Abstract
I engage queer theory and the history of the intelligence quotient (IQ) movement in the United States here to re-imagine the critical nature of both projects. Early IQ researchers, such as Terman and Goddard, hypothesised that IQ was necessary for sexual morality and tested the hypothesis that prostitutes had lower IQ than other women. Terman was further concerned that gifted children not be ‘queer’ and appealed to a Freudian logic of sublimation to explain why children whom he deemed gifted sometimes engaged in homosexual acts. Intelligence testing is not simply a ‘disciplinary’ form of power/knowledge of the sort described by Foucault in Discipline and Punish; it is not oriented towards normalising ‘gifted’ people that it individualises. Rather, gifted people are made visible within a strategy of changing government to accommodate their difference from typical intelligence. This analysis of power suggests new ways of thinking about the intersectional politics of conservative rhetoric that relies on IQ testing, such as the book The Bell Curve.

Keywords: intelligence testing; queer theory; Michel Foucault; normalisation; intersectionality.

Introduction
In the early 1990s, the queering of theory was in full swing (see Turner, 2000 for a history). Activists and scholars in the humanities and social sciences increasingly recognised the impossibility of analysing modern life, thought and culture without making lesbian, gay and queer analyses central (see Abelove, Barale, & Halperin, 1993; Fuss, 1991; Warner, 1993, for representative collections). The multiple epistemologically fractured ways of defining the homo/heterosexual binary were realised as obligatory reference points for discussions of the modern condition (Sedgwick, 1990) and the ontology of gendered being (Butler, 1990). The recognition in the writings of an earlier generation of lesbian/gay historians that ‘sexuality’ and sexual identities were sociological, historical roles (Katz, 1976; McIntosh, 1968; Weeks, 1977), particularly in Foucault’s 1976 History of Sexuality: Volume 1 (Foucault, 1978), informed queer criticisms of early 1990s of the limits of identity politics and the radical potential of queer sex to transform personhood (e.g. Bersani, 1995). Queer people were centre stage, were avant-garde and were making theory over.

This special issue concerns the possibility of increasing the heretofore limited engagement between queer theory and psychology. Mindful of that ambitious and important [page 46] project, this article looks retrospectively on what now seems like a missed earlier possibility. I want to consider why queer theory never engaged with the intense debates in psychology and beyond about the meaning of intelligence quotient (IQ) testing occasioned by the publication of Herrnstein and Murray’s (1994) bestseller The Bell Curve. ‘There is no question that The Bell Curve was (and is) read as a book on race and intelligence’ (Gilman, 1996, p. 3). But the book was also more than that. Herrnstein and Murray (1994) repeatedly argued that the shift away from ‘middle class values’ occasioned by the sexual revolution of the late 1960s and 1970s has hurt, rather than empowered, the American poor, whom they deem to be a ‘cognitive underclass’.

As such, The Bell Curve might have been an object worthy of queer critique. One explanation of why it was not, might be found in Cathy Cohen’s (1997) own critique of queer theory. Grounded in a tradition of intersectional black feminist thought, Cohen
distinguished queer politics that attacks *straights* from that which attacks *heteronormativity*; ‘those localized practices and centralized institutions which legitimate and privilege heterosexuality and heterosexual relationships as fundamental and “natural” within society’ (Cohen, 1997, p. 440). Cohen’s unease about criticisms of straights by self-appointed ‘queers’ centred on the way that such critiques often fail to appreciate the implicit racial and classed ground on which critique can stand. By way of ‘a little history’ that to-be-straight is not necessarily the same thing as to-be-accepted-as-heteronormative, Cohen (1997, p. 453) reminded queer theorists that the prohibition of marriage between enslaved black men and women, that laws against interracial marriages aimed to preserve the white race from the taint of ‘racial mixing’, that Daniel Moynihan’s influential report on *The Negro Family* pathologised matriarchal black families and that the construction of poor and ethnic minority women as unable to control their sexual desires were ongoing.

*The Bell Curve* was a very transparent attack on the lives unsanctioned by heteronormativity that Cohen described. Indeed, Herrnstein and Murray’s (1994) conservative logic reads like a page ripped from Cohen’s little history. These authors argue that intelligence and divorce are linked, statistically, because “[b]right people are perhaps less likely to act on impulse when the marriage has problems, hence are less likely to divorce precipitously during the first years of marriage’ (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994, p. 174). Unmarried women who have children are more likely to be stupid because ‘the less intelligent a woman is, the more likely that she does not think ahead from sex to procreation, does not remember to use birth control, does not carefully consider when and under what circumstances she should have a child’ (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994, p. 179). And why is it accurate to think that women on welfare are likely to lack intelligence? ‘The smarter the woman is, the more likely she will be able to find a job, the more likely she will be able to line up other sources of support (from parents or the father of the child), and the more farsighted she is likely to be about the dangers of going on welfare’ (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994, pp. 193–194). If nothing else, *The Bell Curve* is a primer that you do not have to identify yourself as lesbian, gay, bisexual or queer to feel the ideological force of heteronormativity, worked through the scientific objectivism of American psychology.

Cohen wrote at a moment in American history after Newt Gingrich had become leader of the House of Congress and as assimilated gay and lesbian people were increasingly welcomed into the Republican party whereas poor women on welfare were increasingly targeted by the party’s ‘welfare reform’ policies (see also Cahill, 2005). Her little history urged a progressive politics of affinity in that context among very different people oppressed by interlocking ideologies of racism, sexism, heteronormativity and meritocracy. Although the scope of critical reaction to *The Bell Curve* was extremely broad (e.g. Fraser, 1995; Jacoby & Glauberman, 1995; Kincheloe, Steinberg, & Gresson, 1996), among the [page 47] collected criticism on *The Bell Curve* there is no substantive queer engagement with the work. Nor can I find any engagement with the book or the longer standing racial politics of IQ research in the texts that so definitively queered theory in the early 1990s.

And yet, an intersectional politics of the sort described by Cohen (1997) would have been clearly relevant to *The Bell Curve* wars. Who better than queer theorists – rooting out normalisation everywhere – to argue that going on welfare, having a child in your teens or having a large family rather than a college education might be situated smartness that *requires* intelligence to carry off? I suspect that this lacuna in queer critique misses more than a single debate about a single very bad book in the 1990s. Rather, critiques of the IQ testing movement have not substantively engaged the movement’s consistently conservative sexual politics. To begin to address this silence, in the first half of this article, I offer a little history of my own to remind us why IQ testing has *always* been about sexual restraint and ‘middle class values’. Through this ‘little history’ I want to argue for greater clarity in critical psychology and queer theory on our understanding of how ‘normalisation’ works in the modern psy- disciplines.
A little history, part 1: the stupidity of prostitutes
Herrnstein and Murray’s argument that intelligence is necessary for women to enact ‘middle class values’ is nothing new. Lewis Terman’s 1916 book The Measurement of Intelligence, which introduced the Stanford–Binet test of intelligence, has been rightly read as setting ‘the paradigm for virtually all the written versions that followed’ (Gould, 1981, p. 177), propelling Terman to fame and fortune (Fancher, 1985, p. 139) and marking ‘a fundamental divide in the American history of intelligence’ (Carson, 2006, p. 183). After Terman’s Measurement, ‘intelligence became the intelligence quotient for the pivotal generation of American psychologists who made ‘IQ’ a household term. However, it has always been easier to apply IQ tests than to define the ‘intelligence’ that IQ tests measure, as contemporary attempts at consensus illustrate (e.g. Neisser et al., 1996). Terman (1916, p. 44) relied on a ‘bottom-up’ empirical definition of intelligence; ‘no adequate definition can possibly be framed which is not based primarily on the symptoms empirically brought to light by the test method’. Terman may have been uncertain about the eventual object that empirical work would construct as intelligence. However, he was, by comparison, quite definite that intelligence had a clear relationship to morality. In explaining the chronic delinquency of the feebleminded, Terman argued:

Morality depends upon two things: (a) the ability to foresee and to weigh the possible consequences for self and others of different kinds of behavior; and (b) upon the willingness and capacity to exercise self-restraint. That there are many intelligent criminals is due to the fact that (a) may exist without (b). On the other hand, (b) presupposes (a). In other words, not all criminals are feebleminded, but all feebleminded are at least potential criminals. That every feeble-minded woman is a potential prostitute would hardly be disputed by any one. (Terman, 1916).

Contemporary psychologists may be surprised that Terman linked intelligence to morality, or that prostitution figured the relationship between feeblemindedness and crime. The way that the IQ testing movement has been historicised may contribute to the surprise. Although Carson (2006) has recently recognised that intelligence testing falls within a larger trajectory of American thought about the intellectual capacity necessary for good moral citizenship, most histories of the IQ movement emphasise the movement’s institutional [page 48] links with education and psychiatry (Chapman, 1990; Fancher, 1985) and its reliance on metaphors drawn from engineering and medicine (Brown, 1992). However, close relationships between IQ testing and eugenic movements illustrate how the control of reproduction was always bound up with the measurement of intelligence (Kevles, 1995; Kuhl, 1994). As more recent historical studies have emphasised, Terman was also a pivotal figure in the history of sexuality, who attempted to measure ‘masculinity–femininity’ as a means of detecting male homosexuality (Terman & Miles, 1936), wrote a book about marital happiness that argued that married women did not need to experience orgasm (Terman, Buttenwieser, Ferguson, Johnson, & Wilson, 1938) and wrote a damning critique of Kinsey, Pomeroy, and Martin’s (1948) Sexual Behavior in the Human Male (Terman, 1948; see Hegarty, 2007, forthcoming; Minton, 2003; Terry, 1999, for further discussion of Terman’s sex research).

To understand Terman’s statement about prostitution, it is important to realise that ‘expert’ men often used the term in a far broader sense than twenty-first-century readers might recognise (Lunbeck, 1987). In the early twentieth century, more young American women found themselves employed and living free from familial obligations in large cities than ever before. Prior to the emergence of a visible ‘girl problem’ created by respectable young middle-class women wanting to have sex with soldiers in World War I and the increased recognition of female sexual desire in the 1920s (Kinsey, Pomeroy, Martin, & Gebhard, 1953), the term ‘prostitute’ often served to police the degree to which such women could enjoy the freedoms opened up by urban life in the United States (Lunbeck, 1985).
In the years prior to the publication of Terman’s *Measurement*, several psychologists investigated the hypothesis that ‘prostitutes’ had lower IQ scores than other women. Henry Goddard pivotally first used the Binet test to detect ‘feeblemindedness’ in the Vineland School of New Jersey, which popularised eugenic ideas with his study of the Kalikak (Goddard, 1912) and mass tested the intelligence of European immigrants at Ellis Island (see Zenderland, 1998). From his early studies at Vineland, Goddard concluded that most ‘wayward girls’ were feebleminded and would be better housed in institutions than allowed to live morally disappointing lives outside of them. Goddard was aware that social conditions lead to prostitution, but failed to consider how anything other than low intelligence could precipitate a life of vice.

The world is full of people who have started out with as little capital in the way of education as can be imagined, and yet something within them has pushed them forward. Their inborn intelligence has enabled them to master the work of a trade and they have steadily forged to the front, so that it may well be contended that feeblemindedness is indirectly as well as directly the cause of much of the prostitution. And it is these weakminded, unintelligent girls who make the white slave traffic possible. Although it is true that now and then one is forcibly kidnapped and forced into this life under circumstances which no amount of intelligence could have controlled, a mere reading of an account often shows that the girl was lacking in intelligence or she could not have been entrapped in the way that she was (Goddard, *Feebleminded*, 1923, p. 14).

Revisions of the Binet scale were used similarly. The state of California’s policy of sterilisation looms large in the intersecting histories of the eugenics and IQ testing movements, but prior to World War I, the dominant approach to sexually active young women in California was one of containment rather than surgical normalisation (Kline, 2002). The Stanford–Binet IQ test found one of its first uses in the Sonoma State Home for the Feeble-Minded in California, where women were incarcerated with the goals of limiting their reproduction and protecting public morality. With the paediatrician William Lucas, Terman classified 825 women inmates at Sonoma as ‘idiots’, ‘imbeciles’ and ‘morons’ (Kline, 2002).

Finally, Terman could also draw on research initiated from inside women’s reform prisons. Katherine Davis (1860–1935) is best known to historians of sexuality for her later sex survey, an early demonstration of the normality of lesbianism and female masturbation (Davis, 1929, see Ericksen, 1999; Terry, 1999). As superintendent of Bedford Hills Reform Prison from 1900 to 1914, Davis encouraged reformers and scientists to make behavioural studies of the prisoners in her care. Jean Weidensall completed a book-length study of the prisoners’ psychology, concluding that the IQ scores of prostitutes were bimodally distributed; one group of prostitutes were of low intelligence, but another group were not (see Weidensall, 2009). Studies by both Goddard and Davis informed the Massachusetts ‘Commission for the Investigation of the White Slave Traffic, So Called’, which also concluded that about 51% of prostitutes suffered from mental defects which limited their moral culpability for their crimes (Freedman, 1981).

In short, there are long-standing intersections between the histories of the scientific constructions of ‘prostitutes’ and ‘feebleminded’ as made-up categories of people within the human sciences. Elizabeth Lunbeck (1995) has described how progressive era psychiatrists’ constructions of the ‘hypersexual’ woman who was unrepentant in her sexual desires lead less often to effective individual change than to psychiatric commentary on increasingly contested gender roles. Similarly, intelligence testing provided psychologists no practical solution to prostitution, but allowed a vehicle for expert commentary. Indeed, in many cases the urge to ontologise feeblemindedness and prostitution as casually related overran empirical commitments to the relationship between ‘intelligence’ and IQ scores themselves, as when Terman concluded that prostitutes were ordinarily feebleminded, whether their IQ
test scores revealed that feeblemindedness or not (Kline, 2002, p. 42). Thus, there is much precedent behind the seemingly compassionate – but savagely disempowering – conservatism of Herrnstein and Murray's (1994) paternalistic psychologisation of the link between intelligence and pregnancy before marriage. In both projects, intelligence is imagined as something that is required to contain impulsiveness and to enact middle-class morality, something that poor women cannot do. ‘How intelligent a woman is may interact with her impulsiveness, and hence her ability to exert self-discipline and restraint on her partner in order to avoid pregnancy’ (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994, p. 179).

IQ has been a means of underwriting pity and stigmatisation targeted at poor urban women and making women responsible for sexual morality for quite some time.

A little history II: smart Jews and queer genius
The politics of the IQ movement is not confined to the stigmatisation of those deemed too stupid to enjoy the freedoms of democracy with responsibility. Complicated political effects also follow from the ontologisation of a group as naturally smart. Or so Sander Gilman’s 1996 book Smart Jews argues, through examination of the implications of Herrnstein and Murray’s claim that ‘Ashkenazi Jews of European descent’ embody superior intelligence. Herrnstein and Murray take their lead from economist Miles Storfer (1990), who in turn locates himself within a tradition of intelligence testing that dates back to Terman. Storfer describes superior Jewish intelligence as a product of child-rearing practices, and hence as a model of human betterment for all. To support his claims about the smartness of Jews, Storfer lists Jewish Nobel Prize winners, classical musicians and chess masters. Gilman locates Storfer within a genre of post-Shoah interpretations of Jewish smart as the results of nurture rather than nature. [page 50]

Unlike many commentators, Gilman (1996) recognises that morality and values are the real object of The Bell Curve, and he argues convincingly that constructions of smart Jews have damaging anti-Semitic consequences. These consequences include the naturalising of oppression as a force that produces smartness through hardship and the marking of Jewish intelligence as derivative – verbal, imitative, crafty and deceitful – but devoid of any genuine spark of originality. Gilman concludes that discourses of intelligence privilege those of normal intelligence, ‘the thin ends [of the bell curve] define the problem – the “normal” center is understood as the model of intelligence and therefore also as the model of virtue’ (p. 4). Queer theorists have good reason to attend to Gilman’s arguments and history. He details how Jewish intelligence was constructed by Victorian authors as a compensation for manliness and physical vigour. When seen as problematic, superior Jewish intelligence became a projection of European intellectual’s ‘queerness’. Continuing an earlier theme (see Gilman, 1993), Gilman describes psychoanalysis as a smart response to this ontologisation. Critical psychologists should know that the history of European anti-Semitism continues to be used by some psychologists to explain difference in IQ scores between Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews in the modern state of Israel (Hanna & Lynn, 2008).

The ways that intellectuality and queerness signified each other in late nineteenth century, which Gilman describes, should inform the sense we make of books like The Bell Curve. Even queer theorists who – unlike Cohen (1997) – are fascinated only by the historical construction of the homo/heterosexual binary ought to know that Nordau’s Degeneration opens with the observation that degenerates are not always madmen but ‘are often authors and artists’ and repeatedly returns to Oscar Wilde as the embodiment of all that is wrong with genius. Early sexologists often called attention to ‘sexual invert’ in history such as da Vinci and Michelangelo to argue for the normality of sexual inversion (see, e.g., Ellis, 1936, p. 26). Freud’s (1910/1953) foundational psychobiography of Leonardo da Vinci is perhaps the most developed case study in this genre of historical writing about the queerness of intellectuals. Here, Freud re-worked the ‘great homosexuals in history’ strategy to describe Leonardo as possessed of a capacity for sublimation that psychoanalysis could not explain. Elsewhere, Freud described homosexual desire as the ideal object of sublimation (ref.
paranoia). As Alan Stewart (2003) notes, the hope of finding more famous ‘great homosexuals in history’ continues to incite essentialist histories. However, historians of psychology now have available a wider range of studies of the ways that the lives of bisexual, gay or lesbian human scientists such as Alfred Kinsey (Capshew, Adamson, Buchanan, Murray, & Wake, 2003), Harry Stack Sullivan (Hegarty, 2005), Charlotte Wolff and Magnus Hirschfeld (Brennan & Hegarty, 2009) or Jan Gay and Thomas Painter (Minton, 2003) have been written in different periods of psychology’s histories. The conditions under which writing about psychologists’ same-sex intimacies could be reconciled with narratives about their intellectual achievements have been, to say the least, unstable.

Intelligence testers, no less than historians of psychology, have struggled to narrate the lives of people who are smart and queer. Elsewhere I have followed Andrew Elfenbein’s (1998) intuition that the queer geniuses of the Victorian period continued to haunt the thought of twentieth-century psychologist Lewis Terman (Hegarty, 2007). Among the leaders of the IQ testing movement, Terman stands out for the singularity of his interest in the upper end of the intelligence distribution, and his work on gifted children is constituted by repeated statements that gifted children are anything but queer. Terman dissociated his views on the children he would ontologise as ‘gifted’ from his mentors to forward this view. He was well versed in ‘mad genius’ theories (Becker, 1978, see also Huertas, [page 51] 1993). In an early paper, written under G. Stanley Hall’s influence, Terman sought to normalise gifted children by naturalising the emergence of their intelligence (Terman, 1905). However, Terman also voiced a concern in this paper that intellectually precocious children might be most likely to fall under the strain of modern life, leading to such tragic outcomes as sexual inversion (see Hegarty, 2007). Terman (1915, pp. 534–535) directly confronted the question that Elfenbein thinks may have haunted him: ‘Are children of genius usually defective or queer?’ He responded, in the negative, describing 31 children who had scored above 125 on the Stanford–Binet IQ tests as having ‘favorable moral traits only’ and including only one child who was ‘sexually abnormal and vicious’. In The Measurement of Intelligence, Terman described the ‘mental and moral traits’ of gifted children in similarly glowing terms, such that ‘one is at a loss to understand how the popular superstitions about the “queerness” of bright children could have originated or survived’ (Terman, 1916, pp. 100–101).

Terman became more interested in homosexuality as the term became more available in the 1920s (Chauncey, 1994; Faderman, 1991). Rejecting Freudian accounts of heterosexual dynamics, Terman continued to espouse an Oedipal theory of homosexuality at least until the late 1930s (see Terman et al., 1938). Terman’s investment in the non-queerness of gifted children was most obviously troubled by his patronage and writing about the American composer Henry Cowell (1897–1965). Terman first met Henry Cowell in 1910, at which time Cowell earned a living as a janitor in a public school and by selling wild flowers to Stanford professors. The Stanford–Binet test assessed Cowell’s IQ at 132, which Terman considered an underestimate. At this point ‘Everyone considered Henry as queer, not to say freakish’ (Terman, 1921, pp. 248–249). Terman (1921, p. 251) predicted that ‘[i]f he obtains fame as a musician, his biographer is almost certain to describe his musical genius as natural and inevitable, and to ignore the scientist that he might have become’.

Thankfully, Michael Hicks has written a very different life for Henry Cowell who did, during the 1920s, become a pivotal figure in avant-garde American classical music (Hicks, 2002). Deeply influenced by his Bohemian mother Clarissa Dixon, and by the Halcyon community of theosophists in California, Cowell successfully crafted a persona in the 1920s which gave his avant-garde compositions the air of genius. Far from naturalising any musical genius that Cowell may have possessed, Hicks wrote a life in which Cowell is at work constructing the persona of a genius, and using a narrative centred on his precocious unschooled musical imagination to do so. Terman’s patronage became Cowell’s resource in this regard, and in 1926, Cowell described his mental process of composition in the American Journal of Psychology, in an article introduced by Terman (Cowell, 1926).
Terman may not have invested in Cowell’s genius so publicly had he known that Cowell narrowly avoided arrest for having sex with another man in 1922. In 1936, Cowell was arrested again for having sex with a young man (Hicks, 1991, pp. 44–45) and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. The spectre of the Victorian queer genius returned as Cowell, who was of Irish descent, was spectacularised in local media as ‘the Californian Oscar Wilde’. Ironically, Cowell was incarcerated in San Quentin prison, only a month before the publication of *Sex and Personality*, Terman and Miles’ (1936) book on the measurement of masculinity–femininity. *Sex and Personality* had validated the ‘masculinity–femininity’ test through its ability to detect the ‘passive male homosexuals’ interned in that same prison (Terman & Miles, 1936). Hicks (2002, p. 137) describes how Terman wrote a letter to attempt to secure a pardon for Cowell, suggesting that his homosexuality was a temporary aberration caused, in part, by his mother’s affection and his father’s absence. Although IQ testing and psychoanalysis are not closely allied forms of psychology, both it seems the status of genius to be vulnerable to the discovery of erotic origins, and both read genius as a sign that hetero-normalisation is likely to occur. [page 52]

The similarity between Freud’s Leonardo and Terman’s Cowell suggests that we might be dealing with a ‘discourse’ of queer intellectuality that cuts across seemingly distinct schools of psychological thought. Historians of psychology might accordingly ask queer theorists to add intelligent/stupid to the long list of modern dichotomies that Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (1990) described as structured by the homo/hetero binary (Sedgwick, 1990). This argument that intelligence and sexuality have been co-constructive could be developed much further. Consider how the conflation of masculinity with genius created anxieties about lesbian intellects (Gibson, 1998), the ‘variability hypothesis’ which led to repeated contests about the possibility of women psychologists engaging in genuinely creative scientific work (Shields, 1982), the ways that sex educators – unable to argue for the value of precocious development – looked with envy on the gains made by the early IQ movement (Moran, 2000) or the manner in which prejudices as to whether poor women were intelligent enough to use contraception figured the relationship between eugenicists and advocates of birth control (Hodgson, 1991). I have not touched on the discourses of the intellect and sexuality closer to our own time including the transformation of popular constructions of ‘nerds’ to include the displacement of political narratives of gay men and African American men (Kendall, 1999), the racially marked hypothesis that an excess of testosterone makes some men lower in IQ (Rushton & Jensen, 2005) or the racially unmarked hypothesis that testosterone is positively related to intelligence and a basis of small sex difference in IQ scores (e.g. Ellis & Shayamal, 2009).

**There is more than one kind of normativity**

I have not gone further in these directions because I wanted to return instead to Foucaultian discussions of ‘normalisation’. Consider again Gilman’s claim that ‘the thin ends [of the bell curve] define the problem – the “normal” center is understood as the model of intelligence and therefore also as the model of virtue’ (p. 4). Those familiar with Foucault’s *Discipline and Punish*, and the account of ‘normalisation’ contained therein, may feel comfortable with this statement. Foucault offered that ‘visibility is a trap’, a hypothesis which has particular relevance for psychologists. The historical shift from ‘sovereign power’ to ‘disciplinary power’ that Foucault described rendered powerless people, rather than powerful ones, more visible; ‘as power becomes more anonymous and more functional, those on whom it is exercised tend to be more strongly individualised’. Foucault sees the emergence of disciplinary power as constitutive of the history of psychology; ‘all the sciences, analyses or practices employing the root “psycho” – have their origins in this historical reversal of the procedures of individualization’ (Foucault, 1977, p. 193).

In *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1*, Foucault (1978) described the relationship between power and sex in modern cultures as organised by the production of knowledge, pleasures
and bodies, rather than by sexual repression. As Derek Hook (2003) notes, Foucault’s paradigmatic form of disciplinary power was the confessional, and disciplinary power was oriented towards curing, rehabilitating and intervening in the life of the deviant. ‘Normalization, simply put, is the ultimate goal and effect of disciplinary technologies’ (Hook, 2003, p. 611). Consequently, Foucault oriented a generation of historians of sexuality to think about modern Western secularisation in terms of ‘the procedures by which that will to knowledge regarding sex, which characterises the modern Occident, caused the rituals of confession to function with the norms of scientific regularity’ (p. 65). Foucault offered us five procedures by way of a description and explanation of that historical transformation: the clinical codification of sex, the endowment of sex with a causal power to cause just about anything, the requirement that sex require expert interpretation and expert interpreters and the medicalisation of the relationship between normal and abnormal sex (pp. 65–67). Later Foucault urged us to consider how this production has multiplied because of a ‘multiplication and intensification of pleasures connected to the production of the truth about sex’ (p. 71). If the relationship between normality, power and visibility were as consistent as this, then Gilman would be right to conclude that the ontologisation of some groups as strangely smart is necessarily abnormalising. Rose (1996) similarly takes IQ testing as exemplary of Foucaultian disciplinary power. However, when Terman was making up ‘gifted children’ he was transparently aiming not at their normalisation, and he averred the possibility that their intellectual precocity was won at the expense of their being ‘queer’. Rather, the construction of a category of gifted children, via IQ testing, suggested that educational systems must be changed to accommodate their deviance and not the reverse:

Children with 125 I.Q. or higher are able to progress at far more than the usual rate through the grades (often as rapidly as two or three grades in one year), that they need far less drill and explanation than other children, that in general they show few signs of abnormality in health and character traits, and that their needs cannot be met without extensive modification of the curriculum. (Terman & Chase, 1920, p. 405).

In other words, gifted children show us that the relationship between individualisation and normalisation in the psycho-disciplines is not as simple as Foucault hypothesised in Discipline and Punish. Far from inciting normalisation, gifted children were ontologised as abnormal paragons of moral virtue (Margolin, 1993), and the overall strategy was to shift the world to accommodate their strangeness, rather than to normalise that strangeness away. 395

The history of statistics can help to explain the omission in Foucaultian thought. As Ian Hacking (1990) notes, the Queteletian notion of normality of the 1830s, in which the atypical was to be feared as a source of social instability was supplemented by the eugenic discourses of Galton and his followers (see also Gigerenzer, Swijtink, Porter, Datson, Beatty, & Kruger, 1989). Inspired by the Darwinian idea that evolution works on natural variations, Galton individualised ideal types of person who would push forward the civilisation and the race, such as English scientists, politicians and businessmen (Galton, 1869). Eugenic discourse may have been less salient for Foucault than it needs to be for historians of American psychology. Testing became a way of configuring the hidden interior merit of people in the United States to a far greater degree than in France, where IQ testing originated (Carson, 2006).

Foucault’s later works on governmentality show an increasing awareness that forms of power and agency operate that are not well captured by the confessional model of power/knowledge presented in his earlier works (Hook, 2003). In the last chapter of History of Sexuality, Volume 1, Foucault (1978) briefly mentions eugenics when he argues that state power is exercised through ‘power over life’ in modernity rather than through the visible shedding of blood typical of the earlier monarchical era. ‘Power over life’ works not only on
the individual body, but also on the population, and sexuality became a crucial object of power because it links the two. Foucault is aware that clean lines cannot be drawn between these forms of power; he described the Marquis de Sade, eugenics, biological state racism and the Nazis as evidence that the disciplinary power – more commonly adherent to sexuality – has, on occasion, been organised around the symbolics of blood (Foucault, 1978, pp. 147–149).

I would like to suggest that the IQ testing movement is similarly invested in a strategy that draws on elements of ‘sovereign power’ as well as the disciplinary power that we have come to associate, through Foucault, with the psy-disciplines. Carson (2007) has meticulously traced how IQ testing is but one of several ideas that arose in Republican democracies to square the ideological circle between social inequality and egalitarian ideals. Properly speaking, Republicanism is not an ideology of equality but of natural inequality; Thomas Jefferson believed not that democracy would bring equal power to all, but that it would allow men of merit, the ‘natural aristocracy’, to come to rule over their fellows (Carson, 2007). To be sure, abnormalising anti-Semitism can work through the othering of Jewish smartness, and heteronormativity can work through the idealisation of the sublimation of homosexual desire into art. However, it is not the ontologisation of Jews and homosexuals as ‘smart’ that is disempowering, but the marking of each as strange kinds of smart people; ‘others’ who threaten to answer in the affirmative Terman’s question about the queerness of gifted people. Both the identity-based investments of Jews and queers in high intelligence, worked through a history of intellectuals, suggest that there is more to the politics of reifying a person or a group as highly intelligent than entrapment in disciplinary power.

Sander Gilman recognises as much when he notes that conservative opinion about intelligence testing is often an intensely self-serving and autobiographical genre of writing worthy of expose. When Storfer describes Jewish intelligence as manifested in the helping professions, Gilman (1996, p. 21) wonders ‘Is economist Miles J. Storfer, whatever his self-definition, himself possessed of Jewish superior intelligence by dint of his professional role in the “helping professions”? Elsewhere Gilman (1996, p. 30) notes that The Bell Curve’s major function is to plot Charles Murray onto the map of the conservative intellectual’. Such autobiographical references within works on IQ are not particular to The Bell Curve. Consider Terman’s (1917) account of Galton’s childhood IQ as just below 200. ‘The conclusion is of special interest in view of Galton’s place in the history of mental measurement’ (Terman & Chase, 1920, p. 404). Galton and Darwin’s cousinship has since reappeared as existence proof of Galton’s notion that true scientific greatness is inherited, and for Darwinian reasons (see, e.g., Simonton, 1999). Intelligence testing discourse expresses fantasies of sovereign power by those who deem themselves part of the ‘natural aristocracy’ or a ‘cognitive elite’ and who talk about themselves and each other, loudly, in the process.

Conclusion: what were the 1990s like?
Although I began this article with Cathy Cohen’s critique of queer theory, readers would be forgiven for thinking that this is a queer article about the IQ testing movement for its lack of engagement with the politics of race. At the end of History of Sexuality, Foucault invites us to imagine ourselves in the future looking back on an era where we no longer believe in ‘sexuality’. Ten years on from the millennium, are we at a point to similarly consign the racism of The Bell Curve to history? At the start of 1994, the best-selling nonfiction book on the New York Times’ list was conservative anti-intellectual radio talk-show host Rush Linbaugh’s See I told you so. In that same year, Newt Gingrich led his takeover of Congress, issuing the ‘contract with America’ which ended the welfare system. The Shawshank Redemption won the Academy Award for best film, beating out Quiz Show and Forrest Gump – two films that counterposed narratives about mass deception by seemingly
exceptionally clever, unmistakeably Jewish, people and a WASPish everyman whose stupidity is both his most salient characteristic and the basis of his moral superiority. In short, [page 55] this was not a period about which any historian could confidently claim that ‘the intelligence that IQ tests measure’ was an attribute that Americans held closer to their hearts than notions of traditional morality. Fears about differential intelligence could not have animated the conservatism of *The Bell Curve* on their own; sexual morality was a safer bugbear than stupidity against which to organise a conservative ideology of modern racism. Liberal psychologists’ critiques of *The Bell Curve* tended to assume that psychological racism really depended upon black students doing poorly in IQ tests. The irony of this debate is that it has us believe that something intelligent is being debated.

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**Notes on contributor**
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**References**


