Pret a Voter with Re-encryption Mixes
Ryan, PYA, Schneider, SA, Gollmann, D, Meier, J and Sabelfeld, A (2006) Pret a Voter with Re-encryption Mixes In: 11th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, 2006-09-18 - 2006-09-20, Hamburg, GERMANY.
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11863908_20
We present a number of enhancements to the voter veriable election scheme Pr^et a Voter [CRS05]. Firstly, we propose a mechanism for the distributed construction by a set of independent clerks of the ballot forms. This construction leads to proto-ballot forms with the candidate list encrypted and ensures that only a collusion of all the clerks could determine the cryptographic seeds or the onion/candidate list association. This eliminates the need to trust a single authority to keep this information secret. Furthermore, it allows the on-demand decryption and printing of the ballot forms, so eliminating chain of custody issues and the chain voting style attacks against encrypted receipt schemes identified in [RP05]. The ballot forms proposed here use ElGamal randomised encryption so enabling the use of re-encryption mixes for the anonymising tabulation phase in place of the decryption mixes. This has a number of advantages over the RSA decryption mixes used previously: tolerance against failure of any of the mix tellers, full mixing of terms over the Z*p space and enabling the mixes and audits to be fully independently rerun if necessary.
|Item Type:||Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||Science & Technology, Technology, Computer Science, Theory & Methods, Computer Science|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Engineering and Physical Sciences > Computing Science|
|Deposited By:||Symplectic Elements|
|Deposited On:||03 Oct 2011 16:10|
|Last Modified:||16 Feb 2013 14:52|
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