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Natural implementation with partially honest agents

Lombardi, M and Naoki Yoshihara, (2012) Natural implementation with partially honest agents Discussion Paper.

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Abstract

The paper proposes necessary and sufficient conditions for the natural implementation of (efficient) social choice correspondences (SCCs) in pure finite exchange economies when some of the agents are partially honest. A partially honest agent is an agent who strictly prefers to tell the truth when lying has no better material consequences for her. Firstly, it is shown that if there is even one partially honest agent in the economy (and the planner does not know her identity), then any SCC is Nash implementable by a natural price-allocation mechanism. Secondly, and in sharp contrast with the results of conventional models of natural implementation, it is shown that the equivalence relationship between natural price-allocation mechanisms and natural price-quantity² mechanisms no longer holds. Finally, and even more strikingly, the paper reports that the class of implementable SCCs by natural price-quantity mechanisms is significantly enlarged.

Item Type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Divisions : Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > School of Economics
Authors :
AuthorsEmailORCID
Lombardi, MUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Naoki Yoshihara, UNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Date : 1 February 2012
Related URLs :
Depositing User : Symplectic Elements
Date Deposited : 28 Mar 2017 14:41
Last Modified : 28 Mar 2017 14:41
URI: http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/427923

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