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Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: Strategy space reduction

Lombardi, M (2012) Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: Strategy space reduction Review of Economic Design, pendin. ISSN 1434-4742

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Abstract

Benoît and Ok (2008) show that in a society with at least three agents any weakly unanimous social choice correspondence (SCC) is Maskin's monotonic if and only if it is Nash-implementable via a simple stochastic mechanism (Benoît-Ok's Theorem). This paper fully identifies the class of weakly unanimous SCCs that are Nash-implementable via a simple stochastic mechanism endowed with Saijo's message space specification (Saijo, 1988). It is shown that this class of SCCs is equivalent to the class of SCCs that are Nash-implementable via Benoît-Ok's Theorem.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: The original publication is available at: http://www.springerlink.com
Divisions: Faculty of Business, Economics and Law > Economics
Depositing User: Symplectic Elements
Date Deposited: 21 Jun 2012 13:45
Last Modified: 13 Sep 2014 01:40
URI: http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/427920

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