Favouritism and financial incentives: A natural experiment
Rickman, N and Witt, R (2008) Favouritism and financial incentives: A natural experiment Economica, 75 (298). pp. 296-309.
Football 2Oct2006.pdf - Accepted version Manuscript
Available under License : See the attached licence file.
Principals who exercise favouritism towards certain agents may harm those who are not so favoured. We address this issue in the context of a natural experiment from English soccer. We study the effects of professional referees on a common measure of referee bias: length of injury time in close matches. We find that referees exercised a degree of favouritism prior to professionalism but not afterwards, having controlled for selection and soccer-wide effects. We also discuss the suitability of the variable that we, and others, use to measure favouritism, noting that alternative interpretations may be possible.
|Divisions :||Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > School of Economics|
|Date :||May 2008|
|Identification Number :||https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0335.2007.00605.x|
|Uncontrolled Keywords :||HOME ADVANTAGE, FAVORITISM, SPORT, BIAS, COST|
|Additional Information :||This is an electronic version of an Article published in Economica, 75 (298), 296-309, May 2008. The definitive version is available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.|
|Depositing User :||Symplectic Elements|
|Date Deposited :||19 Apr 2012 11:26|
|Last Modified :||09 Jun 2014 13:36|
Actions (login required)
Downloads per month over past year