Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: Strategy space reduction
Lombardi, M (2012) Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: Strategy space reduction Review of Economic Design, pendin. ISSN 1434-4742
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Benoît and Ok (2008) show that in a society with at least three agents any weakly unanimous social choice correspondence (SCC) is Maskin's monotonic if and only if it is Nash-implementable via a simple stochastic mechanism (Benoît-Ok's Theorem). This paper fully identifies the class of weakly unanimous SCCs that are Nash-implementable via a simple stochastic mechanism endowed with Saijo's message space specification (Saijo, 1988). It is shown that this class of SCCs is equivalent to the class of SCCs that are Nash-implementable via Benoît-Ok's Theorem.
|Additional Information:||The original publication is available at: http://www.springerlink.com|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Business, Economics and Law > Economics|
|Depositing User:||Symplectic Elements|
|Date Deposited:||21 Jun 2012 13:45|
|Last Modified:||09 Jun 2014 13:18|
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