ATTITUDES TOWARDS PEACE OPERATIONS: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS

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SUMMARY

This thesis is about attitudes towards peace operations and their determinants. Although British participation in peace operations has been one of the most prominent foreign policy commitments in the past two decades, little research has explored public attitudes towards such missions. British public opinion polls have assessed support for some humanitarian operations, most notably Bosnia and Kosovo, but these polls are purely descriptive and offer no insight into the nature and structure of belief systems (Ziegler, 1987).

This thesis builds on the hierarchical model of foreign policy attitudes (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987) to explore attitudes towards peace operations with respect to five present-day missions. According to this model, specific foreign policy attitudes are shaped by two types of general predispositions: "postures", such as militarism, and "core values", such as patriotism. Although this model has been applied to a variety of foreign policy issues, several theoretical underpinnings and empirical limitations of this model had yet to be tested.

These limitations were addressed in empirical research, conducted amongst the general population in Guildford, which include both cross-sectional and longitudinal interview and questionnaire data. The data are analysed using multivariate statistics and structural equation modelling.

In accordance with the hierarchical model, the results show that attitudes towards specific peace operations are shaped by more general orientations, and that political knowledge has no significant impact on how attitudes are structured. Empirical findings further suggest the importance of including images in explaining specific attitudes. Finally, an exploration of basic human values (Schwartz, 1992) in addition to the "core values" traditionally studied in existing work suggests a parsimonious approach to examining the value basis of foreign policy attitudes and a useful extension to the hierarchical model.
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To my parents – In memory

Sleep, the past, and wake, the future,
And walk out promptly through the open door;
But you, my coward doubts, may go on sleeping,
You need not wake again – not any more.

Louis MacNeice, from Autumn Journal (1939)
CHAPTER 1
UNDERSTANDING ATTITUDES TOWARDS PEACE OPERATIONS

The British are, by instinct, an internationalist people. We believe that as well as defending our rights, we should discharge our responsibilities in the world. We do not want to stand idly by and watch humanitarian disasters or the aggression of dictators go unchecked. We want to give a lead, we want to be a force for good (Ministry of Defence, 2000)

This thesis is about attitudes towards peace operations and their determinants. The academic literature on such operations has been concerned primarily with practical, policy-related issues, such as the design and conduct of particular missions, with the aim of offering advice and recommendations to decision-makers (Dandeker & Gow, 2000; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Fortna, 2004; Paris, 2000). Research in this area has also focused on the attitudes towards peace operations by soldiers assigned to such missions (e.g. Segal, 1996; Segal, Segal & Eyre, 1992), which has highlighted the psychological ambiguities that may affect soldiers’ performance in such operations (e.g. Britt, 1998; Franke, 1999). Several of these studies have found that perceived public support has a significant effect on the attitudes of soldiers in the field (e.g. Halverson & Bliese, 1996).

Both types of research have emphasised the role of public opinion in promoting a country’s participation in peace operations (e.g. Raevsky, 1996; Avant & Lebovic, 2000). However, only a few polls have investigated attitudes towards such operations in the general public, and even fewer empirical studies have explored the underlying
determinants of such attitudes in a general population (for a similar conclusion from a U.S. perspective see Boettcher, 2004). According to Boettcher (2004, p. 333), "A significant body of literature regarding foreign policy frames and uses of military force has emerged in the field of international relations in the past 15 years, but these studies have never focused exclusively on humanitarian interventions." This thesis aims to fill this empirical gap.

**Peace operations: Definitions**

What are peace operations? Peace operations involve both political activity and the use of an armed force, and are distinct from classic warfare and traditional combat. Numerous definitions exist for the concept of war. Common to most of these is the understanding that war consists of a conflict between the armed forces of two or more countries or coalitions, in which the goal is to achieve certain political objectives (O'Connell, 1995).

Like war, peace operations are military enterprises that serve political ends (Franke, 1999). However, unlike war, peace operations support diplomatic efforts to establish or maintain peace in areas of conflict. Since the establishment of the UN in 1945, there have been 56 UN peace operations. 43 of these missions have been created by the Security Council since 1988 (UN, 2003). There are currently 14 operations in the field, ranging from UNIFIL in Lebanon, UNMIK in Kosovo, UNAMA in Afghanistan to UNAMISL in Sierra Leone.

The literature frequently makes a distinction between first and second generation peace operations. *First generation* operations refer to missions conducted during the Cold War. These operations were carried out under the following conditions (Langholtz, 1998a, p. 220):

1 A reason for this marked increase in operations since the end of the Cold War is given by Langholtz, 1998a, p. 219.
Both nations participating in the dispute sought an end to hostilities
Both nations consented to the presence of UN troops
Sovereignty was clearly defined
The belligerent parties had established armies with disciplined soldiers
Armies pulled back and established a recognisable buffer zone
An agreed upon cease-fire was in place
A UN Security Council Resolution established the mission
Unarmed or lightly armed UN soldiers were inserted into the buffer zone
UN Forces monitored a cease-fire while diplomats sought a permanent political solution.

Under the above constraints, UN peace operations remained relatively small-scale operations. According to Goulding (1993), UN peacekeepers acted impartially between parties in conflict for the first four decades and would use force only in self-defence.

With the end of the Cold War, second generation UN peace operations have expanded beyond traditional operations undertaken under limited conditions, and now include both humanitarian relief and peace enforcement/peace building operations conducted under more demanding circumstances (for an overview of peace operation categories see Diehl, Druckman & Wall, 1998). Compared to first generation operations, second generation operations have also been carried out when hostilities were ongoing, when there was no consent for a UN presence, or even when there was armed opposition to UN peace forces (Langholtz, 1998a, p. 220).

According to Martin and Fortmann (1995), second-generation peace operations have become much harder and more dangerous for at least three reasons: (1) peace operations encompass an ever growing number of tasks, therefore becoming more difficult to comprehend; (2) the goals of peace operations have become more confusing and less clear-cut; and (3) soldiers on peace operations have been revealed to be fallible human beings.
Chapter 1 Understanding attitudes towards peace operations

What is already known about British attitudes to peace operations/humanitarian involvement?

British participation in UN and NATO peace operations was one of the most visible aspects of Britain’s foreign commitments in the 1990s; a commitment that appears to continue in the new millennium. According to the Ministry of Defence (2001),

*We need to be aware of the ways in which public attitudes might shape and constrain military activity. Increasing emotional attachment to the outside world ... and a public desire to see the UK act as a force for good is likely to lead to public support, and possibly public demand, for operations prompted by humanitarian motives.*

Indeed, a survey by MORI (April 2003) indicated that the majority of respondents (75%) agreed with the statement “Britain is a force for good in the world”, whilst another MORI poll (June 2003) reported that seven out of ten respondents (72%) agreed that the “UK Armed Forces contribute to making the world a safer place”. A majority of respondents (58%) also believed that Britain should continue to play a leading role in creating a new world order by its involvement in resolving international conflicts (ICM, November 2001).

Does this mean that the British public is supportive of Britain’s involvement in peace operations or “humanitarian” operations? We simply do not know. Although numerous public opinion polls have assessed British attitudes towards the war in Kosovo, Afghanistan or, more recently, Iraq, only a few British opinion polls have investigated British attitudes towards peace operations or humanitarian interventions. Similarly, only a few empirical studies provide direct information on what might determine support for such operations.

For example, British opinion polls have provided information about the public’s view on a variety of international conflicts. An illustration of British approval of several military interventions from 1950 to 2001 is provided in Figure 1.1, which shows that support for military missions has generally been high in the British public.
 Whilst public opinion on combat missions has frequently been documented, only a few British public opinion polls have investigated attitudes towards conflicts in which military force has been used for humanitarian purposes.

Figure 1.1. British support for international conflicts, 1950-2001 (in percent)

For example, at the time when Bosnian Serb forces were surrounding the town Srebrenica, MORI (April 1993) asked over a thousand British adults whether they would support or oppose an international peacekeeping force, including British troops, to be deployed in Bosnia. 64 percent of the respondents supported such a force, whilst 27 percent opposed it and nine percent had no opinion. When asked whether they would support or oppose sending troops, even if they might have to stay in the area for several years, 44 percent of those who had initially supported sending troops still supported such involvement, whereas 20 percent were opposed to sending troops under those circumstances. Similarly, when asked whether they would still support sending troops, even if many were likely to die, 37 percent of respondents who had initially supported sending troops still supported this, whereas 27 percent opposed it under these circumstances.
When presented with a series of abstract scenarios for the use of national troops in international affairs, the majority of British respondents were also willing to use British troops for humanitarian purposes, such as to assist a population struck by a famine (90%) or to bring peace to a region where there is a civil war (75%), whilst 61 percent of respondents were willing to use troops to ensure the supply of oil (Worldviews Survey, 2002).

Indirect information about attitudes towards humanitarian missions might also be drawn from polls about attitudes towards the United Nations (UN). For example, a 1988 Gallup poll showed that an overwhelming majority (81%) of the British public thought that what happened in other countries should be of concern to Britain, with only 15% claiming that it was not Britain’s business to get involved in other countries’ problems. Two in three respondents (67%) also thought that the UN was doing a good job in trying to solve the problems it had to face, compared to 33 percents who thought that the UN was doing a poor job (Eurobarometer No 32, 1989). When asked to give some examples of why they felt the UN was doing a good job, 45 percent of respondents provided reasons relating to world peace, resolving problems and peacekeeping. In 1995, 41 percent of British respondents still believed the United Nations was doing a good job, with 79 percent of the British public also supporting Britain remaining a member of the UN, compared to only ten percent who believed that Britain should leave the UN (Gallup, August, 1995).

In summary, although little specific information is available about attitudes towards peace operations, the British public emerges as one that supports humanitarian interventions and wants to be involved with the UN.

Public opinion and peace operations: An international perspective

Although no British opinion poll has focused exclusively on attitudes towards peace operations, several international surveys have done so. For example, a Canadian analysis of public attitudes towards peace operations from 1986 to 1992 showed that the majority of respondents believed that peacekeeping should be the priority of the
Canadian Armed Forces, followed by domestic defence issues (Martin & Fortmann, 1995). Similarly, U.S. analyses indicate that the American public not only supports US involvement in peace operations in principle, but also with respect to specific missions in Rwanda and Bosnia (e.g. Kull & Destler, 1999). Similar results have been reported for Slovenia (e.g. NATO, 2002), the Netherlands (van der Meulen & de Konink, 2001), France (La Balme, 2001) and South Africa (e.g. Liebenberg, Malen, Gilliers, Sass & Heinecken, 1997). These studies indicate that respondents from a variety of countries are supportive of their country's involvement in peace operations.

Why should attitudes to peace operations be studied?

Descriptive analyses, such as the ones reported above, have a long tradition in public opinion research as they require less methodological sophistication than more analytically oriented studies. Opinion polls are carried out on behalf of newspapers and magazines, political parties and governmental offices, and only indicate attitudes about issues that are of immediate media or political interest (Rattinger & Holst, 1998; Ziegler, 1987).

Opinion poll data are essential for examining opinion and trends on specific issues. According to Verba (1996, p. 3),

> sample surveys provide the closest approximation to an unbiased representation of the public because participation in a survey requires no resources and because surveys eliminate the bias inherent in the fact that participants in politics are self-selected ... surveys produce just what democracy is supposed to produce – equal representation of all citizens.

However, opinion polls only characterise patterns of attitudes and do not reveal which attitudes influence, promote or preclude each other. They therefore provide no information about the nature and structure of belief systems (Ziegler, 1987).
Recent studies indicate that public opinion has an impact on foreign and national security policies. For example, U.S. (e.g. Holsti, 1992; Sobel, 2001) and European research (La Balme, 2001; Rattinger & Juhasz, 1998; Ziegler, 1987) suggests that public opinion establishes a framework within which policy makers are able to consider various policy options. A more advanced knowledge of the determinants of attitudes towards peace operations could therefore be vital to develop durable foreign and security policies.

**Existing studies: Methodological concerns**

A considerable amount of work in the political sciences, including political psychology, has been concerned with understanding public attitudes towards foreign policy issues and their determinants. However, this research is severely fragmented and atheoretical. Social-psychological work on foreign policy attitudes, such as war, has been more theoretical and consistent in its approach, but studies are few and far between, and their results rarely published. Although both strands of research are carried out in the same domain, they seem to be oblivious to each other's findings; foreign policy research appears to be ignoring the advances made by social-psychological research and vice versa. This thesis therefore draws upon two main strands of study: political-psychological research into foreign policy attitudes, which has been conducted mainly in United States, and social-psychological research into attitudes towards war and other forms of inter-group hostility.

Furthermore, current discussions of public opinion on foreign policy issues are restricted in three important ways. Firstly, the majority of studies have been carried out in the US, whilst less attention has been paid to European publics (Everts, 2001a). Secondly, and more importantly, even US research has not yet moved beyond the context of the Cold War, thus neglecting a diverse set of issues that have become prominent after the Cold War (Everts, 2001a). Finally, discussions of the form and structure of international attitudes have been limited to demographic and political ideology data. Only recently have attempts been made to structure such
attitudes in terms of general worldviews or policy orientations. However, this research is sketchy and lacks thorough analysis.

This thesis

A distinction is frequently made between the individual and aggregate levels of analysis in public opinion research. Research at the aggregate level has focused on two major questions: the stability of public opinion and its rationality. Research at the individual level has concerned itself with the determinants or sources of public opinion and the ways in which individuals come to think about foreign policy issues.

Early research into foreign policy attitudes at the individual level concluded that individuals were not only ill informed about political matters but that their political opinions also lacked structure or coherence (e.g. Almond, 1950; Converse, 1994). However, these studies focused on a single dimension of liberalism/conservatism as orienting individuals' beliefs, an approach that has been challenged by those who have proposed a multi-dimensional structure of belief systems (Holsti, 1996; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987).

Investigations in this thesis are conceptually guided by a multi-dimensional model of foreign policy attitudes, specifically the hierarchical model as proposed by Hurwitz & Peffley (1987). According to this model, specific attitudes are shaped by constructs situated at different levels of abstraction. The next chapter examines this model in detail and places it in the context of a general overview of foreign policy research. Chapter 3 focuses on one important construct within this model, namely core values.

The issues highlighted in the two review chapters are addressed in Chapters 4-9, which report empirical studies that focus on one particular issue in today's political climate – British involvement in peace operations. In the final chapter, findings from this programme of research are evaluated and their wider relevance is discussed.
Discussions of public opinion and foreign policy frequently question whether attitudes towards international affairs are rational and consistent. One method for investigating the stability and coherence of foreign policy beliefs is to search for the underlying dimensions that structure such opinions at the level of the individual, referred to as “constraints”. According to Converse (1964, p. 207), constraint refers to the “success we would have in predicting, given initial knowledge that an individual holds a specified attitude, that he holds certain further ideas and attitudes.” Early work on such constraints of foreign policy attitudes concluded that mass opinions on foreign policy issues lacked not only stability but also predictable structure (Almond, 1950; Converse, 1964).

However, these claims did not survive the challenge of rigorous empirical testing, and most current research has converged on two main points: (1) attitudes to international affairs are in fact structured in at least moderately predictable ways, and (2) a single dimension of internationalism, which had been the focus of earlier studies, inadequately describes opinions on international affairs (Holsti, 1992).

Indeed, recent empirical investigations have been concerned more with the question of how individuals’ foreign policy attitudes are structured rather than if they are

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21 In this thesis the terms foreign policy attitudes, international attitudes and attitudes towards international affairs are used interchangeably.
structured (Bjereld & Ekengren, 1999). This chapter briefly outlines early structural work, which has focused on the horizontal constraint of political attitudes, or the link between attitudes across policy domains. This is followed by a discussion of two recent structural models of foreign policy attitudes that exemplify an approach to attitude structure that has dominated current research. Common to both these structural models is the concept of vertical constraint, or the link between specific policy attitudes and more general orientations. However, they differ in the extent to which they evoke such a linkage.

Previous work: Almond and Converse

For decades it was believed that foreign policy attitudes lacked any coherent structure or content. Almond (1950) was one of the first researchers to examine systematically the public’s attitudes towards foreign policy issues. In a series of studies, Almond (1950) showed that US citizens were ignorant of international issues and did not behave predictably to objective international events. Since people’s opinions were not based on fixed values or followed strategic calculations he concluded that their attitudes were volatile and influenced by temporary mood changes; what Almond termed ‘mood theory’ and what became known as the Almond-Lippmann consensus (see also Lippmann, 1955).

Almond’s conclusions were reinforced by Rosenau (1961, p. 36), who argued that the general public’s position on foreign policy issues was “impulsive, unstable, unreasoning, unpredictable, [and] capable of suddenly shifting direction or of going in several contradictory directions at the same time.”

The lack of structure was also confirmed by Converse (1964) whose work on mass belief systems is one of the most widely cited studies in political science. According to Converse (1964, p. 207), a belief system is “a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional dependence. Furthermore, he argued that if general principles or ideological perspectives shape political opinions, attitudes towards one policy issue in one
domain should not only predict attitudes towards other issues in the same domain, but should also determine attitudes in other policy domains.

However, when analysing the relationships between responses to foreign and domestic policy questions, Converse found only low correlations across and between policy domains. This led him to conclude that the public's political beliefs lacked any underlying ideological consistency that would provide structure or coherence to their political thinking.

Furthermore, using panel data from the 1950s to 1960s, he not only found that there was little coherence between policy items, but also that there was remarkable inconsistency in answers to the same question over time. Indeed, answers to the same foreign policy questions were so unstable as to be nearly random. Converse (1964) thus suggested that opinions in the political domain should be regarded as 'non-attitudes'. However, he also conceded that,

> Belief systems have never surrendered easily to empirical study or quantification. Indeed, they have often served as primary exhibits for the doctrine that what is important to study cannot be measured and that what can be measured is not important to study. (1964, p. 206)

Pessimistic conclusions about the attitude structure of the British public were also made by Butler and Stokes (1974). Assessing attitudes towards nationalisation, Butler and Stokes (1974) found such high levels of opinion instability that they questioned whether well-formed attitudes actually existed in the British public. They concluded that it "seems more plausible to interpret the fluidity of the public's view as an indication of the limited degree to which attitudes are formed towards even the best-known policy issues" (Butler & Stokes, 1974, p. 281).

The claim that foreign policy attitudes are unstructured was later questioned on four methodological grounds: statistical methods, uni-dimensionality, level of abstraction and question framing. Firstly, Converse's failure to find evidence of ideological constraint has been attributed to his reliance on correlation coefficients (e.g. Luttbeg, 1968; Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus, 1978). Others argued that Converse's data were
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riddled by a large amount of random question measurement error and low reliabilities (e.g. Achen, 1975).

Secondly, much of the research during and after World War II relied on a single dimension to uncover the structure of foreign policy beliefs. For example, Converse's (1964) work on U.S. foreign policy belief systems stressed the importance of a liberal (internationalist)-conservative (isolationist) continuum as orienting beliefs on policy issues, which assessed the extent to which individuals agreed or disagreed that a state should be involved in international politics. Individuals who manifested such structural consistency in their worldviews were described as 'ideologues', and their attitudes on foreign policy issues could be predicted from knowledge of their position on this dimension. However, few such ideologues were found (e.g. Barton & Parson, 1977; Stokes, 1966; Wittkopf, 1981), and the applicability of a single ideological dimension was thus questioned\(^{22}\).

Thirdly, Almond and Converse's claims have been criticised for using an inappropriate analytical level of abstraction to uncover any inherent structure. For example, Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) argued that by looking for coherence across policy domains (e.g. domestic and foreign policy issues), Converse focused on horizontal constraint, that is, the relationship amongst various attitudes within and across different policy domains. However, researchers who have focused on vertical constraint, that is, the relationships between abstract ideas and specific attitudes within a specific policy domain, have uncovered stable and coherent structures in mass attitudes (Conover & Feldman, 1984; Hurwitz, Peffley & Seligson, 1993; Juhasz, 2001; Murray & Cowden, 1999). This issue will be explored in more detail later in this chapter.

Lastly, the framing of questions, particularly those gauging the public's interest in foreign affairs, also emerged as another pivotal flaw in earlier research. For example, Caspary (1970) severely criticised Almond's study on the grounds that he had used

\(^{22}\) There is some indication that Converse's data also included multiple dimensions that he was unable to uncover with the statistical methodology he employed. For example, subjecting Converse's correlation matrix to a factor analysis, Luttbeg (1968) found that several factors explained a large amount of variance, thus suggesting the presence of multi-dimensional ideologies.
“mentioning of international problems as most important” as an indicator of interest in foreign policy. Using knowledge of different foreign policy questions as an indicator of interest instead, Caspary (1970) found that attitudes on international issues were much more coherent and stable than Almond had asserted.

Almond’s mood theory and Converse’s findings were thus not only open to a range of criticisms, but they were also contradicted by confrontation with public opinion data (for a discussion of U.S. public opinion stability see Knopf, 1998 and Page & Shapiro, 1992; for European attitude stability see Isernia, Juhasz & Rattinger, 2002; for an analysis of Canadian attitudes towards peacekeeping operations see Martin & Fortmann, 1995). Together, these critiques changed the view about the consistency and coherence of individuals’ attitudes on foreign policy issues, and led to new research in this area.

Recent work: The search for multi-dimensionality

Due to advancements in survey and statistical methods, a consensus has emerged in the literature that attitudes to foreign policy issues are structured, and that this structure is multi-dimensional in nature. However, there is still disagreement regarding the nature and number of these dimensions (Everts, 2001a). It should be stressed that recent studies do not challenge the idea that individuals are ill informed. A typical observation is that “public opinion polls show that people do not follow foreign affairs closely and often do not know enough about the specifics of a particular issue to form opinions” (Light & Lake, 1985, p. 94). Instead, these studies challenge the claim that foreign policy attitudes have no structure or content (but see Clark, Dautrich, Murray, Kull & Ramsay, 2000 who claim that modern public opinion on foreign policy issues is still lacking structure).

It should be noted that the models presented below have been exclusively derived from, or tested on, U.S. public opinion data. Considerably fewer studies have been identified in the literature that were based on European data (e.g. Bjereld & Ekengren, 1999; Carrubba & Singh, 2004; Chittick & Freyberg-Inan, 2001; Everts,
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1995; Gable, 1998; Isernia, Juhasz & Rattinger, 2002; Jenkins-Smith, Mitchell & Herron, 2004; Juhasz, 2001; Kostadinova, 2000; Rattinger, 1991; Wober, 1981; Ziegler, 1987). This is unsurprising given the extensive trend data that has been collected by U.S. opinion pollsters since the end of World War II, which provide unrivalled information. Yet, since the U.S. represents perhaps the last superpower of the post-Cold War era, its position, status and foreign policy concerns are likely to limit the extent to which structural findings can be generalised to other countries (Bjereld & Ekengren, 1999; Everts, 2001b). With the exception of a recent study, there is limited cross-country evidence available on this issue. Jenkins-Smith, Mitchell and Herron (2004) compared the structure of foreign and domestic policy beliefs in U.S. and British publics. They found that although British and American belief systems differed in the distribution of beliefs, the structural relationships within the two samples were remarkably similar.

Two models of foreign policy attitudes

The following sections describe and discuss two models that have been used to describe foreign policy attitudes. The first model is a classification scheme that categorises foreign policy attitudes along two dimensions. The second model proposes that foreign policy attitudes are formed through a series of linkages between abstract and concrete cognitions.

MI/CI classification scheme

Much of the research during and after World War II relied on a single indicator of internationalism to uncover the structure of foreign policy beliefs. Whilst this unidimensional approach had been found wanting, recent research suggests that two faces of internationalism are important predictors of international attitudes.

The most influential account of the dimensions underlying foreign policy beliefs is the Militant Internationalism (MI) – Co-operative Internationalism (CI) scheme, originally developed by Wittkopf (1981, 1986, 1990; Maggiotto & Wittkopf, 1981).
Factor-analysing the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) trend data, Wittkopf found that a significant amount of variance in mass foreign policy beliefs could be explained by two internationalism dimensions: one oriented towards co-operative relations with other countries (co-operative internationalism), the other oriented towards competitive, interventionist and militaristic actions (militant internationalism).

Based on these findings, Wittkopf (1981, 1986; Maggiotto & Wittkopf, 1981) proposed the MI/CI scheme in which individuals are classified according to four belief types, derived from dichotomising and crossing the two dimensions: hardliners (support MI and oppose CI), accommodationists (oppose MI and support CI), internationalists (support both MI and CI), and isolationists (oppose both MI and CI)\(^2\). More specifically, Maggiotto and Wittkopf (1981) posited that these types take the following international stance: "Hardliners" favour international involvement, but oppose co-operation and support more unilateralist action and military intervention; "Accommodationists" support involvement in international affairs, believe in co-operating with other nations, and oppose military interventions; "Internationalists" also support international involvement, but are negative about co-operation and may use military force on a unilateral basis; and "Isolationists" oppose any kind of international involvement.

Using five surveys conducted between 1976 and 1992 from the Foreign Policy Leadership Project (FPLP), Holsti and Rosenau (1990, 1993) confirmed the above scheme, albeit with a different methodology. Whilst Wittkopf derived his dimensions from factor analytical studies, Holsti and Rosenau used the descriptions of the factors found by Wittkopf to design scales tapping into militant and co-operative internationalism. These two scales were used to group respondents into the four belief types identified by Wittkopf, and the resultant groups were then compared on a wide variety of foreign policy questions. In a series of studies they found that knowing how respondents are classified was a powerful predictor of their attitudes towards a wide array of international issues, such as attitudes towards the Gulf War and national security threats (see Holsti, 1996 for a review of these studies). Holsti

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\(^2\) A similar typology was identified by Jonas (1966) on pre-World War II data, whose types included "belligerent isolationists", "timid isolationists", "radical isolationists" and "conservative isolationists".

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and Rosenau (1993) therefore concluded that the MI/CI scheme was an effective way of classifying foreign policy beliefs.

Of interest is that Ziegler (1987), using Eurobarometer data, derived two rather similar dimensions of European public opinion on international issues, which he termed "military co-operation" and "non-military co-operation", whilst similar dimensions were also found in Sweden by Bjereld & Ekengren (1999). In addition to the dimensions reported by Ziegler, Everts (1995) found that a third dimension – attitudes towards the UN – also substantially structured European attitudes towards a variety of foreign policy issues.

Changes in the international arena have raised doubts about the temporal stability of the scheme (Holsti, 1992, Nincic, 1992). Nincic (1992), for example, cautioned that Wittkopf’s dimensions, being based on factor analysis of data collected between 1974 and 1986, only reflect the concerns of the Cold War era. The implication is that the MI/CI scheme might not adequately describe opinions relevant to contemporary international affairs. Studies of the applicability of the MI/CI scheme with respect to post-Cold War foreign policy concerns indicate that the basic structure of attitudes towards foreign affairs proved resistant to change (Bjereld & Ekengren, 1999; Holsti, 1996, 1997; Murray, 1996). For example, Holsti (1997) extended previous analyses of the FPLP survey by including data up to 1996. Despite changes to the MI scale, due to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the MI/CI provided a stable way of classifying opinions.

However, there is some evidence that the MI/CI scheme is not sufficient to describe all the facets of contemporary foreign policy attitudes (Belmont & Mueller, 1998; Richman, Malone & Nolle, 1997; Rosati & Creed, 1997) since it does not account for differences in multi-lateralism (Bjereld & Ekengren, 1999; Chittick & Freyberg-Inan, 2001; Chittick, Billingsley & Travis, 1995; Hinckley, 1988, 1992; Wittkopf, 1986; but see Holsti, 1997). For example, Hinckley (1992) argued that a distinction should be made between individuals who seek to gain international goals through multi-lateral efforts with international institutions or allies, and those who prefer their country to pursue interests uni-laterally. A similar claim was made by Rattinger and Juhasz (1998), who investigated the extent to which ‘international postures’ affect
foreign policy opinions. According to Rattinger and Juhasz, three components constitute differences in international postures: the extent to which the state should be involved internationally (internationalism), how the state should be involved (militarism), and whether the state should be acting alone or with partners (multilateralism).

Thus, there is some disagreement over the number of dimensions and subdimensions that are needed to describe accurately the complexity of foreign policy opinions. But at the same time, the literature concedes that the MI/CI classification is successful in explaining broad differences between individuals' opinions (Rosati & Creed, 1997).

The hierarchical model of constraint

A hierarchical approach to the question of foreign policy attitude structure was proposed by Hurwitz and Peffley (1987, 1990; Peffley and Hurwitz, 1985, 1992), who criticised Wittkopf's scheme on methodological grounds. Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) argued that Wittkopf's decision to juxtapose two factor-analytical dimensions at their midpoints to yield a two-by-two structure of four cells was arbitrary (see also Kegley, 1986). Instead of emphasising foreign policy types, Hurwitz and Peffley retain the constructs of MI and CI as abstract dimensions of more specific foreign policy attitudes. Indeed, research indicates that dimensions rather than types more accurately describe foreign policy beliefs (Chittick & Billingsley, 1989; Chittick, Billingsley & Travis, 1995; Oldendick & Bardes, 1982, 1990).

Based on information-processing research, Hurwitz and Peffley posited that it might be more fruitful to uncover the structure of foreign policy attitudes by adopting an approach that is both domain-specific and limited in the level of abstraction. Concerning domain specificity, they proposed that to detect any underlying connections it is necessary to limit the analysis of attitude structures to specific policy domains. Failure to do so might lead to an interpretation of spurious relationships between attitudes that are not actually connected. Thus, Hurwitz and Peffley (1987, p. 1114) proposed that public opinion on foreign policy attitudes was structured, but with a structure that is "distinctive to the foreign policy domain".
“normative beliefs ... concerning the appropriate role of government in its handling of foreign affairs” (p. 1104), such as isolationism/internationalism and militarism, are based on findings from factor analytical research, such as Wittkopf’s MI/CI scheme. Postures have also been referred to as “policy core beliefs” by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999, p. 56).

It should be reiterated that these constructs are operationalised as dimensions and not types in this model. These postures, in turn, constrain opinions on specific policy issues that are located at the most specific level of abstraction.

The model proposes that individuals who are uncertain about their opinion on a specific issue will use their postures and, in an indirect way, their core values as guidance to form an opinion. Individuals are thus able to categorise and evaluate a wide variety of issues about which they may not otherwise have the necessary information to form clear or stable attitudes. It should be noted that the model also suggests a close relationship between values, postures and specific issues even if there is no uncertainty in opinion, due to the general tendency of individuals to strive for consistency in their attitudes (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1990).

The hierarchical model is not intended to represent a developmental model. Hurwitz and Peffley repeatedly stress that they “make no assumptions about whether abstract beliefs are acquired first, from socialization, or whether concrete attitudes are acquired first, from experience” (Peffley & Hurwitz, 1985, p. 877). Instead, they argue that at any particular point in time, individuals use general principles to derive specific attitudes.

There is good evidence that individuals employ more abstract beliefs or ‘heuristics’ to form attitudes about political issues (e.g. Alvarez & Brehm, 1997; Feldman & Zaller, 1992; Sniderman, Hagen, Tetlock & Brady, 1986; but see also Kuklinski & Quirk, 2000; Luskin, 2002). For example, Brady and Sniderman (1985) explored

27 The ability of heuristics to make individuals behave as if they are fully informed has been termed low-information rationality by Popkin (1991).

28 Kuklinski and Quirk (2000, p. 118) noted that political scientists and psychologists use the concept of heuristics in different ways: “The psychologist starts with the layperson’s common sense perception that people are generally rational. ... In describing their effects, therefore, psychologists
the importance of heuristics in political reasoning and found that structure was obtained by cues individuals drew from their primary group affiliations and from available information on events, which, in turn, shaped their belief systems. Conover and Feldman (1984) also reported that multiple, distinct schema organised attitudes in six domains, including foreign policy beliefs and economic beliefs, whilst Feldman (1988) found that people drew upon beliefs about equality and individualism when making judgements about social welfare programmes. Finally, Rattinger (1991) reported that German security opinions were organised by a few hierarchically-related general concepts, such as attitudes on deterrence and defence, judgements about military balance and communist threat.

A similar approach has also been applied to voting behaviour in Britain, with findings indicating that vote choice is organised by persisting political principles (such as political ideology; e.g. Heath, Howell & Curtice, 1985; Rose & McAllister, 1986, see also Denver & Hands, 1990) or core beliefs (such as libertarianism-authoritarianism; e.g. Heath, Evans & Martin, 1993; Scarbrough, 1984). Converse (1964) anticipated this kind of value-based attitudinal network, likening core value positions to “a sort of glue to bind together many more specific attitudes and beliefs” (p. 211).

The approach taken by the hierarchical model is not undisputed. For example, Denver and Hands (1990) have argued strongly against the notion that persistent principles shape evaluations. Instead, they proposed a model in which choice was a function of evaluations of specific issues in specific contexts. Kristiansen and Zanna (1988, 1994) have also argued that the direction of causality could be reversed, and have suggested that values may function as socially acceptable clichés that justify past actions. Similarly, Zaller (1992) has cautioned against proceeding too quickly with models that presume coherent value beliefs. Instead, he argues that individuals “make up attitude reports as best they can as they go along” and “are heavily influenced by whatever ideas happen to be at the top of their minds” (Zaller, 1992, p. 76).

highlight the error. Political scientists, on the other hand, start with the research showing that people are political ignorant. They find evidence that political heuristics can save them from being strictly clueless. So, unlike psychologists, they are inclined to stress the positive sides".
Nevertheless, in a series of studies, Hurwitz and Peffley (1987, 1990; Peffley & Hurwitz, 1992; Hurwitz, Peffley & Seligson, 1993) found that when underlying dimensions were measured as a series of vertical relationships between attitudes at different levels of abstraction, a structure of attitudes was produced that had more predictive power than partisanship or political ideology, or a series of horizontal relationships. Across several studies, individuals' core values were significant predictors of their foreign-policy postures, which in turn were significantly related to specific policy opinions.

Using structural equation modelling on a sample of 435 U.S. respondents, Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) found that specific opinions about military involvement, defence spending and Soviet policy were shaped by isolationism, that is, the individual's general belief as to whether or not the United States should be involved in international affairs (see Figure 2.2 for details of the relationships in the hierarchical model).

**Figure 2.2.** Hurwitz and Peffley's (1987) structural relationships between foreign-policy attitudes in hierarchical model of constraint

(from Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987, p. 1105)
Isolationists were more opposed than internationalists to committing troops abroad and to renew relations with the Soviet Union. Isolationism, in turn, was influenced by two core values, morality of warfare and ethnocentrism. Individuals who endorsed an ethnocentric view of their country as superior to all others were more likely to be isolationists than individuals with no such views.

Similarly, attitudes towards military involvement and nuclear arms policy were shaped by individual’s beliefs as to whether or not military force should be used to solve international problems (militarism). In turn, individuals who favoured a militaristic stance in world politics were not only more likely to oppose the idea that killing in wartime is immoral but also tended to endorse an ethnocentric view that their country is superior to all others.

Although the applicability of this model to countries other than the U.S. has rarely been tested, there is some indication that this model may be equally applicable outside of America. Testing their model in Costa Rica, where individuals were found to be more pacifist and isolationist in their beliefs than Americans, Hurwitz, Peffley and Seligson (1993) reported that compared to the American population, militarism in the Costa Rican sample did not constrain specific foreign policy beliefs, possibly due to their nation’s lack of experience in dealing with national security issues. Anti-communism, however, powerfully constrained more specific attitudes in the Costa Rican sample. Perez (1999) similarly reported that Panamanian public attitudes towards relations with the U.S. were constrained by anti-communism and internationalism, which in turn were influenced by nationalism and political trust.

Finally, investigating the hierarchical structure in Germany, Juhasz (2001) also found that three postures, namely internationalism, militarism and uni-lateralism, substantially shaped attitudes towards international military operations. These postures in turn were significantly affected by the core values of nationalism and morality of warfare. Together these studies indicate that the hierarchical model of constraint may also be relevant to the structure of foreign policy in countries other than the U.S.
Chapter 2 Foreign policy attitudes: The search for predictable structure

Criticisms and limitations of the hierarchical model

The hierarchical model of foreign policy attitudes has been applied to a variety of foreign policy issues, and its structure has been supported by findings from non-U.S. samples. However, several theoretical underpinnings of this model have yet to be tested and other limitations of existing work still have to be addressed.

Direct effects

The original model does not postulate a direct relationship between core values and specific opinions. This assumption, however, is problematic "since, if this were true, then it would be unnecessary to consider [core values] in the explanation of specific issues at all" (Juhasz, 2001, p. 64).

Indeed, previous research on the determinants of foreign policy issues has found a direct relationship between core values and specific policy opinions (see Chapter 3). For example, several studies have reported a link between nationalism and various policies, such as nuclear armament (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989) or support for the European monetary union (Mueller-Peters, 1998).

However, because this research rarely employs a modelling approach, it is possible that these effects will be mediated by other constructs, such as postures in the hierarchical model. Indeed, when Hurwitz and Peffley (1990) allowed for direct relationships in testing their model in a later study, they found a small direct relationship between some core values (e.g. nationalism and religious fundamentalism) and specific policy attitudes. This issue will be addressed specifically in Chapter 4.

Direction of causality

According to the hierarchical model, the effects in the model are top-down (i.e. from more abstract to concrete levels) as opposed to bottom up (i.e. from more concrete to more abstract levels). However, the premise that attitudes are always influenced by a higher-order attitude is problematic. It is conceivable that the main determinant of an
attitude is not necessarily from a higher (i.e. more abstract) level but from the same or lower (i.e. more specific) level of abstraction (Nincic, 1992; see also Denver & Hands, 1990). For example, if an individual has to evaluate the use of military force in a specific context, he/she might be influenced greatly by historic events (Juhasz, 2001).

Thus, a general attitude about the use of military force may be affected by specific international events. This leads on to another controversial point in the model, namely the lack of bi-directional influences. It is possible that dramatic events or developments in the international arena lead to changes in postures or core values (e.g. Peffley & Hurwitz, 1993). Chapter 5 describes longitudinal data that address the question of causality within the hierarchical model.

Effects of knowledge

According to the model, most individuals use core values and postures to form specific foreign policy opinions. However, there is evidence that individuals need to have at least some information about the issue in question to convert broader beliefs into specific attitudes (e.g. Goren, 2001a; Pollock, Lilie & Vittes, 1993; Zaller, 1992). Zaller (1992), for example, found that the more politically aware individuals were, the more heavily they depended on core values in the formation of specific attitudes, whilst attitudes of the ill informed were unconstrained by such orientations.

Nevertheless, a number of studies have also reported that knowledge neither promotes nor inhibits the use of core values (Sears, Huddy & Schaffter, 1986; Sniderman, Brody & Tetlock, 1991). For example, by controlling for methodological issues that had been neglected in previous research in this area, such as the validity and reliability of measures across cognitively heterogeneous samples, Goren (2001b, 2004) found that information levels did not affect the use of core values and postures.

Thus, the literature presents an unclear picture of the effects, if any, of political knowledge on the relationships within the hierarchical model. Chapters 6 and 7 investigate the impact of two types of knowledge – general political knowledge and
specific foreign policy-related knowledge — on the constructs within the hierarchical model.

Choice of postures and core values

An examination of the effects of postures on foreign policy concerns within this model has almost exclusively been restricted to isolationism, containment (anti-communism) and militarism (for an exception see Juhasz, 2001). In particular the relevance of Soviet containment in post-Cold War concerns is questionable. Despite Peffley and Hurwitz’s (1992) finding that American post-Cold War attitudes were still constrained by anti-communism, a more recent study (Richman, Malone & Nolle, 1997) into the post-Cold War dimensions of American foreign policy attitudes indicated that attitudes were influenced by U.S. global interests and securing American interests (Wittkopf’s co-operative internationalism), military security (Wittkopf’s Militant Internationalism) and global altruism (Chittick et al.’s multilateralism).

Similarly, with the exception of Brewer and Steenbergen (2002), which will be discussed in Chapter 6, the examination of the effects of core values within the hierarchical model has been limited to morality of warfare (e.g. Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987; Hurwitz, Peffley & Seligson, 1993; Juhasz, 2001), moral traditionalism (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1990), ethnocentrism or nationalism (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987, 1990; Juhasz, 2001; Perez, 1999) and political ideology or party identification (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1985, 1987; 1990; Juhasz, 2001; Perez, 1999).

As will be shown in the next chapter (Chapter 3), there is a long research tradition in the political sciences that has linked specific political attitudes to core values. Although moral traditionalism and nationalism may be important elements in shaping political attitudes, several key factors have been identified that have yet to be addressed within the hierarchical model.
Contextual effects

Finally, with the exception of images (see Chapter 3), none of the models or the studies reviewed here has addressed the question of the possible impact of contextual effects on specific policy attitudes. However, there is a growing body of research that explores the extent to which beliefs are shaped by policy-specific contextual information (e.g. Herrmann, Tetlock & Visser, 1999).

The question can be asked to what extent the perceived success or failure of a foreign policy issue constrains individuals' attitudes towards this policy (e.g. Everts, 2001b). For example, studying attitudes towards foreign aid, Taormina and Messick (1983) reported that individuals were more likely to render help if they believed in the effectiveness of the aid. Indeed, perceived effectiveness of the action had the largest single impact of all the studied dimensions (including perceptions of need and perceived similarity) on judgements of deservingness.

Evidence from studies on the effect of casualties on foreign policy attitudes also indicates that contextual effects may be an important consideration (e.g. Mueller, 1973, 1996). According to Boettcher (2004), Americans evaluating a potential humanitarian operation will consider the number of US troops lives lost and the probability of success and failure. This issue will be explored in more detail in Chapter 4 and subsequent chapters.

Choice of policy concerns

With the exception of Juhasz (2001) and Perez (1999), existing research into the hierarchical model has been applied exclusively to Cold-War policy concerns. Although there is no a priori reason why this structure should not be applicable to post Cold-War concerns, it warrants empirical investigation.

The empirical chapters in this thesis address the applicability of the hierarchical model to one particular foreign policy issue – British involvement in peace operations. Five different peace operations are discussed. Chapters 4 and 5 focus on Britain's intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000, describing both cross-sectional and
longitudinal findings. Chapter 6 discusses attitudes towards the European Rapid Reaction Force, which Britain committed to in 2001 and which was to be implemented in 2003. Chapter 7 explores attitudes towards Britain's involvement in the humanitarian operation in Afghanistan, whilst Chapter 8 compares attitudes towards this humanitarian intervention to a concurrent combat mission in Afghanistan. Chapter 9 describes two studies - one about attitudes towards a hypothetical observer mission in the Middle East, the other about Britain's humanitarian intervention in Iraq.

Conclusion

According to Converse (1964), constraint refers to a linkage between abstract orientations and specific policy beliefs. Furthermore, he (1964, p. 211) argued that,

Such constraint is quasi-logically argued on the basis of some superordinate value or posture toward man and society, involving premises about the nature of social justice, social change, "natural law", and the like. Thus, a few crowning postures ... serve as a sort of glue to bind together many more specific attitudes and beliefs, and these postures are of prime centrality in the belief system as a whole.

Although Converse did not operationalise constraint in such a way in his own studies, two models were presented in this chapter in which such a linkage is central to the conceptualisation of political belief systems.

Despite its criticisms and limitations, the hierarchical model of foreign policy attitudes affords perhaps the most promising approach to understanding these kinds of attitudes and will form the conceptual background to the empirical chapters in this thesis. Using both cross-sectional and panel data, the aim of this thesis is to address each of the criticisms and limitations outlined above.
A substantial focus of this thesis is also on one particular component within the hierarchical model – core values. Investigations of the hierarchical model with regard to core values have so far been limited in scope. However, as will be shown in the next chapter, this limitation is a reflection of the lack of systematic research or theoretical guidelines that has characterised foreign policy research in this area.
CHAPTER 3

CORE VALUES AND FOREIGN POLICY ATTITUDES

According to Keele and Wolak (2003, p. 3), “core values are the currency of politics, influencing how individuals structure their political priorities as well as how elites form political discourse.” As outlined in the last chapter, “core values” are pivotal constructs within the hierarchical model of foreign policy attitudes. Core values are “easily distinguishable from postures in that they do not refer directly to governmental actions or policies” (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987, p. 1105), and should be thought of as overarching normative principles and belief assumptions about government, citizenship and society (e.g. McCann, 1997). They also refer to “any relatively stable, individual-level predisposition to accept or reject particular types of arguments” (Zaller, 1991, p. 1216), which may be rooted in personality, ideology, gender, interest, philosophy or party identification (e.g. McCann, 1997; Mueller, 1973; Zaller, 1991).

As outlined in the previous chapter, individuals will be more or less supportive of policy issues, depending on their endorsement of a certain set of core values. Indeed, there is a long tradition in the political sciences of attributing the nature of political attitudes and behaviour to such general orientations (e.g. Conover & Feldman, 1984; Huntington, 1981; Kinder & Sears, 1985). Kinder and Sears (1985, p. 676), for example, regarded core values as being “in an intermediate position between broad, encompassing ideological frames of reference ... and specific opinions on particular topics and candidates, which come and go as the political seasons change.” This chapter focuses on the general orientations that have been shown to shape attitudes towards foreign policy issues in general, and towards issues dealing with international conflict and co-operation in particular.
Some preliminary remarks

Different policy domains are associated with different sets of core values. Attitudes towards American welfare policies, for example, have been linked most frequently to core values such as egalitarianism, individualism and moral traditionalism (e.g. Craig, Kane & Martinez, 2002; Feldman, 1988). Similarly, vote choice has been most commonly associated with liberalism, egalitarianism and individualism, both in the United States (e.g. Kinder & Sears, 1985) and Britain (e.g. Evans, Heath & Lalljee, 1996). It is of interest that these principles are thought to be critical for democratic existence (e.g. Griffith, Plamenatz & Pennock, 1956).

By contrast, investigations into the relevant core values within the foreign policy domain have been minimal and unsystematic. Research that has assessed the link between general orientations and foreign policy issues has predominantly focused on attitudes towards defence spending or international conflict, such as Vietnam or the Gulf War 1990/1991. Remarkably less research has emphasised co-operative policies, such as foreign aid or humanitarian operations.

Apart from Wittkopf’s dimensions of militant and co-operative internationalism (and their variants), studies of international attitudes have also primarily relied on political ideology, party identification and demographic variables, such as gender and age. For example, when studying South African attitudes towards participation in peacekeeping operations, Liebenberg, Malan, Cilliers, Sass & Heinecken (1997) reported how public support for peace operations varied according to party affiliation and race.

Indeed, when investigating the effect of public concern for human rights violations in the world on the public’s willingness to support international action on behalf of the victims, Harff (1987) highlighted the lack of research that addressed the impact of factors other than political ideology on support for humanitarian governmental action. According to Jackson (1983, p.844, see also Amato, 1970 and Herrmann & Keller, 2001), “there is, unfortunately, little hard theory to guide the selection of variables”; a statement that still holds true.
Scholars who are investigating the international attitudes and beliefs of citizens and who are searching for well-researched off-the-shelf measures of their constructs may be disappointed. Put simply, until recently the international (foreign policy) domain of public opinion was both data-poor and measurement-poor, and while improvements have been made, there is much that remains to be done. (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1999, p. 533)

However, research shows that the set of core values that underlie attitudes towards issues in the domestic policy domain do not figure significantly in research on foreign policy issues. Indeed, a common finding is that national and social perceptions are more important in structuring attitudes towards foreign policy issues than personal self-interest (e.g. Bartels, 1994; Conover & Feldman, 1984; Lau, Brown & Sears, 1978; Page & Shapiro, 1992; Tessler & Warriner, 1997).

Similar observations were also made in a study that assessed the impact of political, social and economic principles on attitudes towards the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. Examining attitudes towards peace in a Palestinian sample, Tessler and Nachtwey (1999) found that factors pertaining to national or societal concerns were important predictors of peace attitudes whilst factors referring to personal circumstances were not. Similar findings were also made by Sahliyeh and Deng (2003) who reported that Palestinian support for the peace process was related to trust in political institutions and governmental accountability, but was not associated with economic conditions.

With little theory to guide research, several constructs are presented that were conceptually deemed relevant, such as national attachment, trust, authoritarianism and images. Their theoretical underpinnings will be discussed and research relevant to the present topic, if any, will be outlined. This discussion concludes with a note on the difference between the conception of values in political psychology and social psychology.
Political ideology and party identification

Early work predominantly attributed the structure of political attitudes to ideology (e.g. Converse, 1964) or party identification (Campbell, Converse, Miler & Stokes, 1960). In their seminal work of voting behaviour, Campbell et al. (1960) conceptualised party identification as an attachment to a party, which helps individuals to position themselves on the political landscape. Indeed, most political scientists believed that identification with political parties (liberal-conservative taxonomy) was the single most powerful and persistent political orientation (Huckfeldt, Levine, Margan & Srague, 1999; see Krosnick, 1991 for a review). Ideology and party identification have also consistently been recognised as having a strong relationship with attitudes towards the use of force (e.g. Holsti, 1996; Russett, Hartley & Murray, 1994).

According to Miller and Levitan (1976, p. 36), party identification serves three functions: an information, normative and reference function. These help individuals to answer questions of what is going on (information function), what they should do (normative function) and who they are in political terms (reference function). Two further explanations have been advanced to explain the link between ideology, party identification and policy preferences. Some researchers have argued that rather than working out their position on any particular issues themselves, individuals simply take cues to their issue position from elites they identify as representing their own political values (e.g. Zaller, 1991). Similarly, it has been suggested that individuals respond to policy debates simply on the perceived credibility of their sources (e.g. Mueller, 1973).

There is some indication in the literature that the degree of ideological coherence differs between individuals living in two-party or multi-party political systems. For example, Klingemann (1979) compared levels of ideological conceptualisation between Austria, Britain, the Netherlands, West Germany and the United States. Controlling for levels of political interest and education, Klingemann (1979) found that individuals living in multi-party systems (Austria, the Netherlands and West Germany) showed higher levels of ideological conceptualisation than individuals living in two-party systems (United States and Britain, which was a two party system...
Several studies have reported a strong link between political ideology and foreign policy attitudes. Comparing foreign and domestic policy beliefs in the US and Britain, Jenkins-Smith, Mitchell and Herron (2004) found that such attitudes in both publics were constrained by political ideology. Similarly, Murray and Cowden (1999) reported that political ideology played a significantly more central role than enemy images in structuring elites' foreign policy beliefs.

However, recent research that has assessed political ideology or party identification in tandem with other core values has generally found only a weak, or non-existent, relationship between these and foreign policy attitudes in the mass public (e.g. Bartels, 1994; Cohrs, Moschner, Kielman & Mass, 2002; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987, 1990; Pratto, Stallworth & Conway-Lanz, 1998; for a review of the impact of political ideology on political attitudes see Herron & Jenkins-Smith, 2002).

For example, Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) reported strong correlations between willingness to use force, ethnocentrism and morality of warfare, but only weak correlations between political ideology or party identification and militarism. In particular, Hurwitz, Peffley and Seligson (1993, p. 247) argued that ideology “has received little, if any, support in the U.S. context, where citizens are often described as innocent of such sweeping ideologies”. Exploring the determinants of willingness to use force in foreign policy, Bartels (1994) also found that political ideology only significantly affected foreign policy attitudes when other correlates were omitted from the analyses. Whilst political ideology was significantly related to use of force in a simple regression analysis ($\beta = .403$), this relationship became insignificant ($\beta = .004$) when patriotism ($\beta = .364$) and trust in people ($\beta = -.266$) were entered into the equation.

These findings indicate that it may be too simplistic to focus on political ideology or party identification as the sole determinants of political attitudes. The effect of
political ideology on foreign policy attitudes when assessed concurrently with other constructs thus warrants further investigation.

National attachment

In addition to political ideology, a number of studies have demonstrated that national attachment is a central element in mass belief systems, shaping and structuring political attitudes in a variety of policy domains, including foreign policy (e.g. Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987; Perez, 1999). Indeed, Pritzel (1998, p. 12) has argued that the conduct of foreign policy “has a strong dialectical relationship with national identity”. Foreign policy is central to a sense of national identity, and to an understanding of the nation’s purpose, role and values (Wallace, 1991; Pritzel, 1998), whilst a nation’s self-perception greatly influences how it relates to other countries (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1999; Pritzel, 1998).

In the social-psychological literature, national identity is used to refer to a subjectively positive attitude towards one’s nation (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; see also Blank & Schmidt, 2003, and Blank, Schmidt & Westle, 2001). National identity may arouse commitment, emotional attachment, feelings of nationalism and patriotism, and even self-sacrifice (Brewer, 1991). It manifests itself in history, collective values and symbols, such as the national flag. In a world marked increasingly by tendencies towards globalisation, there is, perhaps paradoxically, a trend towards the reaffirmation of national identities (Breakwell & Lyons, 1996; Herb & Kaplan, 1999).

Discussions of national identity have frequently been dominated by two terms – nationalism and patriotism3.1, whose definitions and relationships are often elusive, leading into a “bog of semantic quicksand” (Worchel & Coutant, 1997). For example, the media, politicians, researchers and laypersons alike have often used these terms interchangeably, suggesting little difference between them (Billig,
However, joining these two concepts together may hide important differences about the processes involved in and the foundations on which attachment to one’s country are based. Adorno and colleagues (1950, p. 107), for example, asked whether patriotism is “a blind attachment to certain national cultural values, uncritical conformity with prevailing group ways, and rejection of other nations as outgroups” or whether the true patriot is someone who “can appreciate the values and ways of other nations”.

**Patriotism**

Most commonly, *patriotism* is thought of as an attachment by group members to their group and territory in which they reside (Bar-Tal, 1993; Bar-Tal & Staub, 1997). This attachment is characterised by “a desire to belong to a group which is positively valued” (Bar-Tal, 1997, p. 248). Patriotism thus reflects a positive evaluation of and emotion towards the group, which is expressed in beliefs and feeling connoting pride, love, loyalty, commitment and care (Bar-Tal, 1993; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1999; Janowitz, 1960; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). Patriotism need not be confined to a nation, but may involve attachment to a group that does not necessarily comprise a nation (Bar-Tal, 1993). However, what is necessary for patriotism is to experience “we-ness” as a group and to feel a sense of belonging to it (Bar-Tal & Staub, 1997).

**Nationalism**

By contrast, *nationalism* is most frequently defined as national attachment grounded in the perception of national superiority and an orientation towards national dominance (Doob, 1964; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Worchel & Coutant, 1997). Nationalism thus focuses on the relative evaluation of one’s country vis-à-vis other countries or international groups (DeLamater, Katz & Kelman, 1969; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1999; Janowitz, 1960). Furthermore, it also refers to the motivation to

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3.2 Conversely, Billig (1995, p. 55-59) has also argued that the popular usage of these terms describes the “nationalist” as a bigoted national chauvinist, which has precipitated a rhetorical polarisation between “good” (patriotic) and “bad” (nationalistic”) ways in which nationals relate to their nations (see also, Reicher & Hopkins, 2001).
enhance the national group - its status, power and influence (Bar-Tal & Staub, 1997).

Whilst affect and attachment are core components of both nationalism and patriotism, it is important to bear in mind the distinction Kosterman & Feshbach (1989; see also Worochel & Coutant, 1997) made between these two constructs: nationalism always involves a positive evaluation of one's country relative to other countries, whereas patriotism does not necessarily entail considering one's country as superior. It should also be noted that although nationalism and patriotism are thought to be stable beliefs, the detailed meaning of patriotism might change over time (e.g. Sullivan, Fried & Dietz, 1992) as it is socially constructed (Anderson, 1992).

Foreign policy attitudes, nationalism and patriotism

Studies investigating the effect of nationalism and/or patriotism on foreign policy attitudes have shown conflicting results. Assessing the relative usefulness of nationalism and patriotism in explaining foreign policy attitudes, Conover and Feldman (1987) found that patriotism and nationalism were both strongly correlated with militarism. However, patriotism was a more powerful predictor of foreign policy attitudes than nationalism, second only to "militarism", even when demographic factors and basic orientations were controlled for. Similar findings were also made by Kaplowitz (1990). Bartels (1994) also reported that pride in the American flag (patriotism) was the strongest predictor of willingness to use force. An interesting qualification to these findings was made by Heskin and Power (2001). They found that patriotism (measured by a semantic scale of perceived satisfaction with one's country) was positively related to moral justifications of the Gulf War (e.g. freeing the people of Kuwait) but was not significantly associated with belligerence (i.e. more force should have been used in the Gulf War).

By contrast, Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) found that nationalism was more strongly related to belligerent attitudes than patriotism, indicating that hostility

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3.3 It should be noted that the use of nationalism as an individual-difference variable is not undisputed in the political sciences. For example, extensive research indicates that nationalism is also an ideology (e.g. Gellner, 1983), advocating national self-determination and a belief in the natural distinctiveness of national groups.
towards other nations is not necessarily implied in attachment to one’s nation. Similar findings were also reported by Feshbach (1990), who reported that nationalism was related to military policies and readiness to go to war, whereas patriotism was associated with nuclear disarmament and willingness to self-sacrifice. A strong link between nationalism and militarism was also reported by Hurwitz and Peffley (1987), who found that nationalism (what they termed ethnocentrism) was the strongest predictors of the use of force to solve international problems, followed by morality of warfare. Nationalism (or what was termed patriotism in their 1990 study) powerfully predicted not only militarism but also attitudes towards the Soviet Union (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1990).

Work on European integration attitudes that investigated the effect of national identity on views such as the Euro (e.g. Cinnirella, 1996, 2001; Mueller-Peters, 1998; Routh & Burgoyne, 1998) has also documented the importance of national identity processes in shaping European attitudes. Such research has shown that a strong national identity is related to negative attitudes to European integration. Contrary to Conover and Feldman (1987), who found patriotism to be a powerful predictor of foreign policy issues, Mueller-Peters (1998) found that nationalistic sentiments in particular posed an obstacle to the acceptance of the Euro, especially in individuals who were proud of their country’s currency. Patriotic feelings, on the other hand, did not hinder the acceptance of the Euro.

These studies agree that nationalism and/or patriotism are important predictors of foreign policy attitudes. However, they disagree on the direction of the effect, which is possibly due to inconsistent conceptualisations, use of different measures of these constructs (see Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989) and different statistical methodologies. This issue will be explored empirically throughout this thesis.

It should be noted that there is some empirical evidence that nationalism and patriotism are not merely surrogates for political ideology. Heath and colleagues (1993) investigated whether nationalism should be conceptualised as an autonomous political dimension from common left-right values. Using data from the British Election Panel Study, they found that nationalism has exploratory power over and above that of long-standing left-right and libertarian-authoritarian dimensions. For
example, nationalism was found to be a better predictor than the other two dimensions of attitudes towards political issues, such as European Integration, Britain’s nuclear deterrent and aid to the Third World. Similar findings were also made with regard to patriotism. Sullivan, Fried and Dietz (1992) found that measures of patriotism had an impact on vote choice above and beyond that of measures of party identification or political ideology. Together, these findings suggest that these forms of national attachment are not merely substitutes for political ideology.

Trust

According to Uslaner (2000, p. 569), “trust is the chicken soup of social life. It reputedly brings us all sorts of good things.” Like nationalism and patriotism, trust is a stable orientation that may serve as a basis for forming other evaluations. The link between trust and politics has been of longstanding interest to researchers. However, only recently have studies examined whether trust shapes public opinion (Brewer & Gross, 2003). Two types of trust have been identified in the literature as being particularly relevant to foreign policy: political trust and social trust3.4. Their relationship to foreign policy attitudes will be described in turn.

Political trust

Political trust, or trust in the government, has most commonly been defined as “evaluations of whether or not political authorities and institutions are performing in accordance with normative expectations held by the public” and as being “a summary judgement that the system is responsive and will do what is right even in the absence of constant scrutiny” (Miller & Listhaug, 1990, p. 358, see also Stokes, 1962)3.5.

3.4 Brewer and Gross (2003) have recently identified another type of trust, international trust, which refers to a generalised belief that one's nation can trust other nations. Brewer, Gross, Aday & Willnat (2004) showed that international trust is shaped by social and political trust, and in turn shapes internationalism and attitudes towards military action in Iraq.

3.5 For alternative definitions of political trust see Levi and Stoker (2000).
Yet, political trust not only affects evaluations of political institutions, but also provides a basis for deciding how much freedom one should grant the government (Hetherington, 1998). According to Hetherington and Globetti (2002, p. 254, see also Hetherington, 1999), political trust may "act as a simple decision rule for supporting or rejecting government activity", particularly in situations when individuals are asked to support policies for which they receive no direct benefit but for which they incur real or perceived costs. Trust in the government may therefore serve as another "standing decision" that affects political evaluations (Hetherington, 1999).

Political trust grows out of childhood political experiences and pre-adult socialisation. For example, there is evidence that children who grew up during a time of political scandals or upheaval are less likely to be politically trusting than if they had grown up during a politically stable time (Damico, Conway & Damico, 2000). Similarly, children who grow up with politically trusting parents are more likely to be politically trusting in later life. Panel research has shown that the single best predictor of later political trust is early levels of political trust (e.g. Damico et al., 2000). However, individuals are not slave to their political up-bringing. Political trust is also later shaped by people's experiences with and perceptions of the government (e.g. Coleman, 1990).

Numerous studies have investigated the sources of political trust (see Levi & Stoker, 2000 for a review), and the causes of declining political trust (e.g. Newton, 1999), which appears to be endemic in many modern democracies (see Miller & Listhaug, 1990). Areas of research where the consequences of trust have received most attention concern political participation (e.g. Tarrow, 2000), and vote choice (e.g. Sigelman, Sigelman & Walkosz, 1992). For example, lower levels of trust have been associated with voting for an 'outsider' candidate (e.g. Luks & Citrin, 1997), and with diminished approval of the president (Hetherington, 1998). Conversely, higher levels of political trust have been associated with presidential support and confidence in the congress (Brewer, Aday, Gross & Willnat, 2002).

Comparatively little work has been conducted on the link between political trust and attitudes towards international affairs. However, the research that has been carried out suggests that political trust can have an important impact on foreign policy
attitudes. According to Popkin and Dimock (2000), individuals use political trust for judging whether they favour internationalist or isolationist interventions. Compared to the politically distrustful, politically trusting individuals are said to be more confident that the government can act effectively in international affairs. Consequently, such individuals might be more willing to see the government get involved with other nations' problems, both co-operatively and militarily.

Although the effects of political trust on internationalism or militarism were not directly assessed by Brewer and Steenbergen (2002), they found that political trust was positively related to attitudes towards defence spending and warm feelings towards the military. Increased levels of political trust have also been linked to increased support for the war in Vietnam (Lau, Brown & Sears, 1978) and Kosovo (Cohrs & Moschner, 2002), whilst decreased levels of political trust have been associated with the rejection of a government's military policy and types of interventions (e.g. Modigliani, 1972).

**Social Trust**

Although numerous studies have investigated the effects of political trust on political attitudes, research indicates that beliefs about human nature are also an important predictor of individuals' political attitudes and behaviour (e.g. Conover & Feldman, 1984; Sullivan, Aldrich, Borgida & Rahn, 1990; Bartels, 1994; Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Rahn & Transue, 1998; Brewer & Steenbergen, 2002). A central component of the belief about human nature is trust in other people (Wrightsman, 1991; Couch & Jones, 1997; Brewer & Steenbergen, 2002). Social trust, also referred to as interpersonal trust or generalised trust, can be defined as a generalised belief that one can trust strangers (Uslaner, 2002), which may be used for deciding whether or not to trust people in particular situations (e.g. Rahn & Transue, 1998).

According to Stack (1978), trust in others develops out of the expectancies that a given behaviour will lead to a specific positive or negative outcome. He thus noted that,
Each individual has different expectancies for reinforcement in interactions involving trust: He is not as likely to be reinforced for believing a stranger as for believing his best friend. ... After many experiences with different agents in varying situations, an individual builds up generalised expectancies (1978, p. 567-568).

Similarly, Orbell & Dawes (1991) have argued that individuals project their own trustworthiness onto others. People therefore use information about themselves as a heuristic to form beliefs about whether or not they can trust others.

Individuals who believe in the goodness of human nature therefore believe that other people are trustworthy and have good intentions, whilst those who are cynical about human nature assume that others cannot be trusted and will take advantage of them when the opportunity arises (Brewer & Steenbergen, 2002). According to Rahn and Transue (1998, p. 545, see also Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994), social trust is thus a “standing decision’ to give most people – even those whom one does not know from direct experience – the benefit of the doubt”.

These beliefs are thought to be stable over time (e.g. Couch & Jones, 1997; Uslaner, 2002) and to influence judgements in a variety of contexts, such as attitudes towards business ventures (e.g. Currall & Inkpen, 2002), participation in voluntary associations (e.g. Anheier & Kendall, 2002) and work organisations (e.g. Baba, 1999), and whether or not to comply with tax laws (e.g. Scholz & Lubell, 1998).

Recent research has also shown that social trust is a relevant construct in political research (e.g. Putnam, 1993). Interpersonal trust has been related to a variety of civic orientations, such as conceptualisations of citizenship and running for student government office (e.g. Crystal & DeBell, 2002). Similarly, Brehm and Rahn (1997) showed that individuals derive their level of confidence in the government in part from their social trust.

A few studies have also investigated the link between social trust and public attitudes towards foreign policy issues (Brewer & Steenbergen, 2002). For example, using 1992 American National Election Study data, Bartels (1994) showed that as trust in
others decreased, support for the use of military force to solve international problems increased. This line of inquiry will be explored in detail in Chapter 6.

Social dominance orientation

Another variable that has frequently been associated with political attitudes is social dominance orientation (SDO). SDO is grounded in social dominance theory (Sidanius, 1993), which posits that societies are group-based with clearly defined hierarchies. SDO more specifically reflects "a general attitudinal orientation toward intergroup relations, reflecting whether one generally prefers such relations to be equal, versus hierarchical" (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth & Malle, 1994, p. 742). Although SDO was initially conceptualised as a dimension of personality (e.g. Pratto et al., 1994), it is now more commonly referred to as a measure of enduring belief (e.g. Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; see also Saucier, 2000; Verkuyten & Hagendoorn, 1998)\textsuperscript{3,6}.

SDO thus refers to an individual’s tendency to classify social groups along a superiority-inferiority dimension and to favour policies that maintain social inequality. People who are high in SDO prefer hierarchical relations amongst groups compared to equal relations amongst groups. These individuals are hierarchy-enhancing and support a variety of "legitimising myths" that align groups on a superior-inferior dimension. These myths include racial and ethnic prejudice, nationalism, patriotism, sexism and political conservatism.

Research on SDO has indicated strong relationships between SDO and general conservative beliefs, such as political and economic conservatism, right-wing political party preferences and ethnic prejudice (e.g. Pratto et al., 1994; Pratto, Stallworth & Sidanius, 1997; Sidanius, Pratto & Bobo, 1996).

\textsuperscript{3,6} For a recent criticism of the SDO construct see Schmitt and Branscombe (2003), and Turner and Reynolds (2003).
Pertinent to the present concern, the relevance of SDO to foreign policy attitudes has also been demonstrated. Early work on personal dominance orientation indicated that such an orientation was effective in predicting more hostile policies in international settings (Etheredge, 1978). Shepard (1988) followed up Etheredge’s (1978) work using secondary sources and biographical material, and found that higher levels of personal dominance were associated with advocating more conflictual policies.\(^3\(^7\). 

Recent work on SDO has shown that it is negatively associated with co-operative strategies (Schafer, 1997a). For example, people high in SDO are more likely to support military programmes in general as well as to support specific military operations in the Gulf War (Pratto, Stallworth & Conway-Lanz, 1998; see also Sidanius & Liu, 1992). Similar findings were also made by Cohrs, Moschner, Kielmann & Mass (2002) who reported a strong relationship between SDO and several military interventions, including attitudes towards military fight against terrorism and attitudes towards military enforcement of human rights. Regarding military fight against terrorism, Henry, Sidanius, Levin, Pratto, & Nammour (2002) found that high levels of SDO were also predictive of support for “anti-terrorist” violence, that is, support for military action in Afghanistan.

The only study to date that has investigated the relationship between SDO and humanitarian action reported a significant negative correlation (r = -.41; Pratto et al., 1994). However, these humanitarian operations were hypothetical, and the effects of SDO in predicting attitudes towards peace operations therefore need to be validated in a realistic setting. It is one of the aims of Chapter 8 to address this issue.

**Authoritarianism**

Another factor that has been linked to foreign policy attitudes is authoritarianism. The construct of authoritarianism was developed as part of a larger effort to understand why certain individuals might be more prejudiced than others. According

\(^{3,7}\) It should be noted that these two studies refer to personal dominance, which differs from SDO conceptually.
to Adorno et al. (1950), generalised ethnocentrism could be explained in terms of a personality syndrome rooted in Freudian psychodynamics. In particular, authoritarians were characterised as displaying rigidity of thought and moral development, and as tending to be punitive towards individuals whose behaviours deviate from conventional norms.

Both the conceptual underpinnings of authoritarianism as well as its measurement have been subjected to intense criticisms (for a review see Altemeyer, 1996). The most extensive recent research in the area of authoritarianism has been conducted by Altemeyer (1981, 1988, 1996), who examined the antecedents and consequences of what he termed right-wing authoritarianism (RWA). According to Altemeyer (1981), RWA is comprised of three elements: authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism. Furthermore, he proposes that authoritarians are prejudiced and intolerant because of their generally hostile nature and their social conservatism.

Based on social learning theory, Altemeyer argues that authoritarianism is acquired through interaction with parents, peers and the media, and through experiences with people who hold unconventional beliefs and lifestyles. Through these interactions children learn to trust and obey authorities, which 'coalesce' into a personality trait during adolescence. However, the view that RWA represents a personality dimension has recently been disputed, and several researchers have suggested that RWA would be better conceived of as a social worldview (e.g. Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Fisher, 2003) that is broadly ideological in nature (e.g. Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Saucier, 2000).

RWA has been related to support for repressive government actions, taking harsher positions towards drug users and the homeless (Peterson, Doty & Winter, 1993), and support for tougher sentences for criminals, including the death sentence (Altemeyer, 1996). Moghaddam and Vuksanovic (1990) also found that individuals with high RWA scores were less supportive of universal human rights than individuals with low scores.
Authoritarianism has also been repeatedly linked to support for military interventions. For example, authoritarianism has been linked to support for the Vietnam War (e.g. Granberg & Corrigan, 1972; Izzett, 1971), the Gulf War 1990/1991 (Doty, Winter, Peterson & Kemmelmeier, 1997; Stephan, Berger, Schmidt & Herrmann, 1995) and the Kosovo War (Bartholomes, Gericke, Hartenstein et al., 1999, Cohrs & Moschner, 2002). Cohrs and colleagues (2002) also reported a strong relationship between RWA and several military interventions, including attitudes towards military fight against terrorism and attitudes towards military enforcement of human rights. Finally, moral conservatism/traditionalism, which is a component of RWA, was found to be predictive of militarism, isolationism and a variety of defence issues in a series of studies by Hurwitz and Peffley (1987).

Empirical research has only explored the relationship between military interventions and RWA. The possible link between RWA and attitudes towards peace operations will be assessed in detail in Chapter 8.

**A note on SDO and RWA**

Recent research (e.g. Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis & Birum, 2002; Saucier, 2000) has suggested that SDO and RWA map unto two basic dimensions that structure social and political attitudes. Zaller (1992) argued that values are organised along a left-right dimension, where certain values will tend to be supported by liberal arguments, whereas other values will tend to underlie conservative ideas.

Indeed, reviewing research on socio-political attitudes and socio-cultural values, Duckitt (2001) found evidence for such a bi-dimensional structure, which is reproduced in Table 3.1. These two roughly orthogonal dimensions are thought to correspond broadly to RWA and SDO. The table indicates one RWA-like dimension, which has variously been termed authoritarianism, traditionalism or social conservatism at one pole versus liberalism or freedom at the other pole. The other SDO-like dimension has typically been termed economic conservatism, belief in
Table 3.1. Bi-dimensional structure of socio-political attitudes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>RWA-like</th>
<th>SDO-like</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio-political attitudes and values</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Eysenck (1954)</td>
<td>Conservatism vs Liberalism</td>
<td>Tough vs tender (humane vs inhumane social attitudes)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tomkins (1964)</td>
<td>Normativism (high vs low conservatism)</td>
<td>Humanism (low vs high humanitarianism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rokeach (1973)</td>
<td>Low vs high Freedom</td>
<td>Low vs high Equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hughes (1975)</td>
<td>Social Conservatism vs Liberalism</td>
<td>Economic Conservatism vs Social welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forsyth (1980)</td>
<td>Low vs high Relativism (tolerance)</td>
<td>Low vs high Idealism (altruism / social concern)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerlinger (1984)</td>
<td>Conservatism (mainly high vs low Protestant ethic / traditionalism)</td>
<td>Liberalism (mainly low vs high egalitarianism / humanitarianism) / Low vs high humanitarianism / egalitarianism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katz &amp; Hass (1988)</td>
<td>High vs low protestant ethic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Middendorp (1991)</td>
<td>Cultural Conservatism vs Openness</td>
<td>Economic Conservatism vs Equality</td>
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<tr>
<td>Braithwaite (1994)</td>
<td>High vs low National Strength and Order</td>
<td>Low vs high International Harmony and Equality</td>
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<td>Saucier (2000)</td>
<td>Alphaism (conservatism and authoritarianism)</td>
<td>Betaism (SDO and Machiavellianism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cultural values</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hofstede (1980)</td>
<td>Collectivism vs Individualism</td>
<td>High vs low Power Distance</td>
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<td>Tromenaars (1993)</td>
<td>Group loyalty vs Individualism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Triandis &amp; Gelfand (1998)</td>
<td>Collectivism vs Individualism</td>
<td>Vertical vs Horizontal Values</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*From: Duckitt (2001)*
inequality or power at one pole, and humanitarianism, egalitarianism or social welfare at its other pole. A variety of measures therefore exist that tap into these two dimensions. However, RWA and SDO seem to be the most reliable uni-dimensional measures that have a consistently better predictive power of socio-political attitudes than the other scales (see Altemeyer, 1998).

Images

Images, or perceptions of foreign countries, have also received considerable theoretical and empirical attention within foreign policy research. A large literature on the effects of images of other nations on political attitudes proposes that a major function of such images is to simplify a complex international environment and to guide perceptions of, and responses to, particular countries (e.g. Brewer & Steenbergen, 2002; Cottam, 1977; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1990; Peffley & Hurwitz, 1992; Hurwitz, Peffley & Seligson, 1993; Herrmann, Voss, Schooler & Ciarrochi, 1997; Hermann, Tetlock & Visser, 1999; Murray & Cowden, 1999).

The concept of image in the analysis of international systems was pioneered by Boulding (1956, 1959), who argued that images of “other” and images of “self” are important factors affecting foreign policy decision-making. Boulding defined an image as, “the total cognitive, affective, and evaluative structure of the behavior unit, or its internal view of itself and its universe” (1959, p. 119). According to Boulding (1959, p. 121; see also Herrmann, 1986; Cottom, 1977), images that are important in the international arena are “those which a nation has of itself and of those other bodies in the system which constitute its international environment.” Furthermore, he argued that perceived hostility or friendliness and the perceived strength or weakness of a nation were central features of an individual’s image of that nation.

It should be noted that the concept of ‘image’ is similar to that of ‘national stereotypes’ advanced in social-psychological studies (e.g. Alexander, Brewer & Herrmann, 1999). According to these studies, four types of ‘realistic’ differences between nation states can be differentiated that are reflected in the content of national
situations: perceived political and economic power (Linssen & Hagendoorn, 1994), perceived cultural differences (Peabody, 1985), geographic features (Linssen & Hagendoorn, 1994), and political and economic relations between different nations (Poppe & Linssen, 1999).

Of Boulding's features, perceptions of hostility or friendliness, trustworthiness or threat, have perhaps received the most attention in foreign policy research (e.g. Chen, 2001). For example, Hurwitz and Peffley (1990, 1992; Hurwitz, Peffley & Seligson, 1993) identified individuals' images of the Soviet Union to be a key organising factor that constrained Americans' foreign policy beliefs during the Cold War. Similarly, Feshbach and White (1986) found that perceptions of fear and distrust of the Soviet Union were significantly related to positive attitudes towards American nuclear arms policies.

Conceptualising threat as the belief that the Soviet Union is a nation determined to expand its influence, and defining trust as the perception that the Soviet Union is an honest actor with which to deal, Hurwitz and Peffley (1990) found that both were important predictors of two postures: militarism and containment. More specifically, they found that individuals who perceive the Soviet Union as untrustworthy and as threatening preferred an assertive foreign policy position that emphasised military strength. Perhaps unsurprisingly, individuals who were distrustful of the Soviet Union were more likely to endorse its containment than individuals with no such beliefs.

Bartels (1994) also reported that attitudes towards U.S. defence spending during the Cold War were significantly determined by individuals' attitudes towards the use of force, followed by their attitudes towards Russia. In this study, individuals who had a negative image of Russia and who believed that the U.S. should be tougher with Russia were more likely to favour increased U.S. defence spending than individuals who viewed Russia more favourably.

Further examining how general beliefs structure foreign policy beliefs outside the U.S., Hurwitz, Peffley and Seligson (1993) found that images of salient nations (e.g.
Cuba, Nicaragua and the U.S.) were a better predictor of specific foreign policy issues in Costa Rica than were militarism or anti-communism.

However, the majority of this research has been carried out during the Cold War when "enemy images" were prevalent. Thus, the question arises to what degree national images of foreign countries have remained a key factor in organising attitudes in the post-Cold era when nations cannot easily be classified in terms of bipolar conflict (Chanley, 1999). There is some tentative evidence that U.S. national images of the Soviet Union still played a role in structuring early post-Cold War political attitudes in that "revised Soviet images appear to have affected ... respondents' views on many different national security issues" (Peffley & Hurwitz, 1992, p. 452). Overall, with the end of the Cold War, U.S. respondents had moved away from a more militant stance towards the Soviet Union as a result of more favourable images of it. The role of images in shaping attitudes towards a contemporary foreign policy, namely peace operations, will be explored in Chapters 7 and 8.

A final word on "core values"

Core values have so far been discussed as referring to overarching normative principles and belief assumptions about government, citizenship and society (e.g. McCann, 1997), a definition that is prevalent in the literature reviewed above. However, the term "value" in social psychology has a different connotation. Values in psychology are commonly defined as desirable, trans-situational goals that vary in importance and serve as guiding principles in people’s lives (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992; for a review of the different definitions of the term "value" see Rohan, 2000).

Values are distinct from attitudes or beliefs because they function as an organised system, and are regarded as broad qualities that underlie and justify attitudes and behaviour (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1996). "Values" in social psychology are thus organised and interlinked, and, by being more primary, distinct from "core values".

50
The interdependencies among values have been widely recognised. A number of two-dimensional value models of social or political goals have been proposed. For example, Scott (1960) identified two groups of policy goals: international cooperation (comprising measures of humanitarianism and pacifism) and international competitiveness (comprising measures of nationalism and power), whilst Rokeach (1973) proposed that values underlying political ideology could be summarised in terms of equality and freedom.

Recently, Braithwaite (1997) proposed the security-harmony model in which social values are regarded as part of two supra-ordinate value orientations, security and harmony, which together explain the way in which individuals evaluate social and political events. According to this model, the security value dimension provides order, legitimates competition for resources and constrains the way in which such competition is played out in society. By contrast, the harmony dimension orients action towards cooperation, peaceful coexistence and regard for the collective. In addition, investigating the influence of values on voting, Barnea and Schwartz (1998) found that ten value types, as identified by Schwartz' (1992) value system, may be politically relevant depending on context.

The relationship between "values" in the psychological sense and "core values" in the foreign policy literature will be explored in detail in Chapter 9.
Chapter Two argued that the hierarchical model of constraint as described by Hurwitz and Peffley (1987, 1990; Peffley & Hurwitz, 1992) represents one of the most promising approaches to understanding foreign policy attitudes. However, several conceptual and empirical limitations were highlighted, which included the lack of direct relationships between core values and specific attitudes, and a lack of empirical application to present-day political issues.

A time-series interview study was used to explore the utility of the hierarchical model with regard to understanding attitudes towards peace operations. In doing so, it compares its validity to alternative models, and also examines any possible direct effects of core values on specific attitudes, thus addressing both of the described limitations of the model and empirical research.

Chapter Two also briefly noted the lack of contextual factors in previous research, such as policy outcome perceptions. The study described here therefore also explores the contribution of two contextual variables to the model of specific policy attitudes, namely perceived risk of casualties and perceived outcome of a mission. Both of these variables will be discussed in detail in the next sections.
Chapter 4 An exploratory analysis of the hierarchical model

Contextual influences: The effects of casualties on foreign policy attitudes

The link between accumulation of casualties and public opinion is based on the pioneering work of Mueller (1973), who examined public support during both the Vietnam and Korean wars. Using time-series data, Mueller (1973) found that whilst domestic political events (e.g. presidential change) did not affect public war support over time, war fatalities had a considerable negative effect on support for both the Vietnam and the Korean War. More specifically, he found that a ten-fold increase in casualties led to a significant drop of 15 percent in support for both of these wars.

Furthermore, Mueller (1973, p. 62, see also Mueller, 1994) found that the cumulative logarithm of casualties in these two wars were better predictors of support than raw casualties because,

*While they [Americans] did weary of the wars, they generally seem to have become hardened to the wars' costs: they are sensitive to relatively small losses in the early stages, but only to large losses in later stages.*

He therefore argued that a cumulative log of national casualties would be the best predictor of wartime opinion (see also Burk, 1999 and Larson, 1996; for an alternative explanation see also Gartner, Segura & Wilkening, 1997; Kull & Ramsay, 2001).

There is also some evidence that the public will not support peacekeeping missions if they incur casualties. For example, although American support for the peacekeeping mission in Somalia was initially strong, American troops had to be withdrawn due to negative public reactions following the deaths of 18 peacekeepers in Mogadishu in 1993 (Daniel, 1996; but see also Kull & Ramsay, 2001). Indeed, Mueller (1996, p. 131) remarked that, “when Americans asked themselves how many American lives it was worth to save hundreds of thousands of Somali lives, the answer came out rather close to zero”.

Similarly, fear of casualties has been blamed for the reluctance of European powers to risk ground troops to counter aggression in the former Yugoslavia (e.g. Luttwak,
1996). For example, after Spanish troops had suffered 17 deaths in Bosnia, the Spanish government withdrew from further confrontation (Hedges, 1997). Reviewing public reactions to post-Cold War American peace missions, Mueller (2000, p. 8) concluded that,

risking lives for a goal as ungraspable and vaporous as policing a small, distant, unthreatening, and seemingly perennially-troubled place like Somalia or Bosnia has proved difficult to manage. It seems clear that policing efforts will be tolerable only as long as the costs in lives for the policing forces remain extremely low.

However, empirical evidence for the casualty hypothesis with regard to peace operations is not unequivocal. An interesting scenario was studied by Kull and Ramsay (2001), who examined public support for the mission in Bosnia. Although no American troops had been killed in Bosnia, it appeared that the majority of Americans believed that they had. If individuals are highly sensitive to casualties, the misperception that fatalities have been incurred should be an important factor in shaping their attitudes towards Bosnia, and their attitudes should differ from those who know that there have been no casualties. Kull and Ramsay (2001), however, found no relationship between the perception of American fatalities and support for US participation in Bosnia. Instead, even amongst respondents who believed that there had been more than 1,000 US casualties, support for the mission in Bosnia was not any lower than for those who believed that there had been none.

There is also some evidence that the British public supported the mission in Kosovo despite the possibility of casualties. At the beginning of the action in Kosovo, the majority of British respondents (51%) were prepared to send ground troops as well as accept casualties (Gallup Poll, 1999). Another poll carried out at the same time, however, indicated that 56% of respondents agreed that the protection of the Albanian Kosovars was "not worth a single British life" and only 19% of respondents agreed to casualties in the order of 1-1,000.

The evidence that, as in war situations, the public will only approve of peace operations when they are casualty-free (Burk, 1999; Luttwak, 1994) is therefore not
clear. Indeed, it has been argued that a correlation between fear of casualties and mission support does not necessarily imply that less acceptance for casualties causes a decline in support (e.g. Isernia, 2001). Instead, it has been suggested that the link between casualties and mission support is contrived since polling agencies fail to take into account other variables, such as perceptions of mission success, that might mediate this relationship (see Everts, 2001b); an issue that will be explored in the next section.

Contextual influences: Outcome perceptions - An important qualification to the casualty debate

Several researchers (e.g. Everts, 2001b; Larson, 1996; van der Meulen & Konink, 2001; Record, 1993) have argued that the lack of apparent mission success is often more important in explaining diminishing public support than the occurrence of casualties. Similarly, according to the Ministry of Defence (2001, section 45), public support is vital to conduct military interventions, and “will depend in large measure on the success of such interventions”.

Examining the relative unpopularity of the Vietnam War, for example, Record (1993) concluded that, “The American People will support even a costly war for a just cause, but they will withdraw their support when they no longer see a reasonable chance for realising a preferred or acceptable outcome” (p. 137). Similarly, Schwarz (1994, p.18) concluded that,

\begin{quote}
Once committed, regardless of its opinion concerning the initial decision – and regardless of costs incurred – the public shows little inclination to quit an intervention and instead strongly supports an escalation of the conflict and measures it believes are necessary to win a decisive victory.
\end{quote}

Larson (1996) also suggested that the public shows considerable resilience in response to casualties because the effect of fatalities is mediated by a means-end analysis, and is thus indirect. According to Larson, support for a military intervention is the result of a series of questions that need to be answered by an individual: 1) Are the benefits of the intervention great enough; 2) Are the prospects for mission
success good enough; 3) Are the actual or expected costs (e.g., financial or loss of lives) low enough; and 4) Taken together, does the probable outcome seem to be worth the costs. Furthermore, in weighing these benefits, prospects and costs, individuals also gauge consensus or dissent among political leaders to inform their own evaluations.

A similar claim to Larson's was also made by Burk (1995, 1999), who argued that public support for a military action is not unconditional, but dependent on the perceived effectiveness and purposefulness of the action. Studying the rapid decline of public support for military action in the Lebanon (1983) and Somalia (1993) following heavy casualties, which led to a withdrawal of American troops in these conflicts, Burk (1995) found that whilst public attitudes were not insensitive to the deaths of American soldiers, public support for both missions was largely determined before casualties occurred.

Similar conclusions about the effects of casualties and outcome perceptions of support for the mission in the Lebanon were also made by Kull and Ramsay (2001). Kull and Ramsay found that attitudes towards US participation in peace operations were shaped by the following concerns: (1) whether the mission was multilateral, (2) whether the US was contributing its fair share, (3) whether the population wanted the operation, and most importantly (4) whether the operation was likely to succeed.

Thus, a rather more complex picture than that painted by the casualty hypothesis has emerged. Support for a mission is likely to be sustained even in the event of fatalities if the public supported the mission in the first place, and if the public believes that the mission is likely to succeed.

The importance of outcome perceptions has also been noted by several studies of humanitarian issues. Cheung and Chan (2000) found that outcome efficacy was an important factor that promoted public intention to donate to a charity. Similarly, Taormina and Messick (1983) reported that perceived effectiveness of foreign aid had the largest single impact on judgements of deservingness of such aid. The
possible effect of outcome perceptions on attitudes towards peace operations therefore merits further investigation.

Choice of core values and postures

According to Hurwitz and Peffley (1990; see also Peffley & Hurwitz, 1992), nationalism is a stable orientation that may serve as a basis for forming other evaluations. As discussed in Chapter 3, previous research has shown a differential effect of nationalism and patriotism on a variety of political issues. However, these studies disagree on the direction of these effects. Thus, their differential impact on peacekeeping attitudes within the hierarchical model needed to be investigated. Because of the interview approach employed in this study, which limited the number of questions that could reasonably be asked, the investigation of core values is restricted to the effects of nationalism and patriotism within the hierarchical model.

Unlike Hurwitz and Peffley (1987, 1990) who examined isolationism, militarism and containment as postures in their research, the selection of postures in this thesis was guided by the works of Chittick and colleagues (1995), Rattinger & Juhasz (1998) and Ziegler (1987), who found that foreign policy attitudes were best described in terms of three dimensions: internationalism, militarism and multi-lateralism. The dimension of internationalism refers to the extent to which an individual believes that it is in their nation's interest to get involved in international affairs. Militarism concerns the individual's position on the appropriateness of the use of force in solving international problems. The final dimension, multi-lateralism, refers to the extent to which individuals believe that their nation should actively co-operate with other nations and organisations to solve international issues.

The context – Sierra Leone

The effects of casualties and outcome perceptions on support for a peace operation in this study will be examined with respect to Britain's intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000. Britain's link with Sierra Leone, on the west coast of Africa, dates back to 1787, when a Crown Colony was established to settle freed slaves. Sierra Leone gained its independence from Britain in 1961, and became a republic in 1971.
The recent history of Sierra Leone has been characterised by instability, caused by several military coups and eight years of internal conflict with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), led by Foday Sankoh. In March 1991, fighters from the RUF launched a war to overthrow the government in Sierra Leone. The army in Sierra Leone defied the coup, but the following year, the army itself overthrew the government. Despite elections in 1996, the conflict within Sierra Leone, and with the RUF, continued.

In June 1998, the Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL). The mission monitored and advised efforts to disarm combatants and restructure the nation’s armed forces. All UNOMSIL personnel were evacuated in December 1998, after a rebel alliance gained control of more than half of the country and its capital, Freetown. However, in July 1999 all parties to the conflict signed an agreement in Lome to end hostilities and form a government of national unity. In October 1999, the Security Council authorised the establishment of UNAMSIL, a larger mission of 6,000 military personnel to assist the government in carrying out provisions of the Lome peace agreement.

In May 2000, RUF rebels attacked UN personnel and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) camps. A number of UN peacekeepers and journalists were killed, and more than 200 others were detained by the rebels. UK forces were deployed to the capital, Freetown, to evacuate UK citizens and to secure the airport for the arrival of UN reinforcement troops. As a result of this unrest, UNAMSIL was increased to 13,000 military personnel in May 2000. Although most of the British troops pulled out of Sierra Leone on 15th June 2000, a Short-Term Training Team remained to assist the army in Sierra Leone in basic training and the development of a new Officer Corps. In August 2000, a group of rebels captured 11 members of the remaining Royal Irish Regiment and one Sierra Leone army liaison officer. Five officers were released and the remaining six were rescued by UK forces in September; an operation during which one British soldier died.

The Security Council again increased the authorised strength of UNAMSIL in March 2001 to 17,500 military personnel. The mission is ongoing.
Model overview and hypotheses

The hierarchical model

The goal of this study was to examine the structure of attitudes towards a peace operation. According to Hurwitz and Peffley (1987, 1990), constructs are grouped together according to their level of generality. Based on Hurwitz and Peffley's model, the level above the specific issue, attitudes towards Sierra Leone, consists of three general postures: internationalism, militarism and multi-lateralism.

The mission in Sierra Leone was characterised by the involvement of British troops in a UN operation, using the minimum of force. It was therefore expected that internationalism and multi-lateralism would be positively correlated with attitudes towards Sierra Leone. Due to its military connotation and implication of the use of force, it is furthermore hypothesised that militarism will be negatively, if at all, associated with attitudes towards Sierra Leone.

In the structural model (Model; see Figure 4.1), core values are assumed to constrain postures. In this study, only nationalism and patriotism were assessed as core values. Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) have argued that attachment to a nation is negatively related to internationalism since it fosters a self-centred view of the world. By contrast, it is positively related to militarism because national interests can be pursued through an assertive foreign policy stance. The link between nationalism and multi-lateralism has not yet been assessed by existing research. However, since research has shown that nationalism is associated with "own-nation-first" opinions (e.g. Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989), it could be hypothesised that it will be negatively related to multi-lateralism, which stresses co-operation with different nations and organisations.

By contrast, patriotism has been related more strongly with peace-loving attitudes and internationally-oriented opinions, and it was therefore hypothesised that patriotism was positively related to internationalism and multi-lateralism, whilst being negatively related to militarism.
According to Hurwitz and Peffley, the direction of causation in the model is assumed to be uni-directional and top-down. Nationalism and patriotism therefore directly affect the three postures, which in turn directly affect attitudes towards Sierra Leone (see Figure 4.1).

**Figure 4.1. Hypothesised structural model (Model$_1$)**

![Diagram of the hypothesised structural model](image)

The validity of a hierarchical model is measured using the statistical technique of structural equation modelling. One standard approach employed in structural equation modelling is to test alternative models in addition to the hypothesised model to eliminate the possibility that any other model might fit the data better (e.g. MacCallum & Austin, 2000). In addition to the paths of the hypothesised model, the alternative model (Model$_2$; see Figure 4.2) also contains paths directly from demographics to foreign policy postures and attitudes towards Sierra Leone as well as from core values to attitudes towards Sierra Leone. These paths also made theoretical sense since numerous studies have indicated direct links between gender and foreign policy attitudes (e.g. Fite, Genest & Wilcox, 1990; Howell & Day, 2000), and national identity and foreign policy attitudes (e.g. Conover & Feldman, 1987; Mueller-Peters, 1998).
A second alternative model (Model3) was also tested in which no structural distinction was made between core values and postures, that is, all the variables directly affected attitudes towards Sierra Leone. This was done to explore whether the hierarchical model provided a better explanation of specific attitudes than a single-layered model.

Figure 4.2. Alternative structural model (Model3)

Extending the hierarchical model: Contextual effects

Based on existing research, which has shown that perceptions of casualties and mission success affect attitudes towards a military operation, the contextual constructs of perceived risk and outcome perceptions should conceptually precede attitudes towards a specific mission. These constructs were therefore situated at a higher level of abstraction from the general postures and directly influenced attitudes towards Sierra Leone (Model1; see Figure 4.3). There is no empirical evidence as to how these contextual variables should relate to the three postures, and no concise predictions were therefore made.
Figure 4.3. Hypothesised extended hierarchical model (Model_{E1})

Figure 4.4. Hypothesised extended hierarchical model (Model_{E2})
However, a final possibility was also explored. It could be argued that perceptions of casualties and mission success are contingent on levels of previous attitudes towards a specific mission. Previous research on the relationship between mission support, casualties and perceived success have been based on correlational analyses, which do not allow for causal inferences to be made. The possibility that these contextual factors were consequences of attitudes towards Sierra Leone and not their determinants was therefore also assessed using structural equation modelling (Model $E_2$; see Figure 4.4).

**METHOD**

**Timing of data collection and procedure**

In order to examine possible changes in attitudes over time, a time-series survey design was employed. Participants were interviewed in both Aldershot and Guildford town centre at three different time points, each corresponding to events in Sierra Leone. *Table 4.1* outlines the dates of data collection and events in Sierra Leone.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time 1</th>
<th>30 June - 4 July 2000</th>
<th>British Army had pulled out of Sierra Leone two weeks earlier</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time 2</td>
<td>28-29 August 2000</td>
<td>11 British soldiers of the Training Team were taken hostage on the 27 August 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time 3</td>
<td>12 –13 September 2000</td>
<td>One British soldier died on 10 September 2000 whilst trying to free British hostages</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be noted that the first survey was carried out at the end of June 2000; two weeks after British troops had pulled out of Sierra Leone. This timing was deemed appropriate because the British intervention in Sierra Leone would have forced people to think about issues relating to peace operations, improving the chances that their opinions would be informed or reasoned.
Potential respondents were asked if they would be willing to participate in a survey. It was explained that the survey would take approximately 10 minutes to complete and that they could refuse to answer any questions to which they did not want to respond. It was also explained that there were no "correct" answers to the questions. Participants were thanked for their time, and any questions about the study were answered. Participants were also asked whether they would like to receive a summary of the findings from this study. If they did, they were asked to indicate their name and address. It was pointed out to them that providing this information did not affect their anonymity which would be preserved at all times.

Sample composition

90 British nationals in both Aldershot and Guildford were sampled at each time-point, with individuals in Aldershot or Guildford town centre being approached for an interview. The final sample constituted 540 participants.

This type of convenience sample is self-selected and thus may not be representative of the larger population of citizens of Guildford and Aldershot across a variety of demographic characteristics, such as age, social class or education level. However, such convenience samples can be strengthened by comparing the sample composition to those of a defined population across a wide range of variables (Wilkinson, 1999).

*Table 4.2* compares the Guildford and Aldershot total study sample to 2001 Census data (Office for National Statistics, 2002) on four demographic variables – gender, age, educational level and social class - and indicates the deviation of the sample from the Census figures for each demographic sub-section in a separate column of percentages.

The Guildford sample over-represented men, those aged between 18-24 and 45-59, those who had A-levels, and those who worked in professional occupations (Class 2) and personal service occupations (Class 6), whilst it under-represented those aged 60 and over, those with no qualifications, and those working as managers (Class 1), and machine process operatives (Class 8).
## Table 4.2. Demographic composition of unweighted sample data for Guildford and Aldershot compared to 2001 Census data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Guildford sample (N = 270)</th>
<th>Guildford Census Data</th>
<th>Diff. Sample/census</th>
<th>Aldershot Study sample (N = 270)</th>
<th>Rushmoor Census data</th>
<th>Diff. Sample/census</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>55.8%</td>
<td>49.0%</td>
<td>6.80%</td>
<td>53.2%</td>
<td>49.0%</td>
<td>4.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>44.2%</td>
<td>51.0%</td>
<td>6.80%</td>
<td>46.8%</td>
<td>51.0%</td>
<td>4.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>11.65%</td>
<td>1.85%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>9.52%</td>
<td>3.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>13.34%</td>
<td>0.94%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>15.92%</td>
<td>0.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-44</td>
<td>33.7%</td>
<td>33.64%</td>
<td>0.06%</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
<td>30.34%</td>
<td>2.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-59</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
<td>22.23%</td>
<td>3.07%</td>
<td>24.9%</td>
<td>22.86%</td>
<td>2.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60- over</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
<td>19.14%</td>
<td>4.04%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>15.33%</td>
<td>0.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edu.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>30.1%</td>
<td>30.57%</td>
<td>0.47%</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>20.57%</td>
<td>2.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A level</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>11.50%</td>
<td>6.00%</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
<td>23.08%</td>
<td>2.98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O level</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
<td>33.66%</td>
<td>1.16%</td>
<td>38.3%</td>
<td>26.25%</td>
<td>12.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>5.96%</td>
<td>1.86%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>7.38%</td>
<td>3.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No qual.</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>2.50%</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
<td>22.73%</td>
<td>2.93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social class(^42)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - Manag.</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>19.28%</td>
<td>3.48%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>14.88%</td>
<td>5.78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - Profess.</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>16.40%</td>
<td>2.20%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>9.87%</td>
<td>2.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 - Technic.</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>17.00%</td>
<td>0.70%</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>17.59%</td>
<td>2.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 - Admin.</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>13.42%</td>
<td>1.12%</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>15.11%</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 - Skilled</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>9.24%</td>
<td>1.94%</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>11.31%</td>
<td>0.99%</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 - Service</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>5.49%</td>
<td>2.81%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>6.42%</td>
<td>3.88%</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 - Sales</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>6.80%</td>
<td>1.70%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>7.46%</td>
<td>3.74%</td>
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<td>8 - Machine</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>3.89%</td>
<td>2.69%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>6.35%</td>
<td>2.95%</td>
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<td>9 - Element.</td>
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<td>8.48%</td>
<td>1.82%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>11.08%</td>
<td>1.52%</td>
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\(^4\) No Aldershot specific data was available. Rushmoor Borough Council data, of which Aldershot is one of the main constituents, was therefore taken as approximate data.

\(^42\) See Table 4.3 for a detailed description of the nine categories of Social Class based on Occupation.
The Aldershot sample over-represented men, those aged between 18-24, 30-44, and 49-59, those who had O-levels, and those who worked in administrative occupations (Class 4), personal service occupations (Class 6) and sales occupations (Class 7), whilst it under-represented those with degrees, other qualifications and no qualifications, and those who worked as managers (Class 1), in professional occupations (Class 2), associate professional occupations (Class 3) and process operatives (Class 8).

These biases were corrected mathematically with the use of post-stratification weights. Using SPSS, the post-stratification weights were computed and weight variables were created. All the analyses in this chapter were based on weighted sample data.43

Once the data had been weighted, there were no significant differences between the two locations in terms of gender and age. However, there were significant differences regarding highest educational level achieved ($\chi^2 = 34.22$, df = 4, $p = 0.003$), with Guildford respondents having significantly more higher degrees or O-levels than respondents from Aldershot. Similarly, the Guildford sample had significantly more respondents in managerial or professional occupations than the Aldershot sample ($\chi^2 = 25.11$, df = 8, $p = 0.024$). These differences in degree rates and occupation are to be expected when one considers that Guildford is an affluent University town, which is located on the "commuter-belt".

It should be noted that Guildford and Aldershot had been chosen to reflect locations with different types of social or cultural context: a town with a strong military history – Aldershot, and a town without any military connections – Guildford. Indeed, significant differences between the two locations in terms of military background emerged, with significantly more respondents in Aldershot than in Guildford having served in the Armed Forces ($\chi^2 = 5.33$, df = 1, $p = 0.045$), having family members in the Armed Forces ($\chi^2 = 32.40$, df = 1, $p = 0.01$) or having friends in the Armed Forces ($\chi^2 = 44.76$, df = 1, $p = 0.001$).

43 It should be noted that the analyses in this and the following empirical chapters were conducted on both weighted and unweighted data, which indicated remarkably similar structural relationships between the two types of data.
Measures

The following measures were included in the interview questionnaire (see Appendix A for details of the interview materials). Most of them involve only a few items. This was unavoidable since a wide range of variables needed to be assessed, with a street-survey approach constraining the number of questions that could reasonably be asked. Descriptive statistics, reliabilities and inter-correlations of the study variables for the sample as a whole appear in Table 4.4 in the Results Section.

"National attachment"
Based on Kosterman & Feshbach¹ (1989) and Lilli and Diehl² (1999), six items were used to tap attachment to Britain: "I am proud to be British¹", "Being British is an important part of my identity²", "Being British is important to me because it makes me feel different from other people²", "I would rather be a citizen of Britain than of any other country in the world¹", "Generally, the more influence Britain has on other nations, the better off they are¹", and "In a sense I am emotionally attached to Britain and emotionally affected by its actions²". Respondents rated these items on a five-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree; 5 = Strongly agree). Principal component analysis indicated two factors, which corresponded to the distinction frequently made between "nationalism" and "patriotism", and a composite variable for each was therefore created. Higher scores indicate a belief in British superiority and greater pride in Britain, respectively.

"Internationalism"
Based on Holsti (1996), the degree to which an individual favoured involvement in international affairs was assessed by two items (five-point Likert scale: 1 = Strongly disagree; 5 = Strongly agree): "International co-operation should be encouraged to solve common problems, such as world hunger or world peace" and "Britain shouldn't worry about world affairs but concentrate on taking care of problems at home" (reversed scoring). A composite variable of "internationalism" was created from these two variables, with higher scores indicating stronger support for international involvement.
"Militarism"
In line with Holsti (1996) and Chittick and colleagues (1995), a militaristic or assertive position towards foreign affairs was examined by two items (five-point Likert scale: 1 = Strongly disagree; 5 = Strongly agree): “In dealing with other nations, our government should be strong and tough” and “The best way to ensure peace is to negotiate with other nations” (reversed scoring). A composite variable of “militarism” was created from these two items. Higher scores on this factor indicate a greater belief in assertive foreign policy solutions.

"Multi-lateralism"
Following Chittick and colleagues (1995, 2001), attitudes towards multi-lateral international ventures were assessed by two items (five-point Likert scale: 1 = Strongly disagree; 5 = Strongly agree): “To make a change in the world, Britain needs to work together with international organisations, such as the UN or NATO” and “Britain’s power in the world is diminished by working together with other nations” (reversed scoring). A composite variable of “multi-lateralism” was created from these two items. Higher scores indicate a greater willingness to co-operate internationally.

"Perceived risk"
Perceptions of the risk of harm to British peacekeepers in Sierra Leone was assessed by three items (five-point Likert scale: 1 = Very unlikely; 5 = Very likely): Likelihood of peacekeepers being “Injured”, “Killed”, and “Taken hostage”. These three items were combined into one scale “perceived risk”, with higher scores indicating more perceived risk of harm.

"Outcome perception"
Perceptions of a successful or unsuccessful outcome of the mission in Sierra Leone were assessed by one item that differed in its wording slightly across the three sampling times (five-point Likert scale: 1 = Strongly disagree; 5 = Strongly agree): T1 “British troops in Sierra Leone have succeeded in implementing the peace agreement”, T2 “British troops in Sierra Leone will succeed in restoring peace in Sierra Leone”, and T3 “British troops in Sierra Leone have succeeded in restoring peace in Sierra Leone”.

"Attitudes towards Sierra Leone"

Attitudes towards the mission in Sierra Leone were assessed by two items (five-point Likert scale: 1 = Strongly disagree; 5 = Strongly agree): “The decision to participate in the UN mission in Sierra Leone was a good one” and “I approve of British troops being used to bring peace to Sierra Leone”. A composite variable of “attitudes towards Sierra Leone” was created from these two items. High scores indicate more positive attitudes towards this mission.

"Demographics"

The interview questionnaire also contained several demographic variables. These included gender and age. Highest education level achieved was classified into five categories: Degree (including PhD), A-level or equivalent, O-level or equivalent, Other, No qualifications.

Using the Standard Occupational Classification 2000 (SOC2000; Office for National Statistics, 2000), occupations were classified into nine major categories, referred to as social classes, following the rules laid down by the SOC to derive The Social Class based on Occupation (Registrar General’s Social Class: SC). These nine major categories are designed to group together occupations with a similar level of occupational skill, and are shown in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3 Social class based on occupation

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<td>Managers and Senior Officials</td>
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<td>Professional Occupations</td>
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<td>Associate Professional and Technical Occupations</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Administrative and Secretarial Occupations</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Skilled Trades Occupations</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Personal Service Occupations</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Sales and Customer Service Occupations</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Process, Plant and Machine Operatives</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Elementary Occupations</td>
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</table>

Other measures included the presence of children (Yes/No). Several studies have shown that media exposure influences public attitudes towards the military and military interventions (e.g. Hofstetter & Moore, 1979; Wanta & Hu, 1993). Interest in current affairs (five-point Likert scale: 1 = “Not at all interested” to 5 = “Very
interested"), and the newspaper most frequently read (The Daily Telegraph, The Guardian, The Independent, The Times, The Financial Times, The Daily Mail, The Sun, The Daily Express, and Other) were therefore also assessed. Three questions about a military background were also included, with responses being made on a Yes-No category: “Have you ever served in the Armed Forces?”, “During the last 30 years has someone from your family served in the Armed Forces?”, and “Do you have friends serving in the Armed Forces?”. Finally, participants were also asked their political party affiliation (Labour, Liberal, Conservative, and Other) and their political ideology concerning foreign policy issues (five-point Likert scale: 1= very liberal to 5 = very conservative).

Analyses

Each proposed model was tested with structural equation modelling (SEM) using Maximum Likelihood Estimation based on a covariance matrix in LISREL 8.52 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2002). The error terms were based on the reliabilities of the respective scales. A “two-step approach” to SEM generation involves estimating a measurement model before a structural model is tested (e.g. Anderson & Gerbin, 1988). However, this approach is inappropriate when concepts have fewer than three indicators, as was the case in the present study (cf. Hayduk, 1996).

Since “Outcome perception” was assessed by only one item across the three timepoints, the reliability for this variable could not be calculated. A reliability coefficient of 0.80 was therefore conservatively estimated for this measure. The assumed values of the reliabilities in this study would affect parameter estimates as well as standard errors. In order to adjust for measurement error, the error variance for each scale was set to one minus the reliability times the observed variance of the scale (see Cohen, Cohen, Teresi, Marchi & Velez, 1990; Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1996). The paths from latent variables to their indicators were set to one (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1996).

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4 For the methodological advantages and limitations of using a one-dimensional measure of political ideology, see Herron and Jenkins-Smith (2002).

5 An alternative approach to defining the paths from the latent variables to their indicators entails setting them to the square roots of the scale’s reliability (e.g. Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1996). Both approaches were tested in this study, which yielded identical results.
The fit of each model was evaluated using the chi-square test, the Goodness-of-Fit Index (GFI), the Adjusted-Goodness-of-Fit index (AGFI), and the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA). The chi-square test is an inferential test of the null hypothesis that the population covariance matrix for the observed variables equals the population covariance matrix. A satisfactory fit of the model is thus obtained when the chi-square test is non-significant, indicating that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected (Bollen, 1989).

However, a chi-square is only a good significance test when used with large samples, when the distributional assumptions are reasonably approximated, and when the model is perfectly specified (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993, but see also Hayduk, 1996). Therefore, three additional overall model fit indices are reported. The GFI compares the ability of a model to reproduce the variance-covariance matrix to the ability of no model at all to do so (Thompson, 2000), whilst the AGFI measures how well the model reproduces the sample covariance matrix, accounting for degrees of freedom in a way that rewards parsimony (Bollen, 1989). The RMSEA focuses on an estimated population fit (Steiger & Lind, 1980, cited in Bollen, 1989). The GFI and AGFI indicate a good fit when they are greater than 0.90 and the RMSEA is less than 0.08 (Thompson, 2000).

Parsimony is considered to be important in assessing model fit (e.g. Hu & Bentler, 1995). Alternative nested models\(^4\)\(^6\) were evaluated using chi-square difference tests. Alternative un-nested models were evaluated using the Expected Cross Validation Index (ECVI; Browne & Cudeck, 1989), which is a measure of the discrepancy between the model-implied covariance matrix in the analysed sample and the covariance matrix that would be expected in another sample of the same size (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993). The smallest ECVI estimate indicates the model with the best fit.

Path coefficients and squared multiple correlations (R\(^2\)) values were also used to evaluate the predictive power of the model since they provide different information from comparisons based on fit indices. Fit indices provide information on the

\(^4\)\(^6\) A model (M\(_1\)) is nested within another model (M\(_2\)) if M\(_1\) can be derived from M\(_2\) by removing one or more linkages.
predictive utility of a model, whilst $R^2$ comparisons indicate the power of a model to reproduce observed covariance/correlation matrices (Bollen, 1989).

Before the analyses, the distributional properties of the data were explored. Using PRELIS 2.5, the data were first screened for outliers and missing values. 38 missing values were identified, which were imputed, that is, substituted by real values for missing values, using PRELIS 2.5 mean substitution, following guidelines by du Toit and du Toit (2001; see also Jöreskorg, 2001).

Using PRELIS 2.5, the univariate and multivariate distributional properties of the data were then determined. To satisfy the assumption of normality, Kline (1998; see also West, Finch & Curran, 1995) suggests absolute value cut-offs of 3.0 for skewness and 8.0 for kurtosis. The skew of the items in this study ranged from -2.121 to 2.331, whilst the values of kurtosis ranged from -3.089 to 2.114, indicating that the responses were normally distributed. Since one can have multivariate non-normality even when all the individual variables are normally distributed, multivariate kurtosis (Mardia’s statistic) was also assessed, which equalled $PK = 1.091$. Whilst there is no standard cut-off for this index, Kline (1998) recommended that multivariate normality can be assumed if this value is less than 3.

RESULTS

Attitudes towards Sierra Leone

Just over half the respondents (53%) strongly agreed or agreed that “the decision to participate in the UN mission in Sierra Leone was a good one”. Half of the respondents (55%) also strongly agreed or agreed with the statement: “I approve of British troops being used to bring peace to Sierra Leone”.

An interesting picture emerged when attitudes towards Sierra Leone were assessed across the three time-points. At T1, half of the respondents (50%) strongly agreed or agreed that participating in the UN mission in Sierra Leone was a good decision. 56% of respondents agreed with this statement at T2, when British soldiers had been
taken hostage. 54% of respondents agreed with it at T3, when a British soldier had been killed in Sierra Leone. Half of the respondents (51%) also strongly agreed or agreed that they approved with British troops being used to bring peace to Sierra Leone at T1. 58% of respondents agreed with this statement at T2, and 55% agreed with it at T3.

Assessing the stability of public attitudes towards Sierra Leone

The above analyses indicated some variability in responses over time. A one-way analysis of variance was conducted to assess whether attitudes towards the mission in Sierra Leone changed significantly across time-points, and whether attitudes towards Sierra Leone differed significantly between the two locations. The ANOVA for these specific attitudes by time-point was just insignificant (F(2,537) = 2.43, p = .068). Similarly, a ANOVA for location was insignificant (F(1,538) = 0.43, p = .721), indicating that attitudes did not differ significantly between Guildford and Aldershot. There was also no significant interaction effect between location and time.

These ANOVA results thus indicated that attitudes towards Sierra Leone were not significantly reactive to political events. Consequently, the analyses reported in the following sections pertain to the sample as a whole, unless otherwise stated.

Descriptive data

Table 4.4 presents descriptive data for the measures, their reliabilities and the correlations between measures relating to attitudes towards the mission in Sierra Leone. Examination of the correlations indicates that attitudes towards Sierra Leone were significantly correlated with the three postures: internationalism, militarism and multi-lateralism.

Attitudes towards Sierra Leone were also significantly correlated with perceived risk, outcome perceptions, nationalism and patriotism. Of the demographic variables, only gender, education and political ideology were significantly correlated with attitudes towards Sierra Leone. The three postures were inter-correlated and were generally
Table 4.4. Descriptive data and correlations amongst key measures (N = 540)

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</table>

M  3.38  2.14  3.48  3.44  2.86  3.68  3.02  3.53  
SD  0.85  1.02  0.81  0.84  1.09  0.94  0.98  0.83

Note. The Cronbach's alpha for each construct appears on the diagonal in parentheses
Significant correlations at p< .05 are in bold; two-tailed
also highly correlated with nationalism, patriotism, gender, education and political ideology.

Of the contextual variables, perceived risk was also strongly correlated with internationalism, militarism, nationalism and some demographic variables, whilst outcome perceptions were significantly related to internationalism, patriotism, nationalism, education and political ideology.

The correlations thus present a complex web of relationships and inter-relationships. The following sections present analyses in which these relationships were tested simultaneously and mediation effects were assessed.

Exploring the hierarchical structure in predicting specific foreign policy attitudes towards Sierra Leone

The question about the inter-relationship of the constructs raised by the simple correlations was specifically addressed through a structural equation model (SEM) using LISREL 8.52 (Jöreskog & Sorbom, 2002). Because of the exploratory nature of the following analyses, the sample was randomly split into two sub-samples to allow for a more robust approach to SEM generation. Following Cudeck and Browne (1983), a model was first estimated on the first sub-sample (calibration sample, N = 270), and the specification with the estimated parameter values was then cross-validated with the second sub-sample (validation sample, N = 270)\(^47\).

 Calibration sample

LISREL analysis was used to test the conceptual model (Model\(_1\)) outlined in Figure 4.1 in the calibration sample (N = 270), with attitudes towards the Sierra Leone mission as the criterion variable. The extent to which the effects of demographic and national attachment variables had unmediated effects on peacekeeping attitudes was also examined by testing an alternative model (Model\(_2\), see Figure 4.2) that allowed

\(^47\) An alternative method to robust SEM generation is the "two-step" approach in which a measurement model is tested before a structural model is estimated (cf. Anderson & Gerbin, 1988). As discussed previously, this approach is inappropriate when concepts have fewer than three indicators (for a more detailed discussion of the shortcomings of this approach see Hayduk, 1996).
each variable in turn to influence directly attitudes towards Sierra Leone. Finally, to test whether a distinction between core values and postures needed to be evoked for understanding attitudes, a second alternative model was also estimated in which core values and postures were situated at the same level of abstraction.

The data fitted the conceptual model (Model1) well ($\chi^2 = 8.12$, df = 10, $p = .27$) and the other measures indicated a good fit (GFI = .988, AGFI = .985, RMSEA = .03, ECVI = .04). Internationalism and multi-lateralism had significant positive direct effects on attitudes towards Sierra Leone, whilst militarism had a direct negative effect on attitudes towards this mission (see Figure 4.5).

Nationalism had a significant negative effect on internationalism and multi-lateralism, and a positive effect on militarism. Patriotism had a significant positive effect on internationalism and multi-lateralism, and a negative effect on militarism. Gender, political ideology and education were the only demographic variables to have direct significant effects on nationalism and patriotism (see Table 4.5 for the magnitude of effects of other demographic variables). Overall, this model explained 37 percent of the total variance in attitudes towards Sierra Leone.

The alternative conceptual model (Model2) tested in the calibration sample retained all the parameters of the initial model and added paths from demographics to foreign policy postures and attitudes towards Sierra Leone, and paths from nationalism and patriotism to attitudes towards Sierra Leone.

None of the demographic variables in Model2 had a direct significant effect on attitudes towards Sierra Leone. However, gender showed a significant negative path to internationalism and a significant positive path to militarism. Political ideology did not significantly affect the three postures, indicating that its effects are mediated by the core values of nationalism and patriotism.

---

4,8 In political research, political ideology is variably used either as a socio-demographic variable or as a core value (cf. Herron & Jenkins-Smith, 2002). In the present analysis, political ideology was modelled both as a socio-demographic variable and as a core value. SEM analyses indicated that modelling it as socio-demographic variable provided a better fit to the data than modelling it as a core value.
Figure 4.5. Hypothesised conceptual model of support for Sierra Leone in calibration sample (Model1; N = 270)

Note: Paths are standardised coefficients. Significant paths are in bold. R^2 values are indicated in parenthesis.
Figure 4.6. Alternative conceptual model of support for Sierra Leone in calibration sample (Model2, N = 270)

Note: Paths are standardised coefficients. Significant paths are in bold. R² values are indicated in parenthesis.
Figure 4.7. Second alternative conceptual model of support for Sierra Leone in calibration sample (Model3, N = 270)

Note: Paths are standardised coefficients. Significant paths are in bold. $R^2$ values are indicated in parenthesis.
### Table 4.5. Standardised total effects for the conceptual model (Model1) in calibration sample (N = 270)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
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<th>3</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Sierra Leone</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Internationalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Militarism</td>
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<td>-.249</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Multi-Lateralism</td>
<td></td>
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<td>.255</td>
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<td>6. Patriotism</td>
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<td>Served in Armed Forces</td>
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<td>Location</td>
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</table>

Note: Total effects in bold are significant at p < .05.
Finally, education had significant positive paths to internationalism and multi-lateralism. Table 4.5 presents the standardised total effects, which include both the direct and indirect effects of one variable unto another. It shows that of the two core values, nationalism had a greater (negative) total effect on attitudes towards Sierra Leone than patriotism.

The alternative conceptual model (Model2, see Figure 4.6) provided a good fit to the data ($\chi^2 = 1.00$, df = 1, $p = .43$, GFI = .998, AGFI = .995, RMSEA = .02, ECVI = .05). This model explained 40 percent of the total variance in attitudes towards Sierra Leone. However, this alternative model (Model2) did not fit the data significantly better than the hypothesised basic model (Model1, $\Delta \chi^2 = 7.12$, df = 9, $p = .064$). Consequently, the more parsimonious conceptual model (Model1) as outlined in Figure 4.5 was retained.

Finally, a second alternative conceptual model (Model3) tested in the calibration sample placed core values, i.e. nationalism and patriotism, and the three postures, i.e. internationalism, militarism and multi-lateralism, on the same level of abstraction. This model (see Figure 4.7) did not fit the data very well ($\chi^2 = 37.13$, df = 22, $p = .03$, GFI = .678, AGFI = .685, RMSEA = .10, ECVI = .11), explaining only 31 percent of the total variance in attitudes towards Sierra Leone. Overall, this model fit the data less well than the hypothesised conceptual model (Model1; ECVI = .11 vs. ECVI = .04, respectively), and the conceptual model (Model1) shown in Figure 4.5 was therefore retained.

Validation sample

On the basis of these results, the fit of the conceptual model (Model1) in Figure 4.5 with the estimated parameter values was then evaluated in the cross-validation sample ($N = 270$). Results suggested that this model provided a good fit to the data of the cross-validation sample (see Table 4.6). It should be noted that the parameter estimates and $R^2$ statistics for this model are identical to those reported in Figure 4.5.

\[^{49}\] Because it could be argued that Militarism and Multi-lateralism are dependent on whether or not Britain should be involved internationally (see Rathbun, 2003), a model was also tested in which internationalism preceded and therefore shaped militarism and multi-lateralism. This model did not fit the data well ($\chi^2 = 30.57$, df = 22, $p = .01$, GFI = .554, AGFI = .555, RMSEA = .11, ECVI = .12).
Table 4.6. Fit indices for the hypothesised structural model in the calibration and validation sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>GFI</th>
<th>AGFI</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conceptual model (Model_1) - Calibration sample</td>
<td>8.12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.988</td>
<td>.985</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conceptual model (Model_1) - Validation sample</td>
<td>8.95</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.981</td>
<td>.980</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Time-series analysis**

Although ANOVA results indicated that attitudes towards Sierra Leone did not differ significantly over time, the possibility that the structure differed at different time points was also investigated. The conceptual model (Model\_1) was first estimated with Time 1 (N = 180) data, and the stability of the solution was then tested by comparing it to that of T2 (N = 180) and T3 (N = 180). Finally, the temporal stability of the model was tested by means of a multiple group SEM in which each time-point was treated as a group.

The conceptual model (Model\_T1) estimated in the previous section was first estimated with T1 data. The fit indices suggested a good overall fit ($\chi^2 = 9.31; \text{df} = 10, p = .26; \text{GFI} = .981; \text{AGFI} = .981; \text{RMSEA} = .039$), thus confirming that the suggested structural relationship provide a good representation of the T1 data.

This solution was then applied to T2 data and the same pattern was replicated. The same was true when it was applied to T3 data. Both models provided a good fit to the data (Model\_T2 = $\chi^2 = 9.79; \text{df} = 10, p = .17; \text{GFI} = .980; \text{AGFI} = .980; \text{RMSEA} = .043$; and Model\_T3 = $\chi^2 = 9.42; \text{df} = 10, p = .10; \text{GFI} = .981; \text{AGFI} = .980; \text{RMSEA} = .040$, respectively).

Following Bollen (1989), an assessment of the stability of the solution was then carried out by estimating and comparing a number of nested models with multiple group structural equation models and treating each wave as a group. These multi-group analyses consisted of five steps. In step 1, structural parameters were constrained to be equal between the groups.
This model was then gradually relaxed in the following steps, with each step’s change in model fit being compared to the model in step 1. In step 2, factor loadings of the latent variables were allowed to vary over time. This step did not significantly change the goodness of fit (see Table 4.7). The model in step 1 was therefore retained, and it was concluded that these effects were equal over time.

The correlations among the independent variables (step 3), the paths from core value to postures and from postures to attitudes towards Sierra Leone (step 4), and the structural equation’s residual variance (step 5) were then allowed to vary over time. As shown in Table 4.7, none of the steps produced a significant change in $\chi^2$. The constrained model in step 1 was therefore retained, and it was concluded that the relationships between attitudes towards Sierra Leone and their antecedents, as well as the relationships between the determinants, were the same across the three time points.

Table 4.7. Multi-group analysis of temporal stability of the influence of determinants on attitudes towards Sierra Leone

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>Df</th>
<th>$\Delta\chi^2$</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1 - Parameters equal</td>
<td>54.79</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2 - Factor loadings of latent variables freed</td>
<td>52.45</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 - Correlations freed</td>
<td>50.08</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 - Structural paths freed</td>
<td>51.84</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - Residual variances freed</td>
<td>53.95</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
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Assessing the effect of perceived risk and outcome perceptions on attitudes towards Sierra Leone

The previous analyses have indicated the utility of the hierarchical model in explaining part of the variance in attitudes towards the mission in Sierra Leone (37%). The aim of the following analyses was to assert the additional exploratory power of two contextual variables, namely perceived risk of casualties and mission outcome perceptions, on attitudes towards Sierra Leone.
Again using a split-sample technique, two models were evaluated, which differed in the placement of the two contextual variables in the model. Firstly, an extended model (Model$_E1$) was evaluated in the calibration sample (N = 270) in which perceived risk and outcome perceptions were situated between postures and attitudes towards Sierra Leone, thereby treating them as causes of specific attitudes towards Sierra Leone (see Figure 4.3). This model provided a good fit to the data ($\chi^2 = 13.20$, df = 15, $p = .23$, GFI = .986, AGFI = .984, RMSEA = .03, ECVI = .06).

In this model, perceived risk was negatively affected by internationalism and militarism, whilst outcome perceptions were positively affected by internationalism and multi-lateralism. In turn, perceived risk negatively affected attitudes towards Sierra Leone, whereas outcome perceptions positively affected attitudes towards this mission (see Figure 4.8; see Table 4.8 for the total effects in this model). Overall, this model explained 42 percent of the total variance in attitudes towards Sierra Leone.

The alternative extended model (Model$_E2$), in which perceived risk and outcome perceptions were treated to be the consequences of specific mission attitudes rather than its causes (see Figure 4.4) was also tested. This model also provided a very good fit ($\chi^2 = 10.82$, df = 12, $p = .25$, GFI = .982, AGFI = .980, RMSEA = .04, ECVI = .08). Figure 4.9 shows that attitudes towards Sierra Leone negatively affected perceived risk, whilst outcome perceptions were positively affected by attitudes towards this mission. Overall, this model explained 40 percent of the total variance in attitudes towards Sierra Leone.

The Model$_E1$ shown in Figure 4.8 fit the data marginally better than did the alternative extended model (Model$_E2$) in Figure 4.9 (ECVI = .06 versus ECVI = .08, respectively).
Figure 4.8. Extended model (Model\textsubscript{E1}) of attitudes towards Sierra Leone including perceived risk and outcome perceptions in calibration sample (N = 270)

Note: Paths are standardised coefficients. Significant paths are in bold. R\textsuperscript{2} values are indicated in parenthesis.
Figure 4.9. Alternative extended model (Model2) of attitudes towards Sierra Leone, including perceived risk and outcome perceptions in calibration sample (N = 270)

Note: Paths are standardised coefficients. Significant paths are in bold. R² values are indicated in parenthesis.
Table 4.8. Standardised total effects for the extended conceptual model (Model_{E1}) in calibration sample (N = 270)

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<tr>
<td>2. Outcome perception</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Perceived risk</td>
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<td>-.423</td>
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<td>-.291</td>
<td>-.248</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Militarism</td>
<td>-.275</td>
<td>-.119</td>
<td>-.209</td>
<td>.283</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Multi-Lateralism</td>
<td>.421</td>
<td>.243</td>
<td>.093</td>
<td>.255</td>
<td>-.114</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Nationalism</td>
<td>-.383</td>
<td>-.265</td>
<td>.214</td>
<td>-.358</td>
<td>.401</td>
<td>-.168</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Patriotism</td>
<td>.468</td>
<td>.301</td>
<td>-.207</td>
<td>.348</td>
<td>-.261</td>
<td>.344</td>
<td>.272</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.213</td>
<td>-.201</td>
<td>.254</td>
<td>-.409</td>
<td>.381</td>
<td>-.161</td>
<td>-.351</td>
<td>-.185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political ideology</td>
<td>-.167</td>
<td>-.153</td>
<td>.184</td>
<td>.080</td>
<td>.266</td>
<td>-.159</td>
<td>.312</td>
<td>.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.263</td>
<td>.271</td>
<td>-.267</td>
<td>.448</td>
<td>-.370</td>
<td>.337</td>
<td>-.277</td>
<td>.308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.107</td>
<td>-.132</td>
<td>.183</td>
<td>.096</td>
<td>.138</td>
<td>.141</td>
<td>.135</td>
<td>-.120</td>
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<tr>
<td>Current affairs</td>
<td>.142</td>
<td>.181</td>
<td>-.204</td>
<td>.134</td>
<td>.144</td>
<td>.199</td>
<td>.141</td>
<td>.133</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social class</td>
<td>.102</td>
<td>.173</td>
<td>-.131</td>
<td>.091</td>
<td>.089</td>
<td>.072</td>
<td>-.205</td>
<td>.138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>-.012</td>
<td>.088</td>
<td>.192</td>
<td>-.034</td>
<td>-.098</td>
<td>.076</td>
<td>.131</td>
<td>.152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Served in Armed Forces</td>
<td>.069</td>
<td>.185</td>
<td>.201</td>
<td>.113</td>
<td>.253</td>
<td>.244</td>
<td>.153</td>
<td>.165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family member in Armed Forces</td>
<td>.074</td>
<td>.143</td>
<td>.197</td>
<td>.073</td>
<td>.191</td>
<td>.089</td>
<td>.138</td>
<td>.156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends in Armed Forces</td>
<td>.071</td>
<td>.087</td>
<td>.190</td>
<td>.093</td>
<td>.138</td>
<td>.077</td>
<td>.099</td>
<td>.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>-.104</td>
<td>-.099</td>
<td>.113</td>
<td>-.115</td>
<td>.116</td>
<td>.068</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td>.018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Total effects in bold are significant at p < .05.
### Table 4.9. Fit indices for the extended structural models in the calibration and validation sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>GFI</th>
<th>AGFI</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
<th>ECVI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extended model (ModelE1) - Calibration sample</td>
<td>13.20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.986</td>
<td>.984</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended model (ModelE1) - Validation sample</td>
<td>13.90</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.986</td>
<td>.983</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative extended model (ModelE2) - Calibration sample</td>
<td>10.82</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.982</td>
<td>.980</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative extended model (ModelE2) - Validation sample</td>
<td>10.95</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.984</td>
<td>.983</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both of these models were tested in the validation sample ($N = 270$). Table 4.9 shows that both of these models also showed a good fit to the data of the validation sample. However, the extended model (ModelE1), in which the contextual variables were indicators of attitudes towards Sierra Leone, had better fit indices than did the alternative extended model (ModelE2), in which the contextual variables were the consequences of attitudes towards this mission.

### DISCUSSION

**Hierarchical model of foreign policy attitudes**

A hierarchical model guided the examination of the determinants of attitudes towards the mission in Sierra Leone. Overall, the results from the three structural equation models were supportive of Hurwitz and Peffley's (1987) hierarchical model as a model of the determinants of attitudes towards the peace operation in Sierra Leone. A "strict" hierarchical structure provided a better, more parsimonious fit of the data than did a model that also included direct effects from core values to specific attitudes. Furthermore, the hierarchical model also provided a better fit than a model in which both core values and postures were situated at the same level of abstraction.
A split-sample approach, in which the structure found in one half of the sample was validated in the second half, further strengthened these results. Overall, the hierarchical model explained 37% of the variance in attitudes towards Sierra Leone.

This finding is consistent with other applications of the model to foreign policy concerns (e.g. Bartels, 1994; Belmont & Mueller, 1998; Bjereld & Ekengren, 1999; Juhasz, 2001). However, this is the first instance in which this model has been applied to a peacekeeping context and a British population.

The direction and relative strength of the relationships confirmed the initial predictions. Internationalism and multi-lateralism were positively associated with attitudes towards Sierra Leone, whilst militarism had a negative effect on mission-specific attitudes. Respondents who believed that Britain should be involved in international affairs, and who believed that Britain should act multi-laterally to solve international problems, therefore held more positive attitudes towards Sierra Leone than their counterparts. Respondents who believed that military force should not be used to settle international problems were also more likely to hold positive attitudes towards Sierra Leone than did respondents who believed in the use of force as a foreign policy means.

The effect of core values

The three postures were shaped by the two core values - nationalism and patriotism. Both internationalism and multi-lateralism were positively influenced by patriotism, whilst internationalism was also negatively affected by nationalism. In line with Adorno et al (1950, p. 107),

The genuine patriot, it would appear, can appreciate the values and ways of other nations, and can be permissive toward much that he cannot personally accept for himself. He is free of rigid conformism, outgroup rejection, and imperialistic striving for power.

Militarism, in turn, was directly positively influenced by nationalism and negatively affected by patriotism, a finding that parallels that of Hurwitz and Peffely (1987),
who found strong partial correlations between militarism and nationalism. Research on inter-group aggression (e.g. Struch & Schwartz, 1989) indicates that aggression may be related to in-group bias. Thus, there are individuals who are internationally oriented and who do not support hawkish policies whilst also being strongly attached to their country (see also Feshbach, 1987).

These findings are also consistent with recent research that has attempted to re-conceptualise forms of national attachments, which suggests that national attachment may take one of two forms. The first is characterised by an outward looking concern with the role of the national group in the international context and a degree of concern about whether the nation has an adequate voice in the international arena. The second is characterised by an inward-oriented, protective interest in the maintenance of a unique culture identity (see Davis, 1999; Nigbur & Cinnirella, unpublished).

The results from this study not only support previous research on the strong relationship between national attachment and foreign policy attitudes, but also extend the findings of such studies. Previous studies have typically only examined the direct link between national attachment and political attitudes (e.g. Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Mueller-Peters, 1998). This study also investigated the indirect ways through which national attachment may exert its influence, and indicated the value of considering how the link between these values and foreign policy attitudes may be mediated by other variables.

The effects of demographic factors

It is also of interest that only three demographic variables, namely gender, education and political ideology, played a significant role in the structural models. Overall, education was negatively associated with nationalism but not significantly related to patriotism, a finding that is similar to that of Blank, Schmidt and Westle (2001). Education showed significant positive total effects on internationalism and multilateralism, and negative total effects on militarism. This finding is in line with previous reports that increasing levels of education are associated with a greater belief in internationalism and less support for militaristic policies (e.g. Holsti, 1996).
Overall, education was positively associated (in terms of its total effects) with attitudes towards Sierra Leone.

It is interesting to note that social class did not significantly affect any of the constructs in the model, with the exception of nationalism. However, social class may affect an individuals' educational level (Tuch, Sigelman & MacDonald, 1999). Indeed, education and social class were correlated ($r = .53$), and the impact of social class in the model could therefore have been indirect.

Nationalism was significantly related to gender, with men being more nationalistic than women. This finding is contrary to previous research that has found no significant gender difference in nationalism (e.g. Blank et al., 2001). Gender was also positively associated with militarism and negatively related to internationalism (in terms of total effects), indicating that women were more likely to be involved internationally and opposed to the use of force than men. Gender was also positively related to attitudes towards Sierra Leone (in terms of total effects), which suggests that women held more positive attitudes towards this mission than men.

These findings are in line with numerous previous studies that have shown that gender is an important predictor in foreign policy attitudes (e.g. Bendyna, Finucane, Kirby, O'Donnell, & Wilcox, 1996; Fite, Genest & Wilcox, 1990; Lester, 1994; but also see Finlay & Love, 1998). In particular, these studies have shown that women are less supportive of the use of military force than men, and several competing theories have been proposed to explain this gender gap (e.g. Clark & Clark, 1999; Howell & Day, 2000). However, gender did not directly affect such attitudes (see Figure 4.6) - a finding that is consistent with Wittkopf (1990), who found that gender differences largely disappear when gender is assessed in combination with other variables.

Although political ideology was strongly related to attitudes towards Sierra Leone in the simple correlations, its impact in the hierarchical model was weak. Consistent with previous studies (e.g. Blank et al., 2001), political ideology was positively related to nationalism, but not patriotism, indicating that respondents who rated themselves to be conservative were more likely to show nationalistic tendencies than
Chapter 4 An exploratory analysis of the hierarchical structure

liberals. Political ideology was also positively associated with militarism and negatively related to multi-lateralism, suggesting that the more conservative respondents were more likely to believe in militaristic, unilateral foreign policy solutions than their liberal counterparts (see Holsti, 1996).

Similarly, political ideology was negatively associated with attitudes towards Sierra Leone (in terms of total effects), which indicates that liberal respondents held more positive attitudes towards this mission than did conservative participants. However, political ideology had no significant direct effect on these attitudes (see Figure 4.6). This finding suggests that ideology only seems to matter when other important correlates are not assessed (Bartels, 1994).

Based on previous findings that having a personal association with the military, such as family or friends in the Armed Forces, has an impact on attitudes towards the use of force in international conflicts (e.g. Bendyna, Finucane, Kirby, O'Donnel & Wilcox, 1996), it is perhaps surprising that these variables had no effect on attitudes towards Sierra Leone in the present study (r = -.12, see Table 4.4). However, Table 4.5 showed that having served in the Armed Forces had a significant total effect on militarism and multi-lateralism, whereas having a family member in the Armed Forces also had a significant (but weak) total effect on militarism. Thus, in line with previous research (e.g. Bendyna et al., 1996), respondents who had served in the Armed Forces were more likely to believe in multi-lateral, military interventions than respondents without such personal military associations. Similarly, respondents who had family members who had served or were serving in the Armed Forces were more likely to endorse militaristic foreign policy solutions than participants with no such family background.

The importance of contextual influences

Finally, there was also evidence to support the addition of measures of perceived risk and outcome perceptions in the hierarchical model. Although there were theoretical cases to be made for both possibilities, structural equation analyses suggested that a model in which perceived risk and outcome perceptions shaped attitudes towards
Sierra Leone provided a better fit to the data (in terms of ECVI values) than did a model in which attitudes towards Sierra Leone influenced these factors.

Consistent with previous research (e.g. Everts, 2001b; Larson, 1996), respondents who perceived the mission in Sierra Leone to be successful and who believed that harm occurring to soldiers in Sierra Leone was unlikely held more positive attitudes towards this mission.

However, the present study has added to previous research by exploring the bases of these perceptions. SEM results indicated that the contextual variables were differentially influenced by the three postures. Outcome perceptions were positively affected by internationalism and multi-lateralism, indicating that respondents who believed that Britain should be involved in world politics in a multi-lateral manner were more likely to perceive the operation in Sierra Leone to be successful. By contrast, perceived risk was negatively related to internationalism and militarism, suggesting that the more respondents believed that Britain should be involved in world affairs, and that interventions should be non-militaristic in nature, the less likely they were to perceive risks of harm to British soldiers in Sierra Leone. The relationship between such contextual factors and specific attitudes therefore warrants further investigation.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the results supported the assumptions of a hierarchical organisation of foreign policy attitudes. Attitudes towards Sierra Leone were shaped by more general predispositions: postures (internationalism, militarism and multi-lateralism) and core values (nationalism and patriotism). Core values, in turn, were influenced by demographic factors (gender, age and political ideology). SEM results indicated that this hierarchical model provided a better fit than models in which no distinction was made between postures and core values or in which core values were allowed to influence attitudes towards Sierra Leone directly.
However, a further criticism of the hierarchical model is that it postulates that the effects in the model are top-down. As argued by Nincic (1992), the assumption that specific foreign policy attitudes are influenced by higher-order attitudes is problematic in that it is conceivable that specific attitudes may influence more abstract attitudes. This issue will be explored in the next chapter, which reports longitudinal data on attitudes towards Sierra Leone.
The previous chapter indicated that a hierarchical model of foreign policy attitudes, where general orientations (i.e. postures and core values) are assumed to determine more specific policy attitudes, provided a good fit of attitudes towards a peace operation in Sierra Leone.

As already discussed in Chapter Two, the hierarchical model of constraint is not without its criticisms in that the causal direction has been assumed rather than tested. It is the purpose of this chapter to test the direction of causality within the hierarchical model of international attitudes.

Whilst the analyses in the previous chapter relied on cross-sectional data, the analyses in this chapter are based on panel data consisting of three waves of interviews. Although the sample size was compromised using the panelling approach, these data allowed for the utility of the hierarchical structure to be tested and for the causal ordering of core values, postures and specific policy attitudes to be untangled.
Top-down or bottom-up processes within the hierarchical model?

Central to the hierarchical model of Hurwitz and Peffley (and other hierarchical models such as Feldman, 1988) is the premise that general assumptions, such as core values and postures, influence specific policy preferences in a top-down (theory-driven) fashion, that is, from more abstract levels to specific ones. This premise is based on information-processing research (e.g. Fiske & Taylor, 1991), which suggests that individuals have a limited capacity for storing and retrieving information, and consequently need to simplify the environment by relying on cognitive shortcuts.

Indeed, Tetlock and McGuire (1986) found that the use of top-down processes or cognitive shortcuts is particularly probable when the information to be processed is highly complex. This is because it is more economical to derive specific judgements from more general principles than to attend to every specific event, especially when the environment is complex, such as in foreign policy. Thus, top-down processes are "the norm for international belief systems, given the great complexity of the domain and the sheer volume of international information" (Peffley & Hurwitz, 1993, p. 66).

McCann (1997) investigated the causal flow of the influence between core values and specific attitudes. Analysing the effects of core values and issue preferences from 1990 on core values and issue preferences in 1992, he found that core values in 1990 structured specific issue preferences in 1992, whilst specific issue positions in 1990 had no effect on core values in 1992. Thus, according to McCann's findings, core values 'caused' policy preferences and not vice versa.

However, the argument that specific attitudes are always influenced by a higher-order (i.e. abstract) attitude has been criticised. For example, Nincic (1992) has argued that it is conceivable that the main determinant of an attitude is not necessarily from a higher but from the same or lower level of abstraction. If an individual has to evaluate the use of military force in a specific context, he/she might be influenced greatly by contemporary (Peffley & Hurwitz, 1993) or historic events (Juhasz, 2001). Thus, beliefs about the use of military force in foreign policy at the postural level may be affected by specific international events. It is therefore possible
that the flow of causality within the model is bottom-up (data-driven), that is, from more specific levels to abstract ones.

Indeed, Peffley and Hurwitz (1992) argued that values and postures might be a product of both theory-driven and data-driven processes. According to the authors, an individual's postures evolve over a long period of time and become quasi-theoretical assumptions that help bring order to a complex environment. However, "people are not prisoners to their extant expectations" (Peffley and Hurwitz, 1992, p. 436), and they argue that when new data is communicated by a trusted source that does not match up with one's theories, then values and postures may be revised. This view is in line with many models in social psychology in which attitudes and behaviour continually interact and reinforce one another (e.g. Kelman, 1979).

Brewer and colleagues (2002) reported that preferences measured at one time-point could affect core values at another time-point. They assessed a number of core values, such as patriotism and social trust, and factors associated with system support, such as confidence in the Armed Forces and presidential support, at two time-points. Using structural equation modelling, they found that general orientations affected more specific forms of system support. However, they also reported an instance in which system support at one time-point shaped general predispositions at another time-point. More specifically, they found that confidence in the military in wave 1 had a significant effect on patriotism in wave 2, and concluded that citizens who rallied around the military also rallied around the flag, and not just the other way round.

An individual's core values and postures may therefore respond to new political information, especially information that is conveyed by trusted others. Because research into the hierarchical model has predominantly relied on cross-sectional data, the possibility of revisions of core values and postures has rarely been examined. Furthermore, the studies that have investigated possible shifts in general attitudes using panel data have predominantly focused on either core values or postures. These studies are outlined in the following two sections. It should be noted, however, that to date no study has examined the extent to which both core values and postures may
be subject to change as a result of new information or changes in specific policy attitudes.

**Stability of core values**

One of the central assertions of the hierarchical model is that core values are relatively stable over time. Indeed, several authors make stability a defining characteristic of core values (e.g. Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987, 1990; Zaller, 1991). A number of studies have explored not only how core values are linked to specific judgements but have also investigated the extent to which these core values are stable over time (e.g. Conover & Feldman, 1984; Hurwitz, Peffley & Seligson, 1993; Jackson, 1983; Judd & Milburn, 1980; Pollock, 1994; Pollock, Lilie & Vittes, 1993; Sears, Huddy & Schaffer, 1986).

However, there is evidence that core values may shift as a result of conflicting new information as shown in two studies of social attitudes. Pollock (1994) investigated public opinion on AIDS before and after "Magic" Johnson announced that he had contracted HIV. Pollock (1994) found that after "Magic" Johnson's announcement, heterosexual moral values defined a new basis of polarisation on AIDS-related policies, which supplanted the importance of moral evaluations of homosexuality that until then had been the primary determinants of public opinions on any AIDS-related issue.

Similarly, Brewer (2003) explored the bases of an increase in support for gay rights policies amongst the American public in the 1990s. Investigating public attitudes towards gay policy between 1992 and 2000, a time span characterised by increased exposure to openly gay and lesbian peers and media figures, Brewer found not only that shifts in the levels of predispositions, such as less moral traditionalism, produced changes in gay policy opinions, but also that the underlying structure of opinion changed during the study period. For example, whilst the effect of egalitarianism remained almost constant between 1992, 1996 and 2000, respondents in 2000 were less likely to base their opinion on moral traditionalism than they were in 1992 and 1996. Thus, Brewer concluded that not only did Americans change in what they
thought about the issue (i.e. becoming more positive), but they also revised how they thought about it.

However, foreign policy studies have rarely reported such dramatic shifts, which define or redefine how the public responds to an issue. This is despite the fact that foreign policy is also subjected to "critical moments" (Carmines & Stimson, 1989), such as wars or other international disputes (e.g. Holsti, 1996). Jackson (1983), for example, not only found that fundamental values such as a concern for greater equality influenced policy-specific judgements, but also that these fundamental values were stable over the four years of the study.

There is some evidence for a change of core values in response to evolving political environments. McCann (1997) analysed American National Election Studies (ANES) panel data from 1990 and 1992, which measured two values - egalitarianism and moral traditionalism, as well as candidate choice in the 1992 presidential campaign. Using structural equation modelling, he found that individuals who supported Clinton became significantly more favourably disposed towards egalitarianism over time, whilst becoming less supportive of moral traditionalism. This dynamic was reversed for individuals who lined up behind Bush. A preference for Bush led to greater support for traditionalism between 1990 and 1992 and to less commitment to egalitarianism.

Recent evidence also suggests that the stability of American values was affected by the September 11th attacks. For example, Olivas-Lujan, Harzig & McCoy (2004) reported an amplification of cosmopolitan and power values in American students following the attacks. However, without the use of longitudinal data it is unclear whether this change in core values is sustained or whether values will return to their pre-event level.

**Stability of postures**

Whilst McCann (1997) and others investigated the stability of core values and found some evidence for a core value shift over time, other studies have explored the stability of postures, such as internationalism or militarism (e.g. Holsti, 1996).
For example, using two-wave panel data from 1986 and 1987, Peffley and Hurwitz (1993) investigated the extent to which postures constrained more specific policy attitudes or whether specific policy attitudes influenced postures. At both time-points, 301 respondents were asked identical questions that assessed their position regarding two postures—militarism and containment, and three policy attitudes—Central American policy, defence spending policy and nuclear arms policy.

According to Converse (1964), the more stable an attitude is, the more central it is to an individual’s belief structure (see also Rokeach, 1973). LISREL analyses of the over-time consistency of the postural and policy constructs indicated that postures were consistently more stable than specific policy attitudes, and Peffley and Hurwitz (1993) thus argued that this finding provided initial evidence that postures are more central to an individual’s belief system than are specific policy attitudes.

To examine the sources of stability in postures and policy attitudes across the two time-points, Peffley and Hurwitz tested six structural equation models, which were generated by pairing each of the two postures with each of the three policy attitudes. Overall, they found that postures were important predictors of two of the three policy attitudes, namely defence spending and Central American policy, whilst these policy attitudes were insignificant predictors of the two postures (see Figure 5.1).

For example, the effect of militarism and, to a lesser extent, containment at Time 1 on attitudes towards defence spending at Time 2 was significant ($\beta = .495$ and $.243$, respectively), whilst defence-spending attitudes at Time 1 had an insignificant effect on militarism and containment at Time 2 ($\beta = -.125$ and $.060$, respectively). An exception to this pattern was found regarding nuclear arms policies, where neither prior postures nor prior policy attitudes were an important source of stability or predictor of the other.

According to Peffley and Hurwitz (1993), these findings are more consistent with a top-down model of constraint in which prior postures influence specific policy attitudes than with a bottom-up model in which prior specific policy attitudes affect postures.
Aims of the study and hypotheses

In this study, the stability and sources of consistency of core values, postures and specific policy attitudes were examined with reference to Britain's mission in Sierra Leone. Unlike Peffley and Hurwitz (1993), who studied construct stability and direction of causality during a period of relative international stability, this study was conducted when the international environment was in a relative state of flux. More specifically, respondents were interviewed before and after dramatic events in Sierra Leone. According to Peffley and Hurwitz (1993, p. 67), if the change in the international environment is strong enough to lead to revisions in either general assumptions or specific policy preferences, then such a quasi-experimental design might be used to determine whether attitude change at one level of abstraction promotes attitudinal change at another level.
According to the hierarchical top-down model, prior core values should account for a good portion of the stability in postures, which, in turn, should account for a good portion of the stability in policy attitudes. By contrast, the bottom-up model predicts the opposite – that prior policy attitudes should explain any stability observed in postures, which, in turn, might explain any stability observed in core values. It should be noted that an intermediate position is also possible in which both core values and specific policy attitudes account for any stability observed in postures.

Based on Peffley and Hurwitz (1993), a conceptual model of the over-time relationships between attitudes at different levels of abstraction is depicted in Figure 5.2. The paths labelled “a”, “b” and “c” in the model are coefficients that measure the stability in the same attitude over time. The paths marked “e” in the model indicate the paths predicted by a top-down model that assumes that postures are likely to be a source of stability in support for Sierra Leone. By contrast, the paths labelled “d” in the model represent the bottom-up paths that assume that prior attitudes towards Sierra Leone are likely to be a source of consistency in attitudes at the postural level.

Figure 5.2. Conceptual model of top-down and bottom-up influences of core values, postures and support for Sierra Leone
In an extension of Peffley and Hurwitz’s model, the causal flow between core values and the three postures is also included in the model. The paths labelled “g” in the model indicate the paths predicted by the top-down model that assume that core values are a likely source of stability at the postural level. On the other hand, the paths labelled “f” represent the bottom-up paths that assumes that attitudes at the postural level might be a stability factor for core values.

According to the hierarchical top-down model, paths “e”, “g”, “a”, “b” and “c” should be significant, whilst the bottom-up model suggests that paths “d”, “f” as well as “a”, “b” and “c” should be significant.

METHOD

Sample composition

A three-wave panel survey was conducted in Guildford in 2000, with each wave of interviews corresponding to events in Sierra Leone as outlined in Chapter 4. On 5/6 July 2000, 90 respondents were approached for an interview in Guildford. Of these respondents, 86 (95%) volunteered to participate in another interview on 30/31 August. 80 (93%) of these respondents also participated in the final wave of interviews, conducted on 14/15 September 2000. The analyses in this chapter were based on the 80 (89%) respondents for which three-wave data was available.

To determine whether attrition across time-points was selective, the responses of respondents who participated in all three interviews were compared to those who participated only in the first two interviews and with those who completed only the first interview. Comparisons were made on demographic characteristics as well as attitudes towards Sierra Leone. The three groups of respondents did not differ significantly from one another on any of these measures, with one exception. At T2, respondents who were subsequently not re-interviewed were less likely to support the mission in Sierra Leone, F(1, 84) = 33.56, p < .05.
The interview took about 10 minutes to complete and the respondents could refuse to answer any questions to which they did not want to respond. It was also explained that there were no “correct” answers to the questions and that their responses would be treated confidentially. After the first interview respondents provided their names and address so that they could be approached for further interviews. It was made clear that providing this information did not affect their anonymity, which would be preserved at all times. Participants were also asked whether they would like to receive a summary of the findings from this study.

This type of sample is self-selected and thus may not be representative of the larger population of citizens in Guildford across a variety of demographic characteristics, such as age or social class. As already mentioned in Chapter 4, comparing the sample composition to those of a defined population across a wide range of key variables can strengthen a convenience sample. This was done by weighting the Guildford interview sample to 2001 Census data for Guildford (see Appendix B for a detailed table).

The sample over-represented men, those aged 30-44 and 45-59, those who had A-levels and other qualifications, those who worked in professional (Class 2), personal service (Class 6) and elementary occupations (Class 9). By contrast, the sample under-represented those who had no educational qualifications, those aged over 60, and those who worked in managerial occupations (Class 1).

The sample was thus weighted on these demographic variables to achieve a more accurate representation of the overall population. All the analyses in this chapter are based on weighted sample data.

Measures

In each wave of the survey, respondents were asked identical questions. The interview schedule was identical to that discussed in Chapter 4, and included questions about national attachment, internationalism, militarism, multi-lateralism and attitudes towards Sierra Leone. In addition, several demographic variables were assessed at time-point 1 (see Appendix A for details of the interview materials).
Details of the means, standard deviations and Cronbach's alphas for the constructs at each time-point is given in Table 5.1 in the Results section.

"National attachment"

Based on Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) and Lilli and Diehl (1999), six items were used to tap attachment to Britain (five-point Likert scale: 1 = "Strongly disagree" - 5 = Strongly agree"): "I am proud to be British", "Being British is an important part of my identity", "Being British is important to me because it makes me feel different from other people", "I would rather be a citizen of Britain than of any other country in the world", and "In a sense I am emotionally attached to Britain and emotionally affected by its actions". Principal component analyses indicated two factors, which were related to the theoretical distinction that has been made between nationalism and patriotism. A composite variable of each of these constructs was therefore created for each time-point, with higher scores on these scales indicating higher nationalistic and patriotic beliefs.

"Internationalism"

Based on Holsti (1996) the degree to which an individual favours involvement in international affairs was assessed by two items (five-point Likert scale: 1 = "Strongly disagree" - 5 = Strongly agree"): "International co-operation should be encouraged to solve common problems, such as world hunger or world peace" and "Britain shouldn't worry about world affairs but concentrate on taking care of problems at home" (reversed scoring). A composite variable of "internationalism" was created from these two variables for each time point, with higher scores indicating stronger support for international involvement.

"Militarism"

In line with Holsti (1996) and Chittick and colleagues (1995), a militaristic or assertive position towards foreign affairs was examined by two items (five-point Likert scale: 1 = "Strongly disagree" - 5 = Strongly agree"): "In dealing with other nations, our government should be strong and tough" and "The best way to ensure
peace is to negotiate with other nations” (reversed scoring). A composite variable of “militarism” with high internal consistency was created from these two items for each time point, with higher scores indicating a greater belief in assertive foreign policy actions.

"Multi-lateralism"
Following Chittick and colleagues (1995, 2001), attitudes towards multi-lateral international ventures were assessed by two items (five-point Likert scale: 1 = “Strongly disagree” – 5 = Strongly agree”): “To make a change in the world, Britain needs to work together with international organisations, such as the UN or NATO” and “Britain’s power in the world is diminished by working together with other nations” (reversed scoring). For each time point, the internal consistency of these two items was high, and a “multi-lateralism” scale was created from them. Higher scores on these items indicate a greater willingness to co-operate internationally.

"Support for Sierra Leone"
Support for the mission in Sierra Leone was assessed by two items (five-point Likert scale: 1 = “Strongly disagree” – 5 = Strongly agree”): “The decision to participate in the UN mission in Sierra Leone was a good one” and “I approve of British troops being used to bring peace to Sierra Leone”. The internal consistency of the support for Sierra Leone scale was high for each time-point.

"Demographics"
The interview questionnaire also contained several demographic variables that were assessed at T1. These included gender, age, and highest education level achieved (Degree, including PhD; A-level or equivalent; O-level or equivalent; No qualifications; Other). Using the Standard Occupational Classification 2000 (SOC2000; Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, 2000), occupations were classified into nine major categories as outlined in Chapter 4. Also included were questions regarding the presence of children (Yes/No), and the newspaper most frequently read (The Daily Telegraph, The Guardian, The Independent, The Times,
The Financial Times, The Daily Mail, The Sun, The Daily Express, The Mirror, Daily Star and Other). Three questions about a military background were also included, with responses being made in a Yes-No format: "Have you ever served in the Armed Forces?", "During the last 30 years has someone from your family served in the Armed Forces?", and "Do you have friends serving in the Armed Forces?". Finally, participants were asked their political party affiliation (Labour, Liberal, Conservative, and Other) and their political ideology concerning foreign policy issues (1= very liberal to 5 = very conservative).

Analysis

The models tested in this model were estimated with structural equation modelling using Maximum Likelihood Estimation based on a covariance matrix in LISREL 8.52 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2002). The reliabilities of the respective scales were used in this study as indicators for the constructs instead of using all of a scale's items. As already discussed in the previous chapter, this was done because estimating a model with latent variables that have fewer than three indicators can lead to problems of underestimation (cf. Hayduk, 1996). Furthermore, in order to adjust for measurement error, the paths from the latent variables to their indicators were set to one, whilst the error variance for each scale was set to one minus the reliability times the observed variance of the scale (see Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1996).

The data were screened for outliers and missing values. 10 missing values were identified, which were substituted by the mean following the guidelines of du Toit and du Toit (2001). Using PRELIS 2.5, the univariate and multivariate properties of the data were then explored, which indicated that the distribution of the variables in this study was multivariate normal with univariate skewness values ranging from -1.113 to 1.232 and kurtosis values ranging from -1.138 to 1.321. Mardia's statistics of multivariate normality was PK = 1.04, which also indicated that the assumption of multivariate normality was tenable.\(^5\)

\(^5\) Kline (1998) recommenced absolute value cut-offs of 3.0 for skewness and 8.0 for kurtosis. Whilst there is no standard cut-off for multivariate normality, Kline suggests that multivariate normality can be assumed if this value is less than 3.
RESULTS

The results are divided into four sections. Firstly, attitudes towards the mission in Sierra Leone were explored in general descriptive terms (percentages), followed by analyses that examined the stability of the constructs in the model over time. Structural equation models of attitudes towards Sierra Leone were then estimated for each time-point, and since each time-point was treated as a group, the stability of this solution was assessed using multi-group modelling. Finally, to examine the direction of causality within the hierarchical model, a three-wave panel analysis was conducted to assess the inter-relationships between attitudes towards Sierra Leone and their determinants.

Attitudes towards Sierra Leone

Just over half the respondents (53%) strongly agreed or agreed that “the decision to participate in the UN mission in Sierra Leone was a good one. A similar percentage of respondents (55%) also strongly agreed or agreed with the statement: “I approve of British troops being used to bring peace to Sierra Leone”.

Interesting differences emerged when attitudes towards Sierra Leone were assessed across the three time-points. At T1, 49% of respondents strongly agreed or agreed that participating in the UN mission in Sierra Leone was a good decision. 57% agreed with this statement at T2, when British soldiers had been taken hostage, whilst 54% agreed with this statement at T3, when a British soldier had been killed in Sierra Leone. Similarly, 50% of respondents strongly agreed or agreed that they approved with British troops being used to bring peace to Sierra Leone at T1. 59% agreed with this statement at T2, whilst 55% agreed with it at T3.

Mean stability and change

The previous analyses indicated some variability in attitudes towards Sierra Leone over time. The analyses in this section were therefore concerned with assessing the stability of the constructs across the three time-points.
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to determine whether there were any significant time differences in attitudes towards Sierra Leone, postures or core values. The results indicated a significant time effect only for attitudes towards Sierra Leone (Wilks' $\Lambda = .64$, $F(2,538) = 12.68$, $p = .01$). The first three columns in Table 5.1 indicate the means of the constructs for each time-point, whilst the last three columns consist of the results of an analysis of change in means using repeated measures t-tests. A value of $>1.96$ is statistically significant ($p < .05$). The t-tests indicated a significant increase of support for Sierra Leone between T1 and T2, and a significant decrease in support between T2 and T3. The change between T1 and T3 was also significant. By contrast, no such significant time differences were found for the three postures or core values.

The test-retest correlations (three columns in the centre of Table 5.1) show that the constructs have good test-retest reliabilities, ranging from .62 to .77, which indicates that the measured attitudes were relatively insensitive to change. However, the test-retest correlations for attitudes towards Sierra Leone were low (ranging from .41 to .44). Thus, the test-retest correlations for the three postures, nationalism and patriotism were higher than those for attitudes towards Sierra Leone, which suggests that postures and core values were more stable over time than were attitudes towards Sierra Leone.

Table 5.1. Means, standard deviations, reliabilities, stabilities and mean changes (N = 80)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>T1</th>
<th>T2</th>
<th>T3</th>
<th>$r_{T1-T2}$</th>
<th>$r_{T2-T3}$</th>
<th>$r_{T1-T3}$</th>
<th>$t_{T1-T2}$</th>
<th>$t_{T2-T3}$</th>
<th>$t_{T1-T3}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>-4.19</td>
<td>-2.01</td>
<td>-3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha$</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internationalism</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>3.79</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^{52}$ One traditional approach for dealing with multiple comparisons is the Bonferroni correction. Instead of using $p < 0.05$ as the criterion to reject the null hypothesis, the significance value is divided by the number of outcomes assessed. The principal problem with this type of correction is an increased risk of Type II error, i.e. reporting no significant differences when reliable effects in fact exist. A better solution in exploratory analyses, such as the ones reported in this study, is to recognise that multiple measures will increase the risk of Type I error (i.e. reporting significant differences when there are none) and to treat any unpredicted findings from the study as preliminary until confirmed in further studies.
Chapter 5 An alternative view?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>T1</th>
<th>T2</th>
<th>T3</th>
<th>r_{T1\rightarrow T2}</th>
<th>r_{T2\rightarrow T3}</th>
<th>r_{T1\rightarrow T3}</th>
<th>t_{T1\rightarrow T2}</th>
<th>t_{T2\rightarrow T3}</th>
<th>t_{T1\rightarrow T3}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>α</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarism</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>α</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-lateralism</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>α</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|          |     |     |     |                       |                       |                       |                    |                    |                    |
| Nationalism | 2.91| 2.92| 2.90| 0.74                  | 0.71                  | 0.77                  | 0.81               | 0.83               | 0.80               |
| SD       | 0.91| 0.90| 0.90|                       |                       |                       |                    |                    |                    |
| α        | 0.85| 0.87| 0.87|                       |                       |                       |                    |                    |                    |
| Patriotism | 3.89| 3.90| 3.90| 0.73                  | 0.75                  | 0.74                  | 0.83               | 0.85               | 0.90               |
| SD       | 0.74| 0.81| 0.79|                       |                       |                       |                    |                    |                    |
| α        | 0.91| 0.90| 0.91|                       |                       |                       |                    |                    |                    |

Note: Significant values at p < 0.05 are in bold

Structural equation modelling – Temporal models

An empirical hierarchical model linking the proposed determinants and attitudes towards Sierra Leone was developed in three steps using LISREL 8.52 (covariance matrix) with maximum likelihood estimation. First, significant antecedents were identified by means of the T1 survey. Applying it to the T2 and T3 data, the reliability of this solution was then tested. Finally, the temporal stability of the final model was tested by means of a multiple group SEM in which each time-point was treated as a group.

Structural model at T1

The hierarchical structural model relating attitudes towards Sierra Leone to foreign policy postures, nationalism, patriotism and demographic variables at T1 is shown in Figure 5.3. The fit indices suggest a good overall fit ($\chi^2 = 8.01; \text{df} = 10, p = .24; \text{GFI} = .983; \text{AGFI} = .980; \text{RMSEA} = .041$), thus confirming that the suggested structural relationships provided a good representation of the data.$^5^3$

$^5^3$ As in the previous chapter, two alternative models were also estimated. The first alternative model included the same parameters as the hierarchical model, but also included direct effects from core values to attitudes towards Sierra Leone as well as direct effects from the demographic variables to the three postures and attitudes towards Sierra Leone. This model fit the data well ($\chi^2 = 1.32; \text{df} = 1, p = .11; \text{GFI} = .992; \text{AGFI} = .990; \text{RMSEA} = .02$). However, as in the previous chapter, this model did not fit significantly better than the hierarchical model ($\Delta \chi^2 = 7.31, \text{df} = 9, p = .060$), and the more
Figure 5.3. Structural hierarchical model at T1

![Diagram showing the structural hierarchical model at T1](image)

Note: Paths are standardised coefficients. Significant paths are in bold. R² values are indicated in parenthesis.

Structural models at T2 and T3

The hierarchical model shown in Figure 5.3 was then applied to T2 data and the same pattern was replicated (see Figure 5.4). The same was true when it was applied to T3 data (see Figure 5.5). Both models provided a good fit of the data (T2: \( \chi^2 = 8.67; \text{df} = 10, p = .23; \text{GFI} = .979; \text{AGFI} = .978; \text{RMSEA} = .045 \); and T3: \( \chi^2 = 7.95; \text{df} = 10, p = .26; \text{GFI} = .982; \text{AGFI} = .979; \text{RMSEA} = .043 \), respectively).

A parsimonious hierarchical model was therefore retained. Similarly, a second alternative model in which core values and postures were situated at the same level of abstraction was also estimated. However, this model provided a poor fit of the data (\( \chi^2 = 29.8; \text{df} = 22, p = .004; \text{GFI} = .612; \text{AGFI} = .608; \text{RMSEA} = .16 \)). Overall, these findings confirm those of the previous chapter that attitudes towards Sierra Leone are determined by foreign policy postures, which in turn are influenced by core values.
Figure 5.4. Structural hierarchical model at T2

![Diagram of structural hierarchical model at T2]

Note: Paths are standardised coefficients. Significant paths are in bold. $R^2$ values are indicated in parenthesis.

Figure 5.5. Structural hierarchical model at T3

![Diagram of structural hierarchical model at T3]

Note: Paths are standardised coefficients. Significant paths are in bold. $R^2$ values are indicated in parenthesis.
Following Bollen (1989), the stability of the solution was then assessed by estimating and comparing a number of nested models with multiple group structural equation models and treating each wave as a group. These multi-group analyses consisted of five steps. In step 1, structural parameters were constrained to be equal at all time-points. This model was then gradually relaxed in the following steps, with each step's change in model fit being compared to the model in step 1. In step 2, factor loadings of the latent variables were allowed to vary over time. This step did not significantly change the goodness of fit (see Table 5.2). The model in step 1 was therefore retained, and it was concluded that these effects were equal over time.

Table 5.2. Multi-group analysis of temporal stability of the influence of determinants on mission support (N = 80 *3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>Df</th>
<th>$\Delta \chi^2$</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 – Parameters equal</td>
<td>57.41</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 – Factor loadings of latent variables freed</td>
<td>53.10</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>4.31</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 – Correlations freed</td>
<td>51.62</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>5.79</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 – Structural paths freed</td>
<td>54.08</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 – Residual variances freed</td>
<td>57.21</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The correlations among the independent variables (step 3), the paths from core values to postures, and from postures to attitudes towards Sierra Leone (step 4), and the structural equation's residual variance (step 5) were then allowed to vary over time. As shown in Table 5.2, none of the steps produced a significant change in $\chi^2$. The constrained model in step 1 was therefore retained, and it was concluded that the relationships between attitudes towards Sierra Leone and their antecedents, as well as the relationships between the determinants, were characterised by temporal stability.

Panel analysis

Whilst the previous analysis has shown that the relationships were temporally stable at a cross-sectional level, the analyses in this section not only control for the
temporal stability of the constructs but also for possible cross-lagged effects between attitudes towards Sierra Leone and their antecedents. To do this, the three data sets were combined in a three-wave panel analysis of the relationship between attitudes towards Sierra Leone and their cross-sectional determinants. According to Finkel (1995), cross-lagged effects models typically provide strong indication of the causal direction among variables.

It is customary in panel analysis to allow unique error variances of the same constructs measured at different times to correlate (e.g. Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993). This is because of the potential effects of memory or other re-test effects (Jöreskog, 2002). However, errors of constructs measured at the same time point are still assumed to be uncorrelated, as are the equation errors (e.g. Maruyama, 1998).

The basic model tested here included the cross-sectional paths from nationalism and patriotism to postures, and from postures to attitudes towards Sierra Leone as well as the first-order stabilities, i.e. the effects of a variable measured at T_, on itself at T_{n+1}. This model did not fit the data ($\chi^2 = 138.15$, df = 75, $p = .012$, GFI = .671, AGFI = .670, RMSEA = .33).

It was then checked whether the cross-sectional as well as the longitudinal paths from national attachment and postures to attitudes towards Sierra Leone or their stabilities differed between T_2 and T_3. Restricting these paths (e.g. paths “a”, “b” and “c” in the conceptual model, Figure 5.1) to be equal led to an insignificant increase in $\chi^2$ ($\Delta\chi^2 = 3.53$, df = 12, $p = .37$), which favours the restricted model.

The possibility that any of the equation errors were serially correlated within the model was then assessed. Allowing any of the equation errors in the model to correlate did not significantly change $\chi^2$ ($\Delta\chi^2 = 1.13$, df = 15, $p = .25$), and the uncorrelated error term restriction was therefore retained.

The possibility that equation errors within the same time-point were correlated was assessed. Allowing equation errors to correlate for each time-point did not lead to a significant change in $\chi^2$ ($\Delta\chi^2 = 0.92$, df = 11, $p = .28$), and the uncorrelated error term restriction was retained.
Possible cross-lagged effects between core values and postures were then assessed. Several cross-lagged effects were identified (see Table 5.3). Nationalism at T1 significantly influenced internationalism and militarism at T2, whilst nationalism at T2 significantly influenced internationalism and militarism at T3 (paths “g” in the conceptual model). Nationalism did not significantly affect multi-lateralism at subsequent time-points. Similarly, none of the paths in the reverse direction were significant (paths “f” in the conceptual model). Addition of these paths to the model led to an overall significant decrease in $\chi^2$ ($\Delta \chi^2 = 25.95, \text{df} = 4$), whilst restricting these cross-lagged paths to be equal led to an insignificant increase in $\chi^2$ ($\Delta \chi^2 = 0.79, \text{df} = 4$). Overall, the model showed an acceptable fit of the data after these paths were included ($\chi^2 = 110.52, \text{df} = 59, p = .033, \text{GFI} = .874, \text{AGFI} = .873, \text{RMSEA} = .081$).

By contrast, patriotism at T1 significantly influenced internationalism, militarism and multi-lateralism T2, whilst patriotism at T2 significantly influenced internationalism, militarism and multi-lateralism at T3 (paths “g” in the conceptual model). None of the paths in the reverse direction were significant (paths “f” in the conceptual model). Addition of these paths to the model led to an overall significant decrease in $\chi^2$ ($\Delta \chi^2 = 29.19, \text{df} = 6$), whilst restricting these cross-lagged paths to be equal led to an insignificant increase in $\chi^2$ ($\Delta \chi^2 = 0.79, \text{df} = 6$). Adding these paths to the model produced a good fit to the data, $\chi^2 = 82.22, \text{df} = 59, p = .041, \text{GFI} = .911, \text{AGFI} = .911, \text{RMSEA} = .063$.

Table 5.3. Differences in $\chi^2$ tests associated with estimating cross-lagged effects between core values and postures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>$\Delta \chi^2$</th>
<th>$\Delta \text{df}$</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic model</td>
<td>139.63</td>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-lagged effects: Nationalism – Postures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism T1 – Internationalism T2</td>
<td>134.07</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism T2 – Internationalism T3</td>
<td>128.02</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>6.05</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism T1 – Militarism T2</td>
<td>120.91</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>7.11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism T2 – Militarism T3</td>
<td>113.68</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>7.23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism T1 – Multi-lateralism T2</td>
<td>111.76</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism T2 – Multi-lateralism T3</td>
<td>109.73</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step</td>
<td>( \chi^2 )</td>
<td>df</td>
<td>( \Delta \chi^2 )</td>
<td>( \Delta df )</td>
<td>p</td>
</tr>
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<td>-----------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Significant cross-lagged effects of nationalism equated</td>
<td>110.52</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cross-lagged effects: Patriotism – Postures</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotism T1 – Internationalism T2</td>
<td>105.49</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>5.03</td>
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<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotism T2 – Internationalism T3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Patriotism T1 – Militarism T2</td>
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<td>56</td>
<td>4.31</td>
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<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotism T2 – Militarism T3</td>
<td>90.95</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>4.22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotism T1 – Multi-lateralism T2</td>
<td>85.97</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>4.98</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotism T2 – Multi-lateralism T3</td>
<td>81.33</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant cross-lagged paths restricted to be equal</td>
<td>82.22</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cross-lagged effects: Postures – Nationalism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internationalism T1 – Nationalism T2</td>
<td>82.01</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internationalism T2 – Nationalism T3</td>
<td>81.48</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarism T1 – Nationalism T2</td>
<td>81.35</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarism T2 – Nationalism T3</td>
<td>81.15</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-lateralism T1 – Nationalism T2</td>
<td>80.83</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-lateralism T2 – Nationalism 3</td>
<td>80.56</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cross-lagged effects: Postures – Patriotism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internationalism T1 – Patriotism T2</td>
<td>79.78</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internationalism T2 – Patriotism T3</td>
<td>79.15</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarism T1 – Patriotism T2</td>
<td>78.79</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarism T2 – Patriotism T3</td>
<td>78.58</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-lateralism T1 – Patriotism T2</td>
<td>78.14</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-lateralism T2 – Patriotism T3</td>
<td>77.75</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Exploring potential cross-lagged effects between the three postures and attitudes towards Sierra Leone showed that internationalism and multi-lateralism but not militarism at T1 significantly influenced attitudes towards Sierra Leone at T2, whilst
internationalism and multi-lateralism but not militarism at T2 significantly affected attitudes towards Sierra Leone at T3 (paths “e” in the conceptual model, see Table 5.4). Including these paths in the model led to a significant drop in $\chi^2$ ($\Delta \chi^2 = 22.22$, df = 4), whilst restricting these cross-lagged paths to be equal led to an insignificant increase in $\chi^2$ ($\Delta \chi^2 = 0.43$, df = 4). After adding these paths the model produced a good fit to the data, $\chi^2 = 55.84$, df = 45, p = .048, GFI = .971, AGFI = .971, RMSEA = .032.

Table 5.4. Differences in $\chi^2$ tests associated with estimating cross-lagged effects between postures and Sierra Leone

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>$\Delta \chi^2$</th>
<th>Adf</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model (carried over)</td>
<td>77.75</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-lagged effects: Postures – Sierra Leone</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internationalism T1 – Sierra Leone T2</td>
<td>71.99</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>5.76</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internationalism T2 – Sierra Leone T3</td>
<td>66.48</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>5.51</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarism T1 – Sierra Leone T2</td>
<td>65.59</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarism T2 – Sierra Leone T3</td>
<td>65.36</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-lateralism T1 – Sierra Leone T2</td>
<td>60.44</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>4.92</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-lateralism T2 – Sierra Leone T3</td>
<td>55.41</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>5.03</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant cross-lagged effects of postures equated</td>
<td>55.84</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-lagged effects: Sierra Leone – Postures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone T1 – Internationalism T2</td>
<td>49.81</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>6.03</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone T2 – Internationalism T3</td>
<td>43.77</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>6.04</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone T1 – Militarism T2</td>
<td>42.46</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone T2 – Militarism T3</td>
<td>41.34</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone T1 – Multi-lateralism T2</td>
<td>40.36</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone T2 – Multi-lateralism T3</td>
<td>39.55</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant cross-lagged paths restricted to be equal</td>
<td>40.15</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Finally, possible significant cross-lagged effects between attitudes towards Sierra Leone and their determinants were then explored (see Table 5.4). Two significant cross-lagged effects originating in attitudes towards Sierra Leone were identified. When everything else was accounted for, attitudes towards Sierra Leone at T1 significantly influenced internationalism at T2, and attitudes towards Sierra Leone at T2 significantly influenced internationalism at T3 (paths “d” in the conceptual model). Adding these two paths to the model led to a significant overall drop in χ^2 (Δχ^2 = 12.07, df = 2), whilst restricting these two cross-lagged paths to be equal led to an insignificant increase in χ^2 (Δχ^2 = 0.6, df = 2). These final changes produced a model that fit the data well, χ^2 = 40.15, df = 41, p = .19, GFI = .993, AGFI = .993, RMSEA = .030. Whilst these two cross-lagged effects were significant, a model in which these paths were not included also fit the data well: χ^2 = 52.27, df = 41, p = .048, GFI = .987, AGFI = .986, RMSEA = .043.

The final model is shown in Figure 5.6. For ease of interpretation the first-order stabilities and demographic data were omitted from the figure. However, demographic variables were included in the estimation to remove some of the most likely sources of spurious associations between the constructs in the model.

**DISCUSSION**

In this study, two models of attitudes towards international policies were investigated that yielded different expectations regarding the source of stability of attitudes towards Sierra Leone. According to the top-down model, attitudes towards Sierra Leone should be influenced by more general principles, such as postures and core values. As a result of their greater centrality within an individual’s belief system, postures and core values should be more stable than specific policy attitudes (Converse, 1964; Sears, 1983). More importantly, they should also be an important source of stability of specific attitudes (Peffley & Hurwitz, 1993). By contrast, the bottom-up model predicts that such specific attitudes should influence more general principles.
Figure 5.6. Cross-lagged effects of support for Sierra Leone, 3-wave panel model (N = 80)

Note: Correlated error terms are not shown. $R^2$ values are indicated in parenthesis.
Overall, the results in this study are more supportive of a top-down hierarchical model than a bottom-up one. Firstly, core values and postures had stronger test-retest correlations over time than did specific attitudes towards Sierra Leone, which suggests a greater stability over time and greater resistance to change. However, zero-order test-retest correlations are not pure measures of attitude stability (e.g. Alwin, 1989; cited in Krosnick, 1991) since these correlations reflect not only the amount of attitude change at a given time but also the amount of random measurement error.

Secondly, high attitudinal stability was also revealed across the cross-sectional structural equation models estimated for each time-point. Not only was the structure similar to that reported in the previous study, but the models across the three time-points were also identical in structure. Across the three models, attitudes towards Sierra Leone were directly influenced by the three postures, which, in turn, were influenced by nationalism and patriotism. Indeed, further analysis using multi-group modelling indicated that the estimated relationships between attitudes towards Sierra Leone and their determinants, as well as the relationships between these antecedents, were characterised by significant temporal stability.

However, the most supportive evidence for the top-down model was found when the three individual surveys were combined in a panel analysis. This analysis indicated that the constructs in the model were found to be stable over time (paths “a”, “b” and “c” in the conceptual model, see Table 5.3 and Figure 5.7)

The analysis of cross-lagged effects indicated that nationalism at one time-point significantly influenced internationalism and militarism at the subsequent time-point (path “g” in the conceptual model). Similarly, patriotism at one time-point significantly affected all three postures at the subsequent time-point. No such significant cross-lagged effects were found for the reverse, bottom-up influences of postures on nationalism and patriotism (path “f” in the conceptual model).
A similar dynamic was also found regarding two of the three postures. As predicted by the top-down model, the effects of internationalism and multi-lateralism at T1 on attitudes towards Sierra Leone at T2 were positive and significant (.33 and .22, respectively; path "e" in the conceptual model), as were the effects of internationalism and multi-lateralism at T2 on attitudes towards Sierra Leone at T3 (.37 & .24, respectively). In line with the top-down model of foreign policy attitudes, much of the over-time consistency in support for Sierra Leone was therefore due to prior postures, whilst prior levels of core values were, in turn, a major source of consistency in attitudes at the postural level.

However, the cross-lagged effects in this study provided evidence for one significant bottom-up relationship, which indicates that at least some of the assumed stable determinants adjust to attitudes towards Sierra Leone. The significant positive paths from attitudes towards Sierra Leone at one time-point to internationalism at the next time-point (path "d" in the conceptual model) suggest that the more respondents
supported the mission in Sierra Leone, the more likely they were to become more internationally-oriented in their foreign policy beliefs in the future.

Thus, internationalism shaped attitudes towards Sierra Leone, whilst attitudes towards Sierra Leone also shaped internationalism. However, the results indicate that the former effects were the more dominant ones. Indeed, a model in which these two significant paths were omitted also fit the data well, which further suggests that the significance of these paths in the model is peripheral.

Overall, there is therefore some tentative evidence that specific attitudes may shape attitudes at the postural level, a finding that is contrary to Peffley and Hurwitz (1993). This discrepancy in findings could be due to the different international environments at the time of sampling. Peffley and Hurwitz carried out their study when the international environment was relatively stable, whilst the present research was conducted when the target political situation was in a state of flux. Indeed, results indicated a significant change in attitudes towards the Sierra Leone mission, with mission support being lowest at T1, highest at T2 and in-between at T3.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, in line with Peffley and Hurwitz (1993) and their earlier formulations (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987, 1990), international attitudes - exemplified by attitudes towards Sierra Leone in the present study - are best accounted for by a hierarchical, top-down structure. However, unlike Peffley and Hurwitz (1993), this study also found some possible evidence for a bottom-up influence of specific issues on postures, as argued for by Nincic (1992) and others. It therefore appears that constructs at the postural level are the product mainly of top-down (theory-driven) processes, with some potential secondary bottom-up (data-driven) influences.
CHAPTER 6
THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE
THE CASE OF THE ERRF

This chapter continues the exploration of the hierarchical structure by assessing the potential effects of knowledge on the relationships within the model. Several studies (e.g. Converse, 1964; Fiske, Kinder & Larter, 1983; Zaller, 1992) have suggested that individuals with greater political knowledge have attitudes that are more stable than have individuals with less political expertise. Although the hierarchical model argues that most individuals utilise core values and postures to form specific policy attitudes (see Chapter 2), an alternative view is that the influence of core values and postures on specific attitudes is itself a function of political expertise. These competing theories have rarely been tested, and one of the aims of this study was to explore this issue using multi-group structural equation analyses.

Another aim of this study was to extend the core value analysis. The previous two chapters have highlighted the importance of nationalism and patriotism, which directly influenced postures, and through them attitudes towards Sierra Leone. As discussed in Chapter 2, numerous political-psychological studies have argued that, like nationalism and patriotism, trust is a stable orientation that may serve as a basis for forming other evaluations (e.g. Popkin & Dimock, 2000; Uslaner, 2002). The

6.1 In this research, the terms “political knowledge”, “political information”, “political awareness” and “political expertise” are used interchangeably. According to Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996, p.10), political knowledge is “the range of factual information about politics that is stored in long-term memory”. Political knowledge is often distinguished from expertise, which refers to “especially good performance in some domain” (Krosnick, 1990, p.3), unless the performance domain is restricted to the retrieval of factual political information from long-term memory.
assessment of the effects of trust on attitudes towards peace operations was therefore also of interest.

Political knowledge

According to Zaller (1992, p. 125), "political awareness deserves to rank alongside party identification and ideology as one of the central constructs of the public opinion field". A large body of research indicates a strong relationship between knowledge and the processing of new information (e.g. Patterson, 1980, Price and Zaller, 1990, 1993), in that more knowledgeable individuals think about politics differently than the less informed (e.g. Fiske & Kinder, 1981, Judd & Downing, 1990; Judd, Milbum & Krosnick, 1981). Informed individuals identify larger, meaningful patterns in information, encode information in more abstract ways, and process information in a deeper, more analytical fashion (Krosnick, 1990).

As discussed in Chapter 2, there is a debate in the literature as to whether or not the hierarchical model posited by Hurwitz and Peffley is influenced by political knowledge. According to Hurwitz and Peffley (1987, 1990), most individuals use core values and postures to inform their policy judgements. Specifically, they argue that such general assumptions are so widely recognised and understood that everybody uses them to form specific opinions (see also Feldman, 1988).

However, it has also been argued that individuals must be at least somewhat informed to translate broader beliefs into specific policy preferences (e.g. Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Juhasz, 2000; Zaller, 1992). The most extreme position was taken by Zaller (1991, 1992), who has argued that the more politically aware or knowledgeable individuals are, the more their specific policy attitudes depend on core values. Zaller (1992) suggested that individuals have so many different temporary constructions of opinions, which reflect the different considerations that are salient at different times. As a result, only the well-informed are able to consistently constrain their attitudes in accordance with organised and integrated sets of beliefs (see also Lau & Redlawsk, 2001). A similar claim was also made by Converse (1964), who argued that the level of consistency in a person's belief system is largely a function of the information that individual possesses.
There is some empirical support for this claim. Using ideological self-identification as a proxy measure for core values, Zaller (1992) found that political awareness promoted the use of core values and that the specific issue preferences of the less informed were unconstrained by such orientations (see Goren, 2001b for a discussion of the methodology).

Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) also suggested that an individual's reliance on core values becomes stronger as political knowledge increases. They found that high political knowledge led to greater attitude stability over time and to higher levels of internal consistency amongst specific issue attitudes. Similarly, McCann (1997) reported that respondents who expressed great interest in the presidential election or had a college degree espoused values that were markedly more consistent than those of less interested or less educated respondents.

Although several studies have investigated the impact of political knowledge on deductive reasoning (e.g. Bartels, 1996; Kuklinski, Metlay & Kay, 1982; Pollock, Lilie & Vittes, 1993; Sears, Huddie & Schaffer, 1986; Sniderman, Brody & Tetlock, 1991), only two studies have compared these two competing explanations and reported empirical support for each. Using regression analysis, Goren (2001a) analysed 1986 and 1992 National Election Study (NES) surveys on social welfare issues that included several core values, such as economic individualism and moral conservatism, as well as a political quiz. He found that political knowledge strengthened the relationship between core values and a variety of policy preferences, such as affirmative action and gay rights. Although the performance of uninformed respondents did not match that of the informed, Goren also reported that a lack of political knowledge did not preclude deductive reasoning.

Goren (2001a) therefore concluded that Zaller and others correctly assume that knowledge enhances the use of core values, but they incorrectly predict that uninformed individuals do not reason deductively. Similarly, whilst the hierarchical model correctly assumes that most individuals rely on core values to inform their judgements about specific issues, it incorrectly predicts that the impact of core values on policy judgements is constant for most individuals.
The issue was addressed again by Goren in a later study. Exploring the effect of political knowledge on welfare and foreign policy issues, Goren (2004) found that individuals relied on core beliefs in the social welfare domain and the foreign policy domain regardless of their level of political expertise. He thus concluded that individuals rely equally on domain-specific core values when taking positions on many specific issues.

Thus, the empirical evidence as to whether or not the relationship between core values and specific attitudes is a function of political knowledge remains largely equivocal. However, according to Goren (2001b, p.20), "if only the politically sophisticated deduce issue attitudes from core principles, then the segment of the public capable of rendering meaningful and politically consequential issue attitudes is seriously diminished." It was therefore one of the aims of this study to examine the role political knowledge plays in moderating attitudes towards a contemporary British foreign policy issues, namely the implementation of the ERRF, in the hierarchical model.

**Political and social trust**

As outlined in Chapter 3, besides nationalism and patriotism, there are theoretical and empirical reasons for examining two other core values, namely social trust and political trust. To recap from Chapter 3, social trust has been defined as a generalised belief that one can trust strangers (Uslaner, 2002), whilst political trust has been referred to as a belief that the government does what is right (e.g. Miller & Listhaug, 1990). Although social and political trust are related, they are differentially related to foreign policy postures and specific policy issues.

**Social trust and foreign policy postures**

Beliefs about human nature have been examined in a variety of contexts, and several studies have suggested a relationship between social trust, also referred to as interpersonal trust or generalised trust in others, and foreign policy attitudes (e.g. Bartels, 1994; Conover & Feldman, 1984; Popkin & Dimock, 2000; Sniderman &
Citrin, 1971). Yet, only a few studies have explored in detail the link between interpersonal trust and international attitudes.

According to Putnam (1993, p. 180), interpersonal trust is important in the study of political attitudes because it "lubricates cooperation". A similar link between social trust and internationalism was made by Uslaner (2002, p. 215), who argued that individuals with high levels of social trust should be more likely to endorse international involvement because "people with faith in others are more likely to cooperate with others because they do not see their interests as incompatible with those of others". Similarly, Popkin and Dimock (2000, p. 225) observed that interpersonal trust should be related to "beliefs about the likelihood of international cooperation".

On the basis of these observations, Brewer and Steenbergen (2002) suggested that social trust should be related to internationalism in general and co-operative internationalism in particular. Based on Hurwitz and Peffley (1987), Brewer and Steenbergen (2002) argued that individuals would use cognitive shortcuts in lieu of factual information (see also Nincic, 1992), and proposed that individuals would turn to their beliefs about human nature when making judgements of foreign policy issues. More specifically, they suggested that in place of specific knowledge, individuals would translate their general trust in the people around them into specific trust in international actors.

Individuals who trust others may therefore assume that foreign nations and their leaders have good intentions, and, consequently, may conclude that international cooperation and intervention will lead to positive results. By contrast, individuals who are cynical about human nature may infer that foreign nations and their leaders cannot be trusted, and, consequently, may conclude that one's country should not be involved in solving other people's problems.

Using 1996 and 1998 American National Election Studies data, Brewer and Steenbergen (2002) found that individuals with a cynical view of human nature were indeed more likely to endorse isolationism than were respondents who were trusting of human nature. A similar effect was found regarding co-operative internationalism.
Chapter 6  The impact of political knowledge

(e.g. support for humanitarian aid or financial assistance). Cynical individuals were less likely than their trusting counterparts to support policies of co-operative internationalism. However, contrary to Bartels (1994), social trust was unrelated to a measure of militarism, and only weakly and non-robustly related to militaristic policy issues, which showed a greater relationship with trust in the government.

Brewer and Steenbergen (2002) thus concluded that beliefs about human nature are potent predictors of foreign policy attitudes, albeit only in certain domains. Interpersonal trust had the greatest influence in decisions of whether or not to get involved with other nations (internationalism), whilst it failed to show such a relationship with the decision of the how to get involved (militarism).

Both Bartels (1994) and Brewer and Steenbergen (2002) found a strong relationship between foreign policy postures and trust in others. However, in both studies, foreign policy postures were outcome variables and assessed by agreement with foreign policy issues that were conceptually related to these postures. The question thus arises whether this relationship would still hold when interpersonal trust, foreign policy postures and attitudes towards a foreign policy issue were assessed in a hierarchical model.

The effects of social trust in a hierarchical model were recently explored by Brewer & Gross (2003), who found that social trust did not directly affect specific policies towards giving humanitarian aid or the use of force against Iraq. Rather, it exerted its influence indirectly through international trust and a general measure of internationalism. However, when the total effects were considered, social trust significantly and positively affected willingness to give humanitarian aid but had no significant total effect on the willingness to use force in Iraq. These findings thus replicate those of Brewer and Steenbergen that social trust is a potent predictor of foreign policy attitudes, albeit only in certain domains.

Although previous studies have assessed the influence of interpersonal trust on two of the postures, namely internationalism and militarism, no study has so far explored its relationship with multi-lateralism. One aim of this study was therefore to fill this empirical gap. Furthermore, none of the above studies have investigated the effect of
knowledge on the link between social trust and foreign policy attitudes. Indeed, Brewer and Steenbergen (2002) speculated that the effects of social trust on foreign policy opinions may depend in part on the information individuals receive. In lieu of investigating the overall impact of knowledge on the hierarchical model, this study also explored the potential moderating effects of political information on this relationship.

**Political trust and foreign policy postures**

Similar to social trust, political trust has been related to political attitudes and behaviour in a variety of contexts (for a review see Levi & Stoker, 2000), including the foreign policy domain (e.g. Popkin & Dimock, 2000). However, its role in shaping foreign policy dimensions has remained largely unexplored.

According to Popkin and Dimock (2000), individuals use political trust for judging whether they favour internationalism or isolationism. Compared to the politically distrustful, politically trusting individuals are said to be more confident that the government can act effectively in international affairs. Consequently, such individuals should be more willing to see the government involve itself with other nations’ problems, both co-operatively and militarily.

Although the effects of political trust on co-operative internationalism or militarism were not directly assessed by Brewer and Steenbergen (2002), they found that political trust was positively related to attitudes towards defence spending and warm feelings towards the military.

In a study by Brewer and Gross (2003), political trust did not directly affect foreign policy issues. Rather, its influence was indirect through international trust and a general measure of internationalism. However, an examination of the total effects showed that political trust significantly and positively affected both willingness to use force in Iraq and, to a lesser extent, willingness to give humanitarian aid.

Overall, these findings are in line with Popkin and Dimock’s (2000) argument that politically trusting individuals are more likely to favour both co-operative and
militaristic foreign policies than are their politically cynical counterparts. However, as in the case of social trust, the effect of political trust on multi-lateralism still remained to be examined. Similarly, the impact of knowledge on the relationship between political trust and specific policy attitudes needed to be explored.

The context – The European Rapid Reaction Force and its implementation

The shortcomings of previous research as noted above were assessed with regard to attitudes towards the European Rapid Reaction Forces (ERRF), which was to be implemented by 2003.

During the British-French summit in St.-Malo in December 1998, a Joint declaration on a common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was achieved. Until then, the United Kingdom had been the country most opposed to the inclusion of defence issues among the EU’s competencies (Heisbourg, 2000). However, this summit and the conflict in Kosovo, which highlighted Europe’s inefficiency in dealing with internal conflicts, led to the decision of the Cologne European Council in June 1999 to develop, “the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO” (cited in Rutten, 2001, p. 41).

In December 1999, the Helsinki European Council established the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) of 50-60,000 personnel. This force was to be implemented by 2003, but its institution has been delayed due to a European-wide dissent over the particulars of the structure of this force. Once operational, the force will be capable of deploying within 60 days for a period of at least a year for humanitarian, peacekeeping and peace-building missions.

What is already known about attitudes towards the ERRF?

What do Europeans in general, and British people in particular, think of the implementation of the ERRF? According to a MORI survey (2000) of over 1000 adults in Britain, most respondents (55%) believed that Tony Blair was right in
committing the British Armed Forces to be involved in the ERRF, whilst 38 percent thought that he was wrong to do this. When asked about the consequences, however, the majority believed that British Forces should not fight under a non-British commander (51%), should not wear a different uniform (62%) and should not get involved in conflicts in which there was no direct interest (51%).

A Eurobarometer survey (N° 54.1) conducted between November and December 2000 provides additional information on this subject. When asked about the rapid reaction force, 73% of Europeans from 15 countries believed that the decision to set up this European defence force was very good (23%) or rather good (50%), whilst 16% had no opinion. Therefore, across Europe, only 11% disagreed with the establishment (Manigart, 2001b). Alongside the Republic of Ireland (55%), the United Kingdom was the least in favour of setting up this force: 60% of British respondents agreed that the decision was a very good or a rather good one, whilst 19% did not express an opinion.

These data indicate that the majority of British respondents were not against the implementation of the ERRF. Indeed, the majority of respondents in each survey welcomed the implementation of this European force (MORI = 55% and Eurobarometer = 60% in favour)\(^6^2\).

**Aims of the study and hypotheses**

This study aimed to extend the core value analysis by exploring the role of social and political trust in shaping attitudes towards the ERRF in the hierarchical model. Another goal was to assess the impact of knowledge on the hierarchical structure. The literature reviewed in this chapter leads to the following predictions:

\(^6^2\) The Eurobarometer data also provided one important qualification to this finding. At the EU level attitudes towards the ERRF were positively related to attitudes towards European Integration. There was also further evidence that attitudes towards the ERRF may have been shaped by more general attitudes towards the British Armed Forces. Both of these constructs were also assessed in this study. Analyses showed that respondents who held more positive attitudes towards European Integration were also more likely to hold more positive attitudes towards the ERRF than participants who believed the contrary. This finding is supportive of Eurobarometer results. Similarly, respondents who endorsed modern, peacekeeping roles of the Armed Forces were also more supportive of the ERRF than participants who believed more in the traditional military roles. For further details see Appendix C. Including these constructs in the analyses did not add to the explanation of attitudes towards the ERRF.
The effect of core values on postures

Previous research has shown that individual differences in foreign policy postures, such as internationalism and militarism may in part depend on one's level of interpersonal and political trust. Since previous research has related social trust to co-operative strategies and political trust to interventionist policies (e.g. Brewer & Steenbergen, 2002; Popkin and Dimock, 2000), a significant relationship between social trust and internationalism, and between political trust, militarism and internationalism was therefore expected. Based on Brewer and Gross (2003) and Brewer and Steenbergen (2002, but see Bartels, 1994), social trust was predicted to be only weakly, if at all, associated with militarism.

The effects of social and political trust on multi-lateralism have not yet been explored. Brewer and Steenbergen (2002) have argued that socially trusting individuals may infer that other nations are friendly and co-operative. Socially trusting respondents may thus infer that other nations and their leaders have good intentions and that co-operative interventions will lead to a positive result. One would therefore expect a significant relationship between the two. Because politically trusting individuals may also assume that the government can work together effectively with other nations, a positive relationship between political trust and multi-lateralism was also predicted.

Past research and the previous two empirical studies have shown that nationalism was associated more with “hawkish” attitudes and “own-country” focused opinions. It was therefore hypothesised that nationalism should be negatively related to internationalism and multi-lateralism. Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) have argued that national interest can be pursued through an assertive foreign policy stance, and a positive relationship between nationalism and militarism was therefore expected.

By contrast, the previous two empirical studies have associated patriotism with peace-loving attitudes and internationally-oriented opinions, and it was therefore hypothesised that patriotism was positively related to internationalism and multi-lateralism, whilst being negatively related to militarism.
Postures and attitudes towards the ERRF

Since the concept of the ERRF includes a willingness to co-operate internationally and multi-laterally with other European countries, a significant (positive) relationship between internationalism and multi-lateralism was hypothesised. The ERRF's remit will be to carry out humanitarian, peacekeeping and peace-building missions, and a significant (negative) relationship with militarism was therefore also expected.

Contextual variables and attitudes towards the ERRF

Chapter 4 had included two contextual factors, namely outcome perceptions and perceived risk, in its analyses. In the present study, these were extended to include also "perceptions of moral responsibility" and "monetary considerations". In discussion of the ERRF, the media has frequently evoked the concept of moral duty (e.g. Guardian, April 11 2001; Daily Telegraph, April 11 2001). Feelings of responsibility have also been found to shape attitudes towards the NATO intervention in Kosovo (Haenze, 2001). A historical analysis of British military interventions (Lowenheim, 2003) reported that issues of moral prestige and moral credibility were crucial elements of Britain's decision for humanitarian interventions. Similarly, the media has frequently emphasised the financial dimension of Britain's participation in the ERRF (The Sun, April 12 2001; The Times, April 11, 2001).

It was therefore expected that perceptions of the potential success of the ERRF and Britain's moral duty to intervene in European conflicts would be significantly (positively) related to attitudes towards the ERRF. It was also hypothesised that perceptions of potential risk to soldiers keeping the peace in Europe and perceptions of British money being "misspent" would be significantly (negatively) associated with ERRF attitudes. The results of Chapter 4 were inconclusive as to whether these contextual factors are predictors of specific attitudes or the consequences. The issue of placement of these constructs was therefore also addressed.

Political knowledge

Finally, the possibility that political knowledge moderates the influence of core values and postures within the model was also examined. Based on Hurwitz and
Peffley’s claim that individuals rely on core values and postures to shape their more specific attitudes independent of their degree of political knowledge, it was hypothesised that attitudes towards the ERRF would be structured in similar ways in both politically informed and uninformed respondents. This prediction was tested using multi-group structural equation analysis.

METHOD

Sample composition

A sample of 322 British respondents from the general public participated in this postal survey, which was carried out in Guilford at the end of March 2001. Of the 600 questionnaires that had been distributed, 326 were returned, of which four had to be discarded because of incomplete information. Overall, the return rate for this survey was 54%.

As in the previous chapters, an attempt was made to strengthen this convenience sample by weighting it to representative area data. Comparisons of the sample data with Guildford Census data (see Appendix D for details) indicated that the sample over-represented men, respondents aged 18-24 and 45-59, those with A-levels and other qualifications, and those in associate professional (Class 3) and personal service occupations (Level 6). Conversely, it under-represented those aged 30-44, those with no qualifications and those in managerial occupations (Class 1).

Using SPSS, the sample was weighted on these variables to achieve a more accurate representation of the overall population. All the analyses in this chapter were conducted after the sample had been weighted.

Measures

Details of the means, standard deviations and Cronbach’s alphas for the constructs in this study are provided in Table 6.1 of the Results section. See Appendix E for the complete set of items used in this survey.
"Nationalism and Patriotism"

Nationalism and patriotism were assessed by 20 items adapted to the British context from Kosterman and Feshbach's (1989) nationalism and patriotism scales. Participants were asked to rate all 20 items on a five-point scale ranging from "Strongly disagree" to "Strongly agree". Factor analysis indicated two factors, corresponding to the distinction made between nationalism and patriotism. Two scales were created, with higher scores indicating higher nationalism and higher patriotism, respectively.

"Social Trust"

Five items were assessed to tap social trust, which were adapted from a pre-existing scale (Wrightsman, 1991; five-point Likert scale: 1 = Strongly disagree to 5 = Strongly agree): "Generally, most people can be trusted"; "Most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance"; "Most people can be counted on to do what they say they will do"; "In dealing with strangers one is better off to be cautious until they have provided evidence that they are trustworthy"; "Most people would tell a lie if they could gain by it". Factor analysis indicated only one component, which explained 48 percent of the variance. One scale was created from these five items, with higher scores representing higher levels of social trust.

"Political trust"

Political trust, or trust in the government, was assessed by five items taken from standardised measures of American political trust (cf. Miller & Listhaug, 1990; five-point Likert scale: 1 = Strongly disagree to 5 = Strongly agree): "I trust the government to do what is right", "The government is run for the benefit of all people", "People in the government waste a lot of the money that we pay in taxes" and "The government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves". In addition, the following item was included (five-point Likert scale: 1 = None - 5 = A lot): "How much confidence do you have in your government?". Factor analysis of the five items yielded a single dimension that accounted for 43 percent of the variance. The five items were combined to form a scale, with higher scores indicating higher levels of political trust.
Political knowledge was assessed by 10 items taken from British Election Studies (BES). These items assessed factual knowledge and were answered on a “True”, “False” and “Don’t know” scale. Items included: “Britain’s electoral system is based on proportional representation (False)”, “Women are not allowed to sit in the House of Lords (False)”, “British Prime Ministers are appointed by the Queen (True)”, and “The longest time allowed between general elections is four years (False)”. For each individual, the number of correct answers were summed to obtain an overall political knowledge score (minimum = 0 to maximum = 10, but see Mondak, 1999 for a critical review of this methodology).

The degree to which individuals favour involvement and co-operation in international affairs was assessed by five items based on previous work (e.g. Herrmann, Tetlock & Visser, 1999; Holsti, 1996; Holsti & Rosenau, 1993; five-point Likert scale: 1 = Strongly disagree to 5 = Strongly agree): “In today’s world, every country has to take care of itself”, “Britain should help improve the standard of living in less developed countries”, “Britain should put pressure on countries which systematically violate basic human rights”, “Britain needs to play an active role in solving problems around the world” and “Britain shouldn’t worry about world affairs but concentrate on taking care of problems at home” (reversed scoring). Only one factor emerged from a factor analysis. These items were formed into a scale, with higher scores indicating greater willingness to co-operate in international affairs.

Militarism was assessed by four items based on Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) and Holsti and Rosenau (1993; five-point Likert scale: 1 = Strongly disagree to 5 =

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63 The questions taken from the BES political knowledge quiz tap propositional knowledge, i.e. respondents are asked to indicate whether the proposition “Britain’s electoral system is based on proportional representation” is true, false or they don’t know. Although the questions in this quiz may neglect other important aspects of political knowledge, such as the ability to interpret information and engage in political argument or whether or not particular values are important, propositional knowledge forms a necessary element of political knowledge (Frazer & Macdonald, 2003). For a detailed discussion of such quizzes see Johns (2002).

64 All the items of internationalism, militarism and multi-lateralism were subjected to a global factor analysis, which indicated three factors that corresponded to the distinction amongst the factors made here.
Strongly agree), including: “In dealing with other nations, our government should be strong and tough”, “The best way to ensure peace is through military strength”, “The best way to ensure peace is to negotiate with other nations” (reversed scoring) and “In general, the use of military force only makes problems worse (reverse scoring)”. Factor analysis showed only one factor, and the four items were combined to form a scale in which higher scores indicate a greater belief in militaristic foreign policy solutions.

“Multi-lateralism”
Multi-lateralism was measured by four items based on Chittick and colleagues (1995, 2001; five-point Likert scale: 1 = Strongly disagree to 5 = Strongly agree), including: “To make a change in the world, Britain needs to work together with other nations or international organisation, such as the UN or NATO”, “It is vital to enlist the co-operation of the UN in settling international disputes”, “Britain’s power in the world is diminished by working together with other nations or international organisations” (reversed scoring) and “International co-operation should be encouraged to solve common problems, such as world hunger or world peace”. Factor analysis indicated only one factor and these items were combined into a scale. Higher scores on this scale represent a greater willingness to work together with other nations and international organisations.

“Perceived risk”
Perceptions of the risk of potential harm to British peacekeepers on ERRF peace missions were assessed by three items (five-point Likert scale: 1 = Very unlikely to 5 = Very likely): The likelihood of British peacekeepers being “Injured”, “Killed” or “Taken hostage”. One component emerged from a factor analysis, and higher scores on this scale indicate a high perceived risk of harm to peacekeepers.

“Outcome perceptions”
General perceptions of the success or lack of success of future ERRF missions were assessed by two items, which were adapted from the previous questionnaires (five-point Likert scale: 1 = Strongly disagree to 5 = Strongly agree): “ERRF troops will succeed in implementing a peace agreement in a country in conflict” and “ERRF
troops will not succeed in establishing lasting peace in a country in conflict" (reversed scoring). A composite variable was created, with higher scores on this scale indicating greater perceptions of success.

"Moral Responsibility"
Perceptions of moral responsibility to partake in peace operations were assessed by two items (5-point Likert scale: 1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree): “As part of Europe, Britain has a moral duty to intervene in European conflicts” and “As a wealthy and powerful country, it is Britain’s duty to intervene in countries that experience conflict”. Higher scores on this scale indicate greater perceptions of moral duty.

"Monetary considerations"
The willingness to see governmental money being spent on peace operations was assessed by two items (five-point Likert scale: 1 = Strongly disagree to 5 = Strongly agree): “The money spent on keeping the peace in foreign countries would be better spent at home” and “British peace operations are a waste of money”. Higher scores on this composite variable suggest greater opposition to money being spent on peace operations.

"Attitudes towards the ERRF"
Support for the ERRF was assessed by four items (five-point Likert scale: 1 = Strongly disagree to 5 = Strongly agree): “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the participation of British troops in the European Rapid Reaction force that will perform peacekeeping duties in European conflicts?”, “I approve of British troops being used as part of an ERRF to bring peace to Europe”, “The ERRF will make us less able to defend our national interests” and “Blair’s decision to commit Britain to joining the ERRF was a good one”. Higher scores on this scale indicate greater support for the ERRF.
"Demographic Variables"

The questionnaire also contained several demographic variables that have already been described in Chapter 4.

Analyses

The models in this study were estimated using LISREL 8.52 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2002), using a Maximum Likelihood Estimation based on a covariance matrix. This study contained more than 30 indicators. Typically, LISREL models with more than 30 indicators representing the latent variables are difficult to estimate (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1996). Consequently, path models were used that incorporated the reliabilities of the respective scales to reduce the number of parameters estimated to a more reasonable level. In order to adjust for measurement error, the paths from latent variables to their indicators were set to one, whilst the error variances for each scale were set to one minus the reliability times the observed variance of the scale (see Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1996).

Data screening indicated 20 missing values, which were substituted by the mean following the guidelines of du Toit and du Toit (2001; see also Jöreskog, 2001). Using PRELIS 2.5, the univariate and multivariate distributional properties of the data were then determined, which indicated that the distribution was multivariate normal with a univariate skewness ranging from -2.131 to 2.194 and a kurtosis ranging from -1.742 to 2.239. Further analysis also indicated that the data were multivariate normal (Mardia's statistic was PK = 1.104).

RESULTS

The results are divided into three sections. The first presents descriptive and correlational data for the constructs used in the structural equation models. The second section investigates the relationship between the general predispositions in this study and attitudes towards the ERRF. Additionally, this section explores the

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6.5 Kline (1998) recommended absolute value cut-offs of 3.0 for skewness and 8.0 for kurtosis. Whilst there is no standard cut-off for multivariate normality, Kline suggests that multivariate normality can be assumed if this value is less than 3.
placement of the four contextual variables within the model. The final section assesses the impact of political knowledge within the hierarchical model.

**General descriptive data**

*Table 6.1* presents descriptive data for measures and correlations between measures relating to attitudes towards the ERRF. Almost six out of ten respondents (58%) in this sample strongly agreed or agreed with the statement “Tony Blair's decision to commit Britain to joining a European Reaction Force was a good one”, whilst 57 percent also strongly agreed or agreed with British troops being used as part of the ERRF to bring peace to Europe. Most respondents (57%) also agreed with the participation of British troops in the European Rapid Reaction force that will perform peacekeeping duties in European conflicts, whilst 46 percent agreed with the statement that the ERRF will make us less able to defend our national interests”.

Attitudes towards the ERRF were highly correlated with internationalism, multi-lateralism and outcome perceptions, and, to a lesser extent, militarism, perceptions of moral responsibility and monetary considerations (*see Table 6.1*). Of the core values, social trust was significantly related to attitudes towards the ERRF, political trust and patriotism. Nationalism was only weakly associated with attitudes towards the ERRF. None of the demographics were significantly correlated with attitudes towards the ERRF.

Of the four contextual variables, outcome perceptions were significantly related to internationalism, multi-lateralism and social trust, amongst others. Perceptions of moral responsibility were highly related to internationalism, political trust, nationalism and social trust, whilst monetary considerations were highly correlated with political trust, nationalism and internationalism.

Of the three postures, internationalism was strongly related to social trust and political trust. Militarism and multi-lateralism were highly associated with political trust.
Table 6.1 Descriptive data and correlations amongst key measures

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M: 3.54 2.94 3.77 3.52 2.82 3.73 3.09 3.69 3.63 3.59 2.81 3.45

SD: 0.90 0.72 0.90 0.92 0.83 1.01 0.93 0.91 1.19 1.10 1.2 1.0

Note: Correlations in bold are significant at p < .05. Cronbach's alpha for each construct is given in parenthesis.
Assessing attitudes towards the ERRF

The correlations in Table 6.1 represent a complex set of relationships and interrelationships. This section presents analyses in which the relationships between nationalism, patriotism, social and political trust, and attitudes towards the ERRF in the hierarchical model were assessed in detail.

As in the previous chapters, a hierarchical model was tested in which variables at more abstract levels were allowed to influence variables at the subsequent level in the model. The first model (Model1) to be tested situated the four contextual variables - outcome perception, perceived risk, perceptions of responsibility and monetary considerations - at a level between postures and attitudes towards the ERRF. This model indicated that attitudes towards the ERRF were affected directly by outcome perceptions, perceived risk, perceptions of responsibility and monetary considerations (see Figure 6.1). For reasons of clarity, the effects of demographic variables on core values were omitted from the figure, but their impact on the variables in the model is provided in Table 6.2.

Outcome perceptions were directly positively affected by internationalism and multi-lateralism; perceptions of responsibility were positively influenced by all three postures; whilst monetary considerations were negatively affected by both internationalism and militarism.

Social trust showed a substantial direct (positive) path to internationalism and multi-lateralism, whilst it had no significant effect on militarism. Political trust had a direct (negative) path to militarism, and positive paths to both internationalism and multi-lateralism. Patriotism also had a positive path to both internationalism and multi-lateralism, whilst showing no significant path to militarism. Finally, nationalism showed a significant positive path to militarism and a just significant negative path to internationalism, whilst it was unrelated to multi-lateralism.

Of the demographic variables, age had a negative path to social trust, whilst education and interest in current affairs were positive influences on social trust. By contrast, gender had a positive effect on political trust, indicating that male
respondents were more politically trusting than females. Education, social class, age and interest in current affairs were positively related to political trust, whilst it was negatively affected by political ideology. Nationalism was positively related to gender, political ideology and age, and negatively affected by education, social class and interest in current affairs. Patriotism, on the other hand, was negatively related to gender and age.

Perceived risk was not significantly related to any of the constructs in the model (see Table 6.2), and modification indices indicate that the fit of the model could be improved if this construct was excluded from the model. Having excluded this variable, the model was re-estimated, which showed an acceptable fit ($\chi^2 = 57.74$, df = 52, $p = .039$, N = 322, GFI = .891, AGFI = .890, RMSEA = .074, ECVI = .07).

To test whether an alternative model (Model2) would provide a better fit to the data, the model was re-estimated with the contextual variables as consequences of attitudes towards the ERRF rather than their causes (see Figure 6.2). In this model, internationalism and multi-lateralism strongly (positively) influenced attitudes towards the ERRF, whilst militarism had a small negative influence on ERRF attitudes. Attitudes towards the ERRF, in turn, positively influenced outcome perceptions and perceptions of responsibility and negatively affected monetary considerations.

This model showed a good fit to the data ($\chi^2 = 51.07$, df = 53, $p = .12$, N = 322, GFI = .941, AGFI = .941, RMSEA = .031, ECVI = .05). An inspection of ECVI values indicates that the alternative model (Model2) fit the data significantly better than did the original conceptualisation (Model1, ECVI = .05 versus .07), and the alternative model was therefore accepted.

The standardised total effects (see Table 6.2), which include both the direct and indirect effects of one variable onto another, indicated that of the core values, social trust had the greatest total effect on attitudes towards the ERRF, followed by political trust.
Figure 6.1. Structural Model (Model 1) of determinants of attitudes towards the ERRF

Note: Estimates are standardised. Only significant paths above 0.2 are shown. R2 values are indicated in parentheses.
Figure 6.2. Alternative model (Model2) of the structural determinants of attitudes towards the ERRF

Note: Estimates are standardised. Only significant paths above 0.20 are shown. R2 values are indicated in parentheses.
## Table 6.2. Standardised total effects for the alternative model (Model B) of attitudes towards the ERFF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceived risk (excluded)</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Outcome</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Responsibility</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Money</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. ERFF</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Internationalism</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Militarism</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Multi-laterlism</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Social trust</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Political trust</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Nationalism</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Patriotism</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political ideology</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social class</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current affairs</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Total effects in bold are significant at $p < .05$. 

Chapter 6 The impact of political knowledge
The role of political knowledge – A multi-group structural equation analysis

The analyses in this section address the second aim of this study - namely the role of political knowledge. Table 6.3 shows the percentage of respondents who gave the 'correct' answer to each item in the political knowledge quiz.

Table 6.3. Percentage correct answers to 10 questions of the political knowledge quiz

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% correct answer</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'No-one may stand for Parliament unless they pay a deposit' (True)</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'The number of members of parliament is about 100' (False)</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Britain has separate elections for the European Parliament and the British Parliament' (True)</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Women are not allowed to sit in the House of Lords' (False)</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Britain's electoral system is based on proportional representation' (False)</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'MPs from different parties are on parliamentary committees' (True)</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'The longest time allowed between general elections is four years' (False)</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Minister of State are senior to Secretaries of State in the government' (False)</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'British Prime Ministers are appointed by the Queen' (True)</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'No-one is allowed to be on the electoral register in two different places' (False)</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In an effort to provide an overall look at the effects of political knowledge within the hierarchical structure, a multi-group structural equation analysis was conducted in which the structure of support for the ERRF was investigated separately for respondents with high and low levels of political knowledge. For this purpose, the sample was divided into a low political knowledge group, consisting of respondents who answered incorrectly at least half of the questions in the political quiz (N = 127), and a high political knowledge group, consisting of respondents who answered correctly at least half of the questions (N = 186).

Before the multi-group model was tested, it was first checked whether the constructs were equally reliable within the two knowledge groups (see Goren 2001b). The analyses in this section are based on 313 respondents, omitting 4 respondents who did not answer any of the 10 knowledge questions, and 5 who replied 'don't know' to all.
reliabilities for each construct are given in Table 6.4, which shows that, with the exception of nationalism and militarism, the constructs were slightly more reliable in the politically informed group than in the uninformed one. In the absence of a formal test of the hypothesis that the reliability estimates differ significantly between the groups (see Goren, 2001b), the magnitude of these differences was estimated by calculating the ratio between the reliabilities of both samples. Interpreted cautiously, the table shows that there were little discernable differences between the reliabilities between the two groups.

Table 6.4. Construct reliabilities by knowledge group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Construct</th>
<th>Low knowledge group</th>
<th>High knowledge group</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Patriotism</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Trust</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Trust</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes towards AF</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes towards Europe</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-lateralism</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarism</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internationalism</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERRF</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monetary considerations</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome perceptions</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Having established that the constructs are approximately equally reliable for the two groups, the following analyses explored whether the high and low knowledge groups relied on general predispositions to the same degree to form their attitudes towards the ERRF. Table 6.5 shows the structural coefficients and model-fit statistics. According to Goren (2004), if Hurwitz and Peffley are right in assuming that both informed and uninformed respondents use general predispositions in similar ways, then the coefficients should be statistically significant in each group, and be statistically insignificant between the two groups. By contrast, if knowledge moderates the use of general principles, then the coefficients should be larger in the high knowledge group, and the differences in the magnitudes of the coefficients between the high and low knowledge group should be statistically significant.
The statistical difference between the two groups can be determined using modification indices, which indicate the effect freeing a parameter has in a model in which the factor loadings are constrained to be equal between the two groups (restricted model). The structural parameters were constrained to be equal between the groups to test the initial premise that both informed and uniformed respondents use core values and postures in similar ways to derive their specific foreign policy opinions. The difference in chi-squares ($\Delta \chi^2$) between the restricted model and the freed sub-model can be used as a test of whether the coefficient in question varies significantly between the two groups, which is equivalent to testing for interactions in an OLS regression. A statistically insignificant $\Delta \chi^2$ will support the conclusion that constraining factor loadings to be equal between the high and low knowledge group does not affect model fit (Bentler, 1995).

As shown in Table 6.5, the internationalism coefficient was significant in both groups, and individuals in both groups relied the same amount on internationalism to shape their attitudes towards the ERRF ($\Delta \chi^2 = 0.075$, df = 1, $p = 0.32$). Militarism was significantly related to attitudes towards the ERRF in both groups. However, the coefficients did not differ significantly ($\Delta \chi^2 = 0.89$, df = 1, $p = 0.27$), suggesting that both groups used militarism to the same degree. Similarly, the multi-lateralism coefficient was significant in both the high and low knowledge group, the chi-square difference was not significant ($\Delta \chi^2 = 0.96$, df = 1, $p = 0.26$), indicating that the coefficients were statistically equivalent between the two groups.

Both social and political trust were significantly associated with attitudes towards the ERRF in both groups, but the coefficients did not differ significantly between the two groups ($\Delta \chi^2 = 2.71$, df = 1, $p = 0.072$; and $\Delta \chi^2 = 2.65$, df = 1, $p = 0.086$, respectively). Nationalism was only significantly related to ERRF attitudes in the low knowledge group, a difference that was statistically not significant using the Bonferroni correction ($\Delta \chi^2 = 5.89$, df = 1, $p = 0.034$). Finally, patriotism was significantly related to attitudes towards the ERRF in both groups and the coefficients did not differ significantly ($\Delta \chi^2 = 0.74$, df = 1, $p = 0.30$). Model fit was

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6.7 The Bonferroni correction is used in these analyses to control for Type I errors across pairwise comparisons. This method tests each comparison at $p = 0.05$ divided by the number of comparisons. In the present study, each comparison was therefore tested at $0.05/7$, or $0.007$, level.
good for both groups. Overall, these results support Hurwitz and Peffley's claim in all instances, and suggest that individuals rely on general principles regardless of their level of knowledge.

Table 6.5. Structural equation model for attitudes towards the ERRF by level of political knowledge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes towards the ERRF</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coefficients</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internationalism</td>
<td>.468**</td>
<td>.501**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarism</td>
<td>-.321**</td>
<td>-.162*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-lateralism</td>
<td>.314**</td>
<td>.456**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social trust</td>
<td>.168*</td>
<td>.365**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political trust</td>
<td>.197*</td>
<td>.341**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>.293**</td>
<td>.097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotism</td>
<td>.229**</td>
<td>.302**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Model Fit:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>χ²</th>
<th>28.21*</th>
<th>25.76*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Df</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFI</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGFI</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMSEA</td>
<td>.044</td>
<td>.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01

DISCUSSION

Consistent with public opinion polls, support for the ERRF was high in the present study. Overall, almost six out of ten respondents agreed that Tony Blair was right in committing British troops to form part of the European force, and that British troops should be used as part of the ERRF to solve European conflicts and to bring peace to Europe. Fewer respondents believed that the ERRF would interfere with national interests.

As expected, attitudes towards the ERRF were significantly influenced by the three postures. Respondents who believed that Britain should be involved in international affairs and should collaborate with other nations or institutions to solve international problems were more supportive of the ERRF than were respondents who believed the contrary. Similarly, participants who believed that military force should be used
to solve international problems were less likely to hold positive attitudes towards the ERRF than respondents who preferred diplomatic actions.

The analyses also indicated that attitudes towards the ERRF shaped, rather than were influenced by, how respondents perceived the possible success of the ERRF, whether Britain had a moral obligation to become involved in international disputes and whether or not peace operations were a waste of money. Respondents who supported the ERRF were more likely to perceive a British responsibility in solving conflicts, to see future missions as successful and money well spent than participants who did not hold positive views of the ERRF. Although a panel study would provide more conclusive evidence for the direction of causality than the present cross-sectional design, present results indicate that these contextual factors are better conceptualised as consequences of support rather than as indicators for support.

Political and social trust

In line with a growing literature (e.g. Bartels, 1994; Brewer & Gross, 2003), the results of this study showed that social trust shapes opinions about international affairs. Of the core values, social trust emerged as the most potent predictor (in terms of its total effect) of attitudes towards the ERRF. Its influence was not direct, but mediated by internationalism and multi-lateralism. Thus, respondents who generally trusted others were more likely than those who mistrusted others to believe that Britain should play a role in international politics and should co-operate with other nations or institutions to bring about change in the world.

Contrary to Bartels (1994), but consistent with findings by Brewer and Steenbergen (2002) and Brewer and Gross (2003), social trust was not significantly related to militarism in this study. Social trust had the greatest influence in decisions of whether or not to get involved in international affairs and whether or not to collaborate with other nations to solve international issues, whilst it had no effect on whether or not force should be used to solve international problems. This finding supported the claim that social trust is an important predictor of foreign policy dimensions only in certain areas of foreign policy (Brewer & Steenbergen, 2002).
The finding that social trust significantly affected multi-lateralism also added to those of Bartels (1994), Brewer and Steenbergen (2002) and Brewer and Gross (2003), who only assessed its impact on internationalism and militarism. Overall, the results in this study were similar to those of Brewer and Steenbergen (2002) and Bartels (1994), who found that postures depended in part on an individual’s level of interpersonal trust.

Social trust itself was significantly affected by several demographic variables. In line with previous research (e.g. Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Rahn & Transue, 1998; Putman, 1995), age was negatively associated with levels of social trust, indicating that younger respondents were more mistrustful than respondents from older generations. The reasons for this link are not clearly understood (Brehm & Rahn, 1997). Congruent with previous research (e.g. Brehm & Rahn, 1997), social trust was also positively related to education, suggesting that better educated respondents were more trusting of others than their lesser educated counterparts.

In keeping with previous research (Popkin & Dimock, 2000), the results of this study also indicated that political trust shaped foreign policy attitudes. Indeed, it consistently emerged to be a better predictor of postures and attitudes towards the ERRF (in terms of its total effects) than either patriotism or nationalism. Although political trust was significantly related to internationalism and multi-lateralism, its effects were smaller than those of social trust. However, unlike social trust, political trust had the greatest influences on whether or not force should be used to solve international problems. Politically trusting respondents were thus more likely than politically cynical ones to believe that negotiation and not force should be used in international conflicts.

Although the finding that political trust was significantly related to militarism is consistent with previous research (e.g. Brewer & Gross, 2003), the sign of the relationship is not. For example, Brewer and Gross (2003) found that political trust was overall positively related to willing to use force, whilst a similar finding was also made by Brewer and Steenbergen (2002). These findings, however, were based on U.S. samples. One possible explanation for this discrepancy may be a difference in the degree to which British and American citizens espouse military action as a means
to solve international conflicts. A general finding from U.S. studies is that American citizens are supportive of military force as a means to an end in foreign policy (e.g. Bartels, 1994). Similarly, these differences may be indicative of the different governmental stances on foreign policy solutions between Britain and the U.S.

Political trust was directly affected by age and education. Consistent with previous research (e.g. Brehm & Rahn, 1997), political trust was negatively related to age, indicating that younger respondents in the sample were more politically cynical than older participants. By contrast, education had a significant positive effect on levels of political trust, suggesting that more educated respondents were more politically trusting than their less educated counterparts.

Yet, there is empirical evidence that the two are inter-related (r = .45 in the present study), although the causal relationship between them is still a matter of intense debate. Investigating the effects of social and political trust on civic engagement (the so-called “social capital” dynamic), Brehm and Rahn (1997) found that the observed association between political trust and social trust was largely due to the influence the former had on the latter. That is, whether or not individuals were socially trusting was strongly influenced by whether or not they were politically trusting. Thus, a trustworthy government may influence the development of social trust and co-operation (Levi & Stoker, 2000; but see Brewer & Sigelman, 2002).

Patriotism and nationalism were also related to the three postures in the expected ways. Patriotic respondents were more willing to see Britain involved internationally and multi-laterally than less patriotic participants. By contrast, nationalistic respondents were more likely to believe that Britain should use force to solve international problems and should concentrate on problems at home than less nationalistic participants. Overall, these findings support the claim that nationalistic sentiments hinder international co-operation by being own-country focused (e.g. Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989), whilst patriotic feelings do not pose an obstacle to becoming involved in foreign affairs (e.g. Mueller-Peters, 1998).
Political knowledge

Finally, present results showed that both politically informed and uninformed respondents used core values and postures to form their specific opinions about the ERRF. There was some indication that politically uninformed respondents were more likely to rely on militarism to form their attitudes towards the ERRF than informed participants. However, this test was insignificant using a Bonferroni correction.

These findings are consistent with Goren (2001a,b, 2004), who reported that political expertise did not systematically enhance the impact of general principles on policy preferences. However, the present study also added to the findings of Goren (2004) in the foreign policy domain. Goren (2004), p. 474), who had only assessed militarism in his study, asked whether political awareness enhanced the use of internationalism when people form foreign policy preferences. Similarly, Brewer and Steenbergen (2002) wondered whether political knowledge would affect the relationship between social trust and specific policy attitudes. Present findings indicate that the answer to both these question would be: no, it does not. Political knowledge did not significantly increase reliance on any of the three postures or the four core values assessed in this study. Present findings therefore support the assumption of Hurwitz and Peffley that political knowledge does not affect the use of general predispositions, and oppose theories that argue that political expertise facilitates political reasoning (e.g. Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Zaller, 1992).

CONCLUSION

Some researchers have suggested that individuals are not political generalists but political specialists who are knowledgeable only about political issues in which they have a direct interest (e.g. Iyengar, 1990; Johns, 2002; Krosnick, Boninger, Chuang, Berent & Carnot, 1993). Therefore, the use of a general political knowledge measure may not have revealed the true impact of political knowledge on attitudes towards the ERRF. Instead, a different picture may have emerged if specific knowledge about the ERRF had been assessed. The possibility of a differential impact of policy-
specific and general political knowledge on political attitudes will be addressed in the next chapter.
The previous chapter showed that political and social trust, patriotism and nationalism consistently biased general foreign policy postures and, through them, attitudes towards the ERRF. Using a measure of general political knowledge the previous study also showed that politically informed and uninformed respondents both relied on general principles to derive their attitudes towards the ERRF.

One aim of this study was to explore further the impact of political knowledge on attitudes towards the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. In the previous chapter it was suggested that if specific foreign policy knowledge had been assessed, the impact of knowledge on the hierarchical structure of attitudes towards the ERRF might have been more pronounced. The impact of specific political knowledge about the ISAF on attitudes towards this mission was therefore examined in this study.

In Chapter 3 it was argued that apart from core values, national images of a target country are also powerful predictors of specific foreign policy opinions. However, existing research has relied almost exclusively on “enemy images”. It is argued in this chapter that present political concerns warrant an investigation into two different types of national images, namely images of the nation’s government and images of the nation’s populace, which were explored empirically.
General versus policy-specific political knowledge

The effects of general versus specific political knowledge on policy attitudes have been a matter of debate, which has largely centred on the issue as to whether or not specific-policy knowledge plays an important role in shaping political policy preferences.

According to Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996), the U.S. public is not made up of information specialists. Rather, they argue that there is a tendency for different types of political knowledge to be correlated with one another. As a result of the strong correlations between types of political knowledge, individuals with high levels of general political knowledge might be more likely to possess specific information about a particular policy (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; see also Althaus, 1998). This is because individuals with high levels of general political knowledge may be more able or motivated to seek out policy-specific information (see also Fiske, Lau & Smith, 1990; but see Zaller, 1992). However, Kuklinski, Quirk, Schwieder and Rich (1998) have shown that even individuals with high levels of general political knowledge may be ignorant of policy-specific information.

Juhasz (2001) proposed that individuals rely more on general principles when they know relatively little about a specific political situation. Investigating differences between East and West Germans, Juhasz found considerably stronger relationships between core values, postures and specific attitudes in East Germany compared to those in the West, which he argued might be due to individuals in the former East being more used to taking cognitive shortcuts as a result of their lower level of information. A similar suggestion was also made by Kuklinski, Metlay & Kay (1982), who reported that domain-specific knowledge was negatively associated with using core beliefs.

Furthermore, Gilens (2001) reported that knowledge of policy-specific information about the amount of federal budget allocated to foreign aid had a stronger effect on policy attitudes than did general political knowledge. More specifically, Gilens found that the consequences of policy-specific ignorance and the effects of policy-relevant
information were greatest for individuals with the highest level of general political knowledge. These findings led him to conclude that,

> what separates actual political preferences from hypothetical 'enlightened preferences' is due to ignorance of specific policy-relevant facts, not a lack of general political knowledge or the cognitive skills or orientations that measures of general political information reflect. (2001, p. 380)

Overall, both Kuklinski and colleagues (1998) and Gilens (2001) suggested that the effect of policy-relevant information is not captured sufficiently by measures of general political knowledge. A measure of specific political knowledge of Afghanistan was therefore devised in this study, and the differential impact of general and specific political knowledge on attitudes towards the ISAF was assessed in a multi-group structural equation model.

**Images and the hierarchical model**

Chapter 3 briefly reviewed research on the importance of images in structuring foreign policy attitudes. Research on individuals' attitudes towards specific foreign countries and foreign policies has shown that images are significantly influenced by the individuals' values and predispositions (e.g. Mueller, 1973; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1990; Peffley & Hurwitz, 1992; Hurwitz, Peffley & Seligson, 1993; Holsti, 1996).

Following this long line of research, Hurwitz and Peffley (1990; see also Peffley & Hurwitz, 1992; Hurwitz, Peffley & Seligson, 1993) also extended the hierarchical model to include 'public images' as another determinant of foreign policy beliefs. The revised model (see *Figure 7.1*) posits that public images, which serve to simplify a complex international environment and to guide responses towards particular countries, are super-ordinate to postures, but are themselves constrained by core values.
Following Boulding (1959) and others, Hurwitz and Peffley argued that two dimensions underlie such images: perceptions of threat and perceptions of trust. Perceptions of threat refer to perceptions of the military power of the target country as well as perceptions as to whether it seeks to expand its influence. By contrast, perceptions of trust include opinions as to whether the target country is trustworthy or deceitful.

Assessing the effects of Soviet public images on attitudes towards defence spending and nuclear policy within the hierarchical model, they found that the two dimensions of trust and threat were closely related to foreign policy attitudes both at the postural and policy-specific level (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1990). At the specific policy level, trust perceptions were a significant predictor of attitudes towards defence spending and nuclear policy, whilst threat perceptions were significant determinants of attitudes towards military policies and Contra policies. Threat and, to a lesser extent, trust perceptions were also important determinants of militarism and containment. Although trust and threat perceptions had direct effects on specific policy issues, these effects were less strong than their direct effects on postures.

A similar dynamic emerged regarding post-Cold War foreign policy issues, when the relations between the superpowers began to change. Individuals' general beliefs about the nature of the Soviet Union, and their position on militarism, were key organising principles that constrained more specific foreign policy attitudes (Peffley & Hurwitz, 1992). By examining how public images structure foreign beliefs within the hierarchical model outside the U.S., Hurwitz, Peffley and Seligson (1993) found that images of salient nations (e.g. Cuba, Nicaragua and the U.S.) were a better predictor of specific policy issues in Costa Rica than was militarism, which was generally only weakly related to any of the measures in that study.
Such findings are not unequivocal. Investigating the role of public enemy images and ideology in elite belief systems, Murray and Cowden (1999) found that public images played a limited role, whilst ideology played a significantly more central role in structuring elites' foreign policy attitudes. It should be noted, however, that Murray and Cowden tested this model within an elite sample, whilst Hurwitz and Peffley used mass publics in their studies. Previous research has shown that elite samples are structured more along political ideology lines than the mass public (e.g. Jennings, 1992; Rosati & Creed, 1997), and therefore the discrepancy in findings may not be surprising.

The majority of the research into images, however, was carried out during the Cold War when “enemy images”, particularly of the Soviet Union, were prevalent (Hermann & Fischerkeller, 1995). The question thus arises to what extent national images of foreign countries have remained a key factor in organising attitudes in the post-Cold era where nations cannot easily be classified in terms of bipolar conflict (Chanley, 1999). Similarly, to what extent are national images viable when the country itself is divided? For example, would a national image of Sierra Leone be able to capture the potentially different public images of the Sierra Leone government and the rebels it was fighting? Similarly, to what extent is the concept of national images practical when there is an apparent rift between a nation’s government and its populace? Would it be more constructive to assess two types of images, one of the nation’s government and one of the nation’s populace, when the population is seen as suffering at the hands of the government, as was the portrayal of pre-war Afghanistan? It is this latter question that was addressed in this study.

In this study, national images were not conceptualised as being comprised solely of threat and trust perceptions. Instead, images were examined by a more global assessment (see Hurwitz et al., 1993), which also included perceptions of strength.

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7.1 In an early version of their analysis of the impact of USSR images on foreign policy attitudes, Hurwitz and Peffley (1990) included a separate image composed only of items pertaining to Gorbachev. Further analysis, however, indicated that respondents' assessment of Gorbachev and the Soviet Union were indistinguishable. Similarly, they argued that when individuals evaluate the image of another country, they make global judgements of that nation, taking into account both the government and its current leadership. It is argued here that a separation between images of the government and a nation’s populace may be conceptually warranted in situations where there is an apparent political rift between a nation’s leadership and its people.
and weakness, trustworthiness and untrustworthiness, co-operation and non-co-operation, democratic and non-democratic, and peacefulness and belligerence. By assessing a broader range of characteristics, elements of images identified by Cottom (1977), Hermann (1986) and others were also included in an abstract sense. The image components of perceived power and motives identified by Hermann (1986), for example, were assessed by individuals’ ratings of the perceived strength, co-operation and peacefulness of the Afghan government and the Afghan population.

**Humanitarianism, egalitarianism and moral traditionalism**

In addition to images, this study also explored a wider range of core values, namely humanitarianism, egalitarianism and moral traditionalism. Humanitarianism is a construct that has not received a lot of attention in research on international attitudes. It refers to a degree of compassion that individuals exercise in their relations with others, and involves a concern for the well-being of others as well as a willingness to help others.

Humanitarianism has frequently been equated with egalitarianism (e.g. Katz & Hass, 1988), which refers to the extent to which individuals believe that individuals in society should have access to the same economic, political and social opportunities. However, there are conceptual reasons why they should be distinct constructs. For example, Feldman and Steenbergen (2001) have argued that egalitarianism refers to beliefs about the equality of societal resources that are held independent of an individual’s social relationships, whilst humanitarianism involves a definition of oneself in relation to others. Indeed, research indicates that the two constructs are not only conceptually but also empirically distinct.

Apart from being only weakly correlated with each other (e.g. Feldman and Steenbergen, 2001), humanitarianism and egalitarianism have also been differentially related to policy preferences. Humanitarianism was found to be a consistently better predictor of attitudes towards government spending on social security, people on welfare and poverty relief than egalitarianism. Humanitarianism was also negatively related to support for policies of tougher sentencing of criminals. Together, these findings suggest that compassion makes humanitarians sympathetic to the plight of
others, such as the poor and criminals, and provides a motivation for providing assistance through support for social welfare policies (Steenbergen, 1996).

Therefore, humanitarianism may be best conceived as a core value that is distinct from egalitarianism (Steenbergen, 1996). Although this construct has been applied predominantly in studies of welfare policies, there are several reasons why humanitarianism may also be important for understanding attitudes towards peace operations and other humanitarian foreign policy concerns, such as foreign aid or enforcement of human rights. If humanitarianism entails a general concern for the well-being of others and a willingness to help others, then foreign policy interventions designed to improve the well-being of others in foreign countries should evoke compassion in humanitarians. For example, peace operations generally emphasise the plight of the population in a war-torn country with respect to living conditions, human rights violations, and so on. One would therefore expect that such situations arouse the compassion of humanitarians.

Indeed, there is some tentative evidence that humanitarianism also includes a concern for the plight of remote others. Investigating the determinants of attitudes towards foreign aid, Steenbergen (1996) found that although egalitarianism was the strongest predictor of support for foreign aid, increased levels of humanitarianism were also associated with stronger support for providing aid to foreign countries. The relevance of humanitarianism with respect to other foreign policy issues therefore merited closer investigation. Similarly, the differential relationship between humanitarianism, egalitarianism and attitudes towards peace operations needed to be explored in greater detail.

One more core value was included in this study, namely moral traditionalism, which refers the extent to which an individual prefers traditional patterns of family and social morality (Conover & Feldman, 1984). Although moral traditionalism is a powerful predictor of domestic policy concerns, such as re-distributional welfare policies and vote choice (e.g. Feldman, 1988), research indicates that it may not figure prominently in foreign policy issues when assessed in tandem with other variables (e.g. Bartels, 1994). Its relevance to understanding attitudes towards peace operations was therefore also investigated.
Chapter 7 Political knowledge revisited

The context – Afghan Stabilisation Force

Whilst there was some international involvement in Afghanistan after the Soviet Invasion in 1979, it was the September 11th 2001 attacks on the United States that brought Afghanistan back into the minds of the international community. In conjunction with military interventions, the multi-national, European-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was authorised by the UN Security Council in December 2001 to support a larger UN mission, UNAMA. The ISAF’s main goals included assisting the Afghan interim government and providing security and stability in the capital, Kabul.

Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the UK signed a joint Memorandum of Understanding in January, which formalised their contributions to the force (for a detailed analysis of the UNAMA mission and the political situation in Afghanistan see The Afghanistan Report in A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change, 2003).

It should be noted that unlike previous UN peace operations around the world, the mission’s main mandate was not to monitor a peace agreement between two belligerent parties but rather to impose peace that was externally mediated amongst victors in a war.

The first British troops of the force began arriving in Afghanistan shortly afterwards to prepare for the arrival of the main body of the ISAF. The force began to deploy on 26th December 2001 and consisted of over 4,800 troops from a number of states. Britain was leading the force until June 2002 and provided 1,800 troops. In June 2002, the Turkish Army took charge of the force.

During its first six months of operation, the ISAF mounted joint patrols with Afghan security forces in and around Kabul, disposed of nearly 3 million munitions, trained the 1st Battalion of the new Afghan National Guard and completed over 200 humanitarian aid projects (Ministry of Defence, 2002).
The ISAF also provided humanitarian assistance to the Afghan authorities after an avalanche struck a tunnel in February 2002. Similarly, following an earthquake in March 2002, ISAF transport aircraft were involved in providing the delivery of emergency supplies and medical personnel.

In March 2002, two German and three Danish soldiers from the ISAF were killed in Kabul, whilst a British soldier died in April 2002, following an incident during a security patrol in Kabul. Both UNAMA and ISAF are ongoing.

Study aims and hypotheses

In addition to the general predictions made in the previous chapter, the following hypotheses were made based on the literature reviewed here:

Core Values

The core value analysis was extended to explore the effects of humanitarianism, egalitarianism and moral traditionalism within the hierarchical model of attitudes towards the ISAF. Based on the findings of Steenbergen (1996; Feldman & Steenbergen, 2001) that humanitarianism is linked to a concern for the plight of others, it was hypothesised that humanitarianism should be significantly related to attitudes towards the ISAF, whose aim it was not only to re-instate a democratic government but also to re-instate decent living conditions and reinforce basic human rights within Afghanistan.

More specifically, it was hypothesised that humanitarianism would exert its effect mainly through internationalism within the hierarchical model. This link was predicted because a general compassion for the situation of other people should translate into a belief that it is in Britain's interest to be involved in solving international problems. Similarly, it was also predicted that humanitarianism would influence beliefs about multi-lateral ventures since Britain's co-operation with multi-national organisations, such as the UN or NATO, could be perceived as the most productive foreign policy means of alleviating poverty, human rights abuses and so on in foreign countries.
The relationship between humanitarianism and militarism, however, may be more equivocal. It could be argued that humanitarianism will be negatively associated with militarism because people who are sympathetic to the plight of others should not want to increase this plight by the use of force and the possibility of war being waged. Conversely, it could be argued that humanitarianism would be positively related to militarism because humanitarians may believe that only through coercive actions can the plight of others be improved. Finally, humanitarianism might not be associated at all with militarism as neither the use of force or negotiation would provide the assistance needed.

**National images**

A central purpose of this study was to investigate the impact of two types of national images within the hierarchical model of attitudes towards the ISAF: images of the Afghan government and images of the Afghan population. Based on Hurwitz and colleagues (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1990; Hurwitz et al., 1993), it was hypothesised that both types of images would affect the three postures, whilst in turn being influenced by core values.

**General versus specific knowledge**

Previous research (e.g. Gilens, 2001) suggests that knowledge of policy-specific information has a stronger effect on policy attitudes than does general political knowledge. It was therefore predicted that if knowledge moderates the influence of core values and postures in the hierarchical model, then policy-specific knowledge would have a greater impact on the relationships than general political knowledge. In addition, Zaller and others have argued that political knowledge promotes the use of core values. It was therefore predicted that respondents with high policy-specific knowledge should rely more on the structural constructs to form their opinions about the ISAF than participants with low policy-specific knowledge. This prediction was tested using multi-group structural equation analysis.
METHOD

Sample composition

Data for this study were collected in a postal survey, which was carried out in Guildford in February 2002. A total of 600 questionnaires were sent out. 336 respondents returned a completed questionnaire; a response rate of 41%.

Compared to Census data (see Appendix F for details), the sample over-represented male respondents, those aged 45-49, those with A-levels, and those in personal service (Class 6), sales (Class 7) and elementary occupations (Class 9), whilst it under-represented those aged 60 and over, those with other or no educational qualifications, and those in managerial (Class 1) and administrative occupations (Class 4).

The sample was weighted on these demographic characteristics to address these biases and to achieve a more accurate representation of the overall population. All the analyses in this chapter were conducted after the sample had been weighted.

Measures

In addition to the factors assessed in the previous study, this study included the following measures (see Appendix G for the details of the items used in this survey). The descriptive statistics, reliabilities and inter-correlations of the study variables are provided in Table 7.1 of the Results section.

"Humanitarianism"

Humanitarian beliefs were assessed by seven items taken from Steenbergen (1996; five-point Likert scale: 1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree): “One should always find ways to help others less fortunate than oneself”, “The dignity and well-being of all should be the most important concerns in any society”, “One of the problems of today’s society is that people are often not kind enough to others”, “All people who are unable to provide for their own should be helped by others”, “A person should always be concerned about the well-being of others”, “It is better not to be too kind to people, because kindness will only be abused”, and “People tend to
pay more attention to the well-being of others than they should”. These seven items were combined into a scale, with higher scores indicating greater concern for the welfare of others.

“Egalitarianism”

Egalitarianism was assessed by six items used in previous research (e.g. Feldman, 1988; see also Evans, Heath & Lalljee, 1996; five-point Likert scale: 1 = Strongly disagree to 5 = Strongly agree): “Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed”, “We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country (reversed scoring)”; “This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are (reversed scoring)”, “It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others (reversed scoring)”, “If people were treated more equally in this country we would have fewer problems”, and “One of the big problems in this country is that we don’t give everyone an equal chance”. A composite variable was created from these six statements. Higher scores on this scale signify a greater belief in equal opportunities within society.

“Moral traditionalism”

Moral traditionalism was measured by five items adapted from previous research (e.g. Evans, Heath & Lalljee, 1996; and Conover & Feldman, 1985; five-point Likert scale: 1 = Strongly disagree to 5 = Strongly agree): “The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of society”, “Society should be more accepting of people whose values are different from most” (reversed scoring), “We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards even if they are very different from our own (reversed scoring)”, “This country would have fewer problems if there was more emphasis on traditional family ties”, “The world is changing and we should adjust our view of moral behaviour to those changes (reversed scoring)”. These five items were combined in a scale, with higher scores indicating greater adherence to traditional values and lifestyle.
"Perceived respect"

In addition to assessing perceptions of risk, responsibility, outcome success and monetary issues, this study also explored perceptions of respect gained through participation in this mission. Two items were used to measure this contextual variable (five-point Likert scale: 1 = Strongly disagree to 5 = Strongly agree): “The expertise shown by British troops in Afghanistan has reinforced respect for Britain around the world” and “British troops in Afghanistan are respected by the local people”. The items were combined, with higher scores indicating greater perceived respect for British troops in Afghanistan.

"Images of Afghanistan"

Individuals’ perceptions of the trustworthiness or untrustworthiness of the government and the population in Afghanistan was examined by two, nine semantic differential questions, which had to be answered on a five-point scale (Hurwitz, Peflley and Seligson, 1993): Trustworthy – Not Trustworthy (reversed scored); Dishonest - Honest, Repressive – Free, Friend – Enemy (reversed scored); Responsible – Irresponsible (reversed scored), Aggressive – Peaceful; Good – Bad (reversed scored), Authoritarian – Democratic, Threatening – Not Threatening. A tenth item was also added: Co-operative – Unco-operative (reversed scored). Two separate scales were created from these items, called “images of the Afghan government” and “images of the Afghan populace”, respectively. Scale scores ranged from a minimum of 10 (low image) to a maximum of 50 (high image).

"Knowledge about Afghanistan"

To assess knowledge about the ISAF, five items were constructed that were based on media representations of this peace operation (see also Prior, 2002). Following “Some people know a lot about politics and foreign policy, others do not keep up with these issues. We would like to know how much you keep up with Britain’s involvement in Afghanistan”, respondents had to indicate which statement was true, false or whether they did not know. The five statements were as follows: “The U.S. is part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan (False)”, “The ISAF is confined to Afghanistan’s capital Kabul (True)”, “The ISAF is headed by British troops (True)”, “The ISAF’s role is to assist the Taliban in rebuilding the
new Afghanistan (False)", and "The ISAF operates under the auspices of NATO (False)". Right answers were coded as 1, and wrong and don't know answers were coded as 0. For each individual the sum of correct answers was computed (minimum = 0 – maximum = 5).

"Attitudes towards the ISAF"

Four items assessed attitudes towards the ISAF (five-point Likert scale: 1 = Strongly disagree – 5 = Strongly agree): "The decision to send British troops to Afghanistan on a peace mission was a good one", "I agree with British peacekeepers being deployed in Afghanistan to restore world peace", "I agree with British peacekeepers being a part of the ISAF to restore human rights in Afghanistan" and "British troops should not serve in Afghanistan in missions other than fighting a war" (reversed scoring). The four items were combined into a scale, with higher scores indicating greater agreement with Britain's involvement in the ISAF.

Analyses

The models in this study were estimated using Maximum Likelihood Estimation based on a covariance matrix, which incorporated the reliabilities of the respective scales to reduce the number of parameters to a reasonable level. In order to adjust for measurement error, the paths from latent variables to their indicators were set to one, whilst the error variances for each scale were set to the product of the scale's variance multiplied by one minus the scale's reliability (see Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1996).

The data were first screened for outliers and missing values. 23 missing values were identified, which were substituted by the mean following the guidelines of du Toit and du Toit (2001; see also Jöreskorg, 2001). Using PRELIS 2.5, the univariate and multivariate distributional properties of the data were then determined, which indicated that the distribution was multivariate normal with a univariate skewness ranging from -2.089 to 1.932 and a kurtosis ranging from -1.872 to 2.340\textsuperscript{72}. Mardia's

\textsuperscript{72} Kline (1998) recommenced absolute value cut-offs of 3.0 for skewness and 8.0 for kurtosis. Whilst there is no standard cut-off for multivariate normality, Kline suggests that multivariate normality can be assumed if this value is less than 3.
statistic was $PK = 1.112$, which also indicated that the assumption of multivariate normality was tenable.

RESULTS

General descriptive analyses

Table 7.1 presents descriptive data for the measures used in this study and the correlations between these measures relating to support for the ISAF. Six out of ten respondents (61%) in this sample agreed with British troops being used as part of the ISAF to bring peace to Afghanistan, whilst 63 percent agreed with British troops being used as part of the ISAF to restore world peace. Six out of ten respondents (62%) also agreed with British troops being used as part of the ISAF to restore human rights in Afghanistan. 34 percent of respondents agreed that British troops should not serve in Afghanistan in missions other than fighting a war.

Table 7.1 also shows the correlations between the measures in this study and indicates that attitudes towards the ISAF were significantly correlated with most of the constructs in the model. Attitudes towards the ISAF were highly correlated with internationalism, militarism, multi-lateralism, perceived respect and outcome perceptions, and, to a lesser extent, perceptions of moral responsibility, perceived risk and monetary considerations. Of the core values, social trust and humanitarianism were significantly associated with attitudes towards the ISAF, political trust and patriotism. Nationalism, egalitarianism and moral traditionalism were only weakly related to attitudes towards the ISAF. Of the demographic variables, only gender, education, political ideology and interest in current affairs were significantly associated with support for the ISAF.
Table 7.1. Descriptive statistics, reliabilities and inter-correlations for attitudes towards the ISAF (Cronbach’s alpha in parenthesis)

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<td>2. Risk</td>
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<td>3. Outcome</td>
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<td>4. Responsibility</td>
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<td>5. Monetary</td>
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<td>6. Respect</td>
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<td>7. Internationalism</td>
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<td>-.34</td>
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<td>8. Militarism</td>
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<td>-.37</td>
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<td>9. Lateralisim</td>
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<td>-.23</td>
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<td>10. Social Trust</td>
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<td>.42</td>
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SD | 1.14  | 1.01  | 1.02  | 0.92  | 0.89  | 0.92  | 1.00  | 1.12  | 0.99  | 0.96  | 0.95  | 1.22  | 0.84  | 0.81  | 0.75  | 1.02  |

Note: Significant correlations at p < 0.05 are in bold
Of the five contextual variables, outcome perceptions and perceived respect were most significantly related to internationalism, multi-lateralism and social trust. Perceived respect was also significantly associated with political trust. Perceptions of moral responsibility were most highly correlated with internationalism, humanitarianism and political trust, followed by social trust and nationalism, whilst monetary considerations were most strongly related to political trust, nationalism, humanitarianism and internationalism. Perceived risk was significantly related to militarism, humanitarianism and political trust.

Of the three postures, internationalism was most strongly related to humanitarianism, political and social trust. Militarism was most highly associated with political trust and nationalism, whilst multi-lateralism was most strongly related to social trust, humanitarianism and political trust. Egalitarianism was correlated with internationalism, and weakly associated with militarism and multi-lateralism. Moral traditionalism was negatively related to internationalism and multi-lateralism, and positively correlated with militarism.

The effects of humanitarianism, egalitarianism and moral traditionalism in the hierarchical model of attitudes towards the ISAF

The previous analyses have shown that humanitarianism, social and political trust strongly related to the three postures and attitudes towards the ISAF in Afghanistan. By contrast, egalitarianism and moral traditionalism were only weakly associated with the three postures and ISAF attitudes. These findings begged the question as to whether these latter two constructs were significant predictors within the hierarchical model of support for the ISAF. Using structural equation modelling, the impact of these core values was assessed in detail.

As in the previous chapters, a model was first estimated in which variables at more abstract levels influenced constructs at more specific levels, with the five contextual variables being modelled as the consequences of attitudes towards the ISAF rather than as its causes. In this model (Model 1, see Figure 7.2), political trust, social trust, humanitarianism and patriotism had significant positive paths to internationalism. Militarism was positively affected by nationalism and political trust. Political and
Figure 7.2. Structural model (Model 1) of the determinants of attitudes towards the ISAF

Note: Estimates are standardised. Only significant paths over .20 are shown. R2 values are indicated in parenthesis.
Table 7.2. Standardised total effects of the structural model of attitudes towards the ISAF

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Note: Total effects significant at p < 0.05 are shown in bold. The highlighted section refers total effects associated with attitudes towards the ISAF.
social trust, humanitarianism and patriotism also had significant paths to multi-
lateralism. Internationalism and multi-lateralism had significant positive paths to
attitudes towards the ISAF. Contrary to expectations, militarism also had a
significant positive effect on attitudes towards the ISAF. Attitudes towards the ISAF
in turn positively affected outcome perceptions, perceived responsibility and
perceived respect, and negatively influenced perceived risk and monetary
considerations.

Egalitarianism and moral traditionalism were only weak predictors of the three
postures or attitudes towards the ISAF (see Table 7.2). Inspection of the modification
indices suggested that the fit of the model could be improved if these variables were
removed. Having excluded these constructs, the model was re-estimated, which
showed an acceptable fit to the data ($\chi^2 = 63.67, df = 54, p = .032, GFI = .901, AGFI
=.900, RMSEA = .066, ECVI = .11$).

As in the previous chapters, an alternative model (Model$_2$) was tested, in which the
five contextual variables were treated as indicators of attitudes towards the ISAF, and
not their consequences. This model did not fit the data well ($\chi^2 = 92.18, df = 72, p =
.012, GFI = .713, AGFI = .712, RMSEA = .071; ECVI = .16$), and the model
(Model$_1$) depicted in Figure 7.2 was therefore retained. Total effects for this model
(Model$_1$) are provided in Table 7.2.

The effects of national images in the hierarchical model of attitudes towards the
ISAF

Another aim of this study was to assess the predictive power of two types of national
images within the hierarchical model – images of the Afghan government and
images of the Afghan population. According to Hurwitz and Peffley (1990), national
images conceptually precede constructs at the postural level. A model (Model$_\text{IMAGE1}$)
was therefore estimated in which the two types of national images were situated at a
level of abstraction between core values and postures (see Figure 7.3). According to
this model, images of the Afghan government showed negative paths to
internationalism, militarism and multi-lateralism, whilst images of the Afghan
population positively affected internationalism and negatively influenced militarism.
Figure 7.3. Original structural model (ModelIMAGE1) of attitudes towards the ISAF, including images

Political trust

Social trust

Humanitarianism

Nationalism

Patriotism

Images of Afghan government

Images of Afghan population

Internationalism

Militarism

Multi-lateralism

ISAF

Outcome perception

Perceived risk

Responsibility

Monetary consideration

Respect

Note: Estimates are standardised. Only significant paths over .20 are shown. R2 values are indicated in parenthesis.
Figure 7.4. Alternative structural model (Model IMAGE2) of attitudes towards the ISAF, including images

Note: Estimates are standardised. Only significant paths over .20 are shown. R2 values are indicated in parenthesis.
Figure 7.5. Final structural equation model (Model_{IMAGES}) of attitudes towards the ISAF, including images

Note: Estimates are standardised. Only significant paths over .20 are shown. R^2 values are indicated in parenthesis.
Table 7.3. Standardised total effects for the final hierarchical model (Model IMAGE3) including national images

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<td>-.244</td>
<td>.295</td>
<td>.451</td>
<td>.196</td>
<td>-.098</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Social trust</td>
<td>.297</td>
<td>.229</td>
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<td>12. Nationalism</td>
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<td>-.117</td>
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<td>.179</td>
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<td>-.219</td>
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<td>.275</td>
<td>-.168</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>13. Patriotism</td>
<td>.193</td>
<td>.109</td>
<td>-.064</td>
<td>-.192</td>
<td>.194</td>
<td>.265</td>
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<tr>
<td>15. Images gov</td>
<td>.188</td>
<td>.201</td>
<td>-.175</td>
<td>-.117</td>
<td>.198</td>
<td>-.261</td>
<td>.209</td>
<td>-.281</td>
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<td>-.333</td>
<td>-.304</td>
<td>-.201</td>
<td>-.105</td>
<td>.197</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>16. Images pop</td>
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<td>-.187</td>
<td>-.154</td>
<td>.204</td>
<td>-.204</td>
<td>.219</td>
<td>-.200</td>
<td>-.192</td>
<td>.348</td>
<td>-.219</td>
<td>-.186</td>
<td>-.103</td>
<td>.392</td>
<td>.306</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
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<td>-.074</td>
<td>.096</td>
<td>.198</td>
<td>-.107</td>
<td>.097</td>
<td>-.078</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>-.080</td>
<td>-.465</td>
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<td>.411</td>
<td>-.209</td>
<td>-.397</td>
<td>-.483</td>
<td>.491</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political id</td>
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<td>-.029</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>.101</td>
<td>-.139</td>
<td>-.021</td>
<td>-.009</td>
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<td>-.024</td>
<td>-.213</td>
<td>-.229</td>
<td>.309</td>
<td>.177</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.121</td>
<td>.167</td>
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<td>Education</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>.037</td>
<td>-.104</td>
<td>-.145</td>
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<td>.192</td>
<td>.148</td>
<td>-.043</td>
<td>.149</td>
<td>.241</td>
<td>.285</td>
<td>-.348</td>
<td>.160</td>
<td>.247</td>
<td>.244</td>
<td>.231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.111</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>-.132</td>
<td>-.163</td>
<td>-.118</td>
<td>-.199</td>
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<td>.141</td>
<td>.220</td>
<td>-.273</td>
<td>.269</td>
<td>-.254</td>
<td>.256</td>
<td>.239</td>
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<td>Current affairs</td>
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<td>-.169</td>
<td>-.117</td>
<td>.195</td>
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<td>.300</td>
<td>-.255</td>
<td>.122</td>
<td>.277</td>
<td>.457</td>
<td>.458</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Significant total effects at p <0.05 are in bold. The shaded section refers to the total effects associated with attitudes towards the ISAF.
Images of the Afghan population did not significantly affect multi-lateralism. However, the strength of these paths did not exceed .22.

In turn, these images were influenced by some of the core values. Social trust had a direct (positive) path to images of the Afghan population and a negative path to images of the Afghan government. Political trust and, to a lesser extent, nationalism showed only significant direct (negative) paths to images of the Afghan government, whereas humanitarianism significantly influenced only images of the Afghan population. Patriotism was only weakly related to images of the Afghan population, whilst nationalism was only a weak influence on images of the Afghan government.

This model (Model\textsubscript{IMAGE1}) did not fit the data well ($\chi^2 = 105.03$, df $= 78$, $p = .009$, GFI $= .667$, AGFI $= .659$, RMSEA $= .112$, ECVI $= .21$). Overall, this model (Model\textsubscript{IMAGE1}) explained 41 percent of the total variance in attitudes towards the ISAF. It could be argued that the two types of images assessed in this study were themselves specific attitudes rather than longstanding predisposition. These images themselves could be shaped by postures rather than shaping them. This possibility was explored in a model (Model\textsubscript{IMAGE2}) in which images were situated at a level of abstraction between postures and specific attitudes towards the ISAF (see Figure 7.4). This model also did not fit the data well ($\chi^2 = 97.18$, df $= 70$, $p = .011$, GFI $= .679$, AGFI $= .673$, RMSEA $= .086$, ECVI $= .16$).

Inspection of the modification indices indicated that the fit of the model could be significantly improved by adding direct paths from the core values to postures, and by adding direct paths from images to attitudes towards the ISAF. The model (Model\textsubscript{IMAGE3}) was re-estimated with these paths included (see Figure 7.5), which provided a better fit to the data ($\chi^2 = 69.57$, df $= 55$, $p = .024$, GFI $= .889$, AGFI $= .889$, RMSEA $= .057$, ECVI $= .09$). In this model, core values directly affected the three postures and images. The three postures and two types of images directly influenced attitudes towards the ISAF, which in turn directly influenced the five contextual variables.

Overall, this model (Model\textsubscript{IMAGE3}) fit the data better than did the conceptual model (Model\textsubscript{IMAGE1}) based on Hurwitz and Peffley (ECVI $= 0.09$ versus ECVI $= .21$), and
the constructs explained 52 percent of the total variance in attitudes towards the ISAF (see Table 7.3 for total effects of the constructs in this model).

The effects of specific knowledge on attitudes towards the ISAF

Another aim of this study was to assess the impact of specific political knowledge within the hierarchical model. Partial correlations were first conducted to assess the impact of the two political knowledge measures, general and policy specific knowledge, on core values, postures and ISAF attitudes.

Partial correlations\(^7\) were performed on general political knowledge and the model constructs. Because the two measures of knowledge were inter-related (r = .51), this was followed by another set of analyses to assess the impact of specific political knowledge on the study variables when general political knowledge was corrected for.

Table 7.4 indicates that when statistically corrected for by general political knowledge, specific political knowledge was more significantly related to the model constructs than was general political knowledge. In particular, specific political knowledge was more highly related than general knowledge to social trust, political trust and humanitarianism. General political knowledge was not significantly correlated with either images of the Afghan government or Afghan population, whereas policy-specific knowledge was significantly (albeit weakly) related to both these images.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Construct</th>
<th>General pol. knowledge</th>
<th>Specific pol. Knowledge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social trust</td>
<td>.30*</td>
<td>.38**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political trust</td>
<td>.36*</td>
<td>.45**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarianism</td>
<td>.34*</td>
<td>.39**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotism</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.25*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^7\) Five respondents who did not answer any of the knowledge questions and six respondents who replied 'don't know' to all knowledge questions were omitted from the analyses in this section, which are thus based on a sample of 325 participants.
Chapter 7 Political knowledge revisited

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Construct</th>
<th>General pol. knowledge</th>
<th>Specific pol. Knowledge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internationalism</td>
<td>.29*</td>
<td>.31*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarism</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-lateralism</td>
<td>.28*</td>
<td>.30*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes towards ISAF</td>
<td>.26*</td>
<td>.39*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Images of Afghan gov.</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.32*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Images of Afghan pop.</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.29*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *=p < .05; **=p < .01.

On the basis of these results, a multi-group structural equation analysis was conducted in which the structure of support for the ISAF was investigated separately for respondents with high or low levels of policy-specific knowledge. For this purpose, the sample was divided into a high specific knowledge group who answered correctly at least four of the five question in the specific knowledge quiz (N = 117), and a low policy-specific knowledge group, consisting of respondents who had answered correctly a maximum of three questions (N = 208).

It was first checked whether the constructs were equally reliable within the two knowledge groups (see Chapter 6). The reliabilities for each construct in the model are given in Table 7.5, which indicates that they were slightly more reliable in the politically informed group and in the uninformed one. The magnitude of these differences was estimated by calculating the ratio between the reliabilities of both samples (see Goren, 2001b), and the table shows that there were no discernible differences between the reliabilities from the two groups. It was therefore concluded that the reliabilities were approximately equal for the two groups.

Table 7.5. Construct reliabilities by specific knowledge group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Construct</th>
<th>Low knowledge group</th>
<th>High knowledge group</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Patriotism</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Trust</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Trust</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarianism</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-lateralism</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarism</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internationalism</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As in Chapter 6, a model was estimated separately within the high and low policy-specific knowledge groups. More specifically, two models were estimated in which
all paths were constrained to be equal, thus assuming that the two groups would not differ in parameter estimates or model fit. The models were initially constrained to be equal since Hurwitz and Peffley argued that individuals, independent of their extent of knowledge, use the hierarchical structure to generate their foreign policy attitudes.

To recap from Chapter 6, if both informed and uninformed respondents rely on core values and postures to form their attitudes towards the ISAF, then the coefficients should be statistically significant in both groups, and the difference in magnitudes between the two groups should be statistically insignificant. However, if the use of core values and postures is moderated by political knowledge, then the coefficients should be significantly larger in the high knowledge group. Statistically significant differences between the two groups were determined using modification indices (see Chapter 6)\(^7\)\(^4\).

Table 7.6 provides the structural coefficients and model-fit statistics. It shows that model fit was acceptable in both groups. The table also indicates that the coefficients were significant in both groups, indicating that both groups relied on these constructs to shape their attitudes towards the ISAF. None of the chi-square differences for the three postures and five core values were statistically significant\(^7\)\(^5\).

Both the coefficients of the Afghan government and Afghan populace were significantly associated with attitudes towards the ISAF. However, the magnitude of both these coefficients was higher in the high specific knowledge group than in the low specific knowledge group; differences that were just statistically insignificant using the Bonferroni correction ($\Delta \chi^2 = 6.02$, df = 1, $p = .015$ and $\Delta \chi^2 = 5.13$, df = 1, $p = .021$, respectively).

\(^7\)\(^4\) Differences are statistically significant at $p < 0.005$ using the Bonferroni method.

\(^7\)\(^5\) Internationalism: $\Delta \chi^2 = 0.51$, df = 1, $p = .38$; Militarism: $\Delta \chi^2 = 1.28$, df = 1, $p = .069$; Multilateralism: $\Delta \chi^2 = 0.83$, df = 1, $p = .25$; Social trust: $\Delta \chi^2 = 0.80$, df = 1, $p = .26$; Political trust: $\Delta \chi^2 = 0.97$, df = 1, $p = .30$; Humanitarianism: $\Delta \chi^2 = 1.33$, df = 1, $p = .078$; Nationalism: $\Delta \chi^2 = 0.95$, df = 1, $p = .38$; and Patriotism: $\Delta \chi^2 = 0.73$, df = 1, $p = .30$. 

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Table 7.6. Structural equation model for attitudes towards the ISAF by level of policy-specific knowledge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coefficients</th>
<th>Attitudes towards the ISAF</th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internationalism</td>
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<td>.547**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarism</td>
<td>.254**</td>
<td>.402**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-lateralism</td>
<td>.309**</td>
<td>.481**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social trust</td>
<td>.216*</td>
<td>.388**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political trust</td>
<td>.211*</td>
<td>.364**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarianism</td>
<td>.338**</td>
<td>.394**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>.286**</td>
<td>.191*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotism</td>
<td>.233**</td>
<td>.325**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan government</td>
<td>-.174*</td>
<td>-.363**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan populace</td>
<td>.192*</td>
<td>.377**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Model Fit:

- $\chi^2$: 82.18* \hspace{1cm} 85.73*
- Df: 58 \hspace{1cm} 58
- GFI: .88 \hspace{1cm} .86
- AGFI: .87 \hspace{1cm} .86
- RMSEA: .057 \hspace{1cm} .062
- N: 117 \hspace{1cm} 208

Note: * = p < 0.05; ** = p < 0.01

DISCUSSION

As predicted, humanitarianism emerged as a powerful predictor of attitudes towards the ISAF. It showed significant positive paths to internationalism and multi-lateralism, but had no significant path to militarism. In terms of its total effects, humanitarianism had a stronger effect on attitudes towards the ISAF than any of the other core values. Thus, not only is humanitarianism a powerful predictor of social welfare policies, but results also suggested that it may be a powerful influence on foreign policy attitudes.

An unexpected finding was the positive relationship between militarism and attitudes towards the ISAF. This could be due to several factors. The operation followed closely behind punitive military action, and this may have made it hard for individuals to distinguish between the different operations. Alternatively, September 11th may have had a significant impact on the effect of militarism on public attitudes. Furthermore, the public may have perceived the humanitarian mission as just a small
part of a larger more belligerent operation, the so called “War on Terror”. Retrospectively, it is hard to make strong assertions about this issue, but a detailed study of media representations of Britain’s involvement within Afghanistan at this time period may help to clarify the role of militarism on public opinion (see Myers, Klak & Koehl, 1996 for an analysis of how the news coverage of Rwanda and Bosnia affected attitudes towards these missions).

Images and foreign policy attitudes

Hurwitz and Peffley (1990) proposed that specific foreign policy preferences reflect an integration of national images and dispositional factors. In particular, they argued that core values influence national images, which, in turn, influence foreign policy postures and through them specific attitudes. However, the results of the structural equation analyses suggested that the effects of national images on support for the ISAF did not strictly follow the structure postulated by Hurwitz and Peffley. Indeed, the conceptual model based on Hurwitz and Peffley showed a poor fit to the data. Although images were influenced by core values, images did not influence postures in a significant way. Based on modification indices, a model was estimated in which core values influenced both images and postures, and in which both postures and images affected attitudes towards the ISAF.

Although contrary to findings by Hurwitz and Peffley (1992) and others (e.g. Murray & Cowden, 1999; Brewer & Steenbergen, 2002), the findings in this study are similar to those of Herrmann and Keller (2001) who reported that perceptions of different countries were not significantly related to value dispositions, such as political ideology, internationalism or militarism.

What could explain this discrepancy between the results in this study and previous research? Existing research of images within the hierarchical model has predominantly relied on enemy images of the Soviet Union. It could be argued that these images were longstanding and ingrained in the American psyche. According to Kegley and Wittkopf (1987), the Soviet Union had spearheaded the communist challenge and American foreign policy had to be dedicated to the containment of Soviet expansionism and influence. Furthermore, according to Hurwitz and Peffley
(1990, p.7), "perceptions of Soviet threat may be quite global and visceral, resting on general assessments that the Soviet Union ... poses a danger to the security and well-being of the United States". It can hardly be claimed that similar "visceral" perceptions underlay either images of the Afghan government or the Afghan populace. Indeed, Afghanistan quite possibly did not figure greatly in the British psyche until after the September 11th attacks. The placement of post-Cold War images may need to be re-conceptualised within the hierarchical model, an issue that is revisited in the next chapter.

Although images did not affect postures, they did significantly influence attitudes towards the ISAF. Images of the Afghan government had a significant negative effect on attitudes towards the ISAF, whilst images of the Afghan population had significant positive effects on ISAF attitudes. Thus, respondents who held images of the government as untrustworthy, aggressive and uncooperative, and images of the populace as trustworthy, peaceful, co-operative and friendly held more positive attitudes towards a peace operation in that country. These results, therefore, suggest that beliefs about the trustworthiness of a foreign nation have remained a key factor in organising attitudes in the post-Cold War era (Chanley, 1999). These findings also suggest that it may be productive to study images of both sides in a modern conflict.

As well as being positively related to social trust, political trust and humanitarianism, images of Afghanistan were to some degree also affected by specific political knowledge. The results indicated that respondents with high specific knowledge of the ISAF appeared to rely more on images of the Afghan government and populace in shaping their attitudes towards the ISAF than did respondents with no such specific knowledge. However, the differences between the groups were insignificant.

Nevertheless, this suggests that people may have based their judgement about the trustworthiness of the Afghan government or population not only on a country-specific evaluation, but also that these perceptions arose from a general proclivity to trust or mistrust others or to be concerned about others in need (e.g. Bartels, 1994; Brewer & Steenbergen, 2002). Similarly, both images were significantly related to political trust. Politically trusting respondents were more likely to have negative perceptions of the Afghan government and more positive images of the Afghan
population than did politically cynical respondents. These results suggest a potential interplay between situational information and general predispositions. Such an interaction has been suggested by Herrman and colleagues (1999; see also Jenkins-Smith et al., 2004 and Herrmann & Keller, 2004), who have argued that mass decisions can be explained in terms of a quasi-rational integration of value disposition and strategic situational assessments. Future research on differing geopolitical contexts may highlight the significance of situational variables in structuring public opinion.

These results also affirm that images or stereotypes of other people and nations are important to the understanding of international attitudes (e.g. Hewstone, 1986). According to Tajfel (1981, p. 148) "the essential cognitive function of stereotyping is thus to systemise and simplify information from the social environment in order to make sense of the world that would otherwise by too complex and chaotic for effective action." Stereotypes also fulfil social functions; "first, their role in contributing to the creation and maintenance of group 'ideologies', explaining or justifying a variety of social actions; and second, their role in helping to preserve or create positively valued differentiations between one's own and other social groups" (Tajfel, 1981, p. 148).

**General versus policy-specific political knowledge**

According to Johns (2002), studies exploring the impact of knowledge require a detailed measure of knowledge that is specific to the independent variable under investigation. The simple correlations indicated that attitudes towards the ISAF were significantly related to both general political knowledge and policy-specific knowledge. As shown by the results in the previous chapter with regards to general political knowledge, the current results indicated that respondents with high policy-specific knowledge did not rely on core values and postures to constrain their attitudes towards the ISAF anymore than did respondents with low policy-specific knowledge.
CONCLUSION

The results presented here showed that policy-specific political knowledge had no influence over the degree to which individuals used core values and postures to shape their attitudes. Contrary to expectations, findings from the present study also showed that images directly influenced attitudes and should be placed at the same level as postures within the hierarchical model.

Additionally, and concurring with the results of other studies (e.g. Page & Shapiro, 1992; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1990), egalitarianism and moral traditionalism did not play a significant role in structuring foreign policy attitudes in the present study. Chapter 3 discussed how social and political attitudes can be structured along two dimensions, a dimension of authoritarianism, and a dimension of egalitarianism. Following the reasoning of Duckitt (2001), egalitarianism would be subsumed within one dimension, whilst moral traditionalism would be contained within the other. The most powerful predictive measures of these dimensions are RWA and SDO (e.g. Altemeyer, 1998), and the next chapter investigates the effects of RWA and SDO upon the hierarchical model and attitudes towards peace operations.
As discussed in Chapter 3, of the many individual difference measures used to predict the rejection of out-groups and prejudice, right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) are widely held to be the most important by contemporary researchers (e.g. Altemeyer, 1998; Doty, Winter, Peterson & Kemmelmeier, 1997; Duckitt, 2001). Both RWA and SDO have also been shown to predict powerfully a wide range of political attitudes (e.g. Pratto et al., 1994).

Another belief that might be an important construct to consider in international attitudes is a belief in a just world (BJW). Although existing evidence for this suggestion is scant, research indicates that BJW predicted attitudes towards the Kosovo War and the War in Afghanistan. The impact of BJW alongside SDO and RWA was therefore also assessed in this study.

The relationship between images and attitudes towards peace operations had been explored in the previous chapter. It was shown that the model proposed by Hurwitz and Peffley (1990) did not provide a good fit to the data, and a re-conceptualisation was proposed. The present study tested this revised model.

The impact of these and the variables assessed in previous chapters were investigated with respect to both a peace operation and a combat mission. This was made possible by the unique political situation in Afghanistan in April 2002, when British troops were involved simultaneously in a peace operation in Kabul (ISAF) and a combat mission in other areas of Afghanistan.
Chapter 8 War and peace in Afghanistan

RWA and SDO

As outlined in Chapter 3, SDO refers to the extent to which “one desires that one’s ingroup dominate and be superior to outgroups” (Pratto et al., 1994, p. 742). Recent research has shown that people high in SDO are more likely to support military programmes in general (e.g. Cohrs, Moschner, Kielmann & Mass, 2002) as well as to support specific military operations in the Gulf War (Pratto, Stallworth & Conway-Lanz, 1998; see also Sidanius & Liu, 1992) and Afghanistan (Henry, Sidanius, Levin, Pratto, & Nammour, 2002).

However, SDO does not unconditionally predict support for war. Pratto and colleagues (1994) investigated the effect of SDO on two types of war — Wars of Dominance (e.g. to protect economic interests, to have influence in that country) and Wars for Humanitarian Reasons (e.g. to ensure human rights, to protect civilians). They found that SDO was positively related to Wars of Dominance and negatively associated with Humanitarian Wars. Pratto and colleagues (1994, p. 758) therefore concluded that rather than predisposing individuals to support war unconditionally, “SDO predisposes people to endorse group dominance ideologies, thus facilitating support for wars of dominance.”

RWA is seen as comprising tendencies to authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression and conventionalism (Altemeyer, 1998). Authoritarianism has also been repeatedly linked to support for military interventions. For example, authoritarianism has been linked to support for wars in general (e.g. Cohrs et al., 2002) as well as the Vietnam War (e.g. Granberg & Corrigan, 1972; Izzett, 1971), the Gulf War 1990/1991 (Doty, Winter, Peterson & Kemmelmeier, 1997; Stephan, Berger, Schmidt & Herrmann, 1995) and the Kosovo War (Bartholomes, Gericke, Hartenstein et al., 1999, Cohrs & Moschner, 2002). A strong correlation between authoritarianism and attitudes towards military enforcement of human rights has also been reported by Fetchenhauer and Bierhoff (2001) and Cohrs and colleagues (2002). Furthermore, investigating American responses to the attacks of September 11th, Henderson-King and colleagues (2004) found that RWA was a significant predictor of the use of military force, increased surveillance and detention, attacking terrorists and sending aid to Afghanistan.
However, empirical research has predominantly explored the relationship between SDO, RWA and military interventions. Thus, the effects of these two variables on attitudes towards peace operations needed to be validated.

Belief in a just world

Previous chapters have highlighted the importance of social trust in shaping attitudes towards peace operations. According to Janoff-Bulman (1992), not only are beliefs about people an important facet of an individual's fundamental assumptions, but beliefs about the world also play a significant role.

The Belief in a Just World (BJW) postulates that, "individuals have a need to believe that they live in a world where people generally get what they deserve" (Lerner & Miller, 1978, p. 1030). This hypothesis was originally formulated by Lerner (1965) to help explain why individuals might blame victims of misfortune for their own fate. Stated simply, BJW thus refers to the belief that good things happen to good people and bad things happen to bad people. According to Lerner and Miller (1978, p. 1030),

*The belief that the world is just enables the individual to confront his physical and social environment as though they were stable and orderly. Without such a belief it would be difficult for the individual to commit himself to the pursuit of long range goals or even to the socially regulated behavior of day to day life.*

This hypothesis was subsequently developed to conceptualise BJW as an inter-individually varying disposition (Rubin & Peplau, 1975). According to this conceptualisation, the more individuals believe in a just world, the more they will rationalise inequalities, the less sympathetically they will react towards injustice, and the more they will derogate victims of social injustice.

Indeed, research has highlighted the strong correlations between BJW and negative attitudes towards disadvantaged targets, such as individuals from economically deprived backgrounds (e.g. Furnham & Gunter, 1984) or poor countries (e.g. Harper
& Manasse, 1992), the unemployed (e.g. Montada & Mohiyeddini, 1998), the elderly (e.g. Begue & Bastounis, 2003) or immigrants and foreign workers (e.g. Dalbert & Yamauchi, 1994). Applebaum (2002) also reported that students with a weak BJW judged potential recipients of aid as more deserving than did students with a strong BJW.

A great number of studies have explored the link between attitudes towards third world poverty and BJW. A common finding from these studies is that individuals with high BJW are more likely to attribute poverty to the victim's dispositional factors (e.g. Cambell, Carr & MacLachlan, 2001). In contrast, individuals with a weaker BJW are more likely to agree that poverty in the developing world is the result of situational factors, such as war, corruption or exploitation (e.g. Harper & Manasse, 1992).

Although the concept of justice-injustice should be particularly relevant to the study of the use of force and international conflict, this link has rarely been assessed directly. Indirect evidence comes from a study by Maes (1998), who found that individuals who believed that the world is just were more likely to trust the government, which supported the Kosovo War, than were individuals who held contrary beliefs. Similarly, Cohrs and colleagues (2002) reasoned that the concept of justice should be particularly relevant in the domain of militaristic attitudes since many military interventions are framed in terms of establishing justice. They found that perceived justice was negatively related with attitudes towards military interventions in general, and military interventions against terrorism and the enforcement of human rights in particular. The authors suggested that this relationship was mediated by political trust, which they had not assessed. However, in another study the belief in just world did not directly influence attitudes towards the Kosovo War, but showed indirect influences through militarism and trust in government (Cohrs & Moschner, 2002).

Two recent studies have also reported a link between BJW and a desire for revenge after the September 11th attacks. Kaiser, Vick and Major (2004) found that the more individuals endorsed beliefs in a just world before the September 11th attacks, the more they felt distressed and threatened by the attacks, and the more they desired
retaliatory political actions. Similarly, Henderson-King and colleagues (2004) reported that BJW was significantly related to using military force and attacking terrorists after the attacks of September 11th.

Thus, there are theoretical and empirical grounds for investigating the importance of BJW in shaping attitudes towards peace operations, which were explored with respect to a humanitarian intervention and a combat mission in Afghanistan.

**BJW, RWA and SDO – Relationship with core values**

Several studies have also shown that SDO, RWA and BJW conceptually precede core values (e.g. Duckitt et al., 2002). For example, using path analysis, Pratto and colleagues (1998; see also Duckitt & Fisher, 2003) showed that a model in which SDO indirectly affected attitudes towards military programmes through nationalism and conservatism provided a better fit than did an alternative model in which SDO directly influenced military attitudes.

Indeed, social-psychological research points to a complex relationship between SDO, RWA, BJW and the other constructs relevant to this study. For example, given that has been linked to derogatory social attitudes, it is perhaps paradoxical that BJW has been related to social trust. According to Lerner (1980), however, the more individuals believe in a just world, the more positive their perception of others in general should be. Indeed, Begue (2002) reported that a just world belief was the most important predictor of interpersonal trust. Begue (2002, p. 377) reasoned that this is because “someone whose world is perceived as just must be just himself, and hence must be trustworthy.” Similarly, Dalbert, Lipkus, Sallay & Goch (2001) argued that individuals with a high BJW are more likely to believe that others will treat him or her fairly than are individuals with a low BJW.

A similar positive relationship has also been reported between BJW and political trust. Peplau and Tyler (1975), for example, found that people who believed the world was just were less cynical about politics and politicians than were people who believed the world was unjust. Zuckermann & Gerbasi (1977) also showed that
respondents who scored high on BJW were more trusting in the government’s position on various public issues than respondents who scored low on BJW.

There is also evidence that SDO is related to some of the core values that have been assessed in previous chapters. Several studies have linked SDO with nationalism and patriotism (e.g. Duckitt et al., 2002; Levin, Sidanius, Rabinowitz & Federico, 1998; Pratto et al., 1994; Pratto et al., 1998). Similarly, SDO has been found to be negatively related to empathy and altruism (Pratto et al., 1994).

Strong relationships between RWA and nationalism have also been reported (e.g. Altermeyer & Kamenshikov, 1991; Duckitt et al., 2002; Oesterreich, 1998). Studies have also shown that authoritarianism is strongly related to trust in government (e.g. Altermeyer, 1998). Thus, one would expect authoritarianism to be more strongly related to support for an international intervention if the government is trusted than if it is not.

Existing work in the foreign policy area has not made a structural distinction between SDO, RWA, BJW and core values, that is, it has assessed these constructs on the same level of abstraction as social trust or nationalism (e.g. Cohrs & Moschner, 2002). Therefore, the position and effects of SDO, RWA and BJW within the hierarchical model were also investigated.

Attitudes towards war and humanitarian interventions

The issues mentioned above were explored with respect to a unique political situation in Afghanistan in April 2002, when British troops were concurrently involved in a peace operation in Kabul (ISAF) and a combat mission in other areas of Afghanistan. This allowed attitudes towards peace operations and combat missions to be assessed simultaneously within the same population.

Fetchenhauer and Bierhoff (2001) proposed that the determinants of attitudes towards humanitarian interventions are different from those for conventional warfare. It was hoped that the political situation at the time of the study would illuminate how these two sets of attitudes might differ.
Political context

In addition to spearheading the ISAF in Kabul, British troops were also deployed to Afghanistan to continue the military fight against Al Qaida. In March 2002, 1,700 Royal Marines were deployed to Afghanistan as Task Force JACANA to play their part, alongside other coalition forces, in the destruction of the terrorist infrastructure in eastern Afghanistan. This task force was the largest offensive ground operation involving UK forces since the Gulf conflict 1990/91. The Task Force withdrew from Afghanistan in July 2002.

Study aims and hypotheses

In addition to the predictions made in previous chapters, the literature reviewed above leads to the following hypotheses:

"Effects of SDO, RWA and BJW within the hierarchical model"

Based on previous research (e.g. Pratto et al., 1994) that SDO, nationalism and patriotism reflect an attitudinal bias to favour the national in-group, a positive relationship was expected between SDO, nationalism and patriotism. Furthermore, because the concern for others mitigates the desire to dominate other groups (e.g. Pratto et al., 1994), it was predicted that SDO was negatively related to humanitarianism.

According to Pratto and colleagues (1998), individuals high in SDO are more likely to support military intervention than those low in SDO because such interventions re-assert a country's dominant position with respect to other countries. It was therefore predicted that SDO would positively correlate with militarism and attitudes towards the combat mission. Based on Pratto and colleagues (1994), SDO should be negatively associated with attitudes towards the ISAF.

The impact of SDO on internationalism and multi-lateralism has not previously been tested, and predictions were therefore made tentatively. Several studies have shown that SDO was negatively related to choosing co-operative strategies (e.g. Schafer, 1997a), and as multi-lateralism represents joint-action and co-operation between
countries and organisations, it could be argued that SDO should have a negative relationship with multi-lateralism.

Similarly, internationalism refers to the extent to which an individual believes that it is in their nation's interest to get involved in international affairs. Internationalism could also be related to increased tolerance for other national or ethnic groups. Consequently, it could be argued that individuals who endorse internationalism are less likely to endorse hierarchical or prejudicial attitudes towards other ethnic or national groups, suggesting that SDO should be negatively related to internationalism.

Since individuals high in RWA tend to be submissive to the views of important others, such as the government (e.g. Oesterreicher, 1998), it was hypothesised that RWA would be positively related to political trust. Based on findings by Altemeyer (1996) and Fetchenhauer and Bierhoff (2001) that individuals high in RWA support inter-group aggression, it was also expected that RWA was positively associated with militarism and attitudes towards the combat mission.

Since RWA is also associated with an ethnocentric view of the world (e.g. Altemeyer, 1996), individuals high in RWA should not be interested in the situation in other countries, and therefore RWA should be negatively related to internationalism. Overall, it was expected that RWA would be positively related to attitudes towards the combat mission and the ISAF, largely as a function of its association with political trust.

BJW refers to the belief that people get what they deserve. Therefore, it was hypothesised that such beliefs should be negatively related to attitudes towards peace operations in that respondents who believe in a just world should be more likely to believe that Afghanistan had created its own problems. Conversely, it could be argued that BJW should be positively related to attitudes towards the combat mission and the humanitarian mission since respondents high in BJW could view the combat mission as a punitive measure, as part of the "War on Terror", in which Afghanistan got what it deserved.
In a similar vein, BJW should be negatively associated with humanitarianism. It could be argued that since people high in BJW typically blame victims of misfortune for their fate, respondents high in BJW should be less likely to show concern for the well-being of others than participants low in BJW. Based on previous research (Begue, 2002), it was also argued that BJW would be positively related to social trust and political trust.

Based on results from the previous chapter, it was expected that images are situated at the same level of abstraction as postures, thereby influencing attitudes towards the ISAF and the combat mission and being influenced by core values. No hypotheses were made about the relationships between SDO, RWA, BJW and images.

METHOD

Sample composition

304 respondents participated in this postal survey, which was carried out in Guildford at the end of April 2002. Of the 600 questionnaires that had been distributed, 309 were returned, of which five had to be discarded because of incomplete information. Overall, the return rate for this survey was 51%. The questionnaire took about 30 minutes to complete.

Compared to Census data (see Appendix H for details), the sample over-represented male respondents, those aged 30-44 and 45-59, those having A-levels and O-levels, and those in working in professional (Class 2), personal service (Level 6) and elementary occupations (Level 9), whilst it under-represented those aged 60 and over, those with a degree and with no qualifications, and those in managerial (Class 1), administrative (Class 4) and skilled trade occupations (Class 5).

The sample was weighted on these characteristics to address these biases and to achieve a more accurate representation of the overall population. All the analyses in this chapter were conducted after the sample had been weighted.
Chapter 8  War and peace in Afghanistan

Measures

In addition to the measures outlined in the previous chapter, this study also assessed the following variables (see Appendix I for details of the items used in this survey):

"Attitudes towards the combat mission"
Attitudes towards the combat mission in Afghanistan were assessed by four items (five-point Likert scale: 1 = Strongly disagree to 5 = Strongly agree). These items included: “I approve of British troops participating in military strikes against the Taliban and Al’Qaida”, “I approve of the way Tony Blair is handling the British response to the terrorist attacks on 11th September”, “I oppose British troops being involved in military action in Afghanistan (reversed scoring)” and “I approve of British troops participating in military air strikes to restore world peace”. These four items were combined into a scale, with higher scores indicating higher agreement with the combat mission.

"Social dominance orientation"
Attitudes towards inter-group relations and support for hierarchy-enhancing myths were assessed with a 14-item SDO measure (Pratto et al., 1994; seven-point Likert scale: 1 = Very negative to 7 = Very positive). Items in this measure included: “It is important that we treat other countries as equal (reverse scoring)”, “This country would be better off if we cared less about how equal all people are”, and “Some people are just more worthy that others”. The 14 items were combined into a scale. Previous studies indicated good internal consistency and validity (see Pratto & Sidanius, 1999). Higher scores on this scale indicate a greater belief in inequality amongst social groups.

"RWA"
A 24-item RWA scale was used to measure authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression and conventionalism (Altemeyer, 1981; seven-point Likert scale: 1 = Disagree strongly to 7 = Agree strongly). Items included: “Our customs and national heritage are the things that have made us great, and certain people should be made to show greater respect for them”, “Youngster should be taught to refuse to fight in a war unless they themselves agree the war is just and necessary (reversed scoring)”,

and "It's one thing to question and doubt someone during an election campaign, but once a man becomes the leader of our country we owe him our greatest support and loyalty." These items were combined into a scale, with higher scores reflecting greater endorsement of RWA.

"Just world belief"

Belief in a just world was measured with an instrument developed by Lipkus, Dalbert and Siegler (1996), following criticism of the internal validity of the scale proposed by Rubin and Peplau (1973, 1975; see Furnham & Procter, 1989, Furnham, 2001). This measure asks participants to express their agreement or disagreement with eight statements that assess beliefs about justice (five-point Likert scale: 1 = Strongly disagree" to 5 = Strongly agree). Items included: "I feel the world treats people fairly", "By and large, people get what they deserve" and "I feel that when people meet with misfortune, they have brought it upon themselves". The eight items were combined into a scale, with greater scores on this scale indicating a greater belief in a just world for others.

The descriptive statistics, reliabilities and inter-correlations amongst all the constructs in this study are provided in Table 8.1.

Analyses

Maximum Likelihood Estimation based on a covariance matrix was used to estimate the models in this study, which incorporated the reliabilities of the respective scales to reduce the number of parameters to a reasonable level (e.g. Schumaker & Lomax, 1996). To adjust for measurement error, the paths from latent variables to their indicators were set to one, whilst the error variances for each scale were set to the product of the scale's variance multiplied by one minus the scale's reliability (see Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1996).

28 missing values were identified during data screening, which were imputed from the mean following the guidelines of du Toit and du Toit (2001; see also Jöreskorg, 2001). Using PRELIS 2.5, the univariate and multivariate distributional properties of the data were then assessed, which indicated that the distribution was multivariate
normal with a univariate skewness ranging from -1.728 to 2.024, and a kurtosis ranging from -1.903 to 2.350\textsuperscript{8.1}. Multivariate kurtosis (Mardia's statistic) was also assessed, which equalled 1.511, which also indicated that the assumption of multivariate normality was tenable.

RESULTS

General descriptive analyses

Consistent with findings from the previous chapter, almost six out of ten respondents (59\%) agreed with British troops being used as part of the ISAF to being peace to Afghanistan. Similarly, six out of ten respondents (61\%) agreed with British troops being used as part of the ISAF to restore world peace, with 62\% also agreeing with British troops being used as part of the ISAF to restore human rights in Afghanistan.

Over six out of ten respondents (67\%) also approved of British troops participating in military strikes against the Taliban and Al'Qaida. A similar percentage of respondents (66\%) also agreed with British troops participating in military strikes in Afghanistan to restore world peace, whilst 35\% were opposed to British troops being involved in military action in Afghanistan.

*Table 8.1* provides the correlations between the measures used in this study and shows that attitudes towards the ISAF and the combat mission were significantly related to most variables under investigation. Attitudes towards the ISAF and the combat mission were moderately correlated (r = .49), indicating that respondents who agreed with British participation in the humanitarian intervention also agreed with British involvement in military action in Afghanistan. Both attitudes were significantly related to internationalism, multi-lateralism and militarism. Militarism was related to attitudes towards the combat mission as well as attitudes towards the ISAF.

\textsuperscript{8.1} Kline (1998) recommenced absolute value cut-offs of 3.0 for skewness and 8.0 for kurtosis. Whilst there is no standard cut-off for multivariate normality, Kline suggests that multivariate normality can be assumed if this value is less than 3.
Table 8.1. Descriptive statistics, reliabilities and inter-correlations for attitudes towards interventions in Afghanistan (Cronbach’s alpha in parenthesis)

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M    | 3.41 | 3.52 | 3.54 | 3.12 | 3.59 | 3.18 | 3.57 | 2.98 | 3.20 | 3.60 | 3.51 | 3.63 | 3.55 |
SD   | 1.05 | 1.00 | 0.98 | 1.10 | 0.89 | 0.64 | 0.94 | 1.11 | 0.83 | 0.86 | 1.53 | 1.42 | 1.07 |

Note: Correlations significant at p < 0.05 are in bold.
As predicted, RWA was positively correlated with both attitudes towards the ISAF and the combat mission. As predicted, SDO was positively related to attitudes towards the combat mission. Contrary to predictions, however, SDO was also positively correlated with attitudes towards the ISAF. Finally, contrary to predictions, BJW were positively correlated with both attitudes towards the ISAF and the combat mission.

The following sections will explore the relationships amongst these constructs and their effect on the missions in Afghanistan in more detail using structural equation modelling.

**SDO, RWA, BJW and attitudes towards the ISAF and the concurrent combat mission**

**The ISAF**

It was argued that SDO, RWA and BJW should conceptually precede other core values, such as political trust and nationalism. A hierarchical model (Model_{ISAF1}) was therefore estimated in which these “worldviews” were placed at a higher level of abstraction than core values (see Figure 8.1). In addition, attitudes towards the ISAF affected the five contextual variables in this model. This model fit the data well ($\chi^2 = 89.03$, df = 83, $p = .039$, GFI = .902, AGFI = .902, RMSEA = .062, ECVI = .08). Overall, this model explained 47 percent of the total variance in attitudes towards the ISAF.

*Figure 8.1* shows that RWA and BJW had significant positive paths to political trust, whilst BJW also showed a significant positive path to social trust. By contrast, SDO and RWA had significant negative paths to social trust. SDO and RWA, but not BJW, had significant positive paths to nationalism and patriotism. Finally, SDO and RWA had significant negative paths to humanitarianism, whilst BJW showed a positive path to humanitarianism.
Figure 8.1. Hierarchical model (ModelISAFL) of attitudes towards the ISAF

Note: Estimates are standardised. Only significant paths above .20 are shown. R^2 values are indicated in parentheses.
Figure 8.2. Hierarchical model (ModelCOMBI) of attitudes towards the combat mission in Afghanistan

Note: Estimates are standardised. Only significant paths above .20 are shown. R² values are indicated in parentheses.
Table 8.2. Standardised total effects for support for attitudes towards the ISAF and combat mission (excluding contextual variables for clarity)

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Note: Total effects in bold are significant at p < 0.05.
Political trust, social trust, patriotism and humanitarianism had significant positive effects on internationalism, whilst nationalism had a significant negative path to internationalism. Political trust, humanitarianism and nationalism also had significant positive effects on militarism, whilst social trust a significant negative effect. Political trust, social trust, patriotism and humanitarianism all had significant positive paths to multi-lateralism. Overall, political trust and humanitarianism were the strongest predictors (in terms of total effects) of attitudes towards the ISAF in Afghanistan (see Table 8.2).

In turn, internationalism, militarism and multi-lateralism had significant positive effects on attitudes towards the ISAF. Attitudes towards the ISAF showed significant positive paths to outcome perceptions, perceived responsibility and perceived respect and significant negative paths to perceived risk and monetary considerations\(^8\,2\).

To assess whether SDO, RWA and BJW also influenced the three postures and attitudes towards the ISAF directly, a model (Model\(_{ISAF2}\)) was re-estimated with these paths included. This model also fit the data well ($\chi^2 = 86.88, df = 71, p = .031, \text{GFI} = .905, \text{AGFI} = .905, \text{RMSEA} = .059$). However, this model did not fit the data significantly better than Model\(_{ISAF1}\) ($\Delta \chi^2 = 2.15, df = 12, p = .32$), and the strictly hierarchical Model\(_{ISAF1}\) shown in Figure 8.1 was retained.

Finally, to explore whether SDO, RWA and BJW could be placed at the same level of abstraction as the other core values, an alternative model (Model\(_{ISAF3}\)) was estimated in which these three constructs were situated alongside other core values ($\chi^2 = 139.88, df = 92, p = .010, \text{GFI} = .758, \text{AGFI} = .759, \text{RMSEA} = .094, \text{ECVI} = .16$). This Model\(_{ISAF3}\) did not fit the data better than did Model\(_{ISAF1}\) (ECVI = .07 versus ECVI = .16), and Model\(_{ISAF1}\) shown in Figure 8.1 was retained.

The influence of SDO, RWA and BJW on attitudes towards the ISAF was therefore best conceptualised as indirect through core values and postures.

\(^8\,2\) An alternative model (Model\(_{ISAF1A}\)) in which the five policy-specific variables influenced attitudes towards the ISAF was also estimated. This model did not fit the data well ($\chi^2 = 115.03, df = 95, p = .012, \text{GFI} = .774, \text{AGFI} = .774, \text{RMSEA} = .12, \text{ECVI} = .17$). This alternative model (Model\(_{ISAF1A}\)) did not fit better than did Model\(_{ISAF1}\) (ECVI = .17 versus ECVI = .08) and Model\(_{ISAF1}\) was retained.
The combat mission

When the hierarchical model (ModelCOMBI) was estimated for attitudes towards the combat mission in Afghanistan ($\chi^2 = 86.12$, df = 83, p = .047, GFI = .914, AGFI = .914, RMSEA = .048, ECVI = .07; see Figure 8.2), a similar picture to that of attitudes towards the ISAF emerged. As predicted, militarism was positively associated with attitudes towards the combat mission. Indeed, militarism was a stronger predictor of combat attitudes than internationalism or multi-lateralism.

As in the previous section, two alternative models were estimated that explored whether SDO, RWA and BJW shaped attitudes towards the combat mission directly (ModelCOMB2: $\chi^2 = 79.09$, df = 71, p = .042, GFI = .921, AGFI = .921, RMSEA = .043, ECVI = .07), and whether these three constructs should be placed at the same level of abstraction as core values (ModelCOMB3: $\chi^2 = 135.34$, df = 96, p = .017, GFI = .767, AGFI = .766, RMSEA = .092, ECVI = .15). Neither model provided a better fit to the data than did ModelCOMBI (ModelCOMBI - ModelCOMB2 = $\Delta \chi^2 = 7.03$, df = 12, p = .15; ModelCOMBI - ModelCOMB3 = ECVI = .07 vs. ECVI = .15, respectively), and ModelCOMBI was therefore retained.

The effect of images on attitudes towards interventions in Afghanistan

To explore the effect of images within the hierarchical model, a model (ModelISAFI) based on findings from the previous chapter was estimated in which images were situated at the same level of abstraction as postures. Images were therefore shaped by core values and influenced attitudes towards the ISAF independently of postures. According to this model, political trust and social trust showed negative paths to images of the Afghan government. In turn, images of the Afghan government had a negative path to attitudes towards the ISAF. Political trust, social trust and humanitarianism showed positive paths to images of the Afghan population, which in turn had a positive path to attitudes towards the ISAF (see Figure 8.3). The model fit

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To investigate whether the five contextual factors influenced attitudes towards the combat mission an alternative model (ModelCOMBIA) was also estimated. This model did not fit the data well ($\chi^2 = 111.25$, df = 95, p = .019, GFI = .779, AGFI = .779, RMSEA = .13, ECVI = .18). This Alternative Model (ModelCOMBIA) did not fit better than did ModelCOMBI (ECVI = .18 versus ECVI = .07) and ModelCOMBI was retained.
the data well ($\chi^2 = 101.23$, df = 90, $p = .048$, GFI = .938, AGFI = .938, RMSEA = .047, ECVI = .06).

To test whether a model following Hurwitz and Peffley's (1990) conceptualisation provided a better fit to the data, a model (Model_ISAFI2) was estimated in which images were situated between core values and postures. This model did not fit the data very well ($\chi^2 = 148.51$, df = 116, $p = .014$, GFI = .788, AGFI = .781, RMSEA = .085, ECVI = .15), and fit the data less well than did the previous model (Model_ISAFI1; ECVI = .15 versus ECVI = .06). The model (Model_ISAFI1) shown in Figure 8.3 was retained (see Table 8.3 for the total effects within this model).

Finally, a model was estimated in which SDO, RWA and BJW directly affected the two images. In this model only SDO showed a significant negative path to images of the Afghan population, whereas BJW showed a positive path to images of the Afghan population. RWA did not significantly affect either image nor did BJW and SDO show significant paths to images of the Afghan government. The fit of the model was acceptable ($\chi^2 = 100.00$, df = 84, $p = .041$, GFI = .940, AGFI = .939, RMSEA = .044, ECVI = .06). However, this model (Model_ISAFI3) did not fit the data significantly better than did the original model (Model_ISAFI1; $\Delta \chi^2 = 1.23$, df = 6, $p = .52$), and the more parsimonious model (Model_ISAFI1) in Figure 8.3 was retained.

To investigate whether a similar relationship existed between images and attitudes towards the combat mission in Afghanistan, a model (Model_COMBI1) was tested that was identical to the structure retained above. The model fit the data well ($\chi^2 = 99.14$, df = 90, $p = .037$, GFI = .912, AGFI = .912, RMSEA = .049, ECVI = .06).
Figure 8.3. Attitudes towards the ISAF including images of Afghanistan

Note: Estimates are standardised. Only significant paths above .20 are shown. $R^2$ values are indicated in parentheses.
Figure 8.4. Attitudes towards the combat mission including images of Afghanistan

Note: Estimates are standardised. Only significant paths above .20 are shown. R^2 values are indicated in parentheses.
Table 8.3. Standardised total effects for support for attitudes towards the ISAF and combat mission including images (excluding contextual variables for clarity)

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Note: Significant total effects (p < 0.05) are in bold
DISCUSSION

This study investigated the different attitudinal bases of attitudes towards war and attitudes towards a humanitarian operation. With the exception of militarism being a stronger predictor of attitudes towards the combat mission than the ISAF, attitudes towards the two interventions were otherwise very similar. Indeed, attitudes towards the combat mission and attitudes towards the ISAF were moderately correlated ($r = .49$). Both attitudes were positively related to internationalism and multi-lateralism. In terms of total effects, both attitudes were most positively influenced by political trust and humanitarianism, followed by patriotism and social trust. Finally, both attitudes were also positively related to SDO, RWA and BJW (in terms of total effects).

This finding is contrary to Fetchenhauer and Bierhoff (2001), who have argued that a distinction needs to be made between attitudes towards conventional war issues and attitudes towards humanitarian interventions. Indeed, Fetchenhauer and Bierhoff (2001) proposed that attitudes towards humanitarian interventions are a novel attitude dimension and should therefore show a different relationship with psychological predictors than attitudes towards a conventional war.

However, as discussed in the previous chapter, it may be harder to distinguish between contemporary peace operations and conventional combat missions in terms of the use of force and rules of engagement (e.g. Langholtz, 1998). This distinction may become even more blurred when humanitarian arguments are used in support of both peace operations and combat missions. Indeed, contrary to predictions, humanitarianism was positively related to militarism in both SEM models of attitudes towards the ISAF and attitudes towards the combat mission. In terms of total effects, humanitarianism was also the strongest predictor of attitudes towards both types of intervention, followed by political trust. An analysis of the media representations of the war in Afghanistan and Britain's involvement in the ISAF may shed some light on this issue (see Myers, Klak & Koehl, 1996).
SDO, RWA and BJW and attitudes towards interventions in Afghanistan

Although SDO and RWA did not directly affect attitudes towards the ISAF or the combat mission in the model, an examination of the total effects indicated that both SDO and RWA were related to mission attitudes. Contrary to predictions, SDO was positively related (in terms of total effects) to both attitudes towards the ISAF and attitudes towards the combat mission.

This finding is contrary to that of Pratto et al. (1994), who showed that SDO was positively related to attitudes towards war and negatively related to attitudes towards humanitarian action. However, as discussed above, this may indicate that the ISAF was not perceived solely as a humanitarian mission but as part of a larger anti-terrorist action or as the enforcement of basic human rights. Two studies (Cohrs et al., 2002; Henry et al, 2002) have found positive relationships between SDO and RWA with both the fight against terrorism and the military enforcement of human rights. Indeed, the enforcement of human rights was a major component of the ISAF mission.

As hypothesised, RWA was positively related to both mission attitudes (in terms of its total effects). Previous research has investigated this link only with respect to military combat missions, both hypothetical and real. This study adds to these findings by showing that RWA was also related to humanitarian missions. Consistent with previous research (e.g. Altermeyer, 1996), this relationship was mediated by political trust, indicating that authoritarianism was characterised by obedience to authority.

Since BJW refers to a belief that people get what they deserve, it was predicted that BJW should be negatively related to the ISAF and the combat mission. However, contrary to predictions BJW was positively associated with both mission attitudes (in terms of total effects). There is some indication in the literature that rather than being associated with victim derogation, BJW can be associated with pro-social behaviour. For example, Bierhoff, Klein and Kramp (1991) found that individuals with high BJW perceived greater social responsibility and empathy to give first aid to a victim after an accident than did individuals with low BJW. Similarly, Furnham (1995)
reported a positive relationship between BJW and donating money to medical charities abroad. According to Bierhoff et al. (1991), high BJW can lead to prosocial behaviour when victims are perceived as innocent and not responsible for their lot.

Indeed, the concept of deservingness is an integral aspect of BJW (see Lerner, 1980), and respondents who are high in BJW could have been more likely to support the interventions in Afghanistan because they perceived a divide between the oppressive Taliban regime and the suffering population. This suggestion is borne out by the finding that BJW was positively related to images of the Afghan population but was not related to images of the Afghan government, indicating that respondents high in BJW were more likely to perceive the Afghan population in positive terms of friendship, trust and peace. Respondents in this study could therefore have perceived the Afghan population as deserving international help through both humanitarian and military interventions, which punish the guilty and reward the deserving.

BJW, RWA, SDO and core values

Another more general aim of this study was to investigate the effects of SDO, RWA and BJW within the hierarchical model. Based on existing research (e.g. Pratto et al., 1994; Duckitt & Fisher, 2003), it was argued that these constructs should conceptually precede core values in the model. Indeed, comparisons of different models indicated that this provided the best fit to the data.

According to SEM models, the relationship between BJW and attitudes towards the two interventions in Afghanistan was mediated by social trust, political trust and humanitarianism. Respondents who believed in a just world were significantly more likely to trust the government and generalised others; findings that replicate those of Begue (2002). In addition, respondents who believed the world was just were also significantly more likely to be concerned about the welfare of others. In turn, both types of trust were significantly related to attitudes towards the combat mission as well as the ISAF. Panel data or experimental manipulation could investigate this relationship in more detail.
In line with previous studies (e.g. Pratto et al., 1994), SDO showed direct positive effects on nationalism and patriotism, indicating that individuals who were high in SDO held more nationalistic beliefs and were more patriotic than individuals low in SDO. SDO was also negatively related to humanitarianism, and social trust. The former finding builds on results by Pratto et al. (1994) that SDO was negatively related to altruism and empathy; the two constructs assumed to underlie humanitarianism (e.g. Brewer & Steenbergen, 2002). Trust in others and a concern for the welfare of others therefore mitigated the desire to dominate other groups.

RWA showed significant positive effects on political trust, nationalism and patriotism, which are consistent with previous research (Altemeyer, 1996). Respondents scoring high on RWA were more politically trusting, held more nationalistic beliefs, and were more patriotic than those scoring low on RWA (Oesterreich, 1998). In line with predictions, it was negatively associated with social trust and humanitarianism.

Images and attitudes towards interventions in Afghanistan

Present results also confirmed findings from the previous study that images shape attitudes towards peace operations in a different way than proposed by Hurwitz and Peffley (1990). Rather than being situated at a level of abstraction between core values and postures, images may be more accurately placed at the same level of abstraction as postures. Images are therefore influenced by core values and, in turn, influence specific attitudes towards peace operations (see Figure 8.5 for a re-conceptualisation of Hurwitz and Peffley’s model).

Images of the Afghan government had negative paths to both attitudes towards the ISAF and the combat mission, whereas images of the Afghan population had positive paths to these attitudes. Perhaps unsurprisingly, respondents who perceived the Afghan government to be untrustworthy, aggressive, threatening and authoritarian, and the Afghan population to be trustworthy, peaceful and good, agreed more with Britain’s involvement in both the combat mission and the peace operation.
Figure 8.5. A revised version of Hurwitz and Peffley’s (1990) model of the hierarchical model including images

CONCLUSION

This chapter has shown that SDO, RWA and BJW affect core values within the hierarchical model, which are more generic constraints than core values. The next chapter assesses the influence of more general descriptors of attitudes, namely Schwartz’s value types, on attitudes towards peace operations. More specifically, it explores the relative importance of ten universal values as predictors of attitudes towards two humanitarian interventions.
CHAPTER 9

BASIC HUMAN VALUES AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS PEACE OPERATIONS

TWO SCENARIOS

Two studies are reported in this chapter that explore the role of basic human values in shaping attitudes towards peace operations. As discussed in Chapter 3, the term "value" has been defined in inconsistent ways not only by social scientist but also by political scientists (for an overview of the different uses of the term see Rohan, 2000). In keeping with political research, "core values" in this thesis have referred to an individual's overarching normative principles and belief assumptions about government, citizenship and society (e.g. McCann, 1997) or the "personal statements regarding the individual's priorities and concerns" (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987, pp.1105-1106). These core values are epitomised in individuals' beliefs about government, nations, human nature, moral traditions, and equality in society amongst others.

Values in social psychology have a different connotation. Values are typically conceptualised as important life goals or standards that serve as guiding principles in life (e.g. Rokeach, 1973). The definition of "values" also frequently implies a structure or organisational system. For example, Hofstede (2001), Rokeach (1973) and Schwartz (1992) maintain that individuals have a value system that contains a finite number of universally important value types, with individuals differing in the importance or priority they attach to each of these value types.
Rokeach (1973) suggested that values occupy a central position in cognitive networks of attitudes and beliefs. If value priorities are "a type of personality disposition" (Bilsky & Schwartz, 1994, p. 178), basic human value systems should cause people to view the world in a particular way. More specifically, "all attitudinal and behavioural decisions ultimately should be traceable to personal value priorities" (Rohan, 2000, p. 270).

Rohan (2000) proposed a model in which attitudinal or behavioural decisions are linked to basic human values (or what he terms personal value systems) through a causal chain of intermediate variables. In its simplest form (see Figure 9.1), the model proposes that basic human values are causally antecedent to worldviews, which refer to individual's conscious beliefs about the world that are a function of their value priorities, such as RWA, SDO and nationalism. In turn, these worldviews influence specific attitudes and behaviours.91

Figure 9.1. Relations among basic human values, worldviews, and attitudinal and behavioural decisions – A simplified model adapted from Rohan (2000)

According to Rohan's model, the core values studied in previous chapters and extant research should be intrinsically related to basic human values. Indeed, some research is accumulating that shows that core values and postures, such as political trust, militarism or nationalism, are underpinned by such basic human values (e.g. Devos, Spini & Schwartz, 2002; Wolfradt & Dalbert, 2003). However, such values have so

91 It should be noted that the influences in Rohan's original model are bi-directional. According to Rohan (2000), changes in worldviews will be mirrored by changes to the underlying value priorities. This reasoning incorporates Rokeach's (1973, p. 21) argument, "a major advantage gained in thinking about a person as a system of values ... is that it becomes possible to conceive of his undergoing change as a result of changes in social conditions." Similarly, Ronan included a bi-directional path from attitudinal or behavioural decision to worldviews to allow for the possibility that worldviews may change in response to a behaviour that is performed frequently. Present data did not allow for such bi-directional effects to be tested, and future research using large-scale longitudinal data is needed to address the causality within this model.
far not been studied with respect to the Hurwitz and Peffley's hierarchical model of foreign policy attitudes.

The main aim of this study was to identify the relative importance of specific basic human value types as predictors of attitudes towards humanitarian operations. A second aim was to examine the extent to which core values and postures were related to, and influenced by, basic human values. These investigations were theoretically guided by Schwartz's theory of basic human values.

The theory of basic human values

Schwartz (1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, 1990) defined values as enduring beliefs pertaining to desirable end states or modes of conduct that transcend specific situations and guide choices of actions. Furthermore, Schwartz and his colleagues have suggested that it is possible to order values by importance to form a hierarchy of value priorities.

Schwartz (1992) derived a typology of values based on the assumption that values refer to a finite number of motivational concerns that originate from the requirement to cope with reality. More specifically, value types are assumed to represent, to different degrees, three universal requirements of human existence to which all individuals and societies must be responsive: (1) to satisfy biological needs, (2) to achieve co-ordinated social interaction, and (3) to meet social and institutional demands for group survival and welfare (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, 1990). Through socialisation, individuals learn to think of their motivational concerns as conscious values, to use terms to communicate these values, and to ascribe different degrees of importance to them.

Evidence suggests that the stability of values can be affected by "significant events", such as the September 11th attacks. For example, Olivas-Lujan, Harzig & McCoy (2004) reported an amplification of cosmopolitan and power values in American students following the attacks. Interestingly, the authors also collected data from a small sample of UK students, but failed to find a similar impact on cultural values in this sample. Future research is needed to explore the possible impact of such significant events on value priorities using a greater range of values in a diverse populations.
According to Schwartz (1992), values also fall along two dimensions that function as motivations. The first dimension contrasts values that orient towards the pursuit of self-interest (self-enhancement) with values that tend towards a concern for the welfare of others (self-transcendence). Values on the second dimension reflect the extent to which individuals are motivated to preserve the status quo (conservation) or the degree to which individuals are motivated to challenge themselves both for intellectual and emotional realisation (openness to change).

Schwartz's model postulates that 56 values can be categorised into ten value types, which, in turn, are arrayed along these two value dimensions (see Figure 9.2 for a schematic representation of these value relations). The ten value types and their meanings are as follows:

1. Self-direction: “independent thought and action-choosing, creating and exploring” (Schwartz, 1992, p. 5)
2. Stimulation: “excitement, novelty, and challenge in life” (p. 8)
3. Hedonism: “pleasure or sensuous gratification for oneself” (p. 8)
4. Achievement: “personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards” (p. 8)
5. Power: “attainment of social status and prestige, and control or dominance over people and resources” (p. 9)
7. Conformity: “restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms” (p. 9)
8. Tradition: “respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that one's culture or religion impose on the individual” (p. 10)
9. Benevolence: “preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact” (p. 11); and
10. Universalism: “understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature” (p. 12).
Following Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, 1990), this model also postulates that different value types serve individual or collective interests. Five value types are thought to serve mainly individual interests (power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation and self-direction) and are opposed to three value types that serve primarily collective interests (benevolence, tradition and conformity). Both types of values are postulated to form adjacent regions. Two value types serve both types of interests (universalism and security), which are located on the boundaries between these regions (see Figure 9.2).

Figure 9.2. Schwartz's (1992) revised theoretical model of relations among motivational types of values, higher order value types, and bipolar value dimensions

The structural relationship between the different value types can also be framed with reference to the two motivational value dimensions (see Figure 9.2). Conformity, tradition and security are value types compatible with the underlying motivation of
conservation, which stress order and resistance to change. Underlying self-direction and stimulation is an intrinsic motivation for mastery and openness to change, and these value types lie in direct opposition to conformity, tradition and security.

Underlying power, achievement and hedonism is the motivation of self-enhancement, which results in an emphasis on the "attainment or preservation of a dominant position within the more general social system" (Schwartz, 1992, p. 9). Finally, benevolence and universalism are both motivated by a concern for others and the transcendence of selfish interests, which are in direct opposition to values such as power, achievement and hedonism.

Figure 9.2 indicates the conflicts and compatibilities that may occur between different value types. According to Schwartz (1992), the combined pursuit of certain value types may give rise to psychological and / or social conflict. Such conflict may arise with the following three value type combinations (shown at opposite ends to each other in the figure):

"(1) self-direction and stimulation versus conformity, tradition, and security – emphasising own independent thought and action and favoring change conflict with submissive self-restriction, preservation of traditional practices, and protection of stability; (2) universalism and benevolence versus achievement and power – acceptance of others as equals and concern for their welfare interferes with the pursuit of one's own relative success and dominance over others; (3) hedonism versus conformity and tradition – indulgence of one's own desires contradicts restraint of one's own impulses and acceptance of externally imposed limits" (Schwartz, 1992, p. 15).

By contrast, value types that are adjacent to each other in the figure are postulated to be compatible. Combinations of the value types lead to the following nine emphases, which have been validated by cross-cultural research (see Schwartz, 1992, p. 42): (1) enhancing the welfare of others and transcending selfish interests (combining universalism and benevolence); (2) showing self-restraint and submission (uniting tradition and conformity); (3) protecting order and harmony in relations with others
(combining conformity and security); (4) controlling uncertainty (uniting security and power); (5) desiring social superiority and esteem (combining power and achievement); (6) egoistic self-indulgence (uniting achievement and hedonism); (7) desiring pleasant arousal (combining hedonism and stimulation); (8) showing motivation for mastery and novelty (uniting stimulation and self-direction); and (9) relying on one’s own judgement and being comfortable with diversity (combining self-direction and universalism). Of interest is that cross-cultural research did not show evidence for a tenth combination, namely uniting benevolence and tradition.

Schwartz also hypothesised that associations between the 10 value types and other variables should decrease monotonically as one moves around the circular structure of value types in both directions from the value that correlates most highly with the variable in question. According to Devos, Spini and Schwartz (2002, p.483, see also Schwartz, 1996),

instead of testing a large set of predictions for the potential associations between a variable and each value, the theory allows us to derive one integrated hypothesis specifying the general pattern of associations between the external variable and the value priorities.

Basic human values and attitudes towards foreign policy issues and militarism

The majority of research that has investigated the value structure of political attitudes using Schwartz’s value system has focused on voting behaviour (e.g. Schwartz, 1996) or the underlying dimensions of political ideology (e.g. Barnea & Schwartz, 1998)\textsuperscript{9,3}. However, a few studies have also attempted to explain international attitudes in terms of Schwartz’s value types.

Mayton, Diessner and Granby (1996; see also Granby, Mayton & Diessner, 1993) found that individuals who preferred non-violent strategies in conflict resolution

\textsuperscript{9,3} For studies that have explored the link between political attitudes and values using a value structure other than Schwartz’s, see, for example, Billig & Cochrane (1979), Braithwaite (1997); Rokeach (1973).
placed greater importance than did individuals who preferred violent strategies on universalism and benevolence; value types that are associated with the preservation and protection of the general welfare of all people and nature. Non-militaristic individuals were also more likely to endorse conformity and self-direction; value types that are associated with harmony in relations and personal freedom.

By contrast, Mayton, Peters and Owens (1999) reported that militaristic attitudes most strongly correlated with values related to power, security, hedonism, achievement and conformity, a finding that was replicated by the same authors in 2000. Another study also found that scores on an acceptance of war scale were positively related to power and valuing absolute rules, whilst being negatively related to valuing taking care of others and inclusiveness (Johnson, Handler & Criss, 1993). Individuals who preferred militaristic solutions were more likely to endorse values of power, achievement and hedonism; value types that place greater emphasis on goals related to social status, prestige, personal success and personal gratification. In addition, these individuals also placed higher priorities on security values, which are associated with safety and stability of society.

The finding that militaristic attitudes were positively related to self-enhancement values (e.g. power) and conservation values (e.g. conformity), as well as other variables, such as RWA and SDO, was also obtained in studies that examined the determinants of attitudes towards specifics wars, such as the Gulf War (e.g. Doty, Winter, Peterson & Kemmelmeier, 1997; Pratto et al., 1994) and the Kosovo War (e.g. Begue & Apostolidis, 2000). Nelson and Milburn (1999, p. 161) thus concluded that militaristic attitudes are "nested within a value system and worldview that gives high priority to the achievement and maintenance of power, authority, and superiority for one's self and one's identity groups".

However, both Fetchenhauer and Bierhoff (2001), and Cohrs and his colleagues (2002) have recently suggested that a distinction needs to be made between attitudes towards conventional war issues and attitudes towards humanitarian interventions. For example, Fetchenhauer and Bierhoff (2001) have argued that attitudes towards humanitarian interventions are a novel attitude dimension that is only weakly anchored in a pre-existing political value system. They also propose that such
attitudes should show a different relationship with human values than conventional war attitudes.

Yet, the empirical evidence that attitudes towards humanitarian interventions are associated with different value and psychological correlates than conventional war attitudes is tentative. For example, Cohrs and colleagues (2002) found that generalised militaristic attitudes, attitudes towards military force against terrorism and attitudes towards military enforcement of human rights were most strongly positively correlated with security values, followed by power values, whilst being most strongly negatively related to universalistic values. Therefore, the association between basic human values and attitudes towards peace operations merited further investigation.

Value types, worldviews and core values

A number of recent studies have also explored the link between basic human values, worldviews and core values. Perhaps the most 'extensive' research has been conducted with regards to the worldviews of RWA and SDO, and studies have shown that these were differentially related to value types.

For example, Rohan and Zanna (1996) investigated the link between RWA and Schwartz's value types. They reported that individuals who held authoritarian beliefs were significantly more likely than their non-authoritarian counterparts to place importance on conformity, tradition, security and power, and to place less importance on self-direction, stimulation and universalism. Similar findings were also made by McFarland and Adelson (1996), who reported significant relationships between authoritarianism and tradition ($r = .41$), conformity ($r = .30$) and security ($r = .26$).

By contrast, SDO was not significantly related to these three values but was instead significantly associated with power ($r = .37$) and universalism ($r = -.29$; McFarland & Adelson, 1996). Duriez and van Hiel (2002) extended these findings by showing that SDO, but not RWA, was significantly positively related to power, achievement and
hedonism, and negatively associated with universalism and benevolence. Similar findings were also made by van Hiel and Mervielde (2002).

Some studies have also shown a close relationship between BJW and value types. Reviewing this research, Furnham and Proctor (1989) found that BJW was positively related to conservative social attitudes, conformity to social rules and deference to authority. Building on this work, Wolfradt and Dalbert (2003) explored the value basis of BJW with a limited set of Schwartz's values and reported that BJW was positively related to conformity and security, and negatively correlated with self-direction.

It has been argued that institutions such as the government help maintain and transmit human values (e.g. Rokeach, 1979). However, only one study to date has explored the value basis of political trust. Devos, Spini and Schwartz (2002) found that trust in institutions was most positively correlated with tradition, security and conformity, and most negatively associated with self-direction and universalism. They thus concluded that individuals who sought security and conformity were more likely to seek attachment to collectives, whilst individuals who relied on their individuality and their own judgment were more sceptical about institutions.

Although Feather (1994) investigated the link between national identification and the endorsement of particular values and found it to be most correlated with hedonism and security, no study to date has investigated the value bases of nationalism or patriotism. According to Wrightsman (1991), individuals with a greater focus on social value dimensions (e.g. broad-mindedness) believe that humans are essentially good (see also de St. Aubin, 1996). However, no extant work has investigated the link between social trust, humanitarianism and Schwartz's value types. Therefore, the value bases of these variables were explored in the current studies.

**Study aims and hypotheses**

The main aim of this chapter was to clarify the role of basic human values in predicting attitudes towards peace operations. A second aim was to explore the relationship between value types, core values and postures. Finally, the extent to
Table 9.1. Predicted relationships between basic human values and study constructs

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Note: + indicates the strongest positive relationships; - refers to the strongest negative relationship
which value types mediated the relationship between core values, postures and attitudes towards peace operations was also investigated. Two studies were carried out that addressed these issues in two different scenarios: a hypothetical observer mission in the Middle East, and post-conflict humanitarian interventions in Iraq.

Based on the theory discussed previously, specifically Schwartz’s value system, the following predictions were made (see Table 9.1 for a summary of these predictions):

"Values types and attitudes towards peace operations"

Two opposing hypotheses about the relationship between value types and attitudes towards peace operations can be made. Idealistically speaking, humanitarian interventions, such as observer missions, should be concerned with the welfare of other people living in foreign countries, i.e. with a world at peace. Attitudes towards such operations should therefore be most positively correlated with universalism, and become increasingly more negative as one moves around the value circle in both directions to achievement and power.

Realistically speaking, humanitarian operations entail bringing stability to a country in conflict and re-establishing harmony in relations. Consequently, it was predicted that attitudes towards humanitarian intervention would be most positively correlated with security, becoming increasingly less so with other values round the circle in both directions to stimulation and self-direction.

"Relationship between value types, worldviews and core values"

Based on Devos and colleagues (2002), who found that individuals who seek conformity and security were more likely to be politically trusting, it was hypothesised that security and self-direction should be most strongly related to political trust. More specifically, political trust should correlate most positively with security, and increasingly less positively with other values going round the value circle in both directions to self-direction values.
The link between social trust and value types has not yet been assessed empirically. Because social trust stems from the interactions one has with other people, which gets generalised to distant others, it was predicted that social trust should correlate most positively with benevolence, and become increasingly more negative with other values going round the value circle in both directions to achievement and hedonism values.

Similarly, the link between humanitarianism has not been assessed empirically. Since humanitarianism refers to the concern for the well-being of others, it was hypothesised that it should be most positively associated with universalism, and become increasingly negatively associated with other values in both directions of the value circle to achievement and power values.

Nationalism has been defined as an attachment to the nation grounded in the perception of national superiority. Consequently, nationalism should be most positively correlated with power, and increasingly less so with adjacent values until it is most negatively associated with universalism and self-direction.

According to Feather (1994), individuals who identified with their country were most likely to endorse values such as security and hedonism. However, patriotism is a positive feeling towards the in-group, and it was hypothesised that it should be most positively correlated with benevolence, becoming increasingly negative with other values in both direction to achievement and hedonism.

Social conservatism and valuing tradition is at the heart of RWA, and in line with other research (e.g. Rohan & Zanna, 1996), RWA should be correlated most positively with tradition, and become increasingly more negative with adjacent values until becoming most negatively related to hedonism and stimulation.

SDO refers to the extent to which one desires one's in-group to dominate others (Pratto et al., 1994). Consequently, and in line with Altemeyer (1998), it was predicted that SDO was most positively correlated with power, becoming increasingly more negative around the value circle to self-direction and universalism.
Finally, only some of Schwartz's value types have been examined in existing research on BJW. However, previous work using other value systems has indicated that BJW correlated most highly with conformity to social rules (e.g. Furnham & Proctor, 1989). Consequently, it was predicted that BJW was most highly related to conformity, becoming increasingly negative around the value circle to hedonism and stimulation.

"Value types and postures"

No research to date has examined the underlying value types of internationalism. Since internationalism is the belief that Britain should be actively involved in foreign affairs, and therefore deals with the transcendence of selfish interest, it was hypothesised that it should be most positively related to universalism, and become increasingly more negative around the value circle to achievement. However, the argument could also be made that international involvement is motivated by control or dominance over people and resources. Thus, the reverse could also be predicted: internationalism would be most positively related to power and increasingly less so as one moves around the value circle until becoming most negatively related to universalism and self-direction.

As indicated by previous research (e.g. Cohrs et al., 2002), militarism should be correlated most positively with power, becoming increasingly more negative as one moves around the value circle to self-direction and universalism.

Finally, no existing research has linked multi-lateralism to value types. Research on social dilemmas indicates that the priority described to universalism distinguishes individuals who co-operated in such dilemmas from those who defected (e.g. Gärling, 1999). Sagiv and Schwartz (1995) found that interpersonal co-operation most strongly correlated with benevolence and power values, which suggests that similar value priorities may underlie international co-operation. Two differing hypotheses can be made about the value basis of multi-lateralism. On the one hand, it could be argued that since multi-lateralism involves co-operation with others, it should be most positively related to values that transcend personal interest, i.e. universalism and benevolence, and be most negatively associated with power and
achievement values. On the other hand, since multi-lateralism may indicate conforming to international norms and harmony in relations, it could be argued that it would be most strongly associated with security and conformity values, and become increasingly less so to stimulation and self-direction.

"Mediating effects of value types"

Finally, it has been argued that all attitudinal decisions are traceable to personal value priorities (Rohan, 2000). At the most extreme end, this view suggests that if one wanted to examine the impact of core values or postures (i.e. the social and political beliefs individual hold) on policy preferences, it should be sufficient to focus on basic human value types. The question of whether or not worldviews, core values and postures, apart from basic human values, separately contributed to an explanation of attitudes towards peace operations was therefore also investigated.

STUDY 1 – A HYPOTHETICAL OBSERVER MISSION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The political context – A hypothetical observer mission in the Middle East

Conflict has been a constant part of life and politics in the Middle East since before the Second World War. The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, and its opposition by the Arab population of Palestine and neighbouring states, has led to multiple armed conflicts over the last 50 years and created frequent incidents of violence and tension.

Despite many attempts to create a political solution to the problems of the Middle East, peace still seems to be a distant hope. It has been proposed that the presence of a neutral observer force stationed within Israel and Palestine could help to enforce agreements between both sides and bring peace to the region. Indonesia proposed such an observer force to the UN Security Council in March 2001, and four European governments – Britain, France, Germany and Italy – proposed such a force to the G8 summit in July 2001. On both occasions the idea was rejected by the UN
and the G8 summit. However, it is still a common and recurring part of proposed solutions to peace in the Middle East and the “Roadmap”.

METHOD

Sample composition

Data for this study were collected in a postal survey, which was carried out in Guildford between November 2002 and January 2003. A total of 600 questionnaires were sent out. 236 respondents returned a completed questionnaire; a response rate of 41%.

Compared to 2001 Census data for Guildford, the study sample over-represented male respondents, those aged 24-29, those with A-levels, and those in associate professional (Class 3), personal (Class 6) and sales occupations (Class 7), whilst it under-represented those aged 60 and over, those with no educational qualifications, and those who were in managerial (Class 1) and elementary professions (Class 9; see Appendix J for further details).

To achieve a more accurate representation of the overall Guildford population the sample was weighted on these four demographic variables. All the analyses in this chapter were conducted after the sample had been weighted.

Measures

As well as assessing the measures used in the previous chapters, this study also included the following variables (see Appendix K for details on the items used in this survey):

“Attitudes towards an observer mission in the Middle East”

Five items were used to assess attitudes towards an observer force in the Middle East (five-point Likert scale: 1 = Strongly disagree to 5 = Strongly agree). The statements were introduced by the following: It has frequently been argued that a UN observer force would help establish and maintain peace between Israel and Palestine. We
would like to know your views about Britain’s participation in such a mission in the Middle East by showing your agreement or disagreement with the following statements. “A UN observer mission in Israel and Palestine would be a good solution to the political situation in the Middle East”, “British troops should be sent to the Middle East as part of a UN observer mission after a peace settlement has been reached”, “An observer mission in the Middle East would help Israel and the Arab nations settle their differences and live in peace”, “In addition to participating in a UN observer mission, Britain should increase diplomatic efforts to broker a peace settlement”, “British participation in a UN observer mission in the Middle East would help make the world a safer place” and “British troops should be sent to the Middle East as part of a UN observer mission before a peace settlement has been reached”. Principal component analysis indicated one factor. The items were combined into a scale, with higher scores indicating greater agreement with the observer mission.

“Basic human values”

Values were measured with the Schwartz Value Survey (Schwartz, 1992), which lists 56 value items that are followed by a short definition in parentheses. Participants had to rate each value as a guiding principle in their own life on a 9-point scale from -1 (opposed to my principles) to 0 (not important) to 7 (of extreme importance). According to Schwartz and Bardi (2001), the asymmetry of this scale reflects the discriminations individuals naturally make when thinking about value importance.

Before rating each of the value items, participants were asked to read the whole list and to choose the values most and least important for them. This procedure anchors the ratings and prevents a shifting of criteria as participants go through the value survey (Schwartz & Bardi, 2001).

Information on the descriptive statistics, reliabilities and inter-correlations amongst all the constructs in this study, not including basic human values, is provided in Table 9.2 of the Results section. The reliabilities of the basic human values and their relationships with the variables assessed in this study are presented separately in the Results section.
Analyses

Unlike the previous chapters, which have reported structural equation modelling, Pearson correlations were used to investigate the relationship between attitudes towards the hypothetical observer missions and their determinants. Hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to examine the relative contribution of basic human values in the prediction of attitudes towards the observer mission. These analyses were chosen because the increased number of constructs assessed in this study and the lower sample size prevented the application of structural equation modelling. However, the correlational method of analyses in this chapter reflected the predominant approach to the study of values in the literature (see Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Mayton et al., 1999).

Four groups of variables were entered by blocks into the regression equation. Basic human values were entered first, followed by worldviews (BJW, RWA and SDO) as the second block. Core values (e.g., social trust and humanitarianism) were entered as the third block, and finally postures were entered as the last block. The aim of this procedure was to evaluate whether worldviews, core values and postures had any incremental validity over and above that of basic human values.

The order in which predictors are entered in a regression equation can make a difference with respect to how much variance they account for. In line with the argument outlined previously, the interest here was whether the determinants of the hierarchical model could add significantly to the prediction of specific attitudes towards a hypothetical observer mission over and above basic human values. The order in which blocks were entered therefore followed the order of levels within the hierarchical model - from the most abstract to the more specific.

RESULTS

Attitudes towards an observer mission in the Middle East

Over half of the respondents (56%) agreed that a UN observer mission in Israel and Palestine would be a good solution to the political situation in the Middle East. Over
six out of ten respondents (62%) also believed that British troops should be sent to the Middle East as part of a UN observer mission after a peace settlement had been reached, with (63%) also agreeing that an observer mission in the Middle East would help Israel and the Arab nations settle their differences and live in peace. 62 percent also agreed that British participation in a UN observer mission in the Middle East would help make the world a safer place, whilst 59% also believed that in addition to participating in an observer force, Britain should increase diplomatic efforts to broker a peace settlement. In contrast, only 45 percent of respondents agreed that British troops should be sent to the Middle East as part of a UN observer mission before a peace settlement has been reached.

Table 9.2 shows the correlations between the measures in this study, excluding basic human values that were analysed separately below. Attitudes towards a hypothetical observer mission in the Middle East were positively related to internationalism, militarism and multi-lateralism. Of the core values, humanitarianism and social trust were most strongly related to attitudes to the observer mission, followed by political trust and patriotism. BJW was also positively correlated with attitudes to the observer mission, as were RWA and SDO. The following sections explore the relationships amongst basic human values, the study variables and attitudes towards the observer mission.

**Schwartz's Value Survey**

Following Schwartz (1992), respondents were dropped before the analyses if they used response option 7 (of supreme importance) more than 21 times, or used any other response more than 35 times, as those respondents are assumed to have failed to make an effort to differentiate amongst their values. Respondents who answered fewer than 41 values were also excluded from the analyses. On the bases of these ranges, five respondents had to be dropped, leaving a total sample size of 231.

The 56 values assessed in the present study were classified into 10 value types following the results of data analyses reported by Schwartz (1992), which used smallest space analysis (Guttman, 1968) applied to ratings obtained for these values from samples in 20 different countries. The value types in their order around the
Table 9.2. Descriptive statistics, reliabilities and inter-correlations for attitudes towards a hypothetical observer mission in the Middle East, not including basic human values (Cronbach’s alpha in parenthesis)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
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<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Observer mission</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Internationalism</td>
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<td>.91</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Militarism</td>
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<td></td>
<td>.89</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Social trust</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.55</td>
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<td>.49</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Pol. Trust</td>
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<td>.54</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.34</td>
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<td>.93</td>
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<td>-.25</td>
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<td>-.29</td>
<td></td>
<td>.84</td>
<td></td>
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<td>8. Patriotism</td>
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<td>.35</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td></td>
<td>.87</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Humanitarianism</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>-.34</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td></td>
<td>.90</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>10. BJW</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.87</td>
</tr>
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<td>11. RWA</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>-.39</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>-.35</td>
<td>-.36</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>-.35</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td></td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. SDO</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>-.33</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>-.39</td>
<td>-.47</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>-.43</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Gender</td>
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<td>-.17</td>
<td>-.24</td>
<td>-.27</td>
<td>-.32</td>
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<td>.22</td>
<td>-.34</td>
<td>-.37</td>
<td>-.32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pol. Ideology</td>
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<td>-.14</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.30</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.21</td>
<td>-.29</td>
<td>-.34</td>
<td>-.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>-.33</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>-.41</td>
<td>-.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social class</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>-.24</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.30</td>
<td>-.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>-.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current affairs</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>-.22</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>-.24</td>
<td>-.29</td>
<td>-.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M       3.38  3.51  3.16  3.56  3.24  3.52  3.01  3.21  3.58  3.52  3.52  3.49
SD      1.01  0.87  1.03  0.81  0.77  0.84  1.06  0.65  0.88  1.40  1.57  1.24

Note: Correlations significant at p < 0.05 are in bold.
## Table 9.3. Schwartz Value Survey – Value types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value type</th>
<th>Values</th>
<th>α</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>Broadminded, wisdom, a world of beauty, equality, unity with nature, a world at peace, social justice, protecting the environment</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>Honest, loyal, helpful, forgiving, responsible</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>Respect for tradition, humble, accepting my position in life, devout, moderate</td>
<td>.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conformity</td>
<td>Self-discipline, obedient, politeness, honouring of parents and elders</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Family security, national security, reciprocation of favours, social order, clean</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Social power, wealth, authority, preserving public image</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>Successful, ambitious, capable, influential</td>
<td>.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonism</td>
<td>Pleasure, enjoying life</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stimulation</td>
<td>A varied life, daring, an exciting life</td>
<td>.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-direction</td>
<td>Creativity, freedom, independent, curious, choosing one's own goals</td>
<td>.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The names of the value types are those assigned by Schwartz (1992)

circle, the specific values comprising each value type, and their internal reliabilities (Cronbach’s alpha) in this study are shown in Table 9.3. Although these reliabilities were low, they were within the range of variation commonly observed for these indices (see Schwartz, 1992).

The total score for each subject for each value type was obtained by averaging the subject’s mean score across the values making up each value type. Indices of the four higher-order value types were obtained by averaging all the values that constitute the higher order type (see Table 9.4). Following Schwartz’ (1992) recommendations for standardising importance ratings of value types to control for scale use differences
across individuals, each individual’s mean importance rating for the 56 core values was used as a covariate in the following analyses.

Table 9.4. Schwartz Value Survey – Value dimensions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value dimension</th>
<th>Values</th>
<th>α</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-transcendence / openness to change</td>
<td>Equality, inner harmony, freedom, self-respect, creativity, a world at peace, unity with nature, wisdom, a world of beauty, social justice, independent, broadminded, protecting the environment, choosing own goals, curious</td>
<td>.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-transcendence / conservation</td>
<td>A spiritual life, meaning in life, politeness, respect for tradition, mature love, self-discipline, detachment, true friendship, moderate, loyal, humble, honouring parents and elders, accepting my portion in life, honest, obedient, helpful, devout, responsible, forgiving</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-enhancement / conservation</td>
<td>Social power, sense of belonging, social order, wealth, reciprocation of favours, family security, social recognition, authority, healthy, preserving my public image, clean</td>
<td>.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-enhancement / openness to change</td>
<td>Pleasure, an exciting life, a varied life, ambitious, daring, influential, capable, intelligent, enjoying life, successful</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Relationship between value types and attitudes towards a hypothetical observer mission in the Middle East

The correlations between value types and attitudes towards a hypothetical observer mission in the Middle East are shown in Figure 9.3. The figure shows that correlations for security, conformity and power were the most positive, whilst those for self-direction and stimulation were the most negative.

Thus, individuals motivated by conservation of order (security), harmony in relations (conformity) and controlling relationships and resources (power) held more positive attitudes towards the observer mission in the Middle East than individuals who were motivated by mastery (self-direction) or openness to change (stimulation).
The Spearman rank correlation between the predicted and observed order of correlations was significant ($r_s = .79$, $p < 0.01$, one-tailed; for a similar procedure see Schwartz & Huismans, 1995), thus providing additional support for the overall model relating attitudes towards this observer mission to the priority given to all the values types.

Figure 9.3. Correlations of values priorities with attitudes towards a hypothetical observer mission in the Middle East

To explore this finding further, the sample was split at the median on the two most relevant and conflicting value types – self-direction and security. Attitudes towards an observer mission in the Middle East were then compared for four sub-samples formed by a 2 (self-direction: high / low) X 2 (security: high / low) cross-classification. A two-way analysis of variance showed significant main effects for self-direction and security ($F (1,229) = 36.09$ and 26.18, respectively, $p < .01$), but no significant interaction.

Table 9.5 shows the means for the four sub-samples. The table indicates that individuals with different attitudes differed in the extent to which they regarded self-
direction and security as important. Individuals who attributed high importance to security and low importance to self-direction showed substantially more positive attitudes to this observer mission than did those who attributed high importance to self-direction and low importance to security. The other two sub-samples, in which individuals were likely to experience value conflict, showed neutral attitudes towards a hypothetical observer mission in the Middle East.

Table 9.5. Mean attitudes towards a hypothetical observer mission in the Middle East as a function of the importance of security and self-direction values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Self-direction</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>3.15 (N = 54)</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.11 (N=76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>2.27 (N=59)</td>
<td>3.08 (N=42)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values, worldviews and core values

Another purpose of this study was to assess the relationship between value types, worldviews, core values and postures. Table 9.6 provides the correlations between the 10 value types, worldviews and core values assessed in this study.

Contrary to predictions, political trust was most positively correlated with conformity, followed by security and tradition, and most negatively associated with self-direction and stimulation. Individuals who valued conservation of order and harmony in social relations were thus more politically trusting than individuals who valued relying on one's own judgement.

Social trust was most positively associated with benevolence and universalism, and most negatively related to power and achievement. Respondents who valued transcendence of self-interests and tolerance of others, as well as openness to change, were more socially trusting than respondents who valued social superiority.

Humanitarianism was most positively correlated with universalism, benevolence and self-direction, and most negatively related to power, security and achievement.
### Table 9.6. Correlations of value types with core values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political trust</th>
<th>Social Trust</th>
<th>Human.</th>
<th>Nationalism</th>
<th>Patriotism</th>
<th>RWA</th>
<th>SDO</th>
<th>BJW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>-.29</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>-.52</td>
<td>-.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.41</td>
<td>-.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.16</td>
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<td>.41</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conformity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>-.42</td>
<td>-.35</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>-.33</td>
<td>-.02</td>
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*Note: Significant correlations are in bold; p = <.005 using the Bonferroni correction (p = 0.05/10)*

### Table 9.7. Correlations of value types with postures

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<th>Militarism</th>
<th>Multi-lateralism</th>
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<td>Self-direction</td>
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<td>-.38</td>
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*Note: Significant correlations are in bold; p = <.005 using the Bonferroni correction*
Individuals who prioritised comfort with the diversity of existence and concern for the welfare of others were more humanitarian than individuals who valued social superiority and social esteem.

Nationalism correlated most positively with security, conformity and tradition, and related most negatively to self-direction. Respondents who were motivated by preservation of traditional practices and protection of stability, and who were motivated by self-esteem, were more nationalistic than respondents who prioritised personal freedom.

Patriotism was most positively related to benevolence and universalism, and most negatively related to achievement and power. Individuals who valued the welfare of close and distant others were more patriotic than individuals who prioritised values stressing pursuit of one's own success and dominance over others.

RWA correlated most positively with tradition and conformity, and related most negatively to hedonism and stimulation. Respondents who were motivated by conservation of order were more authoritarian than individuals who prioritised values relating to pleasure and gratification for oneself.

SDO was most positively associated with power and achievement, and most negatively related to universalism and benevolence. Individuals who valued social superiority and personal esteem scored higher on SDO than respondents who valued the transcendence of self-interests and the welfare of close and distant others.

Finally, BJW correlated most positively with conformity and security, values that stress conservation of order and harmony in social relations, and correlated most negatively with universalism and self-direction, values that emphasise reliance on one's own judgement and comfort with diversity.

Values and postures

Table 9.7 shows that internationalism was most positively correlated with security, conformity and tradition, and most negatively associated with stimulation and self-
direction and hedonism. As predicted, individuals who prioritised conservation of order and harmony in social relations were more likely to believe that Britain should be internationally involved than individuals who prioritised motivation for mastery and openness to change.

As hypothesised, militarism correlated most positively with power, security and conformity, and most negatively with universalism and self-direction. Individuals who were motivated by controlling uncertainty by controlling relationships and resources, and who were motivated by esteem, were more likely to believe in the use of force as a foreign policy means than individuals who were motivated by comfort with the diversity of existence and self-reliance.

Finally, multi-lateralism was positively correlated with security and conformity and negatively associated with hedonism and achievement. Respondents who valued conservation of order and harmony in relations were more likely to believe in Britain being involved multi-laterally in foreign affairs than individuals who prioritised values dealing with self-centredness.

Attitudes towards the observer mission – Hierarchical regression analyses

The previous correlational analyses have shown that worldviews, postures and core values were significantly related to value priorities. These results posed the question as to how well these variables predicted attitudes towards the observer mission in the Middle East, controlling for the effects of value types.

A hierarchical regression analyses was conducted to address this question. The ten basic human values were entered at the first step. The constructs BJW, RWA and SDO were entered at the second step. Core values were then entered at the third step, followed by the three postures at the fourth step.

*Table 9.8 shows how well attitudes towards the observer mission were predicted by the ten value types. This set of predictors accounted for a significant amount of total variance in attitudes towards the observer mission (Adj. $R^2 = .24$, $F(10, 220) = 8.13$, $p = .008$).*
Table 9.8. Result of the hierarchical regression predicting attitudes towards the hypothetical observer mission from basic human values, worldviews, core values, and postures (N = 231)

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<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
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Note: Significant values are in bold; \( p < .05 \)
The second step assessed how well the three worldview constructs predicted attitudes towards the observer mission over and above the ten value types. Table 9.8 shows that BJW, RWA and SDO accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in attitudes towards this mission after controlling for basic human values ($R^2_{\text{change}} = .06$, $F_{\text{change}}(13, 217) = 3.11$, $p = .047$).

The five core values were entered at the next step, and Table 9.8 indicates that these five core values accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in attitudes towards this mission after controlling for the effects of value types and the three worldview constructs ($R^2_{\text{change}} = .11$, $F_{\text{change}}(18, 207) = 6.02$, $p = .033$).

Finally, the fourth step explored how well the three postures predicted attitudes towards the observer mission after all the other variables were controlled for. Table 9.7 shows that the three postures accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in attitudes towards this mission after controlling for the effects of core values and value types ($R^2_{\text{change}} = .08$, $F_{\text{change}}(21, 204) = 4.17$, $p = .029$).

The strongest predictors of attitudes towards this hypothetical mission were security and conformity values, followed by power values. Security, conformity and power values remained significant predictors after the constructs of BJW, RWA and SDO had been added to the equation ($R^2_{\text{change}} = 6\%$). Of the three added constructs, BJW had the greatest effect on attitudes towards the observer mission, indicating that individuals who believed that the world is just held more positive attitudes towards this mission than respondents with lower BJW.

The change in $R^2$ of 11% indicates that core values were additional influences in shaping attitudes towards the Middle East. However, security and conformity values remained significant predictors even when core values were added to the equation. Individuals who trusted the government, who were humanitarians, who were patriotic, and socially trusting held more positive attitudes towards this mission that their counterparts.

Finally, the $R^2$ change of 8% also indicates that postures were additional predictors shaping attitudes towards the observer mission. Individuals who believed that Britain
Chapter 9 Basic human values and attitudes towards peace operations

should be internationally involved, should use forceful foreign policy means and should act multi-laterally held more positive attitudes towards a hypothetical observer mission in the Middle East.

STUDY 2 – HUMANITARIAN ACTION IN IRAQ

The previous section investigated the relevance of basic human values to attitudes towards peace operations with regard to a hypothetical scenario. The research reported in this section explores the predictions made earlier with respect to a ‘real’ peace operation in Iraq.

The political context – Persian Gulf War 2003

After the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the UN imposed strict resolutions designed to remove the threat Saddam Hussein’s regime posed to neighbouring countries and the international community at large. In November 2002, the UN declared that it would no longer tolerate Iraq’s non-cooperation with international law. UN Security Council Resolution 1441 was approved to provide Iraq with a final opportunity to comply with UN disarmament obligations. Despite international diplomatic efforts, and without the approval of the Security Council, coalition forces that included UK troops commenced military operations in March 2003. Overall, the UK contributed 46,000 military personnel (Operation Telic) to a total of 467,000 U.S.-led coalition forces (Ministry of Defence, 2003). The major phase of combat operations was declared over by President Bush on 1st May 2003.

Since the end of the combat operations, UK forces in Southern Iraq have been involved in stabilisation and reconstruction processes as outlined in the UK’s “Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi people”, which had been launched in March 2003. This document outlined the future of Iraq that British forces would contribute to build, and included a vision of Iraq as stable, law-abiding, co-operative with the internal community, and meeting its international obligations as well as providing a representative government for its people.
In line with this vision, UK forces have begun to establish a safe and secure environment for the Iraqi people and to ensure that the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people are met. Since the end of the war in Iraq on 1st May 2003, a total of 689 British military personnel have died (compared to 1059 US military personnel; Iraq Coalition, 2004) and 2200 UK troops have been wounded whilst serving in Iraq (The Scotsman, April 2004).

Although the British public was generally opposed to Britain's involvement in military activities in Iraq (Worldviews, 2002), it was strongly in favour of humanitarian interventions after the war. Eurobarometer data (2003) indicated that 87 percent of British respondents were in favour of the enforcement of British humanitarian aid towards Iraq, compared to 12 percent who were against such aid. Similarly, 57 percent of respondents also favoured British troops being sent to Iraq to maintain peace, with 40 percent being against the use of British forces as peacekeepers.

**METHOD**

**Sample composition**

209 British respondents from the general public participated in this postal survey, which was carried out in Guildford at the end of June 2003. Of the 600 questionnaires that had been distributed, 215 were returned, of which six had to be discarded because of incomplete information. Overall, the return rate for this survey was 35 percent.

Comparison with 2001 Census data (see *Appendix L* for details) showed that the study sample over-represented male respondents, those aged 45-59, those with A-levels and O-levels, and those in professional (Class 2) and sales occupations (Class 7), whilst it under-represented those aged 60 and over, those with no educational qualifications, and those in managerial (Class 1) and administrative occupations (Class 4).

*94 This figure was correct at the time of writing (September 2004). See [http://icasualties.org/oif](http://icasualties.org/oif) for statistics on the coalition forces that are updated daily.*
The sample was weighted on these demographic characteristics to address these biases and to achieve a more accurate representation of the overall population. All the analyses in this chapter were conducted after the sample had been weighted.

Measures

In addition to the measures assessed in the previous studies, the following variable was also included in this study (see Appendix M for details of the items used in this survey):

"Support for humanitarian actions in Iraq"

Support for the humanitarian mission in Iraq was assessed by five items (five-point Likert scale: 1 = Strongly disagree to 5 = Strongly agree). Now that military action in Iraq has officially ended, the Government believes that British forces should contribute to making Iraq a peaceful and democratic country. How do feel about British troops being involved in such post-conflict missions in Iraq? Items included: "I approve of British troops being used to bring peace to Iraq", "British troops will help make Iraq a more democratic country", "British troops in Iraq will help restore the human rights of Iraqi citizens", "British troops should not be involved in humanitarian action in Iraq without the consent of the UN or NATO", and "British involvement in humanitarian operations in Iraq will make the world a safer place". Principal component analysis indicated one factor, and the items were combined into a composite variable, with higher scores indicating greater agreement with British involvement in humanitarian operations in Iraq.

The descriptive statistics, reliabilities and correlations amongst the constructs in Study 2, not including basic human values, are provided in Table 9.9 of the Results section. The reliabilities of basic human values and their relationships with the variables assessed in this study are presented separately.

Analyses

As for the previous study, the analyses in this chapter were restricted to correlations and hierarchical regression. Again, this was due to the increased number of
constructs assessed in this study and a low sample size, which precluded the use of structural equation modelling.

RESULTS

Attitudes towards humanitarian actions in Iraq

Half of the respondents in this sample (51%) agreed that British participation in humanitarian operations in Iraq will make the world a safer place, whilst a similar percentage (52%) agreed that British troops will bring democracy to post-conflict Iraq. Half of the respondents (52%) also approved of British troops being used to bring peace to Iraq, and 54% approved the restoration of human rights. However, more than six out of ten respondents (63%) agreed that British troops should not be involved in humanitarian action in Iraq without the consent of the UN or NATO.

Table 9.9 presents the correlations between the measures in this study. This table does not include the relationships between basic human values and other study variables, which were analysed separately. Attitudes towards humanitarian interventions in Iraq were positively related to militarism, internationalism, multilateralism and humanitarianism. Attitudes towards Iraq were also positively correlated with political and social trust. BJW was positively related to attitudes towards Iraq, as were RWA and SDO. Following the format of Study 1, the following sections explore the relationships amongst basic human values, the study variables and attitudes towards humanitarian interventions in Iraq.

Schwartz’s Value Survey

As reported for the previous study, respondents were dropped before the analyses if they used response option 7 (of supreme importance) more than 21 times, or used any other response more than 35 times, as those respondents are assumed to have failed to make an effort to differentiate amongst their values. Respondents who
Table 9.9. Descriptive statistics, reliabilities and inter-correlations for attitudes towards humanitarian missions in Iraq, not including basic human values (Cronbach’s alpha in parenthesis)

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<td>1.37</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>1.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Correlations significant at p < 0.05 are in bold.
answered fewer than 41 values were also excluded from the analyses. On the bases of these ranges, seven respondents had to be dropped, leaving a total sample size of 202.

The 56 values assessed in the present study were classified into 10 value types following the results of data analyses reported by Schwartz (1992). The reliabilities in this study were as follows: universalism: $\alpha = .77$; benevolence: $\alpha = .81$; tradition: $\alpha = .66$; conformity: $\alpha = .79$; security: $\alpha = .79$; power: $\alpha = .73$; achievement: $\alpha = .71$; hedonism: $\alpha = .69$; stimulation: $\alpha = .71$; and self-direction: $\alpha = .69$. The reliabilities for the four value dimensions, which are obtained by averaging all the values that constitute the higher order type (see Table 9.2 for details), were: self-transcendence/openness to change: $\alpha = .81$; self-transcendence/conservation: $\alpha = .78$; self-enhancement/conservation: $\alpha = .72$; and self-enhancement/openness to change: $\alpha = .74$. These reliabilities were similar to those found in the previous study, and were within the bound of variation commonly observed (see Schwartz, 1992).

The mean rating that each subject gave to the values in the value survey were statistically controlled in the following analyses. Schwartz (1992) recommended this procedure because some of the predictions obtained from values can be attributed to response tendencies.

Relationship between value types and attitudes towards British humanitarian operations in Iraq

The correlations between value types and attitudes towards humanitarian operations in Iraq are shown in Figure 9.4, which indicates that such attitudes were most strongly positively correlated with security, conformity and power values and most negatively related with self-direction and stimulation values. As in the previous study, individuals motivated by conservation of order (security), harmony in relations (conformity) and controlling relationships and resources (power) held more positive attitudes towards the humanitarian interventions in Iraq than individuals who were motivated by mastery and openness to change.
Support for the overall model relating attitudes towards Iraq with value priorities was given by a Spearman rank correlation between the predicted and observed order of correlations, which was highly significant ($r_s = .78$, $p < 0.05$, one-tailed; for a similar procedure see Schwartz & Huismans, 1995).

Following the procedure outlined in the previous study, the sample was first split at the median on the two most relevant and conflicting value types – self-direction and security. Attitudes towards Iraq were then compared for the four sub-samples formed by a 2 (self-direction: high / low) X 2 (security: high / low) cross-classification. A two-way analysis of variance showed significant main effects for self-direction and security ($F (1, 200) = 34.24$ and 28.67, respectively, $p < .01$), but no significant interaction (see Table 9.10 for the means of the four sub-samples).

Similar to the results reported in the previous section, individuals who attributed high importance to security and low importance to self-direction showed substantially more positive attitudes to this peace operation than did those who attributed high importance to self-direction and low importance to security.
Chapter 9 Basic human values and attitudes towards peace operations

Table 9.10. Mean attitudes towards humanitarian operations in Iraq as a function of the importance of security and self-direction values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Security Low</th>
<th>Security High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-direction</td>
<td>Low 3.03 (N = 50)</td>
<td>4.07 (N = 69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High 2.21 (N = 51)</td>
<td>2.83 (N = 32)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values, worldviews, core values and postures

Worldviews and core values showed a similar pattern of association with value priorities as previously reported in Study 1 (see Table 9.11). The relationships between values and postures in this research (see Table 9.12) were also similar to those reported in the previous study, with one exception. Whereas multi-lateralism was positively related to universalism and benevolence in the previous study, no such association was found in the present research. However, multi-lateralism was most strongly related to security, conformity, achievement and hedonism in both studies.

Attitudes towards Iraq – Hierarchical regression analyses

Using the same procedure as outlined in the previous study, a hierarchical regression was conducted to investigate whether the findings from the hypothetical scenario regarding the impact of basic human values on constructs in the hierarchical model could be replicated in a study on attitudes towards a “real” humanitarian mission.

Table 9.13 shows that the ten value types accounted for a significant amount of total variance in attitudes towards Iraq (Adj. R² = .20, F (10, 191) = 18.26, p = .009).

The three constructs of BJW, RWA and SDO were entered at the second step of this regression, which explained a (just) significant proportion of the variance in attitudes towards Iraq after controlling for the effects of value types (R²_change = .05, F_change(13, 188) = 3.11, p = .048).
Table 9.11. Correlations of value types with study core principles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political trust</th>
<th>Social Trust</th>
<th>Human.</th>
<th>Nationalism</th>
<th>Patriotism</th>
<th>RWA</th>
<th>SDO</th>
<th>BJW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>-.34</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-.48</td>
<td>-.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.35</td>
<td>-.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.67</td>
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<td>.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conformity</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.46</td>
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<tr>
<td>Security</td>
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<td>-.20</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.35</td>
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<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.38</td>
<td>-.36</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>-.28</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.29</td>
<td>-.29</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>-.35</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonism</td>
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<td>-.07</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.29</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stimulation</td>
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<td>.20</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>-.39</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>-.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-direction</td>
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<td>.28</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>-.36</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>-.39</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: significant correlations are in bold; $p = 0.005$ using the Bonferroni correction ($p = 0.05/10$)

Table 9.12. Correlations of value types with postures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Internationalism</th>
<th>Militarism</th>
<th>Multi-lateralism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>-.36</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
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<td>-.24</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conformity</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>-.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonism</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stimulation</td>
<td>-.34</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-direction</td>
<td>-.38</td>
<td>-.26</td>
<td>-.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: significant correlations are in bold; $p = 0.005$ using the Bonferroni correction ($p = 0.05/10$)
Table 9.13. Result of the hierarchical regression predicting attitudes towards Iraq from basic human values, worldviews, core values, and postures (N = 202)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>r</td>
<td></td>
<td>t</td>
<td></td>
<td>t</td>
<td></td>
<td>t</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-197.44</td>
<td>-180.19</td>
<td>-151.38</td>
<td>-133.15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.086</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.100</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
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<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.215</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.887</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conformity</td>
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<td>5.301</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>4.114</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>2.611</td>
<td>0.20</td>
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<td>Security</td>
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<td>0.53</td>
<td>5.642</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>5.123</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>4.083</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>4.496</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>3.928</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>3.564</td>
<td>0.27</td>
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<td>Achievement</td>
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<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.204</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.337</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hedonism</td>
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<td>-0.18</td>
<td>-0.153</td>
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<td>-0.175</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.302</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stimulation</td>
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<td>-0.30</td>
<td>-3.010</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>-2.718</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>-2.112</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-direction</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
<td>-3.778</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td>-3.221</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>-3.002</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
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<tr>
<td>BJW</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>5.973</td>
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<td>4.793</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>2.542</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>RWA</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>3.456</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>2.400</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>1.780</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SDO</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>4.039</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>2.938</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>2.125</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political trust</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>3.715</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>2.569</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>3.967</td>
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<td>4.644</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>3.346</td>
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<tr>
<td>Humanitarianism</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.13</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>4.644</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>3.246</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1.017</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>1.017</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.914</td>
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<tr>
<td>Patriotism</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.988</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>1.988</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.871</td>
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<td>4.953</td>
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<td>4.953</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>4.953</td>
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<tr>
<td>Militarism</td>
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<td></td>
<td>5.128</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>5.128</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>5.128</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multi-lateralism</td>
<td>0.47</td>
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<td>4.556</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>4.556</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>4.556</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adj. R²: .20          .25          .38          .47
R² change: .05          .13          .09

Note: Significant values are in bold; p < .05
Core values were included in the equation at the next step, entered at the next step of the equation, which accounted for a significant amount of total variance in attitudes towards Iraq after controlling for the effects of basic human values, BJW, RWA and SDO ($R^2_{change} = .13$, $F_{change}(18, 183) = 12.46$, $p = .016$).

The three postures were entered at the final stage. These explained a significant amount of variance in attitudes towards Iraq once the effects of the other variables were controlled for ($R^2_{change} = .09$, $F_{change}(21, 180) = 8.92$, $p = .023$). Contrary to previous findings, power values, as well as security and conformity values, remained significant predictors even when core values and postures were added to the equation.

**DISCUSSION**

The main aim of these two studies was to investigate the effects of basic human values on attitudes towards peace operations. In line with other research that has examined the effect of values on political attitudes (e.g.; Cohrs et al, 2002; Kristiansen & Matheson, 1990; Mayton et al., 1999), individuals' attitudes towards peace operations, both hypothetical and real, were a function of their value priorities.

**Values and attitudes towards peace operations**

Two predictions were made about the relationship between values and attitudes towards peace operations. On the one hand, it was argued that such attitudes could be most strongly related to universalism as peace operations are frequently framed in humanitarian terms. On the other hand, it was also argued that they could be most strongly associated with security as peace operations bring stability and harmony to a country in conflict. Findings from the two studies show that attitudes towards the Middle East and Iraq were associated more significantly with values stressing security, conformity and power than they were associated with universalism. Thus, as respondents assigned more importance to the conservation of order and harmony in relations their attitudes towards the Middle East and Iraq became more favourable.
The importance of security, conformity and power values in shaping attitudes towards these two operations is also similar to findings made by Cohrs and colleagues (2002) and Fetchenhauer & Bierhoff (2001) about the value basis of humanitarian military interventions, such as the use of force to enforce human rights and in the fight against terrorism.

However, it is unclear from the present research whether this pattern of value association would characterise attitudes towards peace operations that do not have such a strong military association. With respect to attitudes towards Iraq at least, it is possible that respondents did not make a clear-cut distinction between Britain's involvement in combat action and post-conflict humanitarian operations. This possibility is borne out by the finding that attitudes towards Iraq were more strongly correlated with militarism than internationalism or multi-lateralism. Thus, future research should investigate the value basis of attitudes towards peace operations in less ambiguous situations.

Values, core values and postures

Another aim of the two studies reported in this chapter was to assess the relationship between value types, worldviews, core values and postures. The majority of relationships were in the predicted direction in both studies (see Table 9.14 for details of the observed relationships). In line with previous research (Devos et al., 2002), individuals who rated conservation of order and harmony in social relations (conformity, tradition and security) as important were more politically trusting than respondents who rated pleasure for oneself and one's own judgement (self-direction and hedonism) as important. In contrast, respondents who prioritised values of tolerance of others and transcendence of self-interest (benevolence and universalism) were more socially trusting than respondents who rated social superiority (power) as important. Thus, the present investigation showed that political trust and social trust were differentially related to value types, providing further evidence for their distinctiveness (e.g. Uslaner, 2002).

A similar differential relation to value types was also found for nationalism and patriotism, indicating that these are distinct constructs. Whilst nationalism was most
Table 9.14. Observed relationships between 10 value types and study constructs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Universalism</th>
<th>Benevolence</th>
<th>Tradition</th>
<th>Conformity</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Power</th>
<th>Achievement</th>
<th>Hedonism</th>
<th>Stimulation</th>
<th>Self-direction</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peace oper.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Core values</em></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td><em>Posture</em></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: + refers to the most positive association, - refers to the most negative relationship, and () refers to the prediction that was made but not observed.
strongly motivated by overcoming the threat of uncertainty by controlling relationships and resources (security, power and achievement), patriotism was most highly related to a concern about the welfare of close and distant others (benevolence and universalism).

As predicted, RWA, but not SDO was positively associated with conservation of order (tradition and conformity), whilst SDO, but not RWA, was related to social superiority and esteem (power and achievement). These findings are similar to those made by McFarland (1999), and Duriez and van Hiel (2002). Overall, these findings are supportive of Lippa and Arad's (1999) claim that RWA is related to the preservation of in-group norms and tradition, whilst SDO is associated with superiority and power. Considering that the upholding of tradition and conformity to social norms are a defining feature of RWA, it is perhaps unsurprising that it was most significantly related to tradition and conformity values. Similarly, the finding that SDO, which is grounded in feelings of superiority over other social groups, was most strongly related to power and achievement values is to be expected.

Unlike previous studies, the present research also investigated the value bases of the three postures. Results from both studies indicated that both internationalism and multi-lateralism were associated with similar value types. Both postures were most strongly associated with security and conformity, indicating that individuals who believed in Britain's international involvement and multi-lateral ventures were motivated by conserving order and harmonising relations. Militarism, by contrast, was foremost associated with power, followed by security, suggesting that individuals who believed in the use of force in international relations were motivated by overcoming the threat of uncertainties by controlling relationships and resources.

The effect of values within the hierarchical model

Finally, although value types were significantly related to core values and postures, the hierarchical regression analyses in both studies indicated that the components of the hierarchical model contributed to the prediction of attitudes towards the Middle East and Iraq, after controlling for the effects of value types.
However, security and conformity, and power in the case of Iraq, remained significant predictors even when core values and postures had been added to the equation. This finding indicates that basic human values had an effect on attitudes towards peace operations over and above the effects of the constructs assessed in the present research.

It is unclear from present research whether this finding is due to the fact that pertinent core values and postures were missing from the model that tapped into these security and conformity values, or whether basic human values are associated with attitudes towards peace operations in a more direct way.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the contribution of the present study lay in the demonstration that attitudes towards peace operations were related not only to basic human values, but also to a complex interplay of these values with worldviews, core values and postures. This study has not only replicated previous findings on the underlying values of core values, but has also filled some empirical gaps concerning the value basis of social trust, humanitarianism, and multi-lateralism.
CHAPTER 10

GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The aim of the present research was to investigate the determinants of attitudes towards peace operations. Attitudes towards peace operations were explored with reference to a hierarchical model of foreign policy opinions. This model was extensively tested among the general population, and revisions and extensions were proposed. This chapter revisits the theoretical limitations and empirical shortcomings of the hierarchical model, and discusses how findings from the present research have informed these concerns. By doing so, theoretical and practical implications are outlined and some future directions are proposed. Firstly, this chapter outlines the degree of support for peace operations evidenced in the present research programme, followed by a brief discussion of some methodological issues that may limit the generalisation of the current research findings.

Support for peace operations

This thesis began with the question of how supportive the British public is of Britain’s involvement in peace operations or humanitarian interventions. Findings from this research programme showed that respondents were generally supportive of British participation in such operations.

55% approved of British troops being used to bring peace to Sierra Leone (Chapter 4 and 5). Support for British troops in Sierra Leone increased to 59% when British soldiers had been taken hostage, and declined to 55% when a British soldier was killed in Sierra Leone (Chapter 5). Similar levels of support were also found for attitudes towards the ERRF (Chapter 6). Almost six out of ten respondents (58%)
agreed that the decision to join the European Rapid Reaction Forces was a good one, with a similar percentage (57%) also agreeing that British troops are used to bring peace to Europe.

A majority of respondents (61%) agreed with British troops being used to keep the peace in Afghanistan (Chapter 7). Six out of ten respondents (63%) also agreed with British troops being used in Afghanistan to bring peace to the world and to restore human rights (62%). 66% agreed with British involvement in military strikes against the Taliban and Al'Qaida (Chapter 8). A majority also supported a possible international observer force in the Middle East (Chapter 9), with 62% believing that British troops should be sent to the Middle East as part of a UN observer mission.

However, support for the humanitarian mission in Iraq was relatively low. 51 percent agreed that British participation in humanitarian operations in Iraq will make the world a safer place, whilst a similar percentage (52%) agreed that British troops will bring democracy to post-conflict Iraq. 63 percent agreed that British troops should not be involved in humanitarian action in Iraq without the consent of the UN or NATO.

The present studies also found that the typical British supporter of peace operations not only believes that Britain should be involved internationally, but also that this involvement should be multi-lateral in nature and be conducted without the use of force before September 11, 2001 and with the use of force after September 11, 2001. Furthermore, the typical British supporter is socially and politically trusting, humanistic, slightly patriotic, but not nationalistic. The typical supporter also values conservation of order and harmony in relations.

A note on the general limitations of this research

Before discussing the major findings of this research programme and their implications, it is germane to mention some of the methodological issues that may limit the generalisation of the results discussed below.
The investigations in this thesis were survey based. Due to a restricted number of respondents that could reasonably be questioned in these surveys, the populations in this thesis are not comparable to those traditionally studied within this research area using large-scale opinion polls. Despite this reservation, however, this approach allowed for relationships to be explored that are neglected in other research.

Surveys also carry with them inherent methodological problems. For example, individuals who respond to postal surveys are often different in their political outlook from those who do not respond. They tend to be better educated, to have higher incomes, and to be more interested in the topics dealt with in the questionnaire (Dillman, 1978 cited in Erikson & Tedin, 2001).

Research has also explored the effect of question wording on survey responses, which has shown that subtle variations in the presentation of survey questions can affect the way in which individuals respond to the items (Haddock, 2003; for details on response effects in surveys see Tourangeau, Rips & Rasiniski, 2000). The importance of response effects on attitudes towards peace operations could be explored in an experimental study in which respondents are given questionnaires about peace operations that differed in the rating scales used as well as the order of the items. Future studies may also include measures within the survey questionnaire that assess self-presentation (e.g. Berinsky, 2004).

The hierarchical model of foreign policy attitudes – Some critical reflections

Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) argued that Converse and others erred in their conclusions about the volatility of public opinion by focusing on a narrow definition of constraint. Rather, they proposed that a hierarchical structure of attitudes allows politically uninformed as well as informed individuals to express a foreign policy position. According to this model, individuals "cope with an extraordinarily confusing world (with limited resources to pay information costs) by structuring views about specific foreign policies according to their more general and abstract beliefs" (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987, p. 114).
Although this model was developed in 1987, several theoretical limitations and empirical shortcomings were identified that still had to be tested. These concerns are revisited below with respect to what the present research programme has revealed about each. The theoretical implications of the findings as well as research limitations and future research directions are outlined where appropriate.

The hierarchical structure

Present research results supported the assumptions of the hierarchical model of foreign policy attitudes that specific political attitudes are shaped by more general predispositions. This finding is consistent with other applications of this model to foreign policy concerns (Bartels, 1994; Jenkins-Smith et al., 2004; Juhasz, 2001).

However, the present research programme has added to previous studies by systematically comparing the hierarchical model to alternative conceptions. Structural equation modelling indicated that the hierarchical model provided a better fit than models in which no distinction was made between postures and core values, or in which core values were allowed to influence attitudes towards specific policies directly. Based on suggestions by Rathbun (2003), a model was also tested in which militarism and multi-lateralism were dependent on beliefs about internationalism. However, this model did not provide an adequate framework for describing attitudes towards peace operations.

The hierarchical model also postulates that the direction of effects is from more abstract principles to specific opinions rather than vice versa. According to Peffley and Hurwitz (1993, p. 66), top-down rather than bottom-up linkages are “the norm for international belief systems, given the great complexity of the domain and the sheer volume of international information”. Findings from Chapter 5 supported this conclusion. However, a larger, longitudinal data set than was used in the present study is needed to corroborate these findings.

The results also demonstrate that the hierarchical structure of foreign policy beliefs proposed to explain political attitudes in the US is equally relevant to public beliefs
in Britain. This result is consistent with recent research (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2004) that has shown that British and American beliefs did not differ significantly in the structural relationships amongst those beliefs. However, Jenkins-Smith's study only investigated the impact of political ideology and internationalism on attitudes towards nuclear security issues. Further comparative studies are therefore needed to investigate whether the range of core values and postures assessed in the present research are equally important to shaping foreign policy attitudes in other countries.

Although the models tested and cross-validated in the empirical studies provided a good fit to the data, these results do not indicate that the model has been proven (Kline, 1998). In particular, the variables included in the models could have been influenced by unmeasured factors. However, the present studies have attempted to provide a parsimonious integration of variables that was theory-guided, and which had been identified by previous research as particularly salient in attitudes towards foreign policy issues.

Only one policy domain and one particular issue were investigated in this research programme, which may limit the ability to extend the conclusions to models of attitude constraint in other domains. It is possible that the complexity of international politics renders this domain particularly favourable to hierarchical models of constraint (see Peffley & Hurwitz, 1993). According to Hurwitz and Peffley (1987, p. 1113), attitudes towards military issues may be more highly constrained than other foreign policy issues because "the public is thinking more seriously about issues like military involvement and defense spending, these issues are more likely to be linked to general postures." However, there is ample evidence that hierarchical models are a useful framework for examining attitudes not only in the foreign policy domain (e.g. Brewer et al., 2004), but also with respect to other issue domains, such as donations to charities (Cheung & Chan, 2000), gay rights (Brewer, 2003) and environmental concern (e.g. Weible, Sabatier & Lubell, 2004).
Effect of knowledge

As discussed in detail in Chapters 6 and 7, the possible effect of knowledge on individuals’ reasoning about foreign policy issues is a topic of intense debate. The present research showed that neither general nor policy-specific political knowledge had any significant effect on attitudes towards peace operations. Indeed, both informed and uninformed respondents appeared to rely on core values and postures to shape their attitudes towards such operations. This strongly supported Hurwitz and Peffley (1987; see also Feldman, 1988), who assumed that political knowledge does not affect the use of core principles, and opposed those which proposed that political expertise facilitates attitude formation (e.g. Lau & Redlawsk, 2001; Zaller, 1992).

Sniderman, Tetlock and Brady (1986, p. 79) asked, “How is it possible for ordinary citizens to put together a consistent outlook on politics, given that they know so little about it?” This research answers this question by showing that although individuals may not be very knowledgeable about foreign policy matters, their international attitudes are structured by more general orientations.

The implications of this finding are greater than just confirming propositions made by Hurwitz and Peffley. Popkin (1991, p. 218) argued that the use of general principles in lieu of factual knowledge is “an inescapable fact of life, and will occur no matter how educated we are, how much information we have and how much thinking we do.” Indeed, Popkin believed that political campaigns should be reframed to accommodate citizen’s limited information. However, Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) claimed that a lack of basic political knowledge is a hindrance to the democratic process, and suggested several reforms to counter this deficiency, such as better education and greater availability of elite debates.

The measures employed in the present studies were limited, covering only a small area of political participation. In this study general political knowledge was assessed by questions taken from the British Election Studies. It has been suggested that these questions are biased to facts about constitutional rules and partisan policy positions, and therefore ignore important aspects of political knowledge, such as the ability to pursue public goals, to hold government to account or to interpret information and
engage in political argument or decision-making (e.g. Frazer & Macdonald, 2003). Johns (2002) identified three measures of political knowledge that have been used in British studies, which are based on different conceptualisations and operationalisations of the term “political knowledge”. Further studies on the effect of political knowledge on political attitudes should explore a greater range of such forms of political knowledge.

It should also be noted that the present findings were limited by their focus on a single issue at a single point in time. Following Goren (2001b, p.21), “more research across issue space and over time is needed before robust generalisations can be made about the impact cognitive ability has on the relationship between core principles and issue attitudes.”

Postures and core values

Postures

Internationalism and multi-lateralism were consistently positively related to attitudes towards peace operations. With the exception of attitudes towards humanitarian interventions in Iraq (Chapter 9) and the combat mission in Afghanistan (Chapter 8), internationalism was a consistently better predictor of attitudes towards peace operations than were either multi-lateralism or militarism. The importance of internationalism in shaping international attitudes in the present research is consistent with findings reported in previous studies (e.g. Holsti, 1996; Ziegler, 1987).

According to Herrmann and Keller (2004, p. 563), this construct’s “explanatory power is greatest for questions of engagement in far-flung places for reasons not related to traditional security interests”. Although it could be argued that having British troops deployed in foreign countries represents instances of British interests being at stake, the importance of internationalism in shaping opinions on a spectrum of issues ranging from no obvious interests to vital interests needs to be explored further.
Multi-lateralism was consistently positively related to attitudes towards peace operations, indicating that the more individuals believed in international co-operation the more positive their attitudes towards such missions. This result is in line with previous studies that have highlighted the importance of multi-lateralism in determining European attitudes towards foreign deployments (e.g. Holsti, 1996; Juhasz, 2001).

Militarism was positively associated with peace operations in four out of seven studies (Chapters 7 to 9). This finding is in line with Kushner (2004), who reported that although "militant internationalism" is associated with support for military action, it does not preclude support for humanitarian aid, foreign aid or peacekeeping missions.

It should also be pointed out that these four studies were conducted after the September 11th attacks. These attacks may have increased the public's perception of threat from large-scale terrorist attacks, leading them to endorse more belligerent foreign policy attitudes. Indirect evidence for this possibility comes from a study by Gordon and Arian (2001), who found that feelings of threat were significantly related to foreign policy choices. More specifically, the more threatened individuals felt, the more their policy choices tended to maintain or intensify a conflict. There is some indication that a short-lived amplification of militaristic beliefs occurred after September 11th. For example, Jenkins-Smith and Herron (2003) reported that although belief in military force surged immediately after the September 11th attacks, public views returned to pre- 9/11 levels within a few months. Future British research utilising longitudinal studies that cover the period before and after September 11th could address this issue.

Additionally, the foreign policy landscape may be more confusing after the September 11th attacks. The "War on Terror" has already led to two concurrent military and humanitarian missions in the same territory (i.e. Afghanistan and Iraq), which may appear to be part of the same political endeavour. An analysis of how these two pairs of concurrent missions were represented in the media may reveal how they were perceived by the public.
Core values

A substantial focus of the present research was on one particular component within the hierarchical model - core values. Chapter 2 indicated that the analysis of core values in the hierarchical model had thus far been limited to a few variables, such as morality of warfare, moral traditionalism and political ideology. Indeed, Peffley and Hurwitz (1993) argued that researchers need to update their research agenda to discover abstract orientations that play a role in structuring foreign policy attitudes. Chapter 3 presented several constructs that were deemed to be relevant to a discussion of attitudes towards peace operations.

Political ideology

In contrast to previous studies (e.g. Jenkins-Smith et al., 2004), research reported in this thesis found no significant influence of political ideology on attitudes towards peace operations. Political ideology also had no significant effect on the three postures. A possible reason for the discrepancy in these findings is that the majority of previous studies have used political ideology as the sole core value under investigation (also see Bartels, 1994; Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987).

There is some empirical evidence that the distinction between domestic and foreign policy core principles may be blurring, at least at the elite level. For example, Herrmann and Keller (2001) have argued that the differences between domestic and foreign policy issues may diminish as a result of increasing globalisation, leading elites to depend on political ideology when making decisions about both policy domains. Future research should explore the possibility of such "trans-domain" core values.

Nationalism and patriotism

Chapter 3 indicated that nationalism and/or patriotism were important predictors of foreign policy attitudes in a number of studies. However, it was also shown that previous studies disagreed on the direction of this relationship. Throughout this thesis, nationalism was negatively related to internationalism and positively
Chapter 10 Discussion and Conclusion

associated with militarism, which is consistent with findings by Hurwitz and Peffley (1987, 1990).

In contrast, patriotism was positively related to internationalism and multi-lateralism. With the exception of two studies (Chapters 4 and 5), patriotism was not significantly related to militarism. Overall, patriotism showed a positive and significant total effect on specific attitudes towards peace operations in all studies. It was also a stronger predictor of specific policy attitudes (in terms of its total effects) than was nationalism, a finding that replicates that of Conover and Feldman (1987).

These results are consistent with Kosterman & Feshbach (1989) that patriotism is strongly related to peace-loving attitudes and internationally-oriented opinions, but are opposed to the findings of Bartels (1994) and Mueller-Peters (1998). This could be due to the fact Kosterman and Feshbach's measures of patriotism and nationalism were used throughout this thesis, and/or that the opposing studies used a single item to assess these constructs as opposed to the multi-item measures used in the present research.

These findings also show that positive attachment to one's country per se, in the form of patriotism, does not preclude support for Britain's involvement in international affairs. This corroborates recent re-conceptualisations of inward and outward forms of national attachment. Inward national attachment is characterised by a protective interest in the maintenance of a unique national identity, whereas outward national attachment is concerned with the role of the national group in the international arena (Davis, 1999; Nigbur & Cinnirella, unpublished).

Social and political trust

The impact of political and social trust on public opinion has only recently become a research focus. In line with previous studies that have argued that individuals use these two forms of trust as a heuristic in forming political attitudes across a range of topics (e.g. Brewer & Steenbergen, 2002; Hetherington & Globetti, 2002), present findings also indicate that both political and social trust have important consequences. Overall, social trust was more strongly related to co-operative
attitudes (i.e. internationalism), whilst political trust was more concerned with government interventions (i.e. militarism and multi-lateralism).

Unlike previous studies, these findings have also assessed the relationship between multi-lateralism and social trust, and have shown that individuals who are socially trusting are more likely to believe that Britain needs to co-operate with other countries to bring about change in the world than less trusting respondents.

Additionally, this research has extended previous findings by exploring the effect of knowledge on the relationship between social trust and foreign policy attitudes. Contrary to Brewer and Steenbergen (2002), who suggested that the effect of social trust on foreign policy opinions depends on the information individuals have, the present results showed that there were no systematic differences in the way with which uninformed and informed respondents relied on social trust to structure their attitudes.

In contrast to social trust, the effect of political trust on foreign policy attitudes has been explored less frequently in previous studies. Contrary to Popkin and Dimock (2002), who argued that political trust should be positively related to both internationalism and militarism, findings from Chapter 6 indicated that political trust was positively associated with internationalism and negatively related to militarism. Respondents who were political trusting were more likely to believe that Britain should be involved internationally using non-military measures than less politically trusting participants.

However, structural equation modelling showed that militarism was positively associated with political trust in subsequent studies (Chapters 7 to 9). According to Hetherington and Globetti (2002), political trust is a standing decision for supporting or rejecting government activity. This argument may presuppose that individuals know where the government stands on certain political issues. However, as in the case of social trust, present findings also showed that the effect of political trust was not moderated by political knowledge. Instead, these findings may be due to the way with which Britain’s involvement in Afghanistan was represented in the media at that time. Since this study did not investigate media representations, a further study that
explored media frames and political discourse would be necessary to clarify this relationship.

In addition to previous studies, this research programme also assessed the link between multi-lateralism and political trust. Studies showed that respondents who trusted the government were more likely to believe that Britain should work closely with other countries to bring about change than did less trusting participants.

Therefore, social and political trust significantly shaped individuals' beliefs in international co-operation and political interventions in the international arena. Through them, political and social trust also significantly constrained specific attitudes towards foreign policy concerns. Given the centrality of these two constructs in shaping foreign policy attitudes, it is particularly important for policy-makers to understand the role of these types of trust in maintaining support for foreign policy actions.

**Humanitarianism**

Humanitarianism had not received a lot of empirical attention in studies on foreign policy attitudes. It was argued in Chapter 7 that there are several reasons why humanitarianism may be pertinent to research on peace operations. If humanitarianism entails a general concern for the well-being of others and a willingness to help others, then foreign policy interventions designed to improve the well-being of others should evoke compassion.

Indeed, present results showed that this construct was a significant predictor of postures and attitudes towards peace operations. In studies in which humanitarianism was assessed (Chapters 7 to 9), humanitarianism was one of the most potent predictors (in terms of its total effects) of support of peace operations. It was also one of the strongest predictors of internationalism and multi-lateralism. Therefore, a general compassion for the situation of other people translated into the belief that Britain should be involved in solving international problems with the co-operation of other countries or institutions.
Further research needs to determine whether the significant impact of humanitarianism is restricted to issues with an explicit humanitarian dimension, such as foreign aid or support for human rights. A future study may also want to explore the role of empathy in mediating or moderating the role of humanitarianism on policy issues (cf. Feldman & Steenbergen, 2001).

Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation and Belief in a Just World

Findings from the present research indicated that SDO, RWA and BJW were positively associated (in terms of total effects) with attitudes towards the ISAF, the Middle East and Iraq. SDO, RWA and BJW were also positively related to attitudes towards the combat mission in Afghanistan, which is consistent with previous research (e.g. Pratto et al., 1994; Cohrs et al., 2002).

The finding that attitudes towards peace operations were positively associated with SDO contradicts earlier finding by Pratto and colleagues (1994). Pratto et al. (1994) investigated the relationship between SDO, war and humanitarian intervention, and showed that individuals high in SDO held positive attitudes towards war, whilst SDO was negatively related to attitudes towards humanitarian action.

It could be that the interventions in Afghanistan, the Middle East and Iraq were not perceived purely in humanitarian terms, but as part of the fight against terrorism. Some studies (e.g. Cohrs et al., 2002; Henry et al., 2002) indicated that the fight against terrorism as well as the military enforcement of human rights were positively associated with SDO and RWA. Indeed, the military enforcement of human rights was an important part of the mission in both Afghanistan and Iraq, which may account for the positive correlation with the three constructs. Hence, a variety of missions need to be explored in future studies to disentangle these findings further.
Core values versus basic human values

The aim of the final empirical chapter was to explore the role of basic human values in the explanation of foreign policy attitudes. The results from the two studies reported in that chapter showed that the hierarchical model of foreign policy attitudes can be fruitfully extended by including basic human values at a higher level of abstraction than core values (see Figure 10.1).

Figure 10.1. Revised hierarchical model of foreign policy attitudes, incorporating basic human values

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Previous research had investigated the value correlates of attitudes towards war. The present two studies have extended these findings by examining the value basis of attitudes towards humanitarian interventions. It was found that attitudes towards peace operations in the Middle East and Iraq were most strongly correlated with security values, followed by conformity and power. The greater the importance assigned to conservation of order and harmony in relations, the greater the support for the mission in the Middle East and Iraq.

Interestingly, this pattern of value association is the same as that found in studies of attitudes towards conventional war (e.g. Nelson & Milburn, 1999; Cohrs et al., 2002). This is despite Fetchenhauer and Bierhoff's (2001) argument that attitudes towards humanitarian intervention should be differently related to human values than attitudes towards war. Future studies need to investigate whether these associations also hold with peace operations in other countries or whether they were specific to the two missions investigated here.

The two studies also investigated whether or not core values separately contributed to individuals' attitudes towards peace operations when taking into account basic human values. Hierarchical regression analyses in both studies indicated that worldviews, core values and postures continued to contribute to an understanding of
attitudes towards peace operations even controlling for basic human values. Nevertheless, results also suggested that security and conformity values were significant predictors alongside worldviews, core values and postures.

Braithwaite (1997) proposed that political values coalesce around two core dimensions referred to as security and harmony values, which are exemplified by values of national strength and order, and international harmony and equality, respectively. Only one value bears evidence to the value balance model advanced by Braithwaite in the present research – namely security. Instead, the fact that core values and postures were associated with a more or less unique value pattern also indicates a more complex picture.

Future studies should continue the exploration of basic human values within the hierarchical model of foreign policy attitudes. Such research will indicate whether security values are central to all foreign policy beliefs or whether they are of particular importance only with respect to military/defence issues.

**Contextual effects and images**

Several studies have shown that public support for an international intervention is dependent on a variety of contextual effects, such as the perceived effectiveness of a mission (e.g., Burk, 1999; Kull & Ramsay, 2001). However, structural equation modelling showed that such contextual effects were better conceptualised as consequences of mission support in all but two studies. Respondents who supported the missions were more likely to view the mission as successful, to believe that participation has increased respect for Britain throughout the world, and to believe that Britain had a moral obligation to get involved. Conversely, they were less likely to perceive a risk of casualties and to think that such missions were a waste of money.

However, in line with a developing body of research that examined the effect of policy-specific information on beliefs (e.g. Herrmann et al., 1999, Herrmann & Keller, 2004), the present research has shown that images can supplement the
standard focus on general principles in the search for the underlying structure of foreign policy beliefs.

Hurwitz and Peffley initially conceptualised images as a "standing decision" about specific countries that are super-ordinate to postures, but constrained by core values (see Figure 10.2).

Findings from the present research programme (Chapters 7 and 8) indicated that the placement of images within the hierarchical model may need to be revised. Structural equation modelling indicated that although images influenced specific attitudes towards peace operations, they were not significantly related to any of the three postures (see also Herrmann & Keller, 2001).

Figure 10.2. Original hierarchical model including images

However, images of Afghanistan were significantly affected by core values, such as social and political trust. Images were also affected by political knowledge (although this relationship was just insignificant). Overall, these findings suggested that present-day images of particular countries may be better conceptualised as "situational" factors that are located at the same level of abstraction as postures (see Figure 10.3).

Further research is needed to determine whether this re-conceptualisation better captures the effects of images within the hierarchical model than the original formulation. Such research will also need to investigate the sources of images more carefully, i.e. the degree to which images are shaped by core values and the extent to which they are related to political knowledge and/or media representations.
In the light of recent research (e.g. Boettcher, 2004; Herrmann & Keller, 2004), future studies could also explore a greater range of image components. In a series of experimental studies using undergraduate students, Boettcher (2004) explored the role of location, ethnicity/race/religion, type of humanitarian crisis (repressive regime, ethnic conflict, civil war), casualty ratio and probability of success. Boettcher (2004) found no clear patterns of the impact of type of humanitarian crisis on support for a humanitarian intervention. However, he found that location of the intervention and race/ethnicity/religion of the populace mattered in that US support was highest for humanitarian intervention in Eastern Europe and lowest for African countries. These findings require replication in a British sample.

A theoretical caveat

According to Hurwitz, Peffley and Seligson (1993, p. 247), "hierarchical models, in which general, abstract idea elements – postures and core values – structure more specific policy beliefs, have undermined the view that foreign policy beliefs in the
United States lacked structure". As outlined above, a consistent finding in this thesis has been that individuals engage in theory-driven processing when forming opinions about peace operations.

It has been argued that such heuristics can distort individuals’ judgements, that is individuals who rely on core values and postures may have opinions that they would not hold if given more information (e.g. Kuklinski & Quirk, 2000). However, the present research programme showed that political knowledge had little or no effect on attitudes towards peace operations and did not moderate the relationships within the hierarchical structure.

Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and others (e.g. Luskin, 2002) also noted that heuristics may lead to incorrect or sub-optimal opinions or judgements. However, the question arises whether modern foreign policy is that simple that the concepts of optimality or correctness can readily be applied?

Practical implications of the research

The study of public opinion establishes guidelines within which policymakers are able to consider policy options (e.g. Sobel, 2001). According to Holsti (1996, p. 33),

the most important reason for interest in public opinion on foreign affairs arises from the assumption that in some ways and at least some of the time public attitudes have an impact, for better or for worse, on the conduct of the nation’s external policy.

Whilst the present research programme has not addressed the impact of public opinion on foreign policy decision-making, several empirical studies (Bardes & Oldendick, 1990; Everts, 2001) indicate that there is a general tendency in Western democracies for policy makers to be responsive to strongly expressed opinions about specific policy issues.
A minimum level of public support is needed to justify military interventions, such as peace operations. According to Boettcher (2004, p. 333), “when public support for humanitarian intervention wanes or when the public begins openly to question the operation ... democratic governments will find it difficult to continue humanitarian activities.” The war in Vietnam is a case in point in which public outcry contributed to the abandonment of policies that permitted the sacrifice of American soldiers. Public opinion may also be crucial to the government when it is conducting reviews of its foreign and defence policies. The importance assigned to peace operations in new policies will not only depend on the international environment, but will also be influenced by domestic opinions (Martin & Fortmann, 1995).

As well as influencing governmental decisions, declining public support can also affect the performance of soldiers on peace operations. Studies of soldiers have repeatedly shown that public opinion at home has an effect on how soldiers themselves view such missions. For example, Halverson and Bliese (1996) found that soldiers’ personal support for the mission was directly related to the perceived public support at home. Similarly, Kornhuber (1994, cited in Britt, 1998) found that German peacekeepers experienced stress as a result of the ambivalent feelings German society had for such operations.

Overall, findings from this study suggest ways in which policy makers can frame peace operations to generate or sustain public support for such missions. Specifically, a British government intending to establish and maintain a peace operation would do well to appeal to core values, such as social trust and humanitarianism, as well as to beliefs favouring international involvement and co-operation.

Future research

In line with the majority of other political research, the empirical studies reported in this thesis have made the assumption that attitudes towards peace operations are uni-dimensional and bi-polar, i.e. positive, negative or neutral. However, a growing literature indicates that individuals' opinions do not always readily fall into a
positive-negative distinction, but are often simultaneously positive and negative (e.g. Alvarez & Brehm, 1995; Feldman & Zaller, 1992; Huckfeldt & Sprague, 2000; Lavine, 2001; Nelson & Milburn, 1999; Zaller and Feldman, 1992). In other words, individuals frequently "tend to have roughly as many ideas on one side of the issues as on the other" (Sniderman & Saris, 2000, p. 5). When these evaluations of an attitude object are in conflict, the individual is said to be ambivalent (e.g. Alvarez & Brehm, 1995; Craig et al., 2002; Feldman & Zaller, 1992).

Haenze (2001) found that attitudes towards the NATO intervention in Kosovo were marked by a conflict between two principal values: feelings of responsibility for the victims of civil war and ethnic cleansing, and reluctance to destroy lives or injure civilians. Haenze furthermore reported that such attitudinal ambivalence impacted on willingness to protest against military intervention by signing a petition. Cohrs and colleagues (2002) also reported higher attitudinal ambivalence towards the humanitarian interventions in Afghanistan and Kosovo as a result of universalism and justice centrality (i.e. attitudes towards justice/injustice). The role of attitudinal ambivalence and attitudes towards peace operations therefore needs to be explored in greater detail in future studies.

Future research may also need to address the role of emotions as influencing foreign policy choices within the hierarchical model or foreign policy attitudes in general. Although research has investigated the role of emotions indirectly, such as the emotional response to political issues (e.g. Conover & Feldman, 1984), comparatively little research has explored how emotions, such as fear or hatred, influence foreign policy preferences. Proposing a framework for studying the effects of emotion on foreign policy behaviour, Geva & Skorick (2003) found that negative emotions were indeed a powerful determinant of conflictual foreign policy attitudes.

One aspect of emotion most pertinent to present-day foreign policy issues may be anxiety, which promotes immediate learning whilst undermining what has already been learned (Marcus, 2002). Investigating the link between fear of war and the underlying value priorities, Boehnke and Schwartz (1997) postulated that value priorities influence the appraisal of threat of war. They found that the perceived threat of war was greater amongst individuals who attributed greater importance to
values expressing concern for others – universalism and benevolence, and to values pertaining to the preservation of social order – security and conformity. Different objects of worry have also been found to be differentially related to political behaviour. For example, Breakwell, Fife-Schaw and Devereux (1988) reported that worries about external events but not worries about personal problems were positively related to political activism and liberalism.

A related aspect of foreign policy that warrants further investigation concerns perceptions of threat (e.g. Abolfathi, 1980). There is some indication that perceptions of national threat, if not personal threat, have figured in the British psyche since the September 11th attacks and Britain's involvement in both Afghanistan and Iraq (e.g. MORI, March 2003). For example, a Eurobarometer survey (October 2003) indicated that the perceived threat of terrorism was higher in Britain than in any other European country. There is also a growing body of evidence that the September 11th attacks had an impact on political and social attitudes (Huddy, Feldman, Capelos & Provost, 2002). Kushner (2004) is currently exploring perceptions of threat in shaping people's worldviews and specific policy preferences. A similar study could also explore the effect of threat on the hierarchical model in a British population or in European comparative research.

Future studies should also explore the role of the mass media in greater detail. Most foreign policy events do not affect the individual directly. Rather, international events are always mediated by the mass media (Isernia et al., 2002). Although media use was investigated at the most basic level (i.e. the newspaper most frequently read), other media such as television or the internet were not explored in any of the present studies. Yet, these two media are clearly important vehicles of information. When asked where they would normally hear about, or go to find out about, defence issues, 79% stated that they would use television, 63% newspapers and 18% the internet (MORI, June 2003). An experimental study could explore the effect the media has on different levels within the hierarchical model. Such a study could also explore the impact of "soft" (human-interest themes) and "hard" (knowledgeable information sources) media on foreign policy opinions and general predispositions (cf. Baum, 2004).
Although the present research has shown that political knowledge had no significant impact on the use of general principles, it has been argued that the role of political knowledge in shaping the impact of a general predisposition on opinions about a specific political issue depends on whether the media/public debate offers one undisputed interpretation or competing interpretations of the principle (e.g. Brewer, 2003). More specifically, if the implication of a value is undisputed in a specific policy context, then individuals who endorse this principle should hold one policy attitude, whereas individuals who reject that value should hold the competing opinion (e.g. Kinder & Sanders, 1996). In such cases, the impact of the value on specific attitudes should be greater among knowledgeable individuals than among the less knowledgeable ones. By contrast, political knowledge should not have an impact in cases where the media/public debates stress competing interpretations of a value (Brewer, 2003). An experimental design could be used to explore this issue and to disentangle the differential effects of competing interpretations on theory-driven reasoning.

Finally, the investigation into attitudes towards peace operations and their determinants has so far been limited to a society that has been the provider of peacekeeping troops. However, what is still needed is an assessment of such attitudes in a population that has been at the receiving end of Britain's foreign policy.

Concluding remark

The present research programme explored the complexity with which individuals organise their political worlds, which is more diverse than implied by the traditional approaches to political attitudes. According to Paris (2000, p. 27), studies of peace operations have neglected “building bridges between the study of peace operations and larger theoretical debates.” By advancing our understanding of support for peace operations, the present research took a small step in addressing this shortcoming.
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References


References


APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW MATERIALS FOR CHAPTERS 4 AND 5
(SIERRA LEONE)

Cards were used for participants to indicate their answers:

1 = Strongly Disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neither agree nor disagree
4 = Agree
5 = Strongly Agree

and

1 = Very Likely
2 = Likely
3 = Neither likely nor unlikely
4 = Unlikely
5 = Very unlikely
In society today, nationality and what it means to identify with your country is a topic that attracts a good deal of attention. The following few questions aim to improve our understanding of how people like you think about these things.

Please rate your level of agreement with each of the following statements: (Please mark one box for each)

I am proud to be British ................................................

Being British is an important part of my identity ................

I would rather be a citizen of Britain than any other country in the world ............................................

Generally, the more influence Britain has on other nations, the better off they are ..................................

In a sense I am emotionally attached to Britain and emotionally affected by its actions ................................

Please rate your level of agreement with each of the following statements: (Please mark one box for each)

International cooperation should be encouraged to solve common problems, such as world hunger or world peace ...

Britain shouldn’t worry about world affairs but concentrate on taking care of problems at home ......................

In dealing with other nations, our government should be strong and tough ..................................................

The best way to ensure peace is to negotiate with other nations ..........................................................

To make a change in the world, Britain needs to work together with other nations or international organisations such as the UN or NATO ..................................................

Britain’s power in the world is diminished by working together with other nations or international organisations ...
Many of the tasks undertaken by the British Armed Forces fall under the term peace support or peace operation. The British Army is deployed in over 80 countries around the world, with military personnel currently contributing to a UN operation in Sierra Leone. Please rate your level of agreement with each of the following to statements

Please rate your level of agreement with each of the following statements: *(Please mark one box for each)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The decision to participate in the UN mission in Sierra Leone was a good one</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I approve of British troops being used to bring peace to Sierra Leone</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British troops in Sierra Leone have succeeded in implementing the peace agreement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How likely is it that British peacekeepers will be injured?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How likely is it that British peacekeepers will be killed?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How likely is it that British peacekeepers will be taken hostage?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Personal information*

Are you male ☐ or female ☐?

How old are you ________________?

Please select the highest level of education you have achieved:
- Degree, including PhD ☐
- A-level or equivalent ☐
- O-level/GCSE ☐
- Other ☐
- No qualifications ☐

Please indicate your occupation: ________________________________

Do you have children? Yes ☐ No ☐
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How interested are you in current affairs?</td>
<td>Not at all interested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Please indicate the newspaper you most frequently read:</td>
<td>The Daily Telegraph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you ever served in the Armed Forces?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>During the last thirty years has someone from your family served in the Armed Forces?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you have friends serving in the Armed Forces?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If there were an election tomorrow for which political party would you vote?</td>
<td>Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How liberal or conservative would you rate your position on foreign policy issues?</td>
<td>Very liberal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B

Demographic Composition of Unweighted Panel Sample – Sierra Leone

The table presents the demographic characteristics of the final 80 respondents in the sample, when samples were not weighted, as well as 2001 Census data for Guildford for comparison. The difference between the sample and the Census data for each sub-section is provided in the column to the right.

Demographic composition of unweighted panel sample (N = 80*3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Study sample (N = 80)</th>
<th>2001 Census data for Guildford</th>
<th>Difference Sample/Census</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>53.2%</td>
<td>49.0%</td>
<td>4.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>46.8%</td>
<td>51.0%</td>
<td>4.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>11.65%</td>
<td>0.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td>13.34%</td>
<td>0.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-44</td>
<td>35.9%</td>
<td>33.64%</td>
<td>2.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-59</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
<td>22.23%</td>
<td>5.87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 - over</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>19.14%</td>
<td>9.34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>11.50%</td>
<td>3.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-level</td>
<td>34.5%</td>
<td>33.66%</td>
<td>0.84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>5.96%</td>
<td>3.84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No qual.</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>18.30%</td>
<td>8.00%</td>
</tr>
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<td>Occupation</td>
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<td>1.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>17.00%</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>13.42%</td>
<td>0.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>8.3%</td>
<td>9.24%</td>
<td>0.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>5.49%</td>
<td>1.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>6.80%</td>
<td>1.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>3.89%</td>
<td>0.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>8.48%</td>
<td>1.82%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX C

The effects of attitudes towards European integration and attitudes towards the armed forces on attitudes towards the ERRF – Additional analyses

The Eurobarometer provided one important qualification to this finding. At the EU level attitudes towards the ERRF were positively related to attitudes towards the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and European Integration. Thus, respondents who endorsed a common defence policy were more likely to believe that the ERRF was a good initiative than respondents who were against it (82% versus 49%; Manigart, 2001a). A similar pattern of responses was also found regarding attitudes towards being a member of the European Union: respondents who believed that being a member of the EU was good for their country were more likely to endorse the ERRF than those who believed the contrary (83% versus 53%). Could these associations explain Britain’s attitudes towards the implementation of the ERRF?

Although no country-specific data are available on these relationships, data indicate that 51% of British respondents supported a common defence policy, which was considerably lower than the EU average of 73% support. When asked about the level of decision-making regarding defence issues, only 22% of British respondents believed that decisions should be made at EU-level (compared to the European average of 43%), whilst 23% believed that decisions about military interventions should be taken by all the member countries of the EU (versus 37% Europe-wide; Manigart, 2001a). A similar picture emerged with regards to foreign policy. Compared to the European average of 65%, only 31% of British respondents believed that the member states of the EU should have one common foreign policy (Eurobarometer 54.1, 2001).
Attitudes towards the ERRF were therefore directly related to more general attitudes towards European Integration. To investigate this link further, attitudes towards European Integration were also assessed in this study.

Attitudes towards the Armed Forces

Attitudes towards the ERRF may thus be shaped by more general attitudes towards European Integration. It is, however, possible that attitudes towards the ERRF are also shaped by another related construct, namely attitudes towards the British Armed Forces. It has been argued that the majority of present-day military missions, that is peace operations, have created a military that is more like Janowitz’ (1960) ‘constabulary force’: committed to using the minimum of force or violence and seeking international relations rather than victory (Isernia, 2001). Furthermore, an increasing emphasis on a humanitarian role of the Armed Forces has led to a change in the perception of the forces alongside a change in perceptions of the use of force in the international arena in many countries, such as Italy (Isernia, 2001) and France (La Balme, 2001).

Little is known about the British public’s view on the role of the Armed Forces in today’s political climate. Opinion poll data indicate that British respondents have incorporated the newer roles of keeping the peace into their perceptions of the Armed Forces. In a 2000 European survey on this subject, almost all British respondents (96%) believed that the British Armed Forces’ role should be national defence, whilst 93 percent believed that the British Armed Forces should be preparing to fight wars (Manigart, personal communication, November 4, 2002). However, eight out of ten respondents (82%) also agreed that keeping or re-establishing peace in the world is one of the army’s role, whilst 81 percent agreed that the British Armed Forces should help other countries in case of disaster (Manigart, personal communication, November 4, 2002).

It could therefore be argued that individuals who have embraced the more modern roles of the Armed Forces may be more likely to hold positive attitudes towards the ERRF than individuals who have retained the traditional roles of the British military.
To explore this possibility, perceptions of the role of the Armed Forces were also assessed in this study.

**Additional constructs**

According to the Eurobarometer studies, attitudes towards the ERRF across Europe were influenced by attitudes towards Europe in general, and evaluations of EU competencies in particular. It was therefore expected that respondents who hold positive attitudes towards EU membership would be more likely to hold more positive attitudes towards the ERRF than those who hold negative attitudes towards Europe Integration.

The sources and consequences of attitudes towards the Armed Forces on foreign policy attitudes have received little attention in the empirical literature. However, it was expected that individuals who have endorsed the modern roles of the Armed Forces should be more positive towards the ERRF than individuals who have not accepted these roles.

It should be noted here that different placements of these constructs within the hierarchical model are theoretically possible. Firstly, attitudes towards Europe and the Armed Forces may be shaped by the three foreign policy postures, and may in turn directly influence attitudes towards the ERRF. For example, respondents who are willing to see Britain being internationally involved may hold more positive attitudes towards European integration and the British Armed Forces than respondents who believe that Britain should concentrate on problems at home. However, it is also possible that these two constructs shape foreign policy postures. For example, a positive attitude towards European Integration may lead to more willingness to become involved internationally. Similarly, endorsing peacekeeping roles of the Armed Forces may lead to greater willingness to become involved in international problems and to act multi-laterally. This issue will therefore also be addressed.
"Attitudes towards Europe"

Perceptions of Europe were assessed by four items (5-point Lickert scale: 1 = Strongly Disagree – 5 = Strongly Agree): “Tony Blair has said he would like to see Britain play a role ‘at the heart of Europe’. Do you agree or disagree with this view?”, “If there were a referendum today I would prefer Britain to get out of the European Community.”, “There should a single co-ordinated European foreign policy” and “Britain and other members of the EU should move towards closer political and economic integration”. Factor analysis indicated only one component, which explained 49 percent of the variance. The items were combined into one scale, with higher scores indicating more positive attitudes towards European Integration.

"Attitudes towards the British Armed Forces"

Attitudes towards the British Armed Forces and their role in today’s political climate was assessed by four items (5-point Likert scale: 1 = Strongly Disagree – 5 = Strongly Agree): “The Armed Forces are important for Britain”; “The main job of British soldiers is to fight wars” (reversed scoring); “British soldiers should only defend Britain and its territories ” (reversed scoring); “In today’s world, peacekeeping and other non-combat activities should be central to the British military’s functions”. Factor analysis indicated only one component, which accounted for 43 percent of the total variance. The items were combined into a scale, with higher scores indicating a greater willingness to see British soldiers fulfilling non-traditional, peacekeeping roles.

Assessing the effects of attitudes towards the Armed Forces and Europe in the hierarchical model

The aim of this set of analyses was to assert the additional exploratory power of attitudes towards European Integration and the Armed Forces on support for the ERRF. The first model to be tested situated these additional variables between foreign policy postures and attitudes towards the ERRF. According to this model, attitudes towards the ERRF were significantly and positively influenced by Attitudes towards Europe and, to a lesser extent, Attitudes towards modern roles of the Armed Forces. Attitudes towards Europe, in turn, were positively affected by
Internationalism and Multi-lateralism, whilst Attitudes towards modern role of the Armed Forces were positively influenced by Internationalism and Multi-lateralism and negatively affected by Militarism.

This model provided a good fit to the data, $\chi^2 = 44.23$, df = 53, p = .13, N = 322, GFI = .989, AGFI = .989, RMSEA = .036. To test whether an alternative model would provide a better fit to the data, the model was re-estimated with attitudes towards Europe and the Armed Forces being the determinants of foreign policy postures rather than their consequences. In this model, Attitudes towards Europe positively influenced Internationalism and Multi-lateralism, whereas Attitudes towards the modern roles of the Armed Forces only negatively affected Militarism. In turn, Attitudes towards Europe were positively influenced by political and social trust as well as patriotism and negatively affected by nationalism. Attitudes towards the modern roles of the Armed Forces were positively influenced only by political trust and patriotism and negatively shaped by nationalism.

This alternative model only showed an acceptable fit to the data, $\chi^2 = 63.31$, df = 62, p = .06, N = 322, GFI = .967, AGFI = .964, RMSEA = .058. However, this alternative model fit the data significantly worse than did the original one, $\Delta \chi^2 = 19.08$, df = 9, p = .034, and the original model was therefore retained.

The total effects showed that of all the constructs in this model, Internationalism had the strongest total effect on attitudes towards the ERRF (.48), followed by attitudes towards Europe and social trust. Of the core values, social trust had a greater total effect on Attitudes towards Europe than did political trust, which had a marginally stronger total effect on Attitudes towards the Armed Forces than did social trust.

Thus, more positive attitudes towards European Integration were associated with more positive attitudes towards the ERRF. To a lesser extent, more positive attitudes towards the peacekeeping role of the British Armed Forces were also related to more positive attitudes towards the ERRF. The analyses also indicate that attitudes towards European Integration were shaped by a general view of whether Britain should be involved internationally and by the view that Britain should collaborate with other nations to achieve foreign policy goals. Similarly, attitudes towards the Armed
Forces that incorporated a peacekeeping role were not only influenced by a cooperative foreign policy stance but also by how important multi-lateral ventures were believed to be. Moreover, attitudes towards the Armed Forces were also negatively shaped by Militarism, indicating that a more pacifist approach to foreign policy interventions was related to more positive attitudes about peacekeeping roles for British soldiers.

Consistent with expectations, attitudes towards European Integration and attitudes towards the Armed Forces also affected support for the ERRF. Respondents who held more positive attitudes towards European Integration were more likely to also hold more positive attitudes towards the ERRF than participants who believed the contrary, which is supportive of the Eurobarometer finding. Similarly, respondents who endorsed modern, peacekeeping roles of the Armed Forces were also more supportive of the ERRF than were participants who believed more in the traditional military roles.
APPENDIX D

Demographic Composition of Unweighted Sample Data – Attitudes towards the ERRF

The table presents the demographic characteristics of the respondents in the sample, when the sample was not weighted, as well as 2001 Census data for Guildford for comparison.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographic Composition of unweighted sample data</th>
<th>Guildford sample (N = 322)</th>
<th>Guildford Census data</th>
<th>Difference Sample/Census</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>51.1%</td>
<td>49.0%</td>
<td>2.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>48.9%</td>
<td>51.0%</td>
<td>2.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>11.65%</td>
<td>2.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>13.34%</td>
<td>0.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-44</td>
<td>30.7%</td>
<td>33.64%</td>
<td>2.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-59</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
<td>22.23%</td>
<td>1.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+ over</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>19.14%</td>
<td>0.84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>O-level</td>
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<tr>
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<td>19.28%</td>
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</tr>
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<td>3.89%</td>
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<td>8.48%</td>
<td>0.28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX E

Questionnaire Items for Chapter 6 – Attitudes towards the ERRF

In society today, nationality and what it means to identify with your country is a topic that attracts a good deal of attention. The following few questions aim to improve our understanding of how people like you think about these things.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I love my country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>I am proud to be British</td>
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<tr>
<td>In a sense, I am emotionally attached to my country and emotionally affected by its actions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Although at times I may not agree with the government, my commitment to Britain always remains strong</td>
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<tr>
<td>I feel a great pride in Britain</td>
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<tr>
<td>It is not that important for me to serve my country</td>
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<td>I feel good when I see the British flag flying</td>
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<td>The fact that I am British is an important part of my identity</td>
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<td>It is not constructive for one to develop an emotional attachment to ones country</td>
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<tr>
<td>In general, I have very little respect for the British people</td>
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<td>Britain is really just a big and powerful institution</td>
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### Appendix E

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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How much confidence do you have in your government? ............................................................

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British Prime Ministers are appointed by the Queen ..........................................................

The longest time allowed between general elections is four years ..........................................................

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International cooperation should be encouraged to solve common problems such as world hunger or world peace ..........................................................

Britain should help improve the standard of living in less developed countries ..........................................................

Britain should put pressure on countries which systematically violate basic human rights ..........................................................
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<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>In dealing with other nations, our government should be strong and tough</td>
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<tr>
<td>The best way to ensure peace is to negotiate with other nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>To make a change in the world, Britain needs to work together with other nations or international organisations such as the UN or NATO</td>
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<tr>
<td>It is vital to enlist the cooperation of the UN in settling international disputes</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

_Even non-combat missions, such as peacekeeping, involve some risk; what is your assessment of risk to British peacekeepers?: (Please mark one box for each)_

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Very Likely</th>
<th>Likely nor Unlikely</th>
<th>Unlikely</th>
<th>Very Unlikely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How likely is it that British peacekeepers will be injured?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How likely is it that British peacekeepers will be killed?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How likely is it that British peacekeepers will be taken hostage?</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ERRF troops will succeed in implementing a peace agreement in a country in conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERRF troops will not succeed in establishing a lasting peace in a country in conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix E

As part of Europe, Britain has a moral duty to intervene in European conflicts .................................................. □ □ □ □

As a wealthy and powerful country, it is Britain’s duty to intervene in countries that experience conflict .......... □ □ □ □

The money spent on keeping the peace in foreign countries would have been better spent at home .................... □ □ □ □

British peace operations are a waste of money .......... □ □ □ □

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the participation of British troops in the European Rapid Reaction force that will perform peacekeeping duties in European conflicts? .................................................. □ □ □ □

I approve of British troops being used as part of an ERRF to bring peace to Europe ............................................ □ □ □ □

Demographics

Are you male □ or female □?

How old are you _____________?

Please select the highest level of education you have achieved:
Degree, including PhD ............................................ □
A-level or equivalent ............................................ □
O-level/GCSE ..................................................... □
Other ............................................................... □
No qualifications .................................................. □

Please indicate your occupation: ____________________________

Do you have children? Yes □ No □
Are you interested in current affairs? □ □ □ □ □

Please indicate the newspaper you most frequently read:
The Daily Telegraph □
The Guardian □
The Independent □
The Times □
The Financial Times □
The Daily Mail □
The Sun □
The Daily Express □
Other □

Have you ever served in the Armed Forces? Yes □ No □

During the last thirty years has someone from your family served in the Armed Forces? Yes □ No □

Do you have friends serving in the Armed Forces? Yes □ No □

If there were an election tomorrow for which political party would you vote?
Labour □
Liberal □
Conservative □
Other □

How liberal or conservative would you rate your position on foreign policy issues? □

If you would like to receive a summary of the findings from this study, please write your name and address below. Providing this information will not affect your anonymity, which will be preserved at all times.
APPENDIX F

Demographic Composition of Unweighted Sample Data – Attitudes towards the ISAF

The table shows the demographic characteristics of the respondents in the sample, when samples were not weighted, as well as 2001 Guildford Census data for comparison (Office for National Statistics, 2002). The average percentage deviation of the sample statistics from the Census figures for each sub-section is indicated in the column on the right.

Demographic composition of unweighted study sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Guildford Study sample (N = 336)</th>
<th>Guildford Census data</th>
<th>Difference Sample/Census</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
<td>49.0%</td>
<td>4.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
<td>51.0%</td>
<td>4.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>11.65%</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>13.34%</td>
<td>0.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-44</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
<td>33.64%</td>
<td>0.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-59</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
<td>22.23%</td>
<td>3.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60- over</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>19.14%</td>
<td>3.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>30.57%</td>
<td>0.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-level or equiv</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>11.50%</td>
<td>2.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-level or equiv</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
<td>33.66%</td>
<td>0.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>5.96%</td>
<td>1.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No qual.</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social class</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>19.28%</td>
<td>4.38%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>16.40%</td>
<td>0.80%</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>17.00%</td>
<td>0.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>13.42%</td>
<td>1.12%</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>9.24%</td>
<td>0.74%</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>5.49%</td>
<td>1.71%</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>6.80%</td>
<td>1.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>3.89%</td>
<td>0.89%</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>8.48%</td>
<td>2.22%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX G

Questionnaire Items for Chapter 7 – Attitudes towards the ISAF

In society today, nationality and what it means to identify with your country is a topic that attracts a good deal of attention. The following few questions aim to improve our understanding of how people like you think about these things.

---

**I love my country**

**I am proud to be British**

**In a sense, I am emotionally attached to my country and emotionally affected by its actions**

**Although at times I may not agree with the government, my commitment to Britain always remains strong**

**I feel a great pride in Britain**

**It is not that important for me to serve my country**

**I feel good when I see the British flag flying**

**The fact that I am British is an important part of my identity**

**It is not constructive for one to develop an emotional attachment to ones country**

**In general, I have very little respect for the British people**

**Britain is really just a big and powerful institution**
The first duty of every young Briton is to honour British history and heritage .................................................................

The important thing for the British foreign aid programme is to see to it that Britain gains a political advantage ................................

Other countries should try to make their government as much like ours as possible ........................................

Generally, the more influence Britain has on other nations, the better off they are ..............................................

Foreign nations have done some very fine things but it takes Britain to do things in a big way ..............................

It is important that Britain win in international sporting competitions like the Olympics .................................

It is really not important that Britain be number one in whatever it does ..........................................................

Generally, most people can be trusted ........................................

Most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance ...........................................................

Most people can be counted on to do what they say they will do ..............................................................

In dealing with strangers one is better off to be cautious until they have provided evidence that they are trustworthy ..........................

Most people would tell a lie if they could gain by it ..........................

I trust the government to do what is right ........................................

The government is run for the benefit of all people ........

People in government waste a lot of money that we pay in taxes ..............................................................
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Very Little</th>
<th>Some</th>
<th>Quite a Lot</th>
<th>A Lot</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves</td>
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</table>

**Agree** | **Strongly Agree** | **Disagree** | **Neither Agree nor Disagree** | **Agree** | **Strongly Agree**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th></th>
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In dealing with other nations, our government should be strong and tough.

Britain should take all steps including the use of force to prevent aggression by an expansionist power.

The best way to ensure peace is to negotiate with other nations.

To make a change in the world, Britain needs to work together with other nations or international organisations such as the UN or NATO.

It is vital to enlist the cooperation of the UN in settling international disputes.

Britain’s power in the world is diminished by working together with other nations or international organisations.

**Even non-combat missions, such as peacekeeping, involve some risk; what is your assessment of risk to British peacekeepers?: (Please mark one box for each)**

How likely is it that British peacekeepers will be injured?

How likely is it that British peacekeepers will be killed?

How likely is it that British peacekeepers will be taken hostage?

As part of Europe, Britain has a moral duty to intervene in European conflicts.

As a wealthy and powerful country, it is Britain’s duty to intervene in countries that experience conflict.
Appendix G

The money spent on keeping the peace in foreign countries would have been better spent at home .................

Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

British peace operations are a waste of money ............

Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

One should always find ways to help others less fortunate than oneself ............................................................

Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

The dignity and well-being of all should be the most important concerns in any society ............................................................

Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

One of the problems of today's society is that people are often not kind enough to others .........................

Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

All people who are unable to provide for their own should be helped by others ..........................

Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

A person should always be concerned about the well-being of others ..................................................

Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

It is better not to be too kind to people, because kindness will only be abused ..........................

Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

People tend to pay more attention to the well-being of others than they should..........................

Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed......

Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country ............................................................

Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

This country would be better off if we worried about how equal people are ..................................................

Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others..........................

Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

If people were treated more equally in this country we would have fewer problems..........................

Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree
One of the big problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance ........................................

The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of society ..............................................

We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards even if they are very different from our own........................................

This country would have fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties ................

The world is changing and we should adjust our view of moral behaviour to those changes ................

The expertise shown by British troops in Afghanistan has reinforced respect for Britain around the world .........

British troops in Afghanistan are respected by local people ............................................................

Please check one position for each item to indicate how you feel about the population of Afghanistan?

Trustworthy  □  □  □  □  □  Not trustworthy
Dishonest  □  □  □  □  □  Honest
Repressive  □  □  □  □  □  Free
Friend  □  □  □  □  □  Enemy
Responsible  □  □  □  □  □  Irresponsible
Aggressive  □  □  □  □  □  Peaceful
Good  □  □  □  □  □  Bad
Authoritarian  □  □  □  □  □  Democratic
Threatening  □  □  □  □  □  Not threatening
Cooperative  □  □  □  □  □  Uncooperative
Please check one position for each item to indicate how you feel about the government of Afghanistan?

- Trustworthy
- Dishonest
- Repressive
- Friend
- Responsible
- Aggressive
- Good
- Authoritarian
- Threatening
- Cooperative

Not trustworthy
Honest
Free
Enemy
Irresponsible
Peaceful
Bad
Democratic
Not threatening
Uncooperative

Some people know a lot about politics and foreign policy, others do not keep up with Britain's involvement in Afghanistan. Please answer the following questions.

- The US is part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.
- The ISAF is confined to Afghanistan's capital Kabul.
- The ISAF is headed by British troops.
- The ISAF's role is to assist the Taliban in rebuilding the new Afghanistan.
- The ISAF operates under the auspices of NATO.

Demographics

Are you male or female?

How old are you?

Please select the highest level of education you have achieved:
-Degree, including PhD
-A-level or equivalent
-O-level/GCSE
Appendix G

Other ................................................................. No qualifications ........................................... 

Please indicate your occupation:__________________________________________

Do you have children? Yes □ No □

Are you interested in current affairs? ........................................ Not at all interested Neither uninterested nor interested Very interested

Please indicate the newspaper you most frequently read:
The Daily Telegraph ..................................... The Guardian ................................................. The Independent ................................................ The Times ............................................................ The Financial Times ................................................ The Daily Mail ........................................................ The Sun ............................................................... The Daily Express ................................................ Other ..............................................................

Have you ever served in the Armed Forces? Yes □ No □

During the last thirty years has someone from your family served in the Armed Forces? Yes □ No □

Do you have friends serving in the Armed Forces? Yes □ No □

If there were an election tomorrow for which political party would you vote?
Labour ............................................................... Liberal ......................................................... Conservative ................................................ Other ..............................................................

In general, how liberal or conservative would you rate your position on political issues? ................................................ Very liberal Neither liberal nor conservative Very conservative Don't Know

If you would like to receive a summary of the findings from this study, please write your name and address below. Providing this information will not affect your anonymity, which will be preserved at all times.
APPENDIX H

Demographic Composition of Unweighted Sample Data – Chapter 8

The table shows the demographic characteristics of the respondents in the sample, when samples were not weighted, as well as 2001 Guildford Census data for comparison (Office for National Statistics, 2002). The average percentage deviation of the sample statistics from the Census figures for each sub-section is indicated in the column on the right.

Demographic composition of unweighted sample and 2001 Guildford Census data for comparison (Chapter 8)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Study sample (N = 304)</th>
<th>Guildford Census data</th>
<th>Difference Sample/Census</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>54.2%</td>
<td>49.0%</td>
<td>5.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>45.8%</td>
<td>51.0%</td>
<td>5.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>11.65%</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>13.34%</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-44</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
<td>33.64%</td>
<td>1.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-59</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>22.23%</td>
<td>3.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
<td>19.14%</td>
<td>4.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>28.8%</td>
<td>30.57%</td>
<td>1.77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-level or equiv</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>11.50%</td>
<td>3.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-level or equiv</td>
<td>36.2%</td>
<td>33.66%</td>
<td>2.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>5.96%</td>
<td>0.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No qual.</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>19.28%</td>
<td>5.48%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>16.40%</td>
<td>1.50%</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>17.00%</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>13.42%</td>
<td>2.02%</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>9.24%</td>
<td>1.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>5.49%</td>
<td>2.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>6.80%</td>
<td>1.50%</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>3.89%</td>
<td>0.99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>8.48%</td>
<td>4.22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX I

Questionnaire Items for Chapter 8 – Attitudes towards the ISAF and the Combat Mission

In society today, nationality and what it means to identify with your country is a topic that attracts a good deal of attention. The following few questions aim to improve our understanding of how people like you think about these things.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I love my country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am proud to be British</td>
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<tr>
<td>In a sense, I am emotionally attached to my country and</td>
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<tr>
<td>emotionally affected by its actions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Although at times I may not agree with the government, my</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>commitment to Britain always remains strong</td>
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<tr>
<td>I feel a great pride in Britain</td>
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<tr>
<td>It is not that important for me to serve my country</td>
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<tr>
<td>I feel good when I see the British flag flying</td>
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<tr>
<td>The fact that I am British is an important part of my identity</td>
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<tr>
<td>It is not constructive for one to develop an emotional</td>
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<tr>
<td>attachment to ones country</td>
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<tr>
<td>In general, I have very little respect for the British people</td>
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<tr>
<td>Britain is really just a big and powerful institution</td>
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<tr>
<td>Statement</td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Neither Agree nor Disagree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>The first duty of every young Britain is to honour British history and</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>heritage</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>The important thing for the British foreign aid programme is to see to</td>
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<tr>
<td>it that Britain gains a political advantage</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other countries should try to make their government as much like ours</td>
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<tr>
<td>as possible</td>
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<tr>
<td>Generally, the more influence Britain has on other nations, the better</td>
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<tr>
<td>off they are</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign nations have done some very fine things but it takes Britain</td>
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<tr>
<td>to do things in a big way</td>
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<tr>
<td>It is important that Britain win in international sporting competitions</td>
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<tr>
<td>like the Olympics</td>
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<tr>
<td>It is really not important that Britain be number one in whatever it</td>
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<tr>
<td>does</td>
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<tr>
<td>Generally, most people can be trusted</td>
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<tr>
<td>Most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Most people can be counted on to do what they say they will do</td>
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<tr>
<td>In dealing with strangers one is better off to be cautious until they</td>
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<tr>
<td>have provided evidence that they are trustworthy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Most people would tell a lie if they could gain by it</td>
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<tr>
<td>I trust the government to do what is right</td>
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<tr>
<td>The government is run for the benefit of all people</td>
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<tr>
<td>People in government waste a lot of money that we pay in taxes</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix I

The government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves ........................................

How much confidence do you have in your government? ..............................................................

Britain's electoral system is based on proportional representation ..........................................................

Women are not allowed to sit in the House of Lords ............

British Prime Ministers are appointed by the Queen ............

The longest time allowed between general elections is four years ................................................................

No-one may stand for Parliament unless they pay a deposit ..................................................................

The number of members of parliament is about 100 ..... 

Britain has separate elections for the European Parliament and the British Parliament ........................................

MPs from different parties are on parliamentary committees ..............................................................

Ministers of State are senior to Secretaries of State in the government ........................................................

No-one is allowed to be on the electoral register in two different places ........................................................

International cooperation should be encouraged to solve common problems such as world hunger or world peace .................

Britain should help improve the standard of living in less developed countries ........................................

Britain should put pressure on countries which systematically violate basic human rights ..........
Britain shouldn’t worry about world affairs but concentrate on taking care of problems at home ........................................

In dealing with other nations, our government should be strong and tough .............................................................

Britain should take all steps including the use of force to prevent aggression by an expansionist power ............... 

The best way to ensure peace is to negotiate with other nations ...........................................................

To make a change in the world, Britain needs to work together with other nations or international organisations such as the UN or NATO..

It is vital to enlist the cooperation of the UN in settling international disputes ............................................

Britain’s power in the world is diminished by working together with other nations or international organisations.......

Even non-combat missions, such as peacekeeping, involve some risk; what is your assessment of risk to British peacekeepers?: (Please mark one box for each)

How likely is it that British peacekeepers will be injured? ..............................................................

How likely is it that British peacekeepers will be killed? ................................................................

How likely is it that British peacekeepers will be taken hostage? ..........................................................

As part of Europe, Britain has a moral duty to intervene in European conflicts ..........................................

As a wealthy and powerful country, it is Britain’s duty to
intervene in countries that experience conflict...........  

The money spent on keeping the peace in foreign countries 
would have been better spent at home .......................
British peace operations are a waste of money .............

One should always find ways to help others less fortunate 
than oneself.................................................................
The dignity and well-being of all should be the most 
important concerns in any society ..............................
One of the problems of today's society is that people are 
often not kind enough to others ....................................
All people who are unable to provide for their own should 
be helped by others ......................................................
A person should always be concerned about the well-being 
of others .................................................................
It is better not to be too kind to people, because kindness 
will only be abused ......................................................
People tend to pay more attention to the well-being of 
others than they should..................................................  

The expertise shown by British troops in Afghanistan has 
reinforced respect for Britain around the world ............
British troops in Afghanistan are respected by 
local people ..................................................................  

Please check one position for each item to indicate how you feel about the population of Afghanistan?

Trustworthy Not trustworthy

Dishonest Honest

Repressive Free
Appendix I

Friend □ □ □ □ □ Enemy
Responsible □ □ □ □ □ Irresponsible
Aggressive □ □ □ □ □ Peaceful
Good □ □ □ □ □ Bad
Authoritarian □ □ □ □ □ Democratic
Threatening □ □ □ □ □ Not threatening
Cooperative □ □ □ □ □ Uncooperative

Please check one position for each item to indicate how you feel about the government of Afghanistan?

Trustworthy □ □ □ □ □ Not trustworthy
Dishonest □ □ □ □ □ Honest
Repressive □ □ □ □ □ Free
Friend □ □ □ □ □ Enemy
Responsible □ □ □ □ □ Irresponsible
Aggressive □ □ □ □ □ Peaceful
Good □ □ □ □ □ Bad
Authoritarian □ □ □ □ □ Democratic
Threatening □ □ □ □ □ Not threatening
Cooperative □ □ □ □ □ Uncooperative

Some people know a lot about politics and foreign policy, others do not keep up with Britain's involvement in Afghanistan. Please answer the following questions.

The US is part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan ............................................. □ □ □
The ISAF is confined to Afghanistan's capital Kabul .......... □ □ □
The ISAF is headed by British troops ................................ □ □ □
The ISAF's role is to assist the Taliban in rebuilding the new Afghanistan ......................................................... □ □ □
The ISAF operates under the auspices of NATO .......... □ □ □
Which of the following statements do have a positive or negative feeling towards: (Please mark one box for each, where 1 = Very Negative, 2 = Negative, 3 = Slightly Negative, 4 = Neither Positive nor Negative, 5 = Slightly Positive, 6 = Positive, 7 = Very Positive)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Some groups of people are simply not the equals of others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some people are just more worthy than others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This country would be better off if we cared less about how equal all people are</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some people are just more deserving than others</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is not a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some people are just inferior to others</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased economic equality</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Increased social equality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Equality</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>If people were treated more equally we would have fewer problems in this country</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>In an ideal world, all nations would be equal</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>We should try to treat one another as equals as much as possible</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is important that we treat other countries as equals</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Which of the following statements do have a positive or negative feeling towards: (Please mark one box for each, where 1 = Disagree Strongly, 2 = Disagree somewhat, 3 = Disagree slightly, 4 = Neither agree nor disagree, 5 = Agree slightly, 6 = Agree somewhat, 7 = Agree strongly)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Laws have to be strictly enforced if we are going to preserve our way of life</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People should pay less attention to the Bible and the other old traditional forms of religious guidance, and instead develop their own personal standards of what is moral and immoral</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Women should always remember the promise they make in their marriage ceremony to obey their husbands.

Our customs and national heritage are the things that have made us great, and certain people should be made to show greater respect for them.

National anthems, flags, and glorification of one's country should all be de-emphasized to promote the brotherhood of all men.

The facts on crime and sexual immorality, all show we have to crack down harder on deviant groups and troublemakers if we are going to save our moral standards and preserve law and order.

A lot of our society's rules regarding modesty and sexual behaviour are just customs which are not necessarily any better or holier than those which other people follow.

Our prisons are a shocking disgrace. Criminals are unfortunate people who deserve much better care, instead of so much punishment.

Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.

Organisations like the army and the priesthood have a pretty unhealthy effect upon men because they require strict obedience of commands from supervisors.

One good way to teach certain people right from wrong is to give them a good stiff punishment when they get out of line.

Youngsters should be taught to refuse to fight in a war unless they themselves agree the war is just and necessary.

It may be considered old-fashioned by some, but having a decent, respectable appearance is still the mark of a gentleman and, especially a lady.

In these troubled times laws have to be enforced without
mercy, especially when dealing with the agitators and revolutionaries who are stirring things.

Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no doubt every bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly.

Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they ought to get over them and settle down.

Rules about being "well mannered" and respectable are chains from the past that we should question very thoroughly before accepting.

The courts are right in being easy on drug offenders. Punishment would not do any good in cases like these.

If a child starts becoming a little too unconventional, his parents should see to it he returns to the normal ways expected by society.

Being kind to loafers or criminals will only encourage them to take advantage of your weakness, so it's best to use a firm, tough hand when dealing with them.

A "woman's place" should be wherever she wants to be. The days when women are submissive to their husbands and social conventions belong strictly in the past.

Homosexuals are just as good and virtuous as anybody else, and there is nothing wrong with being one.

It's one thing to question and doubt someone during an election campaign, but once a man becomes the leader of our country we owe him our greatest support and loyalty.

Demographics

Are you male or female?

How old are you?
Appendix I

Please select the highest level of education you have achieved:
Degree, including PhD ........................................................................
A-level or equivalent ...........................................................................
O-level/GCSE ....................................................................................
Other ................................................................................................
No qualifications ..............................................................................

Please indicate your occupation: ______________________________________

Do you have children? Yes □ No □
Are you interested in current affairs? Not at all interested □

Are you interested, Neither uninterested nor interested □ Very interested □

Please indicate the newspaper you most frequently read:
The Daily Telegraph ...........................................................................
The Guardian ....................................................................................
The Independent ..............................................................................
The Times .........................................................................................
The Financial Times ...........................................................................
The Daily Mail ..................................................................................
The Sun .............................................................................................
The Daily Express ............................................................................
Other ................................................................................................

Have you ever served in the Armed Forces? Yes □ No □
During the last thirty years has someone from your family served in the Armed Forces?
Yes □ No □

Do you have friends serving in the Armed Forces? Yes □ No □

If there were an election tomorrow for which political party would you vote?
Labour .............................................................................................
Liberal .............................................................................................
Conservative ....................................................................................
Other ..............................................................................................

In general, how liberal or conservative would you rate your position on political issues?
Very liberal □ Neither liberal nor conservative □ Very conservative □ Don't know □
If you would like to receive a summary of the findings from this study, please write your name and address below. Providing this information will not affect your anonymity, which will be preserved at all times.
APPENDIX J

Demographic Composition of Unweighted Sample Data – Chapter 9 – Study 1

The table shows the demographic characteristics of the respondents in the sample, when samples were not weighted, as well as 2001 Guildford Census data for comparison (Office for National Statistics, 2002). The average percentage deviation of the sample statistics from the Census figures for each sub-section is indicated in the column on the right.

Demographic composition of unweighted sample and 2001 Guildford Census data for comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Study sample (N = 304)</th>
<th>Census data</th>
<th>Sample/Census</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>52.3%</td>
<td>49.0%</td>
<td>3.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
<td>51.0%</td>
<td>3.30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Study sample</th>
<th>Census data</th>
<th>Sample/Census</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>11.65%</td>
<td>0.95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>13.34%</td>
<td>2.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-44</td>
<td>35.2%</td>
<td>33.64%</td>
<td>1.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-59</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
<td>22.23%</td>
<td>1.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>19.14%</td>
<td>6.54%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Study sample</th>
<th>Census data</th>
<th>Sample/Census</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
<td>30.57%</td>
<td>0.53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-level</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>11.50%</td>
<td>3.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-level</td>
<td>35.2%</td>
<td>33.66%</td>
<td>1.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>5.96%</td>
<td>0.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No qual.</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>18.30%</td>
<td>5.10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social class</th>
<th>Study sample</th>
<th>Census data</th>
<th>Sample/Census</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
<td>19.28%</td>
<td>4.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>16.40%</td>
<td>1.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>17.00%</td>
<td>1.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>13.42%</td>
<td>1.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>9.24%</td>
<td>0.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>5.49%</td>
<td>2.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>6.80%</td>
<td>2.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>3.89%</td>
<td>1.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>8.48%</td>
<td>4.38%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**APPENDIX K**

**Questionnaire Items for Chapter 9 Study 1—Attitudes towards Observer Mission**

_In society today, nationality and what it means to identify with your country is a topic that attracts a good deal of attention. The following few questions aim to improve our understanding of how people like you think about these things._

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I love my country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am proud to be British</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>In a sense, I am emotionally attached to my country and emotionally affected by its actions</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Although at times I may not agree with the government, my commitment to Britain always remains strong</td>
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<tr>
<td>I feel a great pride in Britain</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>It is not that important for me to serve my country</td>
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<tr>
<td>I feel good when I see the British flag flying</td>
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<tr>
<td>The fact that I am British is an important part of my identity</td>
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<tr>
<td>It is not constructive for one to develop an emotional attachment to ones country</td>
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<tr>
<td>In general, I have very little respect for the British people</td>
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<tr>
<td>Britain is really just a big and powerful institution</td>
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<tr>
<td>Statement</td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Neither Agree nor Disagree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
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<tr>
<td>The first duty of every young Britain is to honour British history and</td>
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<tr>
<td>heritage</td>
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<tr>
<td>The important thing for the British foreign aid programme is to see to it</td>
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<tr>
<td>that Britain gains a political advantage</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other countries should try to make their government as much like ours as</td>
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<tr>
<td>possible</td>
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<tr>
<td>Generally, the more influence Britain has on other nations, the better</td>
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<tr>
<td>off they are</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign nations have done some very fine things but it takes Britain to</td>
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<tr>
<td>do things in a big way</td>
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<tr>
<td>It is important that Britain win in international sporting</td>
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<tr>
<td>competitions like the Olympics</td>
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<tr>
<td>It is really not important that Britain be number one in whatever it</td>
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<tr>
<td>does</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Generally, most people can be trusted</td>
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<tr>
<td>Most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most people can be counted on to do what they say they will do</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In dealing with strangers one is better off to be cautious until they</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>have provided evidence that they are trustworthy</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Most people would tell a lie if they could gain by it</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>I trust the government to do what is right</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government is run for the benefit of all people</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People in government waste a lot of money that we pay in taxes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Very little</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>Quite a lot</td>
<td>A lot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much confidence do you have in your government?</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Very little</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>Quite a lot</td>
<td>A lot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain’s electoral system is based on proportional representation</td>
<td>True</td>
<td>False</td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women are not allowed to sit in the House of Lords</td>
<td>True</td>
<td>False</td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Prime Ministers are appointed by the Queen</td>
<td>True</td>
<td>False</td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The longest time allowed between general elections is four years</td>
<td>True</td>
<td>False</td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No-one may stand for Parliament unless they pay a deposit</td>
<td>True</td>
<td>False</td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The number of members of parliament is about 100</td>
<td>True</td>
<td>False</td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain has separate elections for the European Parliament and the British Parliament</td>
<td>True</td>
<td>False</td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPs from different parties are on parliamentary committees</td>
<td>True</td>
<td>False</td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministers of State are senior to Secretaries of State in the government</td>
<td>True</td>
<td>False</td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No-one is allowed to be on the electoral register in two different places</td>
<td>True</td>
<td>False</td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International cooperation should be encouraged to solve common problems such as world hunger or world peace</td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Neither Agree nor Disagree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain should help improve the standard of living in less developed countries</td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Neither Agree nor Disagree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain should put pressure on countries which systematically violate basic human rights</td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Neither Agree nor Disagree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix K

Britain shouldn't worry about world affairs but concentrate on taking care of problems at home.

In dealing with other nations, our government should be strong and tough.

Britain should take all steps including the use of force to prevent aggression by an expansionist power.

The best way to ensure peace is to negotiate with other nations.

To make a change in the world, Britain needs to work together with other nations or international organisations such as the UN or NATO.

It is vital to enlist the cooperation of the UN in settling international disputes.

Britain's power in the world is diminished by working together with other nations or international organisations.

Even non-combat missions, such as peacekeeping, involve some risk; what is your assessment of risk to British peacekeepers?: (Please mark one box for each)

How likely is it that British peacekeepers will be injured?

How likely is it that British peacekeepers will be killed?

How likely is it that British peacekeepers will be taken hostage?

As part of Europe, Britain has a moral duty to intervene in European conflicts.

As a wealthy and powerful country, it is Britain's duty to...
intervene in countries that experience conflict

The money spent on keeping the peace in foreign countries

British peace operations are a waste of money

One should always find ways to help others less fortunate than oneself

The dignity and well-being of all should be the most important concerns in any society

One of the problems of today's society is that people are often not kind enough to others

All people who are unable to provide for their own should be helped by others

A person should always be concerned about the well-being of others

It is better not to be too kind to people, because kindness will only be abused

People tend to pay more attention to the well-being of others than they should

Which of the following statements do have a positive or negative feeling towards: (Please mark one box for each, where 1 = Very Negative, 2 = Negative, 3 = Slightly Negative, 4 = Neither Positive nor Negative, 5 = Slightly Positive, 6 = Positive, 7 = Very Positive)
Some people are just inferior to others

Increased economic equality

Increased social equality

Equality

If people were treated more equally we would have fewer problems in this country

In an ideal world, all nations would be equal

We should try to treat one another as equals as much as possible

It is important that we treat other countries as equals

Which of the following statements do have a positive or negative feeling towards: (Please mark one box for each, where 1 = Disagree Strongly, 2 = Disagree somewhat, 3 = Disagree slightly, 4 = Neither agree nor disagree, 5 = Agree slightly, 6 = Agree somewhat, 7 = Agree strongly)

Laws have to be strictly enforced if we are going to preserve our way of life

People should pay less attention to the Bible and the other old traditional forms of religious guidance, and instead develop their own personal standards of what is moral and immoral

Women should always remember the promise they make in their marriage ceremony to obey their husbands

Our customs and national heritage are the things that have made us great, and certain people should be made to show greater respect for them

National anthems, flags, and glorification of one’s country should all be de-emphasized to promote the brotherhood of all men

The facts on crime and sexual immorality, all show we have to crack down harder on deviant groups and troublemakers if we are going to save our moral standards
and preserve law and order

A lot of our society's rules regarding modesty and sexual behaviour are just customs which are not necessarily any better or holier than those which other people follow

Our prisons are a shocking disgrace. Criminals are unfortunate people who deserve much better care, instead of so much punishment

Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn

Organisations like the army and the priesthood have a pretty unhealthy effect upon men because they require strict obedience of commands from supervisors

One good way to teach certain people right from wrong is to give them a good stiff punishment when they get out of line

Youngsters should be taught to refuse to fight in a war unless they themselves agree the war is just and necessary

It may be considered old-fashioned by some, but having a decent, respectable appearance is still the mark of a gentleman and, especially a lady

In these troubled times laws have to be enforced without mercy, especially when dealing with the agitators and revolutionaries who are stirring things

Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no doubt every bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly

Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they ought to get over them and settle down

Rules about being "well mannered" and respectable are chains from the past that we should question very thoroughly before accepting

The courts are right in being easy on drug offenders. Punishment
would not do any good in cases like these.............
If a child starts becoming a little too unconventional, his parents should see to it that he returns to the normal ways expected by society ..............................................
Being kind to loafers or criminals will only encourage them to take advantage of your weakness, so it's best to use a firm, tough hand when dealing with them ................
A “woman’s place” should be wherever she wants to be. The days when women are submissive to their husbands and social conventions belong strictly in the past ...
Homosexuals are just as good and virtuous as anybody else, and there is nothing wrong with being one...........
It's one thing to question and doubt someone during an election campaign, but once a man becomes the leader of our country we owe him our greatest support and loyalty........

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree nor Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A UN observer mission in Israel and Palestine would be a good solution to the political situation in the Middle East</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>British troops should be sent to the Middle East as part of a UN observer mission after a peace settlement has been reached</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>An observer mission in the Middle East would help Israel and Arab nations to settle their differences and live in peace</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>In addition to participating in a UN observer mission, Britain should Increase diplomatic efforts to broker a peace settlement</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>British participation in a UN observer mission in the Middle East would help make the world a safer place</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>British troops should be sent to the Middle East as part of a UN observer mission before a peace settlement has been reached</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Rate the importance of the following items as a guiding principle in your life: (Please mark one box for each, where -1 = Opposed to my values, 0 = Not important, 3 = Important, 6 = Very important, 7 = Of supreme importance)

- EQUALITY (equal opportunity for all)
- INNER HARMONY (at peace with myself)
- SOCIAL POWER (control over others, dominance)
- PLEASURE (gratification of desires)
- FREEDOM (freedom of action and thought)
- A SPIRITUAL LIFE (emphasis on spiritual not material matters)
- SENSE OF BELONGING (feeling that others care about me)
- SOCIAL ORDER (stability of society)
- AN EXCITING LIFE (stimulating experiences)
- MEANING IN LIFE (a purpose in life)
- POLITENESS (courtesy, good manners)
- WEALTH (material possessions, money)
- NATIONAL SECURITY (protection of my nation from enemies)
- SELF-RESPECT (belief in one's own worth)
- RECIPROCATION OF FAVOURS (avoidance of debt)
- CREATIVITY (uniqueness, imagination)
- A WORLD AT PEACE (free of war and conflict)
- RESPECT FOR TRADITION (preservation of time-honoured customs)
- MATURE LOVE (deep emotional and spiritual intimacy)
- SELF-DISCIPLINE (self restraint, resistance to temptation)
- DETACHMENT (from worldly concerns)
- FAMILY SECURITY (safety for loved ones)
SOCIAL RECOGNITION (respect, approval by others)
UNITY WITH NATURE (fitting into nature)
A VARIED LIFE (filled with challenge, novelty, and change)
WISDOM (a mature understanding of life)
AUTHORITY (the right to lead or command)
TRUE FRIENDSHIP (close, supportive friends)
A WORLD OF BEAUTY (beauty of nature and the arts)
SOCIAL JUSTICE (correcting injustice, care for the weak)
INDEPENDENT (self-reliant, self-sufficient)
MODERATE (avoiding extremes of feeling and action)
LOYAL (faithful to my friends, group)
AMBITIOUS (hardworking, aspiring)
BROAD-MINDED (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs)
HUMBLE (modest, self-effacing)
DARING (seeking adventure, risk)
PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT (preserving nature)
INFLUENTIAL (having an impact on people and events)
HONOURING OF PARENTS AND ELDERS (showing respect)
CHOOSING OWN GOALS (selecting own purposes)
HEALTHY (not being sick physically or mentally)
CAPABLE (competent, effective, efficient)
ACCEPTING MY PORTION IN LIFE (submitting to life’s circumstances)
### Appendix K

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Options</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HONEST (genuine, sincere)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRESERVING MY PUBLIC IMAGE (protecting my “face”)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OBEDIENT (dutiful, meeting obligations)</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTELLIGENT (logical, thinking)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HELPFUL (working for the welfare of others)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENJOYING LIFE (enjoying food, sex, leisure, etc.)</td>
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<td>DEVOUT (holding to religious faith and belief)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RESPONSIBLE (dependable, reliable)</td>
<td>□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □</td>
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<tr>
<td>CURIOUS (interested in everything, exploring)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FORGIVING (willing to pardon others)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUCCESSFUL (achieving goals)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLEAN (neat, tidy)</td>
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### Demographics

Are you male □ or female □?

How old are you ____________?

Please select the highest level of education you have achieved:
- Degree, including PhD ............................................ □
- A-level or equivalent ...............................................□
- O-level/GCSE ........................................................ □
- Other .................................................................... □
- No qualifications .................................................... □

Please indicate your occupation: ________________________________

Do you have children? Yes □ No □

Are you interested in current affairs? ................. □ □ □ □ □ □...
Please indicate the newspaper you most frequently read:
The Daily Telegraph ...............................................
The Guardian ........................................................
The Independent ....................................................
The Times .............................................................
The Financial Times ................................................
The Daily Mail ........................................................
The Sun .................................................................
The Daily Express ...................................................
Other .................................................................

Have you ever served in the Armed Forces? Yes □ No □

During the last thirty years has someone from your family served in the Armed Forces?
Yes □ No □

Do you have friends serving in the Armed Forces? Yes □ No □

If there were an election tomorrow for which political party would you vote?
Labour ...............................................................□
Liberal ...............................................................□
Conservative ......................................................□
Other ...............................................................□

In general, how liberal or conservative would you rate your position on political issues?
Very liberal □ Neither liberal nor conservative □ Very conservative □ Don't Know □

If you would like to receive a summary of the findings from this study, please write your name and address below. Providing this information will not affect your anonymity, which will be preserved at all times.
APPENDIX L

Demographic Composition of Unweighted Sample Data –
Chapter 9 – Study 2 - Iraq

The table shows the demographic characteristics of the respondents in the sample, when samples were not weighted, as well as 2001 Guildford Census data for comparison (Office for National Statistics, 2002). The average percentage deviation of the sample statistics from the Census figures for each sub-section is indicated in the column on the right.

Demographic composition of unweighted study sample compared to Guildford 2001 Census data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Study sample (N = 209)</th>
<th>Guildford Census data</th>
<th>Differences Sample/Census</th>
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<td>Gender</td>
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<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>55.1%</td>
<td>49.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>44.9%</td>
<td>51.0%</td>
<td>6.10%</td>
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<td>18-24</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>11.65%</td>
<td>1.05%</td>
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<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>13.34%</td>
<td>0.46%</td>
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<tr>
<td>30-44</td>
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<td>45-59</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
<td>22.23%</td>
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<td>60- over</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>19.14%</td>
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<td>Education</td>
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<td>Degree</td>
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<td>A level or equiv</td>
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<td>11.50%</td>
<td>2.90%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>35.3%</td>
<td>33.66%</td>
<td>1.64%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>5.96%</td>
<td>1.26%</td>
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<td>No qual.</td>
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<td>18.3%</td>
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<td>12.1%</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>5.49%</td>
<td>0.71%</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>6.80%</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>3.89%</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>8.48%</td>
<td>0.78%</td>
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APPENDIX M

Questionnaire Items for Chapter 9 - Study 1—Attitudes towards Iraq

In society today, nationality and what it means to identify with your country is a topic that attracts a good deal of attention. The following few questions aim to improve our understanding of how people like you think about these things.

I love my country .......................................................... □

I am proud to be British .................................................. □

In a sense, I am emotionally attached to my country and emotionally affected by its actions .......................................................... □

Although at times I may not agree with the government, my commitment to Britain always remains strong........ □

I feel a great pride in Britain ............................................. □

It is not that important for me to serve my country ........ □

I feel good when I see the British flag flying .................... □

The fact that I am British is an important part of my identity .......................................................... □

It is not constructive for one to develop an emotional attachment to ones country .......................................................... □

In general, I have very little respect for the British people .......................................................... □

Britain is really just a big and powerful institution ...... □
The first duty of every young Briton is to honor British history and heritage.
The important thing for the British foreign aid program is to see to it that Britain gains a political advantage.
Other countries should try to make their government as much like ours as possible.
Generally, the more influence Britain has on other nations, the better off they are.
Foreign nations have done some very fine things but it takes Britain to do things in a big way.
It is important that Britain win in international sporting competitions like the Olympics.
It is really not important that Britain be number one in whatever it does.
Generally, most people can be trusted.
Most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance.
Most people can be counted on to do what they say they will do.
In dealing with strangers one is better off to be cautious until they have provided evidence that they are trustworthy.
Most people would tell a lie if they could gain by it.
I trust the government to do what is right.
The government is run for the benefit of all people.
People in government waste a lot of money that we pay in taxes.
The government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves ........................................

How much confidence do you have in your government? ..........................................................

Britain's electoral system is based on proportional representation ..........................................................

Women are not allowed to sit in the House of Lords ............

British Prime Ministers are appointed by the Queen..........

The longest time allowed between general elections is four years ..........................................................

No-one may stand for Parliament unless they pay a deposit ..................................................................

The number of members of parliament is about 100 .......

Britain has separate elections for the European Parliament and the British Parliament ........................................

MPs from different parties are on parliamentary committees ..............................................................

Ministers of State are senior to Secretaries of State in the government ....................................................

No-one is allowed to be on the electoral register in two different places ......................................................

International cooperation should be encouraged to solve common problems such as world hunger or world peace ........................................

Britain should help improve the standard of living in less developed countries ........................................

Britain should put pressure on countries which systematically violate basic human rights ..................
Britain shouldn't worry about world affairs but concentrate on taking care of problems at home.

In dealing with other nations, our government should be strong and tough.

Britain should take all steps including the use of force to prevent aggression by an expansionist power.

The best way to ensure peace is to negotiate with other nations.

To make a change in the world, Britain needs to work together with other nations or international organisations such as the UN or NATO.

It is vital to enlist the cooperation of the UN in settling international disputes.

Britain's power in the world is diminished by working together with other nations or international organisations.

Even non-combat missions, such as peacekeeping, involve some risk; what is your assessment of risk to British peacekeepers?: (Please mark one box for each)

How likely is it that British peacekeepers will be injured?

How likely is it that British peacekeepers will be killed?

How likely is it that British peacekeepers will be taken hostage?

As part of Europe, Britain has a moral duty to intervene in European conflicts.

As a wealthy and powerful country, it is Britain's duty to...
intervene in countries that experience conflict............

The money spent on keeping the peace in foreign countries would have been better spent at home ....................... 

British peace operations are a waste of money ............

One should always find ways to help others less fortunate than oneself ............................................................

The dignity and well-being of all should be the most important concerns in any society ................................

One of the problems of today's society is that people are often not kind enough to others ................................

All people who are unable to provide for their own should be helped by others ................................................

A person should always be concerned about the well-being of others .................................................................

It is better not to be too kind to people, because kindness will only be abused ..................................................

People tend to pay more attention to the well-being of others than they should....................................................

Which of the following statements do have a positive or negative feeling towards: (Please mark one box for each, where 1 = Very Negative, 2 = Negative, 3 = Slightly Negative, 4 = Neither Positive nor Negative, 5 = Slightly Positive, 6 = Positive, 7 = Very Positive)

Some groups of people are simply not the equals of others .................................................................

Some people are just more worthy than others ........

This country would be better off if we cared less about how equal all people are ...........................................

Some people are just more deserving than others ......

It is not a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others .................................................
Appendix M

Some people are just inferior to others

Increased economic equality

Increased social equality

Equality

If people were treated more equally we would have

fewer problems in this country

In an ideal world, all nations would be equal

We should try to treat one another as equals

as much as possible

It is important that we treat other countries as equals

Which of the following statements do have a positive or negative feeling towards: (Please mark one box for each, where 1 = Disagree Strongly, 2 = Disagree somewhat, 3 = Disagree slightly, 4 = Neither agree nor disagree, 5 = Agree slightly, 6 = Agree somewhat, 7 = Agree strongly)

Laws have to be strictly enforced if we are going to preserve our way of life

People should pay less attention to the Bible and the other old traditional forms of religious guidance, and instead develop their own personal standards of what is moral and immoral

Women should always remember the promise they make in their marriage ceremony to obey their husbands

Our customs and national heritage are the things that have made us great, and certain people should be made to show greater respect for them

National anthems, flags, and glorification of one’s country should all be de-emphasized to promote the brotherhood of all men
The facts on crime and sexual immorality, all show we have to crack down harder on deviant groups and troublemakers if we are going to save our moral standards and preserve law and order.................................

A lot of our society's rules regarding modesty and sexual behaviour are just customs which are not necessarily any better or holier than those which other people follow......................

Our prisons are a shocking disgrace. Criminals are unfortunate people who deserve much better care, instead of so much punishment........................................

Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn........................

Organisations like the army and the priesthood have a pretty unhealthy effect upon men because they require strict obedience of commands from supervisors........................................

One good way to teach certain people right from wrong is to give them a good stiff punishment when they get out of line........................................

Youngsters should be taught to refuse to fight in a war unless they themselves agree the war is just and necessary...........................................

It may be considered old-fashioned by some, but having a decent, respectable appearance is still the mark of a gentleman and, especially a lady.................................

In these troubled times laws have to be enforced without mercy, especially when dealing with the agitators and revolutionaries who are stirring things..............................

Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no doubt every bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly................................

Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they ought to get over them and settle down.
Rules about being "well mannered" and respectable are chains from the past that we should question very thoroughly before accepting.

The courts are right in being easy on drug offenders. Punishment would not do any good in cases like these.

If a child starts becoming a little too unconventional, his parents should see to it he returns to the normal ways expected by society.

Being kind to loafers or criminals will only encourage them to take advantage of your weakness, so it's best to use a firm, tough hand when dealing with them.

A "woman's place" should be wherever she wants to be. The days when women are submissive to their husbands and social conventions belong strictly in the past.

Homosexuals are just as good and virtuous as anybody else, and there is nothing wrong with being one.

It's one thing to question and doubt someone during an election campaign, but once a man becomes the leader of our country we owe him our greatest support and loyalty.

Now that military action in Iraq has officially ended, the Government believes that British forces should contribute to making Iraq a peaceful and democratic country. How do you feel about British troops being involved in such post-conflict missions in Iraq?

I approve of British troops being used to bring peace to Iraq.

British peacekeeping troops will help make Iraq a more democratic country.

British peacekeeping troops in Iraq will help restore the human rights of Iraqi citizens.

British troops should not be involved in humanitarian action in Iraq without the consent of the UN.
British involvement in humanitarian action in Iraq will make the world a safer place ........................................ 

Rate the importance of the following items as a guiding principle in your life: (Please mark one box for each, where -1 = Opposed to my values, 0 = Not important, 3 = Important, 6 = Very important, 7 = Of supreme importance)

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<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>-1</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EQUALITY (equal opportunity for all)</td>
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<td>INNER HARMONY (at peace with myself)</td>
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<td>SOCIAL POWER (control over others, dominance)</td>
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<td>PLEASURE (gratification of desires)</td>
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<td>FREEDOM (freedom of action and thought)</td>
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<td>A SPIRITUAL LIFE (emphasis on spiritual not material matters)</td>
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<td>SENSE OF BELONGING (feeling that others care about me)</td>
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<td>SOCIAL ORDER (stability of society)</td>
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<td>AN EXCITING LIFE (stimulating experiences)</td>
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<td>MEANING IN LIFE (a purpose in life)</td>
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<td>POLITUDE (courtesy, good manners)</td>
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<td>WEALTH (material possessions, money)</td>
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<td>NATIONAL SECURITY (protection of my nation from enemies)</td>
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<td>SELF-RESPECT (belief in one's own worth)</td>
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<td>RECIPROCATION OF FAVOURS (avoidance of debt)</td>
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<td>CREATIVITY (uniqueness, imagination)</td>
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<td>A WORLD AT PEACE (free of war and conflict)</td>
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<td>RESPECT FOR TRADITION (preservation of time-honoured customs)</td>
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<td>MATURE LOVE (deep emotional and spiritual intimacy)</td>
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<td>SELF-DISCIPLINE (self restraint,</td>
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<td>resistance to temptation</td>
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<td>DETACHMENT (from worldly concerns)</td>
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<td>FAMILY SECURITY (safety for loved ones)</td>
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<td>SOCIAL RECOGNITION (respect, approval by others)</td>
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<td>UNITY WITH NATURE (fitting into nature)</td>
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<td>A VARIED LIFE (filled with challenge, novelty, and change)</td>
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<td>WISDOM (a mature understanding of life)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUTHORITY (the right to lead or command)</td>
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<td>TRUE FRIENDSHIP (close, supportive friends)</td>
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<td>A WORLD OF BEAUTY (beauty of nature and the arts)</td>
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<td>SOCIAL JUSTICE (correcting injustice, care for the weak)</td>
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<td>INDEPENDENT (self-reliant, self-sufficient)</td>
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<td>MODERATE (avoiding extremes of feeling and action)</td>
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<td>LOYAL (faithful to my friends, group)</td>
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<td>AMBITIOUS (hardworking, aspiring)</td>
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<td>BROAD-MINDED (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs)</td>
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<td>HUMBLE (modest, self-effacing)</td>
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<td>DARING (seeking adventure, risk)</td>
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<td>PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT (preserving nature)</td>
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<td>INFLUENTIAL (having an impact on people and events)</td>
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<td>HONOURING OF PARENTS AND ELDERS (showing respect)</td>
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<td>CHOOSING OWN GOALS (selecting own purposes)</td>
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<td>HEALTHY (not being sick physically or mentally)</td>
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Appendix M

CAPABLE (competent, effective, efficient) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

ACCEPTING MY PORTION IN LIFE ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
(submitting to life’s circumstances)

HONEST (genuine, sincere) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

PRESERVING MY PUBLIC IMAGE ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
(protecting my “face”)

OBEDEDIENT (dutiful, meeting obligations) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

INTELLIGENT (logical, thinking) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

HELPFUL (working for the welfare of others) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

ENJOYING LIFE (enjoying food, sex, leisure, etc.) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

DEVOUT (holding to religious faith and belief) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

RESPONSIBLE (dependable, reliable) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

CURIOS (interested in everything, exploring) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

FORGIVING (willing to pardon others) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

SUCCESSFUL (achieving goals) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

CLEAN (neat, tidy) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

Demographics
Are you male ☐ or female ☐?

How old are you ____________?

Please select the highest level of education you have achieved:
Degree, including PhD.................................☐
A-level or equivalent.....................................☐
O-level/GCSE ............................................☐
Other ......................................................☐
No qualifications...........................................☐

Please indicate your occupation:___________________________
Appendix M

Do you have children? Yes □ No □

Are you interested in current affairs? □ □ □ □

Please indicate the newspaper you most frequently read:
The Daily Telegraph .............................................. □
The Guardian ........................................................... □
The Independent ...................................................... □
The Times .............................................................. □
The Financial Times ............................................... □
The Daily Mail ....................................................... □
The Sun .................................................................. □
The Daily Express ................................................... □
Other .................................................................... □

Have you ever served in the Armed Forces? Yes □ No □

During the last thirty years has someone from your family served in the Armed Forces? Yes □ No □

Do you have friends serving in the Armed Forces? Yes □ No □

If there were an election tomorrow for which political party would you vote?
Labour ..................................................................... □
Liberal ..................................................................... □
Conservative ............................................................. □
Other ....................................................................... □

In general, how liberal or conservative would you rate your position on political issues? □ □ □ □ □

If you would like to receive a summary of the findings from this study, please write your name and address below. Providing this information will not affect your anonymity, which will be preserved at all times.