Formal Analysis of a Non-Repudiation Protocol.
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Schneider, S (1998) Formal Analysis of a Non-Repudiation Protocol. In: IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 1998-06-09 - 1998-06-11, Rockport, MA, USA.
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.1998.683155
Abstract
The paper applies the theory of communicating sequential processes (CSP) to the modelling and analysis of a non-repudiation protocol. Non-repudiation protocols differ from authentication and key-exchange protocols in that the participants require protection from each other, rather than from an external hostile agent. This means that the kinds of properties that are required of such a protocol, and the way it needs to be modelled to enable analysis, are different to the standard approaches taken to the more widely studied class of protocols and properties. A non-repudiation protocol proposed by Zhou and Gollmann (1996) is analysed within this framework, and this highlights some novel considerations that are required for this kind of protocol
| Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item (Paper) |
|---|---|
| Divisions: | Faculty of Engineering and Physical Sciences > Computing Science |
| ID Code: | 7213 |
| Deposited By: | Symplectic Elements |
| Deposited On: | 30 Sep 2011 15:15 |
| Last Modified: | 16 Feb 2013 16:10 |
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