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Lobbies, delegation and the under-investment problem in regulation

Evans, J, Levine, P and Trillas, F (2008) Lobbies, delegation and the under-investment problem in regulation INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 26 (1). pp. 17-40.

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Item Type: Article
Divisions : Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > School of Economics
Authors :
Evans, J
Levine, P
Trillas, F
Date : 1 January 2008
DOI : 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.09.003
Uncontrolled Keywords : Social Sciences, Economics, Business & Economics, ECONOMICS, under-investment, political equilibrium, capture, delegation, MONETARY-POLICY, COMMITMENT, TRANSPARENCY, CREDIBILITY, COMPETITION, FIRMS
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Additional Information : NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in International Journal of Industrial Organization. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in International Journal of Industrial Organization, 26 (1), January 2008, DOI 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.09.003.
Depositing User : Symplectic Elements
Date Deposited : 16 May 2012 20:14
Last Modified : 31 Oct 2017 14:32

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