Optimal pricing of court services
Rickman, N and Tzavara, D (2005) Optimal pricing of court services European Journal of Law and Economics, 20 (1). pp. 31-41.
Available under License : See the attached licence file.
Litigants are generally charged for using court services. The charges involved are usually set to achieve a combination of efficiency, equity and funding goals. This paper presents a simple model, based on regulated monopoly pricing, to address the question of how these charges should be set. We find that fixed fees generally form part of the optimal charging package, despite concerns about their regressive nature. Per-unit fees will also be used though they may be set below cost; in this case, a trade-off emerges and the fixed fee is used to achieve funding goals. Our model is a useful one for developing extensions from the nonlinear pricing literature. © 2005 Springer Science + Business Media, Inc.
|Divisions :||Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > School of Economics|
|Date :||July 2005|
|Identification Number :||https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-005-1013-1|
|Additional Information :||The original publication is available at: http://www.springerlink.com|
|Depositing User :||Symplectic Elements|
|Date Deposited :||22 Jun 2012 08:33|
|Last Modified :||23 Sep 2013 19:22|
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