Introduction

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One of the key tensions in the development of a ‘European foreign policy’ is the interplay between the national foreign policies of the EU member states and the ambitions for a common policy line agreed at the EU level. At first sight this juxtaposition is somewhat artificial as almost by definition there can be no ‘common’ line at the EU level without the prior existence of national foreign policies from which this commonality should spring. In addition, this tension is also perhaps surprising because at least in principle the ‘Grand Narrative’ of the 2000s in the EU has been towards increasing institutionalization and hence ostensibly also growing commonality in foreign policy at the European level (Smith 2008; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008). The Treaty of Lisbon (2009) and its institutional innovations – the President of the European Council, the new High Representative and the European External Action Service (EEAS) that has brought the external relations aspects of the Council and the Commission together – was specifically designed to facilitate the emergence of a more common and unified European foreign policy (Ashton 2010, see also Cameron 2012 and Missiroli 2010).

Against the background of this objective, it is hardly surprising that the extant analysis has mainly focused on the question of whether there is evidence of a common European foreign policy emerging. The majority of the literature naturally considered the various levels at which European foreign policy is made and envisaged the relationship between
the national and EU levels in largely antagonistic or at least competitive terms (Vaisse and Kundnani 2012; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008). Important inroads have been made into assessing the impact of Europe on national foreign policies, primarily through the Europeanization literature (Wong and Hill 2011). However, what is less clear is whether and how the member states through their national policies impinge, both positively and negatively, upon the construction of a common foreign policy at the EU level (for early attempts see Hill 1996; Manners and Whitman 2000). Thus, good case studies are called for.

Russia is an interesting, significant and difficult case, both in respect of EU level relations and member state--Russia relations. Speaking in his capacity as EU Trade Commissioner, Peter Mandelson (2007) said: ‘[n]o other country reveals our differences as does Russia. This is a failure of Europe as a whole, not any Member State in particular. But it does our interests no good’. There are a number of reasons for this: the extent and intensity of the bilateral relationships and arrangements; the number of these which are characterized by poor relations; the uploading of disputes and the impact on the multilateral level; and a particularly sharp division between the member states as to the most effective way of conducting the relationship at the EU level. Thus, by reason of being a particularly ‘hard case’ for EU foreign policy, Russia can yield correspondingly important insights concerning the possibilities as well as limits of developing a common European foreign policy in the future.

For its part, Russia seeks to encourage, use and even abuse bilateral relations in its wider relations with the EU. These types of interactions may yield tactical gains for
Russia and some member states but in the longer term they have undermined prospects for a successful and mutually advantageous EU–Russia strategic partnership (Haukkala 2010). That said, it should be pointed out that this book is not only interested in examining policy failure but also in probing the possibilities of seeing national foreign policies and the bilateralism with third parties that they often entail as a potentially positive resource for the European Union. To that end, this collection has three objectives. The first is to map the relations of each of the 27 member states with Russia, giving an exhaustive comparative account of these bilateral relationships. Here, we seek to provide the necessary analysis in order to draw conclusions in respect of our second objective, which is to consider the larger question of whether bilateral member state relations constitute a challenge to the development of a coherent and effective EU relationship with Russia. This arises from the dominant discourse that bilateralism has a negative impact on multilateralism (Ginsberg 2001; Smith 2008; Schmidt-Felzmann 2008). The final objective, therefore, is to achieve an understanding of whether there are grounds for challenging this discourse and looking for instances of what we have termed ‘constructive bilateralism’. The need for such a comprehensive contribution is clear. While others have attempted to cover all bilateral relations, notably Leonard and Popescu’s typology of member state relations with Russia in their Power Audit of EU–Russia Relations (European Council on Foreign Relations 2007), very little space, and certainly not recently, has been given to a fully comprehensive yet detailed account of these relations and their impact on the EU. This is therefore the first post-2004/2007 enlargements account of the totality of these relations and the first since the newer member states have become embedded in the EU. This is of particular significance given the general assumption that it is the addition of these new states that has made
European foreign policy-making particularly problematic in respect of Russia (Raik 2007; Light 2008).

At this juncture some definitional ground clearing is in order. By ‘European foreign policy’ we mean the common EU policy line adopted in, and increasingly also made by, the institutions in Brussels. By contrast, ‘national foreign policies’ – or ‘perspectives’ – alludes to the wide variety of approaches utilized by the 27 member states in their bilateral relations with Russia. It should be pointed out that we employ a broad understanding of foreign policy: instead of ‘high politics’ dealing with diplomacy and security policy alone, we are interested in the whole spectrum of relations that the member states entertain with Russia, be they economic, political, socio-cultural or security and defence-related. Therefore, our take on these relations is more akin to external relations than traditional foreign policy per se (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008, see particularly chapters 8 and 9; Manners and Whitman 2000).

Such an interpretation of foreign policy is essential because it is at the level of all these policy areas that the EU--Russia relationship has been developed and institutionalized: indeed, one might argue that the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) have been the least operationalized areas in the relationship. This extended policy field is not distinct to EU--Russia relations, of course. The blurring of the line between domestic and foreign policies is evident in national policies, as is an increasing need to see a range of policies and ministries as tools for the achievement of foreign policy goals. In the EU--Russia case, the driving force is trade and energy, albeit more recently other important matters have appeared on
the agenda. Particularly important has been the question of visa liberalization, which has, in turn, brought the area of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) into focus. With this diffusion of policy areas comes a diffusion of competence, thus key actors are located at the EU level in the Commission, the Council, the European Parliament and the new External Action Service. Adding to this already complex picture, member states conduct their relations with third parties through a range of domestic fora, numerous ministries, parliaments, courts, for instance, as well as through sub-state levels: media, business, public opinion and NGOs. The question of who has competence to do what therefore has enormous relevance.

Following the decision in the Lisbon Treaty to remove the pillar system that stressed the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP, the EU now has increased competence over all aspects of foreign policy that fall under the CFSP. This is not to deny the still-central role of the member states, whereby the European Council is tasked with identifying ‘the strategic interests and objectives of the Union’ (Art. 10b, 1 Lisbon Treaty). However, the CFSP has received a major boost to its EU-level resources, with the creation of new offices and bodies designed to ensure that the CFSP becomes more coherent and effective. In order to provide the continuity denied by a system of six month rotating presidencies, Lisbon created the office of President of the European Council, appointed for two and a half years to act as external representative of the EU on foreign and security policy matters. However, it was with the creation of the position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (henceforth referred to as the High Representative) that Lisbon was perhaps most innovative. Appointed by the European Council, this person (currently Baroness Catherine Ashton)
is responsible for the conduct and consistency of European foreign policy. The High Representative heads the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) and is also a Vice-President of the Commission, thus having a foot in both the Council and the Commission. She can submit joint proposals (with the Commission) for CFSP, and the Commission (jointly with the High Representative) for external actions-related matters. Ashton is assisted in her work by the EEAS that brings the external relations features of both the Council and the Commission under one roof. Thus, on paper at least, the Lisbon Treaty vastly extended the toolbox of the EU in relation to the CFSP.

The encounter and consequent enmeshing of member state perspectives and policies on Russia with the EU level largely takes place in Brussels. Here the key political fora for debate and decision-making are the gatherings of the European Council and the FAC but it is the intricate bureaucratic machinery operating under the political overlay that is of perhaps greater significance. The actual details of common policies are debated and prepared especially in the Working Party on Eastern Europe and Central Asia (COEST) that convenes under the Chairmanship of the EEAS. In the COEST the national diplomats prepare and agree issues and policies – in most cases wordings in documents and declarations – to be further debated and eventually decided at the Political and Security Committee (COPS) or the Committee of Permanent Representatives to the EU (COREPER II) that meet at an ambassadorial level. It is the deliverables flowing from this multifaceted machinery that prepare the EU’s policy on Russia and they are often approved without much further political or strategic debate at the FAC or in the European Councils. That said, under Ashton the FAC has undertaken a new initiative to
ponder the state of play and the strategic direction of EU--Russia relations at the ministerial level as well.

Despite the additions and innovations, questions continue to be asked about the sufficiency and efficiency of the EU’s foreign policy resources. Most problematic is the question of how European foreign policy can be coordinated in a system that has such a plurality of actors, with a plurality of competences in areas which either reside directly in the foreign policy arena or in external relations-related areas whose activities impact on the CFSP. The problem of coordination applies both at policy and institutional levels. Institutionally-speaking, it would be fair to say that it is the member states who present the largest problem for they conduct ‘their’ foreign policy not only through the EU but also outside it in their bilateral relations. While the High Representative has responsibility for coordination, she is ultimately reliant on the member states and the problem this might present is not unanticipated in Treaty terms. The Lisbon Treaty requires that: ‘[b]efore undertaking any action on the international scene or entering into any commitment which could affect the Union’s interests, each member state shall consult the others within the European Council or the Council’ (European Council, Art 16(b), 2007/C 306/01). However, this consultation process most often represents an ideal rather than a reality (interviews with Commission officials July 2011) and it is not always obvious either that the member states’ foreign policies evidence the ‘mutual solidarity’ that ensures that ‘the Union is able to assert its interests and values on the international scene’ (European Council, Art 16(b), 2007/C 306/01).

The mapping of the bilateral relationships in this collection provides valuable insights
into why that solidarity has been so difficult to achieve. While there are many similarities in respect of each member state’s historical and current experiences with Russia, there are also many points of difference. The extent of the differentiation was clear from the earliest stages of our discussions and presented its own analytical conundrum. The only really viable theoretical framework was that of Europeanization and indeed, the loose framework we propose incorporates elements of that. Following Wong and Hill (2011:4) we understand Europeanization to be referring to the ‘process of foreign policy convergence’. This implies increasing commonality between the member states and the EU level. There are three aspects to this process: top-down whereby changes in national foreign policies are identified and attributed to participation in the EU foreign-policy making arena (down-loading); secondly, a bottom-up process whereby developments at the EU level are considered to be shaped by the member states themselves (up-loading); finally, a process of identity change in the participating states and the EU itself (cross-loading). (For a detailed argument on causality in Europeanization, see Exadaktylos and Radaelli 2012.) The contributors to this collection were directed to consider only the application of wider arguments rather than attempting to contribute to this literature by detailing, for instance, processes through which this has or has not occurred.

Multiple levels of analysis naturally had to be considered: the national, regional (i.e. European) as well as, in many instances, the systemic. It is, in certain cases, difficult to talk about a member state’s relations with Russia without reference to NATO, for example in the case of Italy, or without reference to the USA, for example, the UK or the Baltic States. At the national level, authors were asked to identify and elucidate what
makes ‘their’ state’s or states’ relations with Russia ‘unique’ and to consider what structures and constrains the relationship. Most importantly, authors had to consider what the main driver is behind national policies towards Russia: to decide whether these are accounted for by changes in the domestic environment, by changes in Russia or at the regional or systemic levels. In certain cases, it might be considered more appropriate to focus on agency and the role of specific individuals or groups of actors in decision-making processes. For others, a member state’s vulnerability to external pressures might mean privileging structures and explanations centring on relative (in)vulnerability.

Whether explanation centred on agency or structure, a variety of factors were likely to be of importance. For instance, the legacy of historical relations has to be considered in respect of understanding individual leaders’ perceptions of and attitudes towards Russia. But such a legacy might pertain also at a more structural level, at least where broader definitions of structure were applied. Geographical location – relative proximity – matters, of course, although as some chapters go on to demonstrate, this cannot function as a sole predictor of the state of the bilateral relationship. For many of the member states, the economic relationship is inevitably what binds the states together, thus data relating to levels of energy dependence, trading figures, even tourism, is crucial to building an understanding of what functions as the glue in the relationship. However, all authors were directed to consider also the role of identity, including culture and religion, and results here have been surprising in some cases, as we go on to explore in the Conclusions to the book.

Ultimately, the brief to authors was to avoid crude typologies and to deliver instead a nuanced analysis that dealt with the complexities of the bilateral relationship(s). At
base, authors were directed to identify, if possible, internal tensions and cleavages concerning Russia in their respective member states. However, having once delivered an understanding of the member state--Russia relationship, authors were asked to consider the impact of that upon the EU--Russia relationship. Here we were firstly looking for evidence of consistency: was there a shared analysis and policy line or were there perhaps meaningful differences? If so, did these differences constitute a problem or were they perhaps a resource, offering potential for fruitful change, for instance? *How* a member state implements decisions made at the national level are of relevance here. Thus, we asked authors to consider questions, for instance, about the extent to which member states attempt to draw on EU resources/capacities in order to achieve their national objectives; whether wider European discourses were invoked when member states defended their policies or their implementation; whether member states’ policies towards Russia were consistent or inconsistent with EU-level policy.

Of particular relevance here, if nuance was to be achieved, was whether there was evidence or not of a pattern in relation to policy areas. Thus in a policy area highly regulated at the EU level, was there a corresponding commonality at national level? Was there evidence that discourse or priorities changed over a period of time in a direct reflection of interactions within Brussels? We began with an expectation that this might be most evident in the cases of newer member states. We asked authors to consider also that it may be the case that multilateralism in fact ‘funds’ bilateralism in that EU membership grants member states a stake in and a level of understanding about Russia previously unknown, thus facilitating deeper interaction.
Other questions centred around the issue of whether it was the case that as enlargement occurred, certain issues fell within the domain of the EU with which some member states had a prior, deeply vested interest, concern and/or capacity. Human rights issues particularly came to mind here. Thus, we asked whether the EU could be seen as playing a role in terms of changing the ground rules of the national game concerning Russia. Was there any potential for identity change in this respect? Foreign policy analysts have long been preoccupied with the question of change versus continuity (Northedge 1968, Donaldson, 2002, Hill 2003). They demonstrate the need to understand the forces for continuities in any actor’s foreign policy, variables such as belief systems, historical experience, identity (Johansen 1980, Larsen 1997) since beliefs, for instance, ‘should be seen as something which constitutes a frame for action’ (Larsen 1997: 7). However, there are equally persuasive arguments about the need to understand that foreign policies are mutable and that analysis of them ‘is the analysis of the causes and effects of changes’ (Modelski 1962: 102). Thus, we seek to understand the circumstances under which change occurs and to see that even a state’s identity is susceptible to domestic and external forces which have the capacity to bring about change (Hopf 2005). Furthermore, increasing interdependence means that state identity must be seen as increasingly allied to the wider political context in which states function (Hill 2003: 175). While we begin with the assumption that foreign policy is about change and continuity, the high levels of interconnectedness felt between EU member states requires particular consideration of what, if anything, changes and why. Furthermore, we ask in our Conclusions: what needs to change in the future?
One final caveat is in order. Inevitably, given that this book is written from the perspective of the EU member states rather than that of Russia, judgments relate far more to the member states and Brussels than Russia. Thus, we do not claim to deliver any insights from the Russian point of view. In fact, this necessary omission suggests avenues for further research and comparison. Therefore we would like to take this opportunity to present a challenge to our Russian colleagues and invite them to produce a commensurate volume where the Russian perspective(s) on individual EU member states is analyzed.

**THE PLAN OF THE BOOK**

We begin with Germany, arguably the pivotal member state in respect of Russia. Susan Stewart accentuates the economic and business relationship but also highlights the centrality of the German--Russian relationship for all aspects of the EU--Russia partnership. She assesses the justification for the widespread criticism that the closeness of the relationship undermines the EU’s efforts to pursue an effective common policy towards Russia and concludes that the truth is rather more nuanced, with clear differences discernible both between the approaches of the Schröder and Merkel governments and between specific policy spheres. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the possible implications of the German--Polish rapprochement on the EU--Russia policy.

Considering the discourse about the existence of a Franco--German axis, a comparison of the chapters on these two states’ relations with Russia is instructive. Both argue that
business interests are central to the relationship. However, the French relationship with Russia, Rachel Le Noan argues, is best understood as a reflection of France’s long-standing search for a post-imperial role and its desire to retain influence. She illustrates the tensions that exist in France’s wider foreign policy, where it plays a prominent role within the EU but where those interactions often reflect a promotion of French values and interests rather than a desire to negotiate a European consensus. Paradoxically, the failure of the EU to agree a common foreign policy frustrates French interests, driving it to seek deeper relations with Russia as an alternative avenue for its ambitions, which in turn hinders the emergence of a common EU Russia policy.

Ireland’s relations with Russia are peripheral at best, based on small trading figures, relative energy independence, very minor geo-strategic manoeuvrings and little shared history to speak of. The under-developed state of this relationship is explained most obviously by geographic distance. However, that geography alone cannot be an indicator of relations is clear from the UK since it is nearly as remotely situated from Russia as Ireland. Here, however, Maxine David argues that (former) great power status comes into play and explains much of the intensity of the relationship as well as the conflicts. The UK presents as an example of a state that pursues pragmatic and strategic interests but which also attempts to promote the normative agenda. Neither case is particularly instructive in respect of wider lessons for the EU, although, other things being equal, the UK at least could play a more significant role in respect of the normative agenda.
It is the Italian case that is the most revealing, however, in respect of how a member state could usefully contribute more to the development of a more coherent EU Russia policy. In his chapter, Riccardo Alcaro explores Italy’s story with Russia, revealing striking similarities with many other western European states: there is a perception of a shared history, an interest in culture, strong trading relations with Russia and a significant degree of energy reliance. Security issues also come into play, such that, as is argued elsewhere in this volume in respect of other EU member states, Italy’s situation and interests mean that no assessment of the relationship can be made without reference to NATO as well as the EU. In delivering his assessment, Alcaro provides interesting insights into what should, versus what does, constitute Italy’s foreign policy, its leverage over Russia, and its failure to use this as an effective means by which to achieve even its own objectives, never mind those of Europe.

Polish--Russian relations are analyzed next. In his contribution Bartosz Cichocki traces the evolution of relations during the post-Cold War era. According to him, the main driver for change in the relations has been Poland’s growing realization that its place in the EU and indeed the wider Euro--Atlantic context is largely predicated on Warsaw’s ability to normalize its relations with Russia. At times, it seems, this willingness has been reciprocated by the Russian side and the two have made some inroads in developing mutually beneficial relations as well as tackling some of the most painful problems. At the same time, the negative historical experiences as well as the lack of mutual trust between the two make the process of rapprochement very difficult and prone to crises and even sudden reverses.
Licínia Simão’s examination of Spain and Portugal’s relations with Russia is no less revealing of the effects that EU membership can have on its member states’ relations with other actors, although she also argues that what might be termed the effects of Europeanization should not be seen as irrevocable. Both Spain and Portugal are examples of states for which attention to Russia has shifted as a result of EU membership. Despite similar orientations and interests in general foreign policy terms, there is clear blue water between them in respect of relations with Russia. It is true that both have sought to engage with Russia and act as promoters of good relations but Spain’s relations are more extensive, reflecting Spain’s relative size and status, which have served it well in building relations with Russia. However, Simão questions whether there is enough of substance in either state’s Russia relations to ensure a continued interest, concluding that attention is as likely to take a turn away from Russia as to remain with it if other opportunities present themselves.

We then turn to consider the position of the majority of the smaller EU member states where clearly their relationship with Russia is very different compared to that of the larger states and also where there may be structural limitations on their capacity to be major players in European foreign policy-making. However, what is apparent from the chapters that follow is that size is not necessarily the most important factor when it comes to explaining the huge variations in the intensity and quality of the bilateral relationships of small states with Russia that our authors identify. Furthermore, the need generally to act on the basis of consensus with regard to EU-level foreign policy means that some small states, either acting as veto states or working together with like-minded states, have played a significant role in the development of EU’s Russia policy.
Tom Casier compares the policies of the three small founder EU members, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, and explores the evolving balance between their traditional pro-integrationist disposition and a more pragmatic pursuit of national business interests, especially with regards to the energy sector. He concludes that in recent years commercial interests have tended to push the Benelux states to favour bilateral deals over EU coordinated actions and thus their credibility as impartial, pro-European actors in the development of EU policy towards Russia has been weakened. Casier is not the only author to deal with member states that share many characteristics but which operate quite different relations with Russia. Indeed, in their chapter, Tobias Etzold and Hiski Haukkala go so far as to challenge the notion of any substantial Nordic commonality concerning Russia. Instead, they argue that for various historical, geopolitical and economic reasons, Denmark, Finland and Sweden have all developed and had rather different relations with Russia. That said, recent years have witnessed an increasing convergence between the Russia policies of the three countries but it is too early to suggest that a Nordic EU caucus concerning Russia would be in the making in the North.

The Russia relations of the three Baltic States Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are analyzed by Ainius Lašas and David Galbreath. According to them, the key issue in the Baltics’ relations with Russia is the negative historical experiences and the mutual lack of trust between the three and Russia that it gives rise to. This lack of trust is then reflected in more concrete realms of cooperation, such as trade and energy that end up easily being securitized. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia are also new
member states for whom the communist-era legacy continues to cast a shadow on contemporary relations with Russia. However, Martin Dangerfield argues that the picture is not entirely negative and particularly in the economic and energy spheres there are increasingly important and constructive relationships at both the private and state levels. He explores the differences, as well as similarities, in attitudes towards Russia in the three countries and why there has been little formal coordination within the Visegrad framework on policy towards Russia at the EU-level.

Bulgaria’s relations with Russia are rooted in a long history, close proximity and total energy dependence. However, in her chapter, Diana Bozhilova shows how relations have been upset by Bulgaria’s perceptions of where its economic and security interests lie after 1991, perceptions which took it into an EU and NATO orientation, at the expense of Russia. At the same time, Bulgaria has continued to seek close cooperation with Russia in areas consonant with EU interests: energy and conflict resolution. Failures identified here reflect less, Bozhilova argues, on Bulgaria’s objectives than on its capacity to achieve those objectives, either within the EU or with Russia, not least because it is not viewed as a sufficiently weighty political player. Like Bulgaria, Romania is linked to Russia through history, albeit a far more antagonistic and conflictual one. Still, as Mircea Micu demonstrates, their close proximity presents a clear imperative to cooperate on security matters, particularly in relation to frozen conflicts in the region, and also in relation to energy. To a large extent, Romanian antipathy to Russia has been overcome both by the need to cooperate and the realization that it was failing to upload its concerns to the EU successfully because of a perception that it was not a constructive player. Micu considers the reasons for Romania’s
preference for conducting relations with Russia through relevant multilateral fora, and argues this is especially so where they might result in losses for Russia.

Situated in a part of Europe which would not necessarily warrant the development of strong contemporary relations with Russia, are Austria and Slovenia. Paul Luif and Martin Malek reveal an interesting multifaceted Austrian relationship in which political elites pursue a closer relationship with Russia than is publicly acknowledged. A familiar story unfolds in which energy is a pivot around which interactions between the two states turn, with serious consequences for the EU’s energy policy, as Austria is revealed as a significant hub for what many judge to be two competing rather than complementary mooted projects: the EU-backed Nabucco and the Russia-backed South Stream projects. The relationship is about more than energy, however, with Luif and Malek showing the effects of the Chechen Wars on Austria and detailing some of the activities of the Russian secret services in this small but central European state. Slovenia is one of the smallest of the new member states and its foreign policy is primarily focused on its immediate neighbourhood, especially the western Balkans. But as Jackie Gower shows, it has in recent years developed quite an extensive and positive relationship with Russia, particularly with regard to trade and energy but also with an important cultural dimension. With the prospect of Croatia’s accession to the EU in July 2013 and other candidate states in the region, she considers whether we are likely to see a distinctive Western Balkans perspective on EU--Russia policy.

Consideration of the member states’ relations with Russia ends with two chapters examining the relationships of the three southern Mediterranean states, all
geographically distant from Russia but each with surprisingly active bilateral relations with Russia. Arsalan Alshinawi discusses the relationship between Malta and Russia. Interestingly, despite its small size, Malta has been active in its relations with Russia and this activism has been reciprocated by the Russian side. For Malta, the key Russia-related interest seems to be economic and their political dialogue hardly goes beyond regional issues. In his chapter, George Christou debates the notion that Cyprus and Greece are Russian Trojan horses in the EU context. He argues that the certain commonality between Cypriot and Greek and Russian stances is based less on the former countries’ willingness to placate Russian interests for its own sake and more on an actual correspondence of certain key interests between the three. Overall, according to Christou, both Cyprus and Greece are on their way towards increased Europeanization in their foreign policies.

In the Conclusions, we bring the individual country analyses together. On the one hand we consider what general conclusions can be drawn from a host of ‘national perspectives’ on Russia. On the other hand we will tease out the wider ramifications of bilateral relations on the making of common policies on the EU level with a view even to arriving at some policy-relevant conclusions concerning how to take the EU’s policy on Russia forward in the future.

REFERENCES


