Return-map cryptanalysis revisited
Li, SJ, Chen, G and Álvarez, G (2006) Return-map cryptanalysis revisited International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos, 16 (5). pp. 1557-1568.
Available under License : See the attached licence file.
As a powerful cryptanalysis tool, the method of return-map attacks can be used to extract secret messages masked by chaos in secure communication schemes. Recently, a simple defensive mechanism was presented to enhance the security of chaotic parameter modulation schemes against return-map attacks. Two techniques are combined in the proposed defensive mechanism: multistep parameter modulation and alternative driving of two different transmitter variables. This paper re-studies the security of this proposed defensive mechanism against return-map attacks, and points out that the security was much over-estimated in the original publication for both ciphertext-only attack and known/chosen-plaintext attacks. It is found that a deterministic relationship exists between the shape of the return map and the modulated parameter, and that such a relationship can be used to dramatically enhance return-map attacks thereby making them quite easy to break the defensive mechanism.
|Divisions :||Faculty of Engineering and Physical Sciences > Computing Science|
|Identification Number :||https://doi.org/10.1142/S0218127406015507|
|Related URLs :|
|Additional Information :||This is an electronic version of an article published as International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos, Volume 16, Issue 5, 2006, pp 1557-1568 DOI: 10.1142/S0218127406015507 © World Scientific Publishing Company. http://www.worldscinet.com/ijbc/ijbc.shtml|
|Depositing User :||Symplectic Elements|
|Date Deposited :||12 Jun 2012 09:41|
|Last Modified :||23 Sep 2013 19:26|
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