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This book has set out to capture and analyze the multitude of EU member state bilateral relations – what we also call national perspectives – with one of the EU’s main ‘strategic partners’, the Russian Federation. This mapping exercise then enabled us to assess the extent to which bilateral member state relations constitute a challenge to the development of a coherent and effective EU Russia policy. Certainly, there is ample evidence in the chapters supporting the dominant assumption in the literature that tensions exist between bilateral initiatives and multilateral approaches. However, there is also sufficient evidence to suggest that in certain aspects of the EU—Russia relationship the bilateral relationships do play a constructive role.

A ‘UNIVERSE’ OF NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES

The onus in our analysis has been on contemporary relations but in practically every chapter longer and deeper historical and cultural undercurrents have also been touched upon. This suggests that the EU’s relations with external partners should not be examined in too ‘presentist’ terms, that is in isolation from the historical background (see Jørgensen 2006), but that such an endeavour will benefit from the application of a longer time frame analysis as well. Indeed, although EU relations with Russia date back to the early 1990s, most of the bilateral relations discussed in this book are steeped in much older history. Obviously there is no shared ‘EU take’ on the role and relevance of
this history, and indeed what that history is and how it should be interpreted. On the contrary, there exist 27 national perspectives concerning the issue, with the quality of historical experiences varying from benign to malign to indifferent and the same also applies to the relative importance and intensity that the countries attach to them. Therefore, for example, the affinity the Maltese seem to have for their first contact with Russians during the sixteenth century is merely a pleasant background to their contemporary attempts to develop bilateral relations whereas the repulsion the Baltic states still feel towards their forcibly shared history during the twentieth century has the potential to mar not only the bilateral but at times also the wider EU–Russia agenda. The varied nature of the historical experiences of Russia in the EU is therefore a fact that matters and registers and should be kept in mind when discussing the multitudinous contemporary agenda between the EU, its member states and Russia.

It should not be forgotten either that the background to the bilateral relations with Russia is not confined to the intra-EU dynamics alone. On the contrary, in addition to the EU level other actors are salient and in this respect the role of the United States should be highlighted. For the Central and Eastern Europeans especially – above all the Baltic states and Poland – the USA’s policies towards Europe and Russia in particular are important. For example the scrambling in Central and Eastern Europe initially for a coordinated protestation against the ‘reset’ initiated by President Barack Obama in 2009 and then the individual policy changes vis-à-vis Russia in response to it is an illustrative case in point. To a certain degree it is not too far-fetched to argue that at times and in certain cases Washington seems to hold a stronger sway over individual EU member states than ‘Brussels’ does.
In fact, there is a whole array of intervening variables that must be considered with the role of history, geography and culture being the chief among them. However, as all the chapters show, these must be understood as intervening rather than key variables. Firstly, they do not always impact the countries in the same way, for example, proximity does not alone explain good or bad relations in itself – it is the combination of variables that matters. Bulgaria and Romania constitute a relevant case, close geographically but with vastly different historical and contemporary relations with Russia, as do Finland and Estonia. Ireland and the UK, Portugal and Spain are some of the most distantly located member states but, again, have very different relations with Russia. Secondly, in some cases, it is clear that some of the more negative lasting impacts of history have the potential to be overcome to the extent of building deeper more cooperative relationships (Poland), while for others history remains a defining impediment (Estonia and Lithuania).

The place of culture, of religion and identity is a difficult one. It has been somewhat surprising that Slavic identity has not figured more highly in more of the chapters, being a significant explanatory variable in relation to Bulgaria and Slovenia only. Religion, Orthodoxy specifically, has been invoked in certain relationships, notably Cyprus and Greece, but even here it is not a decisive factor in our understanding. Where culture plays its part and therefore needs to inform analysis more extensively, is its role in building and sustaining people-to-people contacts. These are manifested in the exchange of different cultural forms (Ireland), as well as celebration of what is shared (Italy, the Netherlands, Slovenia).
Taken together, the existence of these intervening variables make it very problematic to draw firm conclusions concerning the stances of individual member states on Russia on the basis of economic and/or political interests alone, although obviously these must form the major part of the analysis. At first sight, and as the case-studies in this collection show, this profusion of issues does not readily suggest any hard and fast conclusions. Indeed one conclusion we can draw from this book relates to the very vastness of different national stakes the EU member states have with Russia, such that one could refer to a ‘universe’ of national perspectives. One way of illustrating this variance is to consider two key variables, the relative individual economic and/or political importance that Russia has for the member states. We can envisage an axis whereon we plot the positions (in significance terms) of the member states’ economic and political relations with Russia. Thus we see, for example, that for some states, it is the political, rather than economic, relationship that is most important (Estonia, Finland, Greece) whereas for others it is the reverse (Luxembourg, Netherlands), although, as the chapters show, the situation is far more complex than this and it is also more dynamic.

We have countries that see Russia as an important political partner (Austria, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain) and whose relationships are more easily characterized as partnerships. We also have countries for which political relations are undeniably important but which have also been beset by problems (Poland, the UK and perhaps to a lesser degree Denmark and Sweden) and countries that have had a hard time to develop any meaningful interaction with Russia despite the fact that on a priori grounds they would have a lot to be gained from it (the Baltic states). For most EU
members Russia is no longer perceived as a potential military adversary but we also have a small group of countries which do still consider that a distinct possibility (the Baltics, Finland and Poland in particular). As so many of the chapters show, these relationships experience pressures which act as the catalyst for change (Poland, Romania, Spain). We also have a significant number of countries for which the political relationship is significant only when and if it impacts on the economic and trading relationship (Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta and Portugal). One thing to note particularly in respect of economics is the need to think not only about variance in trading figures between the member states, whereby on pure value in trade statistics, for instance, Germany, France and Italy account for nearly half of all EU trade with Russia, but also to look at what these figures represent in purely national terms. To illustrate the point, Germany has by far the largest share of EU—Russia trade, accounting in 2011 for 32 per cent of the exports and 19 per cent of the imports. However, in absolute terms (for Germany), Russia in fact only ranks eleventh in terms of importance, considerably behind China and the USA. This contrasts interestingly with Poland where the total value of trade with Russia is far less (24 billion EUR for Poland relative to Germany’s 72 billion EUR) but Russia is Poland’s most important extra-EU trading partner. For some of the smaller member states the value of trade with Russia looks relatively modest but Russia actually constitutes a major trading partner.

There is, of course, another key variable, energy, that is present in a significant number of the chapters. The main outcome of the analysis is that although energy is indeed the umbilical cord tying most member states and Russia together, it is misleading to try to read the member state relations with Russia solely through the prism of energy.
dependence. Although the cases of, for example, Austria and Italy show energy is far from insignificant, we also have other cases, such as the Baltic states and Finland, where even a relatively high energy dependence on Russia does not necessarily play the leading role in framing their very different relations with Moscow. Or in other words, the national perspectives on Russia are not a function or solely the outcome of levels of differing energy dependence on Russia in the member states.

All in all, these key variables highlight the differences - the variance - between the member states and underline why any crude typologies of member states into either sheep or wolves are fraught with problems. This is, first of all, the case because we are dealing with genuinely national perspectives on Russia. The member states have developed and continue to develop their relations with Russia on the basis of their national interests and starting points and the analyses in this book show little evidence of kow-towing before Moscow for its own sake. To a degree, this challenges Leonard and Popescu’s (2007) notion of the existence of Russian-inspired ‘Trojan horses’ within the EU. That said, the strong economic and political links that some member states have with Russia obviously do play a role but there is no reason to assume that they play a role beyond the extent that any other significant economic and/or political interest would do. Whether this results in undue Russian influence, and whether that influence will have a benign or a malign impact on the common policy at the EU level, largely depends on Russia’s objectives and intentions, the analysis of which, however, remains outside the remit of this collection.
Both sets of variables, intervening and key, also highlight the changing nature of the bilateral relationships. What is clear is that the member states do not have any fixed takes on Russia, either through time or in relation to specific issue areas, such that one can identify two major themes emerging: variance and change. The variance in national perspectives goes some way towards explaining the persistent problems in generating a single coherent policy on Russia at the EU level. That said, the other interesting and perhaps even somewhat paradoxical finding stemming from the country chapters is that the received wisdom of drastically differing national takes on Russia and on the EU’s overall strategic objectives when it comes to the member state as the root cause of the EU’s problems is largely erroneous. In fact, we conclude that there exists a surprising element of commonality between the member states concerning the overall analysis of Russia’s current trajectory as well as the need to keep constructively engaging the country despite the problems associated with the process. Much of this commonality is a reflection of shifting positions. Perhaps apart from the three Baltic states – and even they have seemed to be converging with the EU mainstream position on Russia recently – practically none of the member states object to the objectives and instruments of the EU’s common Russia policy at the strategic level.

While there are relative differences in respect of tangible economic and political outcomes and imperatives, what we have seen is that for all member states Russia offers at the very least economic opportunities and, for many, political opportunities, even imperatives. After all, if taken from a European security perspective, it is not in the interest of any of the member states for Russia to be economically reduced, politically marginalized or destabilized. On the contrary, there is a clear common interest to
engage constructively with Russia to resolve not only its internal problems (terrorism, nuclear proliferation, cyber-security) but also those of its neighbours (Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and others). It is evident from interactions at the member state and EU levels that all states understand this. Where there is divergence is in relation to perception of direct (and immediate) threat and perception of how best to achieve objectives. After all, Poland, like France, Germany and Italy wants to build, and for the EU to build, a constructive partnership with Russia. Even those states with most reason to fear and distrust Russia have recognized the necessity of engaging with rather than isolating Russia (the Baltic states, Poland and Romania). The divergence is in respect of method and priorities, not the underlying strategic objectives.

THE MEMBER STATES IN THE EU

The story of national perspectives on Russia and their impact on the EU level obviously cannot be told by looking at the dynamics between the EU member states and Russia alone: the internal member state and EU institutional dynamics are also highly significant. Turning to the internal EU level game, as set out in the Introduction to this volume Europeanization was one of the analytical frameworks employed by the contributors. Certain chapters have provided evidence that some convergence of foreign policy towards Russia has occurred (Poland and Romania) and that, as already discussed, there is broad consensus today on what constitutes the most appropriate strategy. In this section, we will consider the three aspects of loading (down, up and cross) central to Europeanization; as well as discussing briefly the need to account for ‘framing’ in any analysis of the CFSP.
As many of the chapters reveal, the EU has impacted directly on individual member states’ relations with Russia. EU membership extends the foreign policy community of any member state and so changes interests and, sometimes, behaviour. One of the most interesting cases is Poland, which according to Bartosz Cichocki has been forced to rethink its relations with Russia basically in its entirety. As Cichocki writes, Poland has drawn the conclusion that its own standing within the EU (but notably also within NATO) is crucially dependent on the quality of its bilateral relations with Russia. This has resulted in a sea change in Poland’s Russia policy which has become more pragmatic and less belligerent towards it in recent years – a change that has been to a degree reciprocated by Russia and that has resulted in some advances between the EU and Russia as well. Another example is Romania, where Micu argues that Romania too has learned it had to adhere to EU norms of behaviour if it was to be taken seriously in respect of its problems with Russia. Romania’s attempts to upload its political agenda vis-à-vis Russia to Brussels were unsuccessful, causing Romania instead to modify its own behaviour and to downgrade what it sought to achieve in respect of Russia. As a result, Romania has adopted a more constructive relationship with Russia (although the longer-term effects of that should not be over-estimated currently). Also, the Iberian states’ relations with Russia are a perhaps unexpected but nevertheless good example of how Europeanization might be said to have had an effect. EU membership has brought Russia into their foreign policy orbit and they have been a positive voice on Russia within the EU – a counter-balance even to some of the more negative voices. Spain and Portugal can to date, therefore, be seen as examples of constructive bilateral relationships with Russia.
Seemingly in answer to calls for the EU to engage with Russia on a more realistic, pragmatic basis (Barysch 2007, Mandelson 2008), in more recent times, EU, or at least European Commission, interactions with Russia have moved closer to the approaches of certain member states (Finland, France, Germany, Italy) who have long conducted a relationship with Russia that has, if not ignored, certainly sidestepped, difficult issues, particularly relating to the normative agenda, where it was felt that this impeded cooperation on key issues concerning trade, energy, visas and security. One of the most obvious changes has come in the shift from a discourse of democratization to modernization (through the P4M), with its emphasis on practical, technical cooperation, notwithstanding the EU’s view that the rule of law agenda is an essential step in Russia’s modernization.

Crossloading effects are more complex, impacting as they do potentially on the very identity of actors. At this stage, it is difficult to argue for evidence of change running that deep. What we do see is a growth in the type of institutional mechanisms and structures, both formal and informal, which might eventually lead to such change. Politically, the chapters have uncovered some interesting dynamics in this respect, particularly as regards coordination of member state positions prior to formal EU negotiations, for example the Benelux, Nordics, Visegrad (to some extent) and, more recently the apparent resurrection of the Weimar Triangle (France, Germany and Poland). Coordination in this type of regional locus has positive effects for the EU inasmuch as it may facilitate more effective and prompt decision-making, although admittedly it may also lead to the entrenchment of positions. This does, however,
answer to some extent the criticisms the EU attracts for the absence or ineffectiveness of its own coordinating mechanisms.

The CFSP generally has attracted a good deal of criticism, not least for the perceived absence of a ‘common’ policy. Much of the criticism is justifiable but it is also the case that the EU is sometimes held up to standards that would be unreasonable in the state context, where institutional and ideological differences abound. The member states themselves are not unitary actors and internal cleavages matter. For example, the case of the UK highlights certain differences of opinion on the ‘proper’ approach to Russia between the government and Parliament. This difference is reflected in the EU context as well, where the European Parliament has always been the most outspoken critic of Russia, especially with regards to human rights, while the Commission adopts a more pragmatic approach. Additionally, in some member states, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, for instance, party political differences betray the lack of a national consensus and account for the vacillations/contradictions evident in their policy towards Russia. Moreover, we see in several member states a failure to coordinate, agree, compromise and concede. Problems of cohesion were not invented by or in Brussels. How issues are framed therefore matters.

In this section, we have demonstrated that EU—member state and member state—Russia relations should be viewed as existing within a circular dynamic, each relationship impacting upon the other. By looking at just one or two instances, it is very easy to see that analysis is dependent first and foremost on the assumptions made and expectations held about the EU and the manner in which an issue is framed. Take, for
instance, Georgia. Sarkozy and (given France’s then-Presidency of the EU) the EU’s response to Georgia did not reflect all the member state’s views (Baltics, Poland, Sweden and the UK) and certainly it did not reflect well on the EU’s reputation as a normative actor. It is not uncommon either to read that the Kremlin’s agreement to let the EU conduct a monitoring mission reflected not the EU’s influence or power, but Russia’s desire to keep NATO out of the region. The alternative view is that France’s pre-existing strong and positive bilateral relationship with Russia meant it was well-placed to engage in dialogue with the Kremlin, to negotiate a ceasefire and to deploy, remarkably swiftly, a monitoring mission (EUMM), where no other entity would have been accepted by Moscow. Seen from this latter perspective, the bilateral relations can be viewed as constituting a positive resource.

THE IMPACT OF BILATERALISM

Nevertheless, progress at the EU level has, on occasion, undeniably been impacted negatively by the priority placed by member states on their own bilateral relations with Russia rather than the common European good. Effects have been felt in a variety of ways. For instance, there is the simple and well-documented uploading of bilateral disputes to the EU level, essentially making a member state’s particular problems with Russia those of the whole Union (the Estonian Bronze Soldier statue, Poland’s meat embargo, the suspension of oil deliveries to Mazeikiai refinery in Lithuania). This has the effect, essentially, of hijacking a previously agreed agenda. There is the equally well-documented practice of concluding bilateral deals, most notably and damagingly in relation to energy, with scant regard for the interests of other member states and even
the previous commitment to pursue a common policy. In addition and perhaps more insidiously, the widespread suspicion persists that at the many high-level bilateral meetings, the Russians are led to believe that the EU’s normative agenda very much plays second fiddle to the pursuit of economic and other more material interests.

Pessimism underpins much analysis of the wider bilateral relationship and is evident in a great deal of the discourse of member states, revolving most obviously around perceptions of identity. A force for continuity in the present imperfect quality of relations is the normative agenda. At bottom, it seems the EU and Russia simply disagree on the question of values and norms and this inevitably impacts on how they define their interests. This problem also impacts on the question of the extent to which bilateralism is a hindrance to multilateralism. Despite the fact that interests and values are not separate from each other, indeed that values can be interests still, too often, values and interests are looked at as competing goals. Even where member states agree that pragmatic engagement with Russia is desirable, they can disagree about the extent to which the wider European normative agenda should be subordinated to economic interests, as many of the chapters show. Thus, despite the often seemingly transactional bases to both the national and EU-level relationships, a strong normative current is evident. This is, perhaps, one reason to be optimistic about the EU’s relations with Russia. It suggests that on all sides there is a desire to seek something more, to find something that will bind the EU to Russia and Russia to the EU, something more than the mere promise of strategic and economic gains.
This leads us to the question of ‘constructive bilateralism’ that was one of our initial hypotheses when we started this project. To be frank, it proved difficult to find instances of undeniable constructive bilateralism, not least because of the assumptions, expectations and framing issues discussed above. Arguably, the role of Germany in launching the P4M is an instance where an initially purely bilateral initiative and dealing with Russia has spilled over into an eventual EU level policy that has itself resulted in not just the original member state (Germany) but 24 other member states signing Modernization Partnerships with Russia. While effects to date are small, they are all positive and have resulted in better political dynamics between ‘Brussels’ and Moscow. Arguments can be made for constructive bilateralism in respect of agenda-setting and the transfer of knowledge and experience. An early example of this was the Northern Dimension where Finland played a pivotal role in building on its own experiences of constructive cross-border cooperation with Russia to help the EU establish a policy framework for addressing a host of regional soft security issues. More recently, several member states have taken the lead in pressing for progress on the heavily disputed question of visa liberalization. Poland has shown how such controversies can be negotiated through small, limited but nevertheless significant and effective steps, solving problems for those living in the border regions of the Kaliningrad oblast.

The relative lack of instances of genuine constructive bilateralism does not deter us from turning the issue the other way round as there is perhaps something to be said about the potential benefits of a lack of a single EU voice when it comes to relations with Russia. As Kissack (2012) has argued, sometimes the EU seems to use the lack of
a unified single voice strategically to engage its partners. Although it would be a bit of a reach to argue that the EU has been strategic in its lack of coherence when it comes to its relations with Russia, the point can at least be entertained that the fact that the EU has verily lacked such a single voice has had some potentially fortuitous political effects as well. For example, during the second Chechen War in the early 2000s it was the slippage from the common EU stance on the part of certain key member states that kept the lines of communication open with Moscow, quite possibly preventing a bigger disruption in relations in the process. In fact, one can only imagine what the political relations between the EU and Russia would be today, had the EU been able to insist with all its full economic, institutional and normative power on the application of its own post-sovereign principles with Russia.

Here, as in the member states, institutional differences come into play in a positive, even if not calculated, way. The EP, like some national parliaments, has been the voice of conscience for the EU, the Commission the voice of strategy. For the EU as an international actor, the building and maintenance of good relations with its partners/other actors is fundamental to the pursuit of its two main objectives: stability and prosperity. The EU continues to pursue a strategic partnership with Russia precisely in order to achieve these. The member states play the central, essential role in an extremely difficult context. The New Cold War discourse, the hot war in Georgia, Russia’s internal electoral controversies, the 2012 NGO (foreign agents) law, the Syria crisis in which Russia pitted itself against the West, the rhetoric of now-President Putin that decries external interference in Russia’s sovereign affairs and Russia’s pointed turn to the East: this is the operational milieu in which the EU has been working. It is not
unremarkable that the EU and its member states have maintained the level and intensity of relations with Russia that they have.

What is so striking about the findings of every chapter, from Germany to Malta, the UK to Slovenia, is the breadth, density and intensity of the interaction with Russia, not only at the higher political level, not even only at the level of business elites, but at the level of ordinary people through tourism, cultural exchange, education and research. Regardless of the size of the political stake at play, it seems that Russia is able to cast its special charm or spell on practically all the member states: Russia is still perceived – and in the European context perhaps rightly so – as a Great Power, and political relations, diplomatic exchanges and high level visits and other photo opportunities with Russia seem to be a sought after commodity practically throughout the Union. The chapters also suggest that this seems to be a feature recognized and highly appreciated by Moscow as well and it quite cleverly manages to play on the vanity of member states by rhetorical flourishing concerning the level, quality and importance of individual member states for Russian foreign policy to its own benefit. However, the people-to-people contacts also reveal relationships that are more than those conceived of, sometimes manipulated by, political leaders.

**FINAL THOUGHTS AND FUTURE AGENDA**

In interviews conducted in Brussels as well as in those member states for which we have responsibility, we the editors have asked officials what needs to change if the EU–Russia relationship is to develop and improve. There is a good deal of
acknowledgement that much has already changed, as is evident in the individual chapters, but there is a general consensus too that further change must occur in relation to the following. Firstly, that member states will have to work much harder to ensure proper consultation with the EU occurs in order to avoid the worst examples of contradiction that we have seen to date, especially in relation to energy. A European Commission official argued (interviews August 2011) that changes were necessary within the EU: that more solidarity between the member states and consistent notification of bilateral developments (which some member states engage in currently) would be helpful.

Secondly, that the EU’s structures, although the subject of ongoing change, must be made more effective if a Russia policy is to be achieved. The same Commission official argued in 2011 that institutional change was necessary to fill the vacuum left by DG RELEX and until that time unsuccessfully bridged by the External Action Service (interviews with European Commission August 2011). This was echoed in a different way in other interviews (for example with former British ambassadors to Moscow) where it was felt that there was a big failure to engage the member states in dialogue with each other in Brussels itself, that information and experience exchange did not feature enough – a rather surprising comment in light of the existence of a fairly extensive EU–Russia related machinery already discussed in the Introduction.

Finally, Russia itself must change if relations with the EU are to be put on a more robust and certain footing. A good deal of pessimism prevails, however, about prospects for change within Russia as long as Putin and his circle remain in power. Russia’s long
overdue WTO accession that finally took place in August 2012 is one potential opening. Indeed, much was said in interviews within member states and in Brussels about the importance of Russia’s membership of the WTO. This seems to signal that the EU players feel that without further, wider structural constraints Russia cannot be brought into line. Here the EU is much more realistic about its capacities than are some of its critics, whose expectations of the EU are often unrealistic. External actors have limited ability to bring about change in another state, and particularly a large and relatively powerful state, such as Russia. Nor can the EU alone achieve change in Russia, which says something about the limitations of the EU’s power.

When it comes to making a difference to the EU’s Russia policy all eyes are usually on Germany. It is true that Berlin is an indispensable part of any attempts at taking EU--Russia relations forward. But if all that was required was for Berlin to take the lead, then surely a fully working EU policy on Russia would have been achieved by now? On the contrary, more policy entrepreneurship (and at times less policy-spoiling) is required from several member states. Therefore we should look beyond Germany to other member states and groupings of member states which may have significant untapped potential in this respect. A case in point is Italy which to date has often acted as a defender of the Russian position within the EU, often to the detriment of the EU and even Italy itself when assessed in wider strategic terms. Both the EU and Italy have failed to exploit the potential that Italy’s close relations with Russia bring, such that in respect of possible catalysts for change, Italy is one to watch. The same would seem to apply to Poland which has already taken strides to revamp its relations with Russia on a more constructive and self-assured footing and which due to its location and size alone
has the potential to emerge as a regional leader in Central and Eastern Europe in the future. The Westerwelle-Sikorski letter represents a very recent and potentially important step in the development of a more coherent and effective EU Russia policy. Additionally on the regional level, the attempts at deepening co-operation between the Nordics as well as their attempts at embracing the Baltic states is an interesting development that should be followed.

This book has shown that at the national level there is much more than meets the eye in EU--Russia relations. The ‘national perspectives on Russia’ are the obvious basis on which attempts to develop a common EU Russia policy rest. They are also the reason for many tensions and contradictions in that very project as well as a source of surprising commonality and vast future potential. This does not mean that this book manages to explore and exhaust all avenues. At least three further fields of fruitful study spring to mind: first, this study highlights that the actual encounter of national perspectives and the EU’s machinery in Brussels is still under-studied. Second, we lack a comparable account of Russia’s bilateral relations with EU member states. Finally, there is some merit to thinking about a longitudinal approach to the national perspectives: the book has shown that significant changes have taken place and there is no need to assume that this process will grind to a halt: the EEAS has only just begun its operation and indeed the new ‘European foreign policy’ is still at a relatively early stage. It seems likely that some of the dynamics of variance and change uncovered in this book have only just been set in motion and their effects on the national perspectives and eventually on the EU policy on Russia still merit further investigation.
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