Board Structure and Executive Pay: Evidence from the UK
Guest, P (2010) Board Structure and Executive Pay: Evidence from the UK Cambridge Journal of Economics, 34 (6). pp. 1075-1096.
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We examine the impact of board structure on executive pay for 1,880 UK public firms over the period 1983–2002, using panel data analysis. First, the proportion of non-executive directors tends to decrease the rate of increase in executive pay whereas board size tends to increase it. Second, the proportion of non-executives strengthens the relation between the rate of increase in executive pay and changes in performance. In particular, although for firms in general the pay–performance link is much weaker when performance is poor, a higher proportion of non-executives strengthens this link considerably. Finally, firms that increase the number of nonexecutives in order to comply with the Cadbury Code of 1992, experience both a decline in the rate of increase in executive pay and an increase in pay–performance sensitivity.
|Divisions :||Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > Surrey Business School|
|Date :||30 December 2010|
|Identification Number :||https://doi.org/10.1093/cje/bep031|
|Depositing User :||Symplectic Elements|
|Date Deposited :||02 Apr 2014 10:16|
|Last Modified :||09 Jun 2014 13:57|
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