Conflict, Growth and Welfare: Can Increasing Property Rights Really be Counterproductive?
Alptekin, A and Levine, P (2009) Conflict, Growth and Welfare: Can Increasing Property Rights Really be Counterproductive? Discussion Paper.
Available under License : See the attached licence file.
Gonzalez (2007), JET, 137(1), 127-139, sets out a growth model with con- flict in which households allocate their resources across consumption, and investment in both productive and unproductive capital. A striking result is obtained: there are circumstances where increasing property rights in society can actually reduce social welfare and hence incremental changes are not nec- essarily in peoples’ interests. This note reassesses this claim in a generalized form of his model with a CRRA utility function (with a risk aversion param- eter, sigma > 1 rather than his logarithmic form) and we assume a less than full depreciation of capital. Both these generalizations prove to be critical ones that significantly change the result.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Discussion Paper)|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Business, Economics and Law > Economics|
|Depositing User:||Symplectic Elements|
|Date Deposited:||20 Apr 2012 11:52|
|Last Modified:||23 Sep 2013 19:22|
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