b), then this may be because the political possibilities opened up by his work on sexuality have been foreclosed by heterosexist
It is useful to remember that Foucault was writing in a context when psychoanalysis appeared to offer a way of thinking about sexual liberation that was widely popular on the left, yet which presumed to name human sexual nature, and through that naming to define the proper limits of such liberation. David Halperin notes that gay/lesbian activists have often seen Foucault's later works as enabling of strategic politics with statecraft, as in the case of AIDS activism, for instance (Halperin, 1995). Foucault's comments on power might also be usefully read in light on the celebratory discourses of the humanistic psychologies of the period that promised liberation from the limits of consciousness and social order (Herman, 1995). For the AIDS activists alluded to by Halperin, the slogan was "drugs into bodies" rather than "liberation from power." When survival requires strategic investment with the state, big science, and corporations in the interests of survival, then there is considerable political utility in rethinking power not as a possession that is won or lost, held or used, but as "the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization" (Foucault, 1978, p. 92, see also Epstein, 1996).

At first glance, Foucault and Latour seem to have offered different explanations of why modern knowledge politics are ironic (Hegarty, 2003). Latour described modernity as an attempt to purify itself of hybridity, whereas Foucault argued that the production of "sexuality" in modernity is obscured by the notion that sexual politics operates through the repression of "natural" sexual difference. Yet the relationship between these projects need not be approached as two distinct historical theses. Douglas (1966, p. 66) notes that "the word 'perversion' is a significant mistranslation of the rare Hebrew word tebhel, which has as its meaning mixing or confusion." Moll (1999) also notes that queer cultures are possible sites where Latour's "unconscious of the moderns" may be being made conscious in recent decades. Indeed, the hybridity of the AIDS virus as both constructed object and a very real entity was clear not only to Latour (1993b) but also to many intellectuals substantively engaged in the cultural work of surviving the epidemic.

Of course, where AIDS in concerned, science can usefully perform its interpretive part; we can learn to live—indeed, must learn to live—as though there are such things as viruses. The virus—a constructed scientific object—is also a historical subject, an "HIV," a real source of illness and death that can be passed form one person to another under certain conditions that we can apparently—individually and collectively—influence. (Treichler, 1991, p. 69)

Tension between Latour and Foucault might be more usefully thought of by historians of psychology then to the extent that we might use each to understand the persistent purification practices of modern single-consciousness that, from within, feels like "objectivity," versus the task of crafting a politics of the purified who require a more complex epistemology to accommodate their existence within, survival beyond, or transformation of, the category of the human.

Curiously, if Foucault's work seemed to present power in too monolithic terms to some psychologists, it was resisted by feminist theorists for its seeming complicity with liberal humanism and its unwillingness to analyze broad power dynamics such as racism and sexism in monolithic terms (Hartsock, 1990). Feminists were quick to recognize that historizing psychology might provide crucial lessons and resources for the contestation and rethinking of what came to be called "women's nature," and "femininity" (Constantinople, 1973; Kitzinger, 1987; Shields, 1982; Weisstein, 1968), as well as lessons from the past from how previous generations of women psychologists had resisted such notions (Furumoto, 1988; Morawski & Agronick, 1991). Haraway (1991) recognized that notions such as women's nature, experience, or distinct biology remain complicit with patriarchal projects to "put women in their proper place" and leave masculinist knowledge unmarked. Whereas some feminist psychologists based accounts of feminism on notions of women's particular epistemology or standpoint, many others saw this as a problem that left women in...
the position of “other” and the masculinist politics of psychological knowledge untouched (Crawford & Marecek, 1989; Mednick, 1989; Morawski, 2005).

Rather than assert such static notions of nature, Haraway put the ironic science-fiction figure of the cyborg at the center of her feminist politics, acknowledging the increasingly complex ways in which women's political situation was shaped by the production and consumption of information technology and the possibilities opened up for feminist work by networks of humans and machines that have their origins in militaristic projects of Cold war domination (Haraway, 1989). By so doing, Haraway insisted on politics of heterogeneity and impurity, and on the creation of counternetworks among people whose knowledges were situated in radically different sites—people whose situatedness could be changed through such connections. Cyborg theorizing was also a response to the imperative for speed in modernity, enabled by the translation of many forms of human beings into quantified code in the human sciences after World War II. One testament to the generative impact of such deliberate, transparent, ironic, dirty, knowledge politics is the rich set of conversations across fields as diverse as film theory, critical psychology, and bioinformatics, which have been inspired by Haraway’s work (Gordo-López & Parker, 1999; Gray, 1995; Kirkup, Janes, Woodward, & Hovenden, 1999).

My use of Haraway, Foucault, Latour, and Douglas here is intended to stimulate psychologists, and historians of psychology, to collectively consider how our unthinking attempts at objectivity, impartiality, and expertise might be motivated by anxieties about positioning ourselves on the safe side of hierarchical value-laden category boundaries which go unspoken and form something like a disciplinary consensus at a particular point in time. Why contest purification efforts now? I think the reasons are multiple. The late 20th century saw the return of a neo-liberal order that mimicked, on a global scale, the conditions that Marx observed in 19th century Europe. Wealth became more unevenly distributed, nature was being undone in the service of capital expansion, the uneven developments occasioned by capitalist economies engendered new forms of inequality, and yet a neo-liberal consensus insisted that politics, ideology—and indeed history—had all come to an end (Harvey, 2000). With the renewed power of nation states over their citizens in the 21st century, attempts to manifest a social imaginary that divides “us” from “them” are articulated with increasing frequency, urgency, and the backing of increasing levels of sanctioned violence. The degree to which this is felt as the increased militarization of borders or the ritualistic purification of a bottle of shampoo from its culpability as a weapon of mass destruction by placing it in a transparent sandwich bag is a rough measure of status in this world.

Given the work of the last decade or so on the importance of war to psychology, historians of psychology should not be surprised to find psychologists working everywhere in ways that serve the interests of the nation states that initiated the current “war on terror,” pursued by increasing governmental power through repeal of the freedoms of their citizens (Zizek, 2004). There is nothing startling about finding psychologists caught up everywhere in this field, from purifying complicity with interrogation of illegally held prisons in Iraq and Guantanamo as mental health care provision in the United States (Behnke, 2006) to an almost complete unwillingness to discuss the war at all in the United Kingdom (Roberts & Esgate, n.d.). It would be wrong, however, to assume that all forms of “mainstream” psychology are complicit with the war, or devoid of useful insights simply because they conduct experiments. Consider for example those existential psychologists who use ahistoricism methods of experimentation to explore and demonstrate how support for war is self-sustaining through the circulation of fear (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 2003). My point in making purification central to our analysis of power is to resist on the one hand the ahistorical ontologies of personhood that undergird such experiments, and at the same time allows such science to meaningfully “perform its interpretive part.” We should not
assume that historians of psychology necessarily have critical leverage over psychologists wielding positivist methodologies and reworking Hobbesian notions of power. Rather, the trick is to find out how historical and positivist critiques of contemporary state power can help each other progress quickly.

Historians might contribute to the critical account of psychology's power more directly if the suspension of an all-out constructivist attack on experimentation were part of a greater effort to keep in mind the purification and translation couplet a propos of modern psychology's investment in war. One of the history of psychology's principal insights has been the recognition of psychology's indebtedness to past military collaborations for its current position of legitimacy (Capshew, 1999; Herman, 1995). I want to hold that alongside the tendency within the United States—the birthplace of the contemporary globally hegemonic form of psychology (Danziger, 2006)—to adopt the metaphor of “war” as the basis of scientifically justified policy campaigns that tend to end up attacking the very people they are supposedly aimed to help (whether the target of that war is cancer, HIV/AIDS, poverty, the sexual psychopath, drugs or “terror”). I also mean to highlight that war is the means of rationalizing the human costs of “purification” as when nature and nurture are said to “battle” for the control of behavior. Those people who are rendered “impure” because their lives sit at the blurry boundaries of existing categories often experience violence from psychology as a result of their positions on the nature versus nurture battleground. As the intersex activist Cheryl Chase put it, psychologists looked to intersex people to figure out how sexual orientation and gender develop, but in a manner that remained ignorant of the effects of psychologically based interventions on intersex children; “there's no way you're gonna tease out ‘nature’ and ‘nurture’ without overlooking all of the trauma that intersexed children and their families experience” (Hegarty & Chase, 2000, p. 129). Disciplinary habits of framing inter- and intradisciplinary divides as “wars”—about culture, science, and so forth—can often have the effect of obscuring, to academicians, their own complicity in more obviously violent actions.

If one goal of the history of psychology is to create accounts of the past that give critical leverage on the problems of the present (Stocking, 1965), then a focus on the politics that purifies psychology of accountability for, and awareness of, the effects of its power may be particularly prescient at this point in time.

**Contributors to the Present Volume**

The authors of the present volume strive for such histories. Stephanie Shields discusses how “constructions of emotion out-of-control are used to disempower people.” In 19th century British evolutionary psychology, emotion could be the undoing of an individual, a gender, a race, or an organization. The lone rational White male adult emerges as the character with sufficient rationality to control these passions, and to purify rational speech of their effects, an identity inhabited by those authors whose expert scientific proclamations had little or no relationship to empirical observation. For Shields, two simultaneous assumptions that emotion is ineffable on the one hand and embodied on the other render “emotion” a privileged object for the creation of psychological power. Foucault's account of “sexuality” is similar to Shields' argument here (Foucault, 1978). Both emotion and sexuality emerge as flexible resources through which hybrids of mind and body, individual and population, science and politics can be generated with the ostensive goal of keeping these categories innocent of each other.

Shields' describes gendered emotion, in which male emotion can be creative formlessness but female emotion never is. But she is emphatic that the politics she describes are not limited to gender. Implicit in Shields' account is the gendering of the category of “mind;” capable of ruling the passions among men but not women. Hans Pols picks up this thread by
describing how notions of the “Javanese mind” trafficked across Dutch psychiatric and political discourse during colonial and postcolonial periods. As in Shields’ discussion, evolutionary accounts of colonial power are present in this account of colonialism. However, Pols further notes that notions of Javanese “culture” are as effective as accounts of “nature” in doing the ideological work of legitimating colonialism. Recalling Foucault’s famous formulation of a “reverse discourse,” Pols also describes how Indonesian nationalists ontologized the Indonesian mind as one constituted by the wounds of colonialism. Thus, as in the best postcolonial work, Pols essay speaks to contested power/knowledge in multiple locations whose unequal interactions made up the colonial order. The European psychiatric tradition is clearly inflected by its complicity in colonization, but that tradition also forms part of the ideological toolkit of decolonization movements. As such Pols essay contributes to the “internationalization” of the history of psychology (Brock, 2006), particularly the much-needed recognition that all forms of psychology are “indigenous” but that some are more globally hegemonic than others (Danziger, 2006).

If some genders and civilizations are more advanced than others, and consequently fit to rule, shouldn’t the most stable leaders be those individuals who are intellectually precocious? Wouldn’t that be best for all? This cognitive elitist antidemocratic politics organized not only the eugenics of Francis Galton, but also the psychometric work of psychologist Lewis Terman. Terman defended the masculinity of his high IQ “gifted children” against the possible charge that they resembled the “mad geniuses” of 19th century theory (Becker, 1978) by quantifying their masculinity. By so doing, Terman drew on two notions of those who differ from the norm: the notion of pathology a propos of male effeminacy and of ideality a propos of male intelligence. I read Terman not only as an architect of the normalizing present, but also as an ironic forefather of critical thinking. Had Terman positioned gender-exceptional children as wonderful rather than pathological—or if psychologists were to consider doing so now (Sedgwick, 1991), the future history of the relationship between “gender,” “sexuality,” and “intelligence” might look radically different, and all of these terms might have very different relationships to power.

Geoff Bunn’s essay is similarly concerned with gender, technology, the construction of individuals’ “truth.” Like earlier essays, Bunn urges us to consider psychological power in terms of who has power to name the psychology of another, and the agency of technologies that fix individuals into subject positions, legitimating the state’s imprisonment of them. A bogus lie detector can be more effective than a scientifically sanctioned one because, explains Bunn, the public representation of the technology’s power to reveal truth configures the human subject’s fear of the test, which is essential to its efficacy in the interrogation room. Gender then structures this popular representation, which is also part of the thing itself; in “factual” representations the lie detector is wielded by a male over a female subject, and the possibility of the reverse is confined to the register of children’s fiction. Bunn’s argument about the ways that psychological technologies configure their subjects through their public representations constitutes, I think, an important reason to move beyond histories of technology that unthinkingly privilege natural over social sciences. The forms of power operant here redraw the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity, popular and scientific cultures, that might contribute to a much wider history of the ways that people are compelled not only to understand themselves as psychological subjects (Rose, 1996) but also become equipped with the peculiar affects and cognitions necessary to render them useful “subjects” of psychological research and surveillance.

Burman’s paper on the imagination of “Japan” and of Japanese psychology in the English-speaking social sciences resonates most obviously with Pols’; both show hegemonic imperialist powers and their subjugated others cooperating in an uneven ontologizing discourse. The distinction between psychological facts and imaginations of nation states are thoroughly muddied by Burman’s treatment of them here. Burman describes what has
elsewhere been called “double reification” (Moghaddam & Lee, 2006), by which native others are read through Western psychological schemas, and then difference is contained within “cross-cultural research” to forbid the conclusion that Western individualism might be an indigenous problematic way of making sense of people to whom it is foreign. The use of psychology as a means of silencing resistance to exported models of psychological forms thought to cohere around modern nations states is particularly evident in the literature on Japan. Burman’s intervention is also particularly a propos, as Japan continues to occupy a privileged position in psychological discourse on cultural difference.

The final essay in this volume returns us in an uncanny way to both the present moment and the point of departure for this special issue. Angela Cassidy, like Stephanie Shields, is concerned with a public discourse about evolution that implicates gender and proceeds through popular media rather than through empirical psychology. Cassidy’s focus is a century later than Shields’ as Cassidy examines how evolutionary psychology was complicit with the “third way” politics of New Labor in Britain in the 1990s. As in Pols’ paper on the Dutch colonies, alliances between psychologists and governments are in evidence, and as with Bunn’s lie detectors, the power of popular media precedes the psychological object that it represents (most obviously among psychologists who are most explicit about the separation of expert science from ordinary discourse). Yet, Cassidy argues, the common sense criticism that evolutionary psychology is a tool of the right is complicated by the emergence of Darwinisms on the left, feminist Darwinisms, and emergent queer Darwinisms. Much as I argue for a possible future for Terman in the history of a category that might replace “intelligence,” Cassidy sees the possibility for critical discourse in evolutionary psychology to speak for an increasingly heterogeneous range of actors (Hird, 2004). It remains to be seen what performative force “nature” in the guise of “our evolutionary past” will enact when enrolled in such a wide range of semiotic work.

Conclusions

The difficulty of crafting this essay on the history of psychology’s power has more than been outweighed by the privilege of working with the contributors and the History of Psychology editorial team to organize the essays in the present volume. As I mentioned in my opening paragraph, my account of psychology’s power in this introduction is open to the criticism that it excludes some critical operations of power. I am under no illusions that the Special Issue as a whole has escaped this criticism or responded to it in any final or complete way. We have focused perhaps too heavily on the overdeveloped West, have not adequately attended to the complexity of psychodynamic theories or clinical practices, and have barely touched the cognitive revolution and its neuropsychological successor at all. These obvious omissions should alert us to the fact that accounting for the past of psychology’s power will need to be an ongoing task that deserves to be center stage in the history of psychology. This should not only be a reflexive endeavor; in addition, it must be the case that accounts of reflexivity in psychology and the history of psychology must be centrally concerned with when they disrupt or reproduce the impulse toward purification. The irony would be in thinking that we, as historians, stand in some kind of “pure” space outside of the operations of power through keeping this critical historical impulse in motion.

Footnotes

1 Danziger came to this conclusion in analyses of social constructionist work in psychology. In relation, Foucault has been problematically described as a theorist of the macro-social within social constructionist schools of psychology, particularly those oriented around the analysis of discourse (Hook, 2001).
As a result of Foucault's death in 1984, Latour commented on this relationship more explicitly than Foucault. Latour not only describes his project as more radical than Foucault's on the grounds that it is focused on the natural sciences rather than the human sciences. Latour also expressed a preference for Foucault's earlier works, such as Discipline and Punish and The Order of Things, over the later work on sexuality. Critical psychologists have made similar commitments to Foucault's earlier works, and have, I believe, missed some critical insights about what can be expected from engagement in power struggles by those who are made objects of power/knowledge that go beyond the frequent characterization of Foucault as a "dark" theorist of power.

References


