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Formal Analysis of a Non-Repudiation Protocol.

Schneider, S (1998) Formal Analysis of a Non-Repudiation Protocol. In: IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 1998-06-09 - 1998-06-11, Rockport, MA, USA.

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Abstract

The paper applies the theory of communicating sequential processes (CSP) to the modelling and analysis of a non-repudiation protocol. Non-repudiation protocols differ from authentication and key-exchange protocols in that the participants require protection from each other, rather than from an external hostile agent. This means that the kinds of properties that are required of such a protocol, and the way it needs to be modelled to enable analysis, are different to the standard approaches taken to the more widely studied class of protocols and properties. A non-repudiation protocol proposed by Zhou and Gollmann (1996) is analysed within this framework, and this highlights some novel considerations that are required for this kind of protocol

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Divisions: Faculty of Engineering and Physical Sciences > Computing Science
Depositing User: Symplectic Elements
Date Deposited: 30 Sep 2011 14:15
Last Modified: 23 Sep 2013 18:45
URI: http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/7213

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