R&D Collaboration Networks in Mixed Oligopoly
Zikos, V (2010) R&D Collaboration Networks in Mixed Oligopoly Southern Economic Journal, 77 (1). pp. 189-212.
We develop a model of endogenous network formation in order to examine the incentives for R&D collaboration in a mixed oligopoly. Our analysis reveals that the complete network, where each firm collaborates with all others, is uniquely stable. When R&D subsidies are not available, in addition to the complete network, the private partial and the private-hub star networks are Pareto efficient. However, the complete network becomes the unique Pareto efficient network when R&D is subsidized. This result is in contrast with earlier contributions in private oligopoly where under strong market rivalry a conflict between stable and efficient networks is likely to occur. It also highlights the role of a public firm as policy instrument in aligning individual incentives for collaboration with the objective of efficiency, independently of whether R&D subsidies are provided by the regulator.
|Divisions :||Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > School of Economics|
|Date :||1 July 2010|
|Identification Number :||https://doi.org/10.4284/sej.2010.77.1.189|
|Depositing User :||Symplectic Elements|
|Date Deposited :||09 Jul 2012 12:46|
|Last Modified :||09 Jun 2014 13:18|
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