Verifying Security Protocols: An Application of CSP.
Schneider, SA and Delicata, R (2004) Verifying Security Protocols: An Application of CSP. In: Communicating Sequential Processes: The First 25 Years, Symposium on the Occasion of 25 Years of CSP, 2004-07-07 - 2004-07-08, London.
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The field of protocol analysis is one area in which CSP has proven particularly successful, and several techniques have been proposed that use CSP to reason about security properties such as confidentiality and authentication. In this paper we describe one such approach, based on theorem-proving, that uses the idea of a rank function to establish the correctness of protocols. This description is motivated by the consideration of a simple, but flawed, authentication protocol. We show how a rank function analysis can be used to locate this flaw and prove that a modified version of the protocol is correct.
|Item Type:||Conference or Workshop Item (Conference Paper)|
|Divisions :||Faculty of Engineering and Physical Sciences > Computing Science|
|Identification Number :||https://doi.org/10.1007/11423348_14|
|Related URLs :|
|Additional Information :||Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005. The original publication is available at http://www.springerlink.com|
|Depositing User :||Symplectic Elements|
|Date Deposited :||14 Mar 2012 14:31|
|Last Modified :||23 Sep 2013 18:45|
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