Favouritism and financial incentives: A natural experiment
Rickman, N and Witt, R (2008) Favouritism and financial incentives: A natural experiment ECONOMICA, 75 (298). 296 - 309. ISSN 0013-0427
Football 2Oct2006.pdf - Accepted Version
Available under License : See the attached licence file.
Principals who exercise favouritism towards certain agents may harm those who are not so favoured. We address this issue in the context of a natural experiment from English soccer. We study the effects of professional referees on a common measure of referee bias: length of injury time in close matches. We find that referees exercised a degree of favouritism prior to professionalism but not afterwards, having controlled for selection and soccer-wide effects. We also discuss the suitability of the variable that we, and others, use to measure favouritism, noting that alternative interpretations may be possible.
|Additional Information:||This is an electronic version of an Article published in Economica, 75 (298), 296-309, May 2008. The definitive version is available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||HOME ADVANTAGE, FAVORITISM, SPORT, BIAS, COST|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Business, Economics and Law > Economics|
|Depositing User:||Symplectic Elements|
|Date Deposited:||19 Apr 2012 11:26|
|Last Modified:||23 Sep 2013 19:22|
Actions (login required)
Downloads per month over past year