European Union studies has blossomed into a multidisciplinary area of enquiry in which scholars of political science, IR, economics, law and history all contribute to what might be called the English-language mainstream, as represented by the major study associations in the field, such as UACES (the University Association for Contemporary European Studies). Within other disciplines, such as sociology and geography, there are also lively literatures on the EU, and increasing links between these disciplinary communities and the ‘mainstream’. EU studies has come from humble origins as a sideshow in IR, creating a body of work which shows how effective multi-disciplinary area studies can be; it has much to offer scholars of both the emerging globalised and transnationalising world political economy (Warleigh 2006), and to help scholars in its respective ‘home’ disciplines adapt to an era beyond what Jan-Aart Scholte (2007) has pithily called ‘methodological territorialism’ (Warleigh-Lack and Phinnemore 2009: 214-18).

And yet, recent overviews of the field (Bourne and Cini 2006; Phinnemore and Warleigh-Lack 2009) have expressed concerns that EU studies may become a victim of its own success if it does not engage in an overt process of internal critique and reflection about ‘how the ways we understand (the) EU…connect with and feed back into our broader social scientific preoccupations’ (Rosamond 2007: 25). Without a clear programme of outreach to our ‘home’ disciplines, where the EU studies component is often hidden in a purdah of specialist journals and considered a sub-field of passing interest rather than a source of new ideas and concepts, EU scholars’ work may fail to resonate beyond those specialist publications (Warleigh-Lack and Phinnemore 2009).² The ‘mainstream’ may also fall intellectually behind those outside it, if the ‘acquis académique’ is not capable of further reflexive change, for example by integrating more work from social theory and sociology (Delanty and Rumford 2005).

It is in this respect that, although the field of EU studies is increasingly diverse in terms of metatheory and methodology, particularly with regard to the importation of the rationalist versus constructivist debate from IR (Jupille 2006), concerns can and
should be raised. Alongside this increasing diversity, which also reflects the development of the EU qua political system, there is a certain ‘presentism’ in much contemporary work within political science, which is still the dominant discipline in the field in quantitative terms (Wessels 2006; Rosamond 2007): EU studies continues to treat its own theoretical and empirical heritage far too casually, with too few scholars steeping themselves in the early literature in the field. Moreover, there are clear limits to EU studies’ emerging variety; Diez and Wiener, for instance, point out that integration theory continues to cast critical perspectives to the margins, while simultaneously privileging work in the English language (Diez and Wiener 2004: 12), a point also made by Wessels (2006) and Warleigh-Lack and Phinnemore (2009). For Ben Rosamond (2007), indeed, EU studies can at present be understood as caught in a tussle between two camps. On the one hand, there exist the pluralists, who advocate and engage with a range of theoretical perspectives and disciplines, with an emphasis on multi- and inter-disciplinarity research. On the other hand, there are the ‘normal scientists’, who seek to make work in EU studies comply with what are considered to be the ‘rigour’ of a narrow range of epistemologies and methodologies, essentially those which dominate the US academy.

For Ian Manners, a particular danger in this regard is the absence of critical, postmodern and feminist perspectives from the EU studies mainstream, reflecting the dominance of political science undertaken from a liberal, fairly positivist viewpoint within this scholarly arena (Manners 2007). Indeed, Manners argues that if work from more critical perspectives continues to define itself as ‘Other’ than the EU studies mainstream, with the latter sharing the diagnosis, EU studies may ossify. It would certainly miss out on a range of challenging encounters that offer a new range of intra-, multi-, and inter-disciplinary partnerships, a different understanding of what scholarship is for (challenging the conventional idea of the neutral scholar), and the possibility of generating genuinely new knowledge (Manners 2007). Taking up this challenge, however, requires the EU studies community to re-think not only what counts as ‘mainstream’ but also its epistemological and metatheoretical premises.

In this article I seek to respond to Manners’ challenge, but from a different position - that of political ecology, or a ‘green’ perspective. The article reflects my own disciplinary heritage as a scholar of politics and IR, although by implication the
arguments put forward below are potentially as valid in disciplines such as Law or Economics. It also reflects the fact that the mainstream in EU studies is still somewhat unreflexively defined by dominant norms of IR scholarship, embodied by the neofunctionalists who for both good and ill did so much to set up EU studies as a field of enquiry. To do this, I proceed in three stages. First, I set out why I think the call for a greater range of critical perspectives in EU studies is useful, focusing on the epistemological challenges and benefits involved in taking such a step. Second, I set out the core ideas of political theories of ecology. Finally, I suggest specific benefits for EU studies of incorporating such an ecological approach.

EPISTEMOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES – FROM POSITIVISM TO EVALUATIVE THEORY

Orthodox approaches in international relations and political studies – including those in EU studies – derive from liberal understandings of scholarship and an approach to knowledge-generation which owes much to Popperian thought (for a discussion, see Rosamond 2007). This ‘critical rationalism’ (Popper 1969: 25-6) has much to recommend it: an awareness of the slipperiness of language, the necessity for argument and discussion, a (limited) acceptance of the observer’s inevitable subjectivity, and an insistence on rigorous examination of sources. However, it also depends upon the existence of objectively observable facts, which are necessary to establish a concept or proposition’s falsifiability, and an approach to knowledge generation which is ultimately Newtonian. Consequently it has limited application beyond the world of certain kinds of natural science: for Popper himself, social and natural sciences follow different trajectories, with the former needing to encompass too many contingencies, variables and ongoing processes to produce ‘long-term unconditional prophecy’ of the sort considered necessary and valid for the kind of natural science he envisaged (Popper 1969: 337). Thus, whatever the challenges of quantum dynamics or string theory to Popper and his fellow travellers in the field of positivist natural science, and they are many, the utility of his ontology and epistemology in the social sciences has always been open to question. The fact that this went unacknowledged in much IR and IR-derived work since the second
world war owes much to the dominance of Realism and US academic understandings of ‘normal science’ (Ashworth 2009).

Hollis and Smith’s seminal work Explaining and Understanding International Relations is a useful document to analyse here, as well as a pellucid discussion of two contrasting approaches to study in the field of IR (Hollis and Smith 1991). Hollis and Smith borrow Weber’s distinction between Erklären and Verstehen to chart the development of two camps in IR scholarship: explainers, who see the world as independent from the observer and capable of at least some degree of prediction, and understanders, who see the world as a construction of rules and meanings upon which the observer is dependent and by which she/he is partly determined. The latter emphasise the tools humans use to generate meaning for themselves out of natural and social phenomena. An illustration may be helpful here. Allow that the local state-run school in your area is closed. This is a social fact, observable and demonstrable. But what does this event actually mean to the lives of those it affects? Is it a disaster for the local community and an indication of a misplaced ideology that privileges economic efficiency over local services? Or is it an opportunity for the private sector, for individuals and families to generate the kind of schooling they wish to see for their own children, relatively free of state control? ‘Explainers’ are quite capable of accounting for how the decision to close the school was taken, and whose interests dominated that process, and this is of course a very useful endeavour. But only the ‘understanders’ are likely to apprehend the human and hence social impact of the school’s closure.

Within the EU studies mainstream, ‘explainers’ have tended to outnumber ‘understanders’. In the context of the early twenty-first century, this epistemological situation is no longer helpful. The challenge from constructivism and reflectivism in IR as well as EU studies is in this sense an encouraging sign (Checkel 2007). However, a different approach is outlined here; one which seeks to inject a different kind of critique of what has often passed for ‘normal science’ in EU studies, and one which sits in a more unabashedly normative context.

Many contemporary scholars call for pluralism in both methodological and epistemological terms (Smith 2007; Wæver 2007), in which scholars put their cards
on the table and set out their metatheoretical positions accordingly, in order to facilitate self-reflection and intellectual development for the field as a whole. In this spirit, I maintain that the rethinking of EU studies could usefully be undertaken in a way which achieves three main tasks:

- to see a form of causal theory as an essential part of the theorising process, helpful in facilitating comparative and conceptually-informed studies of the EU, but no more than that;
- to rebalance the debate between ‘explainers’ and ‘understanders’, by reinforcing the position of non-positivist epistemologies;
- to contribute to normative debates about the value, values and impact of European integration, particularly with regard to participatory democracy, human rights, increased general welfare and, above all, ecology.

I defend this move as follows. As an overall justification, it follows from the established point in social science philosophy that the worth of a new theoretical approach can be that it synthesizes aspects of knowledge which were previously separate and as a consequence leads to the potential for new insights, research or theory (Trigg 1991: 110). As an example of the approach argued for here, revising integration theory would draw not only on work in the fields of EU studies, new regionalism and IR more broadly, but also on normative political theory and environmental (Green) theory. This is an under-developed but increasingly pressing endeavour if the study of regional integration is to make a contribution to the generation of useful knowledge in an era of massive environmental challenge, biodiversity loss and global climate change (Manners 2003).

Following on from this, I maintain that causal theory is ultimately bland if the linkages and processes it uncovers are not linked to some sense of how those lessons can be learned and applied in a normatively progressive manner. This does not mean that empiricism has no place in a scholarly toolkit; rather, it means that such work must be treated as a means to an end, and that positivist norms about value-free scholarship and facts which speak for themselves must be challenged, even if it is correct to assume that the social world can be understood and meaningfully communicated about in a way which gainsays the extremes of post-structuralism.
It must also be acknowledged that norms are always with us. European integration is itself never neutral – it creates winners and losers, and alters balances of power, political opportunity structures and domestic politics generally. It is carried out in the pursuit of goals which are both ideational and material, and as scholars we have a duty to critique these where necessary; in our analyses, we should take on a rather different self-understanding of what our role as scholars comprises – no longer, if we ever truly were, Popperian seekers after neutral general laws, but engaged analysts of controversial social phenomena (van Langenhove 2007).

Epistemologically, this calls for an ‘evaluative theory’ (Stoker 1995: 17) – one which assesses the condition of a phenomenon according to a set of explicit concepts and values. This approach is non-reflectivist to the extent that it posits universally valid values which can be applied based on readily communicable knowledge, but it is also non-positivist in the Popperian sense because it places the defence of, and helping progress towards, a set of values and principles as the ultimate value of theory. Habermasian understandings of critical theory are similar in their objectives and Weltanschauung (Mjøset 1999), as they rely on an ethical foundation and seek to change society if this is necessary according to the theory’s normative underpinnings, rather than simply to describe society accurately. This can of course lead to a clash of norms between scholars and even between scholars and practitioners – but such is the stuff of politics and also, increasingly, of European integration. In what follows, I set out an ecological perspective on EU studies as an example of an evaluative approach to enquiry in the field.

WHICH NORMS? AN INTRODUCTION TO GREEN PERSPECTIVES
If an evaluative approach to EU studies integration is to be essayed, attention must be paid to meaningful and helpful norms and imperatives as a benchmark for analysis. This requires integration scholars to shift their gaze from the immediate dependent variable to major social issues – not necessarily to provide an overall solution to these problems, but to point a way towards solving at least some part of them. In this light, I take as my point of departure the observation that social challenges such as combating poverty and ill-health are crucial, but ultimately secondary to the preservation of the planetary conditions which enable social action to be taken at all because human life continues to exist in a viable manner (Ban 2007). Anthropogenic climate change is the
obvious and most compelling example of how ecological problems must change our perspectives about what is important and what is trivial (Hamilton 2010). Human survival as a species means above all ensuring we do nothing irreparable to the capacity of the earth system to support life through the regulation and creation of the necessary supporting conditions – homoeostasis (Lovelock 1979; Lovelock 2006). This in turn will require a rapprochement of social and natural sciences around the issue of ecology - a huge task, but one which has begun (Midgley 2001).

Within the literature on green political theory, two principal approaches have been identified as minimalist and maximalist variants – ‘environmentalism’ and ‘ecologism’ (Dobson 2006). The former is understood as ‘a managerial approach to environmental problems, secure in the belief that they can be solved without fundamental changes in present values or patterns of production and consumption’, while the latter is understood as the belief that ‘a sustainable and fulfilling existence presupposes radical changes in our relationship with the non-human natural world, and in our mode of social and political life’ (Dobson 2006: 2).

My focus here is on the latter variant, since although many concepts of the former branch are capable of generating radical ideas and programmes, in practice they have been prey to capture by vested interests and have been interpreted in a minimalist fashion. The concept of sustainable development is a case in point. This concept sets economic growth in the context of both resource scarcity and the need for a fairer balance between the North and South of the globe. It asks normative questions about what counts as a ‘resource’, favours local economic autonomy as far as possible in order to maximise self-reliance and autonomy, and seeks moderation in material wants. Regulated markets are used as means of exchange not capital accumulation, and economic development are balanced with social and environmental concerns (John 1999; Porritt 2007). If it were to be realised, sustainable development would make significant changes both to the way we live and to the way we think about the world and our place in it. Indeed, the more radical forms of political ecology would produce results that are in many ways similar. However, as Jordan and Lenschow (2008) wryly note, the (economic) ‘development’ part of the concept has tended to outweigh the ‘sustainability’ part; sustainable development has been honoured in the breach more than in the practice.
The same could be said about another well-known idea within the green theory canon, namely ecological modernisation. This is the notion that economic growth and environmental protection ‘can be reconciled by further, albeit “greener”, industrialisation’ (Carter 2001:211). Ecological modernisation sees environmental degradation as a significant problem, and also accepts that such degradation may require significant adaptation and innovation. To that extent, it marks a departure from conventional thinking. However, as Carter also points out, it privileges technological and market-based responses to environmental problems, assuming that no such problem is incapable of being fixed, while simultaneously failing to accept either the idea of limits to economic growth or the need for an active role for government in pursuit of social justice which are hallmarks of ecological politics (Dobson 2006: 207-13). For this reason, ecological modernisation has often proven to be popular with policy-makers, since it takes the idea of sustainable development and shears it of any transformative potential, while embracing the shift towards neoliberalism and its associated ‘governance’ mechanisms (Carter 2001). Thus, and as a direct consequence, any perceived policy success which comes from ecological modernisation is interpreted as a victory for the dominant paradigm, obviating thereby the need for a new and different approach to policy-making and priority-definition.

In this context, it might be objected that the time for a ‘green turn’ in EU studies, as with life in general, has been and gone. This is a principal claim of the post-ecologists, such as Ingolfur Blühdorn, who maintain that the international societal trend towards economism, coupled with the successful construction by leading politicians of neoliberalism as ‘common sense’ rather than an ideology, have limited the space for ideological challenge from a green perspective or indeed any other angle. Moreover, by a clever appropriation of certain limited environmentalist ideas – as per the ‘ecological modernisation’ discourse – dominant political and economic actors have neutered the ecologist critique by persuading citizens that, insofar as this is necessary, environmental concerns have been taken into consideration. This can be seen, inter alia, from the way in which ecological ideas and principles have been recast in an economic vocabulary: ‘With its managerialist approach and its vocabulary of efficiency, natural and social capital, ecological stakeholding etc, the contemporary
environmental discourse has adopted a distinctly economic idiom’ (Blühdorn 2002: 3; emphasis in original).

From a post-ecologist perspective, the outlook is likely to be bleak. The ideational battles and reconstructions briefly described above have been accompanied by deliberate evisceration of ecological politics and movements/parties by their opponents. For Blühdorn and Welsh (2007), regular news coverage has ‘normalised’ the idea of environmental crisis so that it is incapable of spurring citizens to action (and, one might add, the attempts of climate change deniers to detract from the emerging scientific consensus makes this kind of citizen response even more unlikely). Moreover, the same commentators signal, the increasing acceptance of, or at least accommodation to, capitalism by leading Green figures and movements – even political parties – has resulted in their capture by the mainstream. Ecologism is a perspective with radical and transformative potential, but this is less and less likely to be realised: ‘The ongoing process of modernisation has taken Western consumer societies beyond the politics of sustainability and into a realm where the management of the inability and unwillingness to become sustainable has taken centre ground’ (Blühdorn and Welsh 2007: 192, emphasis in original). In the context of the ongoing climate change which turns what may otherwise seem pleasant philosophical diversions into pressing issues of public policy, perhaps it really is time to write the requiem for (our) species, in Hamilton’s arresting phrase (Hamilton 2010).

However, the matter cannot be left there, not least if we want to avoid the fate of many previous human civilisations and become extinct because we have failed to understand how to live in balance with our environment. Blühdorn and Welsh themselves argue that ecological progress is still possible, but that we must recognise the impact of the widespread and fundamental social changes of recent years, as well as the vastly unequal power structures that they have produced or reinforced, if this is to be possible. This may involve re-thinking aspects of political ecology, at the very least to make it more resistant to any future projects of capture by its opponents. It may also involve scepticism of some of the main Green NGOs and politicians, who have been too ready to compromise their ideals. These points are well-made and entirely logical.
That said, it is precisely the liberation aspects of the full ecologist perspective – on which there is more below - that makes it potentially of such great help in this context. Ecologism presents a different and more fulfilling way of living, enabling people to reappraise their lives and what they want from them. It requires a paradigm change, to be sure, but the rewards of this, both personal and societal, are significant. In a time of widespread disenchantment with conventional politics and ways of living, citizens may well look for different ideals despite the constant calls to self-medicate with so-called Reality TV and addictions of one sort or another. The familiarisation of environmental concerns whose banalisation Blühdorn and Welsh decry may yet serve to foster a different understanding of our place in the ecosphere, since at least it means citizens are aware of environmental degradation to an extent which was not the case a generation ago. It may prove significant that many grassroots ecologist movements are well aware of the problems set out by the ‘post-ecologists’ and are responding to them (Macy 2007). Indeed, many Green politicians are also sending the message that an ecologist turn in thought and ways of living is (remains) a positive act for a different way of life, not a reluctant accommodation with unwanted burdens and regulations (Lucas 2010). It may, then, be too soon to argue that, although their ideas have so far been of less popularity with decision-makers than those of so-called ecological modernisation, ecologists have no real chance of generating ideas which are fit for the task at hand or of causing a paradigm change in our economic and political, as well as psychological, perspectives.

I therefore turn to ecologism – the view that, as stated above, ‘a sustainable and fulfilling existence presupposes radical changes in our relationship with the non-human natural world, and in our mode of social and political life’ (Dobson 2006: 2) – as a means to ‘green’ EU studies. As a political movement and platform, ecologism requires a paradigm change, based on but adapting the principles of the Deep Ecology movement and philosophy. As an academic approach, I intend ‘greening EU studies’ similarly to draw on these principles. Table 1 sets out the principal components of Deep Ecology, as set out by its founder, Arne Næss.
Næss’s principles are explicitly set out as an engaged but revisable set of principles, capable of being harnessed to gradualism and iterated actions for change so long as the direction of travel is sound (i.e., towards deep ecology) (Næss 1989). For him, and indeed for others such as Fritz Schumacher (1989), ecological politics and economics require a spiritual and ideational shift: ‘Without a change of consciousness the ecological movement is experienced as a never-ending list of reminders: “shame, you mustn’t do that”, and “remember, you’re not allowed to...”’ (Næss 1989: 91). In this view, excessive urbanisation and the loss of human scale living have led not only to major social problems, but also to psychological ills. They have also disrupted our understanding as a species of how we are part of, and dependent upon, the planet upon which we live (Lovelock 2009). Moving towards a ‘green’ way of living in this view requires a long-term perspective, with a clear objective - living in dynamic equilibrium with the planet and its other life forms.12 Humans have the duty not only to put environmental degradation right, but to avoid it wherever possible, and to act as caretakers of the environment on behalf of other species which are not as sentient as we are but which nonetheless are of intrinsic value – and on whom we depend as co-inhabitants of the planetary ecosystem (Margulis 1998).

Ecologist economics gives centrality to the idea of ‘enough’ – material comfort rather than high consumption and continuous growth, which is considered impossible in a world of finite resources as well as ethically undesirable (Schumacher 1993). Markets can still be useful devices, but their usage must be placed within clear regulatory parameters focused on their service as means to help humans’ interaction in pursuit of meeting their needs, not their wants (Boyle and Simms 2009). Social concerns must take precedence over economic objectives, and social organisation must reflect balance with the environment, which in turn requires reduction in the global population of humanity as well as a shift in focus towards local trade and self-reliance wherever possible, and quality of life, not ‘standards of living’ (Scott Cato 2009).13 Ecological economists thus argue that economic policy must undergo a profound reorientation (Jackson 2009; Boyle and Simms 2009). It must be directed towards resource usage caps, resource reduction targets, the taxation of energy use, pollution and waste, a shift towards labour-intensive work rather than competition and labour productivity, the regulation of the economy rather than its liberalisation, the reduction of working hours, the replacement of GDP as the yardstick of economic success with
an alternative measure of prosperity (understood as quality of life, not simply material wealth), and limiting consumption by imposing high trading standards regarding ecological impact, durability and fair trade. The North will have to share its material wealth with the South, since the natural limits to economic growth mean that the ‘developing’ countries cannot emulate the industrial path to prosperity without global as well as local ecological catastrophe.

Below I set out what a thorough engagement with these ideas could bring to EU studies on three inter-related axes: for what might be called academic outreach, for substantive research in the field, and in terms of epistemology.

GREENING EU STUDIES

Academic Outreach

A first reason for EU studies scholars to engage with ecologism is to take the opportunity identified in the introduction to this article for new forms of engagement across disciplinary barriers, so that the successes of our field do not go unnoticed elsewhere. If we wish to influence debates in other disciplines or areas of enquiry, or more modestly to take part in debates concerning the biggest issues of our time, such as climate change, there is little chance of doing so successfully if we fail to keep ourselves up to date in this way; ecologist work, with its roots in both philosophy and Earth systems science, is a particularly good bridgehead in this regard. It would also mean that EU studies, in which social sciences dominate, could catch up not just with IR, but also with many of the humanities, in which attention to ecologism has been far more widespread; it would in addition ensure we do not get left behind by changing views of science, scientific method and, indeed, the world in which we live, which at present we seem as a professional community routinely to ignore. An ecologist turn in EU studies would also complement normative and critical scholars’ position in the field, fashioning new lenses with which to critique turbo-capitalism, and potentially building new links with, for example, moral philosophy (McLaughlin 1995) and feminism (Kelly 1994). Such moves would also allow us to engage more fruitfully with those from outside EU studies who look to the EU and its outputs as potential models or sources of learning on such issues as the reform of global governance (Held 2004) or even environmental policy (Eckersley 2004).
A second reason for an ecologist turn in EU studies is its potential to add an extra dimension to research in the field. Clearly, the kind of disciplinary outreach discussed immediately above would be likely to generate substantive new research in time; but it is possible even now to suggest areas of enquiry within EU studies which could benefit from engaging with ecologism. First, it would help scholars of EU environment policy understand policy limits and failures more fully, by incorporating a fuller set of norms and ideas against which to evaluate existing policy measures (Warleigh-Lack 2011; see also James Lovelock’s [2009] remarks on the Emissions Trading Scheme’s failures). Consequently, it could help move our understandings of sustainability into new, deeper territory, and facilitate the prescription of more rigorous policy advice as well as proposals for a more genuinely sustainable EU, responding to the call for such work from Kalypso Nicolaïdis (2010).

As a related point, by adopting an ecologist perspective, longstanding policy problems may be seen in a new light; environmental issues, for example, can no longer be regarded as problems ‘like any other’ rather than as of literally vital importance once this ideational step has been taken (Hovden 1999; Wapner 2010). Furthermore, a scientifically accurate understanding of our species’ place and role in the biosphere could generate fuller understandings of matters such as identity and shared interests beyond national borders, as well as our shared histories as a species (Primavesi 2001). Economics and relations with developing countries must certainly be reappraised in this light (Shiva 2005), with implications for research on everything from the single market to inter-regionalism and development aid.

Epistemology

An ecologist turn in EU studies would also introduce a fundamentally different, and new, set of epistemological concerns to the field. By invoking ecologists’ understandings of humanity as part of nature – and not separate from, or supreme over it – we would challenge both the anthropocentrism and the dualism (the separation of mind and matter, and also of humanity from the rest of nature) of dominant scholarship, looking instead at holist perspectives and systems approaches (Margulis 1999; Shiva 2005). Climate change, in this perspective, becomes not merely a threat but an opportunity to shift human thinking towards new, or at least different, norms
and forms of enquiry (Wapner 2010). Ecologism asks us, as scholars and as citizens, to start imagining new ways of living and organising ourselves, rather than focusing entirely on what we think there actually is, as if that was all that has ever been or could possibly be. In that regard, ecologism is clearly akin to the Idealist tradition in IR; and, building on the work that has been undertaken using Gaia Theory in IR (Litfin 2003, 2004), there is no obvious reason why EU studies could not build on her call for IR scholars ‘to reinvent the human at species level, with critical reflection, within the community of life systems, in a time-developmental context’ (Litfin 2003: 40).

Under an ecologist rubric, in fact, Western traditions of thought in general must be re-interrogated; both cutting-edge physics (Bennett 2010) and Eastern theology/philosophy (Macy 2007) are more in keeping with ecologist thought – not to mention emerging natural science - than orthodox Western philosophy and science. This matters in terms of epistemology because it reinforces the critique of materialism, to some extent in terms of philosophy, and utterly in its more everyday connotation of the economic growth fetish (Hamilton 2010). At the very least, ecologism asks us to revisit our behaviour and worldviews to reappraise what we consider the ‘costs’ and the ‘benefits’ of the choices we make (Næss 1989; Hovden 1999); in ecologist economics and political economy, for instance, the environmental consequences of an activity could make it acceptable or even obligatory, even if from a mainstream epistemology it would be rejected as ‘uneconomic’ (Schumacher 1993; Jackson 2009).

CONCLUSIONS

In this article I have argued in support of Ian Manners’ (2007) call for a greater range of voices and perspectives to be incorporated into the EU studies mainstream, using the particular case of ecologism as an example of the accuracy of his diagnosis regarding the need for greater diversity. I have set out the epistemological case for an evaluative approach to EU studies, and introduced ecologism as an example of a voice waiting to be heard in EU studies. However, I have also elaborated the core features of ecologism as my own call for a ‘green turn’ in EU studies. Such a turn is not envisaged as a totalising enterprise, but rather as one which could make a useful
contribution both to EU studies as it is currently constituted and to its future evolution. In this article, I have been able merely to shape the contours of such an evolution, but I hope nonetheless to have provided useful food for thought to scholars with an interest in the development of EU studies as a field of scholarly enquiry, epistemology, and environmental politics as well as ‘green’ political theory. If so, it will have resonated with Petra Kelly’s injunction to political activists, namely that the taking of small steps towards ecology-inspired change is productive, even if they appear subversive or utopian at first.

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Table 1: Arne Næss’ Principles of Deep Ecology

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<td>1.</td>
<td>All life on Earth has inherent value, regardless of its perceived usefulness for humans;</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>Biodiversity contributes to human and non-human flourishing;</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Humans must only reduce biodiversity in extremis and to satisfy vital needs;</td>
</tr>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Humans currently interfere too much with the natural world;</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Human population levels must decrease to allow for human and non-human flourishing in the long term;</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Basic economic, technological and ideological structures must be changed if humans are to improve their life conditions;</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>This requires us to value quality of life, not standard of living;</td>
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<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>All those who espouse the above principles must mobilise to secure social and economic change.</td>
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*Source:* adapted from Næss 1989: 29
Endnotes

1 I would like to thank the anonymous referee for his/her helpful feedback on the first draft of this article.

2 US-based EU studies scholars seeking tenure on the basis of publications in leading outlets such as the Journal of Common Market Studies will be as familiar with this problem as UK-based scholars in departments of, for instance, Politics or Economics, where such publications are not always considered to be as valuable currency as those in disciplinary journals when it comes to the Research Assessment Exercise (now the ‘Research Excellence Framework’).

3 Manners has himself worked on this issue with his call for a ‘Europaian studies’ (Manners 2003).

4 For a sympathetic critique of neofunctionalism and its potential as a source of ideas for contemporary EU studies, both meta-theoretically and empirically, see Rosamond 2005.

5 As I make clear below, however, I find Stoker’s term ‘evaluative theory’ more helpful, because it implies critique can come from a range of perspectives rather than just Marxist or post-structuralist positions – neither of which is intellectual territory I inhabit, although I have some sympathy for both perspectives.

6 Witness for instance the side-lining of David Mitrany in favour not only of EH Carr but of the latter’s approach to theory, which Mitrany found inherently unconvincing – ironically for good Popperian reasons concerning the possibility of ‘social science’ in Newtonian terms.

7 James Lovelock’s Gaia Theory, developed with Lynn Margulis, sees the biosphere as an interdependent, symbiotic system, in which life actively regulates its environment in order to sustain itself. Lovelock, a chemist, and Margulis, a microbiologist, were initially treated as on the lunatic fringe of their respective disciplines, but over time their views have become accepted in the mainstream. According to Gaia Theory, for any one currently-existing species – including our own – to survive in the long term, the planetary ecosystem must not be altered either too rapidly or too deeply, as either change defeats the system’s ability to self-regulate.

8 The debates between Gaia Theory (whose origins are in natural science) and Deep Ecology (whose origins are in moral philosophy) on the issue of high technology are a case in point.

9 For an examination of ecologism, environmentalism and their application to recent EU strategic economic development plans, see Warleigh-Lack 2011.


11 There are tensions between the proponents of Gaia Theory and those of Deep Ecology on several issues, including the spiritual dimension of ecology and the role of advanced technology in dealing with environmental problems. I do not deny these differences but a full appraisal of them is beyond the scope of this paper.

12 On the point of evolution versus revolution, ecologists are divided. Emphasising the personal as well as the social, Arne Naess (1989) sought social change as the cumulative result of activism by those who had awakened to his ‘deep ecology’ perspective, or at least to a worldview akin to it. James Lovelock, especially in his later writings, is deeply concerned about the impact of climate change upon the living Earth system he calls Gaia, and worries that as a species we may not have left ourselves enough time to adapt new thinking and ways of life before that system inadvertently wipes us out in its search for a new ecological balance, or homeostasis, to which we and many other species cannot adapt (Lovelock 2009).

13 For ecologists, self-reliance is different from self-sufficiency. It implies that trade beyond the locality can be desirable, but only when the good or service being sought is really necessary, and where it cannot be provided locally. It also implies that long-distance trade must be undertaken on a fair trade basis, balancing the needs and desires of the buyer with the need for a diverse local economy and good quality of life of the seller (Dobson 2006; Woodin and Lucas 2004).

14 For example, on ecology, the environment and IR see Lafferière and Stoett 1999; on theology and ecology see Primavesi 2001, Macy 2007.