Lobbies, delegation and the under-investment problem in regulation
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Evans, J, Levine, P and Trillas, F (2008) Lobbies, delegation and the under-investment problem in regulation INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 26 (1). 17 - 40. ISSN 0167-7187
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.09.003
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in International Journal of Industrial Organization. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in International Journal of Industrial Organization, 26 (1), January 2008, DOI 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.09.003. |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Social Sciences, Economics, Business & Economics, under-investment, political equilibrium, capture, delegation, MONETARY-POLICY, COMMITMENT, TRANSPARENCY, CREDIBILITY, COMPETITION, FIRMS |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Business, Economics and Law > Economics |
| ID Code: | 430867 |
| Deposited By: | Symplectic Elements |
| Deposited On: | 16 May 2012 21:14 |
| Last Modified: | 13 Jun 2013 14:43 |
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