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Lobbies, delegation and the under-investment problem in regulation

Evans, J, Levine, P and Trillas, F (2008) Lobbies, delegation and the under-investment problem in regulation INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 26 (1). 17 - 40. ISSN 0167-7187

2006_DP20-06.pdf - Accepted Version
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Item Type: Article
Additional Information: NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in International Journal of Industrial Organization. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in International Journal of Industrial Organization, 26 (1), January 2008, DOI 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.09.003.
Uncontrolled Keywords: Social Sciences, Economics, Business & Economics, ECONOMICS, under-investment, political equilibrium, capture, delegation, MONETARY-POLICY, COMMITMENT, TRANSPARENCY, CREDIBILITY, COMPETITION, FIRMS
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Divisions: Faculty of Business, Economics and Law > Economics
Depositing User: Symplectic Elements
Date Deposited: 16 May 2012 20:14
Last Modified: 17 Jan 2015 14:46

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