VALUE AND NATURAL ORDER IN THE PHILOSOPHY
OF
WILLIAM TEMPLE

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SYNOPSIS

The thesis is an examination of the philosophy of William Temple (1881-1944), concentrating on the personalism which especially characterises his entire philosophical outlook, but which is particularly apparent in his treatment of value.

The areas addressed are:

1. The world-picture which underlies Temple's thought.
2. The place of value in the universe, the nature of value, and the relationship between the self and values.
3. Temple's non-propositional approach to revelation.
4. The concept of value in personality, the human person, and the person in community and Christian fellowship.
5. God, the supreme personal will, and Temple's justification of his existence.
6. The ethical consequences of Temple's philosophy: the concept of Natural Order and its relationship to situation ethics and to the Natural Law tradition.

In analysing these concepts, particular attention is paid to Temple's relationship to both the British Idealist tradition and to Process Theology. Detailed consideration is also given to traditional philosophical questions which concerned Temple, especially the Problem of Evil, the Is/Ought question, and the extent to which the moral capacity is innate. Outlines of alternative approaches to these questions are given where this has appeared necessary.
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The mistakes, of course, are mine.
... the Oxford Conference felt called upon to address a message to the world. I was on the committee which drew it up: I remember the hours we spent, with William Temple as chairman, in working out drafts, none of which satisfied us. Finally we asked Temple to do it. His version was widely approved, and Professor Clavier rightly described it as 'a charter of freedom in service and of service in freedom'. The essential sentence, which engraved itself unforgottably on our minds, ran: 'The first duty of the Church, and its greatest service to the world, is that it be in very deed the Church, confessing the true faith, committed to the fulfilment of the will of Christ, its only Lord, and united in him in a fellowship of love and service.¹

Marc Boegner is here writing about the 1937 Conference on Church, Community and State, which was an important development in the subsequent formation of the World Council of Churches, of which William Temple was to be the first (provisional) President, though his early death in 1944 meant that he was not to oversee the flowering of that organisation.

Boegner's comments are revealing, for they demonstrate significant strands in Temple's personality, not least his ability to harmonise different ideas and viewpoints, an ability which rested in part on the training he had received at the hands of Edward Caird, one of the greatest British Hegelians. It is characteristic of that school of philosophy to believe that each view, each statement about reality contains partial truth, but that it requires modification by another statement, in a system of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, in the quest
for absoluteness. The gift of synthesis was clearly Temple's, though I shall suggest in subsequent chapters that at times his solutions are verbal only.

Perhaps more significant is the sentence which so impressed Boegner. To the casual reader, it might appear that Temple is simply uttering a truism of Christian thought. A closer reading, based more fully on a knowledge of Temple's work, reveals how closely it reflects his mature philosophy. To him, 'fellowship' is not a slick term, but something which reflects a profound personalism which is the constant theme of his work; and he is concerned, again and again, to state in practical terms what love and service mean within the context of social and political life.

The emphasis on the human person as the measure by which social and political life should be judged is one that has been stressed by many religious thinkers in the past fifty years, perhaps in response to the dehumanising influences, both political and technological, of the age. Temple, in an essay, says: 'The Christian ... is very much concerned, precisely as a Christian, to insist that economic wealth is a means to human well-being, and that any action or policy must be wrong which tends to increase the former while diminishing the latter.' We may compare with this Pope John Paul II in Laborens Exercens: 'the principle of the priority of labour over capital is a postulate of the order of social morality.' Nor is this orientation confined only to religious thinkers and philosophers. It may be discerned in fields as diverse as psychology (in, for instance, the work of Carl Rogers), management theory (it is instructive to compare the outlook of Chris Argyris or Victor Vroom with the earlier orthodoxies of Taylorism), and much recent sociology.

How much any one thinker is responsible for an intellectual current, it is impossible accurately to judge. By his authority
and his fame, by his work as preacher, writer and broadcaster, Temple clearly contributed much. Although, as we shall see, such a social concern for individual working men and women had been a concern of the Catholic Church overtly since the Leo XIII's *Rerum Novarum* of 1891, and had occupied the thought of men like F.D. Maurice, Charles Kingsley and Conrad Noel, and indeed, of Archbishop Frederick Temple, and of organisations such as the Guild of St. Matthew, William Temple, more completely than any other, integrated it into the mainstream of Anglican thought, and influenced a generation.

That saddest and most energetic of men, Hilaire Belloc, wrote:

> Now, personality is everything. It was a Personal Will that made all things, visible and invisible. Our hope of immortality resides in this, that we are persons, and half our frailties proceed from a misapprehension of the awful responsibilities which personality involves or a cowardly ignorance of its powers of self-government.  

There is nothing here with which Temple, who knew Belloc, would disagree. Indeed, he holds that it is in personality that supreme value resides, most wholly in the full personality of God. He judges ethics by the standard of what is best to or for a person, and is concerned to demonstrate the personal nature of the Christian's relationship with God.

***

Underlying this thesis, therefore, is a concern with personalism. I have attempted to address a number of ultimately related questions, while tracing links with other thinkers, and looking to consider Temple in relation to theIdealist tradition.
The areas addressed may be summarised briefly:

1. The world-picture which underlies Temple's thought.
2. The place of value in the universe, the nature of value, and the relationship between the self and values.
3. Temple's non-propositional approach to revelation.
4. The concept of value in personality, the human person, and the person in community and Christian fellowship.
5. God, the supreme personal will, and Temple's justification of his existence.

* * *

Anyone writing about the work of a philosopher necessarily comes to his task from a cultural background different from that of the man under consideration. This is especially true in the present case. Temple was a member of the Church of England, in the Protestant tradition. I share neither tradition. His philosophical training was within the Idealist school. I was a pupil of Czeslaw Lejewski, and the predominant influence on my philosophical method was not the linguistic enthusiasms of much contemporary English philosophy, but the Reism of Tadeusz Kotarbinski and the approach of other Polish philosophers, together with the Phenomenology of the Central European type, tracing its origins to the thought of Brentano. To this should be added an abiding interest in medieval philosophy, gained largely from D.P. Henry, and perhaps above all, to the thorough training I received, in my earliest years, in Catholic social thought, to which my late father gave a lifetime's reflection.

This difference of approach will be apparent. I hope it is fruitful rather than otherwise. I have not hesitated to draw on those differences, for it seems that often I have been unable
wholly to accept Temple's reasoning on particular points, while often agreeing with his conclusions, and in parts of this thesis I have tried to outline alternative approaches. Nowhere is this more evident than in my attempt to suggest an alternative basis for natural order, or in my suggestions on the problem of evil. But where I am critical, it is from respect: and it is perhaps tribute to Temple that he stimulates thought rather than passive acceptance. It was this quality that struck me when first I read him, and it is this I find still in him.

* * *

One preliminary question needs to be addressed. Central to Temple's philosophy is a concept of the nature of truth which is itself controversial. In *Nature, Man and God*, he gives a specific definition:

The essential condition for the actualisation of Value is the discovery by Mind of itself or its own principle in its object...

... When Mind makes this discovery in the activity of analysis and synthesis, the form of Value actualised is Truth. 5

He adds to this an explanatory note:

When I say that Mind finds itself or what is itself in its object, I mean an experience which has two aspects: first, that it finds the counterpart of the principle of its own activities as for example the mathematical properties of mechanical combinations of forces or of aesthetic proportions; secondly, that with this discovery goes a feeling of being at home with the object, not lost or bewildered in presence
of it. The latter aspect is not easily capable of definition, but seems to me to be easily recognisable and profoundly significant. It is clear that Temple, as he frequently reminds us, uses 'satisfactoriness' as the test that mind has discovered truth. Truth is that which resolves tension, and the need for it is fundamental to the organism:

... desire is a condition of tension. It arises from a failure in the environment to satisfy the organism, or a realisation that the environment is offering the means of satisfying a need till now unsatisfied; and so soon as under the impulse of desire the organism has found the satisfaction of its need, desire ceases; it exists in the tension which it seeks to relieve.

There is an immediate problem with Temple's view: what is satisfactory to one person is not necessarily so to another. One person may say of an explanation that it is sufficient for him, and he has no need of any other: another, perhaps a scientist, may ask for more, feeling that the given explanation itself opens up further questions. The danger here is that one feels he has found 'truth', the other not. Any account of the differences between the two men will be not a matter of logic so much as analysis of two psychologies: different people being differently satisfied. In this difference there is further peril: the sense of frustration felt by the person satisfied at the apparent obtuseness of the person who is not. The consequence can be that of an unreasoned defence of an orthodoxy against a questioner. Examples abound in intellectual history. Many thinkers were entirely satisfied with a geocentric vision of the universe, and felt that men like Copernicus or Galileo were unnecessarily dissatisfied in their search for an alternative.
Ultimately, greater knowledge prevailed; and it was the dissatisfaction which led to that deeper knowledge. Indeed, according to Karl Popper, it is through dissatisfaction with existing orthodoxy, through seeking to show falsification, that scientific progress is made. There is, between Temple and Popper, a great gulf. As we shall see, many writers about Temple have drawn attention to his self-confidence: some, indeed, have described him as intellectually 'placid', and there is, I think, an element of truth in the criticism. When arguing for the existence of God, for instance, Temple seeks an explanation that raises no further questions, using this to justify his acceptance of purposive will. For me, the critical stance of Popper is preferable, in that it enriches rather than impoverishes a given topic, for it asks us to envisage a universe of other possibilities.

Perhaps we should extend charity to Temple in this. He could not have been familiar with the work of Popper, and his writing shows no familiarity with the existentialists who, finding no intrinsic meaning in the world, require the individual as it were by act of will to impose his own meaning on the world for the sake of his own authenticity. It is not necessary, nor is it part of my purpose, to consider the merits of the existentialist case. It is sufficient to point to the need for a coherent defence of any philosophy to be able to account for the views of others. Any hint of 'well, it satisfies me' is signally unpersuasive. I hope to develop something of this in the ensuing pages: it seems to me an underlying, even temperamental, weakness in Temple as philosopher. But if that is a weakness in him, it should not deflect from the central task of seeking what is of perennial value in his philosophical writing.
Notes

1. Marc Boegner: The Long Road to Unity: p.113
3. Pope John Paul II: Labores Exercens: p.55
4. Hilaire Belloc: First and Last: p.53
6. ibid.: p.165
7. e.g. ibid.: pp.152-153
8. ibid.: p.142
CHAPTER TWO

THE BACKGROUND

1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

It is rare, but not without parallel, that a man notable as a philosopher should reach the very highest ecclesiastical office. Two twentieth century cases however stand out. One is the elevation of Karol Wojtyła, the phenomenologist and Professor of Ethics at Lublin to the papacy as John Paul II. To his work reference will be made in this study in the thought of Dr. William Temple (1881-1944), who was to rise to be Archbishop of Canterbury (1942-1944).

The combination of high church office and philosopher is, at times, an uneasy one. It is tempting to view the philosopher through the office - to consider the philosopher great because of the exaltedness of the man. It is equally tempting to view the philosophy with some surprise, as a curiosity; and perhaps to demean it as somehow irrelevant, more involved with apologetics than with true philosophical concern. The difficulty here is heightened in the case of William Temple, as his philosophical works contain elements of overt theology, in greater measure than in those of Wojtyła. Nonetheless, there is an illogicality in deriding the philosopher because of the churchman: it would be as reasonable to deride the philosophy of Leibniz because he was a mathematician - or, in another field - to the music of Charles Ives because he was a successful businessman.

Nevertheless, there are real difficulties in the philosophical activities of the man of affairs, and these apply with some force in the life and work of William Temple. The point is well made by Temple himself, writing of his first major philosophical work, Mens Creatrix, published in 1917:
This book was planned in the year 1908 when I was a junior don engaged in lecturing in Philosophy. At that time I had the presumption to believe that I was myself destined to be a philosopher. The course of events has led to my since being mainly occupied with what are foolishly distinguished as "practical affairs" (for what is so powerful in practice as a philosophy?), and the completion of this book has been the work of odd moments. It was partly written at Oxford; partly at Repton, while I was Headmaster there; but more than half of it has been dictated in spare half hours since I came to London, indeed during the first six months of 1916.¹

There is indeed, as Dorothy Emmet has noted, a tendency to disjointedness in some of Temple's philosophical work, and she notes also that 'we may feel that...argument has not been subjected to the constant scrutiny for which we look in a writer to whom philosophy has been a primary vocation.'² Indeed, Temple's own description of the years 1908 to 1916 omits much. In those years, he had published seven other books, visited Australia, lectured at the General Theological Seminary in New York, edited a magazine and Papers for Wartime, was President of the Workers Educational Association, laboured for the burgeoning ecumenical movement, and had charge of St. James', Piccadilly, one of London's busiest churches. Mens Creatrix was finished late at night on the eve of his wedding.³ Even for a young man of phenomenal energy such labour must have some effect. As he rose in the church, Temple's activities increased rather than diminished. There is no need to rehearse them here. It is sufficient to note that by the time of Christus Veritas (1924) he was busy as Bishop of Manchester; and he delivered the Gifford Lectures 1932-1934 when Archbishop of York. These lectures were published in 1934 as Nature, Man and God and constitute Temple's last and perhaps most important major contribution to philosophy.
There are clearly disadvantages to the philosopher in so wide a range of activities. There are, however, certain benefits when studying the thought of a man so immersed in public life, a man who could say '... what is so powerful in practice as a philosophy?' for we have the opportunity to consider towards the end of this thesis how Temple applied his philosophical method and ethical principles to a wide range of subjects, including such matters as Nazi treatment of Jews, education, war, history, penal reform, the League of Nations, ecumenism, politics, economics, marriage, gambling and venereal disease. The practical affairs of life provide a test for any philosophy: we shall consider the adequacy of Temple's thought in the light of that test, having first analysed his central philosophical principles.

2. BACKGROUND TO TEMPLE'S PHILOSOPHY

Temple's style in philosophy tends to be vigorous and straightforward. His philosophical 'voice' is confident, tending towards exposition of ideas without a great deal of overt analysis of other philosophers. Of his method, Temple says in *Mens Creatrix*: 'The enquiry is tentative; but for the sake of clearness and brevity the exposition will be confident. Views not accepted will only be mentioned when the ground for their rejection seems to be also ground for the acceptance.' His style was not to change. (We may note that this confidence of exposition is also characteristic of Wojtyla, a characteristic which he shares with much Polish philosophy: but modern British writing is generally more discursive. A British philosopher will conduct a debate with other philosophers; a Polish one - and Temple - prefers to expound directly to the reader.)

This method can create occasional difficulties for the Temple scholar. Because Temple mentions few other philosophers, and even fewer theologians, there is a temptation to treat his
philosophy as if it were a thing complete of itself. Joseph Fletcher in the longest published study of Temple's thought falls into this trap, doing little to set Temple in his intellectual context, especially in the development of English philosophy. More rigorous analysis shows that Temple stands within the tradition of British Idealism, and most evidently of Personal Idealism; though there is a shift towards the newer school of Realism apparent in *Nature, Man and God*. One critic has suggested that 'what Temple has attempted is the development of a theistic idealistic metaphysic on the basis of a realistic epistemology' It seems to me that this is an oversimplification, for reasons which I hope will be apparent later. While the main purpose of this study is not to show the philosophical antecedents of Temple, a brief review of his background of his background will be helpful in elucidating and contextualising certain points.

Temple said of himself that the 'master influences' were St. John, Browning and Plato. Plato, he said, was supreme among philosophers, because of his ability - as perceived by Temple - 'to grasp the whole as a whole - ... Imagination as well as Intellect, the artistic as well as the scientific capacity'. This capacity to grasp the whole, to synthesise and to unify was characteristic of Temple's whole method: in various church and political debates he was frequently called upon to draft consensus statements reconciling the points of view of others: and his philosophical and other writings are shot through with this approach. Nor is this at all surprising. The synthesising approach may be true of Plato: it is certainly true of Temple's Oxford mentor, Edward Caird. Caird repeatedly stressed the need for a unifying principle in philosophy - 'the source of being to all things that are, and of knowing to all beings that know ... an essential principle, or rather the ultimate essential principle of our intelligence, a principle which must manifest itself in the life of every rational creature.' This principle, the ground of thought and
being, is God. This view is fundamental to both Caird and Temple. Temple made explicit his debt to Edward Caird - 'such method in thought as I possess, and especially such grasp of the principles of Dialectic as I have acquired, I believe myself to owe to my Master at Balliol, Edward Caird'\textsuperscript{13} - and Nature, Man and God is dedicated to his memory. Caird had published important studies of Kant\textsuperscript{14} and Hegel\textsuperscript{15}, and it is not surprising that both the critical approach of the one, and the dialectical approach of the other should have had evident influence on Temple's own work, especially in Nature, Man and God. As a student, Temple was a keen disciple of Kant; indeed, his father, Archbishop Frederick Temple, found it necessary to advise his son to stop thinking about the nature of things-in-themselves, 'for Time and Space are a part of you and you cannot do without them'\textsuperscript{16}. The influence of the Dialectical Method is evident both in the emphasis on synthesis and in the whole intellectual method of Nature, Man and God.

Caird held that despite the importance of Kant and Hegel and the significance of metaphysical idealism as a way of interpreting experience, it was an error to import into a foreign country any philosophical system - what satisfied a past generation in another country was not necessarily suited to the intellectual needs of today\textsuperscript{17}. (In some ways we may see this as a reflection of Hegel's own attitude, in particular to the philosophy of law.) Temple seems to have followed Caird in this view\textsuperscript{18}; it is therefore not unexpected that we find his Kantianism and Hegelianism transmuted by British Idealism. To a brief review of this strand in philosophy we now turn.

Idealism was, for almost a century, dominant in British philosophical life. It is now, for various reasons which will be apparent, almost entirely neglected, though there are a few recent thinkers, notably Illtyd Trethowan and T.L.S. Sprigge who show its influence. The term 'Idealism' can be confusing, and it will be helpful to clarify what is meant. 'Idealism' is
and it will be helpful to clarify what is meant. 'Idealism' is generally described as the view that material things exist only as the objects of perception: 'realism', by contrast, is the view that they exist even when not perceived. However, the British Idealists are not, on the whole, very concerned with the theory of perception. The core of their idea is that to be real is to be a member of a 'rational system'; that is to say, a system which is constructed in such a way that the nature of the members can fully be understood only in relation to the whole. The system which thus envelops the members is generally presented as ideal and spiritual. Here may be seen the Platonic influence - in Platonic Idealism the central doctrine is that a thing is real to the extent that it participates in the Ideal. The British Idealists tend to believe either that the reality of a thing is a manifestation of Spirit (Absolute Idealism) or it is a member of a community of spirits (Personal Idealism). Temple's thought draws upon both strands - the unifying principle is God, who sustains the universe; but value is realised in community. Either way, there is a tendency towards explicit metaphysics.19

British Idealism may be traced back to the thought of S.T. Coleridge (1772-1834). In Coleridge we find the emergence of concern with the subject-object relationship, a concern evident throughout the development of idealism. By 'subject' is meant the knowing or perceiving self; the 'object' is the object of that self's perception: 'All knowledge rests on the coincidence of an object with a subject.'20 We must find the ultimate principle in the identity of subject and object, and this identity is found in the self-consciousness of a spirit.21 However, if the spirit is originally the identity of subject and object, it must somehow dissolve this identity to become conscious of itself as object, and this requires an act of will. For this, freedom is necessary, the freedom of the spirit to reconstruct itself objectively to itself. In the further development of this idea Coleridge becomes somewhat cloudy; but
he notes importantly that the ego is not an end in itself\textsuperscript{22}: to understand all existence, we must elevate our conception 'to the absolute self, the great eternal I am'\textsuperscript{23}. We find in Temple, a hundred years later, similar concerns - the move from self to God, the concern with the subject-object relationship, the significance of self-consciousness and the importance of freedom to the intellect. No less important is the cast of mind we find in Coleridge - the idea that an Idealist metaphysics leads to a spiritual comprehension of reality, underpinning Christianity in a conscious opposition to mechanistic approaches to nature.

British Idealism obviously developed a great deal beyond Coleridge. Important figures in that development were James Ferrier(1808-1864), John Grote(1813-1866), T.H.Green(1836-1882), Edward Caird, F.H.Bradley(1846-1924), and Bernard Bosanquet(1848-1923). It is not necessary for present purposes to detail the thought of each of these: rather it will be helpful to consider such elements in each philosopher that will show ideas that were to be central to the system adumbrated by Temple in his works: further parallels will be drawn in the detailed analysis of Temple's own philosophy.

Ferrier emphasises knowledge as a starting point. Nothing can be known except in its relation to self as subject - a thing has meaning, and indeed is only thinkable as an object for a subject. The universe has meaning for a subject, yet further is unthinkable except as having existence for a subject. Nevertheless, we can consider the universe separately from consideration of ourselves, but only, says Ferrier, 'by yoking it on, in thought, to some other self.'\textsuperscript{24} This move seems in experience an improbable one, but it is significant, as Temple makes a similar move from our minds to the sustaining Mind of the universe. Ferrier's eventual formulation is: 'there is one...Absolute Existence which is strictly necessary; and that existence is a supreme, and infinite, and everlasting Mind in
synthesis with all things. For Ferrier, the Absolute is not God alone but a synthesis of God and the world: to treat the Absolute as God would be to risk pantheism.

John Grote stresses the subject-object relationship very strongly. He follows Ferrier in stating that any phenomenon is unintelligible without relation to consciousness. Ferrier had said that we can only be ignorant of what is in principle knowable; for anything unknowable can have no relation to subject and becomes meaningless. The subject has an important part to play in constructing an articulated universe; and the self has ends - teleological activity - in so forming a conception. We find something of this emphasis in Temple, and the language he uses in his development of Natural Order is precisely such a teleological ordering of reality as a basis for moral activity. Likewise, Temple shares with Grote the attitude that science cannot provide total understanding of the universe. For Grote, as for Temple, science works as if things existed in abstraction from things as they are known - for a philosopher, their knowability is essential; and this knowability exists precisely because the objects of the world are consonant with the requirements of mind; they have reasonableness within them, and so we can feel at home with them and make sense of them. This attitude we find in other idealists; and in Temple the point is repeated constantly. Temple makes clear his belief that science is not enough, emphasising the significance of art, moral activity and will and imagination in our comprehension of the universe. In Temple and in Grote the point is made more overtly than in the work of other idealists.

T.H. Green emphasises the active, imaginative aspects of the mind which are essential to full understanding of the universe. To understand is not merely to receive impressions; it is to organise and synthesise by mental activity. This synthesis is a developing activity of the human race. Our understanding
of mental activity in this way brings moral requirements, but these are based on our apprehension of value on the world. Further, the need for activity in understanding shows that man can only realise himself (understand himself) in activity. This activity is free in the sense that his actions are his own, that he is the author of them. Even if they follow from his character, they are nonetheless free. We shall see Temple arguing similarly in making the case for freedom of the will, that the acts of a self-conscious subject can properly be said to be free acts. Temple also follows Green in his belief that while the individual must realise himself, the human person is essentially a social being, who can only fully actualise his potential in society. Nevertheless he follows Green's view that 'our ultimate standard of worth is an ideal of personal worth. All other values are relative to value for, of, or in a person.' For both, society is essential to the development of the individual; and society's forms - state, family, and so on - must cater for this development. To this point we shall be returning frequently in this study.

Edward Caird has been mentioned. Note was made of his emphasis on synthesis and reconciliation, following the Hegelian model - for Caird, there are no antagonisms that cannot be reconciled. If for instance religion and science seem opposed, this is only an appearance. For this reason, Caird regretted the Cartesian tendency to dualism - the gap emphasised by the traditional gap between Cartesians and empiricists. Temple, his pupil, followed him in this: 'If I were asked what was the most disastrous moment in the history of Europe I should be strongly tempted to answer that it was that period of leisure when Rene Descartes, having no claims to meet, remained for a whole day "shut up alone in a stove".' For Caird 'the world is a rational or intelligible system' Man is thus also united, under the central unifying power of God: Temple likewise insists on the unified nature of man - he uses the term 'solidarity' - under God. Caird devoted much of his thought to the development of the
religious impulse in man. Consciousness has three elements: man may look outwards to the not-self, the object; inwards to himself; and upwards to the unifying factor between subject and object, God. Caird traces this development in religious history. In Ancient Greece, man saw God objectively, as 'out there'. In Israel, man looked inwards to the personal God. Only in Christianity do we find united the God of both nature and morality: differences do not disappear, but are united. There follows from this, not surprisingly the view that the traditional division between Natural and Revealed Theology should disappear, subsumed in the philosophical theology of Idealism. We find Temple also casting doubt on the divisions in theology, from a similar point of view. Common to both men is a reaction to the traditional sharp distinctions of Nature, Man and God; these must be reconciled, as must the contrast between the worlds of 'facts' and 'values' - values are in the facts, and every fact has value. To this we shall return. Caird's emphasis on, and interest in, the development of religious thought is not surprising given his frank acceptance of Darwinism. Throughout his work we find evidence of this concern, with consideration of the implications of evolution for philosophy. Temple follows him in this; after all, Frederick Temple had been the first senior churchman overtly to accept the evolutionary process as axiomatic, in the Bampton Lectures of 1884. 30

Bradley, the best-known of the Idealists, had perhaps less influence on Temple than his contemporary, Bosanquet. Nevertheless, we find him quoted quite often by Temple. Temple does not devote much space to the discussion of the principal matters dealt with in ,for instance, Appearance and Reality but he is clearly at one with Bradley in his insistence on the intelligibility of reality: as Bradley puts it: 'the universe appears to be one system; it is an organism (it would appear) and more. It bears the character of the self, the personality to which it is relative, and without which it is as good as
He also follows Bradley in his insistence that the overall unity contains—and must contain—diversity: the theory of concrete universals, the insistence that a universal must be a community of its members, not an abstraction from it, finds echo in Temple's thought. Temple does diverge from Bradley, as we shall see when considering his attitude to the idea of personality, in his attitude to morality: Bradley seems to argue—slightly statically—that morality consists in large part in simply following the norms of society: 'to be moral, I must will my station and its duties.' Nor do we find in Temple Bradley's preoccupation with his rather hazy, and logically suspect, Absolute.

Bosanquet was, as we have noted, more influential than Bradley on Temple. Part of the reason for this is that Bosanquet, perhaps the last great Absolute Idealist, found himself more consciously than Bradley trying to hold the Idealistic line against a younger generation of British philosophers who, like Russell, opposed Idealism. Bosanquet went not so far along the road towards the Absolute as Bradley, concerning himself rather with matters like art, science, religion and social participation. Temple follows him in the view that these activities possess real value: in each of his philosophical works, Temple draws on these activities—involving as the do the traditional Idealist triad of Truth, Beauty and Goodness—to argue for a theistic system. Bosanquet emphasises more strongly than Bradley the significance of value in the world: 'the character of experience as a revelation of the world of values is pretty clear.' Like Bosanquet, Temple gives value a central place in his thought: in Bradley it is a more peripheral concern.

So far in this brief review of Idealism, we have concerned ourselves with Absolute Idealism rather than with Personal Idealism. Here we may content ourselves with a brief glance at only two major thinkers: Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison (1856-
1931), and James Ward (1843-1925). The best-known Personal Idealist, John McTaggart (1866-1925), found less sympathy from Temple, probably because of his atheism: Temple tended to look to philosophers for support of Christian theology. The central thesis, as we have noted, of the Personal Idealists was that the reality of a thing is as a member of a community of spirits. We may add F.C. Copleston's generalisation that 'one of the basic factors in personal idealism is a judgement of value, namely that personality represents the highest value within the field of our experience.' This statement appears at first glance to be a summary of the central argument of Mens Creatrix. However, there are differences between Temple's fundamental views of value and those held by Pringle-Pattison. He also harks back to Bradley and expresses the wish that Pringle-Pattison should explore the implications of his own theism to show the unificatory effects of God; after all, 'even Mr. Bradley's Absolute, though itself dark with excess if light, has something to tell us about its own appearances'.

Temple describes Pringle-Pattison's The Idea of God as 'the nearest approach to a Summa Philosophiae that any contemporary has given us', though he confesses that when reading it 'I am haunted by a sense of ambiguity' in relation to Pringle-Pattison's ideas both of God and of value. Nevertheless, Pringle-Pattison is important to Temple in stressing the importance of the individual and his value, which can be lost in the emphasis on the Absolute: 'the two positions - the divine personality and human dignity and immortality - are two complementary sides of the same view of existence.' Like Pringle-Pattison also, Temple insists that time can be transcended: both use analogies from the symphony and the drama. Both philosophers insist upon the importance for our understanding of the universe of 'the aspects of beauty and sublimity which we recognise in nature and those finer insights which we owe to the poet and the artist.'
Ward insists upon the significance of theism, claiming that this supplies the unity which is missing in pluralism without God: 'God is the ground of the world's being, its ratio essendi': so we find the emphasis both on God and the importance of the individual, in a philosopher who insists, in true Idealist fashion, that the fundamental structure of experience is the subject-object relationship.

In our review we have noted in passing how Temple may be seen to have much in common with leading figures of the British Idealist school. In many ways, Temple may be seen, at least in his early work, as an example of a late flowering of Idealism, and his indebtedness to that school of thought is apparent throughout his work, though later in his career he makes use of philosophers of the realist school. The influence of A.N. Whitehead and Samuel Alexander is evident in Nature, Man and God. It is therefore not surprising that Temple has suffered from the eclipse that Idealism has undergone. Later schools of thought have found Idealism rather woolly, and have criticised much of its work, or simply ignored it. Idealism was attacked by G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell (and later by A.J.Ayer) among others, on philosophical grounds; but perhaps the principal reasons for its eclipse may be found no less in the shifts of society. The experience of the First World War, with its shattering of complacency, and growing doubts about any apparently simple solutions, the overall climate of twentieth century uncertainty, may in the end have proved more damaging to the status of Idealism than this or that philosophical objection. Temple himself sometimes seems to have shared something of the complacency apparent in the Idealist school: he is said to have been unable only once to answer a question, when asked to show reasons for the existence of God - to Temple his existence is a datum, and this is frequently evident in his writing. One critic, the scientist-churchman Bishop Barnes of Birmingham, wrote in a private letter in 1946:
When I first knew him [Temple], he was placidly critical... As the years went on, a dreadful orthodoxy seems to have enveloped him. His extraordinary dexterity with words remained, but whether the ideas behind the words became increasingly valuable I doubt.45

Whether anything of permanent value may be found in the philosophical writings of William Temple, it will be part of the task of this thesis to consider.

MENS CREATRIX, CHRISTUS VERITAS AND NATURE MAN AND GOD

In the course of the review of British Idealism, note was made of many of Temple's philosophical ideas. For present purposes, it may be helpful to provide a brief outline sketch of the arguments of each of the three main philosophical works which provide the basis of this thesis.

Mens Creatrix sets out to demonstrate that the four areas of knowledge, art, science, morality and religion present converging lines of evidence which do not meet unless unity is provided by some factor: and this unifying factor is found in the Incarnation. Temple considers the first half of Mens Creatrix to be philosophical - he takes the conclusions of the four areas mentioned to try to synthesise them. The second part of the book is theological, attempting to show how the revelation of God - and that alone - makes full sense of experience. His reason for doing so is made explicit: 'It is abundantly clear that a perfect theology and a perfect philosophy would coincide. There can only be one Truth46... the aim of this book is to indicate a real unity between faith and knowledge as something to which we can even now in part attain'47. Temple claims his method is broadly scientific: data is investigated to find a unifying hypothesis; once an
hypothesis has been constructed, it is tested by reference to data. We shall consider the adequacy of these hypotheses in due course.

Christus Veritas is more directly theological than its predecessor: it is an attempt to present a Christocentric metaphysic. He deals with such matters as the structure of reality, the question of value, religious experience, man, history and God, before elaborating on them from the point of view of Christian faith.

Nature Man and God is in many ways different in approach from its predecessors, and from the philosophical point of view is perhaps more satisfying. Temple makes clear that it is not a work in which the theme moves from one argument to the next; rather the book is seen as critical in its approach - its purpose is 'to provide a coherent articulation of an experience which has found some measure of co-ordination through adherence to certain principles.' There is, however, much development in the book: Temple moves from consideration of the world of science to an eventual demand for specific Revelation.

Part of the reason why this book is different from its predecessors is that Temple was obliged to follow the terms of the Gifford Trust (Nature Man and God is the printed version of his Gifford lectures) by lecturing on Natural Theology. We have already noted that Temple's mentor, Edward Caird, rejected the traditional division between Natural and Revealed Theology, and Temple follows him in this. For Temple the task of Natural Theology is critical - the criticism of religion, using criticism in the same sense as in aesthetics or the scientific process. To pursue these enquiries, religion must be related to its place in our knowledge and understanding of the universe. This question is approached from many angles: Temple considers science, the activities of mind, truth, beauty and goodness, evil, value, the relations between immanence and transcendence.
He returns to his central conviction that 'the primary assurances of Religion are the ultimate questions of philosophy'\(^{49}\) (Temple's italics), that 'Theological Philosophy... is in the end the only Philosophy that has any hope of being satisfactory'.\(^{50}\) Central to all is the place of value in the structure of reality; and it is to this vision of reality that we must now turn.

NOTES

1. Mens Creatrix p.vii
4. Mens Creatrix: p.23
7. Mens Creatrix: p.7
8. ibid. p.7
9. ibid. p.23
10. In April 1928, as a delegate to a conference in Jerusalem, he wrote to his wife, 'I...seemed to be regarded as having done rather conspicuously my parlour trick of fitting everybody's pet point into a coherent document, when they thought they were contradicting one another.' F.A.Iremonger: William Temple: Archbishop of Canterbury: p.396
11. Edward Caird (1835-1908), Master of Balliol College, Oxford (1893-1907), an important figure in the development of British Idealism.
15. *Hegel* (1883)
18. 'Thomism and Modern Needs' demonstrates a similar outlook.
19. In his Preface to *Doctrine in the Church of England* (1937), Temple appears to have reached a more sceptical position on the possibilities of a complete metaphysic on Christian lines; but he nowhere develops this line of thought.
21. ibid. p. 145
22. ibid. p. 144
23. ibid. p. 144
25. ibid. III, proposition 11, p. 522
26. e.g. *Nature Man and God*: pp. 143-144
27. T. H. Green: *Prolegomena to Ethics*: p. 22
32. F. H. Bradley: *Ethical Studies*: p. 180
33. see Bertrand Russell: *Our Knowledge of the External World*: pp. 6-7 for an early (1914) criticism of Bradley's view.
34. Bernard Bosanquet: 'Life and Philosophy' in *Contemporary British Philosophy*: ed. J. Muirhead, p. 70
35. Known as Andrew Seth until 1898 (see note 17). He took the surname Pringle-Pattison as a condition of inheritance.
37. See, for instance, William Temple: 'Some Implications of Theism' in *Contemporary British Philosophy*: ed. J. Muirhead,
pp.415-416
38. ibid. p.414
39. ibid. p.414
40. ibid. p.415
41. A.S.Pringle-Pattison: Hegelianism and Personality: p.238
43. A.S.Pringle-Pattison: The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy: p.212
44. J,Ward: The Realm of Ends: p.234
45. Quoted by John Barnes: Ahead of His Age: Bishop Barnes of Birmingham: p.386
46. Mens Creatrix: p.3
47. ibid. p.4
49. ibid. p.35
50. ibid. p.44
CHAPTER THREE

THE STRUCTURE OF REALITY

1. INTRODUCTION

As we have seen in the last chapter, Temple's upbringing was firmly within the Idealist tradition, and throughout his work the concerns and, frequently, the language of Idealism recur. Nature Man and God, Temple's last major philosophical work, first published in 1934, is dedicated to the memory of Edward Caird; and in the introduction to that work, Temple averred that 'Such method in thought as I possess... I believe myself to owe to my Master at Balliol, Edward Caird.' Nevertheless, by this time, Temple no longer considered himself an Idealist: 'We have... rejected by implication both Idealism (which starts with Mind and makes the extended world adjectival to it) and Materialism (which starts with the Extended World and makes Mind adjectival to, or epiphenomenal to, this) - though our starting point is closer to Materialism than to Idealism.'\(^1\) Elsewhere, he refers to subjective idealism as heresy.\(^2\) He now describes his own method as Dialectical Realism\(^3\), though he insists that his position 'in its positive content is almost identical with such an Idealism as that of Edward Caird or of Bernard Bosanquet, apart from the method of arriving at it',\(^4\) but 'Realism becomes a basis for the spiritual interpretation of the universe'.\(^5\)

It is interesting to consider the reasons for Temple's apparent change of approach to Realism. An important influence was, I suspect, acquaintance with two of the most significant philosophers of the Realist school - Samuel Alexander and Alfred North Whitehead. Alexander was an old friend. He was Professor of Philosophy at Manchester University during Temple's time as Bishop of Manchester (1921-1929) and indeed presented Temple for his honorary doctorate.\(^6\) Alexander was the first British-based philosopher to produce a comprehensive work
of Realist metaphysics — *Space, Time and Deity* — in 1920 — and in *Nature Man and God* Temple quotes from his *Beauty and Other Forms of Value*. (The strong influence of Husserl on Alexander is interesting, and although there is no evidence that I have been able to discover that Temple was directly familiar with Husserl's work, we shall discover striking parallels with Phenomenology). Whitehead had, perhaps, an even greater influence on Temple's later thought, though the two did not meet until shortly after *Nature Man and God* was published. Whitehead is quoted more often than any other philosopher in the Gifford Lectures, and Temple calls Whitehead's then recent *Process and Reality* (1929) a 'great work'. Temple also makes use of Dorothy Emmet's *Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism*: Professor (then Doctor) Emmet was another friend from his Manchester days.

The distinctive feature of Whitehead's philosophy, for Temple, is his concern with Process — the concern with making sense of a changing and developing universe. Alexander's metaphysic was an evolutionary one, as was Whitehead's; and Temple was naturally inclined to share this concern: as we have seen, his father had been one of the first prominent churchmen to accept evolution as a datum. A recent commentator places Temple firmly within the ranks of the Process theologians, though one normally thinks of the title "Process Theology" to belong — at least in Temple's time — to the Chicago school of the 1930's, best represented by Hartshorne. Teilhard de Chardin is now generally considered the major theologian of evolutionism, but it is easy to overlook the contribution of earlier thinkers (at least by date of publication — Temple was younger than Teilhard, though only by a few months, as was Hartshorne).

The acceptance of both a Process philosophy and a Process theology means that Temple rejects the traditional rather static view of metaphysics represented by Aquinas (and also
what appears to him a static ethical view) in his 1944 Thomism and Modern Needs. While recognising the greatness and significance of Aquinas he urges an updating of his position, rejecting both Aquinas' view of Revelation and his distinction between Natural and Revealed Theology. That Temple should reject the tradition of the 'two theologies' is natural; Caird had already done so. However, his continued rejection of the division is not simply detritus from an otherwise rejected Idealism: it is central to our understanding of Temple's mature philosophy. I believe that Temple's view of Revelation provides a potent clue to understanding both his metaphysics and his ethics.

2. REVELATION

Temple belongs firmly to the non-propositional school of theology. At the centre of the non-propositional view is a particular understanding of the nature of revelation. Historians of theology tend to divide attitudes towards revelation into two schools, or streams: those, like many Fundamentalists today, who take the propositional view, and those who take the non-propositional view, as do many contemporary theologians. The propositional view sees belief (or faith) as an assent to a series of revealed propositions. For instance, a theologian of this kind may tend to refer to the Bible as 'the Word of God', and to see faith as an acceptance of the Bible. The content of revelation is a body of truths about God. Coupled with this view is a tendency to make a clear distinction between Revealed and Natural Theology. Natural Theology is that part of theology which concerns itself with those truths which can (allegedly) be discovered by reason alone; while Revealed Theology concerns those truths which are knowable only because they have been revealed. A theologian of this kind will tend therefore to say, as an example, that God's existence can be known by unaided reason, but that He has three
Persons, the doctrine of the Trinity, can be known only because it has been specifically revealed, in the Bible.

The non-propositional view holds that the content of revelation is God's self-revelation through history: revelation is not of a series of truths about God but is God himself revealing himself to us. Temple, in an important essay, sees the non-propositional view as the proper and distinctively Christian one: 'In Islam a claim is made for a revelation in the Koran similar at first sight to that found in the Bible, and Mohammed is regarded by his followers with a veneration greater than that paid by Jews and Christians to any prophet. But he is still the Prophet and no more; the revelation is in his message not in himself; ... it mainly consists of precepts and the requirement is of obedience to a law rather than of loyalty and love to a Person.' The emphasis is therefore on an encounter with God, most readily (for a Christian) through personal encounter with Christ.

To hold a non-propositional view of Revelation is to treat the Bible not as 'the Word of God', but as an indispensable witness to God's revelation. It therefore becomes possible to limit the idea of the 'Word of God' to the context of God himself: in the New Testament, and most notably in St. John's Gospel, it is only Christ himself who is referred to as the 'Word' (Logos). It is interesting that, as we have seen, Temple spoke of St. John as one of the major influences on his thought, and in his Readings in St. John's Gospel, he emphasises this interpretation of the notion of the Word: 'The whole of Him, flesh included, is the Word, the self-utterance of God.'

The concomitant of not treating the Bible as the 'Word of God' is that it is unnecessary to treat it as infallible. According to Cyril Garbett, Temple's friend and successor as Archbishop of York, it is impossible 'to accept the Bible as an infallible guide: it was not intended to teach man history, science or
philosophy. It is the inspired record of God's revelation of Himself to man. But its message is not automatic; it is clothed in the thought forms of ages far removed from our own, and is conditioned by the limitations of those who transmitted it; it is always golden treasure but sometimes conveyed in earthen vessels. The implications of this view, for a Christian philosopher, are considerable. As we have seen, Temple himself had no difficulty in accepting the theory of evolution, or other scientific discoveries, precisely because of his view of scripture. The Bible is an indispensable guide to revelation because, according to the non-propositional view, it contains the original witness to the major events of revelation. However, the New Testament does not merely contain eye-witness accounts of the ministry of Jesus (or, at least, recalled eye-witness accounts) but testimony based on belief that Jesus was indeed the Messiah. The gospels are written from the standpoint of faith. Regardless of inner contradictions and historical errors in the texts, there is no doubt that the gospel narrators see Jesus as the Son of God; not as a prophet, or a good man, or a deranged political agitator; and this vision is simply given, not argued for. Such a view of scripture is best summed up in an often-quoted passage from Paul Tillich:

The documentary character of the Bible is identical with the fact that it contains the original witness of those who participated in the revealing events. Their participation was their response to the happenings which became revealing events through their response. The inspiration of the biblical writers is their receptive and creative response to potentially revelatory facts. The inspiration of the writers of the New Testament is their acceptance of Jesus as the Christ, and with him, of the New Being, of which they became witnesses. Since there is no revelation unless there is someone who receives it as revelation, the act of reception is part of the
event itself. The Bible is both original event and original document; it witnesses to that of which it is a part.¹⁹ (my italics)

Here we may note two relevant points. Firstly, we can see the appeal of this view to Temple: it concurs with the Idealist concern with the subject-object relationship: the relationship between Mind as the principle of the universe, and the individual mind seeking unity with it. The Idealist sees a possibility of close relationship between the Mind of the universe and the individual mind; but so do many Christian thinkers. Origen, for instance, says: 'There is a kinship between the human mind and God; for the mind is itself an image of God, and therefore can have some conception of the divine nature.'²⁰ Temple, and others like him, are not therefore, introducing a new insistence on the subject-object relationship, though they are more insistent than previous thinkers about its significance.

The second feature of this view of scripture is, from the philosopher's viewpoint, both more significant and more worrying. It is that there is an insistence on events being interpreted or experienced in a particular kind of way. Nowhere in the Bible is there any attempt to 'prove' the existence of God, or the nature of Jesus, or any of the attributes of God. (This is important: I shall suggest in later chapters that certain traditional attributes of God are incoherent.) As a matter of historical record, the biblical writers experience their society in a way in which God is vividly present, as much a character in the 'story' as Abraham or Moses or Elijah. The problem, however, is that another observer of the events of Palestine in the first century might not interpret those events in the way that the St. John of the gospels did. Another observer, like Josephus, might report Jesus as a political agitator. Chesterton says of Christ's life and teaching that 'it is not for us to blame anybody who should find that first
wild whisper merely impious and insane.'21 The question is therefore how this interpretation of revelation, rather than that, is to be justified. The obvious Christian answer would be that we justify faith by saying that we find ourselves in accord with the Biblical writers, that if we reflect upon our experience, we find that the Christian thesis, the Christian revelation makes more 'sense' of our experience than any other. This view, however, contains many problems: to speak of making 'sense' of our experience is to assume that there is 'sense' to be made - that the world (or universe) is a coherent whole; and that our vision of it is more or less coherent as we more or less accept a Christo-centric view. It is precisely that coherence which a radical doubter denies (though, as we shall see, Temple attempts to prove coherence); and it is hard to see, without recourse to justifying criteria outside the context of revelation, how that revelation can be justified by reference to itself. For the non-propositional view of faith, there are further logical difficulties. Logic provides tools for the analysis of propositions: but it provides none for the person who is the content of revelation. The non-propositional view finds the formulae of language about God inadequate: Tillich, for instance, speaks of the inadequacy of our statements about God - 'The segment of finite reality which becomes the vehicle of a concrete assertion about God is affirmed and negated at the same time.'22 While it is true that religious thinkers have always been aware of the limitations of religious language - as Aquinas makes clear in the doctrine of analogy23- nevertheless, they have, in general, attempted to justify their formulations as philosophically sound. The danger with the non-propositional view of faith is that the attempt to justify belief is left aside for a kind of voluntarism: that one believes by the sort of leap of faith on which Kierkegaard was so insistent: 'By relating itself to its own self and by willing to be itself, the self is grounded transparently in the Power which constituted it. And this formula ... is the definition of faith.'24 (my italics). Faith of this kind is as
much a matter of will as anything; it certainly goes beyond mere intellectual assent. Karl Barth, in the same collection that contains Temple's essay on Revelation, speaks of faith as a 'free act of human choice and decision; a work of the heart, the will, and the understanding.' While all Christian theologians agree that there is, by definition, a real act of choice, and an act of will, in faith, their use of religious language is such that dissent (or assent) is possible. So, for instance, when St. Anselm in his Ontological Argument for the existence of God, in Prosologion, Chapter Two26, presents his 'proof', although he begins with a prayer, 'O Lord, Who givest understanding to faith', he gives the argument in such a way that one may either concur or dissent, using the normal methods of philosophy: in short, he uses the methods of natural theology. The non-propositional theologian does not do this. A good example may be found in Bonhoeffer's Christology27. Throughout the lectures that constitute the work, Bonhoeffer insists that the question to be asked is not one about Christ, 'How is He?', but one to Christ, 'Who are You?'. It is evident that these questions are of different logical types, not concealed by the copula 'is'. The first question asks for a cognitive answer, one whose truth - or otherwise - is theoretically verifiable. The second question is certainly not so unambiguously cognitive: it is also not clear how it can be answered, or even whether it can be answered. An atheist would expect the question, addressed to a long dead agitator, to be answered not by 'I am/am not the Son of God', but by silence. The continued life of Christ is presupposed by the question; if there is no continuation of life, the question becomes hollow, mere empty words. If the atheist were to ask a Christian theologian 'What is He?' he would receive an answer which he could then, perhaps, meaningfully discuss. 'Who are You?' also presupposes a means of receiving an answer; and it is not clear what those means might be. Nor, if an answer is received, is the veracity of the answer guaranteed. Any guarantee is based on verifiability - a return to the 'What is
he? kind of question. If a sentry cries out to a complete stranger, his first question may be, 'Who are you, friend or foe?' If the reply is 'Friend', the sentry's next consideration is not 'Who are you?' (though that may be, in colloquial usage, how he phrases his means of establishing identity), but, as an intellectual consideration, 'Is he a friend, as he claims?'; in short, 'What is he?' 'Who are You?' may be answered by silence or by lies, or by truth: but it can only be tested by recasting as 'What is He?', for only the latter provides fully testable answers. (It is not an objection to this point to say that in answer to the sentry's challenge, the stranger might say, 'I'm Major X, and I'm a reconnaissance officer from H.Q.' The answer 'I'm Major X' is that to 'Who are you?' The remainder of the sentence is an answer to the implied 'What is he?') 'Who are You?' is plainly a philosophically inadequate question. Nevertheless, holders of the non-propositional view of theology eschew Natural Theology. When Karl Barth was asked to give the Gifford Lectures in 1935, which are on Natural Theology, he wrote back to say 'I am an avowed opponent of all natural theology'.

Temple, while by no means reluctant to give the Gifford Lectures, shared, as we have seen, Barth's rejection of the traditional distinction between natural and revealed theology: Nature, Man and God culminates in an attack on natural theology - 'Natural Theology ends in a hunger for that Divine Revelation which it began by excluding from its purview'. Temple's acceptance of the non-propositional view of theology is radical. He does not merely speak of a personal encounter with God as witnessed in the Bible, but finds revelation in the whole of creation and in its relation to God. In Nature, Man and God, Temple clarifies this point:

What we find in the Old Testament Scriptures is not mainly, if at all, authoritative declarations of theological doctrine, but living apprehension of a
living process wherein those whose minds are enlightened by divine communion can discern in part the purposive activity of God.

Revelation so conceived is the full actuality of ... relationship between Nature, Man and God ... First there is the world-process, which, in its more complex components, if not throughout, is organic in principle; secondly, we have the fact that certain organisms, to wit ourselves, occurring as episodes of the world-process, are able to apprehend and in part to comprehend that process; thirdly, we infer from this that the process, in order to give rise to such episodes in its course, must be regarded as itself grounded in a mental principle; fourthly, enquiry into that interaction of the intelligent organism with its environment, which we call thought, compels the assertion that the principle in which the world-process is grounded is not only mental but personal; fifthly, this leads us to the conviction that the process itself and all occurrences within it - including the intelligences of men - are due to the purposive action of that Person whose reality has been established as the governing fact of existence. He guides the process; He guides the minds of men; the interaction of the process and the minds which are alike guided by Him is the essence of revelation.

It is clear that here Temple does not restrict the mode of revelation to scripture: it is discovered - he argues - in the consonance of our minds with reality. He returns in this passage, and particularly in the last sentence, to the Idealist concern with subject-object relationships. He is emphatic about this - 'Whether we think of the unceasing revelation afforded in the whole world process or of the occurrences which
constitute revelation in the specialised sense of the word, the principle of revelation is the same - the coincidence of event and appreciation.\textsuperscript{33} This insistence on the coincidence of event and appreciation is, we may note parenthetically, not limited to Idealists: some commentators have remarked on it in, for instance, Aquinas.\textsuperscript{34}

If, as Temple asserts, the whole of creation is the mode of revelation, it might at first appear that he is attempting an updating or modification of the Design Argument, as used by Aquinas or Paley. A closer study of his language makes it clear that this is not so. For instance, in the long passage quoted above, he draws distinctions which are important. His first point, that there is a world-process, is an assertion; the second, that we are episodes within the world process, is a 'fact'; but in the third, that the universe is grounded in a mental principle, the fourth, that the world-process is personal, and the fifth, that there is a personal purpose, he speaks of inference: 'we infer', 'compels the assertion', 'leads to the conviction'. It might seem that to speak of inference is to be concerned with logical inference, in which x follows from y because it must. I think Temple is rather concerned with our everyday use of language, in which we 'infer' without complete proof. I might say, for instance, that I infer from my cat's behaviour that it is presently bored - this seems a reasonable interpretation of its conduct - but I cannot prove that in any logical way, as I cannot make an informed statement about its state of mind. Inference of this kind is about probabilities, or, rather, it is my attempt to comprehend - to interpret - a reality of behaviour which is outside myself - I experience the cat's behaviour as boredom: but there is always the possibility that I might be wrong. Similarly, to speak of the compelled assertion, or the conviction, is to talk not about the world, but to speak of how we feel obliged to interpret or experience it.
This, I think, is an important realisation in our attempt to understand both the non-propositional view of faith and Temple's version of it. John Hick has drawn attention to this aspect of the non-propositional view - the idea of 'experiencing as ...' He suggests that Wittgenstein's comments on puzzle-pictures\textsuperscript{35}, which may be seen in several ways, remind us of how we have experience of 'seeing as'. This, of course, is a commonplace of life. In the desert, we see an oasis in the distance; it is only as we approach that we recognise that it is no oasis at all, but a mirage. This example is epistemologically interesting, as is the puzzle picture. If we say 'there is an oasis', we speak falsely; we have mis-seen. But if we say 'there is a mirage', we see truly. One is a correct account of our perception, the other mistaken. With a puzzle-picture we have the phenomenon of two or more simultaneous interpretations. In this famous example.(fig.1),

![Fig.1](image_url)

we see both a candlestick and two faces, not merely one after another, but interchangeably and both together. Neither version of 'seeing as' is incorrect - unlike the example of the mirage - each is as 'true' as the other. Hick, I think, misses this important distinction in his use of Wittgenstein's example. Two interpretations of a puzzle-picture may have equal validity, and can both be held together. The same is not true of the theistic thesis, or the Hick/Temple view of non-propositional revelation. One may experience the world as God-dominated, or one may not; but only one of these views can be correct. Temple holds, of course, that the religious experience - the religious 'experiencing as' - is the correct one; but with this view of
revelation and of faith, there is no immediately apparent way of argument. A man may say 'I interpret the universe as God-given'. An answer 'Well, I don't' is, in one sense, sufficient answer - though no contradiction. The disagreement is not - as Wisdom has pointed out in his famous parable of the garden - about the facts of the universe (that is a separate matter), but about interpretation. The assertion of interpretation, however, is one about how one feels/sees/understands; and it is itself not open to argument. If I say 'I see an oasis' when in fact I see a mirage, if I am speaking in good faith my statement is true as an expression of my perception even though I can be brought, by closer inspection, to recognise myself as having misperceived. In the case of the oasis, there is a way in which the correctness of my perception can be verified. This however is not the case (discounting eschatological verification) with the theistic view presented by Temple: he rules out the possibility of genuine verification. He eschews natural theology: and so he rules out the external methods, the purely philosophical methods of verifying his point of view: 'By what means does the revelation authenticate itself? From the nature of the case it must offer its own credentials; that revelation should have to appeal to anything outside itself to establish its character as revelation, would be patent absurdity.' This seems, frankly, a shabby argument. What are credentials but a reference to another source to cross-check the information offered? It seems not an absurdity, but merest common sense, to ask of the bearer of startling news some authentication. In the case of the theistic argument, it seems necessary to ask for the only available cross-check, that the view shall at least be reasonable.

To argue, as Temple does, that the character of revelation is such that we must accept its veracity on its own authority has two consequences, each with its own inherent problems. The first is that Temple's position on this matter is simply a sophisticated version of the argument of the Jehovah's Witness
who tries to convince me of the authority of the Bible by reference to itself, even though the Bible contains no argument for its own authority (nor indeed does the Bible assert that authority). The second consequence is that because there is no unambiguous authentication in the world, the world itself is ambiguous. This theme, of the ambiguity of the world, has been best expressed by Pascal, in a famous passage:

It was not right that He should appear in a manner manifestly divine, and completely capable of convincing all men; but it was also not right that He should come in so hidden a manner that He could not be known by those who should sincerely seek Him. He has willed to make Himself quite recognisable by those; and thus, willing to appear openly to those who seek Him with all their heart, He so regulates the knowledge of Himself that He has given signs of Himself, visible to those who seek Him, and not to those who seek Him not. There is enough light for those who only desire to see, and enough obscurity for those who have a contrary disposition. 38

In one sense, this view of God, as the Deus absconditus, the hidden God, reflects the traditional view of Christians, that if God's existence were utterly unambiguous there would be no moral value in the virtue of faith - faith involves commitment to belief. There is no virtue in belief in Pythagoras' Theorem: to disbelieve it is not in some moral sense unworthy - it is simply ignorance. In another sense, however, to accept the notion of a Deus absconditus is to seem to rule out the idea that God is intrinsically knowable. One cannot prove him by reason (contrary to some Catholic thought which has argued that God's existence is in principle provable, if as yet unproven); one can only accept him by a form of voluntarism. The point is well made by Temple's friend, Dorothy Emmet:
Faith is distinguished from the entertainment of a probable proposition by the fact that the latter can be a completely theoretic affair. Faith is a "yes" of self-commitment, it does not turn probabilities into certainties; only a sufficient increase in the weight of evidence could do that. But it is a volitional response which takes us out of the theoretic attitude.39

It is evident that Temple accepted the attitude that reason was not able of itself to authenticate faith. As late as 1944, he spoke of 'Pelagianism - which I still regard as "the only heresy that is intrinsically damnable."'40 (Pelagianism is the heresy that we may be saved by our own unaided efforts, without the intervention of divine grace. It was widespread in North Africa in the early Fifth Century, and has been sometimes revived.) This attack on Pelagianism is a frequently repeated theme in Temple's work.

Because it is necessary - on Temple's analysis - to accept faith on its own merits, it seems that he is particularly open to Anthony Flew's charge that: 'it often seems to people who are not religious as if there was no conceivable event or series of events the occurrence of which would be admitted by sophisticated religious people to be a sufficient reason for conceding "There wasn't a God after all" ... I therefore put ... the simple central question, "What would have to occur or to have occurred to constitute ... a disproof of ... the existence of God?"'41 It seems that Temple is very keen to retain all options. For instance, he argues throughout his work that purpose is readily discernible in nature; and it seems that for him, nothing counts against this view. In Nature, Man and God he says:

Much of the divine action which sustains the world is such as to produce apparent uniformity in the world-
process ... But of course this apparent uniformity may itself be due to an elaborately designed balance of multiform adjustments. If those scientists are right who regard recent developments as having introduced indeterminacy into the basis of Physics, so that the laws of causation are to be understood, not as real uniformities but as statistical averages, the theistic philosopher will be prepared with the account of the (physically) indeterminate behaviour of electrons and of the resultant constancy of natural processes, which has just been offered. If on the other hand the older scientific view of uniform causal processes ultimately prevails, for this also the theist has his explanation, both in the constancy of the Divine Nature which will vary its activity only for sufficient reason, and in the need for substantial uniformity as a basis for moral action.42

In this passage, one feels that Temple is having matters both ways. If nature is, after all, uniform, all well and good; but if it isn't, it is apparently so - and that will serve his purpose equally well. A philosopher not involved in special pleading will not be satisfied with this. If the structure of the world is indeterminate, it is important to understand this; and its apparent uniformity requires further explanation. Is it - to return to Temple's non-propositional view - that we experience the world as uniform? If it is so, then we would perhaps be best advised to ask questions about our own minds. It is possible that - as existentialists suggest - we see the world as in some sense uniform so that we can manage our own existence: to do so is necessary for our survival. We find that for psychic health we need to treat the world as coherent, just to make our everyday existence possible. According to Freud, primitive religious beliefs spring out of that very need for coherence: 'Impersonal forces and destinies cannot be approached; they remain eternally remote. But if the elements
have passions that rage as they do in our own souls, if death itself is not something spontaneous but the violent act of an evil Will, if everywhere in nature there are Beings around us of a kind that we know in our own society, then we can breathe freely, can feel at home in the uncanny and can deal by psychical means with our senseless anxiety. Our own experience tends to confirm this: when we meet something alien, outside the normal in our experience, we speak of familiarising ourselves with it — we work to make it cohere with our understanding, to make 'sense' of it, so that it no longer disturbs us. In doing this, however, we may mistake the alien object, and the coherence may be a false one. A primitive South Sea islander, finding a refrigerator in a crashed aircraft, may make 'sense' of it by treating it as an object of worship — but his 'sense' is a nonsense to those for whom the refrigerator is a commonplace. We can be mistaken.

Temple will have none of this. In *Faith and Modern Thought*, published in 1910 (his first book), he asserts: 'the truth about facts is what satisfies the mind of man: that is the basis of all science.' The obvious objection that the mind may be too easily satisfied does not apparently concern him — as we shall see in the next section, he assumes that mind's experience is true. he does not appear to have changed his view in any fundamental way: towards the end of his life he asserted: 'If the triumphs of Natural Science have any meaning at all, as distinct from the obvious conveniences with which they have supplied us, it is that all the Universe is knit together in an intelligible system.' Despite his disclaimer of Idealism as starting with the mind and making the world adjectival to it, it is clear that Temple invites us to begin with the mind, but to accept its perceptions as — at least in principle — correct.
3. THE WORLD AS UNDERSTOOD

In the sense that the perceptions of mind are - in principle - correct reflections of the world, Temple may be justified in considering himself a Realist. Certainly he rejects the kind of Idealism which he associates with Descartes. We have noted already how Temple spoke of Descartes' shutting himself in a stove as 'the most disastrous day in European history.' In the third lecture in *Nature, Man and God*, he devotes himself to what he calls the 'Cartesian Faux-Pas'. Temple's objection to Descartes is interesting: it is based on psychology. He speaks of 'the inherent error of ... [the Cartesian] ... assumption that in knowledge the mind begins with itself and proceeds to the apprehension of the external world by way of construction and inference.' He argues that Descartes' attempt at radical doubt is psychologically unconvincing:

Doubt, as an active movement of the mind, does not commonly arise through looking for reasons to believe in this or that; it arises from an apparent collision between one actual element in experience and another - it may be of fact with theory, or of theory with theory, or of fact (as observed) with fact (as observed). What Descartes indulged in his stove was purely academic doubt; he was really as sure of the stove as of himself. If it be urged that this academic doubt was not an empirical absence of assurance but an "ideal supposal", I must reply that this method is permissible enough, but that Descartes found the wrong residuum. What he ought to have reached as the irreducible basis of all thought, including doubt, was the subject-object relationship (my italics)

Temple clarifies this last point:
...it seems that in fact I cannot really doubt all else except myself; I cannot really doubt the earth, or the stars, or (above all) my friends; so that I cannot find in fact any greater psychological assurance about the existence of myself than about the existence of a great deal else. And there seems no reason to regard the assurance at which Descartes arrived as more than psychological ... it is impossible to think without thinking something. The subjective function of thought can be properly and usefully distinguished from every object of thought taken separately; but it cannot be isolated from all objects of thought whatsoever without ceasing to exist. ... The appearance of logical cogency is illusory; the assurance to which Descartes clings is psychological only.50

From this discussion of Descartes, two things stand out. First we may note his characteristically brusque approach to doubt: in the last chapter I noted his comment about his own method - 'the enquiry is tentative; but for the sake of clearness the exposition will be confident.'51 His contemporary, G.M.Young, noted this tendency to trample on doubt:

In the introduction to W.T.'s Gifford Lectures, there is a passage which reminds me very forcibly of his manner of thinking, and expounding, in conversation or essays. He describes two ways of arriving at conclusions - one by considering the evidence, the other by intuition, so that he found himself propounding as certain a proposition he had only just thought of. One heard so many of these propositions, e.g. 'Browning never wrote a line that was not poetry'. His exuberant self-confidence in action took, in thinking, the form of an equally exuberant certitude. And the Aristotelians
('Aristotle had the mind of a churchwarden') did not at all approve.\textsuperscript{52}

There is something here reminiscent of Johnson kicking a post and saying of Berkeley's philosophy 'I refute it thus'. However necessary such an attitude of certainty may be in a church leader, it creates problems for the philosopher, to whom the luxury of such certitude is rarely properly present. (This attitude in Temple seems to me a fundamental problem in considering him - without qualification - as a philosopher.) We may note here also Temple's reliance on intuition, which often creates in the thinker's mind a greater sense of certainty than would be given by a more systematic approach to reality.

The second feature of Temple's comments on Descartes is his insistence - yet again - on the subject-object relationship as the fundamental of thought. This is, as we have seen so often, the characteristic feature of British Idealism; but it is also true that we cannot make sense of Temple's comments on the world unless we remember that he is constantly concerned with the world as experienced: 'My own endeavour is ... to provide a coherent articulation of an experience which has found some measure of co-ordination through adherence to certain principles.' It is therefore clear that he sees the philosopher's task not as saying 'we misperceive, the truth is otherwise', but as clarifying and making sense of ('interpreting as') experience which basically faithfully reflects reality but has not yet fully integrated it into a coherent whole.

For this reason, it is not possible to divide easily his metaphysics from his epistemology: both are present together. In certain important respects, therefore, we may detect in Temple certain similarities to the methods of Husserl and other Phenomenologists. For Husserl, consciousness is something which it is impossible to doubt or to prescind from, though we must
distinguish between consciousness, which is a complex of experiences, events and psychical facts, and the objects of consciousness; but these objects of consciousness have meaning only as they have meaning only as they appear to or for consciousness. Brentano had already insisted, as we have seen Temple do, that consciousness is consciousness of, that to think is to think of something. This approach will help us to clarify certain parts of Temple's thinking - I shall argue in a subsequent chapter that there are significant similarities in the approaches of Temple and Brentano to the basics of ethics: that these similarities are based on a comparable approach to metaphysics and epistemology is not irrelevant.

Hence we find in Temple's approach to reality an insistence on how that reality appears to us, even though he will argue elsewhere that reality is more or less as we see it to be. His view of the structure of reality is one which can be encapsulated simply, as he did himself in a sermon:

The world as we see it exists in grades; and it is the destiny of each to be controlled by what is higher than itself; indeed, only as this happens does each grade reveal its latent capacities. Thus matter is controlled by life, and reveals hitherto unsuspected qualities; life is controlled by mind, and reveals hitherto unsuspected qualities; mind is controlled by spirit and reveals hitherto unsuspected qualities. Highest in all of these grades is Personality. As known to us this may not be the last term. But it affords the best analogy we have for the Most High. We shall think of Him more accurately when we think of Him in terms of personality than in any other way.53

Temple's use of language is significant. He speaks not in terms of 'this is', but of revelation. Matter 'reveals', life
'reveals', and so on. Things are 'as known to us', 'as we see it' - in short, how we interpret them. If in other respects there is carelessness in expression - as for instance in the use of 'control', a word that implies rational decision and power - there is none in the repeated reference to revelation.

This is confirmed in other writings on the same theme, as in Temple's essay 'Symbolism as a Metaphysical Principle' published in 1922, or the reworking of that article in Christus Veritas of 1924. In Christus Veritas he uses the same language of revelation - 'Matter only reveals what it really is when life supervenes upon it'; 'Life only reveals what it really is when Mind supervenes upon it. No study of zoology and biology will enable the student to predict the occurrence among living things of the mathematician or the financier. The use of faculties, which at first are used for mere survival, must occur in fact before it can be anticipated in theory.' It is notable here that scientific study is seen as reflection upon what is revealed to us - the integrity of reality 'out there' is maintained: the job of our minds is to make order or coherence out of it: 'the generic character of scientific knowledge requires the individuality of things from which it abstracts in order to make sense of itself.' In a passage reminiscent of his earlier sermon, Temple asserts both aspects of his approach, the pro me aspect as revealed to us, and its objective reality:

... we ... notice that each [grade of reality] depends for its actuality upon those which are below it. Matter itself as experienced by us can be reduced to what is simpler than itself, whether to ... [alpha, beta and gamma] ... particles ... or still more ultimately to Space-Time ... Life is unknown apart from living organisms, which are Matter informed by Life. Mind is unknown except in reasonable organisms. Spirit is unknown except in
conscientious, reasoning, living organisms. Whether the higher grades can exist apart, there seems to be no means of deciding; in our experience they never do ... such seems in fact to be the structure of Reality.59

We may note, in passing, that Temple has here avoided the problems inherent in the word 'controls' - he uses such words as 'supervenes', 'inform'.

We can see that, for Temple, the structure of reality consists of four grades, Matter, Life, Mind and Spirit, though he is careful to remind us that to separate them is an ordering of reality by our minds. Reality is a continuous whole - as he pointed out 'these "grades" taken singly are abstractions. Reality is a continuous whole within which the mind of each individual finds itself.'60 Nevertheless, he says, in an essay, there is a 'perceptible scale of being'61 covering the range 'from mere inorganic matter at one end, through organic matter, vegetable life, animal life, to personality as we know it in human life.'62 It is also possible therefore to speak of 'lower' and 'higher' grades. Matter is the lowest grade: 'The piece of mere inorganic matter (if it exists) is insentient; we treat it as we like without considering its feelings, because we assume it has none ... its individuality, though it exists (for it is "this" and not another) is negligible.'63 We can talk of a 'higher' grade, such as life, because life makes 'sense' of the lower: 'Matter only reveals what it really is when Life supervenes upon it.'64 This can only mean that it makes sense, reveals itself to us, when it is touched by life - or, as we shall see when considering value, its value is only realised as value for consciousness, for life, and so on.

To have recognised a scale of being, yet to have maintained the continuity of the whole, presents special difficulties. For Temple, this vision of reality 'seems to involve an infinite
regress, and suggests an infinite progress.' He claims indifference about this problem: 'whether there is in fact a lowest and highest term in this scale of finite existences, I do not know and do not greatly care.' Nevertheless, he addresses this question in *Mens Creatrix*, attempting to show that there is no logical or ethical objection to an infinite series. He notes that 'it is quite impossible imagine finite regress but ... not impossible to conceive it.' He finds it consistent to conceive of the world 'as an entity consisting of elements which it is for ever harmonising and systematising.'

Temple does not see the need for the end of the world in the traditional Christian sense, rejecting the idea of a literal 'Second Coming' and associated millennial beliefs: for him the Second Coming has already happened, after the Resurrection: scriptural grounds for the millenium seem to him confused and inadequate; and the only sense in which the Second Coming is in the future is an ethical one - 'not all have eyes to perceive; and the time when "every eye shall see Him" is still future, and this is the truth in the expectation of a Return or Second Coming.' Just as Temple does not feel bound to the notion of an end, so too he consciously rejects the need for a First Cause: 'It is urged that if the series is infinite, then, though every part may be linked to every other part, the whole at any rate is indeterminate. But this argument can be satisfied only by the positing of a First Cause, which is itself undetermined.'

We would expect, having seen Temple's rejection of natural theology, to find in him an unwillingness to accept a Thomist underpinning of faith, but I think he comes close to the view of those neo-Thomists who see God not so much as First Cause as Ultimate Explanation of creation. We see this view clearly in *Faith and Modern Thought*: 'My knowledge ... is one of the facts, which must be held together in this coherent scheme ... this seems to involve ... that there is some mentality ... in all the facts of our experience. I do not mean to say that the chairs and tables are thinking; I mean
that everything which exists must be the embodiment of rational principle. The universe turns out to be a rational whole.\textsuperscript{72}

Whether the universe is a rational whole, as Temple asserts, is of course open to doubt. If we accept the non-propositional view of revelation, as Temple expects us to do - if we are to accept the idea of interpreting as - we are surely committed to a recognition of ambiguity in the universe as a whole. The idea of a \textit{Deus absconditus}, recognisable if we wish, not if we wish not, rules out the idea that the universe is evidently rational. The indeterminacy of much in physics - over which Temple passes so glibly - may properly seem to point not to purpose, not to 'rational principle'. If we find our world appearing stable, we should not be surprised. As Hume pointed out, the universe is bound to have the appearance of design; things must have adapted to each other for any kind of life to persist. It could simply be - on the Epicurean or Nietzschean model - that in infinite time all the particles of the universe go through every combination open to them; and that those particles have currently combined in such a form that a relatively stable order exists. On a Darwinian model, the graded reality, which Temple perceives as the result of a purpose, may be simply the result of a blind struggle for survival. To say that the development of the universe seems to be the result of a rational process is not to say that it is such: we may misperceive or misinterpret. That something appears rational and is then achieved does not mean that the achievement is rational. For instance, I know that for a kitten to grow large and healthy it must eat - eating is the only way it can grow. When my kitten does not eat, I worry; but when it does, it does not do so for rational reasons - it does not say 'I will die if I do not eat.' Its eating is instinctive, not rational; and I err if I attribute rationality to what - from a scientific point of view - is a rational result. A rational result may be achieved in a variety of ways - whether by accident, instinct, or even perverted design.
To be consistent with his view of revelation, Temple should say that the universe 'appears to be' a rational whole, and to suggest why we should find his interpretation to make better sense than the alternative - which is to see the universe as a mere brute fact. (But, of course, if the universe is - as the atheist avers - mere brute fact, we should not be surprised if we cannot make sense of it: to make sense, to reduce it to discernible system, may itself be to distort it for the sake of comfort.) Because of his rejection of natural theology, I do not think he is able to do more than follow the procedure he does - which is to analyse experience; though to test the validity of experience by - and only by - experience is fraught with difficulties.

In Temple's experience, the truth about the universe as the result of divine purpose (and that purpose is, he says, the result of a personal God) may be found by an examination of how we feel about the order of the universe:

Willingly to believe what is suspected to be false is felt to be not only a degradation of the credulous believer's personality, but an offence against the order of reality. This feeling is quite unreasonable if the order of reality is a brute fact and nothing else; it is only justifiable if the order of reality is the expression of a personal mind, for the sense of moral obligation towards Truth is of that quality which is only appropriate in connexion with personal claims. 74

Temple confesses that he cannot prove this claim: 'it is an intuitional judgement.' 75 Nevertheless, he produces some supporting evidence. He claims that in our experience we place more value and feel a greater sense of obligation towards claims based on personal relationships than we do towards impersonal or abstract ones. (This view is, as we shall see,
My contention is that the quality of feeling entertained towards it by even materialistic scientists is often such as can only be justified if, in fact, the world-order thus apprehended is the expression of personal mind. It is no answer to that contention to say that this feeling is due to a surviving Theism which ought to be discarded, for such a reply admits the implications of the feeling, and these constitute the point of the contention. If on all grounds the conclusion is accepted that there is no personal mind expressing itself in and through the order of the universe, the existence of our feeling towards Truth may be explained by reference to the fact that during most of the ages of history, men have believed that there was such a mind: the influence of that belief appeared in the form of reverence felt for Truth, and this feeling may be held now as an anachronistic survival. I am not at present arguing against that as a possible hypothesis. I am urging only that most of us feel that reverence, and must either accept its implications or regard it as due to a mistake, and therefore deserving to be discarded. And it is very relevant to observe that this quality of reverence for Truth is specially evident among those who have felt bound, out of loyalty to Truth itself as they had been able to receive it, to abandon belief which alone could justify it. It would seem as if there were some potent force compelling in them an attitude of mind which their own convictions have rendered obsolete. All this is intelligible on b
As Temple points out, this is hardly a philosophical argument; but it is consistent with his commitment to an analysis of experience. The obvious approach here is to analyse one's own experience and to see whether it concurs with Temple's interpretation. I doubt for instance whether all scientists go about their work dominated by a reverence for truth; I suspect that most follow the established norms of their profession without ever thinking much about them - the approach is conditioned by habit and training. Whether 'most of us' feel the reverence for truth which Temple claims I also doubt - not because of malevolence; but because most people seem not to have much time or inclination to delve very far into these matters. Concern for truth, even in its most general form, seems to me conditioned by law or by upbringing. I also think that Temple is being sentimental in his talk about the materialist scientists - evidence suggests that few scientists have changed their views from theism to atheism on purely scientific grounds; though they may have had all sorts of other reasons. T.H.Huxley for instance did not reject Christianity because of his acceptance of Darwinism: he had already rejected Christianity and seems to have treated Darwinism as a club for battering Christians.

My objections to Temple's assertions are, of course, no more philosophically sound than his. He has one set of feelings about how people feel about reality - I entertain another. That - as he part-way acknowledges - lies at the heart of the problems raised by his philosophical method.

He continues his argument for the personal, and hence purposive nature of reality by considering the two other parts of the traditional triad of truth, beauty and goodness. The search for truth alone is not sufficient to enable us to justify God. In
Mens Creatrix, Temple says: 'The intellect working only upon the principles of its own procedure will never lead us to the Transcendent God of Religion, for its claims can be satisfied with less, and the further step is a leap in the dark such as Science may not take.' I have noted in the last chapter that the theme of Mens Creatrix is how art, morality, science and religion together point to a personal God; and Temple takes up this theme.

He notes of beauty, after referring to Lord Balfour's Gifford Lectures, Theism and Humanism: 'the mental attitude of deep appreciation is of its own nature akin to worship. The whole aesthetic experience is unintelligible unless there comes through it a revelation from spirit to spirit. There is more in Beauty than Beauty alone. There is communication from, and communication with, personal Spirit.' It is obviously impossible here to rehearse the whole of aesthetic theory; but some comments immediately spring to mind. Firstly, we may question whether in our experience deep appreciation is, as Temple suggests, akin to worship. I find it hard from my own experience to assert a similarity in the two attitudes, because they are not, I find, clearly analysable. When I appreciate something I am too concerned with it to analyse my feelings; when I indulge myself in introspection, I have turned away from appreciation of an object and am involved in another mental activity not identical with the first. I find a painting striking; but once I consider why I should do so I am appreciating the painting, but myself. Secondly, even if appreciation and worship are akin, it is not legitimate to take Temple's leap to treating them as if they were identical: kinship and identity are not the same thing. If I find an aesthetic experience vividly mediating the presence of God, I may be transferring from one attitude to another; but it is also true that a man may have an aesthetic experience and see it purely as such, without any transference to worship. Thirdly, we may suggest that the aesthetic experience is - or
at least, may be - unintelligible. Certainly we cannot say clearly why we find this more beautiful than that while someone else should see things in another way. One may argue that beauty is in the eye of the beholder - and we might expect this in Temple, given his general philosophical method - but he seems to revert to a Platonic ideal of Beauty - he sees it as objective:

I look back with some astonishment to a time when I admired Doré's pictures more than Rembrandt's, and enjoyed Spohr's music more than Bach's. The cruder artists had an appeal to my primitive taste which was lacking in the others. But I submitted to authority enough to look at pictures and listen to compositions which others told me were good as well as those which appeared good to me. Imperceptibly a change took place. By intercourse with the better art I became sensitive to it and appreciative of it, and in the process lost most of my liking for the cruder and more sentimental expression. The real good began to appear good by the transformation of my taste under its influence.80

I find this astonishing. Temple comes close to restricting the use of the term 'beautiful' to only the highest examples of art. If he found some value in the music of Spohr - on its terms - it is hard to see, given his insistence on the pro me aspect of understanding, that he can treat it later as if it had never had value. Most of us see beauty in more general terms: we find this more beautiful than that. I find Bach's music more beautiful than Spohr's; but that is not to say that Bach's music is beautiful and Spohr's not; there is much to value in Spohr, even though my valuation is of a different kind from that which I place on Bach. Indeed, in certain respects, and in certain circumstances, I might prefer Spohr to Bach (e.g. for relaxation), while nevertheless considering Bach the
greater composer. (Of course, which we consider the greater composer is conditioned by a host of imponderables - culture, tradition, upbringing, mood, temperament, and so on.)

Goodness, according to Temple, reveals particularly the personal character of the universe. He argues throughout his writings for the idea that 'the essence of morality is personal fellowship, or respect for persons as persons.' He suggests that self-sacrifice is only called out of us by people, and by the personal character of their demands. Temple insists that 'there is no morality beyond absolute devotion to the public good'; and that the call of people is far more important than that of a merely abstract call of duty: 'no Law, apart from a Lawgiver, is a proper object of reverence. It is mere brute fact; and every living thing, still more every person exercising intelligent choice, is its superior. The reverence of persons can be appropriately given only to that which itself is at least personal.' I do not propose, for the moment, to examine these claims in detail; they are the theme of subsequent chapters.

By his consideration of the nature of beauty, truth and goodness, Temple intends to convince us of the personal - and hence theistic - character of the universe; but he is conscious that they do not constitute a complete justification. In the end, he considers belief, as we might expect, a matter of individual experience: 'individual belief rests primarily, as I think, on religious experience, and finds its intellectual support in the reflexion that this belief is capable in principle of supplying an explanation of the very existence of the Universe, which no other hypothesis available to us affords any hope of doing. That is no proof.' This religious experience is, as Temple suggests in a sermon, beyond the power of language to explain: 'to ask a religious man why he believes in God is like asking a happy man why he enjoys life. No verbal answer can be given.' But he says, in the same sermon, that
the greater the faith, the more complete the feeling that the theistic interpretation of the world is the only satisfactory one. He is convinced that the only explanation of the world available to us is one in terms of purpose: 'when you ... ask. "Why this and nothing else?" - there is no explanation possible, except in terms of purpose: that is to say, the scientific demand that the world shall correspond to the method of our intellect, the scientific demand for an intellectually satisfactory world, can only be satisfied by belief in a Purpose running through the whole, a Purpose rooted, as all purpose must be, in Will.'

To argue like this is to argue that nature does indeed conform to the requirements of mind as Temple suggests that it should. This, of course, is to argue that the universe is (at least in principle), explicable. It may be, that because we tend to assume that we understand something when we explain (though I am not entirely convinced that explanation and understanding are synonymous), we feel that to understand the universe we must be able to explain it. The human mind baulks at the idea that the universe as a whole may be ultimately inexplicable: it seems to run counter to our quotidian experience. However, that the idea of inexplicability seems scandalous does not make it impossible: we have to face the possibility that the universe may be sheer brute fact. Temple, on the other hand, seems to feel happy once the mind feels happy with the conclusion it has reached: 'Whenever the subject of enquiry is traced to the action of intelligently purposive mind, the enquiry is closed; Mind has recognised itself and is satisfied.' Mind is never happy with inexplicability; but from this it does not follow that it should rest content when an explanation is found.

In this section we have come full-circle back to the assumption that mind's perceptions are - in principle - correct. We should now briefly examine Temple's interpretation of the nature of mind.
4. MIND

A grave problem in dealing with the subject of mind is, as Owen C. Thomas has pointed out, that Temple uses the words 'mind' and 'Mind' with a host of different meanings according to context. In part, no doubt, this variety of meanings can be attributed to the circumstances in which Temple wrote his philosophy. Despite this, and despite the lack of a fully integrated account of mind from Temple's pen, it is possible to discern the general pattern in Temple's thought.

Certain of his principles are deducible from our consideration of his views about the structure of reality. He asserts a real kinship between mind and the world because of his basic metaphysical position that reality is an integrated rational whole, and, as we saw when considering his remarks on the grades of reality, the mind is an integral part of the whole system. While it is true that there is a subject-object relationship, and that neither is reducible to the other, nevertheless, Temple insists, the mind is part of the world-process. He rejects the idea that he associates with Cartesianism which tends to see the mind simply as a passive, apprehending entity. For Temple, the mind has an active, creative part to play in the world-process, and, more than many other philosophers, he emphasises the imaginative, creative aspects of it. In this, he is close to the position adopted by Brentano and subsequent phenomenologists, which was itself a reaction to Cartesian approaches to epistemology. (Elements of this will be explored in subsequent chapters.) Even in simple apprehension Temple notes the way in which the mind creates new forms. He quotes Dorothy Emmet with approval: '"The abiding value of the Kantian philosophy lies in the discovery that an act of experience is a process of construction. But according to Kant, the objective world is constructed by the subject experiencing; while in Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism the
experiencing subject arises out of the world which it feels, and constructs its own nature from the way it feels it."

Temple emphasises the way in which the mind constructs its picture of the world, and creates a vision of itself:

... one of the ways in which the human experiencing subject feels the world is to gather up in the span of a single comprehension an entire period of the process out of which it arises. A man is born at a particular point in history. At first his mind moves only in the service of his bodily needs; but even so it very soon uses memory of the past to guide action in the present. Gradually, as language is acquired, the general qualities offered by perceived objects are more and more detached from the empirical instances by the help of the names for these which language supplies; sequences are traced out; and at last something that may be called a historical grasp of personal life, of family, of nation, is found to exist.

What is implied in this? First, that "present" experience is apprehended as continuous with the "past" out of which it arises. The "present" is never the mathematical point at which past and future meet; that concept is the fruit of abstraction. The present is so much of the empirical process as is immediately apprehended. This is far more than the passing sense-impression of the moment. It is all which is apprehended as continuous with that impression.91

Mind creates this present, and sense of wholeness, because 'it is distressed by the apparent transitoriness of all things. Arising out of flux, and itself in origin an episode of the flux out of which it arises, mind declares its own nature by
demanding permanence. According to Temple, 'the mind, having the power to form concepts, is thus set free from bondage to particular occasions. The concept is a "free idea"'.

A potent clue to clarifying the implications of Temple's view of mind can be found in the work of the great Polish philosopher Tadeusz Kotarbinski. Kotarbinski develops the idea that the only constituents of the world are physical objects — he is the principal figure in the Reist or (later) Concretist school. What concerns us, however, is his analysis of language, reminding us of how, in the process of abstraction, we create onomatoids — or apparent names. An onomatoid occurs, for instance, when we abstract a general quality from the world of things, and treat it as if it were a thing in itself. So, for instance, we observe various objects which share in common 'greenness' — 'green grass', 'green book', and so on. Because we perceive features in common between these objects, we abstract, for convenience' sake a portmanteau noun 'green' to express the common features. That, of itself, is a legitimate procedure so long as we do not treat the new noun as if it were a thing in itself. However, once we make the transference there is a danger that we will begin to think of 'green' as a thing in itself: when people say 'Green is my favourite colour', or 'Green is restful', they slip into this error, missing the point that what they really mean is 'I prefer green things to things of other colour' or 'green things are restful'. When we consider onomatoids such as 'love' or 'justice', (abstracted from 'loving beings', 'just men') the problem — as we shall see in the next chapter — becomes more pronounced.

Kotarbinski considers 'class' to be onomatoidal: 'Concretism would hold its position in the face of the problem of classes, and it would be justified in stating that there were twelve apostles without assuming that an object called the class of apostles, and different from the totality consisting of the
apostles as component bodies, existed in addition to the apostles. He argues further (in the light of such mathematical concepts as set theory) that it is possible to use sentences without any reliance on the concepts 'class' or 'class of classes'. He gives an example:

\[
\sum_{x, y} ((x \in M) \land (y \in M) \land (x \neq y)) \land \prod_z ((z \in M) \rightarrow ((z = x) \lor (z = y))).
\]

This is read: there are two M's is the same as: there is such an x and there is such a y that x is an M and y is an M and x is not identical with y, and moreover what is an M is identical either with x or with y.

Temple, in a less organised way (he could not have known of Kotarbinski's work) is conscious nevertheless of the way in which the mind abstracts from the world of objects, and hints at the idea that 'class' is unreal:

\[
\ldots \text{attention, in fixing itself on the general qualities of objects, detaches these in thought from the objects themselves, and so forms concepts, which the mind can handle in complete independence of particular objects, though they have application and meaning only in reference to particular objects ...}
\]

Real thinking, though it makes use of concepts throughout its course, is directed to the actual world of objects, which are particular instances of general qualities, and seldom, if ever, exhibit any general quality in precise correspondence to the concept, because the presence of other general qualities involves some modification of that which is the special object of attention.

We may note that while the thrust of his argument is similar to Kotarbinski's, Temple's wording is less precise - in a Platonic way, he speaks of 'particular instances of general qualities'.
a mode of language I consider onomatoidal. A clearer use of language would, I think, have enabled Temple to avoid certain problems in his theory of value. (see next chapter)

Similarity with Kotarbinski's approach may be discerned in Temple's treatment of time. We have noted already how Temple sees 'mental' time as not coincident with actual successiveness in objects. Kotarbinski insists that 'the nouns "time", "space" and "characteristics" are ... onomatoids: "located in time" means "being somewhat", "located in space" means "being somewhere", and "having physical characteristics" means "being physically such and such"'; in short 'time' is an abstraction from our interpretation of the successiveness of objects.

It would, of course, be an error to reduce the whole outlook of Temple on the question of mind to that of a concretist like Kotarbinski, revealing though the parallels are. Kotarbinski holds that material concrete objects are 'the only elements of reality' - with that, Temple as a theist would be unable to agree. Nevertheless, in the treatment of language, and the separation of the perceiving mind from the world in flux - in the sense that although the mind is part of the world, its perceptions are shaped into thoughts which often do not faithfully reflect the world - they tread a similar path. Interestingly, Kotarbinski considered Brentano's approach to the world, at least in his last writings, a primitive form of reism, though Brentano maintained a duality of substances - bodies and souls. It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that we shall discern many similarities between Brentano's ethics and Temple's if each is based on a similar attitude to perception. Temple, like Brentano, cannot accept a purely material view of the universe (its ultimate constituents may be things, but these may be spiritual 'things' and material 'things', and not material things only - the comments on onomatoids would still apply): the self is an example of
something non-material: 'It appears that there is in the brain no one centre of consciousness to which all sensations are communicated; I, who see, am the same I, who hear; yet there is no physiological basis of this "I" to whom all the sensations belong; the Ego or Self is therefore non-material.'\(^{100}\) It should be noted that many philosophers have seen the 'self' as purely a logical construction created out of impressions received: they have not found it necessary to posit a non-material being - this debate, it could be argued, is one about the temptation to create onomatoids.

At the beginning of this section, I noted that for Temple the mind is not merely passive, but organising and creative. It is not, for present purposes, necessary to rehearse this in any detail. We have seen how he claims that the mind reorganises material to form concepts. These concepts permit the development of science; when the mind seeks permanence it is able to achieve this 'by formulating changeless principles of the constant change of experience - laws, which themselves unchanging, describe the course of the change which the various objects of attention follow; this is the method of science.'\(^{101}\) However, the scientific method is not the only activity of mind. Temple, more than many philosophers, considers the artistic, imaginative aspect of mind no less important. He develops this theme in *Mens Creatrix*: 'Art is, in structure, Logic in excelsis\(^{102}\), and he quotes Bosanquet with approval: '... all logical activity is a world of content reshaping itself by its own spirit and laws in presence of new suggestions; a syllogism is in principle nothing less; and a Parthenon or "Paradise Lost" is in principle nothing more.'\(^{103}\) Temple glosses this: 'intellect as a rule is content with the skeleton and persists in pushing the enquiry further, while imagination clothes the skeleton with flesh and then contemplates its finished work until satiety overtakes it. Each would find fulfilment only in the full apprehension of the
structure of the universe adequately embodied and expressed.\textsuperscript{104}

Wholeness of understanding is therefore found not in scientific enquiry only, but in the combination of understanding and imagination. Both, he argues, are necessary to the activity of will. He describes the most familiar problem in the practical moral life as 'that of carrying out in actual practice what we know to be right.'\textsuperscript{105} For Temple, mere scientific knowledge does not give any spur to action: 'it may be said that a purely intellectual idea, a mere scientific formula, has no power to awake desire and so stimulate action ... in the cases where the true principle is intellectually or scientifically grasped, but there is lacking any desire to act according to it, imagination must come to the aid of intellect and give body to the right principle, so that it may have attractive power. Imagination is normally the link between intellect and will.'\textsuperscript{106}

Imagination is the spur, because it enables us to visualise results, which a mere call to duty does not do. Temple says of himself: 'I do not find that the recognition of a duty is of any great assistance to its performance.'\textsuperscript{107} For him, imagination, particularly about people, is essential to action. He imagines seeing a man given to excessive drinking hesitating before the door of a public house: 'I should not dilate on the evils of indulgence, but should try to call up a picture which would appeal; I should not say, "Indulgence is sure to bring its penalty" but rather, "Remember your wife and children."'\textsuperscript{108} The use of imagination, he argues, enables us to avoid errors in our moral judgments:

Everyone agrees that no man should appoint another to a post of great responsibility on any grounds except that of his fitness for the post. But very respectable citizens are liable to appoint a man "because it will please his old father", or for some
other wholly irrelevant consideration. And the failure is due to lack of imagination. On one side there is the pleasure of the well-known old man clearly envisaged; on the other there is an arid principle. But if this arid principle is translated into the actual distress of many families through financial incompetence on the part of the old man's son, or of death and bereavement due to military incapacity, or of whatever definite evil is likely to result in the particular instance, the man responsible for the appointment will no longer be ready to buy an old friend's pleasure at the cost of so great a risk.\textsuperscript{109}

However, just as scientific error is possible, so too there may be errors of imagination. He implies that our imaginative pictures be tested by relating them to reality as apprehended - he insists on care in our 'interpreting as' of imagination: '... if imagination is the raising of the image-element to adequacy, there must first be a meaning to which it may be adequate, otherwise it degenerates into fantasy, which is the making of images with no regard to realities; when images thus made are of a kind to stimulate emotion and consequently also activity, they lead men's whole conduct astray. It is thus that men follow the will-o'-the-wisps of superstition.'\textsuperscript{110}

We have moved from apprehension of reality to talk of ethics. Part of the role of both scientific enquiry and imagination is the ability fully to apprehend the universe. One of the fundamentals of the universe is our apprehension - both scientifically and imaginatively - of value; for without apprehension of value, Temple argues, ethical behaviour is impossible.
NOTES

1. **Nature Man and God**: p.198
2. Ibid.: p.213
3. Ibid.: p.498
4. Ibid.: p.498
5. Ibid.: p.498
7. **Nature Man and God**: p.163
9. **Nature Man and God**: p.270
10. Chapter 1, n.30
11. John Mcquarrie: **Twentieth Century Religious Thought**: p.269
12. Published in **Blackfriars**, March 1944, reprinted in **Religious Experience**: pp.229-236
13. See Chapter 2, above.
15. See Chapter 2, above, and **Mens Creatrix**: p.7
18. This, of course, is not purely a twentieth century view. Origen (De Principiis IV,I,16) doubted the scientific veracity of Genesis: 'Who is so foolish as to suppose that God ... planted a paradise in Eden ...? ... I do not suppose that anyone doubts that these things figuratively indicate certain mysteries.'
19. Paul Tillich: **Systematic Theology**: I,35
20. Origen: **De Principiis**: I,I,7
22. Paul Tillich: **Systematic Theology**: I,239
23. **Summa Theologica**: I,13, art.5
24. S.Kierkegaard: **The Sickness Unto Death**: p.216
26. I concur with D.P. Henry's opinion that Chapter 3 is not a reformulation of the Ontological Argument. See D.P. Henry: *Medieval Logic and Metaphysics*: pp.105-117

27. It is unclear whether Temple was familiar with Bonhoeffer's thought. G.K.A. Bell, Bishop of Chichester, was a close personal friend of both men.

28. Bonhoeffer recasts this in the form 'How?', but it is clear that he intends the question to mean a) What is the cause of x?

b) What is the meaning of x? c.f. D. Bonhoeffer: *Christology*: p.28

29. c.f. Bonhoeffer: *Christology*: p.29: "'Who?' is the religious question.' Compare this with Temple's 'God must be to us neither It nor He, but Thou': *Social Witness and Evangelism*, reprinted in *Religious Experience*: p.60


32. ibid.: p.312

33. ibid.: p.315

34. c.f., e.g. G.K. Chesterton: *St. Thomas Aquinas*: p.119: 'Either there is no philosophy ... or else there is a real bridge between the mind and reality.'


38. B. Pascal: *Pensees*: No.430


42. *Nature Man and God*: p.313

44. *Faith and Modern Thought*: p.14
45. 'Christmas Broadcast', published in *Religious Experience*: p.237
46. *Nature Man and God*: p.57 (see Chapter 2, above.)
47. ibid.: p57
48. ibid.: p.73
49. ibid.: p.66
50. ibid.: p.63
51. *Mens Creatrix*: p.23
55. Differences between this article and Chapter 1 of *Christus Veritas* are trivial. In the latter, Temple adds a few additional explanatory paragraphs, and there are minor differences of paragraphing and punctuation: the substance is unchanged.
56. *Christus Veritas*: p.5
57. ibid.: p.5
58. *Mens Creatrix*: p.70
59. *Christus Veritas*: p.6
60. ibid.: p.5
61. 'Some Implications of Theism' in *Contemporary British Philosophy*: Vol.1, p.418
62. ibid.: p.418
63. ibid.: p.418
64. *Christus Veritas*: p.5
65. ibid.: p.4
66. ibid.: p.4
67. *Mens Creatrix*: p.271
68. ibid.: p.272
70. Mens Creatrix: p.270
71. It should be noted that F.C. Copleston in A History of Philosophy, Vol. 2, Part 2, pp. 60-61, suggests that Aquinas himself was referring to God as Ultimate Explanation.
72. Faith and Modern Thought: p.11
73. David Hume: Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion: Part VIII
75. ibid.: p.250
76. ibid.: p.251
77. For a fascinating account of the effects of Darwinism on scientists see Owen Chadwick: The Victorian Church: Vol.2, Chapter 1
78. Mens Creatrix: p.86
80. ibid. p.515
81. ibid. p.254
82. Faith and Modern Thought: p.99
84. 'Symbolism as a Metaphysical Principle' (see note 54) reprinted in Religious Experience: p.80
85. 'Religious Experience', (Sermon preached in Manchester Cathedral, July 6th 1914), reprinted in Religious Experience: p.60
86. ibid.: p.69
89. Owen C. Thomas: William Temple's Philosophy of Religion: pp.70-80
92. ibid.: p.204
93. ibid.: p.202
100. The Nature of Personality: p.xxv. This idea is not uncommon in Idealism: it may be found, for instance, in the works of R.H. Lotze. Temple has much in common with this philosopher — a belief that for truth about the universe we must turn to experience is one important example, which sets both men apart from a pure Platonism.
CHAPTER FOUR

VALUE

1. THE APPREHENSION OF VALUE

We have seen, when considering the nature of mind, how, for Temple, the mind is not purely passive; how, indeed, it restructures and shapes apprehension in both scientific and artistic understanding. What we have not considered is how the mind - according to Temple - apprehends value. To say that is perhaps to imply that there is an objective value or scale of values to be apprehended - Temple believes that there is, though many philosophers would, as we shall see, dissent. Nevertheless, Temple argues from experience, that from our experience of value we are able to discern objectivity.

Temple claims 'that in actual experience Fact and Value are given together, and ... our conception of the world must make room for both and disclose a relation between them in a coherent scheme.' It is unsurprising therefore that Temple should draw attention to the central place which value occupies in philosophy, though he believes that the relationship between 'Value ... (and) ... Reality is by most writers either not discussed or is very sketchily outlined.'

His notion that fact and value are given together in our experience is an important one, not least because it may serve to obviate the fact-value dichotomy which has concerned so many philosophers. If the two are perceived together, rather than one being derived from the other, then it would seem that one of the principal problems in the history of philosophy has been resolved. I am not convinced that Temple has resolved the issue, but his view should be explored.

He is clear that we cannot derive value from fact; he says that it is impossible to do so, and it is evident that in formal logical terms such a move cannot be made: to derive value from
fact is to derive an 'is' from an 'ought' - which cannot be done. Temple does not attempt to do this: value is something which is perceived in the object - it is not the case - he says - that we first contemplate the object, and then, from contemplation, derive the value. We experience the object as itself (fact) and as valuable - though there is no logical link in this.

I am not sure that Temple is correct in this description of perception. Certainly though both fact and value may be held in our experience of an object, it does not follow that they are given together. If I meet something strange, my first, instinctive question is 'What is it?' - and not until later do I ask 'What is its value to me?' I find that I cannot value - or at least, do not thoughtfully consider value in - things that I have not yet begun to understand. Further, I may - and do - perceive the existence - the fact - of things, without ever considering their value. If I look into someone's kitchen, I may see a considerable array of cooking tools and recognise them as such. Nonetheless, though I recognise, and can, if pressed, say for what they are useful (what their instrumental value is) I have no consciousness of perceiving their value: I glance, accept their existence and consider their value not at all. In no normal sense of apprehension do I apprehend their significance. Their instrumental value is not apparent in perception as such; it is only realised in action - if I have to prepare a meal in the stranger's kitchen, I then think of the value of this or that implement. In my own kitchen, instrumental value for me has become familiar - so familiar - that if a visitor asks me what an implement is, I may think of it first for its utility and only secondly for what it is: my answer could well be 'I find it useful for x(value)... it's a y(value)' and I may well think of it in that order. But my visitor's first question is one of fact, 'What is this?', and normally, only secondly 'What do you use it for?'
If my experience is correct, and our perception of instrumental value is both sequential and dependent on circumstances, it is proper to ask whether in our experience any other kind of value strikes us immediately as we perceive a thing's existence. Of course, in an abstract, philosophical/theological sense we may argue, as Temple or Trethowan 4 would, that existence is a good, and that, therefore, the thing has goodness by virtue of existence. That may be true, but it is not, I think, how we do in fact perceive things. No-one, I suspect, seeing a thing as existing is immediately conscious of its goodness, even though he may accept philosophically the goodness of existents: it is only on reflection that he would relate the thing to his philosophical presuppositions. Further, that there are those who perceive mere existence as - of itself - value-free, who accept that x exists without attributing value in every case, implies that value is not a matter of automatic experience, that fact and value are not given together.

Temple's view makes more sense if he means that we can somehow hold a sense of the value of an object in our experience together with its factual nature; and of course we can do this; we can say of a thing that we contemplate 'x is of such a nature and I value it thus...' But this is not to derive one from the other - it is to report on our experience: 'I perceive x and I find it valuable' - the conjunction does not imply derivation - the sentence describes two separate (though possibly contemporaneous) experiences: what the two have in common is that they are both experiences about the object. It is important to notice how I have formulated the sentence: 'I perceive x and find it valuable (or, I value it thus ...)', and not 'I perceive x and its value is ...' The first formulation is nearer to Temple's approach: like revelation, like the perception of the world, it is a formulation pro me; the second formulation implies that any value is inherent in the object x - a much more debatable proposition. While it is true that Temple argues for the objectivity of values, and not that they
are subjective only, he begins with the subjective aspect of values - how they exist pro me. (We may note, at this point, how thinkers such as Brentano have pointed to the idea that any perception of value is pro me, but in the sense that an active mind, with its own preconceptions, is involved in any act of apprehension. Thus, that we may sense both existence and value at the same moment may simply be the coincidence of already valuing subject and existing object: to assume the value is in the object would be to misunderstand the nature of one's own perception.)

The discovery of value, is, Temple argues, the characteristic activity of mind: 'Value ... (is) ... grounded in the discovery by Mind of itself - or its own kin - in its object', and he argues that value is the clue to interpreting both existence and itself. We find here all the principles that we have already noted about Temple's philosophy - the subject-object relationship, the need for mind to find itself reflected in the structure of the universe. These are large claims, but larger still, and most significant, is the idea - already encountered - that mind is indeed the principle of the universe. It is therefore clear that while we must begin with value as it occurs in our apprehension, we must go on to consider Temple's wider idea that the universe is itself the expression of the value of its controlling Mind.

2. VALUE AS APPREHENDED

So far, I have used the term 'value' rather broadly, and without further qualification. In my example about kitchen implements, I spoke of 'instrumental value', as the value of a kitchen implement - to me - is its value for a purpose. Philosophers generally are careful to distinguish kinds of value - instrumental, intrinsic, teleological, moral, aesthetic, and so on. Temple, however, tends to speak of value in a broad sense, without bothering very much to distinguish in
a categorical way between different senses of the term. There is perhaps some justice in this, for rarely is the value of an event purely of one kind. We may, for instance, see a great play, and derive from it aesthetic value; but we derive many other kinds of value - moral, perhaps (it inspires us to improve our own conduct), instrumental (it has enabled us to fill an otherwise empty evening), or teleological (it was attended so that we could write about it). Nevertheless, by distinguishing between the different kinds of value, we are able to clarify our own thinking. That Temple does not so carefully distinguish proves unsurprising when we see how mutable he considers value as apprehended.

That values change - or appear to change - as apprehended is fundamental to Temple's approach. He gives many examples of this. The most significant perhaps is his example from the events of history:

The successive events that constitute Process are, as events, unalterable. Whatever may be a true description of them at the time of their occurrence remains a true description throughout the whole course of time. Hamlet killed Polonius; no length of years can make it true to say that Polonius killed Hamlet. Conversely, if it is now true that the earth revolves, and from the formation of the solar system has revolved, about the sun, then it was never true to say that the sun revolves about the earth. In this sense the event is always unalterable, and not even God can change the past. But it is not true that the value of the past event is unalterable; when it is seen in the context and perspective of a longer vista of time, what was, as an isolated event, evil may be appreciated as an element in a total good - not only as a price paid for a consequent good, but as an indispensable element in what as a whole is good. And
this again is not to be interpreted merely as a preponderance of good in a whole which also contains evil; the thing that was evil becomes a positive ingredient in a total good.

No doubt it is only by rhetoric that this can be called an alteration of the past; for the past event, as past, is what it always was. But the present appreciation of the past discloses a character which in the past was imperceptible. It would be inconceivable that any one should misunderstand the rhetoric which declares that the past is not unalterable, unless some persons had in fact misunderstood it. For it is the whole point of this way of thinking that the past qua past was what it was; if it was bad, it is now true to say that it was bad; but though it was merely bad, it is now an integral element in good. To turn at once to a supreme instance, the crucifixion of Jesus of Nazareth, interpreted as Christians have interpreted it, was for a moment the worst of all manifestations of evil; but throughout the ages it is the best of all manifestations of good; and the Christian scheme of redemption affirms, not only a preponderance of good over evil, so that the temporary victory of evil is wiped out by a more decisive victory of good, but the conversion of defeat itself into triumph.8

At certain basic levels, Temple is, of course, correct. It is true, for instance, that Christians have long interpreted the crucifixion as at once the greatest of all possible evils (the scandal of the murder of God) and the greatest of all possible goods (the redemption of mankind) and that they have, as a matter of record, held both interpretations together. As Temple himself notes9 it is not relevant whether the interpretations are true: merely that we can interpret the same event in both
ways is enough. (We may add that a non-Christian can interpret the crucifixion in other ways - seeing its significance as a source of myth, or a triumph for colonial justice, for instance.) It is also true that time may alter the significance of an event. At the time, the English Reformation may have been interpreted as a purely religious phenomenon: it is only in the longer perspective, and with the benefit of hindsight, that we are able to see that its principal significance was in the revolution it caused in social structure and economic organisation. In the shorter span of our own lives, our perspective on events alters. A life-endangering operation seems an unmitigated horror at the time, and yet it can become, in retrospect, the source of good, making possible the realisation of new opportunities.

By insisting upon the unalterability in themselves of past events, but stressing that what had one apparent value may now seem to have another, Temple seems at first to be maintaining a separation of the world and our interpretation of it. This appears to imply that the criterion of value is what we consider it to be. We recognise value, as we recognise truth, by our feeling of satisfaction: 'Value is recognised by a sense of kinship or "at-homeness" which we may call satisfaction. Where a man claims to find this, his claim cannot be disputed. To every man his own sense of value is final.' In one sense, the latter point is true if and only if one cannot be brought to change one's estimate of the value of something by argument or experience. In the last chapter, I cited Temple's own account of the development of his artistic and musical taste - a case in which he changed his values through a revaluation based on experience. Presumably therefore, if we do not have closed minds, we are always open to the revaluation of our values - we need not accept our values as 'fixed' or 'final' until and unless we choose to do so. That is one possibility: but another is to posit that there are some values which are absolute - we may not at first recognise them, but when we do,
there is no dispute. And it is clear that for Temple there is such absolute value, 'known to us in the three forms of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness (of character).' This creates immediate problems of reconciling our perception of value - which is apparently relative ('I can see no reason why the value of any object should be identical for all people.'), beyond argument ('One cannot ever argue about questions of value.'), yet intuitive and ultimate ('All value-judgments are ultimate. The terms good and bad cannot be analysed. There is no more to be said about them than simply to find out to what objects they can be applied. All value-judgments are in their nature intuitive, and they do not admit of argument.'), unjustifiable ('To justify is to approve as righteous by reference to some external standard; righteousness itself, therefore, which constitutes the standard, cannot be justified; we can only describe it and ask - Do you like it or not?') and unprovable ('I know of no way of proving a priori that anything is good or evil: we must go to our own moral judgements') - with the claim that value is ultimately absolute. I think that, in part, the problem is caused by Temple being pulled in two opposite directions, by his Idealist past on the one hand, and his attempt to justify Christianity on the other. His instinct - as we have seen - was to synthesise. In certain respects this was not always possible.

Temple attempts to link the fact of value as existing in our perception and its actual existence in reality by a simple device. He argues that values are present in the world, but are realised in our apprehension of them:

... into value the subjective element enters not as a limitation, but as a constituent. Value exists in order to be appreciated; and though the appreciating mind finds rather than creates the value, yet the value is dormant or potential until appreciation awakes it to energy and actuality. Value, in short,
is actual in experience. And it is one of the advantages of a philosophy which makes Value its central principle that it thus in its central principle holds objective and subjective together. If a philosophy can be constructed on this basis at all, it will at least be free from the divisive claims of the objective and the subjective. Whatever may be true of knowledge and fact, there is no doubt that in actualised Value subject and object are united on equal terms.¹⁹

These claims, in Christus Veritas, are broad. He emphasises the point in Nature, Man and God: '... Value depends for its actuality on the appreciating mind. That does not mean that the Value resides in the subjective experience of that mind: it means that the appreciation brings to actuality a quality of the object which previously belonged to it really, but potentially and not actually - ' ... for value is "objectively real, but subjectively conditioned."'²⁰ The central place which Temple gives to value is unsurprising if it is the key to the subject-object relationship, if it does provide the element of synthesis.

Temple uses this notion of value to provide the basis for theism. In Christus Veritas, he says:

... if our whole theory is sound, value determines existence, but value is only actual when it is appreciated; therefore Man's appreciation of the world is the first instalment, so to speak, within the Time process, of the realisation of that for which the world was made, though in the eternal Mind which comprehends all Time this is actual eternally. It is Man who first rises to the question why there is a world at all. It is in Man's appreciation of its Value that the answer
begins to appear; for the solution of the problem of existence is found in the experience of what is good. Thus the whole universe is created to reflect the manifold goodness of the Creator, and to produce within itself beings who may share with the Creator His joy in the goodness of the created thing ... The universe exists to reveal the goodness of God so far as it evolves intelligences capable of receiving the revelation. 21

We note, parenthetically, the characteristic stress on the experiencing nature of revelation. Taken as a whole, the argument is unsatisfactory. We need mention only two points. Firstly, Temple uses an argument reminiscent of Berkeley in speaking of 'the eternal Mind (in) which (the value of things) is actual eternally.' Berkeley explained the continued existence of things, when not perceived by us, by saying that God was perceiving them. Temple explains the continued value of things by saying that God is valuing them. There is an element of circularity in such an argument. We are aware of the value of things and hence of the purpose behind them. Secondly, we may note some dishonesty in the penultimate sentence in this extract. To use 'thus' is to imply a logical connection between the sentence about the universe revealing the creator's goodness and the preceding one about the experience of goodness. There is no such logical connection. We may indeed experience goodness, as an interpretation of the world; but it does not follow from this that the - apparent - goodness of the world need be any more than accident, or, more simply, how it appears to us.

In Nature, Man and God, Temple uses a different argument for the existence of God - a variant on the First Cause argument, as he notes 22 - again based on value:
... in actual experience Fact and Value are given together ... accepting Value as equally real with Existence, ... we find in Value the clue to the interpretation of the totality which includes both.

... The Process, in certain of its parts, apprehends itself as exhibiting that same character of Mind by which this apprehension is possible; for Value arises through Mind's discovery of itself in its object. Mind, then, though it appears within the Process at a late stage, discovers throughout that Process the activity of Mind - universally in the form of Truth, commonly in the form of Beauty, sometimes in the form of Goodness. That Mind is pervasive of Reality is a necessary inference from this method of apprehending the world. If that method is justified, as we have tried to show that it is, the conclusion is inevitable. Mind is the principle of unity in Reality, or at least the fullest expression of that principle known to us.

But Reality is first presented as Process. We have found that the Process is subject to Mind, and when Mind expresses itself through process, its activity is called Purpose. We are therefore led to enquire whether Purpose can be the governing principle of the world-process. It has, at least, this advantage as a candidate for that function; it is a principle of explanation which itself requires no further explanation. All other types of explanation set new problems; of any other answer to the question Why? we ask Why? again. But Intelligent Purpose is self-explanatory. When we have traced an occurrence to the Purpose of an intelligent being, we are satisfied. And this is natural enough. Mind has referred the occurrence to itself as cause.
Now it cannot be said that we are under the same necessity to refer the course of the World-Process to Mind as we are to regard Mind as its governing principle; for there might be other causes unknown to us to which it could be referred. Yet if there is one and only one principle known which fulfils the requirement of supplying an explanation without demanding one, it is reasonable, at the least, to experiment with the theory that this does indeed supply explanation of the universe. But that theory is Theism in one or another of its forms.

When we begin to follow up the theory that Mind Purposive, or Intelligent Purpose, supplies the explanation of the world, we are at once confronted with the fact that Purpose is directed to Value or the Good, so that the theory involves the logical priority of Value to Existence. Objects come into existence, if this theory is sound, because they are good, or because some good can be brought into existence by means of them...

... Our minds both exhibit and co-operate with the essential activity of the Mind which pervades and explains the Process.23

There is some irony in this argument. As we have seen, Temple rejected natural theology and its methods, yet here we find him using a strange amalgam of the First Cause Argument (in the form of Ultimate Explanation24), the Cosmological Argument, the Design Argument (purpose in the universe), and the Moral Argument: these will be considered in detail in a subsequent chapter.

Temple asserts, in simple terms, that our values are a guide to reality. I am reminded of Baillie's comment: 'Either our moral
values tell us something about the nature and purpose of reality (i.e. give us the germ of religious belief) or they are subjective and therefore meaningless\textsuperscript{25} - and to both the objection applies that it does not follow from any subjectivity of values that they are meaningless. Even if purely subjective they have meaning for me - just as, if I say 'I prefer apricot to strawberry jam', the statement, though entirely subjective, has real meaning, so too, if I say 'I value beautiful things', however much beauty may be purely subjective, the statement is meaningful to me, and I suggest, would also be to a hearer. That a statement of value may be meaningful in this sense is not to imply that we may therefore infer absolute value.

Nevertheless, Temple is not unique among modern philosophers in arguing in this way. Trethowan argues that if we try 'to find absolute value in human activity alone ... this does not make sense'\textsuperscript{26} and he maintains of God 'that he is the source of being is to say that he is the source of all good because it is fundamentally in terms of value (whether we realise this explicitly or not) that we discover him\textsuperscript{27}... it is as the source of value that we come to know him.'\textsuperscript{28} The question here is whether the mistake may not lie in attempting to find absolute value; or whether, as I shall suggest in the next section, that it is mistaken quest.

We may question also whether the universe is as purposive as Temple implies, or whether indeed it reveals purpose at all. Temple seems to share the optimism apparent among many of his contemporaries, such as H.G.Wells, of evident and inevitable purposive progress - Wells speaks, at the conclusion of his \textit{Outline of History} of man standing upon the earth as upon a foot-stool and reaching out towards the stars.\textsuperscript{29} This sense of purpose seems hard to justify in the face of evil. As Professor Rogerson has said: 'I cannot accept Temple's philosophical attempt to present the universe as purposive, as sacramental, as the expression in all its parts and processes of absolute
value. I cannot justify evil as a necessary part of purposive reality, for all that I accept that good can come out of evil. To take perhaps a bad case, I do not think that I could have encouraged the inmates of Auschwitz or Buchenwald with the thought that their suffering was a necessary part of purposeful reality and that good was bound to come of it ... Faced with Temple's repeated claim that reality must either be inexplicable or capable of explanation in terms of purposive will, I would have to opt for the inexplicability of reality. 30 Indeed, we may say that the dilemma for the Christian lies precisely in attempting to come to terms with the apparent pointlessness of the world as we find it: many of the most significant contemporary Christian thinkers, such as Rudolf Bultmann, have taken little comfort from the structure of the world, arguing not that it reveals God, but that it is something inexplicable of which we must somehow make sense. It could further be argued that an adherence to a non-propositional theology, with its emphasis on a deus absconditus, should lead us to expect few evident signs of overt purpose.

Temple himself, towards the end of his life, perhaps through the events of the Second World War, came to change his mind. On 16th July 1942, he wrote to Dorothy Emmet:

The particular modification to which I am feeling driven is not substantial, though I think it is very important. It is a much clearer perception of what is worked out in the Gifford Lectures about process and value. What we must completely get away from is the notion that the world as it now exists is a rational whole; we must think of its unity not by the analogy of a picture, of which all the parts exist at once, but by the analogy of a drama where, if it is good enough, the full meaning of the first scene only becomes apparent with the final curtain; and we are
in the middle of this. Consequently the world as we see it is strictly unintelligible. We can only have faith that it will become intelligible when the divine purpose, which is the explanation of it, is accomplished. 31

It is a pity that Temple did not live to work out the implications of this change of mind.

3. THE NATURE OF VALUE - OUTLINE OF AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT

It is important for any attempt to evaluate thought to see whether it is possible to retain any part of his approach to questions of value, without a commitment to the existence of objective values. It is, I think, possible to do so. It is outside the scope of this thesis to provide a fully articulated theory of value, but it is, I think, helpful to mention some possible directions of thought which would retain a notion of value without falling - on the one hand - into the idea of objective values, or - on the other - into a mere narrow subjectivism.

We note, when we study many contemporary philosophers, a tendency to be uncomfortable with ideas of value. Popper notes that 'few philosophers with scientific training ... care to talk about values. The reason is simply that so much of the talk about values is just hot air. So many of us fear that we too would only produce hot air or, if not that, something not easily distinguished from it.' 32 Popper, however, is not content to ignore value - he argues that although values cannot be derived from facts, they, like problems, somehow emerge from facts. 33 He argues for a limited objectivity of values, claiming their dominance in the realm of world 3 34, which he sees as partially autonomous 35 (Popper speaks of three worlds, the world of things [world 1], of subjective experiences [world 2], and the world of statements in themselves [world 3]). 36
one sense, at least, the objects of world 3 may be considered real\textsuperscript{37}, because they can act upon physical objects - nevertheless the reality of world 3 objects is not the reality which Plato asserts of his Ideal Forms, though effects are real enough. Popper is emphatic that 'I regard world 3 as being essentially the product of the human mind.'\textsuperscript{38}

Popper's view is important, I think, because he demonstrates the possibility of finding a place for meaningful discourse about values without a commitment to the actual objective existence of values as a constituent of the world - as against the beliefs of Temple, Baillie and Trethowan, who would - as we have seen - argue that talk of value immediately commits us to an acceptance of an objective ground of value.

It is easy, however, to see how philosophers can fall into the trap of thinking that values have an objective, 'real world' existence. The trap is well-illustrated in a passage from Meinong:

That we are ... dealing with more than mere possibilities is shown by a group of entirely attributions such as those we encounter when someone speaks of a pleasant bath, fresh air, oppressive heat, vexatious noise, beautiful colour, a gay or sad, tedious or entertaining story, a sublime work of art, excellent people, good intentions, etc. The close relations of such attributes to our feelings is not open to question, but it is just as unquestionable that they are, as attributes, completely analogous to the other properties set before us by presentative ideas in quite familiar fashion. If I say of the sky that it is blue, and again say of it that it is beautiful, I seem to credit the sky with a property in one case as in the other, and since a feeling participates in the
apprehension of the relevant property in the one case while an idea does the work in the other it is natural to ascribe the presentative function to the feeling in the former case as we do to an idea in the latter.39

Here, Meinong appears to be saying that evaluative statements have a straightforwardly factual character - the two statements are 'completely analogous'. I should argue that even in everyday discourse we do not consider them so. I once had the misfortune to travel by train with a pompous colleague who, looking out of the window, said, "You know, Michael, the sky today is what I like to call blue." This struck me then - and strikes me now - as merely tiresome circumlocution. The point was so evident, so beyond argument, as to be not worth mention. If, on the other hand, the fellow had said that the sky seemed to be of a particularly beautiful blue - it was a winter's morning - there would have been something to discuss, the kinds of blueness that we found beautiful, and so on. Indeed, the very subjectivity of the statement of value would have made possible discourse which the mere factual assertion did not.

But the point is deeper than this rather trivial example. We may ponder whether a statement of value is a true predication. We may consider three statements:
   a) The sky is existing.
   b) The sky is blue.
   c) The sky is beautiful.

In each case, the adjective seems to be a straightforward predicate, describing the object. Closer inspection demonstrates that this is not so. Since Kant's rejection of Descartes' version of the Ontological Argument (which claims that existence is a defining predicate of God), philosophers have not normally treated 'exists' as a predicate: to say something exists, Kant argues, is not to add existence to our concept, together with all its other predicates. It is to
assert that there exists in the real world an x which corresponds with our concept. This thought is further developed in Frege-Russellian language by the notion of an existential quantifier - \((\exists x)(x \ldots )\): which means roughly 'There exists x, such that x is ...'

This view of statement a) suggests a line of thought for dealing with statement e). Is to say 'x is beautiful' to make a straightforward predicative statement, or is it rather to say 'I value x as beautiful', so that the true predication is not of the object, but of myself as witness? To say 'x is beautiful' is not, on deep inspection, therefore to make a statement analogical to 'x is blue'; it is rather to say 'I value x ...' ('I perceive the sky is blue' might at first sight, seem analogous; but it isn't, if, as I think, the sky's blueness is evident to all perceivers: it retains its blueness whether I perceive it or not, whereas the valuation of beauty is dependent on my observation.)

Such a view, necessarily undeveloped, nevertheless enables us to retain Temple's perception that 'value is only actual when it is appreciated', though we have shifted the locus of value from the world of objects to the appreciating mind.

This shift of locus may, at first sight, seem to bring us back to a straightforward subjectivism (the idea that value is purely in the eye of the beholder) which Temple was trying to avoid by insisting on an objective real basis for values. We have seen that Temple insisted that value has a subjective content, and that at times, it appears that it is entirely subjective: 'About intrinsic value there can be no argument: one approves or not and there's an end ... As Mr. F.H. Bradley has argued - "Our sense of value, and in the end, for every man his own sense of value is ultimate and final. And since there is no court of appeal, it is idle even to inquire if this sense is fallible."' (Temple was sufficiently struck by this
passage of Bradley to quote it more than once.\(^{43}\) Closer examination of this quotation shows an implicit acceptance of the objectivity of value - the clause 'About intrinsic vale there can be no argument' can be taken to mean either that statements of value are straightforwardly factual (with all the problems which such a view implies) or that, at least, there is intrinsic value to be approved. Temple certainly means the latter, which he seems to take to imply the former.

However, it is possible, I think, to avoid the objectification of value without falling into the narrow subjectivism of which Temple is so fearful. Popper points the way with his treatment of value as a world 3 component. Once it is placed in world 3, value can be spoken of, as we have seen, meaningfully.

Antony Duff has, in an important paper\(^{44}\), indicated the problems of a purely subjectivist account of ethical values. He argues that a purely subjectivist account does not allow for certain features of moral thought. He notes for example that charity is not merely, as the pure subjectivist would claim, a desire of the individual: 'To the moral agent, the well-being of others matters not just under the aspect of something wasted, but under the aspect of something which makes a claim on him and on his concern\(^{45}\) ... The distinction between desire and duty draws its sense from the moral agent's conception of values independent of, and imposing requirements on, himself and his concerns: he recognises not only that particular desires may conflict with these requirements, but also that his own grasp of these values could be mistaken\(^{46}\) ... a moral agent distinguishes between the good and what he happens to desire or value: the orientation of his concern is towards the good, and his concern is to bring his desires into agreement with the good: only thus can he see other desires he had or might have to be wrong.\(^{47}\) The individual has therefore, in these terms, a sense of an absolute claim on himself: if we take a purely subjective approach, the good, the beautiful, become simply
what pleases us. Duff is noting that we do, in fact, find that we have a sense of the claim of these things over against our desires, which enables us rationally even to alter those desires. In this sense, at least, we may speak of values which are absolute. We are not, however, bound to deem values as objectively existent, other than in a world 3 sense; though in that sense we may consider them existent for us. Meinong expresses this idea well, that by the intentionality of the mind, a value may have objectivity for us, as a result of our mental action (this view, of course, retains Temple's notion of the place of mind in making value dependent on the appreciation - Meinong would say 'intention' - of mind). As Lindsay puts it: 'Meinong holds that intentionality is always two-sided: it has, we may say, its me-wardness and its object-wardness, its relation to my subjective mindedness ... on the one hand, and its relation to objects of varying sorts, on the other. It is, moreover, only by having a specific me-wardness, or immanent content, that it can have a specific object-wardness or transcendent objectivity.'

If it is the case that we can speak in a world 3 sense of an absoluteness of value for us, we are able to find a link with the attitudes which are apparent in Temple's approach to revelation, in particular the sense of 'experiencing as' which so much concerned us in the last chapter. Duff, in his paper, speaks in terms of moral absolutes appearing within a moral perspective. He says that 'the assertion of the absolute status of some particular moral value ... makes sense only within a particular moral perspective, which provides those shared criteria of sense and nonsense, of truth and falsity, which gives such claims their sense. Thus we can provide a philosophical explication of the logic of different moral perspectives, and show how different moral values have such an absolute moral status within them, as fundamental truths: we can show that, and how, for instance, a prohibition on suicide is absolute within a Catholic perspective, but not within
various humanist perspectives...\textsuperscript{49} Here, then, is a way of explaining differences between views of moral absolutes in a manner consistent with Temple's approach, though Temple would, I suspect, differ from Duff's belief\textsuperscript{50} that there is no clear way in which we can indicate that this perspective is superior to that. More importantly, Duff is here able to indicate ways in which there can be real discourse about absolutes deemed 'real', without any problems of 'ontological status'.

For the moment, one question remains. If it is possible to speak of absolutes of value without avowing an objective 'real world' existence, how then are we to decide when we have encountered an absolute value? Connected with this, and flowing from Duff's ideas about different perspectives, is it possible to find common ground in our talk of absolutes of value?

Several approaches suggest themselves\textsuperscript{51}, but I shall consider only one - the idea of satisfactoriness, and, connected with it (in answer to the second part of our question), whether there is common ground for all people to find similar values satisfactory.

As we have seen, Temple was much attracted to the idea of satisfactoriness as a criterion for judging truth: in \textit{Faith and Modern Thought} he said: 'the truth about facts is what satisfies the mind of man'\textsuperscript{51}, and his attitude was not to change.

At first sight, there seems something rather cosy about speaking of value in terms of satisfaction (not only because of the emotional overtones of the world itself): there is something more pleasing (at least to the puritanical mind) about Kant's severe notion of duty. As we have seen\textsuperscript{53}, however, Temple finds a simple appeal to duty psychologically unconvincing: 'I do not find that the recognition of a duty is of any great assistance to its performance.'\textsuperscript{54} A sense of duty,
without imagination, is, for Temple, no spur to action, to the realisation of value. His own belief is that the final encouragement is not in imagination alone: 'It is in this supplying of the motive that religion comes in.' In this need for motive, of course, Temple is passing from a pure ethic of values to something more complex. (See Note A to the present chapter, below.)

Temple is not alone in considering a kind of satisfactoriness essential to our judgment of value. Duff, in the paper cited, notes the inevitable component of satisfactoriness in the subjectivist approach to ethics, by implication if not by name. Anthony Quinton, more radically, claims that ethical statements of value are, in essence appetitive. He speaks of value-judgments almost exclusively in terms of satisfaction: 'A material criterion of morality would be that a value-judgement is moral if it evaluates actions in the light of their bearing on the satisfaction and suffering of everyone affected by them. It is prudential, by contrast, if it evaluates actions in the light of their bearing on the long-term satisfaction of the agent; technical if the evaluating factor is the minimisation of time and cost; aesthetic if it is the reward of satisfaction available in the long run to a contemplative spectator; and so on.'

The idea of satisfactoriness is expressed with special clarity by Franz Brentano in his seminal lecture, The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong. Brentano argues for the intuitive nature of rules 'which can be known to be correct and binding, in and for themselves, and in virtue of their own nature.' He claims that we have an intuitive sense of values:

So far as the feelings about sense qualities are concerned, we might say that these things are a matter of taste, and "De gustibus non est disputandum." But this is not what we would say of
the love of error and the hatred of insight. We would say that such love and hatred are basically perverse and that members of the species in question [N.B. Brentano is speaking of a hypothetical species] hate what is indubitably and intrinsically good and love what is indubitably and intrinsically bad. Why do we answer differently in the two cases when the feeling of compulsion is equally strong? The answer is simple. In the former case the feeling of compulsion is merely instinctive. But in the latter case the feeling of compulsion is a higher love that is experienced as being correct. When we ourselves experience such a love we notice not only that its object is loved and capable of being loved, and that its privation or contrary hated and capable of being hated, but also that one is worthy of love and the other worthy of hate, and therefore that the one is good and the other bad.

Let us consider another example. Just as we prefer insight to error, so, too, generally speaking, we prefer joy to sadness - unless it be joy in what is bad. Were there beings who preferred things the other way around, we would take their attitudes to be perverse, and rightly so. For here, too, our love and hatred are experienced as being correct ...  

... Our knowledge of what is truly and indubitably good arises from the type of experience we have been discussing, where a love is experienced as being correct - in all those cases where we are capable of such knowledge.

We should note, however, that there is no guarantee that every good thing will arouse in us an emotion that is experienced as being correct. When this
does not occur, our criterion fails, in which case the good is absent so far as our knowledge is concerned.\textsuperscript{65}

In passing, we may observe several features. Brentano's formulation enables us to retain Temple's central stress on 'experiencing as' while maintaining the sense that values can be absolutes for us, in the world 3 sense of Popper or the moral perspective sense of Duff. The absoluteness of these values is indicated elsewhere by Brentano: 'The principles of ethics, like those of all other sciences, must be cognitions; they cannot be emotions.'\textsuperscript{66} But this absoluteness, the apparent concreteness implied by speaking of cognition, does not in fact imply an existential status to value; the absoluteness, to Brentano, is a fact of our psychology rather than a quasi-objective reality of the type implied by Temple. From time to time, Temple does refer to intuition ('Reason is essentially a special kind of Intuition - the Intuition of Totality or of the Whole and of every fact in its place in the Whole.'\textsuperscript{67}) but he does not give to it the radical centrality that we find in Brentano.

In our own time, we find a strong correspondence between the attitude of Brentano and that of Karol Wojtyla (Pope John Paul II). Wojtyla, like Brentano, holds that 'judging is cognitive and thus belongs to the sphere of knowing',\textsuperscript{68} and we may note parallels between his views and both Temple's and Brentano's: '... it seems that the intuitive experience of objects is always accompanied by judgment; inasmuch as values are the object of intuition, it is a judgment of values, a judgment positing a given value. The character of this kind of judgment is not then discursive; the value is not reached in the course of a process of reasoning; instead we find it in our knowledge as if it were ready-made rather than formed by reason.'\textsuperscript{69} Wojtyla thus retains the intuitional character of value-judgments; but the value is in the judgment, in an
axiological rather than an existential sense: he speaks of 'the axiological (or moral) truth, which is differentiated from the ontological and logical "truth". In grasping it we assert the value of an object rather than what the object itself or as cognised actually is.'

Here we find the clue to the weakness of Temple's position. He does not recognise, as Wojtyla does, and as I have suggested, that a statement of value has something of the character of an assertion, and, further, he appears not to recognise - and certainly does not differentiate - the two kinds of 'truth' illustrated by Wojtyla. Temple's inability to separate kinds of 'truth', and 'fact', to equate - if you like - the world 1 objectivity from the kind of objectivity of values in world 3, has led to the confusion which has committed him to an implausible position - that value has some sort of objective, real-world, existential status.

If, as I think, the absoluteness of value, and its satisfactoriness, is a matter of some sort of intuition, it is proper to enquire whether it is true that there can be such a form of self-evident intuition, and, further, whether it is possible to show that such intuition is a fundamental characteristic of the human personality.

NOTE A

In this chapter, we have seen Temple building his philosophy, and his ethics, (to be developed later) on a basis of value; and have noted Wojtyla's endorsement of an axiological approach.

Not all Christian moralists find such approaches acceptable. In a recent (1975) work, the Catholic theologian C.Henry Peschke comments:
Ethics of values ascribes (sic.) the perception of moral values to an irrational feeling ... it is left to the individual's discretion to decide which are the moral values that are worthy to be accepted and to be realised. There is no criterion superior to a person's subjective feelings. This lack of a superior, objective criterion for the morally good creates a void, which will easily be filled by the criteria of eudaemonism and utilitarianism ... 

... ethics of values is (sic) not able to provide a satisfactory basis for the categorical character of the moral demand. What is at stake ... is the realisation of certain moral values, which will not be brought into being. Everybody will agree that this is regrettable, just as everybody will find it more or less regrettable if aesthetic values are destroyed or not realised. But it does not appear too difficult to put up with such a loss. Precisely because the moral values are independent entities and not related to any superior purpose of God's glory or man's salvation, the system is unable to provide a peremptory sanction of the moral order. Axiological ethics misses the stern inexorability of a divine will avenging uncompromisingly offences against the moral law and demanding atonement for its infringements.72

I have little sympathy with Peschke's chillingly ferocious view - it approximates too closely to an uncharitable approach; and it does not show how we are to determine the existence - or, indeed, the appearance - of the inexorable divine will. Peschke, speaking of a 'peremptory sanction' seems not to be demanding ethics at all, but a divine legal system. Whatever the faults of the systems of Wojtyla and Temple, these distinguished churchmen do not ignore humanity or forgiveness.
Nevertheless, this mention of Peschke does serve to indicate that in their various philosophies, Temple and Wojtyla should not be considered mere mouthpieces of views shared by all their co-religionists.

NOTE B

We have seen (note 19) that for Temple the experience of value provides the means of uniting subject and object in a way which is satisfying.

Wojtyla takes a contrary view:

In true willing the subject is never passively directed to an object. The object - which may be a good or a value ... - never leads the subject back upon itself; it never forces the subject into its own reality thereby determining it from without; that kind of subject-object relation would in fact amount to determinism; it would mean that the subject was in a way absorbed by the object and also that innerness was absorbed by outerness. The moment of decision in the human will rules out any such pattern of relation ...

But Wojtyla is not a member of the Idealist school, and his concerns are different - his attitude towards the idea of the mind as itself active in perception can be traced directly to the work of Brentano. Whether the problem of the subject-object relation is resolved by consideration of value may prove irrelevant: as we shall see in the next and subsequent chapters the two men's differing attitudes to value nevertheless yield remarkably similar results.
NOTES

2. Christus Veritas: p.3
4. c.f. Dom Illtyd Trethowan: Absolute Value: passim.
6. ibid.: p.219
7. Temple does make one sketchy attempt in Mens Creatrix: p.178, to distinguish the kinds of good, but his remarks are tantalisingly brief: 'The things generally called good fall into three obvious classes - those that are good in themselves, those whose results are good, and those which, being good in themselves, have good results.'
9. ibid.: p. 209
11. Chapter Three, above, note 80
12. Christus Veritas: p.26
13. The Kingdom of God: p.44
15. The Kingdom of God: p.43
16. Plato and Christianity: p.72
17. The Nature of Personality: p.71
18. Chapter Two, above, note 10
19. Christus Veritas: p.18
23. ibid.: pp.218-221
24. see Chapter Three, note 71
27. ibid.: p.141
28. ibid.: p.145
32. Karl Popper: *Unended Quest*: p.193 (Compare this with Temple: note 2, above)
33. ibid.: pp.193-194
34. ibid.: pp. 194-195
35. ibid.: pp.185
36. ibid.: p.181
37. ibid.: p.184
38. ibid.: p.186
40. *Christus Veritas*: p.19
41. supra: note 10
45. ibid.: p.229
46. ibid.: p.231
47. ibid.: p.232
50. ibid.: p.236
51. e.g. a Kantian conception, based on universalisation, would be an alternative.
52. *Faith and Modern Thought*: p.14 - see Chapter Three, above: note 44
53. Chapter Three, above: note 107
54. The Kingdom of God: p.59
55. ibid.: p.62
57. Anthony Quinton: The Nature of Things: pp.359-374
58. ibid.: p.380
59. Franz Brentano: The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, 1889. All references are to Chisholm's edition, 1969. (Full details in Bibliography)
60. ibid.: p.4
61. my italics
62. my italics
63. my italics
64. my italics
65. ibid.: pp.22,24
68. Karol Wojtyla: The Acting Person: p.146
69. ibid.: p.147
70. ibid.: p.141
71. ibid.: p.143
73. Karol Wojtyla: The Acting Person: p.127
1. THE NOTION OF PERSONALITY

Throughout his philosophical career, Temple was insistent on the centrality of personality as the key both to our understanding of the universe, and to our ethical lives. One of his earliest books is devoted entirely to the subject and he returns to the concept repeatedly in his later works.

Nor is this at all surprising. If it is true, as Temple asserts, that the central guiding principle of the universe is purpose (God's purpose), then it follows that the principle is personal. A simple reflection reveals this: a theist, if he describes the cosmos as purposeful, means that it shows forth the personal creative power of God - the atheist, at least normally, denies purpose in the structure of the universe and perceives in it no personal character. The issue between theist and atheist is - usually - whether the universe is purposive.

Temple has no doubt. Further, he argues that purpose is the only satisfactory explanation, the only ultimately self-explanatory explanation of the universe. Nowhere does he set out this view with greater lucidity than in one of his later, and I would say most characteristic, books, Christianity in Thought and Practice, written after his Gifford Lectures. His whole argument is worth considering, containing as it does themes that we shall find recurring repeatedly:

... in this purpose which is characteristic of man, as it is characteristic of no other part of the universe so far as we know, we find something that is unique; namely that it is a principle in its own nature self-explanatory.
If there is to be an explanation of the world, of course it must be found in something concerning which the mind does not ask any further question. We must not need to explain our explanation. We need, then, something which is self-explanatory. If there is one thing and one thing only which answers to that, it will be reasonable to experiment with the hypothesis that this is indeed capable of serving as the explanation of the whole.

Now purpose is, in fact, such a self-explanatory principle ...

... When science sets out to investigate the causes of things, all that it can do is to trace certain uniformities which are observable in the behaviour of natural objects, and by help of these to declare what must have preceded the facts now under observation. It explains today by reference to yesterday; and yesterday by reference to the day before; and the solar system by reference to the nebula; but where did that come from? And if you can trace out where that came from and call it "X" then where did "X" come from? Always the same process will press you further and further back. You ask "Why" of every presented fact or theory, and to every answer you bring forward the question "Why" again.

But when you find that something has been done by a human being for a purpose which you understand, you do not ask "Why" any more. You say, "That explains it." The stock instance is that of a geologist who is investigating the formation of a mountain range. He notices the various strata, the faults in these, and so forth. Then his attention is caught by some stones
heaped together in ways for which it is very difficult on his principles to account.

When he has given his geological explanation of the strata and their faults, he may be pressed further back into the place where geology merges into astronomy and so on to the nebula, as I indicated just now; but concerning these stones there seems no explanation along those lines. But when he returns to his inn in the valley and speaks about them, he is told that they are piles of stones erected by the inhabitants of the two valleys to mark the most convenient track from one to the other. And he asks no more questions. That does explain it. He does not say, "Why did they do that?" He does not even say, "How did they do that?" unless some of the stones seemed heavier than men could lift. He is satisfied; the mind has found something which satisfies its own demand whenever it can trace an observed fact to a purpose.3

This might at first appear to be an attempt to prove the existence of God; after all, Temple once again refers to the notion of satisfactoriness, which he frequently takes as the criterion for assessing truth. Nevertheless, he is careful to note 'if there is to be an explanation of the world...' leaving open the possibility that there might be none. He makes this clear in Christus Veritas:

The only explanation of the Universe that would really explain it, in the sense of providing to the question why it exists an answer that raises no further question, would be a demonstration that it is the creation of a Will which in the creative act seeks an intelligible good. But that is Theism. Theism of some kind is the only theory of the universe which
could really explain it. Theism may be untenable; if it is, the universe is ultimately inexplicable ... Philosophically everything is ready for Theism. But actual belief rests primarily, as I think, on religious experience, and finds its intellectual support in the reflexion that this belief is capable of supplying an explanation of the very existence of the Universe, which no other hypothesis available to us affords any hope of doing. That is no proof. It cannot be laid down as an axiom that there must be some explanation of the existence of the Universe. If the existing scheme of things be internally coherent, it cannot be said that the intellect imperiously demands more than this for its satisfaction. 4

Temple is therefore frankly basing his theistic, purposeful, personalistic view on a hypothesis, which he finds more satisfactory than any alternative. But that does not rule out the alternative. (Detailed consideration of Temple's arguments for thisism will be given in the next chapter - many present themes will recur - but for the moment our concern with the fact of personality.) The idea that religious belief is a matter of experience, that the sense of the personal, is a datum of religious experience, is at one with Temple's acceptance of the non-propositional view of revelation, that the content of revelation is not a body of propositions but the person of God himself. As we have seen in Chapter Three, he takes this personal character of revelation to be the characteristic feature of Christianity; and, of course, his view is a theological commonplace. Christian teaching continually refers to the personal character of God, salvation is through the person of Christ, in ethical behaviour, the Christian is urged to be Christ-like, and so on. We should be surprised therefore if Temple were to attempt an analysis without a personal character. However, even outside the Christian tradition, Temple believes that any satisfactory
theistic interpretation must lead to a notion of a personal character for God, that to consider God as the ground of absolute value is to infer personality:

Plato at one stage found the ultimate principle of existence in the Idea of Good, but later was dissatisfied with this and passed over to the more living phrase, "the royal mind of Zeus"...Plato and many other philosophers conceived the ultimate principle as the good, though Plato was dissatisfied with that and went on to reach higher categories, and so some among us have always represented God or the ultimate principle as properly conceived as the absolute sum of all possible values.

But what is there causative in value? Is it manifest on the face of it without any further factor being introduced that because a thing is good it shall be real? Why should we suppose that there is any sum of all possible or even all actual values gathered together in some one supreme good? Surely it is true that to make good effective and operative there must be the vitalizing principle of will or purpose. There must be personality. It was under that impulse that Plato passed from one type of phraseology to the other, and I think that we shall always be pressed from the thought of God as only a sum of values to the thought of Him as a living person, or at least as a Being in whom personality is a real constituent factor; for that is the more adequate way to speak if we are to find an explanation of the world in the belief that He created it.

We noted in Chapter Four how Temple argued that value begins to give the clue to the nature of the universe, how value leads us to purposive mind, but we have now moved, through tracing
identical steps, to the mind as personal, and not as a mere abstract thing. In this, of course, Temple owes much to the Personal Idealist school: we noted in Chapter One, Copleston's comment that 'one of the basic factors in personal idealism is a judgement of value, namely that personality represents the highest value within the field of our experience.' Consideration of value leads to purpose, purpose to personality.

** * * *

Divine personality may be the highest form of personality, but Temple is insistent that we know personality most evidently in the individual human being. One of the most notable features of personality is individuation - this is the characteristic of humanity. In *Christianity in Thought and Practice*, Temple develops this idea, referring back to the order of reality we noted in Chapter Three - Matter, Life, Mind and Spirit. In passing we saw Temple saying of matter, 'its individuality, though it exists (for it is "this" and not another) is negligible.' He now develops this idea, working through each grade. Speaking of matter he cites the predictability of movement in mechanical objects - 'they act as they are acted upon and not otherwise, so that when you want to find out what will be the result of bringing together two forces, your calculation is relatively simple; and their individuality is negligible.' Individuation begins to appear with life: 'Here at least specific, if not individual, differentiation begins to count for a great deal in reaction to environment. You put two stalks into the same water and one of them flowers into a rose and the other into a carnation - because of the kind of stalks they were, of course. But it cannot be said that the water did it all. Something, which has to be allowed for, is contributed by the reacting organism.' This individuation is yet more marked: 'Nobody who has been intimately acquainted, shall we say, with a Scotch terrier, is going to say that all dogs
behave in the same way in relation to the same environment. They have markedly, in the ordinary sense of the word, though it is a bad use of it, wills of their own and great determination.\textsuperscript{14}

This process of individuation reaches a high point in man - for in him you arrive at a stage where, at least in many cases, individuality seems to account for as much as any generic or specific quality in determining reaction to environment. You may have two brothers brought up under the same conditions, so that they have inherited the same stock, have come under the same influences, and in all respects shared, it would seem, the same experience; yet in front of some sudden challenge, perhaps of danger, their reactions will be totally different.\textsuperscript{15} In this individuation we have personality - the human being has become this individual rather than that.

This individuality is well expressed by Etienne Gilson, in an argument which closely parallels Temple's:

Man is an individual by his body, but he is more than an individual, he is a person. Precisely because the form of his body is an intellect, the relation of soul and body is very different in man from what it is in any other animated being. Animals, even trees, are individuals, and they are such by their bodies, it being impossible that the matter of a certain animal body, or of a tree, should be at the same time numerically the same as that of another animal or another tree. But in their case the force that builds up those bodies spends its whole strength in supporting them. In the case of man, the living principle, before being an organic principle, is an intellect. It is, in fact, an intellect that builds to itself a body, because it needs it for its own intellectual operations. No concepts without
sensations, no sensations without a body; here is why the human intellect has a body and is a soul. Such being the case, there is in man something far above the animating powers of his soul; an intellect which is an original principle of knowledge and of self-determination. Each of us is not only numerically distinct from the others, he is something that is unique in himself, an irreducible value, for which no other possible substitute could be conceived.\(^{16}\)

We note the parallels; but also, I think, the superiority of Temple's method over that of the neo-Thomist Gilson. Temple speaks of experience as observed: the language of 'the force that builds up' or the 'intellect that builds up' is alien to his method: it is certainly difficult to make sense of. For all that, we note the two very different Christian thinkers demonstrating the special nature of the human personality in its individual aspect: as Gilson says, 'Person is not merely individual, it is singular, as having properties or characters not shared by any other member of the same species.'\(^{17}\) Both Temple and Gilson would agree, based on individuality, that personality is the highest degree of reality - Temple does not develop his 'grades of reality' beyond personality. As Aquinas has it, 'Persona significat id quad est perfectissimum in natura.'\(^ {18}\)

Gilson finds the personal character of individuation in self-determination and knowledge: Temple finds it in our attitude to time, in will, in action, in value, and in personal relationships.

For Temple, man has a special nature because of his organisation of time, through the activity of mind and imagination. Purely material things have no sense of time. Vegetable life, while time is important to it, in the sense that 'vegetable life depends upon the order in which these
stages (of development) take place, has no consciousness of time. In the animal, Temple discerns 'some sense, at least, of the significance of time, not having any long view forwards or backwards, but obviously not living wholly in an immediate and momentary present ... There is a rudimentary sense of the movement of time, but there is not enough of this to constitute the opportunity for the formation of anything like a purpose in life.'

It is not necessary to consider whether Temple is correct in this interpretation of animal consciousness, though it is a question which has much exercised philosophers in recent years — like most of his contemporaries, he is little interested in the problem.

In man the 'comprehension of the time process has no parallel at these other levels of existence. First of all, his memory is vastly more capacious and retentive, but still more important is his anticipation and his capacity to form plans to the future, and to make choice between the possible plans that he might form or follow.' Temple frequently refers to the way in which we are able to reorganise time in our minds. We can, in certain respects, escape time altogether: 'in Mathematics we are emancipated from Time by the way of sheer escape; we are free from it because our material, being an object of thought only, is itself non-temporal.' It is true that there is successiveness in our thoughts about mathematics, but the innate nature of mathematical formulae is not itself in any way dependent upon successiveness. For the mind, history is reorganised so that in a special sense it is present: 'The "past" is that which can be inferred from "present" sense-perception. We infer the death of Julius Caesar from documents and other extant forms of evidence. That is truly past. And in ordinary activities, when the mind is not specially stimulated to extend its span, continuity is felt as extending over very short stretches of duration, so that if I am to know what happened five minutes ago it must be by deliberate recollection or by inference, and then what happened five minutes ago is
past. It is not become unreal. It is still present to omniscience, if that exists. It has its place in the real process; but that place is not "now", i.e. within my immediate apprehension. This passage is interesting for several reasons. Firstly, we find again the notion of 'revealed to us': the past has value in relation to us - as we saw in the last chapter - but it also appears that reality is dependent upon the realising mind, and for its persistence upon the appreciating mind of God. Yet again Temple is verging on Berkeley's position on the existence of God. (In his next paragraph, Temple argues 'The conception of an "Eternal Now" - the "moment eternal" - is thus seen to be by no means contradictory. Even in our own limited experience we find illustrations of the principle.)

For Temple, the 'presence' of the 'past' is nowhere more clearly illustrated than in art, for art is in a special way able to provide the sense of permanence (a sense outside time) that - he argues - is indispensable for the satisfaction of mind:

The mind is distressed by the apparent transitoriness of all things. Arising out of flux, and itself in origin an episode out of the flux out of which it arises, mind declares its own nature by demanding permanence. It achieves this in two ways. One is by formulating changeless principles of the constant change of experience - laws which, themselves unchanging, describe the course of change which the various objects of attention follow; this is the method of science. The other is by holding a durational period in a single apprehension so that process becomes a constituent of the non-successive experience achieved. This is the method of Art. It is essential to the drama of Hamlet that the scenes should succeed each other as they do; if all were
played at once, the drama would be destroyed; if their order were altered, it would be another drama. Process, and precisely this process, is indispensable; but this process is a unit, and ideally should be complete in the apprehension of the spectator as a "present" fact.26

It seems to me that Temple is right in this: indeed it is the basis of art that the mind can retain as 'present' that which has gone before. A novel would be quite without meaning if I could only comprehend the word presently before me: I need to retain 'the story so far' for any meaning to exist, and indeed to make the novelist's and my enterprises worthwhile or even possible. And it is also true that science does attempt to make present the principles of change by the construction of laws: if it did not do so, there would be no science - merely a record of instances: 'the generic character of science requires the individuality of things, from which it abstracts in order to make sense of itself.'27 What is not so certain is that in nature there is - as Temple thinks there is - the permanence which mind seeks. I might like there to be unicorns; but no amount of wishing for them will cause them to exist.

As we have seen28, Temple believes that one feature of our sense of time, and organisation of it, is the ability to anticipate and to plan for the future. This, of course, involves will if any plan is to consist in more than mere idle imagination. It follows from this that we find something distinctly human in will - animals, having no sense of future and being - apparently - without imagination (which, as we saw in Chapter Three, is an essential ingredient in will) cannot in a real sense have will: hence, as we saw29, Temple feels that it is 'a bad use' of the word 'will' to apply it to an animal. Though we may properly attribute 'wilfulness' to an animal, we are describing its behaviour, not its state of mind, and we may not properly deem it to have will: as Aquinas would have it, we
are speaking analogically, not univocally. We interpret the animal's behaviour in human terms: it does not, so far as we can tell, consciously plan for the future.

If will is a characteristic of man, we are faced with the traditional philosophical question of free will. Temple has no doubt that we do - as Christians assert - have free will. His argument is worth examining.

* * *

At first sight, Temple's defence of free will appears to be based purely on a verbal analysis, derived from Locke: but closer examination reveals that there is more to his argument:

Will is not a separate entity: the tendency to regard it as such seems to arise from the failure, not of intellect but of imagination, to apprehend activity apart from something which acts; imagination is, of its very nature, always materialistic, and has imposed upon thought an unreal demand for substances which may support attributes and activities. This demand in psychology led to a belief in "faculties" as actually constitutive parts of a substantial soul: and as Purpose is certainly different from any one of our chaotic impulses and ideas, a Will was invented to be the organ of Purpose. It was then asked how this will is determined, and whether it is free. The absurdity of the latter question is sufficiently exposed in Locke's celebrated chapter on "Power", where he points out that it is sensible to ask "Is man free?" or "Has man a will?" - for these mean the same thing; but to ask "Is the will free?" is nonsense, for it only means "Has the power to choose got power to choose?" Locke thus reminds us that the fact before us is Choice; it is actual concrete cases
of choice that we are concerned with; and for the explanation of choice I believe we cannot improve on Aristotle's account of ... the union of Appetition and Intellect.³⁰

Temple is not here resolving the question of whether man has free will, as casual reading of some of his commentators would seem to imply³¹, but asking for a more careful definition of the question, in the form, 'Is man free?'

Temple has no doubt that in a significant sense he is free. He finds the source of this view in the organising power of mind, the way in which it can reshape and reorganise time and has the ability to plan. At a basic level, evidence for this is given in our observation of others: '... two plants will respond quite differently to the same environment, and among the higher animals it becomes impossible to predict how one of them will behave in any given circumstance ... a knowledge of men in general becomes almost a contradiction. We all know how disastrously shallow is the insight of the sort of person who is said to "understand men", and how fallacious is his guidance.'³² Of course, to speak of the unpredictability of others may simply be testament to imperfect knowledge on our part - that we are unable to see the causes of their behaviour.

It appears true that behaviour is caused, that cause, even though internal, is a feature which characterises the nature of choice. It is this internal cause which is taken to imply that we do not have freedom of choice. That we are able to give reasons for choice is taken by some determinists to indicate that our choices are dictated. Anthony Kenny has pointed out the linguistic error involved - the determinist's 'argument rests on the view that when we say that someone did something because he wanted to, the "because" indicates a causal relationship.'³³ The error lies in treating 'cause' and 'reason' as synonyms - which they are not. As Kenny notes:
'there may be a perfectly adequate reason for performing an action and yet the action not ensue, without this fact casting any doubt on the adequacy of the reason.' 34 Kenny continues:

Reasons explain actions that have been performed in the same way as practical reasoning leads to decisions about reasoning about actions that are to be performed. Practical reasoning - reasoning about what to do - differs from theoretical deduction in an important way: to use a convenient technical term borrowed by philosophers from lawyers, practical reasoning is defeasible. That is to say, a conclusion which may be a reasonable one from a given set of premisses may cease to be a reasonable one when further premisses are added ... Because rules of practical inference are defeasible, whereas causal laws are not, reasons cannot be considered as causes. 35

I think Kenny is entirely right in this. Nevertheless, I would add a further consideration which seems to me directly relevant to Temple's consideration of free choice. Philosophers tend to speak of the question of freedom of choice in terms of cause or of reasons. It seems, however, that there are occasions on which it is possible to speak of real choice without reference either to reasons or to causes - choice which is impulsive, yet nonetheless real. When I enter a restaurant and scan the menu, I frequently find it difficult to decide what dish to choose. Certain of my choices have clear reasons. I do not choose any fish dishes, because I dislike fish. But between this or that meat dish, I find rational choice difficult. My appetite tells me nothing about whether to choose Tournedos a la Rossini or a simple grilled steak. I like each equally, and may fancy each equally. I am unmoved by concern about calory content: I know only that I cannot eat both. When
the waiter comes to take my order, I simply name one dish — I make a decision. On any ordinary use of language, I have made a choice — and yet in no sensible way can I cite cause or reason. The only way in which I can say that the choice has been compelled is that I have been compelled to make a choice — the choice itself is uncompelled. And yet I have chosen, and must take the consequences of the undetermined choice. I have had the power to decide, and in the act of decision, I have asserted a freedom of choice — if I could not decide, had no capacity for decision, then it could properly said I had no free choice. In this sense, choice is free, or at least random. Now, it may be that it is this that accounts for the unpredictability of man, that some choices will be inevitably of this decisive, random kind; but that some choices are uncompelled seems to imply that we may speak of others — rational though they may be — as intrinsically uncompelled, because there is a moment of decision when we decide to 'plump' for this option rather than that, and as Kenny has implied, no reason, however logical, forces that moment of decision.

Temple notes this phenomenon: he distinguishes between impulses and real choice. If the determinist position is true, then all decisions are the result of inner impulse; yet it appears that we can control and direct most (I think not all) decisions:

The impulses of human nature all have a place in the economy of the ideal human life, but they can only be made elements in such a life by much effort. If left undisciplined they will not make up a single moral life at all; the man will remain a chaos of impulses; and he cannot himself conduct this discipline at first (though as it moulds him he becomes able to cooperate with it and to conduct it altogether at last), because at first he is just the chaos of impulses. Society educates and disciplines him ...
Real freedom, according to Temple, only exists when we have purpose in life: it is this which gives the personality a standard for relating its ideas, and hence to make an informed choice:

True freedom is not only or chiefly a freedom from external control, but from internal compulsion; it is found, not when a man says, "I did it, and no one else," but when a man says, "I did it, and I am glad I did it, and if opportunity arises I will do it again." Only such a man is really free or really directing his own life. The man who has no purpose in life, or having one yet perpetually acts in direct opposition to itself, is in bondage to a part of himself. 37

Temple distinguishes between freedom and responsibility; we may, though not truly free, nonetheless be held responsible. We may rush 'into an action directly contrary to our general purpose in life, an action that we regret as soon as it is done ... Of course we are responsible for our act, but it is not an act of real freedom.' 38

It would appear that in this sense we are never truly free: and Temple concurs with this: 'in our experience this ideal of perfect self-determination does not exist. Not only do we depend very largely on our environment, but we have not complete control of ourselves. We have no purpose in life wide enough to include the satisfaction of all our impulses and strong enough to check each from undue indulgence.' 39

If this is true, it therefore follows that strictly speaking we never achieve full personality - that quality is, as we shall
see in the next chapter, found only in God. Our task is to bring forth the fullness of personality, which brings true freedom of will. That is why personality is - in Temple's sense - a value, and not simply a factual statement of what we are. Temple does not mean by personality the word as used in ordinary language ('Barbara has a pleasant personality') but strictly in the fullness of personality as a goal towards which we are striving, which in ourselves we are attempting to realise, just as we realise goodness, beauty or truth in ourselves by the act of appreciation. Like these other absolute values, personality becomes actual in ourselves.

We find this actualisation present - albeit incompletely - in our actions. If it is true that 'true freedom manifests itself in constancy and stability of character' then it would appear that character will show itself in its actions. It is clear that Temple believes that this is the case: 'we never know what anything is apart from its activities; we know nothing about substances; we know only actions and reactions.' The individuality of a man is only properly realised by consideration of his functions - hence, in his actions: 'individuality ... is determined by function.' It is in action that free will is most evidently revealed: 'freedom ... is found when a man not only recognises that an action is his own, but when he feels that he has truly expressed his whole nature in it and can wholeheartedly rejoice in it.'

In this we can see similarity with Wojtyla's ideas on man as the acting person. Wojtyla believes that 'only the acting, in which the agent is assumed to be a person ... has moral significance.' The action brings out value.

By our action, value is realised; and there arises the question of personality establishing itself by reference to value. If we have any real choices, our choice of action is likely to be determined by our sense of value - we will tend to choose an
action which most evidently realises the values we have apprehended, and in doing so we move from a merely passive stance to the active one of obligation. As Wojtyla has it: 'in each of his actions the human person is eye-witness of the transition from the "is" to the "should" - the transition from "X is truly good" to "I should do X"'. In this sense of obligation Temple finds another source of personality: man is subject to obligation:

It is, of course, in relation to ... (the) ... making of plans for the future that he becomes a subject of moral obligation. This is because he is aware that upon his choice of this course or that there depend issues affecting far more than himself, and that he is not entitled to make those plans with regard to himself alone. It is in the very act of becoming capable of some comprehension of future time and some present adjustment of his own conduct in relation to it that he also becomes aware that he does not live for himself only, but is under obligation.

The question that arises is whether the sense of obligation is intrinsic to man or whether it is socially conditioned - that it is an artificial acquisition. To consider this will be to continue the discussion begun in the last chapter about whether a sense of value is indeed instinctive to man. If it is true, as both Temple and Wojtyla suggest, that our sense of obligation arises out of our sense of value, then it follows that we can properly connect the two when considering the extent to which these senses inevitably arise from the nature of ourselves as human.

Temple seems in little doubt that obligation is natural and instinctive: 'A man who has a moral sense cannot ignore it; it is part of his nature as much as his instinctive impulses, and to ignore it or defy it is a sure method of failing to achieve
satisfaction. But the moral sense is not deducible from elsewhere. The moral sense seems at least intuitive (as we shall see, Brentano holds that it is intuitive but not instinctive), and is certainly more than simply our acceptance of the norms of our society:

... it is no doubt the case that the content of men's sense of obligation comes to them for the most part out of the tradition in which they have lived. The moral conventions which we accept are supplied to us by the society that has trained us. But that would not account for the sense of obligation in itself in the form in which people do actually feel it. It would account for the sense of a strong pressure upon us to behave in one way or another, but not for our tendency to feel ashamed when we have lived according to one principle, and to approve ourselves when we have lived according to another.

Whether he is correct to find this moral sense intrinsic to our natures, we shall now consider.

2. OBLIGATION AND VALUE - A NATURAL INSTINCT?

Whether there is a natural, intrinsic sense of value and morality is a question of great significance, not only for our discussion of the nature of personality, but for our consideration - in a subsequent chapter - of natural law and natural order. It is not possible within the brief compass of a thesis such as this to review the whole history of natural law theory; we are compelled to curtail discussion to consider largely recent developments and some general considerations, though I hope that this will be enough to indicate whether Temple at least may be correct that - as St. Paul has it of the gentiles - 'what the law requires is written on their
I shall consider three types of evidence—psychological, bio-ethical, and anthropological.

a). Psychological Evidence

The prevailing current of opinion is that moral sense is acquired, rather than being instinctive. Of the earlier generation of psychologists, Brentano is perhaps a good example of those who held that moral sense is acquired even though—as we saw in the last chapter—he held that moral judgment is intuitive. He is certain that no ethical axiom can be a matter of heredity. He argues that no cognitions are hereditary: that all have to be learned by experience:

We can recall to consciousness knowledge which we have acquired during our lifetime in one of three ways.

1. We re-establish the basis for it; or
2. we at least have a clear recollection of having discerned, at an earlier time, grounds for holding it and cherish a reasonable conviction that our judgement is true, even if we do not at present review its basis; or
3. we no longer recall the foundation, but our earlier knowledge inclines us to agree with it, just as dispositions to perform similar acts are built up by habit. We form judgements out of force of habit.

To which of these would a conviction which we have a hereditary disposition to hold be analogous? Not the first, or the second, but the third. But that is as much as to say that it is not a question of cognition. In just the same way, with an equally strong impulse, we could hold what is false to be an a priori truth, as well as what is true; we could
claim, e.g., that ghosts exist. And that even this third case does not occur is to be seen from the fact that not even associations are hereditary. The Chinese have ancestors who have spoken the same language for thousands of years ... but each descendant has to learn it from scratch.

Just as surely as there are no synthetic a priori cognitions, so surely is it impossible for the principles of ethical knowledge to be counted among them.\textsuperscript{50}

All judgments are therefore learned, according to Brentano. It is the justification of ethical and value judgments that is intuitive - but we have still to discern the instinct (if it is such) to make particular judgments.

Brentano is perhaps better known as a philosopher than a psychologist. Nevertheless, his view on the nature of cognition as learned was a commonplace of orthodox psychologists of his time. A similar view of the cognition of ethical judgments may be found in the work of the English psychologist, Spearman: 'With regard to the biological "environment", the "situations" and the stimuli of a man - as also his more philosophically pointed "private universes" - these (in so far as psychological) really consist in nothing else than portions of his cognitive field.'\textsuperscript{51} (Interestingly, Spearman was deeply influenced by Idealist philosophy: one of the subjects which he considers, from a psychological point of view - but with language similar to that of his philosophical contemporaries - is the whole question of the subject-object relationship.\textsuperscript{52})

Today's orthodoxy is most clearly represented in the work of Piaget. For Piaget, morality is essentially the product of socialisation: from respect for adult restraint, the child learns the morality of heteronomy; from mutual respect with his
peers, he learns the morality of autonomy. Both are intrinsically social. Piaget claims that the child begins life in a state of 'anomy' - a stage in which he is unconstrained by rules; it is only in growth, learning through intercourse with others, that he develops autonomy in his judgments. This is a consequence of reciprocity, the idea that goodness is strictly fairness. So, therefore, the child develops rudimentary moral values: he finds, for instance, that deception destroys mutual trust, or that offensive behaviour harms co-operation: support for his growing moral sense is given by the social relations in which he - inevitably - finds himself. (Piaget's notion of reciprocity has been considered by some commentators too broad a definition: but this need not detain us here.)

Whether it is true that - as Piaget claims - the child does, by an 'almost automatic process' achieve true moral autonomy through his social relations, I tend to doubt. Piaget seems to feel that in the process of growth reciprocity - the idea that 'if I do this to you, you will do it to me' - will naturally mature into a universal morality of love and forgiveness, self-directed. (In fairness to Piaget, it should be noted that his investigations are little concerned with the question of the autonomous adolescent: his observations are largely confined to younger age groups.) It appears, as far as I can tell, that many people never achieve real moral autonomy: adults will give as reasons for acting - or refraining from action - such explanations as 'it is against the law', 'I will get into trouble if I am found out', or 'how would I like it if he did that to me' (simple reciprocity) - reasons which are quite consonant with childish notions of adult constraint, unfairness, fear of losing esteem, and hardly at all with universal morality. Temple seems - in his psychologically unsophisticated way - much closer than Piaget to reflecting the real world in his insistence that full autonomy is rarely if ever reached - that fullness of personality is a goal, a value, to be striven for.
There are, of course, other defects in Piaget's arguments. Various studies (e.g. The Character Education Enquiry, Adolescent Character and Personality) have demonstrated empirically that Piaget takes too little account of the variety in children's moral development, the differences caused by variations in intelligence, social class and sex differences, and his idea of a stimulus-response pattern of learning tends not to explain such things as the behaviour of the anti-social child or the phenomenon of the child who rises morally above his peers, nor indeed the frequently growing complexity of interpersonal relationships with parents. (In the move towards autonomy one would, on Piaget's analysis, expect children to drift away from parents.)

Nevertheless, I think Piaget is broadly right to emphasise the social aspect of the growth of morality. Temple insisted - as we shall see in the next section - that the personality only develops and has meaning in the context of community. The sense of morality develops most evidently in a society, and it is noteworthy that a child develops a high level of positive social relations - and maintains these - before even the development of personal play, the spirit of co-operation or the social use of material.

Support for this purely social nature of moral development can be found in consideration of the so-called 'feral child'. Attested cases of feral children - children who are exposed or lost in infancy and who are reared by animals (like Romulus and Remus) - show them to be wholly bestialised; but this is merely to emphasise (perhaps) that the human capacity for a moral sense needs to be developed by society; but that what is intrinsic is not so much a moral sense as a capacity for moral sense: to this extent, Bull's assertion that such a child 'remains an animal' is untrue if we hold that humans have - innately (under normal circumstances) - a capacity for moral judgment. The truth is perhaps not that a sense of morals is
unborn, but that moral capacity is - as Bull says: 'Both heredity and environment are involved in the process of moral development'; heredity only by virtue of providing the moral capacity. Actual morality is, at least initially, a process of socialisation - feral children seem quickly to adapt.

However, recent research, particularly in the United States, has suggested that the orthodox view - represented by Piaget - that the child has no innate moral sense may be profoundly mistaken. Signs of altruism have been noted in children as young as two days old. Martin Hoffman found that two-day-old infants in hospital often become more agitated and cry more loudly when other children are crying than they do when they hear other loud sounds. Various other observations by the American National Institute of Mental Health show remarkable results: data shows that 'children have a capacity for compassion and for various kinds of prosocial behaviour from at least the age of one.' Some sociobiologists suggest that there may be a genetic cause for this phenomenon: after all, altruism brings, from the evolutionary point of view, advantages to one's genetic line. Nevertheless, one scientist suggests that the right conditions have to be present for empathy properly to develop - this would be consistent with the view that moral capacity is inborn, though the evidence of the crying babies suggests that the mere presence of other people may be sufficient condition. If that is true, it is difficult to see, on a traditional stimulus-response basis, how the mere presence of others constitutes sufficient stimulus for the responses elicited.

The idea that the sense of morals may have a genetic basis has been given a further stimulus by consideration of the psychopathic personality. The complete psychopath is a moral imbecile without moral control of any sort (I am speaking of the total psychopath - not merely a subject with psychopathic tendencies), entirely at the mercy of impulse. Two suggestions
about the state bear on our discussion: some researchers believe that the psychopath is due to a defect in the central nervous system that prevents any form of conditioning - the capacity for moral sense is simply not present. Other research traces this defect to genetic abnormality - an idea which is consistent with the evolutionary need for altruism, as societies reject and not infrequently attempt to destroy the psychopath as profoundly threatening to their own continuing existence.

We have come, therefore, to the question of a genetic source for an innate sense of morality - to the considerations of bio-ethics.

(b). The Evidence of Bio-ethics

Recently, much attention has been given, by biologists and others, to the question of a biological basis for ethics. Findings - so far - are tentative: more concrete evidence is still needed. If the case is proven, the consequences for ethical philosophy will be profound, not least in the resurgence of natural law theory. I am not yet convinced that the case has been so proven, and therefore I raise points with caution.

One of the principal figures in the development of sociobiology is Edward O. Wilson. He believes that the main task of contemporary philosophy is to come to terms with the genetic structures of human life:

... innate censors and motivators exist in the brain that deeply and unconsciously affect our ethical premises; from these roots, morality evolved as instinct. If that perception is correct, science may soon be in a position to investigate the very origin and meaning of human values, from which all ethical
pronouncements and much of political practice flow. Philosophers themselves, most of whom lack an evolutionary perspective, have not devoted much time to the problem. They examine the precepts of ethical systems with reference to their consequences and not to their origins. Like everyone else, philosophers measure their personal emotional responses to various alternatives as though consulting a hidden oracle. That oracle resides in the deep emotional centres of the brain, most probably within the limbic system, a complex array of neurous and hormone-secreting cells located just beneath the "thinking" portion of the cerebral cortex. Human emotional responses and the more general practices based on them have been programmed to a substantial degree by natural selection over thousands of generations. The challenge to science is to measure the tightness of the constraints caused by the programming, to find their source in the brain, and to decode their significance through the reconstruction of the evolutionary history of the mind ... Success will generate ... the dilemma, which can be stated as follows: Which of the censors and motivators should be obeyed and which ones might better be curtailed or sublimated.64

Many consequences flow from Wilson's hypothesis. Firstly, if he is correct in placing the cause of moral sense in genetic and evolutionary factors, there would be no ground for the theist's view that moral sense 'reveals' the personality of God, or must be - somehow - planted by God. A naturalist explanation of this kind restricts argument about God to the question of his existence as ground of being. (Evolution of itself does not rule out ground-of-being or first cause arguments. To say that something happened very slowly rather than - in the Genesis story - very quickly does not explain that it happened at all.)
Secondly, the consequences of a purely genetic basis for morality opens up (frightening?) possibilities for future genetic engineering. Thirdly, as Hefner has pointed out⁶⁵, the findings of sociobiology point towards a possible solution to the traditional is/ought problem. Fourthly, as Wilson himself notes, merely to show the mechanics of the instinctive emotions of the mind does not enable us to determine precisely how we should behave. For instance, instincts towards aggressive and violent behaviour, necessary though these may be in primitive stages of the struggle for survival need to be consciously curtailed for the continuing evolution of civilisation. What was once useful may no longer be so - and the social pressure of necessity gives support to our attempts to control violent tendencies. This view is consistent with Teilhard de Chardin's evolutionary account of how, through the development of consciousness (noogenesis), man is able consciously to shape the future growth of evolution. It also brings into sharp focus the value of Temple's insistence on the need for real autonomy - the point at which we so control our actions that we can say 'I did it, and I am glad I did it, and if opportunity arises I will do it again.'⁶⁶

To say that moral sense is instinctive, that it is conditioned by evolutionary requirements of survival, may seem to imply that any morality will be ultimately egoistic - I do this that I may survive. This would seem to rule out any altruism, which some philosophers have considered an essential part of true morality. But a pure egoism implies that any 'morality' will be based purely on an ethics of reciprocity. I have suggested, when considering psychological evidence, that there may be an evolutionary requirement for altruism. It is now time to take this argument a little further.

In a recent and most suggestive work⁶⁷, Professor Singer has given several striking examples of how altruism is an aid to evolution and survival. I give one example in full:

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Suppose two early humans are attacked by a sabretooth cat. If both flee, one will be picked off by the cat; if both stand their ground, there is a very good chance that they can fight the cat off; if one flees and the other stands and fights, the fugitive will escape and the fighter will be killed ... From the self-interested point of view, if your partner flees your chances of survival are better if you flee too (you have a 50 percent chance rather than none at all) and if your partner stands and fights you still do better to run (you are sure of escape if you flee, whereas it is only probable, not certain, that together you and your partner can overcome the cat). So two purely self-interested early humans would flee, and one of them would die. Two early humans who cared for each other, however, would stand and fight, and most likely neither would die. Let us say, just to be able to put a figure on it, that two humans cooperating can defeat a sabretooth cat on nine out of every ten occasions and on the tenth occasion the cat kills one of them. Let us also say that when a sabretooth cat pursues two fleeing humans it always catches one of them, and which one it catches is entirely random, since differences in human running speed are negligible in comparison to the speed of a cat. Then one of a pair of purely self-interested humans would not, on average, last more than a single encounter with a sabretooth cat; but one of a pair of altruistic humans would on average survive ten such encounters.

If situations analogous to this imaginary sabretooth cat attack were common, early humans would do better hunting with altruistic comrades than with self-interested partners. Of course, an egoist who could find an altruist to go hunting with him would do
better still; but altruists who could not detect—and refuse to assist—purely self-interested partners would be selected against. Evolution would therefore favour those who are genuinely altruistic to other altruists, but are not altruistic to those who seek to take advantage of their altruism.68

Singer notes that an alternative explanation to altruism in this example could be an innate sense that it is wrong to desert a partner in times of danger69, but that is again to give an essentially moral account of an evolutionarily valuable sense of self-preservation.

Support for the view that an innate sense of altruism is helpful for evolutionary purposes may be drawn from considerations of animal behaviour. It is well known that blackbirds and thrushes give warning calls when hawks fly overhead; such calls doubtless decrease the chances of the caller's survival because they serve to give away his own position. A much-quoted example concerns Thomson's gazelles, small antelope hunted in Africa by packs of dogs. When a gazelle notices a dog-pack, it bounds away in a stiff-legged gait called 'stotting', which acts as a warning signal to the rest of the herd. This happens whenever a gazelle is attacked, and only at the last moment will the singled-out gazelle stretch to its full running stride (faster than a dog's). In this, there is no advantage to the individual gazelle—it risks its own life for the sake of the herd. This is surely altruism of an instinctive kind, making evolutionary sense only in the context of survival of the species.

There is, it appears, a significantly communal aspect to any innate morality: from these brief examples it seems that instinct—in the evolutionary sense—is geared to the preservation of the species, rather than simply to the survival of the individual. Similar altruism is apparent in human
behaviour. Self-sacrifice in war has been a commonplace of history: people from the three hundred Spartans under Leonidas at Thermopylae to the American heroes of the Alamo, or the kamikaze pilots of Japan in 1945 have willingly sacrificed themselves to ensure the continued survival of their communities. Individual acts of heroism - like that of Captain Oates - tell a similar story. This sense of altruism - if instinctive - coheres with Temple's ideas about the personality in community, which will shortly be developed.

The significance of bio-ethics and sociobiology is not yet fully apparent. For the moment, I am happy to concur with Singer's appraisal:

> When well-grounded theories are relevant to an ethical decision, they should be taken into account. The particular moral judgments that we end up making may reflect these theories. For this reason it is perfectly true that philosophers, along with everyone else, should know something about the current state of biological theories of human nature. To ignore biology is to ignore one possible source of knowledge relevant to ethical decisions.

> There is, however, no justification here for dramatic claims about explaining ethics "at all depths" or fashioning a biology of ethics which will do away with the need for ethical philosophers. Even if we should uncritically accept the sociobiological view of human nature in its entirety, the new facts we would have learned would affect ethics only at a relatively superficial level. The central question of ethics, the nature and justification of fundamental ethical values, would remain the same. 71
The significant point, I think, is that bio-ethics enables us to see the possibility of the hereditary nature of much of the moral sense - it points beyond mere social conditioning to other possibilities. It also serves as a caution: it reminds us of the way in which our minds are rooted in - and are not apart from - nature. As Hefner remarks, 'biological, psychological, and sociological facts about the human evaluator and the environment are relevant to the evaluative judgment. The human evaluator is part of the world, not alienated from it.' The tendency to treat the appreciating mind, the soul, as somehow sui generis, disembodied from the world has been a persistent and lamentable error in Christian thinking, an unfortunate consequence of Platonism. The attitude persists, despite frequent condemnations, by, for instance, the Councils of Brega (561), Constantinople (869-870) and Vienna (1311-1312). At the latter, the Council fathers declared, 'we define that from now on whoever shall presume to assert, defend, or obstinately hold that the rational or intellectual soul is not in itself and essentially the form of the human body, is to be censured as a heretic.' As we have seen, Temple emphasised the rootedness of the mind in the world: he speaks of the mind 'arising out of flux, and itself in origin an episode out of the flux out of which it arises.' There is nothing in bio-ethics fundamentally inconsistent with his views.

(c). Anthropological Evidence

Irenaeus (c.130-200) spoke of an innate sense of morality: as a Christian thinker, he nevertheless recognises the existence of 'the law of nature, by which the natural man is justified, which, even before the giving of the Law, was kept by those who were justified by faith and pleased God'. In a subsequent chapter, we shall consider whether there is indeed an intrinsic sense of a natural law, though as we have seen, the so far sketchy evidence of bio-ethics seems to point in that direction. In the last fifty years, increasing study of
anthropology in particular the study of primitive groups, seems to point to the presence of an innate moral sense.

Certain common features of primitive tribes stand out. Firstly, the unit of the family seems common to all societies. As Philip Ekka has noted:

No totally promiscuous society has yet been discovered in the world. The Eskimo who have the custom of lending their wives on occasions to guests and friends, and the Shoshoneans who permit their wives sexual relations with tribal members other than the husbands when these are away hunting, are both basically monogamous people.

The Masai and the Chagga, both African tribes, recognise the family as a social unit, but they also allow their younger class of adult men dedicated to warlike activities in regimental organisations to have promiscuous relations with the younger class of adult girls. After their marriage, they settle down to regular family life.77

From a purely evolutionary point of view, the maintenance of the family unity makes evident sense. It serves to provide a source of maintaining the fabric of society. As Singer notes, 'When families see that the children are fed, kept clean and sheltered, that the sick are nursed and the elderly cared for, they are led by bonds of natural affection to do what would otherwise fall on the community itself and either would not be done at all or would require labour unmotivated by natural impulses ... Given the much greater intensity of family feeling compared with the degree of concern we have for the welfare of strangers, ethical rules which accept a degree of partiality toward the interests of ones own family may be the best means of promoting the welfare of all families, and thus of the
entire community. 78 This sense of the fundamental significance of the family is reflected in the failure of modern attempts to avoid the apparent limitations of the family unit. Two significant examples - one from Israel, the other from the Soviet Union - will suffice. In the early years of the kibbutz movement in Palestine, an attempt was made to make the family unit entirely subordinate to the community. For children, the kibbutz provided nurses, teachers, and meals and entertainment, all on a communal basis. Children were encouraged to call their parents by name. This system was devised to produce a deeper sense of community, particularly at a time when Israel felt under threat from surrounding Arab states. The underlying reason for this has been stated by Yonina Talmon: 'Family ties are based on an exclusive and discriminating loyalty which sets the members of one's family more or less apart from others. Families may easily become competing foci of emotional involvement that can infringe on loyalty to the collective. Deep attachment to one's spouse and children ... may gain precedence over the more ideological and more task-orientated relations with comrades.' 79 This system has largely broken down, and the family unit has reasserted itself. Families spend more time as units, children frequently sleep in the family unit rather than in the children's house, and meals are often taken in the family unit rather then in the communal dining halls. Part of the reason for this may be the traditionally strong Jewish sense of family reasserting itself; but much more, I think, is the innate sense of family kinship. Evidence for this is strengthened by consideration of the Soviet experience. In the years following the 1917 revolution attempts were made to break down the traditionally strong sense of family by a regime encouraging free-love. This quickly broke down, and traditional patterns reasserted themselves, with many traditional features. 80 Attitudes towards the nature of marriage are almost unchanged since pre-revolutionary days. 81 As Geiger says: 'the record suggests that many in the population have found the ideal marriage pattern both desirable
and attainable. Attempts to break down the family unit on ideological grounds in the Peoples Republic of China have proved similarly ill-fated.

If it is true, on evolutionary grounds, that the instinct for family life is necessary for survival, it follows that we will be able to discern a consistent nexus of ethical rules which will lend to the preservation of the family against intrusion, and to regulate its internal structure. One obvious example of such rules is the universal prohibition on incest: Levi-Strauss notes:

What remains true is that every society, past or present, proclaims that if the husband-wife relationship ... implies sexual rights, there are other relationships equally derived from the familial structure, which made sexual connections inconceivable, sinful, or legally punishable.

The universal prohibition of incest specifies, as a general rule, that people considered as parents and children, or brother and sister, even if only by name, cannot have sexual relations and even less marry each other. In some recorded instances - such as ancient Egypt, pre-Columbian Peru, also some African, Southeast Asian, and Polynesian kingdoms - incest was defined far less strictly than elsewhere. Even there, however, the rule existed since incest was limited to a minority group, the ruling class ...; on the other hand, not every kind of close relatives were permitted as spouse: for instance, it was the half-sister, the full being excluded; or, if the full sister was allowed, then it should be the elder sister, the younger one being excluded.

Leslie Paul suggests that incest is the supreme taboo, and indeed forms man's first moral absolute:
No matter to what primitive people one turns, incest meets with horrified condemnation and is held to merit exile or death. It provokes an emotional shock far greater than ... murder. And in people after people we find that the most elaborate social institutions have come into being to render intentional incest so manifest and culpable that it can be detected and punished with the greatest of ease. Clans and subclans, totemic groups and marriage groups, and similar social institutions ... mark firmly and publicly the groups tabooed to each other and do so with a force greater that any law as we understand it in the west. Even so, they are seldom ... sufficient to overcome incestuous desires. They are invariably discovered side by side with a most rigid etiquette which cuts the contacts between brothers and sisters to a minimum, and ensures that such a minimum is conducted in the public view.85

The ban on incest seems universal and apparently instinctive. Yet, if it is an instinct it is difficult to account for. No parallel instinct seems to exist in the animal kingdom. While it is possible to argue that inbreeding does indeed damage a family (witness the instances of haemophilia in the Imperial Russian Royal Family), this seems insufficient reason for the basis of an instinct: the knowledge of damage is a scientific rather than an intrinsic instinctive one, and such scientific knowledge would not be available to a primitive society. The ban on incest makes sense only within the context of a prior, social sense of family; and it is that prior social sense which is - or may be - innate.

It seems that anthropological evidence of an innate moral sense is only reasonable if it can be shown to be universally the case, in all societies. If it were possible to demonstrate that there existed a tribe without such a sense, with no
concern for family, then it would not be possible to posit an innate sense of morality - it would follow that any such sense must be social. In recent years, since the publication of Colin Turnbull's *The Mountain People*, there has been much debate among anthropologists about the Ik, a tribe from Northern Uganda. Following the turning of their traditional hunting grounds into a national park, and a period of famine, the Ik were forced to become farmers in an arid mountain area. According to Turnbull, Ik society collapsed in consequence. Parents turned out three year old children to fend for themselves, the old and the sick were mocked, it was considered foolishness to help another. Turnbull's book has been thoroughly criticised for subjectivity, and anthropologists have suggested other interpretation of the phenomena than the total abandonment of values. Even if we take Turnbull's analysis as correct as an account of Ik life, it is evident that certain taboos remain. The Ik do not kill each other, nor do they resort to cannibalism, which one would expect if it were true that all moral inhibition had disappeared. (There have been well-publicised cases of cannibalism among western people under the strain of hunger, and the Ik have known severe famine.) Although the Ik appear to have lost all conventional morality - including the taboo on incest - they do seem to have some minimal (if to us unacceptable) moral code. Further, as the Ik previously had a severe moral code (e.g. adulterers were burned) the phenomenon is a breakdown of moral sense, and not an example of a society which never had such a sense. As it is possible to conceive of an individual choosing to ignore other instincts (a hermit scorning the instinct of gregariousness, a hunger-striker ignoring the instinct for food), so it is possible to ignore a moral instinct - as, for instance, concentration camp attendants have done, though we consider this brutalisation. And if this ignoring can be done by an individual, it can be done by a community. That a hunger-striker refuses food does not mean that there is no instinct for food: we speak of self-will overriding instincts. Having
an instinct does not mean that it will always be followed, or that if we see someone not follow an instinct, that the instinct therefore does not exist. If so basic an instinct as that for food can be ignored, so, I think, can any other. Just as I can say that my life is insignificant and I can starve myself to death for a cause, and do, so too I can perceive my moral instincts as pointless (as the Ik appear to do) in the face of famine, and choose not to follow them. This seems to be the case with the Ik. Turnbull shows how the Ik laugh at moral injunctions; if these were without meaning, one would simply expect them to be ignored. It seems impossible to use the Ik to demonstrate a lack of innate moral sense, though their apparent perversity still requires explanation. Other groups in similar circumstances have maintained moral integrity.

* * *

It is, I think, possible to produce certain broad - if tentative conclusions from this very brief review of the evidence, conclusions which will lead us on to consider Temple's sense of community.

It seems at least probable that there is an innate capacity for morality even if not an innate sense of moral requirements. However, this is not to prove the theistic thesis in the way that Trethowan seems to think it does. It does not follow from a sense of morality that this sense is God-given. As we have seen, a purely secular evolutionary account of its cause can be given, without reference to God. Just as the fact of evolution is philosophically neutral as a proof or disproof of God, so is any moral capacity grounded in a moral sense which is itself a fact of evolution. If it is possible - as I think - to base a natural law approach on the fact of innate moral sense, such a natural law theory can be built up without reference to theological presuppositions.
That such a theory can be built up appears however to involve the traditional fact/value, is/ought problem, that it seems formally impossible to derive an actual rule of moral conduct, or a value, from a mere statement of the facts. I wish to indicate here one possible way of avoiding this problem, compatible with Temple's thought. Hefner suggests a possible way forward based on bio-ethics:

The sociobiological interpretations of life suggest that our very existence takes place within the institution of evolution, governed by the dynamics of natural selection ... One does not have to make a decision to "evolve" in order to live. One does not decide to set the genetic dynamics in motion in order to live. It is not legitimate to hold a person accountable for his or her genes' following the laws of natural selection on the grounds that the person accepted that accountability in the act of existing. Rather, the very occurrence of genes entails development according to the dynamics of evolution and natural selection. Therefore, survival is a value, in some sense, that is embodied in the evolutionary institution in which we all live. All ... values could be said, likewise, to be institutional facts.89

Following some hints of Kotarbinski, I think it possible to show this point clearly by an illustration from language. If we consider two sentences 'He is hungry', 'He ought to eat', we find an apparently straightforward transition from 'is' to 'ought' - the natural way to conquer hunger is to eat. The second sentence can be recast in 'is' form: 'The way not to be hungry is to eat', thus avoiding 'ought'. It is argued that the moral 'ought' is different from the 'natural 'ought'. However, if it is true that moral sense is a natural, genetic, evolutionary need just as eating is, it will follow that a
similar transition is possible, provided that the subject is a person. This is a difficult idea, which I shall try to clarify. If I say 'Life is pleasant. Therefore I ought to avoid suicide.', it is clear that there is no formal logical link from 'is' to 'ought', from the particular status of the first sentence. But, if I personalise the ideas, I can avoid the transition, either by removing the 'is', or by removing the 'ought'. Thus I may say 'life-enjoying I ought to avoid suicide', awkward though it might sound. The 'I' of personal identity is inseparable from the life-enjoying 'I' - I am not I, but someone else, without that life-enjoying capacity; and it naturally follows from the particular 'I' that I am when I utter the sentences not only that I ought not to commit suicide (which is how I might verbalise it) but that so long as I am the "I" that I am, I will not commit suicide (thus avoiding the 'ought'). It is true that tomorrow I may no longer enjoy life; but the non-life-enjoying "I" is not the 'I' of whom I spoke when I said 'Life-enjoying I ought not to commit suicide.' Now, this example is based on the 'I' of mood - sometimes I enjoy life, at other times I do not. But the I of the evolutionary process remains; the genetic, evolutionary 'I' is never not genetic or evolutionary; and all 'oughts' that pertain to that part of me remain. What these 'oughts' are is more difficult to say, though I suggest that they are those I find natural to protect my own survival and that of my species. Indeed the cast of mind that leads me to 'ought' is natural and instinctive.

A further consideration enables us to deepen our understanding of the personal 'ought'. There is a feature of uttering an 'ought' sentence which is concealed by the conventions of grammar. In the sentence 'I ought to give alms to the poor', the utterance, grammatically speaking, is present tense; but the act of giving alms must inevitably be future from the utterance, even though it may be a future act only by a matter of seconds. Thus, even if I say 'I ought to do this now', that apparently present 'now' in fact refers to the future: the time
may be only instants in the future. There is therefore a
temporal gap between utterance and the doing (or not doing) of
the act referred to in the utterance. I shall call the time of
the utterance \( t_1 \), the time of the act, \( t_2 \) - this refers to the
indefinitely future time in which I will (or will not) be
performing the act.

It follows that if at \( t_1 \) I say 'I ought to give alms to the
poor', at \( t_2 \) either it is true that I am giving alms to the
poor or it is not true that I am giving alms to the poor. Thus,
at \( t_2 \), any utterance about what I am doing is straightforwardly
cognitive - it is a statement in the 'is' form. The 'ought' at
\( t_2 \) has disappeared. If at \( t_2 \) I am not giving alms to the poor,
and still I ought to, the points made about \( t_2 \) still apply to a
future \( t_3 \).

So, by \( t_2 \), ought has disappeared. What therefore is the status
of 'I ought to give alms to the poor' at \( t_1 \)? It is, I suggest,
a straightforwardly factual statement of preference for a given
state of affairs at \( t_2 \). At \( t_1 \) I am saying 'I wish to see x (my
almsgiving) at \( t_2 \).' It is not necessary to specify the nature
of preference, whether it is for reasons of my pleasure, duty,
greatest good of the greatest number or whatever: it is a datum
of human nature that we have a capacity for preference; the
reasons for the preference may not be determinable or even open
to argument (Temple's 'To every man his own sense of value is
final,' may be recalled). Here we return to human nature, to
the 'I' which says 'I ought to give alms to the poor.' The
whole complex, evolving, conscious 'I' has the innate capacity
of imagination - the ability to stand at \( t_1 \) and to foresee, to
plan, a possible scenario for \( t_2 \), even to the extent of being
able to foresee alternative possible scenarios: 'I ought to do
x (at \( t_2 \)) but I know (i.e. foresee) that I will not'. Indeed,
without the faculty of imagination, without the ability to
foresee, the word 'ought' would become meaningless.
In this interpretation of 'ought', we are at one with Temple both in his stress on the role of imagination in the act of willing and in his notions of mind as able to reshape experiences, to make past events present and to imagine the future. Nowhere is this clearer than in the statement, about a past event, 'I ought to have done x'. In retrospect, we can imagine the consequences of having done 'x' rather than 'y' - we can imagine a state of affairs - at a time subsequent to the original decision - different from that which did obtain: we can imagine a scenario different from that which was.

By forethought and by hindsight it is thus possible in a human context to see a way in which a $t_1$ is a $t_2$ statement of fact. Certain further remarks need to be made. There is in common usage a mode of speaking which seems to imply a present 'ought' - people say, 'I am doing what I ought to be doing'. The difficulty is more apparent than real; the utterance is made at $t_2$, but the 'ought' refers to the prior sense of rightness of the preference at a preceding $t_1$, because it is only in relation to a previous sense (even immediately previous) that one can now utter 'This is what I ought to be doing'.

I have insisted that this analysis only applies to the personal use of 'ought'. I would argue further that 'ought' only makes sense in a personal context. Even when we use it to present an apparently non-personal idea, 'Life ought to be enjoyed', 'Beauty ought to be appreciated', it is evident that there is an underlying personal element - 'you/people/I/we/he/she ought to enjoy life/appreciate beauty': one is asking oneself or others to contemplate the advantages of a future scenario in which life is enjoyed or beauty appreciated. Similarly, to say 'those stones ought to be bigger' is to say among other things - 'to build a wall (say) I need bigger stones' (a statement of fact). It is the merest nonsense to say 'those stones ought to be bigger' meaning 'you stones - grow!' Having no
consciousness, stones cannot foresee growth, let alone grow. Such a use is empty.

Given the evolved fact of the human mind, with imagination and foresight, the development of an idea of 'ought' seems to me inevitable. Because we can imagine alternative futures, we find - for whatever reason, whether heredity, survival instinct or conscious appraisal - that we prefer this vision of personal future to that; and we express that preference by the term 'ought', referring to the kind of action that we believe or know will lead us to achieve that preferred future. We may not take that action, through lethargy, temptation, or whatever; the recognition of the possibility of the action is enough for us to say 'I ought to to do that'. It is a psychological fact that our minds can foresee a future scenario; and that, in a psychological if not strictly logical way, leads from 'is' to 'ought'. But this is only possible if we introduce into our argument the aspects of present and future time: strict logicians, concerned with the timelessness of their formulae, rarely introduce time.

This discussion of the is/ought question naturally bears on thought about the fact/value problem. If it is natural for the mind to think in terms of 'ought' when considering possible alternative futures, so too it is natural to consider the proposed option as valued. Indeed, it is almost tautological to speak in this way - the statement of value is a statement of preference. When I say 'I ought to do x', I am saying 'I value x more', x being a course of action. Likewise of other values: to say of a beautiful object, 'y is valuable' is a straightforward statement of preference. And because we can conceive of alternatives, and indeed may be able to perceive actual alternatives and hold both y and the alternative within the mind's eye simultaneously (or nearly so), it is possible to express our preference by speaking of the value of it. Nor is this to fall into a narrow subjectivism; we can express
(normally) reasons for preference, and the experience of an object can be shared, though it will not be identical for all observers. Thus, for instance, all who see the Mona Lisa may share a sense of its beauty, and hence value it; though each observer (for reasons of heredity, upbringing and so on) will have his own reasons for finding the painting beautiful, each perception being subtly different. (Pure subjectivism, it appears, tends to concentrate on the difference between observers rather than on what they have in common, and to give too little weight to the discourse between observers, which itself leads to a deepening of individual perception. I shall return to this subject when considering Temple's views on education.). It is true of course that sometimes we cannot state reasons for preference; but it is nevertheless also true that in our discourse we distinguish between preferences for which we can give reasons ('I like x because...') and those for which we cannot ('I don't know why I like x, but I do'). However, even in the latter case, when we cannot express our reasons in works, it is reasonable to assume that there is some kind of innate reason, though we find it inexpressible. Even without reasons, it remains a fact that it is our preference. (See Section 1, above)

A word of caution. I have not attempted to derive 'ought' from 'is' or 'value' from 'fact': I have rather tried to show that it is because of the structure of human nature a transition from 'is' to 'ought', 'fact' to 'value' is natural; that one can be expressed in terms of the other. I do not pretend that this is a strictly logical procedure - merely that it is an inevitable one.

To speak of the is/ought problem in terms of preference is to return to the heart of the human personality, to the way we are as products of heredity, socialisation, and environment. As Temple says, 'my likes and dislikes are not free; they are fixed by my heredity, training and circumstance'.
3. **PERSONALITY IN COMMUNITY**

For Temple, the meaning of personality is realised fully—indeed, in any significant sense, only—in the activity of personality in relationship with other persons: personality is realised fully only in community. He expresses this view forcefully: 'The isolated individual may be wise or foolish; he cannot be moral or immoral. An atheistic debauchee upon a desert island is not liable to moral censure.'

There is a characteristic exaggeration here; it may properly be asked whether there are nonetheless duties to self—the term 'debauchee' implies improper neglect of duties to self: the term implies censure, as if the foolishness of debauchery were a matter of moral regret. Even so, Temple's general point seems credible: it is clear that without others to be the subject of consideration, any moral growth or fullness is impossible. Nor is this true only of moral development: other talents are dependent on relationship with others—communication, whether in art or any form, is so by definition. Temple's point is that only in relation to others can we judge rightly moral action. I further suggest that this insight provides another key in the attempt to make some sense of the is/ought problem. If my suggestion that 'ought' is an expression of preference for a particular future 'is' is justifiable, there remains the problem of determining a reason for preferring this state of affairs to that. If no such key is available, there remains only a crude emotivism, with attempts to justify one feeling as somehow 'better' than another, or more 'appropriate' than another, with the attendant suggestion that society's pursuit of a 'criminal' is no more than the majority attempting to impose on the fugitive its feeling of appropriateness of conduct. For a Christian, like Temple, this cannot be acceptable—he is obliged to discover objective criteria, which he finds in the value of personality.
This value of personality is, as already hinted, found in the personality operating within the community. Temple speaks categorically of man: 'his destiny is fulfilled in the achievement of two unities, unity of individual personality and unity of universal fellowship.' The need for both unities, Temple believes, is both epistemological and moral: we can fully perceive only in community, and our moral impulses can be fully developed only in community.

A. THE CARTESIAN ERROR

Temple emphasises the limitations of the individual mind. His rejection of Cartesianism, which we shall now explore in further detail, is frequently repeated and specific: 'It has been the habit, and ... the besetting sin, of philosophy to take cognition as the initial form of apprehension, and to seek, by such expedients as may be available, to evolve the other forms of apprehension, such as appreciation, from this. That is the source of the Cartesian error, though indeed it is much older than Descartes.' The Cartesian error lay in mistaking the nature of knowledge: 'the inherent error of its initial assumption that in knowledge the mind begins with itself and proceeds to the apprehension of the external world by way of construction and inference.' From the error, various consequences follow. In politics one consequence of the implied individualism was the growth of nationalism: 'In the sphere of Politics, the unmitigated assertion of national independence led to the fuller development of the various national types, with consequent enrichment of the art and literature of the world, and to local experiments of universal value in the making of constitutions and in the relations between political and social life. But it also led through various instances of national self-assertion to the international Hell or Bedlam of the years 1914 to 1918.' Nor was religion free from the 'infection' of excessive individualism: in the face of war, 'the check which it might
have been hoped that Religion would exercise could not be applied, for Religion also had become departmentalised, and was by most people regarded as a "private affair between a man and his Maker," so that its main if not its only concern was with personal piety.\textsuperscript{98} Art likewise has suffered from the individualism which has followed from the Cartesian habits of mind: 'the formula "Art for Art's sake" in which the movement of emancipation eventually found expression, is an exaggeration as false and pernicious as the contrary error. It expresses a complete detachment of Art from all other interests or modes of experience so that artists, under its impulse, are liable to become engrossed in self-expression without any enquiry whether they have a self which is worthy, or even fit, to be expressed.'\textsuperscript{99}

Temple's comments are, in one sense, part of the common currency of intellectual history: the growth of individualism since the Renaissance, and its effects, have been well-documented - as Temple has it, 'the chief characteristic of the modern or post-Reformation period has been departmentalisation. The great enterprise of all-inclusive unity, which was characteristic of the Middle Ages, was progressively abandoned.'\textsuperscript{100} What is notable is not the historical point, but the vehemence with which it is expressed: he refers to 'the principle of departmentalisation which finds its grossest expression in the formula "Business is business", and its most immoral in "My country, right or wrong".'\textsuperscript{101} Temple's work is peppered with references to the 'Cartesian Faux-Pas'; but his solutions to this problem, as he sees it, do not lie in reaction. While the Roman Catholic Church of his time reacted to the disintegrative tendencies of modern life by a conscious medievalism (typified by Pope Leo XIII's encouragement of neo-Thomism, the condemnations of Modernism of Pius IX and St. Pius X, and in England by the romantic ideals of the Distributist League and its supporters, most notably G.K. Chesterton, Hilaire
Belloc and Vincent McNab), Temple, as a good Hegelian might, looked to a future based on synthesis:

Return to the concrete richness and bewildering variety and still more bewildering interconnexion of actual experience must be the mode of deliverance from the false scent on which Descartes set the modern mind in its search for truth. It is not a return to the Middle Ages that we want. It is not desirable any more than it is possible to put back the clock. Those are not wise guides, I am very sure, who wish to cultivate a medieval mentality on the ground that we need to recover the medieval sense alike of objectivity and of unity. It is our task consciously and deliberately to construct a "synthesis" of the classical and medieval "thesis" with the modern "antithesis", and this in some fundamental respects will resemble the "thesis" more closely than the "antithesis". But it will not leave the "antithesis" unexpressed; we cannot go behind the Reformation - that great bouleversement of human thinking, wherein it was for the first time fully recognised that each man is by nature the centre of his own universe, however true it be that his most urgent need is to discover that it does not involve about him as its pivot. The "duty of private judgement", the autonomy of the individual conscience, the integrity of the individual mind - all these which find their basis in the proclamation of personal sincerity as the fundamental human excellence - not the highest but the most basic - are realities discovered in the period of departmentalism and never again to be forgotten.102

For Temple, it would be a fundamental task, as we shall see, to develop an ethical theory suitable for the syntheses of a new
era. It may be that Temple paints with too broad a brush: Edward Heath has noted that 'some may feel that in a search for a fairer society William Temple placed too little emphasis on the need to maintain personal freedom'; the divide in philosophy between pre- and post-Reformation thought is not perhaps so decisive as Temple suggests - the primacy of individual conscience is forcibly expressed by Aquinas, for instance; but questions of this kind should not obscure what Temple saw as the lesson of history.

The departmentalism of human intellectual effort has damaged the practice of philosophy no less than other areas of activity:

Philosophy meanwhile has been involved in the same process. Inasmuch as every particular study or pursuit of knowledge is the subject of a special science, Philosophy has been left with the study of knowledge in general, and has been in preposterous disproportion occupied with the enquiry whether and how Knowledge may be possible at all. Mankind, being quite well aware that it possesses some fragment of what is Knowledge if such a thing exists and must pass for Knowledge if it does not, leaves Philosophy to spin its cobwebs and gets on with the business of the world as best it may.

That was written in 1932, four years before the publication of Ayer's *Language, Truth and Logic*, perhaps the high point of the development of analytical philosophy, not so much for any intrinsic profundity or originality as for the trenchancy of its attack on the traditional metaphysics of which Temple is an exemplar. Ayer had been deeply influenced by - though he developed his thought in new directions - Russell; and both saw themselves in the tradition of the British empiricists. It is notable that Russell devoted much of his philosophical work
(other than his seminal expositions in logic) to questions of epistemology - even his elementary text, The Problems of Philosophy is almost exclusively concerned with epistemology\(^{105}\), and Ayer has likewise devoted much of his writing to the same subject. At the time of his writing, Temple would have been aware of his contemporaries' concerns - whether his strictures on philosophical activity are equally applicable to the non-British scene is open to doubt. (In Poland, for instance, Kotarbinski, almost an exact contemporary, while producing major work in epistemology continued to develop theories of metaphysics which remain significant, while Lejewski maintains that metaphysics is the central discipline in philosophy.) Temple quotes, with approval, Pringle-Pattison's stricture on the empiricists: 'it was the most unfortunate error of the Scottish philosophers that they identified the epistemological with the metaphysical problem.'\(^{106}\) We are perhaps close to the reason for much of the neglect of Temple's philosophical work, that in content and in style it is out of tune with dominant currents in British thought of the past half-century. Ayer's claim that 'the philosopher is not, qua philosopher, in a position to assess the value of any political theory: his function is simply to elucidate the theory by defining the symbols which occur in it.'\(^{107}\) reveals a habit of thought quite at odds with Temple's style and method.

If it is true that Temple is out of tune with much recent philosophy, it is notable that by the time of Nature, Man and God, while still describing himself as 'a loyal pupil of Edward Caird'\(^{108}\), he wishes to distinguish himself from the Hegelian tradition. He does so by referring to an innate Cartesianism he finds within the British Hegelian tradition: 'the English Hegelians laid reiterated emphasis on the fact that the distinction between Self and Not-Self is drawn within the given unity of experience. But in them still the old tradition sufficiently prevailed to lead to an assumption of an
epistemological and thus (for this philosophy) a metaphysical priority of the Subject in the Subject-Object relation of Knowledge. For this there is no foundation if once the Cartesian starting-point has been discarded. Temple does not reject the emphasis on subject-object relationship which we have seen to be basic both to his thought and to Idealism; but he is concerned to stress that undue weight on the subject is not for him. (In a subsequent chapter, we shall see how Temple differs from the neo-Hegelians in accepting a version of natural law.)

If the error of Cartesianism lies in emphasis of the subject at the expense of the object, it is unsurprising that Temple will develop an ethic based on the needs of others, and the realisation of others' intrinsic value. But to do this, it is necessary to develop first a philosophical basis. He quotes extensively from Baron Von Hugel:

Modern philosophy started with a strong emphasis upon the subject, and this starting-point was first impressively articulated in Descartes' famous (but, alas, dangerously inadequate) fundamental formula - his one axiom - 'cogito, ergo sum'. We thus take for granted, as rock-certain, what is demonstrably non-existent: 'I think' instead of 'I think such and such realities', or at least, 'I think such and such objects'. The subject and object, always interconnected in man's actual experience and hence to be assumed in their interconnexion, were thus severed from each other, in the very starting-point of philosophy; and then this severance and quite artificial separateness could hardly any more be bridged over - the object could hardly be recovered, since man (after all) is in fact restricted, and is here rightly recognised as restricted, to the analysis of what actually exists, and to what he
really experiences. The appeal here to its experience was, then, right; what was wrong was the exclusion, before any and all investigation, and without any justification, of one entire third of every living experience. For all experience is always threefold: it is always simultaneously experience of the subject, of the object, and of the overbridging thought; indeed, clear consciousness always first concerns the object, and only much later on the subject. And thus, through that artificial abstraction, there promptly arose such sheer figments of the brain as knowledge, not of objects alone, but of subjective states alone; and (stranger still) knowledge that objects exist, and that they all have an inside, but an inside which is never actually revealed to us by the qualities of those objects; and (culminating miracle of strangeness) that this inside abides ever essentially unknowable by us, and yet, all the same, we absolutely know that it contradicts all these appearances. Man thus, though well within the universe, isolates himself from it; he imprisons himself in his own faculties, and, as to anything further, knows only that objects exist as to which these faculties essentially and inevitable mislead him.

Here no criticism of the logic of the position is sufficient; indeed, such criticisms mostly end by bearing unwilling, or even unwitting, testimony to the general self-consistency of this subjectivism. Only a criticism, not of the conclusions as consistent or not with their premises, but of these premises as adequate or not to real experience, is sufficient.
Several points are notable here. It is easy to see why this extract so appealed to Temple: the author uses the traditional language of the Idealists to make his point - truth lies in the right ordering of the subject-object relationship and the emphasis on the 'overbridging thought' which links the two. The point is made that the experience of objects is also - and simultaneously - an experience of an experiencing self; any separate analysis of the components of the experience is an afterthought, or, more clearly, a subsequent reflection - an abstraction from - the original experience; and in that abstraction false emphasis is possible. This explains the reason for continuing the quotation to include the point that logical analysis of the Cartesian position is unhelpful: the appeal of subjectivism is precisely that it has apparent formal logical consistency (with minor amendments: *cogito ergo sum* is not formally an analytic proposition) - the most potent criticisms tend to be not that there is error in the logic, but that the argument begins from an erroneous premise. Gilbert Ryle famously attacked Cartesianism in *The Concept of Mind*; though his reasons are different from Temple's, we may perhaps rightly see both men as part of a general reaction to this dominant strand in modern philosophy.

The erroneous premise was, for both William Temple and Baron von Hugel, that the Cartesian view was inadequate to experience. Again, we find Temple's underlying non-propositional approach - the world is experienced as real, as real as the subject. For Temple, we must 'return to the concrete richness and bewildering variety and still more bewildering interconnexion of actual experience'\textsuperscript{112}. To the extent that Temple was an Idealist, he was a writer with a natural disinclination to speculate without reference to experience.

B. VALUE AS OBJECTIVE
Man is bound to his experience; but in that binding, he must recognise his limitations as an individual. Early in his career, in *Mens Creatrix*, Temple developed an argument for the epistemological significance of community:

In countless ways it appears that only through the diversity of personalities is the whole of Reality apprehended or its whole Truth known. For it seems impossible to deny that when a beautiful object is appreciated, it gains in quality itself. Whether or not a thing can fitly be called beautiful if no one can see it, I do not know; but I am quite clear that, if no one can see it, it does not matter if it is beautiful or not. Its value begins when it is appreciated. Good must mean good for somebody; apart from consciousness, value is non-existent.

And yet it seems impossible to say that the value is in the appreciating mind. It exists for it, and only so; but it is in the object. So the object when it is appreciated becomes something which it was not until then. But if so, and if there are various values which cannot all be realised for the same consciousness, then the variety of intelligences is necessary for the full actualisation of the value of the world.; The complete truth, therefore, if we include Value, is only grasped by the whole society of intelligences, and can never be fully grasped by one alone.113

This is a curious argument, not least because of the assumptions underlying it. The crucial question, shortly to be developed, is whether it is possible to accept Temple's belief in an objective value: on this depends much else. Evident in this passage is the necessary relationship between the subject and object - the object realises meaning only when it is
appreciated, a point we have seen so frequently in Temple. What is evident in his argument here, however, is the belief that when an object is appreciated it increases in value in itself. Temple states categorically that 'it seems impossible to say that the value is in the appreciating mind'. Much depends on what is meant by 'in', as if there were an ontological category of value which might - somehow - subsist here or there. Whatever may be meant here, there is still the question whether the value of something is in itself or as appreciated - that a thing's value is that I find it so. It seems not at all impossible that in this sense value is in the appreciating mind, as I have previously maintained. Thus, I may say that 'I find this vase/symphony/sonnet beautiful', by which I mean 'I value x as beautiful'. My statement is clearly about myself - the 'I' who values, and not at all about the object of my valuation: the link between the subject and the object is not the object's beauty, but my finding it beautiful. I can analyse the object and give reasons why I find it so - symmetry, melodic power, choice of words - even though those reasons are never complete. When they are incomplete, when I cannot give full expression to my appreciation of a Shakespeare sonnet or a Beethoven quartet, it is simply that I cannot fully put into words, however I may try, the total reaction of my intellectual/emotional/imaginative self. I may turn to a critic who, through more developed skills, may give fuller, clearer expression than I can give, of a reaction.

What Temple is attempting to do, I think, is to sustain the aesthetic notion of the beauty of things in themselves - to maintain that a Shakespeare play is somehow intrinsically more valuable than a Mickey Spillane novel; and to put this perception on a more certain and reliable basis than simply 'I prefer Shakespeare to Mickey Spillane.' We have seen in Chapter Three my suggestion, here repeated, that the locus of valuation is in the self and not in the appreciated object. It
is now necessary to develop this topic in relation to collective or communal perception.

Temple suggests that there is a distinction between different people's views of aesthetic value - 'there is a clear difference between the judgment "This is beautiful", where it is a real analysis of experience, and "This is beautiful" where it is the repetition of the verdict of an expert: in the former case it means, "This gives me aesthetic pleasure", while in the latter it means, at best "This would give aesthetic pleasure to anyone of sufficiently trained susceptibilities", and in this case the value is itself still potential and not actual.' Temple notes differences of perception, but refers to the 'value itself': he is quite specific that there is real value that ought to be appreciated: 'inasmuch as there is a particular character which every individual, as this member of the society of spirits, ought to make his own, so, by consequence, there are certain values which he ought to appreciate and thereby actualise.'

He is fearful of accepting a purely emotive view: he refers to such a notion as 'utter chaos.' I think he is mistaken, in that it seems possible to retain the idea that 'x is valuable' (i.e. 'people value it and it ought to be maintained') without at all valuing it oneself. In this sense, something may be valued in the community, and so maintain its worth to persons, without being at all significant to the individual. Thus, I find that I value music very highly, literature and art to a large extent: and dance not at all. On my rare excursions to the ballet, like Anton Bruckner at the premiere of 'Parsifal', I am blind to the stage action. I find myself, however much encouraged by my reading, however much the subject of balletomanes' enthusiasm, entirely unable to appreciate what to me are meaningless gestures and gyrations. Gestures I can be taught to interpret; the discipline I can recognise, but I recognise it as I recognise the precision of the Brigade of
Guards, and with as little emotional involvement. I do not therefore say that dance is not valuable, or not worthy of support and appreciation: it is merely not valuable to me. The consequent reflection is not that ballet is meaningless, but that my aesthetic capability is limited. In other words, in this subject there is an incapacity to appreciate that object. Each act of appreciation is different, not necessarily because of a change in the object, but a change in the subject. The Mona Lisa is much the same today as yesterday, exhibited in much the same light, at the same temperature in the same ambience. If yesterday I appreciated it differently from the way I appreciate it today, the change is in me, as the valuation is in me. And if another subject sees it, he may value it differently; but in discourse we may discover common or at least similar reactions.

Likewise, discourse reveals common or similar reactions in our appreciations of Shakespeare and Mickey Spillane. It is consensus, both among present critics and across the years, which places one author above another. It is also common features of intellect and emotion, common qualities of the subject, which cause us to share, or perhaps rather to hold, similar perceptions. Now this does not leave an 'utter chaos' of subjectivism. It is not meaningless to develop aesthetic concepts of aesthetic, critical discourse. The value of these follows precisely from the changes and variations in the subject across time. It is not that I innately appreciate art, merely that I have some capacity to do so; my appreciation has grown because others have said 'you'll enjoy this because...', or 'why don't you try ...?' or 'can you see how...?' Aesthetics seems to be as much involved with recommendation and encouragement as with appreciation alone. If it is true that de gustibus non disputandum, it is also true that taste may be developed, affected, altered by the growth and change of self in relationship with others.
It is this truth that Temple seems aware of; his error seems to be in assuming an underlying, unalterable value. This assumption leads him to the second part of his argument, that 'the variety of intelligences is necessary for the full actualisation of the value of the world. The complete truth ... if we include Value, is only grasped by the whole society of intelligences'. It is one thing to say that a variety of perceptions by a number of intelligences will provide a greater total of understanding than one intelligence alone; but it is quite another to suggest that therefore the totality of intelligences will perceive the whole value of the world. I cannot see how such an assertion can be made, as the basis for it cannot - by definition - be ascertained by a single intelligence. If a single intelligence could know that all value were perceived by the totality of intelligences, he could see the totality of value, to make the assertion: and that, according to Temple, is precisely what he cannot do. Temple's assertion seems impossible without an inference of an omniscient God, but he seems to consider this inference, at this stage of his argument, unnecessary:

...when we consider our experience as it is handled by knowledge, we find a world which is known and appreciated by the whole society of finite intelligences. The whole grasp of their collective experience cannot be held in one centre of consciousness however "Absolute" or "Infinite", because some of the elements are intrinsically incompatible. There cannot be one Mind which includes all of this. The Absolute Being (so far) appears precisely as the society of intelligences.117

Temple appears to be saying, as I understand it, that he accepts that no intelligence can - even in principle - know the totality of value; and that he would include God in this. It may be that God cannot know the full texture of a thing as I
value it - directly - in that I may attach a particular balance of value to a given object (I would not see it as God sees it), but an omniscient God would surely know that I saw the object in such and such a way, and thus have the knowledge that the whole range of possible valuations is held by the totality of observers, including myself. (An omniscient God would know the range of possible interpretations.) But it does not follow from this that all possible interpretations, all possible valuations, are actually held. If even an infinite centre of consciousness cannot know all possible valuations, because some 'elements are intrinsically incompatible' it is surely impossible to make any claim about the totality of intelligences. Even if one could notionally total the sum of all knowledge held by all intelligences, one could not then notionally total the sum of the not known - the sum of unknown quantities must itself be unknown. I think that Temple is here guilty of false analogy. It is true that my knowledge of astronomy is severely limited compared with the sum of present knowledge of astronomy; and present knowledge is doubtless severely limited by comparison with the total knowledge past, present and future. (I assume, though Temple does not here make the point explicit, that he means the society of intelligences across all time.) But the total of knowledge held is not necessarily the same as the total of all knowledge possible to be held. The total of astronomical knowledge may forever be necessarily inadequate - it is inconceivable, to me at least, that every past astronomical event can be intimately known, without invoking the truly omniscient God; and that is no proof of his existence, for it is not inconceivable that an event may be forever unknown. (We can conceive of an unknown event: if I see certain astronomical phenomena, and I know that there was a time when no human intelligences existed, I can imagine that certain similar astronomical phenomena could have taken place, though I have no knowledge of either time or details. Such an event, though conceived of, remains strictly unknown.)
Temple is about to leave philosophising behind, and explicitly to move into theological speculation. He makes the transition within a single sentence:

The conception of the Universe coming to focus in a multitude of intelligences, and realising its own value in their manifold appreciation of it, is not a notion which degrades our spiritual life; nor is it alien from the life of religion; for this Society of Spirits is the Communion of Saints, and the agency that builds it up is the Holy Church, which is that Communion as so far realised and active, and its spirit of self-transcendence and self-sacrifice (which are two names for one thing) is the Holy Spirit. 118

It is now possible to recognise the significance of what Temple is attempting to achieve in apparently denying full omniscience to God. As a Christian he is trying, I think, to justify the creation of a universe. Underpinning his view is the view, similar to that of Teilhard de Chardin, that the fullness of God, though ever-present, is realised or manifested through and in his own creation; that God is 'built up' in the mystical Body of Christ, through the creative co-operation of man and God. For this reason, as for Teilhard, co-operation and solidarity are important - essential - in the theological scheme.

Nevertheless, the argument Temple has used, based on the sum of all knowledge held by all intelligences, remains a curious, and, I believe, unsatisfactory one. The reason for holding such a view may be found in the Hegelianism of Caird - the idea that the Absolute is discovered through the dialectical
processes, by which one man's partial perception of truths, countered by another's, leads ever onwards to the stage of the fullness of the Absolute, in which is fullness of knowledge. In that sense, there is, in the totality of all perception, the completeness of all knowledge. More directly, and more surely, we can point to a significant dictum of Bradley, that reality is experience: 'When we ask as to the matter which fills up the empty outline, we can reply in one word, that this matter is experience ... Sentient experience, in short, is reality, and what is not this is not real.' Within such a definition, it would follow inevitably that the sum of all reality is the sum of all experience; and this, for Bradley, is the essence of Idealism.

I set out Temple's argument without reference to Bradley's dictum, to examine it on its own merits; I suggest that it is unsatisfactory, for the reasons given. But I wanted also to use this argument to show how Temple was to shift his position away from Idealism and neo-Hegelianism by the time of *Nature, Man and God*, which, for reasons I hope to make clear in a subsequent chapter, left open the way for the development of a natural law position. I have noted already that no longer could Temple be considered an Idealist: nowhere is this more clear than in his treatment of collective consciousness in his later book.

In the later book, Temple speaks of the Commonwealth of Value, in Lecture XVI. The idea that the totality of perceptions provides completeness of possible knowledge of value is entirely missing. Instead of an Idealist gloss, there is instead the move from an epistemological bias - that community provides knowledge - to a religious one, that it is central to our spiritual natures to be communal:

... finite souls are to a very great extent reciprocally constitutive of one another. We have our
whole being in fellowship with each other, and are what we are because of the tradition that we inherit and the influences that play upon us. Something of our own we bring to this, but only the omniscience of God can discriminate between this original contribution and the work of social influences. It is partly because of this essentially social character of finite mind that self-centredness and self-concern are suicidal; they set up an absolute contradiction between the activity of mind and its own nature. But if the mind or soul is thus constituted, then it may at least reasonably be regarded as requiring for its own fulfilment the special social relationship that may exist between it and every other mind, while every other will be the poorer for the lack of social relationship with it. Moreover, what is in question here is not only the good enjoyed by each in proper appreciation of the other, but the special good of each waiting to be actualised by others' appreciation of it. It is possible, no doubt, to conceive the Commonwealth as a series of eccentric circles, each representing the sphere of social relationships proper to an individual soul. And some such notion would be natural if not inevitable if the Commonwealth itself were conceived on republican principles, that is to say, as a fellowship cohering by the attachment of members to one another. But we have seen reason for conceiving it as a Monarchy, so that the fellowship coheres by the allegiance of all members to the King or Head, and to one another in and through Him. The conception congruous with this is that each member should have, or be destined to have, through Him a fellowship with all others who owe to Him the same allegiance.
Such a commonwealth must bind into unity all spirits of all periods of time. In other words it involves everlasting life for all who are its members; but this life is something more than everlasting. It must, at least progressively even if never completely, partake of the nature of eternity, wherein all successiveness is united in a single apprehension. Only so could the whole value of all the social relationships comprised in it be actualised. 122

Differences between this argument and that of Mens Creatrix are evident. Temple retains the idea that the universe comes into focus in the Communion of Saints ('We have called it the Commonwealth of Value; its Christian name is the Communion of Saints' 123), but he speaks only of 'the whole value of all the social relationships comprised in it', something very different from 'the complete truth ... grasped by the whole society of intelligences.' 'All successiveness ... united in a single apprehension' is not the same as 'the full actualisation of the value of the world'.

In this argument, Temple passes from philosophy to theology. He emphasises the limitations of individual mind, and argues that we contradict our own natures if we are self-centred - he is again indicating the limitations of beginning our enquiries in a Cartesian manner. Self is only fully realised in the appreciation of others. What is not apparent is the meaning of this appreciation, and it raises problems which Temple does not consider. A practical example may illustrate this. I have a certain talent as a painter, possibly not very great. At one level, it is evident that my talent is wasted if it is not appreciated by others - pictures nobody looks at might as well not exist. But it does not follow that I as painter am realised or fulfilled by others' appreciation of my pictures. If I am dead, I might be fulfilled in that my talent has at last been
recognised; but I am not fulfilled in that I am not conscious of that appreciation. Value in this sense is never truly fulfilled to me; and any joy that may exist in my relationship with viewers, across space and time, is lost to me - it is locked in their perceptions. That my value is wholly realised, in the full sense of being known, is something that can be true only within an eternal life. Of course, Temple presumes this, but it is not deducible from the appreciation of me by others. That particular conditions need to exist for something to happen does not entail that they will exist. In the temporal order alone they do not exist.

Temple tries to make this leap - 'if the mind or soul is thus constituted, then it may be at least reasonably regarded as requiring for its own fulfilment the special social relationship that may exist between it and every other mind.' Specifying the necessary conditions for something does not, as we have seen, then involve the fulfilment of those conditions. To say of the commonwealth of value that it must do this or that is not a logical entailment; it is a leap of faith. It does not follow from this that Temple's point is meaningless; theologically he performs a worthwhile function in providing an argument that if there is an eternal life then it would surely be communal: 'for the self-centred spirit there can be no eternal life. Even if it should exist for ever, its existence could only be an ever-deepening chill of death. Because it seeks its satisfaction in itself, where none is to be found, it must suffer an always intenser pang of spiritual hunger, which cannot be allayed until that spirit turns to another source of satisfaction.'

It is easy to understand Temple's lifelong hatred of Pelagianism as 'the only intrinsically damnable heresy.'

The religious assumption is also apparent in Temple's idea that the commonwealth is a monarchy rather than a republic - he wishes to retain the idea of the Body of Christ, which involves
the kingship of Christ. This should not surprise us - the epistemological significance of community inevitably - for Temple - involves a religious dimension.

Temple believes that the meaning of religious experience is found in the whole experience of religious persons.\textsuperscript{125} This experience is personal and all-pervading; the religious man experiences the world as a religious whole: 'the religious man is not only religious when he prays; his work is religiously done, his recreation religiously enjoyed, his food and drink religiously received; the last he often emphasises by the custom of "grace before meat". He does his duty religiously; above all, his failures in duty affect him religiously.'\textsuperscript{126} The community's importance lies in sustaining the religious life of its members. In a sermon preached in Manchester Cathedral in 1914, Temple is specific: 'To ask a religious man why he believes in God is like asking a happy man why he enjoys life. No verbal answer can be given. But if we live in that man's fellowship, or in the fellowship of a society of such men, which is what the church ought to be, we may catch the secret by sympathy.'\textsuperscript{127} We learn within the community of believers - 'in any individual the type of religious experience will depend upon the religious tradition prevalent in his social environment.'\textsuperscript{128} From the significance of the environment enormous consequences flow: 'the immense importance of securing that the traditional and prevalent belief of any community is in the closest attainable correspondence with truth, alike by the exclusion of falsehood, which, in this field, is idolatry or superstition, and by the inclusion of all truth which is relevant. Correctness of belief is of high importance to the individual ... But it is very much more important to the community, because whatever is the prevalent belief of the community will be accepted uncritically by great numbers of individuals and will predispose them towards forms of religious experience, and of its issue in religious and moral practice, corresponding to that belief. Heresy may be compatible in the
individual with deep religion which as a whole is sound; but the Church is bound to regard heresy as for its purposes a more serious evil than some aberrations which in the individual would be more pernicious. 129

This is an odd passage, which perhaps raises more questions than it answers; and Temple does not expand on it. It seems to argue for an ecclesiastical authoritarianism: heresy is an evil which must be kept out of society to avoid confusing the uncritical mass of people. This view is based upon the idea that the majority over the years perceive most closely the true values of things. It is a view concordant with the theory of mass-perception advanced in Mens Creatrix, but it is difficult to relate it to a more liberal view of religious freedom. The obvious objection to such an opinion is the difficulty of determining the identity of the true guardians of authority, and the difficulty of deciding the boundary between creative innovation within a tradition and heresy. Perhaps the answer lies in the episcopacy - for Temple it presumably would - but there is no guarantee of right judgment in all cases of the bishops: this has never been doctrine (though at times it may have appeared to be the practice) of the more overtly authoritarian Catholic church - it certainly seems at odds with Anglicanism. Perhaps the lack of further clarification of this passage is the consequence of hurried writing, though I confess that there are a number of passages in Temple which seem to argue for authoritarian approaches to dissent; but we should at least note that it provides part of the important view that religion is never purely a private matter: it must affect political life. Temple was never afraid to intervene in the political life of the nation, though he believed that a churchman should not take a party political stance. In 1926, he took an active part, with other churchmen, in attempting to resolve the miners' strike. This was held by some to be unwarranted interference. At the time, Temple defended his actions robustly: in a letter to The Times (August 19th, 1926)
he wrote: 'if it is urged that such action as we took is improper in principle, we completely disagree with such a view. As Christians, and most of us as Christians charged with official responsibility, we saw two parties doing great damage to the community by a continued conflict which was bound to be ended by negotiation sooner or later; our religion and our office required of us that we should do anything which lay in our power to bring them, in the literal sense, to reason.'

Years later, he noted: 'It is commonly assumed that Religion is one department of life, like Art or Science, and that it is playing the part of a busybody when it lays down principles for the guidance of other departments, whether Art and Science or Business and Politics. When a group of Bishops attempted to bring Government, Coal Owners and Miners together in a solution of the disastrous Coal Strike of 1926, Mr. Baldwin, then Prime Minister, asked how the Bishops would like it if he referred to the Iron and Steel Federation the revision of the Athanasian Creed: and this was acclaimed as a legitimate score.'

The involvement in political life was a legacy from his father: Archbishop Frederick Temple, when Bishop of London, had attempted, together with Cardinal Manning, to mediate in the Dock Strike of 1889. In William Temple there was profound belief in the moral requirement - and, indeed, moral inevitability - of personal involvement in community.

* * *

Morality begins in the recognition that man is inevitably a social creature. It is evident that Temple had read Bradley's My Station and Its Duties. There, Bradley asserts 'no ... individual men exist ... what we call an individual man is what he is by virtue of community.' He explains what he means by this: 'Let us take a man, an Englishman as he is now, and try to point out that, apart from what he has in common with others, apart from his sameness with others, he is not an Englishman - nor a man at all; that if you take him as
something by himself, he is not what he is ... he is what he is because he is a born and educated social being, and a member of an individual social organism, ... if you make abstraction from all this which is the same in him as in others, what you have left is not an Englishman nor a man, but some, I know not what, residuum which never has existed by itself and does not so exist. For this reason,, Bradley argues that moral behaviour lies in citizenship, in the community in which we live. Bradley, in Hegelian tradition, sees that community as the nation-state: 'we must say that a man's life with its moral duties, is in the main filled up by his station in that system of wholes which the state is, and this, partly by its laws and institutions, and still more by its spirit, gives him the life which he does live, and ought to live.' This sounds a very conservative position, and A.J.M.Milne comments that it is clear 'that what Bradley had in mind in that doctrine is something along the lines of morality at the level of rule and custom rather than the levels of spheres of rational activity.'

Temple's view, as we shall see, moved beyond a simple nationalism and pure custom. I shall suggest that adoption of a natural law position, particularly in the final stages of his career, represents a fundamental breach with Hegelian Idealism. Nonetheless, elements of the earlier thinkers still re-emerge: this may indeed help to explain the extraordinary passage on heresy, already quoted. Temple's broadening out of the principle, his move to a less conservative, less Bradleian, more overtly Christian position is signalled in Nature, Man and God. He notes that 'Our actual obligations depend on our membership of society and on the character of the society of which we are members.' (It is possible to see that obligations are dependent on circumstances, an idea to be developed in our consideration of natural order.) But Temple does not accept that our own community is therefore the pinnacle of moral behaviour:
But that does not affect the nature of obligation itself, or the inherent logic which makes it a principle of progress. For no stage or level of civilisation is satisfactory in itself; certainly no one proposes to leave all things just as they are in this present year of grace! The sense of obligation to serve the common good as apprehended at any time is inevitably a sense of obligation also to apprehend it better. The limitations set to the community in which membership, with its obligation of loyalty, is recognised are more and more evidently accidental or artificial. At one point after another it becomes manifest that the accepted convention is in fact contradictory of the principle of fellow-membership which is the root and moral sanction of all conventions, until the one universal law is known in the form "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself", where "neighbour" is interpreted, as in the Parable of the Good Samaritan, to mean any human being with whom even accidental contact occurs, and even though according to current convention he would be an object of hatred and contempt.140

Much is significant here. It is apparent that Temple distinguishes between actual obligation - the obligations that are naturally entailed by our functions as family members, as citizens, as workers - and absolute obligation. The distinction is made between a rule of conduct and absolute obligation. In a later work, Temple clarifies his point:

I do not myself believe that there is any rule of conduct, strictly so called, that is of absolute obligation. I think that with regard to all rules of conduct strictly so called it must be admitted that there might be circumstances which would make it obligatory to break them rather than to keep them.
It is true that "Thou shalt do no murder", because murdering is the kind of killing that is wrong; but it had to be changed to that from the earlier form, "Thou shalt not kill", precisely because there are some kinds of killing which seem to be least justifiable. Therefore, if you like to say so, "Thou shalt do no murder" is of absolute obligation; but the question may arise in the courts of law whether the killing that took place was murder or was not; and, therefore, this law does not give us absolute direction with regard to our conduct in all possible circumstances. If you come into a room and find some bully about to torture and kill a child and you swing the poker at him and in fact kill him, most of us at any rate will say you did quite right, and such killing was not wrong. In other words, it was not murder. You are not called upon at such a moment to be careful so to measure the strength of your blow that you may by all means avoid killing the bully; the vital matter is to stop him from killing the child. If you can do that without killing him, so much the better, but don't think too much about it.141

The example of killing is a commonplace of ethical discussion, and there is a clear and important distinction between killing and murder. 'Murder is wrong' is tautologous (Wrongful killing is wrong'); 'killing is wrong' is not. But Temple's point is a deeper one than simply saying that not all killing is wrong. He is close to W.D. Ross's position of distinguishing between actual and prima facie duty. Ross makes the point that every rule has exception, but that there are certain duties which, all things being equal, ought always be carried out. Thus, I should always, prima facie, keep promises; but it may be that I have promised to help a man in a particular enterprise, but I now discover that enterprise will culminate in murder. Now all
things are not equal: my actual duty would be to break my promise and to attempt to frustrate the enterprise. Temple had clearly read Ross, but his own definition of distinctions is deeper - 'Dr Ross is right to hold that the good to be gained by breaking a promise must be very great before it is right to break the promise, but he does not probe deep enough for the ground of his conviction. It is not because "a promise is a promise" that a man must keep it at great inconvenience to himself and even to others. It is because a promise creates a personal claim, and to break it for any reason which the man to whom it was made cannot be expected to regard as compelling, is to ignore his claim and so 'to flout the sanctity of his personality'. Temple's point is made on the basis of the particular value of personality. The prima facie duty is to the human personality: 'there is no universal rule of action, there are universal principles to be applied in action. What act is right or wrong may depend on circumstances. But the distinction between right and wrong does not depend on circumstances, nor does the obligation to do the right; so the absolute duty is to do right; what that right will be dependant on circumstances. Temple believes that this is not a very difficult distinction:

The popular riddle concerning the reconciliation of an absolute moral obligation with the variety of actual moral codes or conventions did not of itself cause very much trouble, for we found that universal obligation attaches not to particular judgements of conscience but to conscientiousness. What acts are right may depend on circumstances, social history and context, personal relationships, and a host of other considerations. But there is an absolute obligation to will whatever on each occasion be right ... The distinction may be readily comprehensible, but the problem of application is complex. Temple is conscious of the
temptation to determine the right steps in a particular situation by a form of utilitarianism; but he finds this impracticable: 'we ... recognise that this criterion [the view that those acts are right which are productive of most good ...], however sound in principle, is inapplicable on any large scale in practice, partly because no one know the whole train of consequences that will follow from his action, but partly also because it provides no criterion by which to frame a comparative estimate of different kinds of good.'

The solution to this problem is a matter of intellectual difficulty, but it is evident that for Temple this difficulty is itself creative - as we saw earlier, the lack of satisfactoriness we perceive in communities creates the 'inherent logic' which makes obligation a 'principle of progress'. The clue to the solution of the problem of application may be found in three ways: through our perception of others, through a sense of vocation and through Natural Order. Our discussion of the third way will be the subject of a subsequent chapter; but it is appropriate to consider perception of others and vocation here.

a) The Moral Value of Others

That man is a social being has been an intrinsic idea in social and political philosophy from the beginning - Aristotle famously asserts 'man is by nature a social being.' This perception was carried into Christian thought, so that it is natural for Aquinas to say that 'since man is naturally a social animal, as needing for his life many things that he cannot prepare for himself, consequently he is naturally a part of some multitude, from which he receives help in living well.' In our own day Wojtyla insists that 'the mark of the communal - or social - trait is essentially imprinted on human existence itself.' Daniel Maguire believes that moral development consists precisely in the growth of society: 'As
persons grow and develop in what I have called the foundational moral experience, community, something qualitatively better than coexistence develops.' 150

Temple is evidently within this tradition. We shall consider the similarities between his thought and the ideas of Wojtyla and Maguire. What is significant, and, I think, of lasting importance in Temple, is his ability to clothe a traditional insight with imagination and passion; and to build an important edifice upon that insight.

His starting point is the second form of Kant's Categorical Imperative - 'So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only.' 151 This idea is fundamental to Temple: as we shall see, his whole idea of Natural Order is based upon the right ordering of means and ends, whether in individual action or in the collective actions of societies.

In Nature, Man and God Temple avers that his wish is to develop the idea 'in a more concrete form.' 152 His view is clear and unambiguous:

The principle of morality is that we should behave as Persons who are members of a Society of Persons - a Society in which Personality is itself a valid claim of entrance. We are to treat all Persons as Persons, and all as fellow-members with us in the Society of Persons. Actual duties will depend upon actual personal relationship; there is a special duty of parent to child and child to parent; there is a special relationship between citizens of any one nation; the duty of an Englishman to a Frenchman is not to treat him as if he were an Englishman, or as if no national distinctions existed, but to recognise that devotion to France is as excellent in him as
love of England is in an Englishman. In practice, no doubt, the main task of each man's moral life is to secure that his own self counts for no more with him than anyone else's self. The Englishman should be loyal to England, not because it is his country, but because he is its citizen - not because in some sense it belongs to him, but because in a far deeper sense he belongs to it. And this stage is the more easily reached as we follow the sound principle of checking each narrower loyalty by what is wider. A man cannot do much to serve humanity as a whole directly; but he can check the narrower loyalty by the wider, so that he will serve his family, but not at cost to his country, and will serve his country, but not at cost to mankind.153

Temple was never a narrow nationalist, as the events of his life make clear. However, we may note here, particularly in the final sentence, Temple's idea of the right ordering of priorities - the key to Natural Order. Knowledge of the whole, as far as it is possible, should lead to true perspective of the parts. The precise nature of our roles is limited and defined by the part we play in society as a whole; and his situation defines the moral requirements that are placed upon us.

For this reason, and it is central to the view of ethics we are considering, we are obliged to reject any Pharisaic notion that ethical propriety lies in strict adherence to this or that code: as Temple said, in an earlier work, 'Generalisations, if taken as a direct guide to conduct, are the source of all manner of evil.'154 He makes the same point in Nature, Man and God: 'personal relationships can seldom be precisely formulated; and as our actual obligations are such as rise out of our actual moral relations they can seldom be represented by any formula. For this reason, as well as because in these
relationships intuition so far outstrips reflection, it is best in action to rely chiefly on the spontaneous reaction of our moral nature to the situation confronting us. The justice of Temple's point may be recognised by reflection on history and society. My objection to many policies in many states lies in an objection to the placing of an ethical goal above the individual needs of members of the society. Lenin said that 'To us morality is subordinated to the interests of the proletariat's class struggle ... morality is what serves to destroy the old exploiting society and to unite all the working people around the proletariat, which is building up a new, a communist society.' That subordination of morality led in practice to vast suffering, deaths, and curtailments of freedom in the name of the necessary progress of the Soviet Union. In other circumstances, failure to direct attention to the needs of this person, qua person, has led to the particular horrors associated with racism in many contemporary societies, with genocide, and with unreasonable demands made by rulers of those governed. The institution of slavery encapsulates the philosophy that sees people as economic objects, as things and not as persons. There is a tendency in all of us to treat particular classes of people as groups - to speak of 'the poor', 'the blacks' as if they were not a collection of suffering individuals. Temple's friend Chesterton drew attention to 'the huge modern heresy of altering the human soul to fit its conditions, instead of altering human conditions to fit the human soul,' and said that 'all institutions shall be judged and damned by whether they have fitted the normal flesh and spirit.' This, in characteristically flamboyant style, is an expression of the point which Temple more soberly makes: 'whatever is a truly personal good - a good which resides in a person - takes priority over all non-personal goods, because morality is the discovery or recognitions by persons of personality on others, to whom by the common attribute of personality they are bound in the ties of community membership.'
The directness of Temple's personalism, and its effectiveness as a spur to action may be seen by comparison of his principle of justice - 'the main task of each man's moral life is to secure that his own self counts for no more with him than anyone else's self' - with that of other philosophers. The great Victorian, Henry Sidgwick, formulated his principle of justice thus: 'it cannot be right for A to treat B in a manner in which it would be wrong for B to treat A, merely on the ground that they are two different individuals, and without there being any difference between the natures or circumstances of the two which can be stated as a reasonable ground for a difference of treatment.' , or again, 'the good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view (if I may say so) of the Universe, than the good of any other.' Rashdall produced his Axiom of Equity: 'I ought to regard the good of one man as of equal intrinsic value with the like good of anyone else.' The difference between Temple and other philosophers is not that there is anything radically new about his theory, but that he has particular insight and imagination in its expression. If Temple was a philosopher he was also a preacher; his aim was to encourage people to do better.

Temple significantly linked imagination with ethical behaviour. In an earlier chapter I noted this link; speaking of the role of imagination, Temple says: 'the apparent good is not only that which seems good, but also the good which appears, which takes shape before the senses or in the imagination.' What imagination provides is the specific shape of a moral circumstance - we recall Temple's advice to the drinker hesitating before a public house - 'I should not say, "Indulgence is sure to bring its penalty", but rather, "remember your wife and children."' This specificity of thought is, as we have seen, characteristic - like Brentano, Temple holds that to imagine or to think is to think of some particular thing: 'without some perpect or image I cannot hold a concept in my thought.' This provides the clue to our
giving equal weight to others: we need to have imaginative insight into the other person if we are to serve him:

... it will not be possible to treat another human being altogether as an end in himself, truly considering what is his welfare, unless I have love for him in my heart — love in the two forms which it must always take: concern for his welfare with desire to serve it, and insight into his needs so that I may judge wherein his welfare truly consists.168

There is precedent for this need for insight within the Idealist tradition; especially in the work of Josiah Royce, the American Idealist, which was familiar to Temple.169 Royce asks the question, 'What then is our neighbour?':

We find that out by treating him in thought just as we do ourselves. What art thou? Thou art now just a present state, with its experiences, thoughts and desires. But what is thy future Self? Simply future states, future experiences, future thoughts and desires, that, although not now existing for thee are postulated by thee as certain to come, and as in some real relation to thy present Self. What then is thy neighbour? He too is a mass of states, of experiences, thoughts, and desires just as real as thou art, no more but yet no less present to thy experience now than is thy future Self. He is not that face that frowns or smiles at thee, although often thou thinkest of him only as that. He is not the arm that strikes or defends thee, not the voice that speaks to thee, not that machine that gives thee when thou movest it with the offer of money. To be sure, thou dost often think of him as if he were that automaton yonder, that answers thee when thou speakest to it. But no, thy neighbour is as actual,
as concrete as thou art. Just as thy future is real, though not though thine, so thy neighbour is real, though his thoughts never are thy thoughts. Dost thou believe this? Art thou sure what it means? This is for thee the turning-point of thy whole conduct towards him. What we now ask of thee is no sentiment, no gush of pity, no tremulous weakness of sympathy, but a calm, clear insight.170

Royce's development of the point, in essence the same as Temple's, presents clearly both the value and the difficulty of attaining what Royce calls 'the moral insight'. It is a block to such an insight to assume that my neighbour is just as I am - I like this, hate that, think this, feel that; and so must he. That is a common fault in human intercourse - it is the explanation of much unfairness, as when a person is appointed to a post because he shares some background with his interviewer: the interviewer's unconscious error is to think, 'I went to this school and I'm a good chap: he went to this school and therefore he must be a good chap.' It is a common enough error, perhaps as prevalent as that, already noted, of treating whole masses of people as if to say, 'this man is black' is sufficient to summarise his sufferings, fears, doubts, beliefs, hopes - a Nigerian friend said that the worst form of racialism he encountered was that of white people telling him not what he ought to think, but what he did think.

This problem is tacitly acknowledged by Royce: 'Just as thy future is real, though not thine, so thy neighbour is real, though his thoughts never are thy thoughts.' That the other person is still inevitably other should not hold us back from the realisation that he is as fully human as I am. He has an inner life as I have, and just as it is a matter of surprise to me when I discover that others' perceptions of me at a given time are quite different from the perceptions I recall of myself (as for instance when others comment on my calmness in
certain circumstances when I was conscious of anger and confusion) so it should not be a matter of surprise that my perceptions of others are so often at odds with their experiences. The essence of moral insight is awareness - paradoxically - of limitation. That is why Royce calls for 'calm clear insight', and Temple for 'insight into his needs so that I may judge wherein his welfare truly consists.'

True judgment requires imagination. When we judge the correct action for dealing with a person, Temple suggests, we should begin with his needs; and experience would indicate that this is not simply a matter of stated need. Any schoolteacher, any parent, is aware of this distinction; and we know from our own experience that we will articulate needs in one way because we are inhibited or unable to articulate them in another - we have the sense that 'if I say this it will be unacceptable/impossible/make me look silly.' Articulated requests are frequently negotiating positions - 'if I ask this, I may go some way towards achieving that' - and the word and the wish are not identical. Imagination is necessary to recognise the possible real needs of the other - to determine what it is that he needs. But it is imagination built upon certain facts: an awareness of the actual position in which the other person may find himself. This cannot be perfectly known: but what is known is that part of the other's position is his relationship with myself - I am part of his world - and I should have some knowledge of relevant information about myself. My perspective is not his; but both perspectives overlap, and there is a common society in which the two of us are bound together.

Temple is fully conscious of this aspect of moral insight. He wishes to demonstrate that it develops only in its relationship with others. Speaking of love of neighbour, concern for his welfare, the desire to serve it and insight into his needs, he continues:
In our own day we have to see this in a much fuller relation than has been customary to this other consideration, that personality only comes to itself, only becomes what it is capable of being, through its development in the reciprocal relationships of society. This, of course, has never been denied, but it has received comparatively little emphasis until lately in most ethical schemes. Indeed the form in which these present the matter is, as a rule, that of my obligation to recognise that, just as I am I, so somebody else is also an I, a centre of consciousness and claims. But that puts it wrongly. What has to be said is that I am only I in my relationships with You, and You are only You, or capable of being called an I, in your relationships with Me. It is positively in the interaction of embryonic personalities with one another that the resultant personality is developed. Personality is always a social product; it is not something which only has to allow for the expression of a similar principle in other beings alongside of its own development; it is something which can only reach its own full development in its intercourse with others similarly developing in that intercourse. 171

Temple here goes beyond Royce. He is at one with much modern theology. Comparison with other thinkers is illuminating. Most striking is the similarity with Martin Buber, the Jewish theologian: 'I become through my relation to the Thou; as I become I, I say Thou. All real living is meeting.' 172 (Whether Temple had read Buber I cannot tell. Ich und Du was published in Germany in 1923, but not translated into English until 1937. Temple wrote Christianity in Thought and Practice in the winter of 1935-1936. He met - through his international activities - most of the leading Protestant theologians of his day, many of
whom - e.g. H. Richard Neibuhr - were deeply influenced by Buber.)

The distinction Temple is trying to draw is this: my personality is developed only in relationship with others; and that relationship can only develop as, and in so far as, I am conscious of the fullness of being - have the moral insight - of others. I move from treating others as depersonalised objects if I am aware of the fullness of myself - as Buber would put it, if I move from an I-It relationship to I-Thou. ('Thou' carries the implication of personhood: the distinguished and personal second-person singular, like the French 'tu'). Temple moves from simple epistemic awareness of the other to actual personal involvement; moral awareness leads to moral activity.

Moral activity is the essence of ethics, which is necessarily about performance: moral awareness which does not culminate in something being done can scarcely be deemed ethical - thinking pleasant thoughts is not of itself moral activity, and because no moral good flows to persons, it is hard to see that it is moral at all. We return to Temple's moral debauchee alone on the island. It might be argued that he would be a better person by thinking moral rather than immoral thoughts, but it is a very limited sort of improvement: a man can think kind thoughts, which might encourage him to be kind if circumstances allow: but he can only be a kind man by acting kindly, and that is only truly possible in the presence of others. He can prepare to be kind by mentally rehearsing kind acts - he may put himself in the frame of mind for acting kindly - but he cannot be kind. It is analogous to the way in which I can prepare to play cricket by solitary practice: but I need others to play the game. This indicates a limitation on Temple's original point: the debauchee can only be moral in the presence of others, but it does not mean he has license to disport himself precisely as he wishes: for he has (I think) a moral
duty to conduct himself so that he may (when circumstances change) be of right mind to behave morally. And this state of mind can only be created by the use of imagination, by having images of others and their needs: for the real people, by definition, are not present to the man alone. Right imagining is important: if an overheated imagination has conceived of people only as objects of lust, then his return to society will be a monstrous event. (His 'wrong' imagining consists precisely in seeing people as objects for his use, not as persons in themselves.)

Temple's concern has recently found echo in the work of Daniel Maguire, the American Catholic philosopher. Maguire's conclusions are similar to Temple's, though differently expressed:

Ethics ... is centred on persons. Persons ... are existentially realised and particularised in the shaping influences of social and historical reality. ... Personal life, like all life, is a process, a personing process ... Persons are distinguished by such things as their capacity to imagine, create, be amused, and love benevolently ... The person becomes a person and grows in personhood interpersonally. The self is the counterpart of other selves. Thinking, choosing, and growing cannot take place or be understood apart from our sociality. The social ambience in which we are formed as persons ... will differ according to culture and will affect different individuals differently ...

... That is moral which befits and enhances the humanisation of persons as they are. Persons are in some ways unique and importantly different. Therefore what befits one may not be right for another, and what befits a person now may not be good for that
same person later ... No sensitive ethics will bunch disparate persons under one rubric. 173

For Temple, as for Maguire, each person must be seen sensitively in his own circumstances. That is why Temple was so insistent on the relativity of ethical judgment, emphasised so strongly that 'actual duties ... depend on actual relationship' 174, and why he placed so much stress on the notion of vocation.

b). The Sense of Vocation

If it is true, as Temple believes, that each person is both defined and limited by his fellowship with other men, then it follows that he is also ethically circumscribed by his relationships with them. Each of us has his own sphere of action and his own particular set of moral requirements placed upon him. I can do good or ill in various ways: but those ways are defined by circumstances. If I live entirely cut off from the company of others, I cannot be cruel nor kind. If I have no children I can neither be a cruel parent nor exercise the virtues of being a good father. And all my other duties flow from the circumstances of my life. My duties to my employer grow out of my relationship with him; so long as I am his employee, having promised to work for him, I am, I believe, obliged to carry out certain tasks that I contracted to do, even at the expense of other charitable possibilities. If I am contracted to teach a class on such and such an evening I am morally required to do so; even though in doing so I may have to refuse to take part in some apparently grander charitable enterprise, like collecting money for the Third World. Actual moral duty is definable by my circumstances. Temple gives a concrete example, referring to a conversation he held with a group of students 'who were in sympathy with the Labour Party in domestic politics and were thoroughgoing pacifists in foreign politics':

183
Our conversation concerned the latter group of problems. They urged that the British Government as representing the British people was required by Christian principles to prefer the interest of other nations because this is the course dictated by love. But they had no useful reply when I replied that of course they would demand of a Trade Union Committee during an industrial dispute that it should prefer the employers' interest to that of the workers. Obviously this would be a ridiculous demand. If the committee acted thus it would be dismissed both justly and ignominiously, and men would be elected in its place to represent as powerfully as they could the cause for which they were trustees. The way of love in such a case is not the way of altruism; it is the way of reasonable claim and just award. Each party should state its claim as strongly but also as fairly as it can, with determination to accept the judgment of the most competent and impartial tribunal that can be devised; in other words, the way of love lies through justice. 175

It is clear that Temple rejects any hazy or sentimental altruism: if one finds oneself elected a trade union officer, there is a specific group of demands which follows. The expectation of ones fellows is that of behaving in an appropriate manner: and that manner is defined by role, which itself is the consequence of specific relationship. A mediator's task is different from that of a trade union official. (We have, in some ways, a throwback to Bradley's 'My Station and Its Duties': 'we may take it as an obvious fact that in my station my particular duties are prescribed to me, and I have them whether I wish to or not ... here and now ... my life has this and that function in this and that case.' 176)
It may even be the case that a duty which appears evidently right may, by circumstances, become wrong. Temple is conscious of this dilemma:

It may be right for a man on whom no one is dependent to throw up a lucrative employment in order to work in poverty among slum-dwellers. Is it equally right for him to do this if he is married? It can only be so if then his wife is willing to join in the same sacrifice. If both are agreed, it may be a noble act. But now suppose that they have an infant child. Is it still noble? Is it even permissible? The child cannot give consent, and its whole future, even its physical health may be jeopardised. A clear divine call may override all other considerations; but apart from such a call it may safely be said that duty forbids to the married man with children what it might require of him if he were unmarried. And the duty of the family as a whole is not the same as that of an isolated individual.177

This is not an academic argument, particularly in the Church of England. One of the greatest problems of the nineteenth century was the development of industrial slums. It was often difficult to find clergy to staff town parishes; clergy were unwilling to submit their families to the life involved.178 Temple's point, however, raises the question of the right ordering of demands. One frequently has a conflict of demands, created by different requirements of different orders: within one community there are many sub-communities, of family, work-place, trade union, church, nation, and a host of others. It is necessary at times to choose between them, and to balance their demands.

Bradley had recognised this: 'there are such facts as the family, then in a middle position a man's own profession and society, and, over all, the larger community of the state.'179
Bradley followed Hegel in his identification of the particular value of the state, with a relativity attaching to its laws. That is to say that for a Hegelian, as we have seen, there is a particular and, ultimately, unquestionable value in the state (see note 135): the state is the moral community. We have already seen Temple's comments on the limitations of considering the particular community of the state; now we must take up his suggestions of the priority of types of community, for these suggestions contain the basis of a post-Idealist doctrine of Natural Order.

Temple recognises three main types of groupings: each type requires close attention.

(i). 'The natural grouping by family or locality' - 'the community'

The first group contains all the categories envisaged by Bradley: it contains 'the local group - village, town, country, state, nation', and consists of the persons resident in that group. They are 'conscious of a common tradition, a common interest and, to some extent, a common purpose; they are also conscious with greater or less vividness of a distinction between their own and all other groups.' We should note that our participation in the community is inevitable by virtue of birth and nurture; it is not a matter of choice, though the part we may play in the community certainly is. It is a matter of awareness, not will, that we are members of the community. For this reason, that adherence requires little intellectual effort, its appeal is especially powerful. Temple sees this as egoistic, and the cause of narrow nationalism:

A community ... is inevitably self-regarding. Its whole raison d'être is to be itself ... the devotion on which a community relies in its members is devotion to itself, not to any object beyond itself.
And the community will display a natural egoism far more intense than that of the individual. In particular the nation is capable of developing an almost overwhelming power of egoistic energy. It has a uniquely penetrating hold upon the loyalty of its citizens, because it appeals to higher and lower nature - to their altruism and egoism - both at once. Consequently a whole-hearted response is possible without any preliminary conversion ... The natural community has by its nature an exorbitant egoism, partly because it is the end or goal of its own being, partly because its effectiveness in serving that end rests upon its appeal to the self-assertiveness of its members, while it also gives an outlet to their generosity and self-sacrifice; it is of its essence self-centred in a supremely high degree. The effects of this can only be mitigated if the members of the community feel themselves also to be members of something wider than itself.\textsuperscript{184} 

The community is natural to us; but it is not the whole answer to our needs. It is something of which we may be aware, and awareness can be fostered: a state and its politicians can - as the Nazis did - foster a perversion of community by emotional appeals - through flags, parades and other trappings - to the populace. Experience shows that unreflective nationalism is readily aroused: an awareness of the community is already there in the citizens, almost - as it were - awaiting encouragement. 

(ii). Association

Unlike our sense of community, which follows simply from the fact of our existence as social beings, the sense of association requires an act of will. To be a member of an association requires a conscious act of determination to join:
The second type of group is appropriately designated by the term "association". This represents the voluntary coming together of men for a specific object - the protection of some interest or the promotion of some cause. It may develop into a company of personal friends, but in itself it is limited by its own object and seldom creates much consciousness of difference between itself and other groups, unless these are concerned to resist it or to compete with it. 185

There are many organisations which fit Temple's description. Any student of industrial relations is conscious of how a trade union, for example, is such a voluntary organisation; and it is noticeable how the self-consciousness of a union - apart from among a handful of activists - only tends to develop when it is under pressure. If livelihoods or living standards are threatened a previously largely passive group will become active, and members become aware of their membership. Temple gives reasons both for this phenomenon and for the limitations of association:

An association is not of its essence self-regarding. Its purpose lies beyond itself. It exists to effect something. The aim may be very comprehensive or very limited; in either case the devotion on which it can count in its members is their devotion not to it, but to the object which it exists to serve. 186

One becomes a member of an association for a particular purpose or set of purposes - one may join a political party to attempt to bring about the political circumstances under which one would wish to live.

It is noticeable, however, that it is not always possible to make a clear distinction between 'community' and 'association':
... some associations tend to pass into communities. The great opposing groups of employers and employed are now very nearly natural communities, for men find themselves in one or the other more by force of circumstance than by choice, and each group has developed traditions of its own which are valued almost as much for their own sake as for their effectiveness in producing results.187 There is a significant point underlying Temple's comments. As we shall see when considering Natural Order, Temple, particularly towards the end of his career, was concerned to stress the significance of the 'right ordering' of means and ends: an action exists for an end. Sin and disorder occur when means and ends are confused, when means to an end become an end in themselves. Thus, for instance, someone may join a political party to try to bring about a change in social conditions - the collective action of the party is the means to that end. But it may happen that the end may come to be forgotten: for that activist the good of the Party takes precedence over the ends for which the party came into being. As a political phenomenon, this valuing of party above its purpose has become a commonplace; but the same effect is seen when an employee places loyalty to the organisation (or worse - demands loyalty to the organisation) above the purposes for which the organisation exists. Indeed, this confusion of means and ends disorders the organisation and weakens it, a point recently emphasised by R.E.Ewins:

The point of any co-operative enterprise is the production of some good. That point, or the common aim of the enterprise, properly informs the organisation and the rules allocating jobs and claims. Insofar as the rules fail to correspond with that point, the activity becomes more coercive and pointless and less cooperative. Requirements that somebody bear burdens unnecessary for the carrying out of the enterprise makes that enterprise less co-operative.188
Any association is open to the ebb and flow of greater or lesser commitment; or it may be abused, as when a man joins an association not for the sake of its purposes but for his own, as a man may become a Freemason not to serve the cause of universal brotherhood but because he believes that it may advance his career. As association is imperfect, though necessary, Temple posits a higher form of social grouping, which he calls 'Fellowship'.

(iii). Fellowship

In examining Temple's concept of Fellowship, we pass out of any purely political philosophy into theology:

... there is the type of group which alone deserves the name of "fellowship". It is a group of people whose union with one another is voluntary in the sense that it is neither a given natural fact, as with the family, nor compulsory as with the criminals collected at any one time in a prison. But it is not voluntary in the sense that it is deliberately planned by its members; rather they find themselves bound to one another by a common response to an ideal or to a leader. They have not banded themselves together to serve that ideal or to follow that leader; but each has made his own response, and therein has found himself united to all others who have also made it. An "association" formed for the promotion of some good cause may grow into this as the members rise to a higher level of devotion. But the only perfect example of such a "fellowship" is the Christian Church ... It is a true "fellowship" ... for its members are bound to one another by their partnership in something else, which is that same Holy Spirit.189
We are now in the realm of the most altruistic form of grouping - the most voluntary, and hence the most conscious. It is evident that what Temple has in mind is that traditional theological concept, the Body of Christ: 'The name of this fellowship, which ought ideally to be so close as to constitute a single personality, is the Church.'

This fellowship within the Body of Christ has profound significance within Temple's non-propositional view of faith, the view that the Word of God is not the Bible but Christ himself. Nowhere is the connection clearer than in an article of 1937:

... the Christian Church, the new Israel ... is constituted by the Incarnate Word of God, the Word spoken in Jesus of Nazareth; and it is itself a part of that Word which constitutes it. For the Living Word of God is the knowledge of God given to the commissioned community, and the fellowship of believers is not merely the congregation to which the Word is proclaimed, but is, in virtue of its nature as fellowship, the proclamation of that Word.

Clearly this fellowship is not merely an ethical or political fact: it is the essential condition of Christian life. Temple is at pains to stress the reality of his belief: fellowship, whether between people or with Christ, is direct: 'The fellowship of the Christian with his Lord does not in the smallest degree resemble the kind of communication which spiritualists believe to be possible between the spirits of the departed and ourselves. It is an intimate, personal fellowship.' Temple is here entirely consistent with his non-propositional view, perceiving the world as in community with Christ. There remains the central philosophical problem that one is placed in the position of accepting and sharing in such a view, or rejecting it. Temple believes the issue to be
clear-cut: 'I do hold most emphatically that the choice for us lies between Christian Theism and ultimate scepticism. And a priori I prefer the former ...'¹⁹³ This is an assertion of his belief that reason is fundamentally an intuitive thing, built out of the way we experience the whole universe: 'Reason is essentially a special kind of Intuition - the Intuition of Totality or of the Whole and of every fact in its place in the Whole.'¹⁹⁴

This perception of the fundamental nature of fellowship - and especially Christian fellowship lies at the heart of Temple's ethical and political thought. He stresses the point repeatedly - and this rather lengthy exposition of his thought on value in community has been necessary to begin to do justice to the insistence of this theme, both socially and theologically. In a lecture just a year before his death, Temple emphasised the significance of the community of religion: 'All the way down God has worked through this community of people, not only in isolated individual instances but in a social group, because the nature of man is fundamentally a social thing and if man is to be redeemed it must be a social redemption.'¹⁹⁵ In this, as in so many other ways, Temple parallels the 'living for others', the finding of the Word within the community, so passionately embraced by Dietrich Bonhoeffer:

Who is God? ... Encounter with Jesus Christ. The experience that a transformation of all human life is given in the fact that 'Jesus is there only for others'. His 'being there for others' is the experience of transcendence ... Our relation to God is not a 'religious' relationship to the highest, most powerful, and best Being imaginable - that is not authentic transcendence - but our relation to God is a new life in 'existence for others', through participation in the being of Jesus. The transcendental is not infinite and unattainable
tasks, but the neighbour who is within reach in any given situation ... The Church is the Church only when it exists for others ... The Church must share in the secular problems of ordinary life, not dominating, but helping and serving.196

Bonhoeffer and Temple represent an important strand in modern Protestantism. Temple's friend, R.H. Tawney, in Religion and the Rise of Capitalism had drawn attention to the effects on society of the individualism implicit - and sometimes explicit - in Protestantism, frequently accompanied by a radical separation of authority between Church and secular authorities. In their thought, and by the example of their lives, both men embody a different orientation towards society; and we are here able to discern the theological underpinnings of their views. In the Catholic tradition, Wojtyla likewise emphasises the idea that transcendence, the outward reaching of the self, is found in participation with others:

It is the person's transcendence in the action when the action is being performed "together with others" - transcendence which manifests that the person has not become altogether absorbed by social interplay and thus "conditioned", but stands out as having retained his very own freedom of choice and direction - which is the basis as well as the condition of participation. It also corresponds to the situation we emphasise over again, namely, of the integration of the person in the action; as we know, the latter is a complementary aspect relative to the former. To be capable of participation thus indicates that man, when he acts together with other men, retains in this acting the personalistic value of his own action and at the same time shares in the realisation and the results of communal acting. Owing to this share, man, when he acts together with others, retains everything
that results from the communal acting and simultaneously brings about - in this very manner - the personalistic value of his own action ... everything that constitutes the personalistic value of the action and the realisation of the transcendence and the integration of the person contained in it - is realised because of acting together with others ... We see now that participation is the factor that determines the personalistic value of cooperation. The sort of cooperation - or more precisely, of acting together with others - in which the element of participation is missing, deprives the actions of the person with their personalistic value. 197

Wojtyla's comments provide a useful gloss on Temple. He makes clear the idea that participation in fellowship must be more than merely formal: it is not sufficient simply to act with others - which necessarily we do through the interdependence of society - but we must make a full commitment of self in order to realise that self. To participate is to make an act of will, that we work for and with others; only thus is self realised. There is a special significance for this within the Christian community. At face value, it might appear that an eremitic existence - like that of a Carthusian or Trappist monk - would contradict the participative role demanded by Temple, Wojtyla and Bonhoeffer: the most frequent complaint against the contemplative life is than it is a withdrawal from the world. Wojtyla's view points in another direction. If it is true, as he suggests, that participation lies in the self, in the commitment of heart and will, and not simply in the performance of tasks with others - in the formal act of doing so - it would follow, given the Christian belief in the efficacy of prayer, that the commitment of heart and mind in the act of devotion for the world is both a concrete and true participation (in Wojtyla's terms) in human affairs. This is entirely consistent
with the actions of vocations directors in monasteries who give short shrift to novices who appear to wish to withdraw from the world. On this, Wojtyła and Temple are at odds. In The Kingdom of God, Temple wrote: 'With all its enormous virtues, the great objection to the monastic system appears to me to be this: it ignores the fact that you cannot cut yourself from your generation and live in it a life which is altogether at variance with its principles. If you do, it will be something forced and not natural.'

This difference in view is significant: it is perhaps most important in the question of the content of the idea of participation. It is one thing to talk of the need for fellowship and participation, another to give it concrete substance. There is in Christian thought a real controversy about the nature of this participation. Aquinas says that 'After God we are obliged by charity to love our neighbour, to whom we are bound by special social ties due to our common vocation to happiness. What charity obliges us to love in our neighbour is this: that together we may attain to happiness'. It is clear that for Aquinas, the sense of community, while inevitable, is not endowed with the totality with which it is imbued by Temple: 'man is a naturally sociable animal; men even in the state of innocence would have lived in society. Social life among many could not exist, however, unless someone took the position of authority to direct them to the common good. For many people are by their very multiplicity interested in a multiplicity of ends, while one person is concerned with one end.'

The tone here is very different from that of the three modern churchmen we have considered: for Aquinas, community is a fact of our social nature, but the community is not the spiritual entity that Temple hopes to see - its function is interpreted as a legalistic one: 'it is permitted to the entire community, although not to single individuals, to establish a law'.
Bonhoeffer, is quite alien to the medieval schoolman, who stated, 'the marriage bond is to be avoided at all costs by those tending to perfection, because this bond entangles a person in worldly cares'.

There are here clearly distinct views. On the one hand, we have Aquinas emphasising salvation obtained through love of God and the duty of charity towards the neighbour, on the other, Temple stressing social obligation, and, as we have seen, vocation in his specific sense with its echoes of Bradley. the concreteness of Temple - as opposed perhaps to the more individualistic, perhaps, in the pejorative sense, monastic view of Aquinas - lies in the emphasis he gives to the individual in his station as bound by the activities of others in the community. His participation - like Bonhoeffer's - lies in the reality of his position in the world. for Temple, monasticism cannot be part of that reality as it could be on Wojtyla's analysis of participation: for us, the question of the content of participation must remain open, but it is legitimate to ask whether Temple may not somewhat undervalue the extent to which we may properly alter our manner of participation, as, for instance, if I choose to alter my life to a new pattern, to undertake a new career, even to enter a monastery. Perhaps Temple would have emphasised this aspect a little more had he had the opportunity to consider the radical freedom of choice emphasised by the existentialists, but it could be argued that for most people such radicalism is never embraced: for ordinary men reality is the daily work of lives bound willy-nilly by circumstance.

* * *

We may conclude our consideration of the significance of personality by some reflections on how, through the route of Idealism, Temple had come to a view of the person common to many contemporary theologians. We have already seen the
similarities with Bonhoeffer and Wojtyla. We may note also some comments of Paul Tillich in the autumn of his life:

Contemporary ethical theory has strongly emphasised the person-to-person encounter as the experiential root of morality. The decisive reason for this is the basic difference between the encounter of a person with another person and his encounter with nonpersonal realities (Martin Buber's ego-thou as opposed to ego-it) ... There is, however, a limit here and now in the ego-thou encounter. The limit is the other person ... The acknowledgement of somebody as a person remains an external act that can be performed with legal detachment or cool objectivity. It can achieve justice without creating a relationship. Under many conditions this is the only way of actualising justice, especially in encounters of social groups. But mere objectivity never occurs between human beings. Accompanying "pure" detachment is always an element of involvement. In the encounter of person with person within a community of persons, "community" also expresses involvement because it implies mutual participation, and, by participation, union. And the desire for union of the separated (which is ultimately re-union) is love. All communions are embodiments of love, the urge for participation in the other one. Justice is taken into love if the acknowledgement of the other person as person is not detached but involved. In this way, love becomes the ultimate moral principle, including justice and transcending it at the same time. 205

There is nothing here with which Temple would disagree, even to the close identification of justice with love: 'it is axiomatic that Love should be the predominant Christian impulse, and that the primary form of Love is social
organisation is Justice'. But what is important in Tillich's expression of these ideas is the clue provided to the question, raised earlier in this chapter, of the is-ought dilemma.

Tillich, like Temple, recognises as fundamental the idea that morality is based on the other person. What is significant is the realisation that in reality we do treat people in different ways. There is a difference between our attitude towards personal and non-personal realities. This we know from experience. A personal appeal to our charity is more effective than an impersonal one. If a friend requires help, and I am able to give it, I do so: it seems the most natural thing in the world, whereas an impersonal appeal in a newspaper advertisement has not immediate appeal. The same phenomenon is evident to any fund-raiser for charity. To make an appeal effective it is best to film sufferers directly, to be brought into people's homes on television. This is commonplace, and it confirms Temple's emphasis on direct appeal, the use of imagination and the encounter with 'thou'. But it is necessary to take the argument further: and Tillich provides the key when he says that 'mere objectivity never occurs between human beings'.

I have insisted, both in chapter and in the present chapter that the significant point in valuing anything is the valuing self: and the common features between members of the community that 'this is valuable' (or, more accurately, 'we value this' - the valuing being a quality of the observers) are, I have suggested, the basis of useful discourse. I dissent from Temple in his attribution of some fixed value within a given object, preferring to concentrate on the quality of the observer, provided only that the possibility of agreement between individuals is borne in mind.
A potent clue to the development of this line of reasoning may be found in Brentano's philosophy. In Chapter 3, I drew attention to Brentano's emphasis - an echo of which can be found in Temple - on 'experiencing as', and the belief that the absoluteness of certain values is a fact of our psychology. It is now necessary to develop the idea further.

Brentano believed, as firmly as Temple, in the subject-object relationship as the fundamental of philosophical activity. The significance of Brentano, the founding father of Phenomenology (Edmund Husserl was his pupil), lies in the special analysis of the state of mind of the subject. For Brentano, one is never simply a detached observer of phenomena. (We may note that Brentano argued in the latter part of his career that we are presented only with individuals, not propositions or states of affairs: this is why Kotarbinski notes that 'there is a striking similarity between some of the ideas of the old philosopher and the early ideas of concretism, especially those concerned with semantics'.) Like Temple - though for different reasons - he rejects any simple Cartesian belief in a pure, observing intellect. If there is an act of perception there is no neutral perceiver: the perceiver is a sentient being, and the act of perception involves - in Brentano's terms - the primitive emotional experience of love or hatred, or as Chisholm more gently expresses it, 'the object of presentation is an object of a proemotion or of an antiemotion'. And from the fact that we experience some things favourably and others unfavourably, we develop the sense of preference: if I love this and hate that (a primitive emotion), I naturally develop the concept that I prefer this to that. Preference is a matter of judgment - something which is more than a mere desire: 'a man may have a rational preference which conflicts with some passionate desire'. The intellectual side of the concept must be firmly understood, for Brentano is not concerned with a simple emotivism. He is positive that 'a feeling of compulsion may well be a force that
drives us to action, but it is not a sanction that confers
validity'.

There is a distinction between feeling and judging. Judgment
is an intellectual act of decision about the content of our
original perception. And of judgments we can say, as of any
significant proposition, that they are correct or incorrect.
Thus if I say I hate the smell of fish, that is a simple
expression of an emotional reaction: to speak of my statement
as 'correct' or 'incorrect' (assuming that I am known to be
veracious) is not relevant. But, for Brentano, if I say that I
ought to do this or that, or that this is 'good', I am making a
judgment of which it is possible to affirm correctness. From
this we can derive our notion of the good: 'We call a thing
good when the love relating to it is correct. In the broadest
sense of the term, the good is that which is worthy of love,
that which can be loved with a love that is correct.'

Brentano holds that the knowledge that a particular thing is
good - that we have a duty to behave in a particular way - is a
matter of self-evidence, not in the sense that a mathematical
proposition is self-evident, but rather in the fact that it is
experienced as correct, in the way noted in Chapter Four. In
a letter to Oskar Kraus he clarified the distinction:

"Knowledge is good" is not like the law of
contradiction; the concepts, just by themselves, do
not enable us to see that it is a true proposition.
In this way it differs from the principles of
mathematics; one can see, from the concepts alone,
that two plus one is equal to three, for "two plus
one" is the analytic definition of "three".

You note, however, that we also know, on the basis of
concepts alone, that two plus one is necessarily
equal to three, although the concept of necessity
does not lie in the concept of two plus one. ... What happens in such cases is this: We combine three with two plus one by means of a negative copula, and then reject this combination apodictically. We are then led to concepts such as that of the impossible by reflecting on the apodictic judgement. Thus there is an experience from which we derive such concepts as that of the impossible, and the object of this experience is the apodictic judgement.

It is in this way, then, that we arrive at the judgement, "It is necessarily true that two plus one is equal to three," despite the fact that the concept of "necessarily true" is not included in that of "two plus one". And this is quite different from the way in which we arrive at a generalisation such as,"It is necessarily true that a physical body that is at rest will remain at rest unless it is disturbed by some other physical body, and that a physical body that is in motion will move in a straight line and with uniform speed unless it is disturbed by some other physical body". In the case of mathematical judgement, but not in the present case, the apodictic judgement, which provides the occasion for abstracting the concept of impossibility, arises out of the concepts alone. The ethical case is also unlike that of mathematics: the mere concept, "knowledge which is not good", does not provide the occasion for an apodictic rejection.

Thus still another experience is needed. The concept of knowledge must give rise to an act of love, and this love, just because it does arise in this way, is experienced as being correct. For a purely intellectual being, the thought that "two plus one is not equal to three" would be sufficient to give rise
to its apodictic rejection; but (supposing for the moment, that the concept of the good is given a priori) the thought that "Knowledge is not good" would not give rise to apodictic rejection.

But the experience required is analogous to the one that we undergo upon contemplating, "It is impossible for two and one not to be equal to three". For the love that is experienced as being correct also arises out of concepts, and it is just because of this fact that the love is experienced as being correct. And so you are right in saying that this way of arriving at a generalisation is quite different from what takes place when we make an induction. For where we have an induction in the strict and proper sense, as in the example above, we have only a probable generalisation (in the most favourable case, one that is infinitely close to certainty). But in the ethical case, we have the absolute certainty of an apodictic judgement.

And so I think we should protest against calling this knowledge empirical - despite the fact that, in order to acquire the knowledge, it is necessary to feel and experience love. The knowledge that we have here is a priori. But when we say that a certain type of knowledge is a priori, we do not mean to imply that the concepts which it involves can be given without perception and apperception. What distinguishes the present type of a priori knowledge from the others is the fact that one must perceive and apperceive certain acts of love and not merely certain intellectual cognitions.216
It is clear that Brentano believes that there are several ways in which a thing may be self-evident; but it has to be said that nowhere does he fully develop a system for doing so. In simple terms however we can say that his method is analogical - in several works he stresses that the method is analogical to our sense of self-evidence in other spheres: 'We call something good in view of the fact that the love directed upon it is experienced as being correct, just as we say that an object exists if the acknowledgement directed upon it is directly or indirectly evident.' The implication of this is, I think, that to ask for demonstration of the ethical by the rules of formal logic, with its mathematical method, is inappropriate, in much the same way that formal logic is inappropriate in musical appreciation; or indeed in immediate perception, though logic is a tool in the interpretation of perception. Just so, it can be a tool in the interpretation of initial moral impulse, though it cannot justify the impulse itself, just as it cannot justify a primitive perception. I suggest, and I think Brentano implies, that the sense of duty is itself, at least in part, a natural perception built out of human nature, rather than by any logical process. Thus, if I have the feeling of love towards someone it is a natural and universal inclination to do good for her. It is not that I make a logical connection between perceiving her as lovable and determining on that basis that I ought to act in an altruistic way towards her: my behaviour arises directly out of the way I perceive. To experience this person in this way is to behave in this way: my behaviour is part of my experiencing her as lovable. Intellect may then modify or direct my behaviour; but it is not the impulse to it. Where intellect does play a part is in the action of seeing that if x is worthy of being treated in this way, anyone intrinsically like x ought also to be treated with similar consideration. Then I am beginning to construct a principle of justice: but the impulse of love which gave rise to it is, I believe, a primitive and natural one. I can give (to an extent) a scientific reason for it - based on
evolutionary, biological and social evidence - but not a strictly logical one. Brentano implies the same - of right feeling, he says 'the natural pleasure we take is a more exalted form of love, experienced as being right. In discovering this love within ourselves we recognise the object not only as being loved and lovable, but also as being worthy of love.' Brentano implies that the object ought to be loved.

If it is true that the process of duty follows not by logical procedure but out of a natural impulse, it should not be at all surprising if, as Brentano asserts, there is considerable unity among men on the basis of ethics. This we have already considered in an earlier section of the present chapter, with a variety of evidence. The distinction which Temple draws between impulse and control is, in its essence, echoed in the idea of Brentano that right thinking is 'exalted' and reflective - that right action follows most truly when the experience of love of an object matches the realisation that to pursue the object will lead to an increase in happiness, and is thus a proper love.

Two implications of Brentano's thought, which find parallels in Temple, must also be mentioned. The first is that any ethics must be, if not an ethics of virtue, at least largely concerned with the growth of the self, and, indeed, Temple devoted much of his life's work to the question of moral education and the moulding of the self to make right judgments.

Secondly, we may note that Brentano finds that his theory leads naturally to a form of Natural Law position, the view that 'the word "natural" may refer to those rules which can be known to be correct and binding, in and for themselves, and in virtue of their own nature; rules that are "natural" in this sense contrast with the arbitrary dictates which those in power may happen to lay down.' In the traditional conflict between
positive and natural law theorists, Brentano is clearly allied with the latter. So too is Temple.

In considering Temple's view of Natural Order, it will, I hope, be possible to draw together the threads of the arguments raised thus far; but if one area of reconciliation for these arguments lies in the community and in our active participation in the right ordering of it, another is in the plenitude of God.

Notes

1. The Nature of Personality, 1911
2. 1936
3. Christianity in Thought and Practice: pp.62-64
4. Christus Veritas: pp.7-8
5. Chapter Three, above, note 14
6. Christianity in Thought and Practice: pp.61-65
7. Chapter Four, above, note 21
8. ibid.: note 23
9. Chapter Two, above, note 36
10. Chapter Three, above, note 63
11. 'Some Implications of Theism' in Contemporary British Philosophy, Vol.1, p.418
12. Christianity in Thought and Practice: pp.50-51
13. ibid.: p.51
14. ibid.: p.51
15. ibid.: p.52
17. ibid.: p.936
18. Summa Theologica, I, 29, 3
19. Christianity in Thought and Practice: pp.53-54
20. ibid.: p.53
22. Christianity in Thought and Practice: pp.53-54
23. Mens Creatrix: p.72
25. ibid.: p.206
26. ibid.: pp.204-205
27. Mens Creatrix: p.70
28. note 22, above
29. note 14, above
30. Mens Creatrix: p.167
31. e.g. Joseph Fletcher: William Temple: Twentieth Century Christian: p.47
32. Mens Creatrix: pp.169-170
34. ibid.: pp.28-29
35. ibid.: p.29
36. Mens Creatrix: p.169
37. ibid.: p.170
38. ibid.: p.171
39. ibid.: p.171
40. ibid.: p.172
41. The Nature of Personality: pp.xxvii-xxviii
42. Mens Creatrix: p.78
43. Christus Veritas: p.58
44. Karol Wojtyla: The Acting Person: p.11
45. ibid.: p.162
46. Christianity in Thought and Practice: p.54
47. Mens Creatrix: p.288
48. Christianity in Thought and Practice: p.54
49. Romans: Chapter 2, Verse 15
52. ibid.: pp.226-239
53. see, e.g., Norman J. Bull: *Moral Judgement from Childhood to Adolescence*: p.18
54. ibid.: p.14
55. H. Hartshorne and M. A. May
56. R. J. Havinghurst and H. Taba
57. see, e.g. C. I. Sandstrom: *The Psychology of Childhood and Adolescence*: p.192
58. Norman J. Bull: *Moral Judgement from Childhood to Adolescence*: p.8
59. ibid.: p.8
60. Maya Pines: 'Good Samaritans at Age Two': *Psychology Today*, June 1979: p.70
61. ibid.: p.66
62. ibid.: p.70
63. Norman J. Bull: *Moral Judgement from Childhood to Adolescence*: p.8
64. Edward O. Wilson: *On Human Nature*: pp.5-6
66. *Mens Creatrix*: p.170
67. Peter Singer: *The Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology*
68. ibid.: pp.48-49
69. ibid.: p.49
70. ibid.: pp.6-7, also Edward O. Wilson: *Sociobiology*: p.124
71. ibid.: p.68
73. quoted by Ervin Nemsszeghy S. J. and John Russell S. J.: *Theology of Evolution*: p.69
74. see, e.g. note 26, above
75. *Nature Man and God*: p.204
76. Irenaeus: *Adversus Haereses*: iv, xiii, 1
ed. Illtud Evans: p.112
78. Peter Singer: *The Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology*: p.36
79. ibid.: p34, quoted from Yonana Talmon: *Family and Community in the Kibbutz*, (1972)
80. see, e.g. H.Kent Geiger: *The Family in Soviet Russia*: passim
81. ibid.: pp.217-239
82. ibid.: p.217
83. Alisdair Clayre: *The Heart of the Dragon*: p.80
86. Simon and Schuster, 1972
87. ibid.: pp.289-294
88. For an important discussion of this, see Christine Battersby: 'Morality and the Ik', *Philosophy*, April 1978, Vol.53. No.204: pp.201-214
90. *Christus Veritas*: p.24
91. see Chapter Four, section 3, above
92. *The Hope of a New World*: p.23
93. *The Nature of Personality*: p.51
94. *Christus Veritas*: p.75
96. ibid.: p.73
97. ibid.: p.76
98. ibid.: pp.76-77
99. ibid.: p.77
100. ibid: p.76
101. ibid.: p.77
102. ibid.: p.80
103. Edward Heath: Foreword to William Temple: *Christianity and Social Order*: p.2
104. **Nature Man** and **God**: pp.77-78
105. B.Russell: *The Problems of Philosophy*: passim
109. ibid.: pp.71-72
110. Baron von Hugel (1852-1925) is today an unjustly neglected figure. Identified with the Modernists, he nevertheless remained a loyal - if slightly eccentric - member of the Roman Catholic Church, and a writer of broad interests in philosophy of religion and theology. His thought was perhaps most influential outside the Catholic Church.
112. *Nature Man and God*: p.80
113. *Mens Creatrix*: p.84
114. ibid.: pp.84-85
115. ibid.: p.85
116. ibid.: p.85
117. ibid.: p.85
118. ibid.: p.86
120. see note 109, above
121. *Nature Man and God*: pp.404-426
122. ibid.: pp.421-422
123. ibid.: p.426
124. ibid.: p.424
125. ibid.: p.334
126. ibid.: p.334
127. 'Religious Experience': reprinted in *Religious Experience*: p.60
129. ibid.: pp.335-336
131. Christianity and Social Order: p.29
132. Quoted in Nature Man and God: p.189
133. F.H. Bradley: Ethical Studies: p.166
134. ibid.: p.166
135. Temple, I shall suggest, goes beyond this by accepting a
Natural Law position; Hegelians hold the nation-state as the
supreme unit of ethical behaviour: 'Hegel's state is the
ethical community. It is not an institution for the realisation
of ethics but is this realisation itself.' - Carl Joachim
Friedrich: The Philosophy of Law in Historically Perspective:
p.131
136. F.H. Bradley: Ethical Studies: p.174
137. A.J.M. Milne: The Social Philosophy of English Idealism:
p.64
138. see note 129
139. Nature Man and God: p.189
140. ibid.: p.189
141. Christianity in Thought and Practice: pp.56-57
143. Christianity in Thought and Practice: p.57
144. Nature Man and God: p.405
145. ibid.: p.406
146. see note 140
147. Aristotle: Nichomachean Ethics: Book 1, Chapter vii
148. St. Thomas Aquinas: Commentary on Nichomachean Ethics: 1,1
149. Karol Wojtyla: The Acting Person: p.262
151. I. Kant: Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of
Moral (Abbott's translation): p.56 quoted in Nature Man and
God: p.189, and referred to in Christianity in Thought and
Practice: p.57
152. Nature Man and God: p.191
153. ibid.: pp.191-192
154. The Nature of Personality: p.6
155. Nature Man and God: p.194
156. V.I. Lenin: The Tasks of the Youth Leagues: Speech
Delivered at the Third All-Russia Congress of the Russian Young Communist League, October 2, 1920 from Selected Works; pp.614-615

157. G.K. Chesterton: *What's Wrong With the World*: p.100
158. ibid.: p.282
160. ibid.: p.192
162. ibid.: p.382
164. Chapter Three, note 105-110
165. *Mens Creatrix*: p.159
166. ibid.: p.158
167. ibid.: p.38
168. *Christianity in Thought and Practice*: p.59
169. see Joseph Fletcher: *William Temple*: Twentieth Century Christian: p.311
171. *Christianity in Thought and Practice*: pp.59-60
172. Martin Buber: *I and Thou*: p.11
175. *Christianity in Thought and Practice*: pp.77-78
176. F.H. Bradley: *Ethical Studies*: pp.176-177
177. *Christianity in Thought and Practice*: pp.76-77
178. '...the vicar of St. Mathias, Bethnal Green, Mr. Colbourne, who had a name as an effective and zealous pastor, refused to accept the living if he were required by the bishop to reside in the parish, because there was not a house to be had, and the parish was unhealthy to reside in. He refused to subject his children to the trial of growing up in a sewerless, fever-ridden alley among a gin-drinking, fornicating rabble.' - Owen Chadwick: *The Victorian Church*: Vol.I: p.331
179. F.H. Bradley: *Ethical Studies*: p.174
180. see note 140, above
181. Christianity in Thought and Practice: p.78
182. ibid.: p.78
183. ibid.: p.78
184. ibid.: pp.81-82
185. ibid.: p.79
186. ibid.: pp.80-81
187. ibid.: p.85
189. Christianity in Thought and Practice: pp.79-80
190. Christian Faith and Life: p.125
191. Essay in Revelation: ed. John Baillie and Hugh Martin: p.113
192. The Preacher's Theme Today: p.41
193. The Nature of Personality: p.95
195. 'The Church in the Bible' (Lecture at Bible House, London, 8th October, 1943) reprinted in Religious Experience: p.215
197. Karol Wojtyla: The Acting Person: p.269
198. The Kingdom of God: p.84
199. St. Thomas Aquinas: De perfectione vitae spiritualis: Chapter II
200. Summa Theologica: I q.96, a.4
201. ibid.: I-II, q.97, a.3, ad.3
202. De perfectione vitae spiritualis: Chapter VIII
203. see notes 175, 177 above
204. see, e.g., Jean-Paul Sartre: Existentialism and Humanism: passim
205. Paul Tillich: Morality and Beyond: pp.31,33
206. Christianity and Social Order: p.78
207. see note 205, above
208. Chapter Four, notes 59-66
209. see R.M.Chisholm: Brentano and Intrinsic Value: pp.9-18
210. Thadeusz Kotarbinski: Gnosiology: p.432
211. R.M. Chisholm: Brentano and Intrinsic Value: p.18
212. Franz Brentano: Letter to Oskar Kraus, September 9, 1908, reprinted in The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong: p.114
214. ibid.: p.18
215. see Chapter Four, note 65
216. Franz Brentano: Letter to Oskar Kraus, March 24th, 1904, reprinted in The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong: pp.112-113
218. ibid.: p.132
220. see notes 36 and 37, above
221. see, for instance, Franz Brentano: The Foundation and Construction of Ethics: pp.279-376
222. Franz Brentano: The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong: p.4
If personality is the highest value, God is the supreme form of personality. Temple, in holding this view, is in a significant religious tradition. Aquinas, writing of the idea of personality, says:

"Person" refers to that which is most perfect in the whole of nature, namely to that which subsists in rational nature. Now, because God's nature has all perfection, and thus every kind of perfection, and thus every kind of perfection should be attributed to him, it is fitting to use the word "person" to speak of God; yet when it is used of God it is not used exactly as it is of creatures, but in a higher sense, just as is the case with other words naming creatures ... the word "person" is not discovered in the text of the Old or New Testament as referring to God. Yet what this word means is often present in Holy Scripture, namely, that his is the peak of self-existence and most perfect in wisdom ... Although we may not use "person" in its original meaning of God, we may extend this acceptably for our present purpose. Since famous men were represented in comedies and tragedies, the word "person" (persona: mask) came to be used to refer to men of high rank. In the ecclesiastical world there grew up the habit of referring to 'personages' of rank. For this reason some theologians define "person" as "a hypostasis distinguished by dignity". To subsist in rational nature is characterised by dignity, and so, as we said, every individual with rational nature is spoken of as "person". Certainly the dignity of divine
nature surpasses every nature, and thus it is entirely suitable to speak of God as "person".  

If we take the analogical use of religious language - the Thomist idea that when we use words like 'faith', 'love' in relation to God, we are using them analogically - we find here that Aquinas is reversing his common procedure, but he is entirely consistent with the view expressed in his Fourth Way of demonstrating the existence of God: 'There is ... a truest and best and most noble thing, and so most fully existing. Now when many things share some property, whatever most fully possesses it causes it in others. To use Aristotle's example, fire, the hottest of all things, causes all other things to be hot. There is, therefore, something that causes in all other things their being, their goodness, and any other perfection they possess.' Aquinas also stresses the idea that 'God is the first exemplar of everything.'

On this view, God himself is the truest and most full personality: when we claim personality for ourselves we are not taking a human quality and attributing it to god; rather we are claiming our creature status, reflecting the creator.

Such an outlook is entirely consonant with the logic of Temple's position. If, as we have seen, personality is for him the highest value, we would expect God to be the supreme exemplification of that personality. In Nature, Man and God, Temple is specific about this: 'the explanation of the world is to be sought in a Personal Reality, or to use the historic phrase, in a Living God.'

The Fourth Way of Aquinas is, I think, a particularly weak argument for the existence of God. He deduces from comparability of things a greatest in the series, which is God: only so can a series be judged. But if I see two books, one larger than another, I do not need to infer an infinitely
larger book in order to recognise this as bigger than that: the existence of the series itself demands the comparison which I as observer make. (I am inclined to believe that the basis of comparison is not in the objects or in a relation subsisting between them, but in the perception of the observer: the comparison 'exists' because the observer has made it.) The same is true of moral judgments: if I perceive this person to be more generous than another, it is because I see him perform more generous actions than the other. From a given series we do not need to infer a first or last term. As we saw in Chapter Three, Temple expressed a similar view: 'whether there is in fact a lowest and highest term in this scale of finite existences, I do not know and do not greatly care.'

If we find Aquinas' Fourth Way inadequate, it is clear that by recognising the possibility of an infinite series Temple is, he believes, cutting himself off from any reliance on a First Cause argument. It is interesting to follow Temple's arguments for God's existence, because he attempts - not always very successfully - to base his view on his non-propositional view of revelation; which means a tendency to eschew the traditional means of natural theology. A close reading of Nature, Man and God reveals a tension. The terms of the Gifford Trust require the chosen lecturer to lecture on natural theology - and yet Temple implicitly rejects the methods of that school of thought. At times in the lectures one is conscious that Temple is not fulfilling his terms of reference: Emil Brunner, in a letter to Temple, pointed out that all his conclusions are determined by his Christian faith and that:

Your conception of natural theology does not seem to me a consistent one. On the one hand, it approaches what I would call Christian Philosophy - thought which does indeed start from the Christian faith, but which is abstracted from it in the actual process of development and presentation; the Christian faith
itself, however, determines the course of thought, performing, we might say, a regulative rather than a constructive function.

On the other hand, it seems also intended as true natural theology, by which I mean a kind of thought which does not even allow the Christian faith a regulative influence on the thought process, but which comes down simply and solely on the side of that power of logical argument which is at anyone's disposal, and of the facts, which are accessible to anyone.

Thirdly, you understand by natural theology thought which includes in its scope the facts of religion, and therefore also of Christianity as well, and which consequently, as embracing Christianity, seems to be striving towards a kind of synthesis of Christian faith with reason. So, for instance, your conception of religion is determined a priori by Christian faith, and is deduced from it; the same applies to your concepts of sin, love, personality, etc. This means, however, that in these passages your natural theology is natural only in appearance, while it is in truth Christian. In the third and final part of your book, your expositions are substantially, even predominantly, nothing more nor less than Christian dogmatics, even though the difference in method is repeatedly stressed.6

I see no reason to dissent from Brunner's view: throughout Temple's work one is conscious of the Christian attempting to express his views in philosophical terms rather than a more strictly philosophical approach - Wojtyla, in The Acting Person writes as a philosopher rather than a philosophical churchman:
there is no internal evidence of the cardinal, as there is, I think, in Temple of the bishop.

The confusion about natural theology is the consequence of two factors: Temple's personal spiritual history and the personalism of his philosophical approach.

We have already noted the confidence which characterises Temple's approach to philosophical matters. This habit seems to have been natural to him. A revealing letter was written to his father, by then Archbishop of Canterbury, in 1899:

There is a great advantage to Kant's system ... If we consider that Time is a real object, of the nature of eternal progress, and then say that God cannot change, as we must say, we shall very nearly destroy the Personality of our Idea; God will appear to us to be a fixed Law, capable of no modification, and if a Person at all - then a Person incapable of action; for action implies change of some sort, though not necessarily of character: and, which is far more important, we shall be unable to state with reason that prayers can have any effect. But if we abolish Time, God's Personality is just like ours; His real Essence is unaffected by Time; yet He is revealed to our sensibility by actions, representing in phenomena the Object of Deity. I think this argument is correct, and, if so, it is certainly one of the strongest I know in favour of Kant's system.

The most significant point is not the validity of Temple's argument, but the habits of mind revealed. The characteristic concern with personality is already evident. Kant is judged not on his own merits, but by whether his view is consonant with Temple's previous religious beliefs. A careful study of Temple's life shows that he seems to have had a remarkable lack
of self-doubt about his religious beliefs. He doubted certain aspects of doctrine - the Bishop of Oxford, in 1906, refused him ordination because of his doubts about the Virgin Birth and the Bodily Resurrection of Christ - there were none at all about the fundamental correctness of the Christian interpretation of life. E.V.Knox noted that even as a boy, 'he had a sort of quiet purpose that was recognised ... Temple could accept the rough and tumble, be a butt for mockers, give as good as he received, keep a fixed resolve and a simple faith.'9 Dorothy Emmet, who knew him well in the last years of his life said that 'we get the impression that he is never very seriously puzzled.'10 It is said that the only time Temple was unable to answer a question was when he was asked to justify his belief in the existence of God. We have seen already Bishop Barnes' comment that the young Temple was 'placidly critical', and that later 'a dreadful orthodoxy seems to have enveloped him'11: and Dean Inge felt his approach to be insufficiently critical.12 Temple himself believed that his father's daily bible readings made 'natural and spontaneous that whole outlook upon life which the Bible expresses.'13 In Christus Veritas, he says that he is 'trying to set out a whole view of the world and life as it appears to one mind at least from an avowedly Christian standpoint.'14 That luxury is not formally available to him in the terms of the Gifford Trust: yet it seems that Temple is most himself when writing as a professed Christian.

His personalism we have seen repeatedly: for Temple, religion is a matter of experience. Natural theology is base on the idea, as we saw in Chapter Three15, that reason can, without special revelation, deduce certain truths about God. For a non-propositional thinker, such as Temple or Karl Barth, it is a matter of total experience that the world is perceived in a particular way. One does not believe in God or disbelieve in him as in an intellectual proposition: one either knows him or does not, as one knows or does not know a person. It is thus little wonder that Temple strikes many readers as uncertain
about natural theology: it requires a habit of mind quite alien
to him.

Thus we have to consider his views of the existence of God from
a special sort of perspective. Conventional neo-Thomist ideas
have a strong natural theology bias, while Temple is unable to
follow this path. An evident problem arises. If I say 'I
experience this in such-and-such a way', it is, as I indicated
in Chapter Three, in one sense sufficient for for my listener
to reply, 'Well, I don't'. If my response is that I am
interpreting 'correctly', and my listener 'incorrectly', I
raise problems of authentication which seem soluble only by
traditional philosophical means. Some recent philosophical work
does appear to offer the opportunity of assessing the possible
validity of experiential approaches to faith: these comments we
shall consider while outlining Temple's final arguments for
God's existence. In doing so, we are, as it were, gathering
together the threads of arguments already delineated in earlier
chapters. This reflects Temple's own method: he speaks
variously of concentric circles and converging lines; for him,
all experience, whether of intellect, of beauty or of ethical
concerns, points towards the God of his belief.

THE FOUR DIALECTICAL TRANSITIONS

In Nature, Man and God, Temple presents in most detail his
thoughts on God in a form more complete than elsewhere; it is
therefore most helpful to concentrate our attention on the
argument of the Gifford Lectures, not least because they bring
together many strands of arguments already considered. It is
within this context that criticisms already outlined in general
terms should be applied with more specific force, and
implications more thoroughly developed. Recent developments
have provided ideas in the philosophy of religion - notably in
the work of Swinburne16, Gaskin17, Lewis18, Shepherd19,
O'Hear20, Smart21, Hick22, Hubbeling23 and many others - which
enable the recent reader to understand Temple's arguments with
great clarity, and, I shall suggest, to recognise implications
of which he seems largely unaware.

In Nature, Man and God, Temple uses a method which he calls
'dialectical transition'. I think that we should interpret the
term 'dialectical' very loosely in this context, stripped of
its Hegelian connotations. It is wisest to understand it as
being synonymous with 'argument from experience' or perhaps
'interaction of mind with experience'; put simply, it is
perhaps no more than an arbitrary label for stages in his
argument, and should be read as no more than that - it is in no
way central to his views to burden the idea of 'dialectic' with
any ideological trappings - as Thomas notes: '... it may be
that the idea that his argument consisted of dialectical
transitions was an afterthought ... and that the method of the
theistic argument is dialectical only in the general sense
employed by Plato.'

Temple's argument consists of four 'dialectical transitions' or
stages. The first transition is an argument developed from the
scientific picture of the world, and the explanatory power of
mind. The second transition is based on the requirement of
personal reality as an explanation of value. The third
transition is based on an attempt to answer the problem of
evil. The fourth is not really a theistic argument at all: it
is rather an outline of the need for, and a justification of,
specific revelation.

a). The First Dialectical Transition

Temple believes that the world can only truly be understood in
terms of mind: we can - at least in outline - explain the world
in this way; and it is inexplicable on any other criterion. The
essence of this transition is the search for explanation, which
should be distinguished from an enquiry into causation: Temple
is not covertly introducing a version of the First Cause argument - if his argument has predecessors, we should perhaps look to Aquinas' Third Way, the argument from contingency\textsuperscript{25}. As we shall see, a number of recent philosophers, notably Shepherd, have concentrated on the explanatory elements of arguments for God.

In our discussion of Temple's argument, we shall note how themes developed earlier recur, notably in connection with value and personality. The underlying principle of the argument is summarised by Temple thus:

The ground of the universe, by reference to which the universe is explicable or intelligible, must be such that it requires no further explanation of itself. But all ways of accounting for facts or occurrences in terms of physical laws call for further explanation - and that in two ways: they explain what is by reference to what was; but this in turn calls for explanation by reference to what was before that; and the physical law itself is not self-explanatory. Why is it so, and not otherwise?

Now Mind, determined by Good as apprehended, is such a principle of explanation as is required ... When Mind, determined by Good as apprehended, initiates activity, no further explanation is needed. The enquiring mind, confronted with an example of what it perfectly understands as the essential characteristic of its own being, is completely satisfied. Whenever the subject of enquiry is traced to the action of intelligently purposive mind, the enquiry is closed; Mind has recognised itself and is satisfied.\textsuperscript{26}

It is necessary to examine each state of the argument as presented in Lectures V and VIII: much is more controversial
than Temple perhaps realises. Underlying the argument is much reliance on Whitehead's process thought: the significance of this will become apparent as we progress.

The argument begins in a lengthy consideration of the nature of mind in the world and of the coherence of mind with the world: 'there is a kinship between Mind and the World, so that we can assert of the World a relation of correspondence to Mind as we know it in ourselves, and can affirm that our minds rightly find themselves at home in the world.' He accepts of this kinship that 'it may be urged that this is only natural, for the mind is a product of nature and has grown up in intercourse with nature in order to guide our nature; consequently nature seems to correspond to mind because mind was actually constructed in correspondence to nature. Even if that be admitted ... yet the actual kinship remains.'

Is there truly the kinship between the mind and nature that Temple stresses throughout his work? Some reflections on scientific method could suggest - though not prove - otherwise. Suppose that an unmanned probe is being sent to some far-off planet to investigate its geological structure. It will land on that planet and scoop up rock samples which it will then test. The tests will have been programmed on earth. Any test will necessarily be experientially based; we know how to test for silver or for mercury because we have experience of these elements. Our earthly programmers would, I presume, incorporate into the probe tests for every known element. Suppose the planet has elements hitherto unknown on earth. The tests, having no point of reference, could at most tell us that the planet contains unknown elements, but their nature would be intrinsically unknowable unless sufficient data, and probably the elements themselves, could be returned to earth for experimental analysis. But it is quite within the bounds of possibility that an element might be so minuscule or so diffuse that it escaped the sensitivity of the testing machines: in
which case we would remain quite unaware of its existence. The probe is such that it can only test truly what it is designed to test.

Now, the same may be true of the human self. I receive information from the world through the five senses; but it is not impossible that there may be something in nature that I cannot in any sensible way detect. Not only would it be impossible for me to detect its existence, but I cannot make any assertions about it one way or another: I simply have no means of detection. I cannot grow another sense in order to detect it; and would be unlikely to develop a machine which converts it into data I can receive - as my radio converts radio waves into comprehensible form - if there is no way by which my intellect can become aware of it. (This of course is not to say we are necessarily unaware of an unseen star by deductions from the movements of known stars. I am concerned here with the possibility of an entity with no evidences, direct or indirect, to our senses.) There may be such things or there may not: in principle it would be unknowable, and that unknowableness surely rules out more than a provisional assertion of a coherence or kinship between our minds and the universe.

Again, an evolutionist might argue that a particular development of senses might be the consequence of evolutionary factors: the human race has developed such senses in such a way as are needed to survive. We know that our senses are not the same as those of other creatures: bats and dogs have hearing abilities to detect sounds to which we are deaf. Further, it may be argued that it is an evolutionary necessity to develop our perceptions in an orderly way, to perceive them as ordered and coherent: if we did not, we should not long survive. But we would need only such coherence as would be sufficient for survival, and, it may be urged, such coherence as would enable us to feel 'at home' in the world. For psychic survival, we
need to feel a sense of kinship with the world, just as we need for physical survival a sense of danger. But we have to be aware that feeling a sense of kinship is not the same as actually being akin: a feeling 'that our minds rightly find themselves at home in the world', even if universally true of humanity, which may be doubted, may not be justified. That something 'feels right' does not make it so; something we must bear in mind in Temple's several appeals to a sense of satisfactoriness.

The first part of the argument concerns the kinship of world and mind, of subject and object. The second involves the explanatory power of mind. Temple notes that any complete explanation of the world process must incorporate an account of the phenomenon of mind: 'our minds discover themselves to be occurrences within, and forming part of, the process with which they recognise kinship, so that a full account of the process must account for them along with the rest, and a full explanation of the process must explain how they come to be part of it.'

He rejects the notion that there can be a material explanation for the emergence. His reasoning is interesting, and depends ultimately on experience: 'as far as our experience goes, matter does not generate thought, nor does thought generate matter.' His appeal is to our experience of the phenomenon of explanation - we naturally have the requirement for explanation: it is part of our experience that we want answers, and answers that satisfy us as complete. In our experience of matter, 'there is no known principle that is self-explanatory; of every principle or systematisation of experience it is possible to ask - Why is it thus and not otherwise?'

Temple's rejection of material explanations is very brief. He considers the Epicurean thesis in less than a paragraph:
At one period a certain school of philosophers would have been content to answer that in infinite time every permutation and combination of the ultimate particles of matter is bound to occur, and this is the one that is occurring now. I am not satisfied that such a view expresses a sound logic of probability; but it is scarcely worth while to discuss that point, because the argument in question ignores and contradicts the essential principle of the organism. An organism is not a mere collection of juxtaposed particles or cells. Its nature is determined by its principle of unity; and this also determines the organisms that proceed from it. Consequently of the whole organic world — whether that be the entire universe or not — we are bound to say, with Whitehead,

"The evolution of history can be rationalised by the consideration of the determination of successors by antecedents. But, on the other hand, the evolution of history is incapable of rationalisation (by that means), because it exhibits a selected flux of participating forms. No reason, internal to history, can be assigned why that flux of forms, rather than another flux, should have been illustrated."[32]

This is an interesting passage. The dismissal of the Epicurean thesis omits a critical stage of the original argument, which is that if any permutation of finite particles moving in infinite time represents a stable order, at some time that stable order must occur. Now, such an order would be bound to have the appearance of unity within its organisms — such is the nature of stability — and that would be why there is this 'flux of forms' rather than that. That stable order would, if it could happen, occur. It would have been interesting to read Temple's reasons for believing that the Epicurean logic of
probability is unsound: but nowhere in his work does he explain his thinking. In the absence of such an explanation, it seems an inevitable conclusion that the Epicurean thesis cannot be dismissed so lightly; and despite Temple's dismissal of the argument as if it were an ancient notion which some philosophers once held, it is very much a live thesis. O'Hear believes that 'Hume's Epicurean account of the presence of order in the world ... cannot be lightly dismissed by the theist'. The significant point is that the thesis provides an alternative account of how (apparent) order could occur ('once ... granted that there could be active and reactive primary elements in nature'), without reference to a guiding mind. Indeed, even among theists, the emergence of mind has been explained in terms of evolution. Temple's assertion that 'in fact all attempts to trace in evolution an explanation of the emergence of mind have totally failed' is, I think, a characteristic overstatement. Teilhard de Chardin attempts evolutionary explanation of the rise of consciousness through his 'Law of Complexity-Consciousness'. While it is outside our scope to consider the range of evolutionary explanations offered for the emergence of mind, one implication of Temple's position needs to be examined.

If we assume that there is no possible natural explanation of the emergence of mind, we are led to a number of difficult conclusions. If all attempts to explain this emergence are doomed to fail, we would be obliged to infer that there was, at a particular point in evolution, an intervention by something capable of giving consciousness to crude matter. This thing we might describe as God: but however we describe it, we should be obliged to suspend our normal methods of scientific enquiry, at least at that point. Such intervention would, I think, create a radical difficulty for theology. In the first place, the requirement of a non-material being would create an undermining of human free-will as asserted by Christians. For all other matters we can provide either a natural or a theistic
explanation; it would be odd to have one circumstance in which God could not maintain the epistemic distance from the world that seems essential to the notion of faith as an un compelled, free response to him. Secondly, to imply that there must be such an intervention would be a limitation on the alleged omnipotence of God, for it would seem that he was unable to create primal matter of such kind that consciousness could emerge out of it. And if it is possible to create primal matter of such kind that consciousness could emerge out of it, it would— in principle— be possible by examination of all aspects of that matter to detect that manner of that emergence.

A further point arises out of Temple's ideas at this point. In summarising his argument, he asserts:

We have followed the guidance of "modern knowledge" so as to see Mind first as something which occurs in, or emerges out of, the whole evolutionary process of the universe; and our willingness to see Mind as one element in Nature has led—not to Naturalism—but to a fresh perception that if Nature (containing Mind) is to be explained at all, it is Mind that can alone supply the explanation. The more completely we include Mind within Nature, the more inexplicable must Nature become except by reference to Mind. If Nature is only a whirling mass of protons and electrons, that gyration might intelligibly go on for ever, and at some point in its endless permutations would present us with the physical universe of contemporary experience. Such a universe might exist apart from any Immanent or Transcendent Mind or Spirit. But if, as science has disclosed, Mind is part of Nature, then Nature (to contain such a part) must be grounded in Mind.
In short, the more we identify ourselves with the rest of the natural order, the more are we compelled to assert the reality of a supernatural Creator.\textsuperscript{37}

Leaving to one side the question of whether nature must be grounded in mind, we should recognise an underlying assumption that the universe is ultimately explicable. It must be said that the issue which divides theist and atheist is, ultimately, a disagreement about final explanation. The atheist asserts, and the theist denies, that the fact of matter is indeed inexplicable – a brute fact. It may be added that somewhere there is a first fact, either God alone or matter alone: theist and atheist begin at different first points – the atheist's position is, given the fact of matter, to investigate how it works. To Temple's comments on the inexplicability of nature except by mind, the atheist would say that the evidence of mind is too slight to be convincing, and the whole simply is ultimately inexplicable. Nor is this an incoherent position: it could be argued that in any investigation, something is just – has to be – taken as a datum, whether the fact of mind (the Cartesian beginning), the existence of objects, the validity of a law of nature. Indeed, if we did not accept as a datum a starting point, we would make no progress. It is not, by extension, an unreasonable or unparalleled procedure to take brute matter as a first and irreducible first principle if, as the atheist asserts, evidence for going behind that first principle is either too slim, or – as some believe – too incoherent to be credible. Temple's assertion that the whole is explicable is unlikely to convince anyone who believes that it is not; the question of where investigation begins, the point at which we have to say we must be satisfied, remains open.

Temple is in no doubt that the starting-point is personal explanation. He believed throughout his career that only personal explanation was self-explanatory: in \textit{The Kingdom of}
God, he reflects Bradley's notion of 'Absolute Reality': 'it is not in any kind of sense self-explanatory, because there is only one thing in our experience which is self-explanatory, and that is a purpose with which we can sympathise'. In Mens Creatrix, he says:

Mind does accept as final an explanation in terms of Purpose and Will; for this (and, so far as our experience goes, this alone) combines efficient and final causation. "Why is this canvas covered with paint?" "Because I painted it." "Why did you do that?" "Because I hoped to create a thing of beauty for the delight of myself and others." If, then, we find any ground for saying the world is the product of an Infinite Will, created for the sake of its Value, the intellect, which could not from any consideration of its own procedure reach any such result, will none the less accept this doctrine as altogether agreeable to itself.

The same point is developed in Christus Veritas:

...if we ask for an explanation of the Universe as a whole we are bound to formulate the answer in terms of Will ... there I would only submit that there is in our experience one, and only one, self-explanatory principle - namely, Purpose or Will. No doubt, if any one can believe in a purpose with no will behind it, we should have to say "Purpose" only, leaving "Will" as a precarious inference; but as it appears that Purpose and Will are terms that mutually imply each other, we may speak of either indifferently. There is a "problem of evil", but there is not in the same sense any problem of good. When we find as the cause of any phenomenon an intelligent will which chose to cause that phenomenon to occur, we raise no
further questions, unless we fail to see how that will came to seek this occurrence as good. We may be puzzled by the way a man exercises choice; but our problem here is not, as a rule, a problem of efficient causation. When we sympathise, we are not puzzled. If I say of any one "I cannot understand acting like that", I do not mean that I cannot give a psychological analysis of the motives of the action; I mean that I cannot imagine myself doing it. When in the causal regress we arrive at a will, the regress is at an end, and to understand means, not to give a causal explanation, but to sympathise. We have reached an ultimate term. And when we do sympathise, our mind raises no more questions. The only explanation of the Universe that would really explain it, in the sense of providing to the question why it exists an answer that raises no further question, would be the demonstration that it is the creation of a Will which in the creative act seeks an intelligible good. But that is Theism.

In *Nature, Man and God*, Temple refers to this idea yet again:

... when we turn from the world as apprehended by Mind to Mind which apprehends the World, we find among its functions a principle which is self-explanatory - the principle of Purpose or of Intelligent Choice. This is an ultimate principle of explanation. When we find that the position of a given set of material objects is due to their having been arranged with a view to facilitating the accomplishment of some intelligible purpose, our minds are satisfied. That a plank should lie across a stream may call for much explanation if no human beings have ever placed it there; but if men laid it across to form a bridge, so that they could cross
over dry-shod, no further explanation is needed. Purpose is a self-explanatory principle...

The notion that personal explanation is ultimate is one that is clearly fundamental to the whole of Temple's thought, and entirely consistent with his non-propositional approach. If religious life is encounter with a person - if God is to us a person - then the evidence of his existence will be the evidence of a person.

The question of the value of personal explanation has, in recent years, been discussed by Swinburne, Shepherd, and O'Hear, among others. Swinburne takes a view very similar to that of Temple - 'I conclude ... that personal explanation is sui generis, and is not reducible to scientific explanation ... personal explanation explains, whether or not it involves or is backed by scientific explanation' - even though I can find no evidence that Swinburne is familiar with Temple's thought. The advantage of studying Swinburne, in the present context, is that he attempts to give a deeper analysis of what personal explanation involves.

For Swinburne, personal explanation applies when 'the occurrence of an event E is explained as brought about by a rational agent or person P, having the intention J to bring about E.' This definition is significant, for it enables us to distinguish the features of personal explanation. Particularly important is the emphasis on intention, which I shall consider shortly: for the moment, we should consider that - for Swinburne at least - it would not be sufficient to say - as Temple may appear to do - that if we know someone did something intentionally, we are satisfied. To know that an act is performed intentionally is not to explain it: we merely learn something further about the act - 'E is not explained merely by our being told that P intentionally brought it about. We need to know how P was in a position to bring it about, how
it was that $P$'s intentions were efficacious. We also need to know why $P$ had that intention.

We may now pick up the threads of certain arguments first outlined in Chapter Three. There I suggested that the non-propositional view contained an underlying problem, which is that to say 'Who are you?' implies a further question, 'What are you?', for to receive the answer 'I'm X' asks the further question, 'Who is that?', or 'What are you?' In the present case, the question 'Why did this event happen?' or 'Why is there such-and-such state of affairs?' is not, I think, satisfactorily answered simply by saying, 'I did it', or, as Swinburne's initial definition demands, 'I did it and I had the intention to do it', or more colloquially but in this case most relevantly, 'I did it on purpose.' When an event is particularly inexplicable, or apparently so, the instinct is to say 'What did you do that for?' Now, that question does not imply that the person who acted did so without reason, only that the reason is invisible to us.

In relation to the central questions of theism, the request for information is particularly significant. It is, I think, simply not true that 'when we do sympathise, our mind raises no more questions. In purely material matters, Temple's answer to the plank across the stream is fairly satisfactory: one might quibble on detail - why choose to put the plank here? why use a plank and not another material? - but essentially one is content. I am not so convinced about the painting. One is surely led to ask a host of further questions, about subject-matter - why was this subject chosen? - style, technique, colour and so on. And the art-critic is not content to be told that the artist did as he did to create beauty: he asks why, examining motivation, experience, influences, and a host of psychological questions.
If this is true, then how much more so will be the position with God. If we infer God as explicans of the universe, it is insufficient to say that we encounter a purposive mind, and therefore we can be satisfied. The positing of God opens a new range of questions - why did he create this universe and not another?, if he is a necessary being, why did he create a contingent universe: why should he need to? and if it was not necessary that he should, why did he bother? - more complex and more intangible than those about the painter. Indeed, it is part of the philosophical problem of seeing God in terms of Ultimate Explanation that it seems to require all manner of further explanation.

Dorothy Emmet provides an interesting clue to the dilemma in some remarks about Buber's Ich und Du:

A good deal has been written ... about Buber's distinction between "primary word" signified by the expression "I-Thou", and the "primary word" signified by the expression "I-it". In the relation "I-it" we have the subject's relation to objects apprehended as existing contiguously in time and space, and bounding one another. In the relation "I-thou" we are conscious of being confronted by another centre of experience. We cannot include the "Thou" merely as an object within our own experience; we must respect it as an independent centre of experience from which the world is apprehended from a perspective which is not our perspective.\(^{45}\)

If we are to pick up hints from this, we are bound to say that the underlying suggestion is that, by virtue of being an 'independent centre' of experience, God (or any other such centre) is ultimately mysterious, just as the inner life of another is at heart closed to us. We may return to Royce's insight, mentioned in the last chapter, that the heart of
ethics lies in the realisation of the actuality of one's neighbour: though 'his thoughts are never thy thoughts.' We need the insight of the other, but the insight is imaginative and inferential - I realise in my own life what it is to be a centre of consciousness, and can infer that there would be a similarity of capacity - of capabilities of perception - in the other person, though the content of that consciousness is largely to closed to me. I infer the similarities by observation of behaviour and statements, but that observation at times brings into sharp focus that there are real differences of outlook. Ethics - in part at least - requires a concern for the welfare of others, awareness that they feel in particular ways, respect for the differences from ourselves.

Thus, the experience of the other person is forever the experience of otherness, which can be understood only imaginatively and inferentially. Paradoxically, the fact of personal relationship is to be aware of the separateness of the other, just as a long-married couple know that there remains an inner mystery in each, and full understanding is never wholly achieved.

Perhaps, therefore, when interpreting Temple we should rephrase his arguments to say that when we have reached the point of the inference of personal explanation, it is not that we are satisfied, but that we are unable to progress much further: we have reached an essentially unknowable mystery: we cannot know it, because we are unable to occupy that centre of consciousness which is not ours. we do - in truth - still ask questions, but are aware that we are unable to progress further.

This reading opens up areas for thought: for if God is variously described as First Cause or Ultimate Explanation, it is not that no further questions can be asked, but that it becomes impossible, on a personal thesis, to hope for answers.
There is something unsatisfactory about this, for what we have found is a stopping-point in enquiry, with the inevitable question of why we should stop here and not elsewhere.

O'Hear has indicated dissatisfaction with Swinburne's use of personal agency as a stopping-point, for reasons similar to those I gave earlier about Temple: 'his belief that personal explanation is the most natural stopping-place for explanation is not likely to be accepted by everyone, where God's decision to create is being taken as a basic datum not to be further explained. Is postulating an inscrutable act of will as the ultimate brute fact any more natural than postulating some facts about matter as no further explicable?' The theist, Shepherd, comments that personal explanation 'may be adequate within its own terms, but the continued existence of purposing selves remains unexplained in these terms.'

Further significant objections are raised by O'Hear which are directly relevant to Temple, most significantly that 'All the knowledge we have of personal agency is of finite, embodied agents, whereas the theistic hypothesis postulates an infinite, disembodied agent, who brings things about in the world just by willing them, a willing which appears to have no further explanation.' The most we are able to say is that in looking for personal explanation in the universe we find something like the kinds of things we find when, in ordinary experience, we are aware of the actions of personal agency: in other words, our argument is one from analogy, or, more exactly, from a model. It is not necessarily that the model is mistaken, or that analogical argument is illegitimate. Dorothy Emmet has argued powerfully for the value of analogous thinking in metaphysics, relating this to scientific models; but she is aware - as we should be - of the limitations of this form of argument, that it should be constantly checked against experience to see that the model is legitimate. On this matter, O'Hear would argue that it is not - the data are too various
and contradictory for certainty. The argument is rather similar to that employed against the Design Argument. Just as the world may in certain respects appear designed, like Paley's watch, so in others it appears natural alone - like a cabbage - which takes us no nearer to the inference of a designer. We may interpret the evidence either way. So too with explanation. (I suspect that a personal explanation argument is closer to a design argument than Temple - with his antipathy to natural theology - would care to admit). But in this case, in the inference of personal explanation, there are additional problems. Precisely because, unlike the human agents of the model, God is disembodied - and thus personal agency must function in a different way from that of human purpose - questions arise about the operation of his explanatory power; and if this operation requires explanation itself, it is difficult to say with certainty that personal agency is sufficient explanation in itself.

In Temple's case this problem of the model applies with particular force. In Chapter Three, we noted that he uses 'mind' and 'Mind' in many different ways, throughout his works. Thomas attempts to tease out the variety of meanings:

... there is considerable confusion in the Gifford Lectures in the use of the terms "mind" and "Mind". These two terms seem to be used almost interchangeably with the following meanings: the complete generic sense including animal, human and divine mind, a generic sense including human and divine mind, the human mind as a class, the human mind as a particular (singular and plural), the animal mind as a class, the animal mind as a particular (singular and plural), individual minds both animal and human, divine mind in a generic sense, and the divine mind as a particular...
and he continues by listing other sources of confusion. Much of the time, the variety of meanings is insignificant, because context makes clear the meaning; but in the case of this dialectical transition, the confusion is crucial. It is apparent in this passage:

We find that the Process is akin to $\text{Mind}_1$, that $\text{Mind}_2$ arises in the course of it, and that $\text{Mind}_3$ does exhibit what is essentially the thing required - a self-explanatory principle of origination. It is then more reasonable to test the hypothesis that $\text{Mind}_4$ contains the explanation of the World-Process than to refuse to test it. 51 (my subscripts)

Here there are distinct uses of 'Mind'. $\text{Mind}_1$' appears to be human mind, the known (individual?) experience of which provides a pattern or model for further enquiry. $\text{Mind}_2$' would seem to be the phenomenon of mental activity in the world. $\text{Mind}_3$' is perhaps almost the same as $\text{Mind}_1$: Temple is, I think, saying that 'our known minds provide the paradigm cases of a self-explanatory explanation', but it could be argued that it is nearer to $\text{Mind}_2$, the phenomenon of mind. But that raises significant problems: our earlier comments on the nature of other minds would indicate that significant knowledge of other minds is inferential only, which would mean that particular care should be taken in any attempt to infer the whole nature of (collective) mental activity. $\text{Mind}_4$ is presumably divine mind.

The significance of the confusion is twofold. Firstly, there is a veiling of important difference: the reader is inclined to assume synonymy which does not necessarily exist - differences between divine and human mind are ellided; and yet we have seen from O'Hear's comments that there are real differences to be explained. Temple is glossing over them - perhaps he still felt, as he did in 1899, that 'God's Personality is just like
ours', and that there is no need to keep a division between the two ideas. For Temple, this may be insignificant; but it would not necessarily be so to a critic. Secondly, if Temple is attempting to construct an argument by analogy, to provide a model - and the use of 'akin' implies that he is - it is fundamental to the construction of that model that the meaning of words within that model should be clear. If I say of something that it is rather like something else, I need to specify common and uncommon features with precision: only thus is it possible to judge how far and in what ways the model holds, and only thus is it possible to prevent illegitimate inference from the model. Temple, by lack of clarity about both the model and that to which it refers, opens the door to uncertainty and confusion - it is difficult to agree that mind is of this or that kind if we do not know the precise sort of mind we are considering. Temple's own comments are not altogether helpful:

In so far as God and man are spiritual they are of one kind; in so far as God and rational, they are of one kind. But in so far as God creates, redeems and sanctifies while man is created, redeemed and sanctified, they are of two kinds. God is not creature; man is not creator. God is not redeemed sinner; man is not redeemer from sin. At this point the Otherness is complete.52

He says that in spirit and reason, man and God are of one kind; but it is not clear how this is possible if one is created and the other creator: spiritual and rational dimensions will be different; and it is that kind of difference, here unexplored by Temple, which must be considered in the construction of any model.

* * *
Certain of Temple's further arguments in this dialectical transition require comment, in particular those concerned with time and value.

We noted, in Temple's letter to his father, an attempt to justify the timelessness of God. In Chapter Three, we saw that Temple holds that the self is non-material and that mental time is not coincident with successiveness in objects. In *Nature, Man and God*, he attempts, on the basis of the phenomenon of mind, to demonstrate the timelessness of the mind of God.

His argument is, in essence, a simple one, derived from the fact of God's omniscience. He argues that our own minds provide a basis for the idea of timelessness, that mental time is for us unified:

..."present" experience is apprehended as continuous with the "past" out of which it arises. The "present" is never the mathematical point at which past and future meet; that concept is a fruit of abstraction. The present is so much of the empirical process as is immediately apprehended. This is far more than the passing sense-impression of the moment. It is all which is apprehended as continuous with that impression. And this may be an indefinitely long stretch of duration.53

His claim is that mind has the experience of timeless perception. He points to our experience of a great play or work of art: when we watch it we are aware of successiveness of the scenes, but it is as a whole that we appreciate *Hamlet*:

Art gives us, in a selected and deliberately ordered portion of experience, an illustration of what might be extended over the whole of it if our faculties
were sufficiently developed. In every act of sensation there is already memory of its first instant, and when memory alone retains the sense-perception, it may still be "present" if its continuity with sensation is not only conceptually thought but organically felt. It is where the whole organic or personal being is involved, as the great dramatist goes far to involve it, that the "present" is extended to cover a great stretch of what to indifferent observation is "past". In other words, only Love is qualified to view the world sub specie aeternitatis.  

What we have, most clearly in the case of a great play, is a glimpse of what it is to have the experience of eternal 'now'. Whether Temple is correct I doubt.  

Recent philosophers have paid much attention to the question of the timelessness of God: and the question of timelessness is, in some ways, related to that of immutability. Aquinas argues that a thing 'lacking change and never varying its mode of existence will not display a before and after' and hence, in being immutable is necessarily timeless. Swinburne points out that 'a totally immutable thing could just go on existing forever without being timeless - especially if other things, such as the universe, changed, while the immutable thing continued changeless. The change of other things would measure the passage of time during which the immutable thing changed not.'  

Shepherd is even more forceful, arguing that if God is creator, 'Creativity ... is correlative with temporality.'  

In Chapter Three, I noted that Kotarbinski held that time is onomatoidal, a derivation from the existence of objects; time is a way of expressing 'existing somewhat': to exist is to have some duration. On such a notion of time, 'God exists timelessly' is, as I think, a radically incoherent notion: either he
exists, and hence has duration, or he does not: the having of duration seems to me intrinsic to the idea of existence.

The reason why Temple wishes to maintain his idea of the timelessness of God is evident: 'The mind is distressed by the apparent transitoriness of all things. Arising out of flux, and itself in origin an episode of the flux out of which it arises, mind declares its own nature by demanding permanence.' I think that he is confused here. (We may leave to one side the dubious inference that because mind demands something that that thing exists to meet the demand; though it is consonant with his underlying belief that the mind is a model of the structure of the universe.) If we are distressed by the transitoriness of all things, what distresses is not that things are located in time, but that all things in our direct experience are subject to change and decay: and the permanence that we demand is not freedom from time, but freedom from decay. God is generally seen as free from decay: the false inference underlying the claim of 'timelessness' is drawn from the unspoken assumption that 'time decays' rather than the more exact 'all known objects with time decay' - it is the objects which decay, not 'time' as some mysterious agent which decays them.

It is, I think, to preserve the concept of God from any notion that he can decay that many philosophers - Temple among them - have tried to remove God from the idea that he is in any sense temporal. They have tried - I think - to assert that he is timeless to maintain the idea of his perfection; if he were somehow forced to be within the temporal process, then there appears to be a limitation on his power. This is, I suggest, mistaken. If we interpret time as Kotarbinski suggests, the problem disappears: if being in time is logically intrinsic to the idea of existence then it is not to impute imperfection to God to say that he cannot perform the logically impossible by existing outside time; Aquinas - among many others - points out
that it is no limitation on God's power to say that he cannot perform the logically impossible.

If we examine Temple more closely, however, we find that his argument would prove something less than the timelessness of God: it would - if valid - demonstrate only that he is capable of perceiving all things at once; the perceiving mind - if it exists - would, I have suggested, remain temporal by the act of existing. I am not convinced that it is even possible to demonstrate even this very limited notion of 'timelessness'. The fact that I can perceive a play or a symphony as a whole, in retrospect, does not mean that I perceive it timelessly: I continue to exist 'in time', and there is a successiveness in my perception, not strictly synchronous with the successiveness of objects in the world in the way that the actual three hours of the play or hour of the symphony will be, but certainly of longer duration than a single instant. I may rearrange time in memory, but I cannot thereby either take memory outside time nor remove some sense of duration from my recollections. Temple seems to be giving a poetic use of 'time' a positive ontological status which is not sustainable.

A further problem arises if we consider Temple's notion that mind is purposive; as we have seen, this is central to his idea of the explanatory power of mind. It is difficult to conceive of any definition of purpose devoid of temporal significance. In ordinary usage, to say we have a purpose is to mean that we wish to bring about a particular state of affairs; once it is achieved, we no longer have that particular purpose. If one were timeless, one would both have a purpose and have it achieved; simultaneously one would have the purpose and not have it - which is contradictory. Purpose is, on any ordinary usage, rooted in time - and there is no evidence that Temple wishes to give it a special technical meaning in relation to God: as we have seen, he believes that there is a real similarity between God's personality and ours.
We may note that a temporal vision of God is not inconsistent with Christian belief: Swinburne comments that the 'doctrine of divine timelessness is very little in evidence before Augustine. The Old Testament certainly shows no sign of it. For the Old Testament writers ... God does now this, now that; now destroys Jerusalem, now lets the exiles return home. The same applies in general for the New Testament writers..." Tillich believes that a God outside time is lifeless; Teilhard de Chardin clearly assumes a temporal movement of God between Alpha and Omega points. Today, the novels of the American theologian Andrew M. Greeley portray a loving God deeply involved in the time-process. I cannot see that a Christian needs to uphold God's timelessness for reverence or worship: eternity of God matters, but the manner of that eternity would not.

Though Temple makes this question of timelessness part of this dialectical transition - through the activity of mind seeking permanence - I do not think the general thrust of his argument for the explanatory power is damaged by its omission. It may be seen perhaps as an interesting relic of his enthusiasm for Kant which he showed in his youth, and his abiding love of Plato; but the logic of much of his philosophy points in another direction.

* * *

The place of value in this dialectical transition parallels that of mind. If physical facts cannot account for mind, they are unable to explain value: 'Starting from the physical end we can never account for Mind; and Value shares its precarious lot'. In Chapter Four, we saw how value is for Temple a source of an argument for God, and there is no need to rehearse the points made in that chapter, beyond the comment that I made that it is not indubitable that value is objective: indeed, it is on this matter of the objectivity of value that I am most
inclined to quarrel with Temple. The question here, however, is not whether one side or the other in this debate is correct, but rather that the fact that there is a genuine disagreement on the objectivity of values rules out as finally convincing any argument based on that premise: as Hubbeling comments, 'The kind of existence of values is different. They refer to states of affairs in an ideal world of which we may wish that they were present in our world ... thus I believe it is wrong to ascribe ontological status tot the moral postulates or, in other words, to hold that they imply certain states of affairs in reality, i.e. in this our world. They may imply certain states of affairs in an ideal world; but does this ideal world exist?' Hubbeling, if correct, is asserting that to build an argument on value as objective would require the proving of many subsidiary hypotheses even before we can take value as first premise in a theistic argument. Temple's argument at this point may lend possible support to the notion of God for someone of neo-Platonist beliefs; but in the face of a multiplicity of beliefs about values, it is unconvincing.

* * *

In Chapter Four, I noted that the attempt to argue the existence of God in terms of ultimate Explanation of mind and value is a concealed form of traditional argument. As we have seen, he rejected a First Cause argument throughout his career: in Chapter Three, we saw his comment that it is quite impossible to imagine an infinite regress but ... not impossible to conceive it'. That was in Mens Creatrix. Other comments elsewhere he makes the same point: in The Nature of Personality, he says, '... I cannot see why the world should ever have begun at all. God is its Creator, not because He made it at a moment of time, but because from all eternity to all eternity it depends upon the Will of God.' He clarifies the idea in @The Faith and Modern Thought: 'For the life of me I cannot understand why it should not have gone on forever. I
see no reason why you should suddenly introduce a First Cause in that chain of reasoning backwards that is carried on in the natural sciences. This is an appeal to a principle of economy, but, as I noted in Chapter Three, many neo-Thomists themselves omit the First Cause, seeing God rather as continuing cause or ultimate explanation - the 'Cosmos-Explaining-Being' of Ninian Smart. Smart believes that it is wiser to speak in terms of explanation than of cause; he claims that 'explanation' is a more flexible notion than cause. Shepherd develops the idea further, basing what he calls a 'soft' cosmological argument - from the universality of our experience of inference - on a belief that an explanation is needed for the continued existence of the universe. He maintains that to define the cause of anything is not altogether to explain it - causal explanation does not account for the continued existence of the phenomenon. We should note, however, that Shepherd believes that explanation in terms of purpose is open to the same objection as one in terms of cause: 'My contention ... is that though causal explanation of any one thing may be adequate to account for it causally, it is inadequate to account for it completely, and that is true of any causal or indeed theoretical explanation of anything in the world ... And so too with regard to purposive explanation. This may be adequate within its own terms, but the continued existence of purposing selves remains unexplained in these terms'.

Part of the problem of an argument built on cause is that cause is a temporal notion. That 'X caused Y' does not in any way enable us to infer that X has had any continued existence: often a cause will disappear in the coming into being of the event. A Christian proof of God, as opposed to a proof of First Cause, requires the continued existence of God; and this cannot be deduced from a First Cause argument. But, as Shepherd implies, we seem to require an explanation for how it is that the world exists. The search for explanation is a
search for a timeless (in the sense of being sufficient for all moments) ground of existence. By 'ground' we mean something more than 'cause': there is the idea of both 'sustaining power' and 'explanation'.

Based on this search for explanation, Hubbeling produces an interesting formulation of the Cosmological Argument, which would answer Temple's objections to the First Cause Argument, for it is based on explanation and includes within itself the possibility of an infinite series. Hubbeling's formulation (his Variant II) is:

1. There is at least one contingent being.
2. This contingent being finds its ground in something else.
3. The ground of this contingent being is either an infinite series of contingent beings or it is a necessary being.
4. An infinite series of contingent being demands for its existence a ground which cannot itself be contingent.

Therefore:

5. There must be an ens necessarium, i.e. a necessary being.\(^{67}\)

Hubbeling produces a number of 'proofs' of this formulation based on modal logic\(^{68}\), in a variety of logical languages, but he recognises that any systematic proof is based on the premise that 'There are states of affairs which have necessarily a certain ground, i.e. that in all worlds in which fx occurs also b, its ground, occurs'.\(^{69}\) This may be questioned, but he believes that support can be given to his formulations by the use of set and lattice theory.
In simple terms, his argument is this. He presupposes the a priori principle 'ex nihilo nihil fit'. He is arguing that a linear causal chain is insufficiently explanatory. In one sense this is fairly evident - Hubbeling gives the example of our finding the cause of a child in its parents, adding that we need a second-order cause of the fact that two parents produce a human being - the cause of the causation:

In this way we acquire the following argument: We presuppose that the set of states in this world together with the relation 'to find its ground in' (and this is a translation of the principle 'ex nihilo nihil fit') constitutes an ordered set. This ordered set is a directed set by which we mean the following: If there are two states of affairs within the set, say A and B, and A does not find its ground in B nor B in A, then there is a third state of affairs, say C, which is the ground of both A and B (there might of course be intermediate grounds between C and A/B) ... Now this whole set of states of affairs, which is ordered by the relation 'to find its ground in', has an infinite number of subsets ordered by this same relation. And each of these ordered subsets again has an infinite number of states of affairs as its elements, so that in spite of our assumption that the set is a directed set, we are far from arriving at a last element ... 

But now we make another assumption, viz. that there are subsets of the same type. Such a subset is for example the subset characterized by the relation 'being generated': a child is generated by his parents, who are themselves generated by their parents, and so on ...
We now presuppose that it is possible to recognize types of ordered subsets. All generations of children by their parents constitute one type of subset. All kinds of things causing heat constitute another type, all kinds of magnetic attraction another, and so on. In this way we can make a partition within the whole set of states of affairs ordered by the relation 'to find its ground in'. We thus get a number of subsets characterized by a certain type of ground-consequence relation. Now the fundamental idea of my reconstruction of the cosmological argument is that this number of subsets is not infinite, in other works, there is only a limited number of types of grounds.

Once more we seek the ground of these subsets. By doing so we apply the principle 'ex nihilo nihil fit' in a multiple way. That is, we say that the relation 'to find its ground in' is not only applicable within the various subsets, but also to the subsets as a whole ... So this set of subsets is again a directed and ordered set and because this directed set has a limited number of elements (the elements are here the subsets, each of different type) this set has a last element according to modern set and lattice theory ... Thus we arrive at a last element and this element is a ground that we might interpret as God.72

The particular advantage of Hubbeling's formulation is that it reveals clearly the underlying premises of any such argument, in particular the wide application of the principle 'ex nihilo nihil fit'. The value of our excursion into Hubbeling is twofold: Firstly that it is, despite Temple's doubts, apparently possible to recast traditional cosmological arguments in a way that meets Temple's objection to the original, simple notion of First Cause; and secondly, that if
this is so, and such formulations are available, it is possible to construct an outline for Natural Theology. I think that in the Gifford Lectures Temple is struggling towards this position, but in a rather uncertain way.

* * *

This struggle takes us to the heart of the difficulty of any assessment of William Temple as philosopher - he is radically torn between the demands of theology and those of philosophy; and I am not convinced that the two are ever reconciled. Early in this chapter, we noted Brunner's comments indicating a tension within the Gifford Lectures, and earlier saw Barth's refusal to deliver the lectures because of his disavowal of natural theology.

Temple was, by habit, a synthesiser. Part of his enormous success as a churchman, not least within the ecumenical movement, was his ability to synthesise widely differing viewpoints in a single work. He was much in demand as a writer of reports and chairman of committees. Critics might say that his talent was for 'papering over the cracks', but there was a solid legacy of genuine achievement in the endurance of the World Council of Churches, and, I think, his most significant memorial, the development of the ecumenical Church of South India. This habit of synthesising is very apparent in the philosophical writings, in the initial attempts, in Mens Creatrix especially, to marry an Idealist approach with Christianity, followed by the attempt to reconcile that resulting philosophy with Process thought in Nature, Man and God. In the next chapter, we shall see how he draws on different strands in social thought, combining various contemporary ideas, to form a continuous whole.

I think that this cast of mind applies in his thought in philosophy and theology: it is as if he is trying to combine
the anti-philosophical bias so evident in the work of Brunner and Barth with the influence of his own philosophical upbringing. Caird was described by Professor MacCunn as 'a man of coherent convictions', by which he meant that Caird had the habit of attempting to reconcile very different philosophical positions. Shortly before his own death, Temple referred to his own 'temperamental disposition, fortified by the fact that my master in logic was Edward Caird, to start from the assumption that every conviction strongly held is at least partly true, and that, as a rule, our wisdom is to find out, if we can, where this partial truth fits into the whole fabric.' The derivation from Hegelianism is evident, but what is particularly interesting is the underlying assumption that we should look for the truth in a given viewpoint as a first action, rather than - as many of us would - to examine it to find out what's wrong with it. There is, of course, a problem with Temple's method. The obvious point is that two statements are not necessarily compatible, nor partly true. Some men hold passionately that the earth is roughly spheroid, others that it is distinctly flat. Now, it is not the case that each is partly correct; one is right and one is wrong, or each is wrong. Is any compromise possible? At first it appears not, but reflection might provide one. Each might accept the proposition 'For the practical purposes of daily life it is possible to treat the earth as flat', or, 'A builder constructing a house treats the world as flat'. Two evident points follow. A degree of co-operative action is possible - a 'round-earth' builder could follow the instructions of a 'flat-earth' architect; they could live together with their differences. In such a way, two people from different religious traditions can cooperate in particular areas of life. The value of this pragmatic compromise can be enormous as a social cement - much of Temple's practical achievement rests on this; but it remains a matter of real difference whether the earth is indeed round or flat. In certain contexts, it is of purely theoretical concern, and can be ignored (though its truth-value remains unaltered);
but in others, the actual truth of the matter has real factual consequences. The danger inherent in the synthetic method is that the synthesiser may try to achieve his synthesis by concentrating on the 'true' but trivial aspects of each position, and ignoring the real questions underneath. (This point is very similar to one made by critics of the ecumenical movement.)

It is this problem that seems to underlie the tension between writing about natural theology as explanatory and, at the same time, trying to reject its methods. To rule out a First Cause argument is not, as Temple perhaps imagines, to eschew all natural theology: I have suggested that arguments from contingency or inference remain live possibilities. What Temple is trying to do, I think, is to emphasise the personalism of his views: that as his God is personal, he must be known as a person - by personal encounter. Hence the emphasis on 'personal qualities', such as personal explanation and purpose. In this he is close to Barth and some existentialist theologians like Bultmann. (I shall explore the idea of encounter a little more fully in the last section of this chapter, though it underlies much of it.) But his emphasis may disguise certain other significant points. If we see the universe in terms of purpose, we will wish to seek evidence of that purpose; and purpose, by definition, is teleological - purpose is necessarily directed to some end. And if that is so, we are pointing towards a design argument, one of the most traditional of all natural theology arguments. There is, I suggest, no significant difference between 'the Purposer purposes' and 'the Designer designs' from the point of view of creation. The difference of language may conceal, but does not remove, the unity of the underlying concepts.

One of the traditional objections to the Design Argument (the same would apply in terms of purpose) is that, even if correct, it wouldn't prove very much. From the results of design we can
infer only a limited amount about the designer. If I can see only one pan of a pair of scales, if the pan is in the air I can infer only that whatever is in the other pan is heavier. I have no evidence of how much heavier, or what it is. From the existence of the world I may infer only — at most — a designer able to design it, which is not at all necessarily the all-loving, omnipotent eternal God — the truly personal God — of Temple's Christian belief.

To infer such a God, other evidence is needed, most significantly for the personal reality Temple claims.

b.) The Second Dialectical Transition

The second dialectical transition is designed to take us beyond the concept of God as 'Purposive Mind' specifically to God as person: it emphasises the personality of God — an important step for Temple on the way to the culmination of his argument in the personal revelation called for in his fourth transition. In considering the present concept, it will be necessary to attempt to determine whether it is indeed possible to see 'God as personality as a coherent concept; we are thus taking up as a question the idea which underlies Temple's stress on the centrality of personality which was developed earlier in largely human terms, and considering the view of Aquinas cited at the beginning of the present chapter. It will also be necessary, I think, to modify certain views of the nature of God as we have already done in considering the concept of timelessness: the full significance of this may become apparent in the next section.

Temple briefly summarises his argument for personality:

Willingly to believe what is suspected to be false is felt to be not only a degradation of the credulous
believer's personality, but an offence against the order of reality. This feeling is quite unreasonable if the order of reality is a brute fact and nothing else; it is only justifiable if the order of reality is the expression of a personal mind, for the sense of moral obligation towards Truth is of that quality which is only appropriate in connection with personal claims.75

Of this view, he says: 'I must confess that I know no way of arguing this last point, to which, none the less, I attach great importance. It is an intuitional judgement.'76 In fact, Temple's point is an experiential one: he tries to develop his view on the basis of how we experience the sense of truth, that in feeling a sense of obligation in our search for truth, or when confronted by truth, we are aware of a personal quality in the universe:

The exalted language used about Truth and its sanctity perplexes those who think of it as a quality attaching to isolated bits of information. If I say "The sun shone all day in Glasgow on February 24, 1933", that statement, though admittedly improbable, is either true or false. But in neither case has it any sanctity. If I am mistaken about it, that does not greatly matter. To say it while knowing it to be false would be wrong, because to deceive people is to outrage their personality; but we are here concerned, not with saying what is thought, but with thinking what is true; and there is no sanctity in correct information about particulars, nor any calamity in being misinformed, unless this leads to calamitous action. Yet there is a sense in which Truth is august and compelling.77
At this stage of demonstration, we may note the Platonic influence of 'Truth' as something 'august and compelling'. I think that this is an hypostasis - I am unable to see that 'Truth' has any significance. Temple uses the word, with its tell-tale capital letter, as if it signified something in itself, as if it had ontological status. There is in Temple - partly under the influence of his avowed Platonism, partly from the Idealism of his youth - a tendency to Realism, in the medieval sense. He is given to assuming that there is 'something' which is 'Truth', as many philosophers, most evidently Plato, have done: he assumes that there is a universal, Truth, which somehow exists. It was to the medievals a matter of real debate whether universals really exist ('Realism') or are purely abstractions, forms of words ('Nominalism'). Some modern philosophers, including Russell, have at various times held that universals have some ontological status (though Russell refers to them as 'subsisting' to distinguish them from 'existing' objects). It is not necessary here to develop the debate if we can reformulate Temple's position without any reference to this peculiar 'Truth'. I believe such a reformulation is necessary because it is easy to be distracted by a philosophical debate not readily settled. It is therefore perhaps wisest to recast his argument in terms of our sense of personal concern or dignity in truth-telling. In place of a doubtful and at least semi-abstract 'Truth', we posit two less dubitable categories of entity, ourselves and the objects about which we formulate propositions. These propositions either reflect accurately the objects about which they are formulated, or they do not; and because it is - as Brentano so notably pointed out - that we are not passive observers, but rather creatures so formed that we always take an attitude towards the objects of our perception, we feel a sense of shame - of 'hatred' (in Brentano's terminology) - towards ourselves. It is to this sense of shame that I think Temple is alluding; and his argument can, without particular damage, be recast without
reference to a doubtful ontological category of 'Truth'. For if we have this sense of shame about constructing consciously false propositions, it could be argued that we are so made that we have this shamefulness because God made us to have a personal view of the world, to treat it in a personal way. But - and this recasting reveals the flaw in Temple's position - it could equally be argued that the sense of shame is not that we are conscious that we are in the face of 'Truth', but that, because we always have a position of 'love' or 'hate' in our relations with the objects of our perceptions, with the images in our minds, we feel that somehow - when consciously untruthful - we are denigrating ourselves. And as we are personal we are indeed outraging personality: but the personality is ours. If this is indeed the case, we are no further forward in our attempt to find personality in the universe. To this we may add the further consideration that if Brentano is correct in his judgment that we see the world never wholly neutrally, that we colour it by the preferences and antipathies of our own personality, it is not unreasonable to suppose (there is a long philosophical tradition for this position) that we may see it as personal, not because it is so, but because we see it so: we experience it as personal because we are persons.

For these reasons one is obliged to reject the second transition as finally unconvincing: we must, like Temple, see it as at most a possible interpretation. But to do this, we are bound to consider the question of the coherence of the notion that God is a personality, and whether it is possible to find significance in Aquinas' idea, cited in the first words of this chapter, that God is the only true personality.

* * *

At first sight, the idea is a very difficult one. In a recent lecture on Descartes, John Cottingham asserted of the Cartesian
observer, 'what does the thinking is a person, and a person is, necessarily, something with a body.'\textsuperscript{81} Now, in any conventional sense, we are confronted with a dilemma. If Cottingham is correct - for the moment it would be wise to suspend judgment - a 'timeless', spiritual, traditional God cannot be a 'person' in any normal use of words. In a way, we must accept that in humans, the self is expressed through bodily activity; or perhaps more accurately, the 'self' is the sum of bodily activity (I include mental activity within this description). There is - as Wojtyla would agree - only the 'acting person' as a psychosomatic unity: and only through action is there personality - the composite being is the only agency of it. The only direct experience of purposive action that we are certain of, and which is indubitable to all humans (some people claim awareness of spiritual agency, but this experience is not shared by all, and is doubted by many), is that of human action. In relation to God, perhaps the phenomenon most difficult to imagine is how the immutable, spiritual, eternally contemplating God could perform the activity of creation; how activity is possible without apparent means. To assert that God is omnipotent, and that all things are possible to him, is certainly to beg the question. (I have always felt this problem to be a greater obstacle to belief than the problem to be a greater obstacle to belief than the problem of evil: as we shall see, Temple thought otherwise). It could be retorted that the whole notion of creation \textit{ex nihilo} is unimaginable - we have no experience of it, yet the fact it is unimaginable does not rule it out as impossible; for the central dilemma remains that things do exist, and if we rule out the creator as unimaginable and inexplicable, we are left even so with an inexplicable brute fact. It is this 'inexplicable brute fact' that Temple wishes to avoid; and only personal explanation seems to do that, at the cost of gaps within our conception of that explanation. It is not quite the same as saying, 'this artefact was made by an electric press, but I have no idea how an electric press works'; it is rather, 'this artefact was made
by an electric press, though I have never seen one, have no idea how it works, nor do I think anyone else has ever come across one, either.' The position of the believer is that, absurd though it may seem, he believes something like this of his God; and the atheist believes that to think such a thing is simply absurd.

But in Christianity, it is - at least superficially - possible to point to real personality in God, in Christ. It is a commonplace of Christian thought that the believer knows his God only through God-made-man in Christ. John Hick has suggested that only in the incarnation may sense be made of certain theological and ethical ideas:

In Christianity, God is known as "the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ". He is defined as the Being about whom Jesus taught; the Being in relation to whom he lived, and into a relationship with whom he brought his disciples; the Being whose agape toward men was seen on earth in the life of Jesus. In short, God is the transcendent Creator who is held to have revealed himself in Christ. Jesus' teaching about the Father is accordingly accepted as a part of that self-disclosure, and it is from this teaching (together with that of the prophets who preceded him) that Christianity professes to derive its knowledge of God's transcendent being. Only God himself can know his own infinite nature; and our human belief about that nature is based, according to Christianity, upon his self-revelation in Christ.82

The question of transcendence is particularly significant. This is the heart of the Christian mystery: if God has revealed himself in Christ, the evident question is how. If Christ is fully human (and hence, as far as anyone may be, a fully integrated person) it is difficult to see how, at the same
time, he can be equally and wholly the personality of God, even one distilled in human terms. A non-propositional view of faith is not as helpful as it might appear. Bonhoeffer's question 'Who are You?' becomes complex in the light of so difficult a personality, and difficult to separate from 'What is He?' The quest for the historical Jesus has proved difficult; and knowledge of his personality is difficult. Torrance has commented: 'Jesus will always prove intractably enigmatic, indeed an impossible subject for plastic representation of any kind, precisely because He is a Subject who by His very nature resists being subjected to what we deem to be observable or being interpreted exclusively in terms of cosmic perceptibility.'\(^{83}\) For Torrance, knowing Jesus is not a matter of perception, but of 'audition'\(^{84}\); one must listen to his word, 'because in Him we hear a Word from beyond, the eternal Word of God from beyond the observable, a Word which, while it is made flesh at this end, yet recedes into the eternity of God at the other end.'\(^{85}\) Whether this takes us much further forward may be doubted: rather the question of the enigma is emphasised; we can, as it were, hope only to grasp one 'end' of the personality of Christ, and from that deduce where it might lead. It might be said that of any other person, we know only that part of the personality which is exposed to us: we may make deductions about other aspects, predictions about future behaviour, but we remain aware that we see only an aspect of personality: we know that the experiences of others are different. I like someone, in consequence of one set of experiences as filtered through the particular stance of my personality: another will dislike the person, for his experiences and personality are different. But while in relation to Christ, it may be a false hope to expect to know the whole of his personality, there is, nonetheless, the special claim made of him that his person has a special God-Man character; and if I am to accept that claim, it does seem necessary to have some idea of the special kind of person involved.
This question has been raised by the distinguished Catholic theologian, Walter Kasper, and related specifically to the problem of seeing Christ as an integrated personality. Kasper confronts the whole concept of person, and, in common with many modern thinkers, refers to the idea of any person as an open system (in the terminology of systems thinkers who believe that any individual may be seen as - rarely - a 'closed system', or - more commonly - an 'open system', 'open', that is, to the influence of the whole environment, on which we are dependent and which shapes the options we may take and the resources open to us). According to Kasper, there is, in a sense, something in common between every believer and Christ himself, a personality shaped by being open to God. Of course, Christ's personality is that much more open than that of the ordinary Christian - what Kasper is pointing to is the idea that we are in error if we think of our personalities as an entirely without a dimension which Christ has. An imaginative leap is possible: I cannot bat like Sir Donald Bradman, but I can bat a little - I can conceive of, though I could not imagine myself so doing, batting in that superlative way. This is an example of analogy, in the Thomist sense, based on the relative senses of understanding. Kasper is worth quoting at length, because he casts particular light on the discussion of Temple:

The traditional concept of the person ... is still abstract; in the concrete, a person is only actualised in relationships. The uniqueness of each individual implies its demarcation from any other and therefore a relation to him. Consequently, a person only exists in a threefold relation: to himself, to the world around, to his fellow men. A person is present to himself by having what is other than him present to him. In concrete terms, the essence of the person is love. Hegel clearly defined this fundamental law even before the personalism of our time (M.Buber, F.Ebner, F.Rosenzweig, and so on):
'It is in the nature or character of what we mean by personality or subject to abolish its isolation or separateness. In friendship and love I give up my abstract personality and in this way win it back as concrete personality.' These relations on the horizontal plane, however, are so to speak crossed and supported by the all-embracing relation of man to God (here again we must go beyond the traditional concept). This applies both to the uniqueness and to the unbounded openness of the person. The uniqueness of each person demands absolute acceptance for their own sake; this is why the person is sacred and of inviolable dignity. Here in the conditioned, something absolutely unconditional shines out. In unbounded openness, the person points beyond everything limited into the infinite mystery of God. The uniqueness and openness both require a ground, consequently the person is not only a reference to, but also a participation in God's nature. The human person can therefore only be ultimately defined from God as ground and in relation to God; God himself has to be included in the definition of the human person. In this sense, Scripture speaks of man as the 'image and likeness of God' (Gen. I. 27) ...

... The infinite distance between God and man, Creator and creature, mediation between which is hinted at in the human person in his question and hope, cannot be bridged from man's side. By the very nature of the case it can only be done from God's side. Man in his personality is only the grammar, potentia oboedientalis, the purely passive potentiality, for this mediation. Its realisation remains a mysterium stricte dictum, that is, we can grasp neither the That nor the How. We cannot deduce that it will become a reality, because as men we have
no control over God, and after it has happened we cannot understand how it does so, because we cannot in thought encompass the relation between God and man and so grasp it. What we can do as human beings is something purely negative, show that the mediation that has occurred in Jesus Christ is not in any way in contradiction to man's nature, but is its deepest fulfilment. Man as person is, as it were, the indeterminate mediation between God and man; in Jesus Christ this receives from God its specific form, plenitude and perfection. Consequently Jesus Christ in person is man's salvation. 86

Kasper's view is valuable to us, because, like Temple, it is based on a profound personalism, and it finds the fullness of personality most clearly in community. The definition of person is discovered only in the I-Thou relationship, but Kasper adds the third dimension of God as sustainer: in this sense, God is the explanatory principle. In relation to God we complete - as far as it may ever be completed - the principle of what it is to be a person. But he retains the sense of God as ineluctably mysterious; subsequently he emphasises the response of faith as the acceptance of the ultimate enigma of God. How complex this enigma is I hope to indicate shortly.

In Chapter Three, we saw Temple's adherence to a non-propositional view of theology. This involves the idea of faith as the coming-to-know Christ, in a direct and personal way. Temple, curiously, suggests that we may do this almost because of the difficulty of finding 'the historical Jesus':

...; revelation finds its perfect and focal expression in Jesus Himself. It is of supreme importance that He wrote no book. It is even of greater advantage that there is no single deed or saying of which we can be perfectly sure that He said
or did precisely this or that. Indeed of His sayings we have no exact reproduction, for presumable He spoke in Aramaic, and our records are in Greek, and all translation makes some difference. But the revelation is not in His teaching nor in His acts; it is Himself. The records which we have bring us nearer to Himself than would a series of photographs and phonographic records; for persons are known in personal relationships and what we have is the record of such relationships as illustrated by the impression which He made on a variety of persons in a series of revealing moments. It is not necessarily those who spend most time with a man who know him best; it may happen that they see only the routine which governs the fabric of his life; those who are in his company only for a moment, but that a critical moment calling for exercise of all his qualities, may see a reality not discloses in daily routine. The episodes selected for record in the Gospels are not very many; but they are revealing. We can have about Napoleon far more numerous distinct pieces of information than we have about Jesus of Nazareth; but we do not personally know Napoleon as we can know Him, even if it be only 'knowledge after the flesh' that is in our minds, and no thought of spiritual communion with Him as ever present Lord.

On one level, this is a strange argument. If I compare my direct knowledge of the Christ of the Gospels with my knowledge of Napoleon, I am compelled to say that I can call Napoleon to mind with greater clarity. Certain aspects of his life, particular episodes, reveal much of the many-faceted genius. When I study in detail the tactics of Austerlitz and compare them with those of Cromwell, when I know the terrain on which the battle was fought, I see in a vivid way Napoleon's military genius; and when I put in the scales the personal belongings in
the Musee de l'Armee, the glimpses of court life, the occasional miscalculations, the lasting monument of the Code Napoleon, the aspects caught by different portraitists, I feel a profound sense of the man as something more than a name in the history books. But I think Temple means something other than this. When I say 'I know such-and-such a person', I mean not only that I am acquainted with him but that he recognises and is aware of me. I may say I have met a particular famous person, but I would only say that I know him when he recognises me as someone known to him. In that sense, Napoleon is forever a stranger to me. For Temple, Christ may be known in the personal sense; in the God-Man is personal knowledge of me. This, of course, assumes that Christ is accepted as the 'ever present Lord': I am unable to see how Temple can say we know Christ personally 'even if it be only "knowledge after the flesh"' unless he means that Christ knows us personally even though we know him only as we know Napoleon. But that of course is to assume that Christ is indeed who Christians claim him to be.

A further difficulty, which Temple seems to neglect, is the accuracy of our perception. In human affairs, when I 'know' someone, I know him only in the aspects which are shown to me. Even my closest friends are in some respects unknown to me. I may know well a man and his wife; but the privacy of his married life is essentially and necessarily closed to me - I may pick up hints, yet misinterpret even those. Likewise, the Jesus of the Gospels reveals not the whole of himself: when, for instance, he is reported to draw apart from his disciples, like them I can only speculate about his inner state. And if I claim a personal relationship with Christ, it is at best only intermittent and represents only a tiny fraction of his total existence. Much remains closed. Even then, I must be conscious of my capacity for mistaken judgment and wishful thinking - just as I may be tempted to see friends in my own image and likeness, so I may interpret Christ not as he is but
as I would like him to be. This is a real question for the practising Christian: the Christ claimed by some of my evangelical friends as their personal saviour is unrecognisable to me; I do not know, any more than I know when we perceive other people differently, whether one or another of us is mistaken or self-deluded, or whether we simply see different sides of the same person: and all that is over and above the fundamental question of whether Christ is at all as Christians claim him to be.

But if we do accept, on an open-system model, that Christ can be a coherent personality, though, as Kasper insists, still largely closed to us, we are obliged to recognise the enigma of his Godly side: if we can understand Jesus as Man/God as a coherent idea, our direct experience is only on Man: we can understand the concept of man as an open system, and see Christ as such, and yet be unable to imagine that side which is Godly. We may not the Kasper clearly refers to God as the true personality, of whom man is the 'image and likeness'; this is the point made by Aquinas - cited in the opening paragraphs of this chapter - which raises, again, the question of whether God 'as such' can be considered a 'coherent personality'.

For Temple, as earlier suggested, God in himself, and God as revealed in all forms (not as Christ alone) is personal:

Unless all existence is a medium of Revelation, no particular Revelation is possible; for the possibility of Revelation depends on the personal quality of that supreme and Ultimate Reality which is God. If there is no Ultimate Reality which is God. If there is no Ultimate Reality, which is the ground of all else, then there is no God to be revealed; if that Reality is not personal, there can be no special Revelation but only uniform procedure; if there be an Ultimate Reality, and this is personal, then all
existence is Revelation. Either all occurrences are in some degree revelation of God, or else there is no such revelation at all; for the conditions of the possibility of any revelation require that there should be nothing which is not revelation. Only if God is revealed in the rising of a son of man from the dead; only if He is revealed in the history of Syrians and Philistines can He be revealed in the history of Israel; only if he chooses all men for His own can He choose any at all; only if nothing is profane can anything be sacred.88

This maintains the idea that Christ is not alone the source of revelation, though he may be seen as its focus: all that we need to know may be found in Jesus. But Temple emphasises also the personality of God as perceived in the Old Testament:

If God is God indeed, then he is Lord not of Israel only, but of all nations; and we shall expect that if we find His method of disclosing Himself to men, we shall also find that it is of general application. But there is a difference. I well remember as a schoolboy asking my father if Plato was not as truly inspired as Isaiah, and his answering 'Yes, but Plato did not know he was inspired and Isaiah did.' This is the distinctive fact about Israel - not that God cared only for this nation, but that He led them to know that they were cared for by a God Who was not their God only - to know that they were in the hands of the God of all the earth. So from before the dawn of exact history we find in the world a community conscious of divine commission; if Abraham is the name for a tribe in migration, that only underlines the fact thus stated. Within this community those who live by obedience to God as known to them become able to know more and to interpret more profoundly the
events which disclose and set forward His purpose. The sense of commission takes the form of an obligation not only to obey, but to bear witness before other nations. To Israel alone has been given the knowledge of God, the Ultimate Reality, as Living and Righteous Will, to Whom we conform ourselves not only by accurate thought as seekers for truth, nor only by concentrated contemplation as lovers of beauty, but by the obedience to the moral law as responsible persons. \(^{89}\)

This view is entirely consistent with Temple's belief that religious experience is 'the whole experience of religious persons' \(^{90}\), though it is not, it seems, wholly compatible with his eschewal of natural theology: if all creation is an aspect of revelation, natural theology seems possible, though perhaps the thrust of Temple's view is to emphasise the personal 'experiencing-as', the act of experience, rather than the seeking truth in that which is experienced. This vision of revelation shows God (perhaps as 'God the Father') as a character, a personality, in the history of Israel; and there is no doubt that in the language of the Old Testament, God is represented as a personality. If that personality is inscrutable, it is nonetheless in the experience of the biblical writers a coherent entity.

There is no doubt that there is a real distinction between God as represented in the Old Testament and the almighty, eternal, immutable, timeless, omniscient God of philosophy. In a recent novel, Andrew M. Greeley has his theologian-priest hero, Blackie Ryan, say:

'Anytime the necessities of Greek philosophy force us into a position that is at odds with the scriptural self-revelation of God, I say reject Greek philosophy. But we have raised generation upon
generation of Roman Catholics to believe, not because of the scriptures, but because of Greek philosophy, that everything that happens in the world is directly attributable to God. That, it seems to me, is patent nonsense. 91

Here, Greeley is speaking of omnipotence. In the next section, I shall suggest that certain traditional concepts of God, particularly in relation to omnipotence and omniscience, are as radically incoherent (and at odds with scripture), as I believe his timelessness to be. I also will suggest that Temple himself, certainly by the time of his later writings, was edging away from traditional Platonic views of God; but this is a matter of hints and suggestions.

In the extract from his essay on Revelation, there is apparent at least the suggestion of a self-revealing, living (and not simply static) God, actively at work, directing and guiding his people. But at the same time, this God is omnipresent, working in and through all creation.

J.C.A. Gaskin has suggested that omnipresence creates special difficulties, which take us back to Cottingham's idea that 'a person is, necessarily, something with a body'. 92 In God and Philosophy, Flew argues similarly: 'Being an agent, showing willpower, displaying wisdom are so much prerogatives of people, they refer so entirely and particularly to human transactions and human experience, that it becomes more and more forced and unnatural to apply the relevant expressions the further you go down the evolutionary scale. To try to apply them to something which is not an animal at all cannot but result in a complete cutting of the lines of communication.' 93 Gaskin puts the dilemma thus: 'We are asked to suppose that there could be an entity which never had, and does not now have, a body of any sort through which it can carry out its intentions, but which can, nevertheless, everywhere and
anywhere at once will and achieve anything which it is logically possible to will and achieve."}

Gaskin believes that there are two central problems fatal to any attempt to consider God as a person:

One is the complete loss, for an omnipresent bodiless entity, of any point of view, any centre relative to the world. I do not think it is merely a failure of my anthropocentric imagination that I cannot grasp what it would be like to be a conscious agent everywhere at once. Conscious agents ... act from a point of view of the universe. They even have a point of view of their own bodies ... God, ex hypothesi, does not. If I imagine myself able, as a basic act, to turn the moon round on its axis so that you could see the other side of it from earth, I would inevitably conceive of myself seeing the moon from some point of view. The supposition of a sight, or an awareness, which embraces all points of view, is not just omniscience, it is dispersal of the agent. It might be like seeing myself from my own fingertip and from everywhere else on my own body simultaneously. I cannot make much sense of even that degree of dispersal of my centre of consciousness, let alone understand a dispersal which embraces every view of everything in the universe ...

... My second problem with the notion of a disembodied omnipresent agent takes the above a stage further. The basic acts which a person can perform are movements of his own body. Now if God is an omnipresent spirit which moves any part of the universe as a basic act, this must surely mean, if the analogy with a human agent is to hold in any way at all, that the universe is identical with God's
body. If we really have to think in this way in order to make sense of the supposition that God is an omnipresent agent disconnected from any normal body, then two things go wrong. The first is that, once again, control over the body implies a centre of consciousness from which the body is directed. An equal dispersal of consciousness over the whole body, like life in a lump of primeval protoplasm, may indicate a living thing in some weird way, but it is not a person. So if we are hooked on this strange idea that the universe is to God what a body is to man, it seems unavoidable to ask: how does the directive centre of consciousness relate to it? Where is God's mind? The second worry is that if God's embodiment is the universe itself, and its movements are his basic acts, then it would appear to be absurd to speak of God creating heaven and earth. Heaven and earth are God. All the talk about God being the explanation of the fact of order or the reason why there is anything at all would then be a theistic fantasy. The universe is the eternal, self-explaining necessity we take God to be. But this supposition is identical in all respects that I can understand with the central thesis of classical atheism that the physical universe and its movements are the ultimate realities.

This touches on many issues, a number of which are beyond the scope of the present these, but certain comments arise out of our discussion of Temple. We have repeatedly seen that for a non-propositional theologian, the dominant idea is of 'experiencing as'; I suggest that it could be argued that God is 'experienced as' a person: it is as a person that he speaks to the Christian believer. He speaks through the person of Jesus Christ, but we recall that Temple also sees him as speaking in other guises to Israel. In specific terms, I
suggest that the Christian believer pictures God as speaking from a particular - if unknown - place; God seems to him to speak from somewhere. Like Brentano, I believe that the mind can only conceive of abstract terms in specific images: thus, if I consider the idea of 'justice', I cannot conceive of an abstract - my mind sees 'justice' in terms of congeries of images - courts, judges, just men, instances of fairness, and so on. I may define justice in various abstract ways, but I conceive it only in specifics: it is important here not to confuse conception and definition. It is clear that the Old Testament writers conceived God in these specific terms, and my experience is that ordinary believers picture God likewise. If Brentano is correct, that is what we would expect.

We have here a conflict between God-as-experienced and what is believed to be the reality of God. A number of questions follow, in particular those of the veracity of the God-experiences claimed. It may be that the clue to the dilemma is to be found in Temple's perception of revelation as the self-disclosure of God. This self-disclosure is most evident in Christ, operating as a focus of thought, but this - as we have seen - is not the only means used: many people claim to find God mediated in this or that aspect of daily life. It has long been held that the fullness of God is intrinsically unknowable to man - Aquinas argues that God's existence is self-evident in itself, but not to us - simply because man lacks the capacity for full perception and comprehension. It is evident that we can only comprehend as much as we have capacity to comprehend. Thus, it is held God uses such means as he considers appropriate for our understanding; and it is in this guise that he reveals himself. Philosophical speculation goes beyond revelation; it could be argued that it thus necessarily comes up against the bounds of the unknowable, and finds itself trapped in paradox. Religion that draws only on the revealed, personal aspect of God can act as a basis for personal faith. Such a view would, I think, be consistent with Temple's
teaching; but it does not provide an answer to the questions of how we may be certain that our experience is valid. Nor indeed is it an answer to the question of whether God is fundamentally personal to say that his nature is intrinsically unknowable to us; but it is perhaps the only response which can be given.

Gaskin's second point may be dealt with more briefly - I think it is less significant than the first. Christianity has never claimed that the universe is the embodiment of God - that would be pantheism - having drawn a distinction between creator and created. If, as Christians claim, God is omnipotent (even in the limited sense I shall suggest in the next section) then it would be open to him to create that which is not himself, just as when a human creates something it is not a part of himself. Indeed, if it were not so, God's omnipotence would be not the only capability denied him. If the universe is finite in size, then, on Gaskin's view, God also would be finite, thus denying the omnipresence which he claims leads us to the conclusion that God and the universe are one. Gaskin's error seems to lie in his view that 'we are hooked on this strange idea that the universe is to God what a body is to man.' The idea is strange indeed; but it is not how the average Christian sees the universe. To take a crude analogy, the Christian sees the omnipresence of God not as meaning he is everything, but rather as if he were like water in a sponge. We say 'the sponge is soaked through with water', or 'water is in every part of the sponge'; but we do not by that mean that the water is the sponge, though to our experience water is in every part of it. It is in that sense that God is experienced as omnipresent; and that is not pantheism. (I am not suggesting that the analogy is more correct than Gaskin's; only that it more nearly approximates to the common view.) What the analogy does not do, of course, is to say what it is of God, what is the 'spiritual substance' with which the matter of the universe is charged, nor the means by which they are connected with God. But the believer would assert - and the non-believer deny - that they
exist, just as radio waves existed before we had means to
detect them. This kind of omnipresence does not mean that there
is no specific 'locus' of God's mind; something may be present
in a number of different ways. Thus I may say my feet are
presently under my desk; part of me, and a sensate part of me,
is there; but it does not follow that my mind is in my feet
(though the case has occasionally been argued). The question
becomes a matter of in what sense 'I' am under the desk on
which I write - but in some sense part of me is present there.
So with God, the question concerns the sense in which he is
omnipresent; in the next section I shall suggest that several
of his qualities require more exact definition than sometimes
given.

c.) The Third Dialectical Transition

The third and fourth transitions are not strictly proofs of the
existence of God. They concern the problems of the
relationships of God with human beings, and try to demonstrate
the meaning and significance of theism in human life.

The third transition deals with the 'Evil attendant upon finite
minds and the resultant conception of the relation between
these and the Transcendent Mind.' To Temple, the question of
ever was one both of theological and philosophical concern, and
of practical importance to the work of evangelism. In The
Kingdom of God, he avers: 'the only religious problem that I
have ever come across in anyone that I have ever met,
constituting a real hindrance to religious conviction, is the
problem of evil.'

It is generally felt that it was a weakness of Idealism that it
was in part a product of nineteenth century optimism, which
believed in inevitable progress. I have earlier suggested that
much of the reason for the eclipse of Idealism was not so much
the objections of philosophers as the damage to the optimism of
its adherents created by the events of the twentieth century. W.M. Horton has a telling anecdote:

As an undergraduate philosophy student I witnessed the shattering effect of the sinking of the Lusitania upon Josiah Royce, the great idealistic philosopher. He confessed to our class in metaphysics, the morning after the tragedy, that he was no longer able to interpret this war in Hegelian terms (as a temporary conflict between thesis and antithesis leading towards a higher synthesis) but had to regard the ghastly event which had just occurred as a sheer unmitigated evil, that nothing could explain or excuse. In his earlier works, such as The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, he had claimed that idealism was so certainly true that every attempt to deny its theses only served to confirm them; in his few remaining works (for he did not live long after this great disillusionment) he spoke of the hope of the great community - the hope, no longer the certainty of a noble outcome of history. 100

Much of twentieth century theology - notably that of Barth and Tillich - reflects a profound awareness of the horrors of evil, and a reshaping of Christian thought to find a response to it. Dietrich Bonhoeffer wrestled with the dilemma of being a Christian in a totalitarian state, dying for his connections with the conspirators against Hitler. Bishop Bell of Chichester, friend of both Bonhoeffer and Temple, protested in the House of Lords against carpet bombing of German cities and emphasised repeatedly the fullness of the evils of war. Many thinkers turned to existentialism, and there was a revival of interest in the depiction of human isolation so graphically portrayed by Kierkegaard. As he was a child of the nineteenth century, lived through the First World War, dealt with the injustices of the poor of Britain, especially during the
General Strike, and presided over the Church of England during the Second World War, Temple would seem uniquely qualified to speak on the problem of evil. Yet I find his writings on the philosophical issues among his most disappointing, which is curious, as some of his best writing deals with individual evils. Perhaps the failure was a temperamental one - W.R. Matthews tells us that 'It was observed by his friends that he found it almost impossible to think evil of anyone - a charity which caused him sometimes to be deceived', and A.E. Baker adds that 'Considering men's conduct, he always attributed the best motives that would account for it ... he did not notice when critics or opponents were rude or unjust.' Although he describes evil, reading his descriptions one is not fully convinced that he has a full sense of the horrors he has described, and some of his solutions strike the reader as superficial.

Intellectually, there is no doubt that Temple is clearly aware of traditional forms of the problem. He opens Lecture XIV of Nature, Man and God with an apparently bald statement:

All theistic schemes of thought are confronted with one great and apparently insoluble difficulty - the fact of evil. The difficulty presented by this fact is felt with acuteness varying directly with the completeness of conviction that God is good. If reality consists only of happenings, void of all purpose and tending to no goal, it may then be impossible to understand it at all, but at least there is then no special difficulty about the occurrences described as evil. Whatever causal processes are recognised to exist are sufficient to account for these events, as for others. The very fact that evil is felt to be a problem even by many of those who avow no theistic faith, is evidence of the natural tendency of the mind to seek some
explanation of the world in other terms than those of purely efficient causation. But as soon as that principle is pronounced insufficient, there is no alternative recourse save to the principle of purpose; and if this be adopted the difficulty presented by evil at once appears.\textsuperscript{103}

The problem of evil itself is classically presented in the form of a dilemma: 'If God is perfectly good, He must want to abolish evil; if He is unlimitedly powerful, He must be able to abolish all evil: but evil exists; therefore either God is not perfectly good or He is not unlimitedly powerful.'\textsuperscript{104} The Christian problem, as Temple himself states, is that 'We have to recognise to the full the reality, and the radical badness and wrongness of evil; the universal sovereignty of God; and His perfect goodness.'\textsuperscript{105} Any solution to the problem is, according to Temple, unlikely to be wholly satisfactory.\textsuperscript{106} The solution, which he has hinted at in terms of purpose, is unusual in that it is stated in terms of the idealist's concern with Truth, Beauty and Goodness rather than the more traditional division of theodicy into moral and non-moral evil. It is clear from Temple's reference to purpose that his concern is largely with evil as following mental activity (purpose is possible only to animate, \textit{purposive} mind; an insentient being cannot entertain purpose). This is clear from his comments on pre-human life:

There seems to be no doubt that life in the jungle is, on balance, good. The larger beasts must kill the smaller to maintain themselves; but though this involves for the smaller beasts moments of terror, it seems clear from the accounts of naturalists that even for them enjoyment of life is the prevailing tone or colour of experience. And though there is already some problem concerning the occurrence of any evil at all, yet at this level there is reason to be
satisfied with the balance of good over evil. That is not all that we have to say about it. But it is all that arises at this stage; and at this stage it is enough. For the stage at which evil may be taken up into good and made part of its own excellence is the stage of definite moral values. If life at the animal stage is good on the whole, then on the whole it is good, and no question of its justification arises. If later developments appear to offer a justification of the subordinate element of evil which it contains, that is to be welcomed in the interest of a completely rational interpretation of the world; but even without it we can safely pronounce that the best understanding we can frame of the animal world offers no obstacle to a reasonable Theism.\textsuperscript{107}

Since Temple's death, philosophers have been much concerned with animal rights; I doubt that a contemporary philosopher would take so sanguine a view of animal suffering, even though much recent debate has concerned human treatment of animals - which is within our control - rather than the treatment of some animals by others. It is certainly true that before the emergence of man, moral evil as normally understood did not arise; but the question of suffering - and apparently purposeless suffering - certainly does. I may look on the destruction of dinosaurs with equanimity - it is something I can do nothing about - but it is difficult for me to assert that their purpose was served, and they ceased to exist. I know little of their purpose, but it is clear that pain was suffered without any experience - on the suffering creature's part - that it served some significant purpose. To say that evil may be taken up into good only makes sense if that which suffers is aware of the greater good; otherwise the good of suffering is only in the mind of the observer, and not at all in the mind of the sufferer. To him, his suffering is real, complete and unremittingly evil and is so perceived by him, regardless of
how I interpret it. If we transfer the question of suffering out of the animal kingdom and refer it to human pain, we are confronted by particular problems. It is one thing to say that out of the suffering of those in concentration camps has come certain good - consciousness of human dignity, a new state of Israel, and so on - but quite another to suggest that the suffering of this individual Gypsy or Jew is thus taken up into goodness: his suffering and death remain evil in themselves and are experienced by him as unmitigatedly evil. If, when I visited Auschwitz, I felt a determination that such a thing should not happen again, and thus out of the experience came some good for the future, the effect on me did not reduce by one jot the evil and suffering inflicted on the camp's many inmates. I stress this point, because - as we shall see - Temple makes great play of the idea of experience as somehow transmuting evil.

That for Temple evil is a matter of how things are experienced is evident from his blunt statement that 'Evil is Negative Value.' That value is known only experientially is evident from our earlier realisation that value requires recognition by mind: 'The essential condition of Positive Value has been found to be the recognition by mind of itself, or of what is akin to itself, in its object.' This is pure Idealism; but it also raises the question of whether evil arises only when experienced as such. If I see a dog savaged by some creature, I am conscious of the suffering - it is part of my experience - but if some primeval animal was savaged by another, I know nothing of it. But I find it difficult to draw a distinction between the actual sufferings involved; it seems the same in both cases, though only one impinges on me. (There is, I think, a danger in the view that only what is experienced as evil is so, not least that my concern for others may become sentimental only. I have never seen bear-baiting, but I consider it evil, even though none of the spectators may have experienced it as such.) Temple seems to be drawing a distinction between evil
and suffering, and to concentrate on the question of evil as a matter of perception (if it is negative value, it is a matter for the mind) rather than as something which exists in the world. If evil is mental only, it may be held - as Christian Scientists assert - as apparent rather than real: yet Temple, as an orthodox Christian, must assert its reality (I am not convinced he successfully does so). But, I suggest that if evil is seen as a matter of valuation, and evil is not quite the same thing as suffering, an answer to the 'problem of evil' will be unsatisfactory to the sceptic. In my experience, when the sceptic points to the 'problem of evil', he does not ask me to justify how I value things: he points to the problem of suffering; he asks 'If God is so good, why do the innocent suffer?' and by 'evil', he does not mean 'negative value': he means specific, concrete, experienced pain.

Temple sees evil in terms of the classical triad of Truth, Beauty and Goodness:

When Mind in its aesthetic activity of contemplation finds what is strange and alien, that is the experience of Ugliness. When Mind in its scientific activity of analysis and synthesis finds itself bewildered and baffled by its environment, or when it acquiesces in an apparent recognition of its own principle in that environment, to which other facts than those under observation are recalcitrant, that is the experience of Ignorance or Error. When Mind in its ethical activity of determining personal relationships either fails to find its counterpart, or finds it as something akin, indeed, but hostile, that is the experience of Moral Evil.110

Here, evil is clearly a matter of experience, and we note the stress on moral evil; to the question of suffering, of non-moral evil, Temple pays scant attention in *Nature, Man and God*. 

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In *Mens Creatrix*, he attempts to deal with the problem of suffering, but we should note that even here, the question is of how it is experienced; and the account of suffering is limited to human suffering:

I can only assert my own judgment that there are cases of suffering which, by drawing out real sympathy, such as is effective in overcoming the suffering, are justified; the existence of the suffering and the sympathy together is better than the absence of both. The sympathy takes the pain into itself and makes it an element in its own good. It is true that the average tolerably selfish man can only be roused to sympathy by the sight of real pain; but that is not the point I wish to emphasise, for it seems that so far the dependence of the sympathy on the suffering is accidental. But there is a peculiar quality about sympathy of this kind which consists in the nature of its object, and it is a quality of supreme excellence. Pain coupled with fortitude in its endurance, especially when this is inspired by love, and meeting the full sympathy which at first lightens it and at last destroys it by removal of its grounds, is sometimes the condition of what is best in human life. It is of no use to argue the point; we think so or we do not ...

This does not in any sense answer our question about primeval suffering: to the dinosaur our belated sympathy is pointless, and it speaks nothing to the animal in pain. If we are able to find a justification for - even a goodness in - human suffering, we may perhaps justify the goodness of the creator to man; but this does not deal with the other question of how a loving creator can permit pointless, literally inhuman suffering. Small creatures suffered at the whim of dinosaurs; the dinosaurs were wiped out - the point of the savagery of the
prehistoric years, not for a short time but for millions of years, seems even more pointless. It is the presence of suffering at all, and not in suffering humanity alone, which raises questions about the all-loving creator.

For Temple, it seems sufficient to 'harmonise experience', to create a whole:

To justify the actual sufferings of men we must seek them out and extend our sympathy, spending ourselves in the removal of pain and sorrow which are elements in the good of the world precisely, but only, so far as they are overcome. The theoretical and the practical are not really two functions, but one, and it is not sensible to give one a priority to the other. Always our aim is to systematise or harmonise experience; sometimes the mind does this by 'thinking', sometimes by 'acting'; to leave out any of the mind's functions will make it incapable of the full apprehension of Reality. The evil we are considering is not a concept, but is the actual pain and sorrows of men. To make a harmony of these, within the beneficent Purpose of God as so far understood, involves not the concept of sympathy but actual sympathising effort. In the degree in which we are capable of love we have the right to say to any who in this world are in tribulation, "I have overcome the world."¹¹²

It appears that for him, the matter may be resolved not by explaining away evil, but by a process of harmonisation. In Nature, Man and God, this 'harmonisation' is achieved by the device of seeing evil as a constituent - when in right proportion - of supreme good:
In each main sphere Evil can be subordinated to the corresponding good: Error subserves Truth when the explanation of an occurrence illustrates, as a well-founded explanation must, the rational order of the whole within which the error occurred. The climax of Art is found when the great artist takes the repellent and hostile elements in experience and, welding them into the completeness of his harmony, makes them - while still in their isolation horrifying - constituent and contributory elements of the sublime.

But the inherent predominance of Good over Evil is nowhere so clear as in the moral and spiritual sphere. The presence of what is morally good in a process or occurrence which as a whole is evil cannot add to that evil, nor can the good become in any case an evil thing. But the presence of evil can enhance the excellence of what on the whole is good, and the event or act which in isolation is evil can be itself an integral and contributing part of a whole which, as a whole, is good. To cite once more the supreme instance; the crucifixion of Christ is (in the Christian scheme) supremely bad when taken in isolation, but when taken as part of the whole scheme of which it is the pivot, it is supremely good.\textsuperscript{113}

There is a danger in this type of view, especially in the use of the aesthetic analogy. Hick has drawn attention to the problem of using the example of artistic creation, the use of 'light and dark' to form a harmonious totality. He comments that 'the danger ... of ... [the] ... aesthetic analogy is that it is heavily weighted towards monism. Evil tends to disappear, its terrible reality concealed within the larger pattern.'\textsuperscript{114}

According to Hick, such a view is a legacy of Augustinianism - he is unhappy about it precisely because it depersonalises the
universe: 'The whole aesthetic or quasi-aesthetic understanding of the perfection of the universe is sub-personal in character. The universe, including the finite personal life within it, is seen as a complex picture or symphony or organism whose value resides in its totality, and whose perfection is compatible with much suffering and sin in some of the constituent units.' 115

On this matter, I think Hick is entirely right, and his comments have particular irony in relation to Temple, the supreme personalist. As we shall see in the next chapter, Temple refers repeatedly to Kant's dictum to treat people always as ends, never as means; and yet in this case the individual's suffering is seen as a means to a greater end. Thus, a concentration camp inmate's suffering is held to have meaning within 'Purpose' conceived as a whole; but that meaning is apparent not to him, but to the detached observer of the whole, or to God. To the sufferer this seems scant consolation; and though it may make evil comprehensible from one viewpoint, the sensitive sufferer does not share that perception: he becomes something to be used. It might be added that on such a view God is seen not as the personal God of every individual, but as a distant observing critic of his own work.

The passage cited from Temple is not an isolated instance of his use of the observer argument. In an earlier lecture in the Gifford series, we find:

... when it is seen in the context and perspective of a longer vista of time, what was, as an isolated event, evil may be appreciated as an element in a total good - not only as a price paid for a consequent good, but as an indispensable element in what as a whole is good. And this again is not to be interpreted merely as a preponderance of good in a whole which also contains evil; the thing that was
evil becomes a positive ingredient in a total good
... the present appreciation of the past discloses a
color which in the past was imperceptible.116

This comes close to Hick's charge of monism. The irony of this
is that it is not of a piece with the stress on personality so
evident in the previous chapter: indeed, Hick's critical view
of what he considers an Augustinian approach to evil is based
on the insights of a twentieth century theological approach
with which we would normally identify Temple:

Twentieth century theologians of all communions are
more explicitly conscious than their predecessors in
most other periods that our positive knowledge of God
and of His manner of dealing with His creation is
derived from the Incarnation. And the category that
inevitably dominates a theology based upon God's
self-disclosure in Christ is the category of the
personal. Because God has revealed Himself to us in
and through a human life we must think of Him and of
His attitude to ourselves in personal terms ...
Instead of seeing human life as a link in the great
chain of being, we must see finite personality as
made in God's image and as of unique significance to
Him ... Instead of upholding the perfection of the
universe as an aesthetic whole, we must think of it
as perfect in the rather different sense that it it
is suited for the fulfilment of God's purpose for it
... if God is the Personal Infinite, man alone among
God's creatures is, so far as we know, capable of
personal relationships with Him. This fact singles
man out and gives him a special place in the created
order ... Instead, then, of thinking of the origin
and fate of human personality of an aesthetically
valued whole, we should see the great frame of
nature, with all its sources of evil, as the
deliberately mysterious environment of finite personal life... In the light of the Incarnation, then, any justification of evil must (I suggest) be a justification of it as playing a part in bringing about the high good of man's fellowship with God, rather than as necessary to the aesthetic perfection of a universe which, in virtue of its completeness, includes personal life. 117

The aesthetic approach of Temple is emphasised by his constant references - in *Nature, Man and God* to Hamlet, in *Mens Creatrix* to the poetry of Mrs. Hamilton King and G.F. Bradby, to Othello, Cordelia and Sophocles' *Antigone*, to Turner's *Fighting Temeraire*, Perugino's *Crucifixion* and the Bach B Minor Mass - to the arts to justify his position. But the aesthetic is artificial as a guide on the matter of evil; the artist does not include actual, painful evil in his masterpiece, merely the image of it. When a play is presented, Othello does not truly suffer; he presents only a picture of suffering; but the evil of the world is - at least for the Christian - actual, and not simply the black of an artist's palette. Temple is here mistaking his analogy, assuming that what is true in his model is thus necessarily true in the reality it represents.

Where he comes closer to the personalist school, as described by Hick, is in the anthropocentric approach to evil. I happen, as already suggested, to consider Temple mistaken about this, but it is interesting to note that he shares this perspective with Schleiermacher, who makes a direct connection between sin and evil:

... our proposition implies, first, that without sin there could be nothing in the world that could properly be considered an evil, but that whatever is directly bound up with the transitoriness of human life would be apprehended as at most an unavoidable
imperfection, and the operation of natural forces which impede the efforts of men as but incentives to bring these forces more fully under human control. Secondly, it is implied that the measure in which sin is present is the measure in which evil is present, so that, just as the human race is the proper sphere of sin, and sin the corporate act of the race, so the whole world in its relation to man is the proper sphere of evil, and evil the corporate suffering of the race. 118

In simple terms, Schleiermacher's point is that the great good off the world, and its sole purpose, is redemption: full goodness comes only in the redeemed man, and God has created this world as the perfect arena for redemption - without evil, and without the 'fallenness' of man, no redemption is possible, as there would be no bondage from which man would need to be redeemed. The measure of evil is thus how it affects man's redemption - suffering, on this view, is significant only as it touches man; even natural 'evils' only become so within a redemptive vision, 'as man, were he without sin, would not feel what are merely hindrances of sensual functions as evils ... the very fact that he does so feel them is due to sin, and hence that type of evil, subjectively considered, is a penalty of sin.' 119 We may note - parenthetically - that Teilhard de Chardin avoids the problem of anthropocentricity while retaining the idea of evil as having redemptive significance by his extension of the idea of redemption not to man alone but to the whole world: 'a world, assumed to be progressing towards perfection, or "rising upward", is of its nature precisely still disorganised. A world without a trace or a threat of evil would be a world already consummated.' 120 Such a vision avoids the suggestion that our dinosaur's suffering is valueless, though its exact value remains obscure, especially to him. Schleiermacher, who died in 1834, may be forgiven for a vision of creation as a stage on which man acts out his destiny; it is
a little surprising that Temple, a century later, and half a century after his father's frank acceptance of evolutionary theory, should accept so apparently uncritically a similar view.

Nevertheless, in this at least Temple may claim back his personalism, but as we shall see, his account raises particular problems. In arguing that evil follows from the finitude of self, he seems after all to be attributing evil to the creator who made man in his finitude. The form of this finitude is self-centredness. Mind in man has the ability to think beyond the self, by the power of imagination. Here, Temple echoes Brentano: 'The mind cannot think without percept or image.' This specific habit of mind leads to the pull of imagination:

... imagination, just because it exists offer particular instances of general qualities, offers to desire the stimulus which the appropriate physical objects offer to appetite. Hence comes a great, and in principle unlimited, expansion of the life of desire, which initially functions only as expressive of the vital needs of the organism or as stimulated by appropriate objects in the physical environment. Desire as so expanded may take the form of aspiration or of lust. No doubt it always takes in fact both forms at first, and one way of expressing the purpose of educational discipline is to say that it aims at directing the whole force of desire away from lust towards aspiration ... From these considerations it is clear that so far as Evil is a product of exaggerated or misdirected desire, the condition of its occurrence is identical with the condition that makes possible all the higher ranges of human life ... All depends on how it is used.
That, he says, is the mechanism of evil - the mistaken following of pictures given by imagination; but what still needs to be explained is why man so often chooses evil for its own sake: he declares that to be impossible, on the grounds that no one acts in a way that he does not see as good for himself: 'evil for others is still desired as supposedly good for him who desires it.' Whether Temple is correct in this is an experiential matter; it is, however, possible to argue that a man may choose evil without a sense that it is good for him - he may, for instance, choose to gamble without seeing it as good for him or anyone else; but it could, perhaps, still be argued that something about the gambling is some form of apparent good: Temple himself refers to a man who 'may know as a matter of general principle that stealing is not only wrong but bad - bad, that is, for him. But if he sufficiently desires an object that is within his grasp, he may nonetheless take it unless there is also before him the sorrow of the person robbed, or the penalty which he is likely to bring upon himself.' This example suggests the complexity of human motivation, which has been much studied in recent years. An interesting concept, which gives support to Temple's intuition is Victor H. Vroom's Expectancy Theory. This theory suggests that motivation is a product of the anticipated outcome of an action. The force of motivation may be represented by the formula:

\[
\text{Force} = \text{valence} \times \text{expectancy}
\]

where force is the strength of a person's motivation, valence is the strength of an individual's preference for an outcome, and expectancy is the belief that a particular action will lead to that outcome. According to Vroom, there is no motivation if there is no value placed on an action. It should be noted that Vroom, like Temple, believes that this value is that which is given to it by the individual, not an absolute value: in other words, Temple's 'apparent good'.
The inclination to choose the evil - to mistake the apparent good - is in large part a matter of character: 'A man's character determines his apparent good at any moment; his apparent good determines conduct.'\[127\] This, of course, is not an original insight: it is the dominant theme of Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics*, but it is interesting to consider it in relation to Temple's views on education - to him, the character-forming aspect (which is an education in goodness) is paramount: in *Mens Creatrix* he defines the purposes of education as discipline, initiation into social life and instruction - 'By means of it the individual is put in the way of fashioning the unity of his own soul's internal harmony, and becomes fit to take his place in the community as one element in that larger harmony.'\[128\] At the end of his life, he said that education's 'job is to develop personality.'\[129\] This educational function is a total one: personality is the highest goal, and its development one of public policy - most of Temple's interventions in public affairs were concerned with education in one form or another. Even on such things as house-building, he emphasised the development of the personality: in 1943, he told the National Book Council 'that we should urge the provision in all new houses of built-in book cases.'\[130\] If we have undisciplined characters, Temple believes, we are particularly open to temptation, for this is 'more felt in the region of bodily appetites, or of personal resentments, or of professional or commercial ambition, or of political sentiment.'\[131\]

Temple asserts that there is 'an unquestionable bias or tendency to evil in human nature'\[132\] and identifies this character with Original Sin. The reason lies in the nature of personality: for mind is not merely reactive; it has the ability to ascribe value, for its own purposes. One of the distinctively human capacities is that of reflection on himself; and in reflecting on self, he ascribes value to himself:
The mind by a necessary tendency of its own nature attaches more importance to values which find their actualisation in itself than to those which find it elsewhere; or to put it crudely, each man cares more about what seems good for him than about goods which he does not expect personally to enjoy. Even so far as he knows of these, they take a second place for him; and about many of them he knows nothing. So he becomes not only the subject of his own value judgements which he can never cease to be, but also the centre and criterion of his own system of values which he is quite unfit to be.\textsuperscript{133}

Thus, the locus of evil is clearly within the individual. Temple is absolutely specific in this judgment:

\begin{quote}
We totally misconceive alike the philosophic and the practical problem of evil if we picture it as the winning of control over lawless and therefore evil passions by a righteous but insufficiently powerful reason or spirit. It is the spirit which is evil; it is reason which is perverted; it is aspiration itself which is corrupt.\textsuperscript{134}
\end{quote}

Such a view resurrects in acute form the question of how God could create such a creature, selfish and inclined to evil. In creating such a creature capable of such sin, it would appear that God had - in contrast to the perfect goodness claimed of him - created evil. Temple's attempt to deal with this problem raises almost as many questions as it resolves:

\begin{quote}
Because it was not necessary that we should err, we cannot say that our sin is itself God's act; it is our fault, not His, in the first instance. But that we are finite selves is directly due to God's act, and we cannot doubt that God foresaw the issues of
conferring selfhood upon finite beings, so that sin falls within His purpose, and is even part of it, though it can not be said that He directly willed or wills it. What He faced was a probability so great as to be distinguishable only in thought from certainty. "I speak after the manner of men"; of course there is, for God's eternal knowledge, no such thing as "probability" but apprehension of all reality in its ordered completeness. Yet that distinction is important. For it means that God did not directly cause any man to sin ... It is not wicked to be finite; but it is so improbable as to be beyond all reasonable estimate of practical possibility that finite selves, if left to themselves, should not be wicked.135

It is difficult to follow parts of this: God is assumed to be unable to create evil, yet it is - somehow - part of his purpose. That man will sin is seen as 'a probability so great as to be distinguishable only in thought from certainty.' Temple is evidently conscious of difficulty here: if he is omnipresent, all time is present to God, which makes the grammatical mode 'will sin' meaningless to him; for to God - as traditionally conceived - there is no future, in the way that to us the future is something which cannot be fully known. Temple's attempt to deal with the problem appears to attribute to God a curious duality. In a footnote to eternal knowledge in the passage cited, he says, 'as distinguished from His temporal knowledge. We find ourselves obliged to attribute both modes of experience and knowledge to God.'136 This distinction is developed in a later passage, in which Temple outlines the relationship of the eternal God with the temporal world:

Upon one planet attached to a certain sun (whether also elsewhere or not we have no knowledge), His creativity expressed itself in beings able in
somemeasure thus to enter into His mind and understand His work, so that in them He found a fuller counterpart than elsewhere of His own being. Rooted in nature they yet are not swayed only by natural forces, but by that in which they find themselves as God seeks to find Himself in them. They, like all else, exist only in dependence on His will. But since He has thought it good (that is, has found Himself in determining) to fashion them in so complete a resemblance to Himself, He must now control them according to the law of their being which He has imposed on them; He must control them through what appears to them good and their power to appreciate it — that is, through their unforced affection and will. Thus He Himself does not know beforehand exactly how they will respond to the various modes of His manifestation of Himself to them. So far as He is Himself at work within the process of Time, the precise mode of the future is unknown to Him, though its general issue in the fulfilment of His purpose is secure. Yet, all the same, because He is not in His own nature within the Time-process any more than the dramatist is personally within the play, and all that happens utterly depends on Him, He knows it all with utter certainty. to Him the contingent is still contingent, as not being compelled by its own past; yet the whole is necessary, and therefore also all its parts; and the whole is the expression of His will. So He knows the contingent as contingent and yet knows it with certainty.\textsuperscript{137}

This approach is a curious one, positing as it does a dual knowledge: the paradox of a God who in one way knows the future, and, in another, does not. This distinction is not held by all theologians, though the Averroists denied to God the
knowledge of particulars. St. Thomas Aquinas clearly believed God's knowledge to be absolute, and without distinction. His modern commentator, Etienne Gilson, draws together the threads of his argument:

... God knows all future contingents, both in their causes and in themselves as actually realised. for, although future contingents are realised successively, God knows them not successively. We have already established that God is outside time; the standard of His knowledge, as of His being, is eternity; now, eternity which exists simultaneously, comprises the whole of time in a changeless present. God, therefore, knows the future contingents as actually present and realised, yet the necessary knowledge which He has of them, in no way invalidates the character of their contingency. Here again, St. Thomas departs from Averroism and even from the most authentic Aristotelianism. According to Averroes and Aristotle, the essential character of a future contingent is that it may or may not occur; it is therefore impossible to conceive how it can be an object of knowledge for anyone at all, and, as soon as a contingent is known to be true, it ceases to be contingent and immediately becomes necessary. But the authority of Aristotle is unable to prevail against the truth of dogma. To deny to God the knowledge of future contingents is tantamount to rendering Providence impossible. On this point, as on all others which touch the Divine essence, we must abandon the Greek philosopher to follow the teaching of St. Augustine.138

The problem appears to be that Temple is trying to maintain both the eternal knowledge of God and to give some meaning to the actual experience of God in the world. It is clear that
there is a significant difficulty: in a passage cited earlier\textsuperscript{139}, we noted Greeley's comment that we should always prefer the God of scripture to the God of Greek philosophy: Temple's dilemma (shared by many)) is his attempt as Christian and Platonist to reconcile the two, in a God who both wholly knows, and yet does not know, the future. Temple attempts a justification of this by citing Trinitarian doctrines\textsuperscript{140}, but confesses, 'There is something here which we cannot fathom ... The profoundest religious intuitions do not here lead to a scheme of thought perfectly comprehensible by men.'\textsuperscript{141} But it is clear that for him - at least in theory - the evidence of scripture is primary: he quotes with approval Aquinas' acceptance of the Augustinian doctrine that we should 'hold the truth of scripture without wavering', though not a particular explanation of it.\textsuperscript{142} Hence his evident embarrassment, for in his acceptance of two modes of thought, he abandons the classical statement of God's nature by Boethius, which to the scholastics was the cardinal text:

Whatever includes and possesses the whole fullness of illimitable life at once and is such that nothing future is absent from it and nothing past has flowed away, this is rightly judged to be eternal, and of this it is necessary both that \textit{being in full possession of itself it be always present to itself \textit{and that it have the infinity of mobile time present}}.\textsuperscript{143} (my italics)

Aquinas asserts - on the same basis - that the essence of God is self-knowledge; Temple's distinction seems inconsistent with this, and with the modern Thomist's view that 'God's knowledge ... is for ever complete and changeless.'\textsuperscript{144}

Perhaps Temple could have avoided the difficulty, or at least minimised it, by the suggestion that though we are experienced by God in an eternal mode, he is necessarily experienced by us.
as temporal: our only means of understanding is as successive. This does not resolve the question of God's actual knowledge, and the historic difficulty of reconciling the absolute knowledge claimed for God— with its implicit foreknowledge— with apparent freewill: instead, we are left only with an explanation of our experience. It is not part of the task of this thesis to outline a revised theology, but it may be possible to suggest a line of thought which might point to a way out of the difficulty. Suggestions in Whitehead and Hartshorne, of God as process, are perhaps promising; but I suggest that the key issue is that of the temporality of the Godhead. I have already said that the 'timelessness' of God is— as I think, following Kotarbinski— incoherent, that timeliness is necessary to any endurance. The moment we see God as timely, certain consequences follow, particularly for God's foreknowledge. It is a truism of Christian theology that it is no limitation to God's omnipotence to say that he cannot perform the logically impossible— God cannot create a square circle, for instance, because the logically impossible is merely verbal: the 'square circle' is a form of words which cannot refer to an existent. Indeed, Christian thought is careful not to define God's attributes too closely. The Roman Catechism, referring to the Nicene Creed, comments that 'the pastor should ... point out the propriety and wisdom of having omitted in the Creed all other names of God and of having proposed to us only the attribute of "The Almighty" as the object of our faith.' The catechism ties omniscience to omnipotence, but even so is careful to point out that God's omnipotence is not absolute: 'although God can do all things, yet he cannot lie, or deceive, or be deceived; he cannot sin, or be ignorant of anything, or cease to exist. These things are compatible only with those beings whose actions are imperfect. They are certainly incompatible with the nature of God, whose acts are all-perfect.'
'Omnipotence' thus seems less than total: but reflection shows this to be necessary. If one has an ability, it is logically impossible not to have that ability, though it is not logically necessary to have to exercise it. 'Omnipotence' means, I think, 'ability to do all that may (logically) be done'. If this is so - and theologians appear to accept this - by extension it is consistent to describe omniscience as 'ability to know all that may (logically) be known'. Now, what is logically capable of being known will be different between a timely and a timeless God. A God to whom all times are omnipresent must know every possible act of every possible creature; a timely God can only know that which it is possible to know. In relation to creatures with free will, there would be no possibility that he could know with certainty the consequence of free and uncompelled choice: the logical nature of future choice would render such a thing impossible. If omniscience is, as I suggest, 'ability to know all that may (logically) be known', then it is no limitation of 'omniscience' to say that it may not be possible to God to know that which it is not logically possible for him to know: and that state of affairs is, I suggest, intrinsic to God's creation of creatures with free will, and it would provide the ground for a genuine and unambiguous freedom.

Such an approach would avoid the dualism attributed to God's nature by Temple. This dualism is, as I have indicated, a feature of process theology, especially that of Hartshorne, who distinguishes between 'the God of philosophy' and the concrete 'God of religion', shaped in his experience by the activity of his creatures. He believes that such a perception simplifies the question of the problem of evil to a 'pseudo-problem'. For Hartshorne, the clue lies in denying the traditional concept of omnipotence: the God of process theism is unable to control finite beings - he can only set them goals which he has to persuade them to reach. The advantage of this view is the emphasis on God as one who suffers with his
creation: Whitehead refers to God as 'the great companion - the fellow-sufferer, who understands.' Within the Christian context, particularly within the modern emphasis on the pilgrim church, the vision strikes a particular chord: Christ is seen as the great suffering companion. (This is a constant theme of Andrew Greeley, cited earlier.) The difficulty of the thesis, however, is the innate dualism of God, the idea that his knowledge is in two modes; and, it is argued, the suggestion that Hartshorne has 'resolved' the problem of evil only at the expense of his omnipotence. My proposal is, I think, more modest, principally because I am not so concerned to propose the 'traditional' views of God, as Temple and Hartshorne have done; and because I am concerned to suggest that an analysis of 'omnipotence' and 'omniscience' indicates necessary limitations. The only significant defence of my position is that it is consistent with Christian tradition. Traditionally and habitually, Christians as a matter of fact, used tensed language to refer to God - 'God did such-and-such for the people of Israel', 'God is my companion', 'God will come again'. It is, of course, partly that the mode of human experience is tensed, and past, present and future are differently experienced and may be known with different degrees of certainty - these degrees of certainty are conditioned by the fact of a thing's being past or future. It might appear that we should treat this being 'trapped' within the constraints of time as limitation, and hence to say that as God is unlimited the 'constraint' of time does not apply. But such an interpretation is in part a matter of language; what is a constraint in one usage is not experienced as a constraint in another. Thus, if God exists, he exists; and by the fact of his existence, it is not possible (at least in that moment) for him not to exist. That is not a matter of limitation, but a matter of logic (the law of excluded middle) and in normal discourse it does not seem to us a significant constraint. Whether existing in time is such an example of logical necessity is unclear: it is simply that I would hold that 'X exists in time'
is tautologous: 'To be in time' is contained in the notion of 'existence'; and it is not a significant limitation on being a particular thing to be that thing and not something else. (It is not a significant objection to the omnipresence of God to say that there are some things which are not part of God: there is no logical contradiction in saying that 'God is not that which is not God'; there would be in saying 'God is that which is not God'. More to the point, that God is not identical to everything is not experienced by believers as at all a significant objection to the fullness of God.)

Such a view is compatible with Temple's view to the extent that there is a harmonisation with the actual experience of the Christian; in experiencing God temporally, man necessarily experiences him and his activity as temporal. As a matter of fact, one never does experience the timeless (and hence outside experience, which, as Kant pointed out, has temporality as a necessary condition of thought) God of Plato. On empirical grounds, I am reluctant to posit that which cannot possibly be experienced: Temple was not so reluctant, but was evidently troubled by the division between the God of his traditional belief and the God of his actual religious experience. In the matter of evil, the tension is, so far as I can see, nowhere resolved.

* * *

Perhaps Temple would have been most at home with what Kenneth Surin has called 'Practical Theodicy', which he bases on the work of Dorothee Soelle (1929- ), Jurgen Moltmann (1926- ) and P.T.Forsyth (1848-1921). Soelle makes an important comment, potent with insight for anyone who hopes to build a theological framework on Temple's perspective: 'That all suffering is social suffering ... means that all suffering is to be worked on. No suffering can be clothed and transfigured any longer with the appearance of fate.' 150 Soelle emphasises the human
being within a community, striving with the brute fact of evil, more concerned with how the Christian is to deal with the fact than with the theory of whence the evil came. But this emphasis - consistent with Bonhoeffer's dictum that 'man is challenged to participate in the sufferings of God at the hands of a godless world' creates special problems. God is experienced rather as companion than creator - the emphasis is on personal relationship. This is consistent with Temple's religious outlook, but creates problems for a philosophical consideration of God: if he is, supremely, a personal God, suffering with the human race, large and apparently insoluble problems arise about the origin, meaning and value of the objects of the universe; and God seems something less than the creator of all. Surin draws out this theme, characterising the common features of Soelle, Moltmann and Forsyth:

1. They affirm the principle that God is in some sense a deity who suffers with his creatures.
2. They maintain that the God who suffers in this world cannot be an immutable and impassible deity.
3. They insist that the question of overwhelming import to the sufferer is not 'Is theism unintelligible because I am suffering?', but 'Is this God a God of salvation - is this a God who can help?'
4. They claim that it is a corollary of (1) and (3) that a theological approach to the 'problem of evil' from the standpoint of victims will necessarily lead to soteriology, or more precisely (given the framework of the Christian mythos), into the doctrine of the atonement.

The second of these theses is the stumbling block for Temple, but it would seem that only by an acceptance of this, as I have argued, that God can become at all explicable in relation to evil. If he were to accept the line of the 'practical theodicists', Temple would discover the possibility that the
question of evil becomes as clearly personal as he would wish. Alan Garfinkel leads us to see that there are two kinds of 'spaces' occupied by different approaches to theodicy. The traditional theodicist of the 'theoretical' kind is concerned with the following objects of explanation:

Evil exists because

\{ 
\begin{align*}
\text{the world is a 'vale of soul-making'} \\
\text{we are free beings} \\
\text{good is impossible without the} \\
\text{possibility of evil}
\end{align*}
\}

The 'practical' theodicist is more likely to view the problems thus:

Evil exists because

\{ 
\begin{align*}
\text{I am imprisoned here} \\
\text{We are being tortured now} \\
\text{You are indifferent to our hunger} \\
\text{God is an indifferent spectator}
\end{align*}
\}

Surin contrasts the underlying questions behind the different approaches. The 'theoretical theodicist' asks:

Given that there is evil (in general), why does evil (in general) exist?

The 'practical theodicist' asks a more modest but more personally orientated question:

Why is this (specific evil) being done to me/us, by you/Them, here and now?

The need for such a formulation is perhaps a modern perception, grown out of the savagery of so much of twentieth century experience, though one could argue that it exemplifies the attitudes of Old Testament characters; but one might wish, with his special gifts of imagination and personal insight, that
Temple had attempted to provide an answer to it, rather than trying - not very successfully - to answer a more traditional series of questions. In this, as in other things, one senses him to be on the verge of new insight, but restrained by the orthodoxies of his past.

d) The Fourth Dialectical Transition

As we have just seen, Surin maintains that a practical theodicy leads necessarily to soteriology (the branch of theology which deals with the saving work of Christ for the world) and the doctrine of the atonement. Temple's fourth transition, which itself grows out of the problem of evil, is a theological one, based on the idea that 'Natural Theology culminates in a demand for the specific Revelation which its principles forbid it to include in its own province.' This is not an argument so much as a claim that only revelation can fill the gaps in argument. From the reader's point of view, there are two significant points in Temple's comments - some further thoughts on the problem of evil, which indicate possibilities nowhere developed; and a reiteration of the non-propositional view of revelation.

The fourth transition is the subject of Lecture XX, the final lecture in Nature, Man and God. Much of the lecture, as one would expect, is recapitulation of the whole course. But the development of the comments on evil is significant, principally because Temple states in unequivocal terms the challenge which he believes evil makes to faith: 'What is wanted is some ground for belief that the occurrence of the evil is an actual element in total good ... to show that evil is capable of justification is not to show that it is justified; and nothing less than this is required. If evil were only a possibility, a possible justification might suffice. But evil is actual, and only an actual justification is relevant.'
The justification offered by Temple is a fairly conventional one - he follows (and quotes) Bosanquet\textsuperscript{157} in the view that evil, at least in the form of suffering, is not simply something outweighed by good, but is an integral element in it: 'evil ... can be so confronted by him who experiences it that the whole is not a mere preponderance of satisfaction, but an enriched personality for which the evil moment has made an indispensable contribution to the enrichment.'\textsuperscript{158} Such a view raises considerable problems, as we saw in the last section, in that so much evil is difficult to justify. If I suffer pain, it may make me a nobler character; but that presupposes my survival. A concentration camp victim does not have the opportunity to be ennobled by his suffering in any way that is visible to us. If he has the opportunity in an afterlife, we are not in a position to judge this, and cannot with certainty assert it: it is a matter of faith. But it is that faith which Temple is attempting to justify. It could be argued that the existence of equivocal circumstances is necessary to the integrity of faith - if the contribution of evil to good were beyond all doubt, it could not be a matter of belief - but it is this ambiguity that Temple hopes to overcome. The importance of this problem is that it points further towards the need for specific revelation: natural theology alone cannot point to the truth of God; only our experience of Christ could do that.

An interesting feature of Temple's discussion of evil, particularly given the distinction made by Surin, is that Temple also gives consideration to the 'theoretical' and 'practical' aspects of theodicy, and he asserts that 'any solution of this whole problem for our minds ... must be sought at the level of our own experience.'\textsuperscript{159} His argument is, as we have seen that in our experience evil may be transformed into a component of good - characteristically, he attempts to demonstrate this in relation to beauty, truth and goodness; and true realisation of this comes to him who transcends the self and its apparent good:
The man who would see Truth must yield his mind to the facts; the man who would enjoy Beauty must surrender his soul to its spell; the man who would love must give his very self, for that is what love is. At every point therefore the aspiration towards these forms of good requires a denial of self, and in the measure of its attainment passes over into worship, of which the meaning is total self-giving and self-submission to the Object of worship. This then, it seems, is man's true good - to worship.160

To worship is to worship God; and God is discovered in revelation. The emphasis is on discovery, for revelation takes place within experience. In this last lecture of Nature, Man and God, we come full circle, in a frank and explicit acceptance of a non-propositional view of faith:

... there [are] no "revealed truths", but ... "truths of revelation". The essential revelation is an act of God apprehended in a complete living experience, in which subjective and objective factors are both active; it is not capable of isolation from that experience itself is recovered or renewed. Sacred writings and authoritative formulae are not themselves the substance or reality of revelation. That is always the living God Himself, and nothing less or other. But sacred writings and authoritative formulae may contain the record of the divine act which actually is the revelation, and point the way to recovery or renewal of the experience in which it is apprehended. Thus for the Christian the Nicene Creed is not an object of faith, but a formulation of a faith of which the object is God revealed in Christ. It is a formulation of inferences drawn from revelation. The revelation ... is Christ Himself as
It is clear that this position is a natural conclusion from many strands of Temple's thought: it is a vision of theology which relates belief to his concern with the centrality of experience, which appears to reconcile the subject and object in a significant whole, and which, above all, emphasises personality: the personality of the believer encounters Christ.

A NOTE ON NATURAL THEOLOGY

As we have seen, Temple is unhappy about natural theology; but under the terms of the Gifford Trust, he was required to lecture within the natural theology tradition. His final comments are interesting:

... Natural Theology cannot win ... [a man] ... to worship. It may assure him that there is a God who both claims and deserves his worship; it may bid him to seek that God and the way to worship Him; but it cannot confront him with the God whom it describes. It can only discuss God; it cannot reveal Him. And for this reason its whole fabric of thought is liable to be laid in ruins be devastating doubt. For the existence of God is fully credible only if evil is being transmuted into good; and that cannot - demonstrably cannot - finally be accomplished unless God the Supreme Good becomes the apparent good to every man ... Natural Theology, which is indispensable as a source of interpretation and as a purge of superstition even for those who have received a true revelation, yet if left to itself, ends in a hunger which it cannot satisfy, and yet of
which it must perish if no satisfaction is forthcoming.162

The curious point about this passage is that although Temple, as a non-propositional theologian, has an instinctive tendency to eschew natural theology - this has been a dominant feature of twentieth century theology (even in the Roman Catholic church, Karl Rahner has pleaded for 'kerygmatic theology' directed to preaching and limited almost entirely to the message of the gospels, while Orthodox theology has emphasised patristic thought, and Barth repeatedly repudiated natural theology) - he seems tacitly to accept the twofold tradition, so strong in the Roman Catholic church, of Natural and Revealed Theology; and his comments may be read as a call for a combination of the two, rather than a Barthian rejection. It should also be noted that there are signs of a return to natural theology in the work of recent religious thinkers163: it appears that some questions do not disappear, despite the different sets of questions Barthians would wish to be the central focus of theology.

NOTES

1. Summa Theologica: I, q.29,a.3,c & ad.1,2
2. ibid.: I, q.2,a.3
3. ibid.: I, q.44,a.3
5. Christus Veritas: p.4 (see Chapter Three, notes 66-70, above)
7. see Chapter Three, note 52, and Chapter Two, note 45, above
11. see Chapter Two, note 45
12. see Adam Fox: Dean Inge: p.250
14. Christus Veritas: p.vii
15. see Chapter Three, note 31
17. J.C.A.Gaskin: The Quest for Eternity
18. H.D.Lewis: Our Experience of God
19. John J.Shepherd: Experience Inference and God
20. Anthony O'Hear: Experience Explanation and Faith
23. H.G.Hubbeling: Principles of the Philosophy of Religion
25. Summa Theologica: I, q.2,a.3
27. ibid.: p.130
28. ibid.: p.130
29. ibid.: p.130
30. ibid.: pp.130-131
31. ibid.: p.131
32. ibid.: p.131. The quotation is from A.N.Whitehead: Process and Reality: p.64. The words italicised are Temple's insertion.
33. Anthony O'Hear: Experience Explanation and Faith: p.135
34. ibid.: p.137
36. Teilhard de Chardin: The Phenomenon of Man: passim
38. The Kingdom of God: p.108
39. Mens Creatrix: p.89
40. Christus Veritas: p.7
43. ibid.: p.132
44. ibid.: p.132
45. Dorothy Emmet: The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking: pp.207-208
46. Anthony O'Hear: Experience Explanation and Faith: p.113
47. John J. Shepherd: Experience Inference and God: p.47
49. Dorothy Emmet: The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking: passim. There is a useful summary, pp.215-216
52. ibid.: p.396
53. ibid.: p.203
54. ibid.: p.205
55. Summa Theologica: I, q.10, a.1
56. Richard Swinburne: The Coherence of Theism: p.219
57. John J. Shepherd: Experience Inference and God: p.112
58. Nature Man and God: p.204
60. Nature Man and God: p.214
62. The Nature of Personality: p.87
63. Faith and Modern Thought: pp.8-9
64. Ninian Smart: Philosophers and Religious Truth: p.87
65. John J. Shepherd: Experience Inference and God: especially pp.16-81
66. ibid.: p.47
68. ibid.: pp.209-214
69. ibid.: p.210
70. ibid.: p.111
71. ibid.: p.111
72. ibid.: pp.111-112
74. Introduction to O.C.Quick: The Gospel of the Modern World: p.xii
75. Nature Man and God: p.250
76. ibid.: p.250
77. ibid.: p.250
78. see Bertrand Russell: The Problems of Philosophy: pp.52-63
79. For the nominalist position, two of the most significant analyses may be found in The Glosses of Peter Abelard on Porphyry, a major - and, I believe, unjustly neglected - work, and, in our own day, Tadeusz Kotarbinski: 'The Humanities Without Hypostases', Gnosiology: pp.481-491
80. cf. R.M.Chisholm: Brentano and Intrinsic Value: pp.17-32
82. John Hick: Philosophy of Religion: p.94
83. Thomas F.Torrance: Theological Science: p.23
84. ibid.: p.24
85. ibid.: p.25
86. Walter Kasper: Jesus the Christ: pp.246-247
91. Andrew M.Greeley: Rite of Spring: pp.196-197
92. see note 81, above
93. Anthony Flew: God and Philosophy: p.37
94. J.C.A.Gaskin: The Quest for Eternity: p.111
95. ibid.: pp.112-113

97. Summa Theologica: I, q.2, a.2


99. The Kingdom of God: p.57


106. ibid.: p.356

107. ibid.: p.360

108. ibid.: p.357

109. ibid.: p.357

110. ibid.: p.357

111. Mens Creatrix: p.278

112. ibid.: p.281


115. ibid.: p.201


119. ibid.: p.319

120. Teilhard de Chardin: Le Milieu Divin: p.64

121. Nature Man and God: p.360

122. ibid.: p.361

123. ibid.: p.362
124. ibid.: p.363
125. see Victor H.Vroom: Work and Motivation: passim
126. see Harold Koontz, Cyril O'Donnell and Heinz Weihrich: Management: p.486
128. Mens Creatrix: p.242
129. The Church Looks Forward: p.81
130. 'The Resources and Influence of English Literature', First Annual Lecture of the National Book Council, May 21st, 1943; reprinted in Religious Experience, ed. A.E.Baker: p.188
132. ibid.: p.363
133. Ibid.: p.365
134. ibid.: p.368
135. ibid.: p.369
136. ibid.: p.369
137. ibid.: pp.444-445
139. see note 91, above
141. ibid.: p.445
142. ibid.:p.310, also Summa Theologica: I, q.48, a.1
143. Boethius: Consolation of Philosophy: Book V, prose 6
144. A.L.Reys: 'The One God': The Teaching of the Catholic Church: ed. Monsignor Canon George D.Smith: p.103
145. The Roman Catechism: First Article, 13
146. ibid.: First Article, 12
147. see, e.g.: Charles Hartshorne: Man's Vision of God: passim
149. see note 91, above
150. Dorothee Soelle: Suffering: p.106
152. Kenneth Surin: Theology and the Problem of Evil: p.137
153. Alan Garfinkel: Forms of Explanation: Rethinking the Question in Social Theory: Chapter 1, passim

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154. Kenneth Surin: *Theology and the Problem of Evil*: pp.147-
155. *Nature Man and God*: p.xii
156. ibid: pp.508,511
159. ibid.: p.504
160. ibid.: p.518
161. ibid.: pp.499-500
162. ibid.: p.519
163. see, e.g. John J. Shepherd: *Experience Inference and God*: passim, especially Chapters 1 and 9
CHAPTER SEVEN

NATURAL ORDER

... If the conception of a good has to be expounded in terms of such actions as those of a practice, of the narrative unity of a human life and of a moral tradition, then goods, and with them the only grounds for the authority of laws and virtues, can only be discovered by entering into those relationships which constitute communities whose central bond is a shared vision of and understanding of goods.¹

William Temple's ethical philosophy flows naturally from his views on value - if personality is the highest value, then any ethic is necessarily personal: it lies in doing good for the person within a community. This points towards a version of situation or contingency ethics, because the needs of a particular person are determined by his circumstances; and circumstances arise out of his own nature, his particular needs, his role in society, and the exigencies of a given time. As we have seen, Temple had been influenced by the Idealist vision of a moral code based on 'My Station and Its Duties', and much of his writing is about the actual life of the Christian within a whole community. His concern with political life is well-known; as we shall see, this seemed to him an inevitable consequence of concern for the community, and the growth of an individual's life. If the whole personality is in fellowship with others, a community has an inner dynamic, and this is political (though not necessarily party political). For Temple, as for Aristotle, ethics leads naturally into the political area: in ethical matters, he was - certainly towards the end of his life - much closer to an Aristotelian than a Platonic position than he might have cared to admit; and there is no essential difference between his views and those recently
expounded by Alisdair MacIntyre, cited at the head of this chapter.

One of the tragedies of Temple's life is that we do not have from him a single major work on ethics. It is clear, especially from his later writings, that he was developing a coherent ethical position: Christianity and Social Order, written in 1941, has an integration in its views not always present in earlier writings. The circumstance of war, the social currents that led - nationally - to a concern about how society might be constructed in the post-war years, seem to have concentrated his mind on the fundamental principles which should underlie future developments. In these matters, he was an activist: the 'Temple clause' in the 1944 Education Act is perhaps the most famous and certainly most debated section of R.A. Butler's blueprint for the next generation. Of course, Temple had always been an active commentator on the events of his time, busy on commissions and enquiries, a tireless worker on behalf of the unemployed and in industrial matters, but what had been hints and suggestions in his books hitherto was to be integrated into the conception of Natural Order, explicit in Christianity and Social Order, though not fully worked out. (I shall suggest that various articles show inconsistencies in his scheme, but there are clues that he might have been able, given time, to present something more permanently valuable.) The concept of Natural Order was a conscious attempt to integrate Anglican thought into the Natural Law tradition, so strong in the Roman Catholic church. Had he lived, Temple might have found particular ecumenical value in the development of common ethical criteria. (He was President of what was to be the World Council of Churches. At this time, the Catholic church refused any links with this body, though Temple did much to develop personal ties - in 1939, Temple, the Chief Rabbi and Cardinal Hinsley addressed a Royal Albert Hall meeting to attack racial persecution in Germany, and in 1941 was involved, with Cardinal Hinsley and others, in a joint letter to The Times
accepting the Pope's 'Five Peace Points.' Iremonger tells us that:

Temple never disguised his belief that the differences between the Roman and Anglican Churches cut deep into the intellectual and spiritual life of both Communions, but this separation did nothing to impair his friendship with Cardinal Hinsley - there was a notable sympathy between the two men, and each had a warm regard for the other - and he had begun to work happily with Hinsley's successor Cardinal Griffin, who declared that he was 'looking forward', at the time of the Archbishop's death, 'to many years of fruitful association' in their 'common tasks'. Temple also had plans, towards the end of his life, for making a more personal approach to the Vatican, in the hope that Roman and Anglican theologians might be encouraged to undertake some joint study of the Natural Law as the basis of Christian living, but for more than one reason he decided to abandon the project.

The interest in Natural Law was genuine, as may be seen from a late article based on an address to the Aquinas Society. This is an important piece of writing, because Temple spells both his view on the value of Aquinas and indicates where he believes Aquinas requires modification in the light of modern conditions. The value of this summary for the Temple scholar is that we are able to see how the demands for modification in the Thomist ethical scheme flow from the developed themes of Temple's mature theology.

Temple believes that the Thomist scheme requires modification in six ways:
1. The society of the thirteenth century was a stable one, far less fluid than our own. This fixity enabled the moral thinker to perceive rights and obligations more readily than today: a modern recasting of Thomism should reflect this change.

2. The modern fluidity is in large part the consequence of modern concern for the individual personality - Aquinas is insufficiently concerned with individuality.

3. Aquinas, living in a static society, has nothing to say about the dynamics of social progress: 'we need to develop a type of responsible citizenship for which his world made no opportunity.'

4. Aquinas gives insufficient weight to sin, treating individual sins as individual problems, rather than considering evil in all its manifestations: 'whatever may be true of St. Thomas himself, the Thomist tradition as commonly presented does not adequately convey the awful pervasiveness and penetrating potency of sin in all departments of human life, including in its sphere of poisonous influence even our worship and our generosity.'

5. St. Thomas is too concerned with knowledge, not enough with 'affective knowledge': 'the inadequate appreciation of individuality in Thomism leads to an insufficient emphasis upon actual personal relations - what some moderns call "meeting" - alike in morals and in religion.'

6. Thomism has a too conceptual interpretation of revelation: 'Thomism proceeds upon the widely accepted view that Revelation is given in propositions. I should contend that the primary medium of Revelation is events ... in all Revelation what is revealed is not a truth concerning God but God Himself in action.'
For these reasons, it is, I think, possible to understand why Temple prefers the term 'Natural Order' to 'Natural Law': he wishes to distance himself from too close an identification with a purely Thomist interpretation of Natural Law. I suggest that for Temple, the roots of his approach lie elsewhere than in Thomism, though his conclusions are similar. It is also true that there was an emphasis in his time on a particular concept of 'order': Bishop Bell produced a Penguin Special, *Christianity and World Order*; another Penguin was A.C.F. Beales' *The Catholic Church and International Order* (1941): and in 1942, Father Philip Hughes published *The Pope's New Order*. In 1943, R.A.L. Smith wrote 'Dictators and democrats, bureaucrats and business men, one and all acclaim a New Order that is to come into being at the end of the war.' Order' was a fashionable and charged word of the years surrounding *Christianity and Social Order*: Temple is trying to relate it to deep moral principle.

**The Concept of Natural Order**

Temple does not produce a clear definition of natural order: rather he attempts to show its significance ostensively, by demonstration. Its roots lie in a realisation that one needs some means of applying the Christian virtues of love and justice: to say that the solution of a problem is to love, or to be just, is not a particularly helpful answer to practical difficulties:

It is axiomatic that Love should be the predominant Christian impulse, and that the primary form of Love in Social organisation is Justice. No doubt this latter truth is sometimes ignored by those who wish to apply Love, so to speak, wholesale and direct. But it is hard to see how this works out. Imagine a Trade Union Committee negotiating with an Employer's Federation in an industrial crisis on the verge of a
strike or lock-out. This Committee is to be activated by love. Oh, yes, by all means - but towards whom? Are they to love the workers or the employers? Of course - both. But then that will not help them much to determine what terms ought to be either proposed or accepted. The fact is that these problems arise only so far as perfect love is not operative. That is a reason why both sides should confess their sin, but still the problem is unresolved.\textsuperscript{11}

What is needed is some practical guidance on how to apply love and justice; and the best way to achieve this, as in the resolution of any problem, is to have a series of priorities: to ask what is most important. The concept of natural order, in Temple's formulation, provides an answer to the problem of producing agreed priorities.

Natural order is discovered 'partly by observing the generally accepted standards of judgement and partly by consideration of the proper functions of whatever is the subject of enquiry.'\textsuperscript{12} The second is particularly important. What is meant may perhaps be best understood from Temple's own example:

... in the economic field, the reason why goods are produced is that men may satisfy their needs by consuming these goods. Production by its own natural law exists for consumption. If, then, a system comes into being in which production is regulated more by the profit obtainable for the producer, that system is defying the Natural Law or Natural Order.

There is nothing wrong about profits as such. It has always been recognised that both the producer and the trader are entitled to a profit as their own means of livelihood, which they have earned by their service to the community. Further, there can be no profit
except so far as the needs of customers are being met. But it is possible none the less for those two to get into the wrong order, so that the consumer is treated, not as a person whose interest is the true end of the whole process, but only as an indispensable condition of success in an essentially profit-seeking enterprise.¹³

What is demanded is an analysis of purpose: to examine a particular activity to discover its end. In relation to its end a given course of action may be judged and rightly ordered. Temple comments in his article on Thomism, 'Many of the troubles of the modern world come from the confusion of means and ends. St. Thomas vindicates the saying of St. Augustine that omnis humana perversitas est uti fruendis et frui utendis by pointing out that lex aeterna primo et principaliter ordinat hominem ad finem (Sum. Theol. Pt.I, Q.II, A.71)¹⁴

In his analysis of modern problems, Temple articulates a feeling shared by many - that disorder (Aquinas refers to sin as inordinatio) enters society when the true purpose of an organisation is subordinated to other ends. A company initially exists to supply a perceived gap in the market, and incidentally, to profit by supplying that gap. Sometimes, as the company grows, this appears to be forgotten - companies will deliberately manipulate the market, or restrict supplies for the sake of profits, either their own or those of financial backers. The problem of contradictory ends arises, perhaps with particular clarity in the case of nationalised industries. In Britain, industries have been nationalised, but there has been no consistent reasoning for their public ownership. The rail system provides a particular example: nationalised to ensure a means of travel for all, they have at various times been measured not in terms of their efficiency in providing a service but of profitability. (It might be argued that this is inevitable given that they do weigh on the public purse: I am
not concerned with a political point, but with the problems of inconsistency of purpose). Rail links have been cut, not because they do not serve a need but because they do not make a profit. In other fields, there is often a half-spoken suggestion that a health service or educational establishment exists not for health or education but for other purposes, or that the service is subordinate to administrative convenience.

Temple expressed these views for a broad English audience. He was not the first to do so - as an example, Cardinal Manning, commenting in 1891 on *Rerum Novarum*, presented a graphic picture of disorder:

> It is clear that the normal state of man in the natural order is that every man should have and should dwell in his own home, surrounded by the duties and charities of life. If the civil population of the country were debarred from marriage, like the standing army, the face of the country would be visited with all the evils of a garrison town. Homeless men are reckless.  

The signal importance of Temple lies not in his originality but in the influence of his views: Denys Mumby refers to *Christianity and Social Order* as 'one of the foundation piers of the Welfare State'\(^\text{16}\), and Hannen Swaffer of the *Daily Herald* said that the Labour Party owed its sweeping victory of 1945 more to William Temple than to any other man.\(^\text{17}\) *Christianity and Social Order* was easily Temple's most popular book: over 130,000 copies were sold on publication in 1942.\(^\text{18}\) Temple himself tells us in his preface that 'the principles which I lay down are not an expression of a purely personal point of view but represent the main trend of Christian social teaching.'\(^\text{19}\)
It is not surprising that we should find hints of natural order thought in earlier works. In *Mens Creatrix*, there is reference to order: 'The true aim alike of State and individual is that condition which may be called either free order or ordered freedom.' He insists upon a right ordering of the functions of the state: if this is ignored, disorder and tyranny follow: 'Inasmuch as man is social, the State and the Church must be maintained even at great cost; but it must not be forgotten that the happiness or character they aim at producing can only be actualised by their individual members, and the individuality of the State is subservient to that of the citizens, because its function is subservient.' Perhaps most interestingly, he stresses the dehumanisation of industrial society, 'the sense that the employees are treated as "hands" and not as "persons", so far as the industry is concerned. Their personality apparently is for their leisure time; only their productive utility counts in industry itself.' Precisely the same point had been made by Pope Leo XIII in *Rerum Novarum*: 'it is shameful and inhuman to treat men like chattels to make money by, or to look upon them as merely so much muscle or physical strength', and depersonalisation by industry is the major theme of Pope John Paul II's *Laborem Exercens* (1981). The question of means and ends is raised in *Christus Veritas*, almost as an aside: 'it is enough to make clear the danger of separating means and ends in our estimate of the value of ends. The means may have no value in itself, and yet may increase the value of the end which is reached through it.'

The talk of means and ends enables us to understand the origin of Temple's conception of natural order. It is derived, I think, not from his study of Aquinas, but from his knowledge of Kant: it is an attempt to work through the implications of the second form of Kant's Categorical Imperative. Temple is explicit about this: 'in his second version of the Categorical Imperative - "Treat humanity always as an end withal and never
only as a means" - he found the true moral principle; but ... he never perceived or elaborated its full significance.  

This Kantian formulation is entirely consistent with the metaphysical bases of Temple's thought: it values personality most highly, and is connected with purpose. 'Right order' involves the prioritising of people and their needs above any other ...'because it is of persons, the highest interest of the community and of its members is a personal interest, the fulfilment of their being as Persons; and this is Righteousness ...

For whatever is a truly personal good - a good which resides in a person - takes priority over all non-personal goods, because morality is the discovery or recognition by persons of personality in others, to whom by the common attribute of personality they are bound in the ties of community membership.

We find here the characteristic stress on the personal: the basis of natural order is the value, the centrality, of the person. This, I think, is a difference of emphasis from Aquinas (as we saw, Temple considered that Aquinas gave too small a place to the individual): Aquinas emphasises rather the juridical aspects of natural law - its basis is not the primacy of the personality, but divine law: 'since all things subject to divine providence are ruled and measured by the eternal law ...

it is evident that all things partake somewhat of eternal law, in so far as, namely, from its being imprinted on them, they derive their respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends.'  

Natural law is seen, in Gilson's words as 'universal legislation', placing beings 'in a position similar to that of rational persons, governed by a law.' (We should be careful, however, to recognise some ambiguity in Aquinas about the use of the term 'law': scholars have been careful to distinguish two senses - 'ius' and 'lex': these have been explored in outline by A.P.D'Entreves, and in detail by Oscar J. Brown. The significant point is that it is something
to which human beings naturally conform, rather than developed out of our being.)

If natural order is concerned with the individual person and his needs, then it may indeed be possible to use it as a basis of ethical judgment. Temple believes the conception provides practical guidance:

It is wholesome to go back to this conception of Natural Law because it holds together two aspects of truth which it is not easy to hold in combination—the ideal and the practical. We tend to follow one or other of two lines: either we start from a purely ideal conception, and then bleat fatuously about love; or else we start from the world as it is with the hope of remedying an abuse here or there, and then we have no general direction or criterion of progress. The conception of Natural Law will help us to frame a conception of the right or ideal relation between the various activities of men and of the men engaged in them. For consideration of the status of an activity in the light of its social function keeps both the ideal and the practical full in view. 32

It is apparent that the guidance is not the provision of answers to every problem, but rather of how to determine ethical priorities. In ethics, a traditional and fundamental problem is that of conflict between priorities, as when the demands of honesty and charity pull in different directions. Natural order provides criteria for making the necessary judgment: in brief, one asks what is best for the persons involved. Morality is served when one asks not what is the right rule to follow, but rather, what is the good (what benefits personality) for this person/these persons. The clarification of problems comes if one is able to say 'for this person, charity is more important than honesty': but that
judgment is based on analysis of circumstance. The criterion of judgment becomes not rule-based, but circumstance-based.

**Situation Ethics**

In the encyclical *Summi Pontificatus* (1939), Pope Pius XII enunciated a doctrine of the natural law with which Temple's thought is in accord: 'God's law, imposed in the moral order, bids us carefully distinguish, in the interests of the common good, what is the right and what is the wrong way of meeting the needs of the moment, what necessity does and what it does not demand of us.' The extension of natural law into such a situationalism seems common among its practitioners. A recent Catholic writer emphasises the point: 'In the final accounting, there is no authoritative guidebook by which Christians can determine what is consistent with the Gospel and what is not. The Christian lives in a world of pre-moral and moral values and of material and formal norms which express those values. But those norms have to be applied in each case, and no case is exactly like another.' Aquinas himself draws attention to the situationalism inherent in each instance of moral judgment: 'whatever is received is received according to the mode [situation] of the receiver.'

This aspect of situationalism may properly be traced to Aristotle. In the *Nichomachean Ethics*, he constantly emphasises that right ethical action depends upon the situation, the agent, and the activities involved. This demands the practical virtue of prudence, which he likens to art. Likewise, Aquinas distinguishes the intellectual virtues as 'five in number: the understanding of principles, the science of conclusions, the wisdom of judging by the highest causes involved in in a given situation, the prudence of right doing, and the art of right making.' The distinction between prudence and art is clarified in the *Summa Theologica*: 'The value of art consists,
not in the artist, but in the work of art, for making, which is
an action going out into external material, is a perfection,
not of the maker, but of the thing made. But the value of
prudence is in the doer, who is perfected by his activity, for
prudence is the right idea of things to be done. Prudence
concerns the whole of human life and its last end; art deals
with a local end. This activity is essential to the
application of moral virtue: and is only rightly applied when
prudence leads to appropriate action:

... moral virtue is a habit making a good choice. Here two conditions are called for, a good intention
of the end, which moral virtue provides by giving us
a bias to what is reasonable, and a right taking of
means, which implies that the reason takes good
counsel, makes the right selection, and commends the
correct course, all of which functions attach to
prudence and its associate virtues. Moral virtue in
consequence requires understanding of principles. As
theory works from true premises so prudence
presupposes a true sense of background, for it is the
right idea of dealing with a human situation.

We note that there is here a realisation that moral conduct
involves the application of virtues: natural order, for Temple,
provides the prudential criterion necessary for that
application to specific situations.

While, since Aristotle, moral philosophers have been concerned
with questions of application of principles, it is in the
present century that there has been particular emphasis on
situational ethics. In simple terms, this approach is based on
the idea that there is no one right way of conducting any part
of human life - the 'right' way of behaving is not determined
by reference to a particular rule which always holds, but
according to the exigencies of a given situation. What is
'right' or 'wrong' in a given set of circumstances is determined by that situation: any rules one may follow are at best guidelines or rules of thumb - only the needs of the situation can tell us whether we should apply particular rules. A situationalist does not usually dispense with all rules, because experience tells us that it is generally wise to follow certain patterns of behaviour: what he does do is to say that no rule is universally applicable - in certain circumstances, it is positively the right thing to do to disobey the rule and wrong to obey. Thus, a situationalist would say that in most circumstances, experience has shown that it is best to tell the truth, (and so he can formulate the general rule 'tell the truth'), but it does not follow that it is right always to tell the truth. If we suppose that we have information vital to the country's interest and an enemy agent is questioning us, it is not merely permissible to tell a lie - in these circumstances it is positively the right thing to do: the situationalist would say that in these circumstances it would be wrong not to lie. This approach might seem fairly obvious in the case of lying, but fewer people are prepared to go all the way with the situationalist's belief that nothing is exempt from the possibility of exception - a true situationalist would not, for instance, be a pacifist, because he could not rule out the possibility that in certain circumstances it would be right to go to war. If challenged by the example of burning babies, he would say simply that he could not think of any circumstances where this would be right, but he accepts the theoretical possibility that such a circumstance might arise. If a situational approach is adopted - it is argued - it is essential that one has in mind not general rules but general goals: in ethical matters it might be that one should always so act that the welfare of the individual person is paramount.

According to Joseph Fletcher, there is nothing in this account of situationalism with which Temple would disagree. Perhaps we would be wise to remember that Fletcher is one of the leading
exponents of what Peschke has called 'agapist situationism', he has published a number of significant books on the subject. The maxim of this view of ethics is that the rule is to love: but only circumstances can enable us to determine what is the loving action.

Temple's clearest exposition of situationalism may be found in a relatively late essay: the passage requires full quotation:

... our whole case is that it can [be], and often is, right to do things which in isolation are bad. What things it is right to do may be very much affected by circumstances. Murder is always wrong; because murder is the taking of another man's life for personal and selfish ends. To kill a man, if that is the only alternative to being killed by him, is not murder; it is usually classed as justified homicide. Even if it is arguable that a perfect Christian would allow himself to be killed rather than kill his would-be murderer in self-defence, it is not arguable that he should allow a human brute to kill a child rather than to kill that brute himself. Of course he should stop him without taking his life if that is possible; but if it is not possible, he is not only at liberty, he is under obligation to kill; and that obligation is rooted in love.

People sometimes become confused by the recognition that the rightness of most acts is relative and not absolute; but this does not mean that the rightness is in any way doubtful ... The general principle is that relative terms are absolute in the appropriate relations. To kill is right, if at all, relatively and not absolutely; that is, it can only be right in special circumstances. But in those circumstances it is absolutely right.
It is doubtful if any act is right "in itself". Every act is a link in a chain of causes and effects ...

The rightness of an act ... nearly always, and perhaps always, depends on the way in which that act is related to circumstances; that is what is meant by calling it relatively right; but this does not in the least imply that it is only doubtfully right. It may be, in those circumstances, certainly and absolutely right.

Sometimes it looks as if an act were right apart from all relativity - as when a father gives a present to a child, or a man lays down his life for his friends. But it is possible to "spoil" children! And while the giving of oneself for others is always a sign of noble unselfishness, it only becomes right if the interest of the friends which is served in this way is the highest. A man ought not to put his life in serious danger in order to provide for his friends some momentary amusement, though this might be accurately described as laying down life for those friends.42

I think that other examples might be brought to show that some acts are never right: but it would be more helpful to see how Temple attempts to justify his approach in two particular moral questions; these may enable us to judge his consistency.

Two Cases: War and Gambling

(i) War

The passage just quoted is taken from Temple's writing during the Second World War. It is significant because war tends to
demand a large number of compromises in moral conduct - on one occasion, Winston Churchill remarked that in wartime truth is so precious that it must be surrounded by a bodyguard of lies. His remark was concerned with deception; and in the Second World War, the British effort required deception, adultery, theft, and many other activities in pursuit of what appeared just ends - the evil of Nazism seemed to make many of these activities not simply permissible but necessary. In Germany, Dietrich Bonhoeffer felt morally bound to those who plotted the assassination of Hitler, believing this to be morally right.

Temple himself was no pacifist, and in 1940 he published a pamphlet, A Conditional Justification of War, in which he accepted - in essence - the just war doctrine, and the concept of the lesser evil. Each of these is an essentially situationalist position. He argues that the specific circumstances of the Second World War make it necessary:

The whole question, then, comes down to this: Is the Nazi threat to civilisation so serious that the evil of allowing it to develop is greater even than the monstrous evil of war?

About the answer to that question I have no doubt. Most of the elements in life which we reckon as of highest value are incompatible with Nazi rule. What is happening in Bohemia and Poland illustrates the principles and temper of that rule; and its characteristic institutions are the Gestapo and the concentration camps. Far better some years of "total war", with all its misery and waste and increasing bitterness of spirit, than the riveting of that diabolic system upon more and more peoples.43

The consideration of the example of the Second World War points to a specific difficulty with the 'lesser evil' doctrine. It
seems to me that that war provided, from the point of view of the Allied cause, as near an example of the just war as history affords. The difficulty is of determining the lesser evil: in declaring war, any nation is involved in imponderables. For this reason, a traditional view that to wage a just war, 'victory must be assured'\(^4\) seems to ask thee impossible; certainly in 1939 Britain had no such assurance. But to embark on war is to unleash evils which cannot be foreseen - in 1939, the sufferings of Dresden, the extent of Soviet suffering, and the cruel carnage of the Soviet advance on Berlin, could not be foreseen. In saying that war is the lesser evil, there are two problems: the impossibility of knowing whether the actual evils of war truly are less than the hypothetical evils of not fighting; and the impossibility of judging whether war is truly the last resort. Even with these provisos, situations create their own difficulties. If we are to say war is only just if it is truly the last resort, we may be at odds with a 'lesser evil' doctrine. In these circumstances, we may say that a nation may legitimately defend itself if attacked. This would seem to require that a country should wait while its enemy masses at its borders. It is difficult to say this is wholly moral or the lesser evil: a successful preemptive strike may, in the end, create less carnage than awaiting attack - for Britain to have waited until France had fallen and its territorial boundaries invaded does not seem significantly more moral than taking arms in 1939.

If there are significant problems with war - and we have only touched on these\(^4\) pacifism raises, starkly, situational problems. One problem is that pacifism seems effective only in certain circumstances. Mahatma Gandhi - frequently cited as a paradigm case of effective pacifism - was successful because of cultural circumstances: British India was not a totalitarian state, his activities touched a chord of public opinion in Britain, and so on. In Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany or Hoxha's Albania, he would have been ineffective, his
disappearance unmarked. It was circumstance that made him effective, and his political genius was in the manipulation of situations.

These difficulties remain: many of these points recur in current debate about nuclear weapons. Part of the problem is muddy thinking. Temple's clear personalism is useful here. It is evidently helpful to thought not to assert that 'nuclear weapons are immoral': they are inanimate, and thus morally neutral. If we ask whether the making, ownership or use of such weapons is moral, if we thus personalise the debate, then we are closer to the issues. A further thought demonstrates this. If we knew - which is impossible - that the possession of nuclear weapons would guarantee no more war, or no significant war, I doubt that there would be any debate about keeping them. Our dilemma is that we do not - cannot - know this. A situational judgment has to be made in a case in which it is not possible to know all relevant circumstances. And this is a weakness, if an inevitable one, of situationalism. Nor is it true of war alone: almost any situation is likewise to a degree uncertain.

This is compounded by human weakness. I judge the cause of the Second World War Allies to be generally just; but I am aware that the Axis powers considered their cause just. A pacifist may wish to consider the 'slippery slope' argument, similar to that sometimes used against abortion or euthanasia. This would hold that if one admits any war as just, as moral boundaries are blurred it is inevitable that people will argue that this or that other war is just because it is like the first in some morally relevant respects. On this argument, it is better to hold the line against all wars because of the corrupting effect - the permissive effect - of admitting any one as just. Such an argument takes us to the heart of discussion about situationalism, and the argument about about a situational or a more absolute ethical system/ I would suggest, against such a
pacifist view, that its consequence is itself a form of 'lesser evil' argument, which puts it on a par with, and, I think, as identical to the just war argument it purports to refute. For such an argument claims that we must accept the lesser evil (of suffering the consequences of non-resistance) for the sake of the greater good (the avoidance of war). Thus it is itself a 'lesser evil' argument: and one may not legitimately use a lesser evil argument to deny the validity of a lesser evil argument. This leaves us with the argument between pacifist and non-pacifist no further forward: each appears to rely on a 'lesser evil' argument; and only circumstance would appear to be a guide — uncertain though it necessarily is — as to which is right. Perhaps, in the case of war, only situationalism is possible as a judgment — though it is a circumstance of judgment as uncertain and as dangerous as war itself. In this Temple is consistent. He is conscious that to attempt to take a particular position on a particular war creates special moral demands:

... one thing is certain. If we are to use such justification of joining in war as has been offered without becoming involved in horrible hypocrisy, we must be in deadly earnest. Only if we are determined to see that our victory really does serve justice and freedom; only if we are determined in our own national life to promote justice and freedom where now they are imperfectly attained; only on these conditions dare we come forward as their champions in war.

Especially must we remember that it is very hard to extract justice from strife. The passions evoked by war blind the vision and distort the judgment. We dare not hope to make our victory result in pure justice. We can, indeed, make it result in something far nearer justice than a Nazi domination; that alone
would justify our fighting. But we must not ignore
the perils inseparable from our enterprise; and we
must steadfastly determine that we will resist, so
far as by God's help we can, these corrupting
influences...46

It is clear that situationalism is not an easy form of ethics:
it requires constant intellectual effort, clear-mindedness, and
acute judgment; and the ability to avoid self-deception. For it
is easy to believe that one is rightly judging circumstances
when simply interpreting them to suit oneself: the history of
war demonstrates this phenomenon with special force.

(ii) Gambling

In 1927, Temple republished an essay which had appeared in The
Pilgrim, on gambling. It is interesting because he uses a
natural order argument in an attempt to demonstrate that
gambling is always wrong - a view that seems at odds with his
situationalism, and which, I think, points to a significant
weakness in Temple's position.

Temple condemns even moderate gambling on the grounds of
example, in remarkably fierce language:

The advocate of gambling in moderation usually
appeals in fact to a profoundly anti-social
principle, which is conspicuously dominant today. The
moderate gambler is very liable to say that he does
no harm with his gambling, and if others do harm with
theirs, that is no affair of his. But that is, in the
strict and theological sense of the term, damnable;
and to that form of damnation we are just now very
prone ... This reversion to ethical individualism
cannot last; it cuts too fatally at the roots of
social life; but it is now prevalent and widely
pernicious. To take your pleasure in a way which encourages your neighbour in a course so noxious for him is wicked. To repudiate responsibility for one's influence is as profoundly wicked as anything can be - far wickeder than most crimes of passion - for it denies one of the springs of all obligation.47

Temple is here raising a significant point for any situationalism, which is the effect of example. Among the consequences of an action is the example it sets for the conduct of others, and any complete theory of situation ethics must put this into the balance of judgment. It is rare that consequences of action are entirely unknown; and it is a profound truth of human frailty that we are influenced by the activity of others - 'If he can do it, why can't I?' is frequently heard: arguments that circumstances are different tend to fall on deaf ears. The weight of example is one particularly difficult to calculate in reaching a moral assessment; but it is something which calls in the First Form of Kant's Categorical Imperative, the principle of universalisation. Of course, one may consistently believe that in any circumstances one may consistently ask 'what if everyone acted like this?' and consistently will that everyone should; yet it is this type of thought which unusual conduct has to contend with. The problem is a familiar one. I may say, 'I would wish anyone in similar circumstances to act as I do'; but it does not follow that circumstances are truly repeatable. In a certain situation I behave in a particular way; and that is visible. What is not visible is my reasoning. If I say 'I would wish anyone in similar circumstances to act as I do', I actually mean something like 'I would wish anyone in similar circumstances to consider these particular points/ to develop his logic/ to think about human needs of the people involved/ to be a caring human being/ to behave physically as I do'; and much of that process is invisible. Only outward signs are visible - actions, and any words I may use - but my inner
processes are not, nor are any small but significant points which make these circumstances special. When I say I would wish people to act as I do, I do not (or should not) mean that they simply ape my actions: I would hope I meant that in so far as I acted as a thoughtful, independent moral agent, that others would so act. I might further say that it is situationalism that I wish to universalise - the conduct of examining circumstances in a certain kind of way.

Temple's argument against gambling is based on the idea that it is a distortion of the natural order, because it involves the distribution of money by chance:

...the excitement ... resides in the hope and fear of winning or losing money, according to some unknown contingency largely determined by luck or chance (that is, by forces not rationally controlled).

Now the distribution of money by chance is a socially wrong principle ... gambling is, in mere fact, a source of immense moral and social evil; so that, if its principle is false, it ought to be altogether repudiated. And its principle certainly is false ... we see it when someone wins a big sum for no service rendered. It is bad for the winner, who is encouraged to live idly; it is bad for society, within which wealth, with its labour-directing potency, is so distributed. Wealth ought to be distributed in accordance with (a) need, (b) service rendered, (c) service expected; the last is the justification for inherited wealth. No one proposes that wealth should be distributed in accordance with chance. That is a false principle...

The objection which springs to mind is that life is indeed deeply influenced by chance, in a host of ways: whether I come
from this or that land, have inherited such and such characteristics, have been brought up in particular circumstances, are all strictly matters of chance. So far as I am concerned, these forces are not rationally controllable. To an extent, all my activities may be touched by chance: and it has been a force in my life in all sorts of unexpected ways.

If other matters are affected by chance, one wonders what is special about money. It could be argued that it is man-made, and hence ought to be more strictly controllable than natural circumstances. Money is socially affected: the social value of money changes. In the middle ages, money had little social value: it bought little, for most needs (and these were different) were met by other means. Money achieved its status through the development of a money-based, as opposed to a service-based economy; and that with difficulty (Simon de Montfort's struggle with Henry III can be seen as in large part a consequence of a need by the monarchy for cash in a society not geared to provide it). But money is a social means to particular ends, and those ends change. I use money for a host of purposes unknown in the reign of Henry III; not least, I use it to provide recreation. Now, Temple nowhere suggests that the use of money for recreational purposes is wrong. It would be wrong to use it for recreation at the expense of my commitments; but it is almost inevitable that if I indulge my human need for leisure that today it will involve expenditure. It is also true that the question of chance enters recreation: it is, for instance, fundamental to sport. I may achieve success as a batsman because of the random effects of wind and rain on the state of the pitch, or because the sun was in the fielder's eyes when he dropped a catch before I had scored.

My recreation involves expense and chance. Whether I choose to spend a sum of money on watching a day's cricket or on football pools seems a matter of indifference: in either case, chance enters - it might rain, or I might lose my few pounds. If it
rains, I lose money to no purpose as surely as I do on the football pools; either way, I help to provide employment, though it does me no service. If I play cricket, I gamble not a few pounds, but greater things: the risks may be low, but I hazard myself; I could be injured or killed, or by chance kill or maim another. If it is true that chance enters here, so too with money; and if gambling were abolished, chance would still affect wealth, as when a natural disaster gravely affects a company. Chance seems part of the natural order, and part of recreation: if recreation almost necessarily involves money, I cannot see that moderate gambling is any more offensive than other recreational activity, why money has a moral value denied to the other things I use as the counters of recreation.

Other thinkers within the natural law tradition do not share Temple's severity about gambling. Even Peschke, whose tendency is to be more rigid than Temple on morality, is content to limit himself to 'husbands have the serious responsibility not to waste their money through gambling, drinking, exorbitant smoking, etc.' Even Peschke, whose tendency is to be more rigid than Temple on morality, is content to limit himself to 'husbands have the serious responsibility not to waste their money through gambling, drinking, exorbitant smoking, etc.' Even Peschke, whose tendency is to be more rigid than Temple on morality, is content to limit himself to 'husbands have the serious responsibility not to waste their money through gambling, drinking, exorbitant smoking, etc.' Even Peschke, whose tendency is to be more rigid than Temple on morality, is content to limit himself to 'husbands have the serious responsibility not to waste their money through gambling, drinking, exorbitant smoking, etc.' 49 He does not condemn gambling in moderation, provided that more important commitments are met. J. Messner, in perhaps the most significant twentieth century work of applied natural law, comments:

Precisely because certain ends are essential for the integration of the human person, in the process of this integration they all hold their own against ends of higher rank as long as the latter are not thereby frustrated. Thus an existential end of lower rank prevails in conflict with one of higher rank if the former would be otherwise frustrated, provided that by giving way to the former the latter is not ruled out altogether. Therefore gambling for the sake of recreation is good if other existential ends are not frustrated. 50
This touches on the most significant weakness in Temple's conception of natural order. Messner rightly - as I think - holds that the human person is not a creature of a single end, but a variety of ends, each of which has its own rights, and, as it were, its own logic. Fulfilment of the self has a variety of needs - intellectual, physical, spiritual, recreational, and so on. Any integration, any 'right ordering', requires balance of the needs. Messner gives an important example: 'A mother must nurse her child whose health is in serious danger and give up attending divine service, although the end of devotion to the child ranks in itself lower than that of devotion to the Creator; in the process of realisation, however, in the particular circumstances described, the end of devotion to the child's well-being prevails, since the end of its preservation is in danger of being frustrated, whereas the end of devotion to the Creator can still be attained.'

The implication here is that there are different 'Orders' in human life, the needs of each of which have to be balanced, though the orders are, within themselves, self-contained. Temple briefly mentions the concept of orders - 'The Germans, with their fruitful doctrine of various "orders" (Ordnungen), have contributed much, and among English writers the American Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr, has broken new ground with disturbing but, as I am convinced, most salutary effect - but he nowhere develops it.

The concept of orders is, I think, clearest in the work of Niebuhr's friend, Bonhoeffer, who develops his ideas in his Ethics, though the corruption of the word 'order' by the Nazis led him to prefer the term 'divine mandates'. Bonhoeffer contends that there are five of these - marriage, labour, culture, state and church. Each retains its legitimacy - by divine commission - so long as it serves God's purpose for man; but each is constrained by the other mandates - the state should not interfere in the church, nor culture in the state:
each has its own logic. There are, I think, certain difficulties in this view, not least the question of what would constitute 'interference'; but the idea is helpful in suggesting that human activity has different and parallel ends, each with their own requirements.

Perhaps more fruitful for present discussion are the ideas recently developed by John Finnis. He holds that there are a number of 'basic forms of good', and lists as necessary for human well-being: Life, Knowledge, Play, Aesthetic Experience, Sociability, Practical Reasonableness, and 'Religion', each of which is fundamental and a natural fact of human nature. The logic of these is, Finnis believes, beyond argument: we are so constituted that to be human is to wish to fulfil, in our individual ways, each of these forms of good. And because each is required, one may not suppress one (indeed, it would be unnatural to do so), for the sake of another.

Finnis' suggestions are valuable to our present discussion in a particular way: adopting them enables us to see a way out of the position which Temple's undifferentiated 'natural order' seemed to require. If we say that gambling belongs to the form of Play, it would - if nothing else intervened - be legitimate so long as it did not interfere with any other basic good: precisely the point made by Messner. Excessive gambling clearly would interfere with other goods; but so would any other form of excess (that, after all, is what we mean by 'excess'); and if it could be shown that a man's gambling did not interfere with his basic forms of good, nor those of anyone else, I would argue that it is not wrong. This is not at all the same as saying that all gambling is acceptable, or that any one form of gambling is - only circumstance can determine that - but it is to say that I am unable to accept gambling as an exception to the situationalism for which Temple has argued. It is only necessary to find one example of gambling being acceptable to deny the universal condemnation; and I confess that I am quite
unable to see that the pleasure of an elderly pensioner backing a Grand National horse, or buying a ticket in a church raffle, is a source of damage to the natural order or the basis of economics. If the question of example is raised, it could be argued that the modest gamble is an example of moderation as much as of gambling — it is a matter of judgment which has the greater effect. The same problem arises with any act; those who wish to take it as an example tend to select those features of the act which appeal, rather than as a whole.

Perhaps Temple's comments on gambling should be seen as an aberration within a generally consistent situationalism, but I suspect that they reflect conviction. Of course, few of us are ever wholly consistent, and his view has value in acting as a focus of discussion, not least because it is uncommon.

* * *

In later writings, Temple applies the concept of natural order to many issues, each of which demands deep study outside the scope of this thesis. Much of his writing concerns economic and financial matters — he was fascinated, for instance, by banking — yet no-one has attempted a detailed study of his views. Likewise, there is scope for an analysis of his views on education, the nature of the community, and particularly his view of the effects of Calvinism on the economic order: each would properly require a thesis as long as this. All that has been possible in the present chapter is an outline of the natural order concept, with an attempt to draw out some examples of explicit situationalism.

The Justification of Natural Order

Natural law theory has, in the twentieth century, been the subject of considerable criticism. One of its fiercest critics has been Hans Kelsen, who has deeply influenced the development
of positive law theory. His remarks are particularly pertinent to any study of Temple's comments:

The natural-law doctrine presupposes that value is immanent in reality and that this value is absolute, or, what amounts to the same thing, that a divine will is inherent in nature. Only under this presupposition is it possible to maintain the doctrine that the law can be deduced from nature and that this law is absolute justice. Since the metaphysical assumption of the immanence of value in natural reality is not acceptable from the point of view of science, the natural-law doctrine is based on the logical fallacy of an inference from the "is" to the "ought". The norms allegedly deduced from nature are - in truth - tacitly presupposed, and are based on subjective values, which are presented as the intentions of nature as a legislator. By identifying the laws of nature with rules of law, pretending that the order of nature is or contains a just social order, the natural-law doctrine, like primitive animism, conceives of nature as a part of society. But it can be easily proved that modern science is the result of a process characterised by the tendency of emancipating the interpretation of nature from social categories. Before the tribunal of science, the natural-law doctrine has no chance. But it may deny the jurisdiction of this tribunal by referring to its religious character.55

Kelsen's confusion - and I think it is a confusion - is to assume that natural law is necessarily a religious perception. If, as I shall suggest, it is possible to deduce a form of natural law from human activity without reference to religious belief, much of the thrust of Kelsen's objection would fall.
Natural law theory has, as a matter of history, been closely tied to belief in God. Cicero, in his famous formulation of natural law theory, sees God as its source:

True law is right reason in accordance with Nature; it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands, and averts from wrong-doing by its prohibitions ... It is a sin to try to alter this law, nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal any part of it, and it is impossible to abolish it entirely. We cannot be freed from its obligations by Senate or People, and we need not look outside ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it. And there will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and for all times, and there will be one master and one ruler, that is, God, over us all, for He is the author of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing judge.\textsuperscript{56}

It is also true that the classical theory of St. Thomas is based on the idea that 'Natural law ... [is] ... nothing else than the impression of the divine light in us ... the Natural law is nothing else than the participation of the Eternal law in rational creatures.'\textsuperscript{57} Even so, Aquinas is clear that the law is not an arbitrary divine command (he rejects the Divine Command theory of ethics) but is discernible by reason. This is absolutely clear in a central passage:

St. Augustine says: 'There is no law unless it be just'. So the validity of law depends upon its justice. But in human affairs a thing is said to be just when it accords aright with the rule of reason: and ... the first rule of reason is the Natural Law. Thus all humanly enacted laws are in accord with
reason to the extent that they derive from the
Natural Law.\(^{58}\)

Thus, natural law is discernible by and in accordance with reason: one may assume that for Aquinas, as for others, it is a natural perception of those who use reason. However, the point is not always clear in modern proponents of natural law theory - Jacques Maritain, for instance, constantly stresses the ties of natural law with theological virtue: 'it is thus that Christianity has suspended the moral from the supra-moral in the moral life of man'\(^{59}\), and d'Entreves has drawn attention to modern Thomists who develop natural law 'into a codified system of human rights based on the Christian view of the supreme value of the individual soul, the goal of Redemption.'\(^{60}\)

It may be that it is this type of religious basis for natural law theory which is at the heart of Kelsen's objection, though there is another area of difficulty. Kelsen maintains that it is scientifically impossible to deduce an 'ought' from an 'is'; therefore no system of morality may be derived from a natural fact. A legal or moral norm may be deduced only from another, higher and more basic, norm; a grundnorm: this leads Rommen to say that 'but for his agnosticism ... [his] ... thought structure would have led straight to the conclusion that this basic norm must be the law of God, in whom being and oughtness are identical and who has revealed His law in the order of being, in the ordo rerum, from which through intuition or by discursive thinking we derive the precepts of a natural law.'\(^{61}\)

This seems a faintly ludicrous suggestion; even apart from the curious statement that 'being' and 'oughtness' are identical in God, it is an odd procedure to assume that if only an opponent would change his views about religion he would necessarily accept a code the opposite of that which he currently holds. It also raises in sharp relief the question that d'Entreves mentions: Rommen appears to require a particular religious belief as a prerequisite of the perception of natural law. Only
if certain metaphysical assumptions are made is it possible to perceive the reasonableness of natural law.

D'Entreves believes that a number of classical natural law theorists present an alternative basis. Grotius held that natural law theory 'would have a degree of validity even if it should concede that which cannot be conceded without the utmost wickedness, that there is no God, or that the affairs of men are of no concern to Him.'

Natural law has, according to Grotius, the same kind of authority as that two and two make four. According to d'Entreves, the 'doctrine of natural law which is set forth in the great treatises of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries - from Pufendorf's De Iure Naturae et Gentium (1672) to Burlamaqui's Principes du Droit Naturel (1747), and Vattel's Droit des Gens ou Principes de la Loi Naturelle (1758) - has nothing to do with theology.' There is thus a tradition of non-religious approaches to natural law, which is especially important in any attempt to justify a similar position. Interestingly, Temple once remarked that 'in its nature ... the moral judgment is quite absolutely independent of religion.'

We should note also that any adherence to natural order is essentially, for Temple, a rational process:

We ... avoid the great blunder of supposing that being true to nature means being true to the primitive and the elementary; it means truth to the general course and tendency which we find in the process of nature, where such progress can be traced, and whatever the cause of such progress may be.

To examine cause, to trace progress, course and tendency, requires the exercise of critical reason.

In an earlier chapter, I considered whether an examination of psychological and anthropological evidence would indicate an
innate capacity for morality. It is not here possible to present a complete natural law system, but it is possible to outline the basis of such a system, built upon the idea that it is natural to behave in a certain kind of way. The position to be argued is consistent with Brentano's belief that 'the word "natural" may refer to those rules which can be known to be correct and binding, in and for themselves, and in virtue of their own nature.' I have already suggested that the basis of human morality may be the consequence of preference leading to particular activity: and it is activity, and the analysis of activity, which seems to provide the true basis of natural order.

To do this requires the rejection of the Cartesian tradition of stressing the cognitive aspect of man, and to look instead to the concept of the acting person. This notion demands, in various ways, a return to Aristotle's belief that ethics is an activity; his Nicomachean Ethics is meant, in essence, to be a handbook on self-fulfilment, by living well as a human being.

In recent times, this approach has been exemplified in the work of Wojtyla. Working from the premise that man is a psychosomatic unity, Wojtyla considers the phenomenon of conscience: it is a datum that the intellect renders the self capable of reflection on his own actions, and it is - as Brentano insists - the case that we observe no phenomena neutrally: in Brentano's terminology, we feel 'love' or 'hate' towards the phenomena presented to the mind. (We would be more likely to say that we have 'preferences'.) This sense of preference is the beginning of conscience: we move organically from believing something is preferable to questioning about why it is preferable; and thence, critically, to whether it is justified to consider it preferable. It is a matter of experience that preferences change; by reflection and by intercourse with others, we do change our opinions. But, it is also true that preferences change unconsciously: my childhood
passion for cream horns has entirely disappeared, for reasons I cannot discern. This change in tastes is thus only partly rational. I use the term 'organic' to distinguish the transition from a 'logical' or 'mechanical' one: it is partly mysterious, it certainly does not demonstrate a formal logic: but it is real. Likewise, it is a datum that human beings actually are in action: by being born into a community we are in a network of activities. It is worth remembering that activity actually precedes thought: a baby is active and inter-active (it moves, acts and responds) long before developing the capacity to reflect on that activity. The beginning of reflection is reflection on activity of self and others already in process. To this extent, the tendency of some philosophers to write as if there were first meditation and only then thoughtful action is a misleading one: the model presented for theoretical purposes is only a model. In the process of life, ethical activity is, as it were, partly reactive: social processes are ongoing, through the activity of myself and others, and my contemplation and criticism of right action occurs within that context, rather than as a passive onlooker. Indeed, even as a 'contemplative onlooker' I am not inactive: each new phenomenon is an alteration of my pattern of preference, and I change with the new inter-action brought about by each change of circumstance. Thus, the alteration of circumstances triggers the 'organic' change from 'is' to 'ought'. By a slightly different path of reasoning from the one just outlined, Wojtyla concludes: 'In each of his actions the human person is eyewitness of the transition from the "is" to the "should" - the transition from "X is truly good" to "I should do X".' To put it another way, we are necessarily in activity, and, as it is human activity, it is the subject of a degree of reflection - we do not, as a matter of fact, habitually act entirely without thought - and that reflection includes imaginative foresight: we can envision possible futures. Because we think in terms of preferences, we find some possible futures preferable to others, for whatever reasons,
and tend, because we are in action, to guide our activity. To think of what is, before the mind, because of the kind of organism we are, leads us to prefer; and the transition to should be, from preference, is a natural one. It is natural because we are in activity: and activity presents us with choices. To act is itself to choose, even though we may not have realised it: by acting I have chosen to act. Because the human organism is active, it becomes committed to choice: theoretically it can at any point act in a variety of ways - it has the capacity to do so - but circumstance means that it cannot act in all ways that it is capable of doing. I have the capacity to eat or not to eat: but I can only do one of these at one time. I can do either: I must do, now, only one. Thus, from being a creature capable of choice, and as an active being, I am necessarily choosing. The choice may be this or that; but I am bound to make it, and, because to be human is to be reflective, I naturally say, 'what should I do?' It is the inescapable fact of choice that creates the possibility of obligation; and the fact of choice flows from the nature of my being as active.

The nature of the choice, with the concept of duty, flows from the inevitably communal face of activity: as Wojtyla says: 'The person's duties with regard to other people ... occur in virtue of an interpersonal nexus of "participation" that manifests itself in the personal intertwining of the coexistence and collaboration of people.' He believes that the root of moral judgment lies in consideration of activity:

... any moral value, whether good or bad, presupposes the performance of the action, indeed full-fledged performance. If action fails to be actually performed or if it betrays in some respects the authenticity of self-determination, then its moral value loses its foundations or at any rate partly loses them. Hence any judgment about moral values, about any merits or
demerits attributed to man, have to begin by determining efficacy, self-determination, and responsibility; in other words, we have first to establish whether this particular man-person did or did not perform the action.\textsuperscript{70}

The basis of judgment is hence the action, and it is natural to ask of an action whether it worked - whether the action achieved the results intended; and to ask that is to assume the reality of intentionality. Where we can infer intention, we apply the concept of responsibility; but none of this removes the central point that it is the fact of the action from which the judgments flow.

Wojtyla believes that in the attribution of a judgment there is necessarily a moral dimension:

... the performance of the action by the person should not be seen as having a purely ontological significance, since ... the performance itself of the action by the person is a value. If we call this value "personalistic" it is because the person performing the action also fulfils himself in it, that is, acquires a personal feature.\textsuperscript{71}

The implication is that the moment we speak of responsibility or efficacy of an action, we are making a judgment about a person. Further, it is a personal judgment because a person who has performed an action is a different kind of person from one who has not. A saint is a man who has acted in a saintly way (I am speaking of a psychosomatic unity - he has acted in a saintly way in answer to saintly thoughts): I am not a saint if I have not. The fulfilment of saintliness happens only in action, and it is only action which is fully capable of being judged. (This is consistent with Aristotle's view that one is not really moral while asleep: morality is an activity).
We are now speaking the language of 'persons', 'actions' 'responsibility', 'judgment', 'intention'; and this is the language of ethics. Each, as I think, flows from the fact of human activity, from the reality of activity as in part intellectual. From the fact of activity we may find a productive basis for an ethical system, based on the natural basis of man as i) acting, ii) reflecting, iii) judging, and iv) being in community.

The American philosopher, Alan Gewirth, may serve as an example of one way of developing the consequences of an action-centred path towards a concept of natural order. He believes that activity in the individual creates a demand for certain kinds of rights; to be active requires the making of choices, which need a degree of freedom of movement and imply responsibility. Activity takes place in a sphere in which there are others: and one must interact with others. This involves what Gewirth calls 'transactions'; as a centre of consciousness who acts and needs to act, I meet and deal with others who have the same needs. If I wish to act, I must permit that ability to others: a transaction is something that happens between people adjusting their choices and actions to each other, and, as I suggested, to act implies choice. Thus a transaction presumes a certain degree of rights to each participant. From this fact, Gewirth deduces his 'Principle of Generic Consistency' [PGC]: *Act in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well as of yourself*. Gewirth continues:

The PGC is a necessary principle in two ways. It is formally or logically necessary in that for any agent to deny or violate it is to contradict himself, since he would then be in the position of holding that rights he claims for himself by virtue of having certain qualities are not possessed by other persons who have those qualities. The principle is also materially necessary, or categorical, in that ... the
obligations of the PGC cannot be escaped by any agent by shifting his inclinations, interests, or ideals, or by appealing to institutional rules whose contents are determined by convention. Since the generic features of action are involved in the necessary structure of agency, and since the agent must hold that he has rights to these features simply insofar as he is a prospective purposive agent, he rationally must accept that his recipients also have these rights insofar as they too are prospective purposive agents.\textsuperscript{74}

If he is correct, Gewirth has deduced a moral principle from the fact of activity. This could provide the basis of a natural order system: he notices some important parallels\textsuperscript{75} between the two ideas, and he attempts to deduce both personal and communal ethical principles from his original perception.

In the present context, we should note that an understanding of the principle requires the kind of perception of the other agent demanded by Temple and Josiah Royce: only with such imaginative insight would it be possible to recognise the nature of the activity of another. In reality, of course, it seems not implausible that he is as much a centre of consciousness as I am; certainly it seems less implausible than any alternative view. But this requires thought - the discernment of the nature of things. Once the matter has been recognised, we seem to be tracing the general course of nature, and the particular kind of organism which is the acting person. We have also, by implication, granted value to the person, as at least equal to the value I claim to myself by acting - the point made by Wojtyla. Each of these things is a natural fact, and appears naturally valuable. Any thought, any choice, concerning activity should therefore take account of them - action is about a person or a person's acting - and any system of guidelines for conduct should not violate them, and should
respect their priority. And that, I suggest, provides a basis for natural order: as a fact of nature, certain things are valuable, on the basis of the nature of activity.

Further analysis may suggest other features of activity which need to be taken into account. Aristotle and others believe that the pursuit of happiness (or what is perceived as happiness) is an inevitable feature of human activity: Max Scheler speaks of love as an aspect. It is not possible in the present limited space to develop these points: my concern has been simply to try to demonstrate the possibility of a natural order conception, based on the nature of the person. If the case is reasonably made, it may provide some theoretical credibility to Temple's position and conclusions, especially if, as I believe, that justification can be made independently of particular religious belief.

Notes

1. Alisdair Macintyre: *After Virtue*: p.240
3. ibid.: p.560
4. ibid.: pp.423-424
6. ibid.: p.233
7. ibid.: p.234
8. ibid.: pp.234-235
9. ibid.: p.235
11. Christianity and Social Order: pp.78-79
12. ibid.: p.80
13. ibid.: p.80
14. 'Thomism and Modern Needs': *Blackfriars*: March 1944:
18. ibid.: p. v
19. Christianity and Social Order: p.27
20. Mens Creatrix: p.225
21. ibid.: p.79
22. ibid.: pp.222-223
26. ibid.: p.193
27. St. Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologica: II.1, q.91, a.2
29. ibid.: p.331
31. Oscar J. Brown: Natural Rectitude and Divine Law in Aquinas: especially pp.165-174
32. Christianity and Social Order: p.82
33. Pope Pius XII: Darkness Over the Earth (Summi Pontificatus): p.26
35. St. Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologica: I, q.79, a.6
36. St. Thomas Aquinas: Commentary, VI Ethics, lect.3
37. St. Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologica: II.1, q.57, a.5, ad.1
38. ibid.: II.I, q.57, a.4, ad.3
39. ibid.: II.I, q.58, a.4
42. A Conditional Justification of War: reprinted in Religious Experience: pp.173-174
43. ibid.: p.176
44. Jacques Ellul: Violence: p.6
45. The best recent work on the subject is, I think, Michael Walzer: Just and Unjust Wars, which covers many points which cannot be discussed here.
47. 'Gambling and Ethics' in Essays in Christian Politics: pp.129, 130
48. ibid.: pp.127-128
51. ibid.: p.26
52. Christianity in Thought and Practice: p.74
53. Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Ethics
54. John Finnis: Natural Law and Natural Rights: pp.85-90
55. Hans Kelsen: What is Justice?: pp.141-142
56. Cicero: De Republica, III, xxii, 33
57. St. Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologica: II.I, q.91, a.2
58. ibid.: II.I, q.95, a.2
60. A.P.D'Entreves: Natural Law: p.48
62. Hugo Grotius: De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Prolegomena #11
63. ibid.: I, i, x
64. A.P.D'Entreves: Natural Law: p.55
65. The Kingdom of God: p.42
66. ibid.: pp.118-119
67. Franz Brentano: The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong: (see Chapter Five, note 222)
68. Karol Wojtyla: The Acting Person: p.162
69. ibid.: p.163
70. ibid.: p.265
71. ibid.: p.265
72. Alan Gewirth: Reason and Morality: p.129
73. ibid.: p.135
74. ibid.: p.135
75. ibid.: p.279
76. (1874-1929) Professor Scheler has been described as the most significant Catholic philosopher of his time. He worked mainly in Berlin, strongly influencing many artists and intellectuals, such as Otto Klemperer, at whose wedding he was best man. He was the subject of Wojtyla's doctoral research.
CONCLUSION

THE PHILOSOPHER

Any final assessment of the value of Temple's contribution to philosophy remains difficult. He is indubitably a transitional figure, and at times seems caught between the Idealism of his upbringing and the developing currents of twentieth century thought, both theological and philosophical. If, as I have suggested, there is apparent throughout his work a deeply non-propositional approach to questions of revelation, he is clearly at one with the main trends of modern theology, and yet there is also something of the nineteenth century in his apparent optimism about the progress of mankind and the continuing Platonism in his philosophy.

Part of this difficulty in any judgment of Temple lies in the problem noted by W.R. Matthews:

To speak candidly, I think the defects of Temple's method of philosophising come to the surface ... We are persuaded, while we read, that in principle the problem is solved, but subsequent reflection awakens doubt whether the solution may not be partly verbal. I remember, after a meeting of the Doctrinal Commission at which he had produced an amazing formula which appeared to satisfy everyone, saying to him, "If you had been at the Council of Nicea we need never have lost the Arians." I meant to express admiration, though I fear he did not take it so, and since then I have wondered if it was not also an unconscious criticism.¹

There is, as any careful reader quickly realises, a remarkable verbal felicity in Temple; and it is certainly true that after prolonged reflection one is often aware of gaps in argument -
it is easy to be swept along by the confidence of exposition. One of the dangers of this is that there is a temptation to feel the victim of deception, and hence subsequently to be harsh in criticism. David L. Edwards has perceptively described him as 'a philosopher, or rather a philosophically minded preacher', and there is truth in this description. Many of his books, not least *Nature, Man and God*, are the texts of courses of lectures, and there is an evident rhetorical and apologetic tone throughout his work. In all his writing there is a sense that his philosophical training is being deployed in defence of previously accepted religious dogma. Matthews comments that:

... I believe that Temple's reverence for the tradition of the Church prevented him from criticising drastically any doctrine which had become a part of the tradition. At least he had an almost insuperable reluctance to abandon it. In the case before us a considerable part of the difficulty arises from the conception of God as self-sufficient. Why not try the hypothesis, suggested by the Gospels, that God is not self-sufficient?

I have devoted part of this thesis to the question of the difficulties posed by the problem of evil if we adhere - as Temple appears to do - to a strictly Platonic, timeless and self-sufficient God.

This creates a particular tension in seeing Temple as unreservedly a process theologian, despite his apparent endorsement of Whitehead in *Nature, Man and God*. Whitehead conceives the world in dynamic terms, and we are to think in terms of 'process' and 'organism'. He believes the world to be made up from 'actual entities', which range from the tiniest fragment of existence to God at the top of the scale. The world process consists of the 'becoming' of these actual entities. It is important to notice that the entities are alone wholly real
(we may compare this with Kotarbinski's notion that the sole constituents of the universe are material objects): mentality is not a separate substance, but a pole of a bipolar actual entity. For Whitehead, every entity has a mental (though not necessarily conscious) and a physical pole.

God, as himself an actual entity, is himself bipolar. The mental or conceptual pole, which Whitehead calls his 'Primordial nature', is unchanging, complete, and the source of all ideals and possibilities. In the primordial sense, he is not dependent on the universe, indeed has no reference to any particular creation. But, his ideas are conceptual only: they lack actuality, which can only be supplied by physical experience in a temporal world. This side, the 'consequent nature', 'is determined, incomplete, consequent, everlasting, fully actual, and conscious'. It depends entirely upon the evolving universe for its reality: 'The "consequent nature" of God is the physical prehension by God of the actualities of the evolving universe'. By 'prehension' he means the involvement of actual entities with each other in a nexus of relationships. This involves a kind of panpsychism: Whitehead speaks constantly in the images of an interweaving of material and mental: 'The primordial nature is conceptual, the consequent nature is the weaving of God's physical feelings upon His primordial concepts. Thus, the whole is organically connected; each of our partial, limited experiences is taken up into a unity in the consequent wisdom: 'God's nature is best conceived ... [as] ... a tender care that nothing be lost'. In this sense, what is emphasised is not God as immutable creator, but God as the patient and wise guide of the universe: 'He does not create the world, He saves it: or, more accurately, He is the poet of the world, with tender patience leading it by His vision of truth, beauty and goodness'. The emphasis is on the personal aspect of God: 'What is done in the world is transformed into a reality in heaven, and the reality in heaven passes back into the world. By reason of this reciprocal
relation, the love in the world passes into the love in heaven, and floods back again into the world. In this sense, God is the great companion - the fellow-sufferer who understands.\textsuperscript{10}

In some respects, Whitehead's metaphysics are difficult to comprehend; and certain aspects of his conception of God are incoherent. For instance, he sees the primordial nature of God as envisaging all eternal objects. But this envisaging, we are told, lacks consciousness. Does God then have, under this aspect, only a kind of blind feeling? If so, it is hard to see how all possibilities, all conceptions are to be represented to this blind feeling. It is also difficult to see how the realisation of particular concepts can make no difference to the primordial nature if it is seen as yearning for actualisation. It is hard to see that such actualisation would not create change in that which seeks actualisation, unless the primordial nature is itself simply a kind of blind longing, separate from the consequent nature of God in every way. And if that is the case, we seem to have a divide between two natures in God, an uncrossable chasm between one part and the other, quite as great as the traditional bifurcation between mental and physical, which, by means of his concept of bipolarity, Whitehead endeavours to avoid. He has created a division as incomprehensible as that which Temple uses to differentiate between the side of God which knows the future and that which does not.

A further difficulty with Whitehead's conception of the primordial nature of God has been indicated by Rasvihary Das:

This nature lacks fulness of actuality as well as consciousness. These defects are supposed to be remedied by His consequent nature. the consequent nature of God consists in the physical prehensions of the temporal actualities of the world. But how or where are these actualities to be had? They have no
being prior to the being of God. Since they can arise only by initially feeling physically other actualities, it is apparent that God must already be actual, if there are to be any actualities at all. Thus we find that the temporal actualities cannot realise themselves unless God is already actual, and God cannot actualise Himself unless the temporal actualities are there. We do not know how we can get over this difficulty.

This objection perhaps takes us to the heart of a particular difficulty encountered in both Whitehead and Temple, the question already raised about the merely verbal solution of a problem. What is meant by a 'actual' or actuality'? Is it precisely the same as 'physical' or 'material' realisation? In a continually evolving universe, it is difficult to say that a thing is wholly realised. The actual child is the potential adult; but the actualised adult has no potential to be a child, yet it is hard to see the adult as somehow less than the child, or the ashes of the man at the end of his life as somehow a fuller being than he was when alive. Which actuality is harmonised with God? Or is it, as I am inclined to think, simply erroneous to assume that we should consider 'actuality' as something in itself instead of seeing it as a purely verbal device to indicate, for convenience' sake, a particular stage which, for the sake of argument, we so designate. In different guises, for the sake of particular purposes, we may call the same thing 'actual' or 'potential', 'realised' or 'unrealised'; and the given word is defined not by the object itself but by the perspective from which it is examined.

The problem of the apparent verbal solution appears in Whitehead's notion that all things are harmonised in the consequent nature of God. This comes close to a quasi-mystical notion of 'Oneness'. It is one thing to speak of a harmony, created by God, but quite another to see how, in practice,
quite incompatible things are to be harmonised and yet in any significant sense retain their identity. If the lion lies down with the lamb, it seems to lose something of itself. At what time, and in what way, can the victim be harmonised with the aggressor? Whitehead's God does not forcibly harmonise things: we are told that things are harmonised in the rightness of his feeling. It is difficult to see how a subjective feeling can right an objective wrong. I may feel that a wrong 'out there' in the world may not feel so wrong, much as a Christian Scientist may experience pain as purely imaginary: but that seems to devalue the reality of evil which, I believe, is an essential element in a truly Christian understanding of the world.

In Whitehead, there is a sense in which the understanding of God is frankly mystical: 'The concept of God is the way in which we understand the incredible fact that what cannot be, yet is.' I am not convinced that it is possible to say that we can ever say that we can ever 'understand' that 'what cannot be, yet is', for it is surely impossible to understand a contradiction: we can be aware of it, but we remain baffled, just as I am aware that a bee flies, though its flight defies all known laws of aerodynamics, but I cannot pretend that my awareness constitutes understanding.

If Whitehead's words are to be taken seriously, we must see his explanations as inevitably incomplete, a verbal attempt to mediate, to picture a universe which is sacramental, and which itself is vividly shot through with the presence of God. In this we find a point of unity with Temple. For Temple, as we have repeatedly seen, the universe is itself the source of revelation, whether through truth, beauty and goodness, or through the collective religious experience of mankind. The sacramental nature of the universe, in which the object of salvation is not simply men's souls, but the whole of creation, is an idea emphasised in many twentieth philosophers and
theologians, including, as well as Temple and Whitehead, Teilhard de Chardin, Hartshorne and Alexander.

Temple does not accept so dynamic a view of God, with consequences we have seen when considering the problem of evil. Mcquarrie has noted the dilemma posed by different strands within the movement usually called Process Theology:

The more thoroughgoing and consistent realists - Alexander, Whitehead, Hartshorne - bring God into time so that he becomes to some extent a God who is 'on his way', so to speak, a God who in one way or another is not yet complete in his perfection, a natural God rather than a supernatural God. Others - Morgan and Joad among the philosophers, Temple and Thornton among the theologians - definitely put God beyond the spatiotemporal world, making him the eternally perfect supernatural god of traditional theism. And this difference of opinion about God seems to lead us to a dilemma; for there is no doubt that the first of these two conceptions of God is the most satisfying intellectually, and the one that is most consistent with the realist approach to metaphysics; but at first glance the second is more satisfying religiously, though by placing God beyond space and time in some superempirical realm it throws away those virtues of realist metaphysics ... and reverts to the old-style metaphysics of the supernatural.13

The question that Mcquarrie poses is whether the God of Whitehead and Hartshorne, the God who suffers with mankind, can be the object of the deep awe and reverence which is at the heart of religion. He concludes:
We must remember that Whitehead recognises a primordial as well as a consequent nature in God; that his disciple, Hartshorne, has argued that the idea of God who completes himself is more consonant with the 'living' God of biblical revelation than the idea of a static perfection; that the notion of a God who is in some manner still 'on his way' goes far towards easing the problem of evil, so intractable for traditional theism; and that such a notion also gives fuller meaning to the moral life of men by taking seriously their responsibility as 'co-workers' with God. At least, it cannot be lightly said that such an idea of God is not religiously satisfying, or that it does not accord with the Christian idea of God, freed, perhaps, from some of its patristic and medieval accretions.14

By a different route, based not on the bipolar actual entities of Whitehead, but on Kotarbinski's understanding of space and time, and more agnostic than Whitehead on the nature of God, I have reached a not dissimilar view. My intention has been, by avoiding the kind of argument employed by Whitehead, to avert the dangers of an incoherent type of metaphysical speculation.

* * *

In Whitehead is an intense Platonism - in this he is apparently at one with Temple. But, despite his enthusiasm (he once famously remarked that the history of philosophy consists of footnotes to Plato), he is aware of the limits of Platonism, more acutely than Temple. Bluntly he states '... Plato is the originator of the heresies and of the feeblest side of Christian Theology.'15 His criticism requires full quotation, for it points to a crucial weakness in Temple's position:
Plato's answer is invariably framed in terms of mere dramatic imitation. When Plato turns to the World, after considering God as giving life and motion to the ideas by the inclusion of them in the divine nature, he can find only second-rate substitutes and never the originals. For Plato there is a derivative second-rate God of the World, who is a mere Icon, that is to say an image. Also, when he looks for the ideas, he can only find, in the World, imitations. Thus the World, for Plato, includes only the image of God, and imitations of his ideas, and never God and his ideas.

Plato has definite reasons for this gap between the transient world and the eternal nature of God. He is avoiding difficulties, although he only achieves the feeblest of solutions. What metaphysics requires is a solution exhibiting the plurality of individuals as consistent with the unity of the Universe, and a solution which exhibits the world as requiring its union with God, and God as requiring his union with the World. Sound doctrine also requires an understanding how the Ideals in God's nature, by reason of their status in his nature, are thereby persuasive elements in the creative advance. Plato grounded these derivations from God upon his will [my italics]; whereas metaphysics requires that the relationships of God to the World should lie beyond the accidents of will, and that they be founded upon the necessities of the nature of God and the nature of the world. 16
He goes on to say that Christian theologians have found a metaphysical answer in a 'doctrine of mutual immanence in the divine nature'. It is true that Temple, in *Nature, Man and God*, writes at some length, in particular in the final lectures, on the 'immanence of the transcendent' and the 'transcendence of the immanent'; but there remains a tendency towards a dichotomy between spirit and material things. Three quotations (italicised in the original) give the flavour of Temple's argument:

The mind of a human being increasingly organises itself and its own world apart from the processes which, for the most part, control the body within which, and (at first) as a function of which, the mind has come into being. As mind increasingly takes control of the organism, so it becomes increasingly independent of the organism as physiologically conceived. 18

For as it is true that matter is the necessary condition for the actuality of life and this also of spirit, so also is it true that, in our experience at least, spirit arises within and as part of an organism which is also material, and expresses its spirituality, not by ignoring matter but by controlling it. 19

We reach a conviction of the independence and the supremacy of mind or spirit; we do not reach a conviction of the non-existence of matter. On the contrary, it is from an assertion of the reality of matter that we reach our conviction of the supremacy of spirit. 20

In the last extract, Temple is - he believes - turning his back on Idealism, 'which we regard as an error due to the effort to
construct philosophy as a theory of cognition rather than as a theory of living experience. He believes that Idealism arose as a consequence of 'the elaborate intellectual constructions of modern science, which it is impossible to verify by direct experience.' But the habits of mind inculcated by prolonged exposure to Idealism remain in Temple: he sees the spirit as something able to be quite wholly independent of the matter out of which it arose - the idea of psychosomatic unity so characteristic of modern psychology, and stressed by Wojtyla, appears foreign to his way of thought. That Temple does not deny the reality of matter is a long step from Teilhard's view of the essential holiness of matter, and the idea that 'God so loved the world that He sent His only Son', or the interconnectedness that causes Whitehead so specifically to emphasise what he sees as the bipolarity of things.

In Teilhard, there is a profound sense of interpenetration of spirit and matter; the noosphere may be a kind of giant cosmic envelope, but the geosphere and biosphere (matter, inorganic and organic) are contained within it, and are integral to it. Temple's stress on mind has led him to conceive of it in terms of independence, as controlling, and, most tellingly, as supreme over matter.

There are two dangers in this; and each has profound religious consequences. Firstly, there is a danger of misunderstanding the doctrine of the incarnation. Secondly, there is a temptation to understate the significance of evil.

The doctrine of the incarnation has to be seen, I think, in terms of scandal. In Christian thought, the idea has led to considerable difficulty, chiefly for historical reasons. In the early church, controversy surrounded the question of how it was possible for the man Jesus also to be God, and how he could be related to the doctrine of the Trinity. Important though these questions are, the problem of how a man could also be God
should not deflect attention from the question of how God could also be man; and what that means - or could mean to us. Because we think we know the man Jesus, we tend to argue from him to God; but the crucial question for us is the taking on of human form by God, and what that means for us.

Part of this problem is rooted in the original sources of Christianity, in the Gospels. Rudolf Bultmann has pointed to some of the literary weaknesses of the evangelists: they could not, for instance, handle crowd scenes - crowds of people speak always and only with a single voice. But, more significantly, the Jesus of the Gospels is the public Jesus. Most attention is paid to his utterances, some to his miracles, much to his public humiliation and suffering. The private Jesus remains as it were unknown: the temptations are clothed in the language of myth and allegory, and the agony in the garden could not be known to disciples who were asleep. What it meant to be the human Jesus remains closed to us, private pains only hinted at. St. John, in the sublime opening chapter of his Gospel, tells us that 'the Word became Flesh and dwelt amongst us', but the full weight of the meaning of the phrase is closed. None of the gospels, each of which is very short, gives more than even a brief sketch of even the public elements of a short, but busy, ministry; and of the largest part of Jesus' life, there is no record at all.

An account of the public life is partial, and itself misleading. We know how difficult it is for people to recognise the private world, with its needs and fears, pains and sorrows, of people with a public face. (A nun once told me that the worst part of her vocation was that no-one imagined she might need to use a lavatory). If it is hard to visualise the suffering humanity of celebrities and royalty, so more difficult is it to visualise (paradoxically) not the Godhead of Christ, but his humanity, especially with so little documentary evidence. But it is in the humanity of Christ that the extent
of the scandal of incarnation lies. In recent years theological attention has been fixed on the question of Christ's sexuality, and it is revealing that to many Christians it seems more scandalous that Jesus might have had sexual feelings than claims that he was not God. But the Jesus of the pious imagination is a curious creature, etiolated and living in a kind of haze. The metaphysical assertion that he was without sin leads, if we are not careful, to the assumption that, until the passion, he was without pain. But to be wholly human is to live with, and in, suffering, from infantile indigestion and teething pains to the graver sorrows of adolescence and adulthood, from bullying to insect bites. Only so does the human mind learn endurance and courage; only so does the heroism of the passion become possible reality.

The failure to recognise the extent of the significance of the meaning of the incarnation, and the extent of - if the doctrine be true - the voluntary self-humbling of God, may be partly attributed to the influence of Platonism. If attention is devoted solely to the ineluctable, timeless, unchanging, infinite God of Platonists, the suffering incarnated God slips into the background. It becomes hard to see how Christ fits into the scheme of things if God is so self-sufficient and immutable. But if we see God not so much in terms of a God of goodness, but a God of love, who is moved, and does love, then perspective changes. God becomes 'the great companion - the fellow-sufferer who understands'. This is to stress the humanity of God, rather than the remoteness of Plato's disembodied Form. It is also to see an interpenetration with the world, which is more than a disembodied 'will' or 'Purpose' controlling matter.

On such a view, suffering becomes more than simply a problem of evil' to be explained or even, for some, explained away. There is an ancient tradition of associating evil with the material; the spiritual seems somehow free of its taint. To concentrate
on the spiritual side of Christ is, perhaps, a kind of mental
defence against too close an involvement with the pain of his
world and perhaps of ours. Idealism seems also a kind of
escape; we have seen how rudely shattered was Royce's world by
the Lusitania sinking. Even in Plato himself, who was so much
more acute in his psychology than many of his acolytes, human
evil is reduced to human ignorance. [Temple insisted that much
evil flowed from man seeking the good, but confusing the
apparent with the actual good.]

Hans Kung has recognised the centrality of suffering to a
redeemptive scheme:

... suffering ... is encompassed by God; suffering
too, even though it seems like being forsaken by God,
can become the point of encounter with God. The
believer ... looks to the One sufferer in believing
trust in him who is also secretly present
particularly in suffering and who himself sustains
and maintains man in the utmost peril,
meaninglessness, nothingness, abandonment, loneliness
and emptiness ... It is in suffering particularly
that God can be shown to be the One whom Jesus
proclaimed: ... the Father of the lost. This God is
himself the answer to the question of theodicy, to
life's enigmas, to suffering, injustice, death in the
world. As Father of the lost, he is no longer a God
transcendent and remote, but a God close to man in
incomprehensible goodness, generously and
magnanimously pursuing him through history, in
darkness, futility and meaninglessness, inviting him
to dare to hope, mercifully sustaining him even in
his remoteness from God.23

In Kung's vision, suffering is faced with directness one feels
missing in Temple. That is not to say that he is unaware of
human misery: the range of his writing on social problems, from venereal disease to unemployment, is testimony to that, as is the evidence of his considerable public activity.

But there is a difference between awareness of the ills of society, especially if they are seen - as they are by some - simply as social problems to be resolved, and a searing existential sense of suffering at the root of things, as evidenced in the writings of Kierkegaard and others. Temple has too much wisdom to assume that social problems are, as it were, external: through all his social writing there is profoundly present the sense that resolution of social suffering requires the reorientation - the right ordering - of men's hearts and minds in Christian fellowship. But there remains, as one reads him, the sense that he is too readily content, that he has such confidence that he has found the truth, that his inner serenity, even placidity, has too deeply penetrated his work. In personal relationships, such inner strength shines like a beacon through English life in the first half of a troubled century. To the power of his personality and the depth of his faith, many have paid eloquent tribute; and to the roles of bishop and archbishop, ecumenist and social activist, he brought abilities perhaps unparalleled. But that which made him, in his way, so splendid a churchman, is perhaps out of character with the philosopher's world of doubt.

And so we have come full circle, to Temple's idea of truth as that which satisfies the mind. In my introduction, I contrasted Temple's vision of truth as that which satisfies the mind. In my introduction, I contrasted Temple's vision of truth with the critical approach of Popper. Perhaps, in seeing Temple as a kind of late flower of Idealism, we may discern weaknesses not only in that school, but also in others. Temple himself noted, as we have seen, that British philosophers had been too much concerned with epistemology, too little with metaphysics. To say this perhaps most clearly illustrates a weakness in any
notion of truth as satisfactoriness. If we make truth dependent upon the self, we are interpreting the world in terms of self (a view held by a number of empiricists), rather than self in terms of the world. The process of growing is one of learning how the self belongs in the world in which it finds itself, and rarely the other way about; and that, I suggest, is the natural inclination of mind.

* * *

William Temple, then, cannot unreservedly be deemed a philosopher so much as a churchman who deployed considerable philosophical gifts in the defence of his faith and evangelisation of his nation. His contribution to events was profound: as Walter James has commented: 'The leading British figure after 1918 ... to re-state Christian responsibility for politics and economics was William Temple. The movement reached a peak during his short tenure of the see of Canterbury, and one would have to go back to the Middle Ages to find an Archbishop as convinced as Temple was of the relevance of Christianity to everyday political affairs.' Robert Craig believes that, 'In contemporary Protestant social thought and action there are happily significant signs of the permanent value of Temple's social teaching, and that these signs appear not only in theological formulations but also in the day-to-day activities of local and national churches is particularly noteworthy.' To this we should add his ecumenical efforts - the significant contribution to the World Council of Churches, his efforts at dialogue with the pre-Vatican Council Catholic Church, and the example of the Church of South India, whose development he did so much to foster. Whatever doubts one may have of him as a philosopher, his achievement is secure, and his influence lasting.

That, perhaps, is enough.
Notes

5. ibid.: p.489
6. ibid.: p.122
7. ibid.: p.488
8. ibid.: p.490
9. ibid.: p.490
10. ibid.: p.497
11. R. Das: The Philosophy of Whitehead: p.188
14. ibid.: p.277
16. ibid.: p.215
17. ibid.: p.217
19. ibid.: p.477
20. ibid.: p.491
21. ibid.: p.490
22. ibid.: p.490
I have not attempted to provide a complete bibliography of the works of William Temple. Many of his lesser writings consist of repetitions of ideas more fully adumbrated in his main books, suitably adapted to the needs of various audiences. He was, for instance, a prolific pamphleteer and writer of occasional articles for a variety of different magazines, newsletters and collections of essays. I have listed only those works cited in the present thesis, not all those used during the course of research. Dates are of the editions used, not necessarily those of original publication.

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