Breaking a chaos-noise-based secure communication scheme
Li, SJ, Álvarez, G, Chen, GR and Mou, XQ (2005) Breaking a chaos-noise-based secure communication scheme Chaos, 15 (1), 013703.
Chaos2005.pdf - Accepted version Manuscript
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This paper studies the security of a secure communication scheme based on two discrete-time intermittently chaotic systems synchronized via a common random driving signal. Some security defects of the scheme are revealed: 1) The key space can be remarkably reduced; 2) the decryption is insensitive to the mismatch of the secret key; 3) the key-generation process is insecure against known/chosen-plaintext attacks. The first two defects mean that the scheme is not secure enough against brute-force attacks, and the third one means that an attacker can easily break the cryptosystem by approximately estimating the secret key once he has a chance to access a fragment of the generated keystream. Yet it remains to be clarified if intermittent chaos could be used for designing secure chaotic cryptosystems.
|Divisions :||Faculty of Engineering and Physical Sciences > Computing Science|
|Identification Number :||https://doi.org/10.1063/1.1856711|
|Related URLs :|
|Additional Information :||
Copyright 2005 American Institute of Physics. This article may be downloaded for personal use only. Any other use requires prior permission of the author and the American Institute of Physics.
The following article appeared in Chaos, 15 (1) 013703 and may be found at S. J. Li et al., Chaos 15, 013703 (2005)
|Depositing User :||Symplectic Elements|
|Date Deposited :||02 May 2012 13:20|
|Last Modified :||23 Sep 2013 19:26|
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