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**Abstract**

The literature on the life and work of American psychiatrist Harry Stack Sullivan is used to provide a critique of Jacques Derrida’s *Archive Fever*. Derrida’s concept of archival violence relies on psychoanalysis both for its epistemology and for its exemplar of archival violence. The Sullivan literature shows how these positions become antagonistic when Derrida’s work is used to think about Freud’s critics. The published literature on Sullivan is described as a queer archive that has been strongly shaped by historical shifts in discourses about homosexuality, but that continues to stimulate and frustrate attempts to know the essential truth about Sullivan. Sullivan scholars have been quick to read his personality theory as autobiography, belittling the importance of friendship in Sullivan’s developmental theory, which differentiates it from the heteronormative Oedipal narrative. It is argued that Derrida’s mode of critique would entrench rather than unearth such heteronormative historiographical moves. Scholars are invited to put Sullivan’s biographies and published works to a broader range of uses in the human sciences.

**Key words**

archive, biography, Jacques Derrida, heteronormativity, Harry Stack Sullivan
As my title suggests, I am, like other historians of the human sciences, attempting to feel my way into the politics of archives. For me, as for some of my colleagues, Jacques Derrida’s (1996) *Archive Fever* has left a lasting impression on the way that I understand how ‘the archive which produces history is also the product of history’ (Joyce, 1999: 36). Since its publication, *Archive Fever* has been invoked in discussions of archives as diverse as the internet (Caygill, 1999), Nietzsche’s papers (Ernst, 1999), and DNA evidence in the O. J. Simpson trial (Lynch, 1999). The conversation has gone far beyond Derrida’s specific critique of the history of psychoanalysis. Yet, in reading what I will call the *queer archive* of American psychiatrist Harry Stack Sullivan, I have been led to wonder whether the critical scope of *Archive Fever* is limited to the historiography of psychoanalysis in ways that neither Derrida nor those who have cited him have acknowledged. These psychoanalytic commitments render *Archive Fever* complicit with hetero-normativity and limit its utility for those who would democratize history.

**FORGETTING AND REMEMBERING SULLIVAN**

Sullivan scholars often describe his memory as lost or forgotten. They understand themselves to be laboring less against a ‘Manichean aboriginal maw of darkness’ – to use Eve Sedgwick’s (1990: 8) term – than against an actively constructed ignorance about the man and his work. For example, Bartlett Evans (1997) argues that Sullivan’s obscurity is multiply determined. First, Sullivan’s ideas have become so axiomatic that they are no longer attributed to any author. Second, Sullivan wrote little and poorly. Third, Sullivan’s hostility to psychoanalysis ensured that psychoanalysts wanted to forget him. Fourth, Sullivan was ‘personally a very difficult man, who inspired rumors of myriad deviances’ (Evans, 1997: 12). Among these rumors, Evans highlights Sullivan’s schizophrenia and his homosexuality, although others have also noted his dependence on alcohol (see Allen, 1995: 5; Bever, 1993: 400–1; Perry, 1982: 174–5).
Given these overdetermined, and likely willful, ignorances, it behooves me to begin by describing some details of this life which have not been erased. Harry Stack Sullivan was born in 1892 the only surviving child of Irish-American farmers in Chenango County in New York State. Precociously bright, Sullivan won a scholarship in high school to attend Cornell University, but was dismissed in his first year. The exact circumstances and consequences of this dismissal remain debatable. Sullivan later enrolled in the Chicago College of Medicine and Surgery where he had an undistinguished student career and was awarded a medical degree in 1917. Sullivan worked both privately and for the American military before moving to Washington DC in 1922 to work at St Elizabeth’s, the national psychiatric hospital. There he came under the influence of William Alanson White, the mental hygienist, social reformer, opponent of capital punishment, and expert defense witness in the Leopold and Loeb murder trial.

Between 1922 and 1930 Sullivan worked at Shepperd and Enoch Pratt Hospital in Baltimore, accomplishing the clinical work which made him famous. Sullivan set up a ward for the treatment of young male schizophrenics who were carefully selected from the hospital’s larger wards. Medical personnel were banned from the ward, which was staffed only by six other shy awkward young men. Sullivan theorized schizophrenia as a form of disordered social relation caused by a failure to experience certain key developmental experiences involving what he called ‘chums’, experiences that the non-hierarchical ward environment was supposed to provide. In articles published during the 1920s, Sullivan reported the remarkable result that 80 per cent of his schizophrenic patients recovered under these conditions.

In 1927, at the age of 35, Harry Sullivan met a 15-year-old hustler called Jimmie Inscoe who became his partner and remained so for the rest of Harry’s life. Jimmie took Harry’s name, becoming James Inscoe Sullivan, and was often referred to as Harry’s son, although no formal adoption ever occurred. In 1930 the Sullivans
moved to New York where Harry set up a private practice and Jimmie worked as his secretary. However, private analysis was a difficult means of making a living in New York after the Stock Exchange crash of 1929 (Hale, 1995), and Harry Stack Sullivan filed for bankruptcy in 1932.

Sullivan’s interpersonal theories of schizophrenia were informed not only by his clinical work, but also by his social science colleagues, particularly the anthropologist Edward Sapir. In 1933, Sullivan, Sapir and others founded the William Alanson White Psychiatric Foundation to promote a new vision of psychiatry that was more closely tied to the social sciences and less allied with psychoanalysis. The foundation continues to train analysts to this day.² Sullivan was one of the original co-editors of the foundation’s journal Psychiatry in 1938. Throughout the 1930s he had close friendships with the psychoanalyst Clara Thompson (whom he sometimes described as his analyst), the design artist John Vassos and the author Ralph Ellison.

In 1939, the Sullivans moved to Baltimore where Sullivan's work was centered on the Washington School of Psychiatry. This teaching institution was part of the White Foundation and trained psychiatrists according to an eclectic curriculum that was less dedicated to psychoanalysis than its contemporaries. Sullivan became embroiled in psychoanalytic turf wars during the 1940s, siding first with feminist Karen Horney in her split with the New York Psychoanalytic Society in 1941, and later with Erich Fromm in his split with Karen Horney’s Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis in 1943. As psychiatric consultant to the Selective Services (1940–1), Sullivan contributed to their ‘Medical Circular no. 1’ which introduced community physicians to basic psychiatry. However, Sullivan withdrew from service prior to the inclusion of homosexuality as grounds for exclusion from the armed forces. During and after the war, the Washington School flourished under the auspices of the White Foundation and in response to the increased need for trained military psychiatric personnel. After 1945 Sullivan became involved in the UNESCO
‘Tensions Project’ examining contributions of psychiatry to world peace. He died in Paris in 1949, en route to a UNESCO meeting.

ARCHIVE FEVER AND PSYCHOANALYSIS

Maverick clinician, founder of a pivotal journal, shaper of a major training institute, and indeed of the boundary between sanity and insanity in the mass deployment of psychiatry during the Second World War, Sullivan seems an unlikely figure to forget. Perhaps Derrida’s *Archive Fever* provides a starting point to analyse why he has been. Derrida reminds his readers that the term ‘archive’ originates in the earlier *arkhe* which refers to a repository, a legal principle, and to the location from which commandments commence (Derrida, 1996: 1). Indeed, to control the archive is to control the future meanings of tradition, and tradition’s authority. Thus, for Derrida (1996: 3) ‘there is no political power without control of the archive’ and democracy is essentially a question of access to the archive’s construction, organization, and interpretation. *Archive Fever* aims to make visible the power exercised by *archons* that come to speak for, and to limit access to, the authority of archives.

Derrida’s critical impulse finds a target in Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi’s (1991) *Freud’s Moses: Judaism Terminable and Interminable* which centers on Freud’s (1939) *Moses and Monotheism*. Here, Freud argues that the biblical Moses was really an Egyptian noble who was murdered by his Jewish followers to whom he had introduced an Egyptian monotheistic religion. This murder was repressed and covered over by the belief that the Jews themselves are the originators of monotheism. For Freud, this Oedipal moment is fundamental to contemporary Jewish character, and it explains to him why his contemporary Jews have ‘a particularly high opinion of themselves’ (Freud, 1939: 105).

Citing his disciplinary training as a Jewish historian, Yerushalmi (1991: 8) argues that Freud’s *Moses* should be interpreted in light of Freud’s own Jewish identity. Yerushalmi describes Freud
as a ‘psychological Jew’ who has abandoned tradition in favor of the empty category of Jewish ‘character’. Contra to Freud’s own account, Yerushalmi argues that Freud’s upbringing was far from secularized, and he uses a Hebrew inscription in a Bible that Jakob Freud returned to his son Sigmund on Sigmund’s 35th birthday to prove his case. For Yerushalmi, anti-Semitic prejudice irks psychological Jews by recalling the degree to which their secularized lives are determined by unchosen ancestral events. For Freud in particular, the possibility of psycho-analysis being labeled a ‘Jewish national affair’ remained ‘an abiding concern and source of inner conflict throughout his life’ (Yerushalmi, 1991: 42). Yerushalmi concludes that Freud’s invocation of a repressed race memory of Moses’s killing resolves this inner conflict by allowing the essence of Jewish character to remain interminable, even if Judaism itself has no future.

Derrida makes explicit how Yerushalmi’s analytic scheme is premised on a negation of psychoanalysis from the outset. For Derrida, the fundamental principle of all archives is to consign, to gather together signs, so that ‘there should not be any absolute dissociation, any heterogeneity of secret which could separate (secrenere) or partition, in an absolute manner’ (Derrida, 1996: 3). Throughout Archive Fever, Derrida repeatedly emphasizes the incongruity between this consignation and Freud’s concept of the death drive. Thus any science of the archive must either dismiss Freud’s thought and take psychoanalysis as a historical object, or acknowledge the challenge posed by the death drive to the rationality of archiving. Derrida favors the latter approach, to the point of arguing that the threat of the death drive – in the form of radical forgetting – constitutes the necessary occasion of all archiving.

Yerushalmi’s work is used throughout Archive Fever to demonstrate the limits of ‘proper historiography’ that does not attend to this psychoanalytic challenge. For Derrida, Yerushalmi’s fifth chapter, which is written as a ‘monologue with Freud’ and addresses Freud’s ghost directly, constitutes the book’s essence.
This chapter/monologue obviously transgresses the norms of historical scholarship, making visible to Derrida how Yerushalmi’s earlier appeal to those norms forms part of a project to become the archon of Freud’s interior life. Derrida sees archival violence at work in this monologue on several counts. First, by addressing Freud as a fellow Jew, Yerushalmi recalls Freud to a form of unchosen community, offering him shelter only to attack him.6 Importantly, the archive which warrants this return – the inscription in the Bible – is a citation of patriarchal authority. Second, by turning the dead Freud into the ‘spectral subject’ addressed by this monologue, Yerushalmi purports to speak for Freud, and particularly to make Freud’s ghost assent to Yerushalmi’s thesis about Freud’s own identity crisis. This move is also bound up with patriarchy. By constructing Freud as a patriarch, and then interiorizing his ghost within his monologue, Yerushalmi repeats the primal violence and return of the repressed described by psychoanalysis in general (and Moses and Monotheism in particular). Thus, in refuting Freud’s theory, Yerushalmi’s book enacts the psychological moves that it predicts, and evidences Freud’s enduring relevance.7

In thinking through the relevance of this critique to Harry Stack Sullivan it is necessary to attend to the double positioning of psychoanalysis in Derrida’s account of archival violence. First, Derrida’s attack on Freud’s Moses makes Freud the exemplary victim of the archival violence enacted whenever living historians write the lives of dead human scientists in ways that negate their theories.

To want to speak about psychoanalysis, to claim to do the history of psychoanalysis from a purely apsychanalytic point of view, purified of all psychoanalytic influence, to the point of believing one could erase the traces of any Freudian impression is like claiming the right to speak without knowing what one is speaking about, without even wanting to hear anything about it. This structure is not only valid for the history of psychoanalysis, or for any discourse on...
psychoanalysis, it is valid at least for all the so-called social or human sciences. (Derrida, 1996: 54–5; emphasis added)

However, for Derrida the Freudian death drive is also the occasion of all archiving, rendering agreement with psychoanalytic theories of the subject necessary for access to his account of archival violence. These two claims – that the death drive is the necessary occasion of archive fever and that Freud is one of many intellectuals upon whom archival violence has been enacted – work to deepen the reader of Archive Fever’s impression that Freud’s Moses is indeed a violent text. Yet, when attention shifts away from Freud, as Derrida suggests it might, and scholars have often shown it to do in this journal, these two positions of psychoanalysis create quite different impressions. Any analysis of the forgetting of Sullivan’s life would contribute to the history of psychoanalysis, but any which presumes Freudian dynamics from the outset would enact archival violence, by reifying the theory that Sullivan labored hard to reject. Clearly a theory of archival violence is needed here that does not rely on psychoanalytic assumptions.

**THE QUEER ARCHIVE OF HARRY STACK SULLIVAN**

When I looked to other scholars’ uses of Derrida’s work to think through archives other than the psychoanalytic one, I was particularly struck by feminist work that acknowledged the affective experience of archival scholarship. When Harriet Bradley (1999) narrated her work in archives as public as a records office in Leicester and as intimate as her deceased mother’s private effects, she stressed the pleasures, seductions, and illusions of her work. Critiquing Derrida’s psychoanalytic presumptions directly, Carolyn Steedman (1998) noted the dissimilarity between an archive and the unconscious mind, and reminded us that archival work involves the reading of ‘purloined letters’, a practice that has long been constructed as not only illicit, but also erotic.
Lesbian, gay, and queer history provides another starting point for a theory of the archival violence that structures the forgetting of Sullivan. Early pioneers in this field found the recovery of gay and lesbian pasts to be impeded by the lack of a coherent lesbian and gay archive, the deliberate destruction of personal letters, and the withholding of access to archives for gay and lesbian scholars (e.g. Duberman, 1989; Freedman, 1998; Katz, 1976). Thus, for historians, what Adrienne Rich (1980) called ‘compulsory heterosexuality’ is not only part of the history of sexuality, but also shapes the histories of sexuality that can be written. Ann Cvetovich (2002: 110) has recently argued that ‘lesbian and gay history demands a radical archive of emotion’ to address the traumatic loss of these histories. This radical archive is paradigmatically made up of ephemera: ‘the term used by archivists and librarians to describe occasional publications and paper documents, material objects, or items that fall into the miscellaneous category when catalogued’ (Cvetovich, 2002: 111).

Yet the traumatic fragmentation of lesbian and gay histories does not warrant an essentialist grasping at archives to bring a historical figure’s ‘true’ homosexuality to light. Foucault (1978) points to both the historical emergence of the modern category of the homosexual and the political horizons of desires for truth about sex. Moves to unearth the historical truth about homosexuality are not escapes from power. Rather, as Alan Stewart (2003) points out, ‘we are conditioned to see in privacy and secrecy, what is withheld, the signs of the sexual, and more specifically, the homosexual’. For Stewart, queer archives prime the association between secrecy and homosexuality, and keep alive the essentialist fantasy of finding that crucial piece of solid evidence and identifying a historical figure’s homosexuality. Of course, it is precisely this kind of fantasy of knowing the other’s secrets that Yerushalmi’s use of Jakob Freud’s letter incites and exploits. Following Steedman (1998) we might ask if the emphasis on patriarchal politics both in Yerushalmi’s and in Derrida’s books also has the effect of covering over the erotics of men’s knowledge of each other’s private minds.
Sullivan’s life certainly incites fantasies of knowing his secrets, in particular because there is clear evidence of deliberate dissembling. According to Sullivan scholar Michael Allen, Jimmy Inscoe Sullivan, Sullivan’s partner, may have burned Harry’s private letters after Harry’s death in 1949. When Jimmie died some decades later,

Friends of Sullivan’s swooped down upon Jimmie’s little house in suburban Rockville, Maryland, eager to find the long-fabled documents. They found, as far as I could ascertain, nothing. (Allen, 1995: 15)

Reading Sullivan’s posthumously edited writings, and the secondary literature on Sullivan, I recognized in myself and in others the repeated asking and frustration of similar essentialist impulses. Was Harry Stack Sullivan really gay? How exactly did Jimmie and Harry meet? What really happened after Harry dropped out from Cornell? The Sullivan literature remains a kind of queer archive that incites these questions amongst those few historians who have studied it. However, I do not want to repeat the moves of decrying Sullivan’s repression, or continuing to eagerly swoop down on private houses looking to purloin letters. Rather, I want to consider how archive fever would feel if its occasion were not the Freudian death drive, but rather the historically specific dynamics of closeting and outing.

THE WORKS OF HARRY STACK SULLIVAN

To a large degree, one can periodize the discussion of homosexuality in the literature on and by Sullivan according to changing opinions about homosexuality in American psychiatry. The postwar context was a period of exponential growth in American psychiatry (Capshaw, 1999; Herman, 1995), and one in which national security was increasingly framed as a psychological battle for hearts and minds (Lutz, 1997; Osgood, 2002). In 1953, President Eisenhower extended military codes used for the exclusion of gay men from the armed forces to civilian populations (D’Emilio, 1983), and homosexuality was classified as a mental

Gay psychiatrists were not recognizable in this context, and Sullivan’s life received no sustained biographical attention. However, his psychiatric works began to appear in book form. Seven books have been published under Sullivan’s name, but only one was published during his lifetime (Sullivan, 1947). It was largely left to Sullivan’s followers in the White Foundation to create a public archive of his thought after his death. In the early 1950s three volumes based on transcriptions of Sullivan’s lectures were published in rapid succession (Sullivan, 1953, 1954, 1956). Two edited books of Sullivan’s articles were published later by this same committee (Sullivan, 1962, 1964). The primary archon in the formation of this public archive was Sullivan’s former secretary Helen Swick Perry, who participated in the editing of all of these books, and wrote introductory commentaries on all of the articles reprinted in the latter two volumes.

The last Sullivan book to be published was the first to be written. Sullivan completed *Personal Psychopathology* (1972) around 1932, but decided against publishing it, upon the advice of his friends. *Personal Psychopathology* presents Sullivan’s first major statement of his personality theory and draws extensively on his clinical work with schizophrenic patients. It was recirculated in mimeograph form within the White Foundation in 1965, and when it ultimately appeared as a book, Perry was once again the editor. More than any other of Sullivan’s writings, it has been interpreted as a cipher of his private thoughts and of his own biographical history. However, Sullivan’s own sexuality remained unspoken in this period. Quite late on, scholars could describe Sullivan’s theory of homosexuality without mentioning the possibility of autobiographical relevance at all (e.g. Mullahy, 1970).

**THE BIOGRAPHIES OF HARRY STACK SULLIVAN**
Following gay and lesbian liberation protest, the APA voted to declassify homosexuality as a mental illness in 1973. Lesbians and gay men managed to convince psychiatrists that they were not categorically ill, largely by countering psychoanalytic discourse with an ‘evidence of experience’ (Scott, 1991) and by claiming to be authorities on their own lives (Bayer, 1981). In the decade after the declassification of homosexuality, Sullivan’s experience began to be described more thoroughly, and questions about his sexuality were broached. Chapman (1976) was the first to publish a claim that Sullivan was homosexual. His book on Sullivan’s thought opens with a biographical chapter titled ‘The Life and Emotional Problems of Harry Stack Sullivan’, which problematizes Sullivan’s life most thoroughly in regard to sexuality. Sullivan was described as ‘acutely aware of the ways in which his early emotional traumas had made him inept in many interpersonal areas, and his homosexual urges jabbed him intermittently until his final disease-ridden years’ (Chapman, 1976: 38). Recalling Yerushalmi’s evocation of Freud’s assenting specter, Chapman presents Sullivan as willfully closeted:

There were, of course, the added problems of his sexual life. By his own admission, he never achieved a genital heterosexual relationship, and he felt this was a painful failure. Despite the discretion he exercised in his homosexual contacts, some of his close friends knew of his sexual difficulties, and in professional circles his homosexuality was generally suspected. Further discussion of Sullivan’s sexual life would harm the families of persons recently dead. (Chapman, 1976: 17).

Chapman has never revealed his sources, and his foreclosure of the discussion allowed knowledge of Sullivan’s homosexuality, on condition that it is interpreted as a failure. Sullivan’s ‘discretion’ and experience of sexual failure assure the reader of Sullivan’s assent to Chapman’s homophobia. In a manner familiar to lesbian, gay and queer historians, and markedly different from the eager swooping on Jimmie Inscoe Sullivan’s house, Chapman’s secrecy is positioned as the opposite of violence; it limits harm to
those who are associated with Sullivan’s ‘homosexual contacts’ through structures of heterosexual kinship.

Chatelaine’s work (1981) situated Sullivan with respect to his intellectual influences and published elements of a biographical study of Sullivan. These include such useful archival materials as interviews with former Shepperd-Pratt employees who knew Sullivan personally. One interviewee describes how Sullivan was known as ‘Miss Sullivan’ by his ward’s attendants, and how some hospital employees avoided the ward because of their homophobia. Another described the majority of patients and ward attendants as gay men and Sullivan as gay but ‘under control’ (Chatelaine, 1981: 447–55). In spite of these archival ephemera, Chatelaine concluded that there is insufficient evidence to prove Sullivan’s homosexuality. The question of what sort of evidence would be needed to prove his heterosexuality is not broached.

Finally, Helen Swick Perry (1982) published Psychiatrist of America: The Life of Harry Stack Sullivan. Perry’s is the only biography to claim personal knowledge of Sullivan, and to represent itself as a completed project. Yet the project was begun long after Sullivan’s death and relies often on Perry’s memory as a primary source of data. Since its publication it has become the standard reference on Sullivan’s life, making Perry the archon both of Sullivan’s theory and of his private life. To date, no other book-length biography has appeared. Psychiatrist of America implies Sullivan’s homosexuality everywhere but never affirms it explicitly. For example, Perry describes the American roots of Sullivan’s thinking as follows:

As surely as Walt Whitman’s Leaves of Grass, or Theodore Dreiser’s Sister Carrie, or Sherwood Anderson’s Winesburg, Ohio, or Willa Cather’s My Antonia, Harry Stack Sullivan’s interpersonal theory is an American product, raised to the level of science and art through the lonely search and brilliant
observation of a boy growing up in Chenango County at the
turn of the century. (Perry, 1982: 9)8

Her most frank statement on Sullivan’s sexuality remains obscure:

Over time he achieved his own freedom, however flawed. Friends and colleagues of Sullivan’s by their ‘direct knowledge,’ report that he had some sexual experiences with women as well as with men. But there is no ready label for how he lived and thought and yearned. (Perry, 1982: 334)

Like Chapman, Perry (1982: 335–8) discusses Sullivan’s sexuality as ‘a grave handicap for sexual intimacy with women’, an ‘inadequacy’, and as his ‘own lot in life’ from which he never managed to ‘cure himself’. Like Chapman, she also does not cite any sources on these points. She also writes suspiciously little about the internal dynamics of Miss Sullivan’s ward and does not even refer to the interviews published by Chatelaine. However, far from fixing the truth of Sullivan’s sexuality, Perry’s archonic moves have rendered her text a queer archive that has incited much further discussion.

HOW HARRY STACK SULLIVAN BECAME GAY

All of the biographies discussed above were severely limited by an inability to think of homosexuality as anything but a personal failure, or a poor replica of heterosexuality. In the early 1990s, the explosion of work in lesbian, gay, and queer studies encouraged scholars across the humanities to conceptualize modern lesbian and gay subjectivities as important cultural forms in their own right, rather than as derivations of – or approximations to – heterosexual norms (e.g. Butler, 1990; Duggan, 1992; Lauretis, 1991; Miller, 1988; Sedgwick, 1990; Warner, 1993). Subsequent essays on Sullivan began to learn from this movement and to recognize Sullivan’s homosexuality without presuming it to be a source of shame or something that warranted explanation.
Evincing the kind of essentialist impulse described earlier, Allen (1995: 2) set out to ‘prove irrefutably, that Harry Stack Sullivan was gay’. This goal was seemingly achieved by an interview with a heterosexual male trainee of Sullivan who reported having sex with Sullivan twice in 1937. However, Allen notes that on his discovering this fact, his interest turned to Sullivan’s understanding of his sexuality. He describes Sullivan as a relatively self-aware gay man, critiquing previous constructions of him as a lonely, failing, problematic heterosexual. In contrast to past authors, Allen emphasizes Harry’s relationship with Jimmie, and cites interviews with Perry to support the view that she deliberately erased significant aspects of Sullivan’s gay life.

A second essay used D. A. Miller’s (1988) concept of the open secret to critique Perry’s treatment of Sullivan’s homosexuality (Harnod, 1998). Like Allen, Harnod approached Sullivan’s understanding of his homosexuality as a puzzle, but he found a clue in a reading of Sullivan’s personal symbol. The symbol consists of two horses’ heads, one black and one white, in a yin-and-yang pattern. Harnod reads the symbol as referencing a Platonic distinction between love and lust:

Sullivan must have been particularly struck by Plato’s symbol for the soul in *Phaedrus*, the charioteer pulled upward by the horse of spiritual love and downward by the horse of lust. (Harnod, 1998: 314)

For Harnod, Sullivan valorized a kind of Manichean love that denied bodily lust and allowed Sullivan to come to terms with his homosexuality. Yet this homosexuality continued to exert such an influence that Harnod (1998: 317) triumphantly concludes that it is ‘the repressed other of interpersonal psychoanalysis’. Once it was unspeakable, later an open secret to be touched on but lightly; by the end of the 1990s Harry Stack Sullivan had begun to become an openly gay man.

**A SULLIVANIAN IMPRESSION**
In spite of their variability, all of these accounts aim to know the truth of Sullivan’s capacity for loving others. Throughout, there is a continued appeal to Sullivan’s posthumously published works, presumed to be riddled with secret autobiographical clues. Positioning Sullivan as a failing heterosexual, Perry (1982: 140–1) reads one of his case histories drawn ‘from the group of schizophrenics’ (Sullivan, 1947: 100) as an autobiographical reference to Sullivan’s own emerging heterosexuality. In contrast, Allen (1995: 12) refers to passages in Sullivan’s writings that are more tolerant of homosexuality to develop his narrative of Sullivan as an adjusted gay man.

Clearly the range of lives written from Sullivan’s works is diverse indeed. Such uses of these works can have the effect of making Sullivan assent to each biographer’s speculation. As Derrida might have it, they animate Sullivan’s ghost to make it assent with their own narrative. In so doing, they cover over the historically specific norms which warrant and constrain the writing of Sullivan’s sexual history. Discourse which ontologizes the homosexual is a move within, not outside, modern power (Foucault, 1978). Allen (1995: 7) argues that Sullivan’s early adulthood was organized by ‘the all consuming drama of coming out’. But the shifting terrain of sexual categories in Sullivan’s time negates the singularity to ‘coming out’ that Allen assumes (Chauncey, 1994). The homo/hetero axis is but one of many axes of sexual difference (Sedgwick, 1990), and gay men are far from the most marginal of sexual people (Rubin, 1983). In particular Sullivan scholars continue to read secrecy as evidence of homosexuality. Why assume, as Harnod (1998) does, that Sullivan’s horse’s-head symbol is a public reference to his homosexuality, and not a more literal reference to bestiality? Applying the problematic strategy of reading Sullivan’s work as autobiography, no end of evidence could be found to support this conclusion. Consider Sullivan’s references to sexual dreams about horses (Sullivan, 1972: 298) or ‘my pleasure in horseback riding’ (Sullivan, 1947: 27).9
Does it make sense to follow Derrida and to think of the discovery of a gay-affirmative Sullivan in the 1990s as a kind of return of Sullivan to a form of unwanted community? This form of archival violence is repeatedly played out in Sullivan biographies. I have described elsewhere how Sullivan’s Irish Catholic background provides Perry with an increasingly tortured schema to explain Sullivan’s lack of heterosexual interest, his intimate relationships with men, his financial extravagance and his alcoholism. Perry’s account of Sullivan’s difference from heterosexual norms of American WASPs returns Sullivan to the Catholic Church, an institution that he often critiqued and in which he did not participate as an adult (Hegarty, 2004). Harnod returns Sullivan to an unchosen community that turns us back to the problematics of Derrida’s double debt to psychoanalysis in *Archive Fever*. Writing in a psychoanalytic journal, Harnod describes Sullivan’s theory as ‘psycho-analysis’ rather than ‘psychiatry’; a distinction that Sullivan labored hard to create. For Harnod, Sullivan’s homosexuality is not simply forgotten, but repressed. Harnod reminds us that D. A. Miller’s ‘open secret’ takes as its foundational exemplar the Freudian hysteric. The Freudian impression on Harnod’s account of Sullivan, and the consequent violence to Sullivan’s own thought, point to the limits of grounding the category of archival violence in Freudian terms. Indeed, Harnod’s text speaks to our chronic overfamiliarity with psychoanalysis, a Freudian impression on all of us, without which Derrida’s text would be utterly unintelligible.

No such familiarity can be claimed for Sullivan. Rather, the persistent search for the truth of Sullivan’s personality in his works proceeds in concert with a refusal to listen to what Sullivan might have said about the possibility of such knowing. Sullivan’s writings center human personality on ‘the self system’, which is formed from significant relationships with others and which forms the basis of feelings of well-being (e.g. Sullivan, 1954: 96, 130). In this corpus of work, human being is necessarily interpersonal. This leads to a critique of the idea of unique personality:
I have inveighed against ‘the delusion of unique individuality’ and referred to personality as the hypothetical entity which we posit to account for interpersonal relations. I do not believe that this denies anyone ‘A personality’; it serves its purpose if it warns anyone that I never expect to know all about his personality – and am as certain as can be that he too will always share my ignorance in this regard. (Sullivan, 1947: xi)

Interior Freudian instincts, including the death drive, are described as convenient theoretical fictions in Sullivan’s works. This of course suggests that all attempts to use notions of interior personality dynamics as explanatory constructs do violence to Sullivan’s memory. Yet the ubiquity of such statements has not slowed the impulse to treat Sullivan’s personality as a puzzle to be deciphered, or those same works as the cipher. Ironically, the historians who have written about Sullivan have presumed to know more about minds from words than Sullivan often did in regard to his own psychiatric patients. The variability in the accounts of Sullivan’s life evidences an enduring Sullivanian impression. As Sullivan appears to have believed, it is no trivial matter to know the mind of another through his or her words.

HARRY STACK SULLIVAN AND HIS CHUMS

When a theory of the human subject is read as a form of autobiography, it becomes ideographic rather than nomothetic. Whatever the theory’s historical interest, its enduring epistemic value for the human sciences is diminished. The tethering of Sullivan’s work to his life accomplishes this effect also. As my impulse is to animate a wider range of interest in Sullivan, it is worth looking to his theory to see where it has been most forcefully rewritten as autobiography, and what might be learned by rethinking it once again as a general theory of the human subject. Sullivan certainly does not always sustain the anti-individualist impulse implied by his critique of unique
personality. Like Freud, Sullivan describes a singular, and highly androcentric, developmental norm for the growing human. Just as narrative has been central to the professionalization of history (White, 1987), theories of normative developmental stages have been key in the origins of developmental psychology as a way of understanding the modern subject (Burman, 1994). Sullivan’s thought is no different.

Sullivan’s developmental theory contains the usual complement of oral, anal, and genital theories. However, unlike Freud’s narrative, Sullivan locates the development of affective life outside the heterosexual nuclear family. Sullivan describes how children form ‘chumships’ with same-sex peers towards the end of pre-adolescence, and these relationships signal the end of childhood egocentricity and provide the first experiences of love. Eventually these chumships give way to same-sex adolescent gangs, a shift which is roughly co-terminous with the onset of puberty. Sullivan (1947: 41) writes glowingly of these chumships, they represent ‘the quiet miracle of adolescence’ and are necessarily homosexual, as they require feelings of similarity. Thus, ‘the boy finds a chum who is a boy, the girl finds a chum who is a girl’ (Sullivan, 1947: 43). While homosexual sex can occur between chums, Sullivan describes this as more likely to lead towards adult heterosexuality than adult homosexuality (Sullivan, 1953: 256–7). Failure to achieve such chumships can lead to disaster, and it is not uncommon for them to represent ‘the best grasp on the problems of life that some people ever manifest’ (Sullivan, 1954: 137). It is these chumships which Sullivan understood his schizophrenic patients at Shepperd–Pratt to have missed, and which he hoped their experience on Miss Sullivan’s ward might provide.

The posthumous discovery of Sullivan’s close pre-adolescent friendship with Clarence Bellinger (also later a psychiatrist) has made chumship the focal point for the application of Sullivan’s theory to understanding his life. Several biographers have focused
on Sullivan’s friendship with Bellinger (Chapman, 1976: 22–3; Perry, 1982: 90–2; Harnod, 1998: 311–12), and tend to assume that this was the prototypical chumship. Once Sullivan’s theory of chums has been deciphered as a secret autobiographical reference to his relationship with Bellinger, Sullivan’s developmental narrative returns to the dynamics of the heterosexual nuclear family, where Freud’s is also centred. The child’s relations outside the nuclear family become peripheral once again. Archive Fever might lead away from a consideration of such historiographical politics. To the extent that Derrida valorizes the endurance of Oedipal narratives, his work remains within the play of heterosexual kinship relations, and erases the possibility that children’s most intimate and formative experiences of love are often not with their kin.

CONCLUSIONS

Thus while there has been a Derridian impression on my thinking about Sullivan, Sullivan’s work leads me to conclude that Archive Fever frustrates Derrida’s own project to open up the archive to multiple uses much more than Derrida, among others, has acknowledged. The category of archival violence that Derrida presents is limited by its Freudian impression, an impression that has been made on all of us. Centering the category of archival violence on Sullivan, a deliberately forgotten figure, queries attempts both to silence and to stabilize Sullivan’s complicated theory of human relationality, particularly those aspects of it that invoke determinants from outside the heterosexual nuclear family.

What kinds of questions might democratize the Sullivan archive and broaden engagement with it? I shall conclude with some possible future directions. First, and most obviously, Sullivan’s chums are a rare attempt within psychology to prioritize children’s friendships as something other than a developmental precursor to subsequent adult relationality. To what extent is their dismissal part of a larger pattern of prioritizing adults over children, or familial over non-familial
relationships, as determinants of personality? Second, queer kinship also figures heavily in anthropologists’ post-Schneiderian debates about the constructedness of American kinship (Schneider, 1980; Hayden, 1995; Weston, 1991). This conversation often points to the newness of queer families, but nowhere takes account of the Sullivans, who used the cultural logic of ‘father’ and ‘son’ to describe themselves and moved through the culture and personality network of American anthropologists in 1930s New York. Third, Sullivan theorized homosexuality and schizophrenia as effects of alienation, prefiguring the work of Gregory Bateson, Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault, Guy Hocquenghem, and R. D. Laing. How does our reduction of his history to autobiography obscure his contribution to a history of alienation and alterity? Derrida is right that archives act on us, and that tradition can appear to provide shelter that becomes attack. But Derrida also fails to make visible how the heterosexual family constitutes such a false form of shelter, or to allow for the productive forms of relationality that Sullivan theorized beyond its boundaries.

NOTES

1. Perry (1982: 9) writes that ‘there is some mystery about the way in which Sullivan met Jimmie’ but it appears to be a mystery of her own making. Sullivan refers to Jimmie as a ‘former patient’, and Perry reports that one of Sullivan’s colleagues had seen Jimmie standing in the street for several nights ‘in some kind of catatonic pose’. Allen (1995: 9) has subsequently reported that Perry told him that Jimmie had been working as a hustler prior to moving in with Harry Stack Sullivan.

2. See www.wawhite.org/home/home.htm

3. Yerushalmi (1991: xv–xvi) describes himself as ‘a historian who has generally been known as a student of Sephardic Jewry’ and notes that ‘it occurred to me that it was precisely my training as a Jewish historian that might enable me to understand this book [Moses and Monotheism] in ways not accessible to psycho-analysts or literary critics’.

4. Derrida (1996: 34) writes: ‘Let us imagine in effect a project of
general archivio-logy. . . . Such a discipline must in effect risk being paralysed in a preliminary aporia. It would have either (1) to include psychoanalysis . . or (2) on the contrary, to place itself under the critical authority (in the Kantian sense) of psychoanalysis.’

5. Derrida (1996: 40) writes: ‘Thus one can say just as well that the entire book is in advance contained, as if carried away, drawn in, engulfed by the abysmal element of the “Monologue” for which it constitutes a kind of long preface, an exergue, a preamble, or a foreword. The true title of the book, its most appropriate title, its truth, would indeed be Monologue with Freud.’


   In what is at issue here, indeed has been so all along, we both have, as Jews, an equal stake. Therefore in speaking of the Jews I shall not say “they.” I shall say “we.” The distinction is familiar to you.’ Derrida (1996: 41) comments that now in death, as at his circumcision, Freud is forced to enter this community not of his choosing. ‘He cannot refuse this community at once proposed and imposed. He can only say “yes” to this covenant into which he must enter one more time’ (emphasis in original).

7. Derrida (1996: 61) describes Yerushalmi as ‘[m]imicking a doubly fictitious paricide, he argues bitterly with a master whose psychoanalytic rules and premises he accepts’.

8. Aside from Whitman’s and Cather’s sexualities, Dreiser’s Sister Carrie was banned upon publication for its sensationalism while Anderson’s collection of short stories opens with ‘Hands’, an account of a gay schoolteacher whose life is ruined by scandal in small-town America.

9. Even Kinsey, Pomeroy and Martin (1948: 671) would support such a hypothesis. These researchers found that ‘26 to 28 per cent of the rural males of the college level have some animal experience to the point of orgasm’.

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