Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: Strategy space reduction
Tools
Tools
Tools
Lombardi, M (2012) Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: Strategy space reduction Review of Economic Design, pending . ISSN 1434-4742
![[img]](/style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png)
| PDF (licence) 32Kb | |
| PDF Available under License : See the attached licence file. 149Kb |
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10058-012-0117-7
Abstract
Benoît and Ok (2008) show that in a society with at least three agents any weakly unanimous social choice correspondence (SCC) is Maskin's monotonic if and only if it is Nash-implementable via a simple stochastic mechanism (Benoît-Ok's Theorem). This paper fully identifies the class of weakly unanimous SCCs that are Nash-implementable via a simple stochastic mechanism endowed with Saijo's message space specification (Saijo, 1988). It is shown that this class of SCCs is equivalent to the class of SCCs that are Nash-implementable via Benoît-Ok's Theorem.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | The original publication is available at: http://www.springerlink.com |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Business, Economics and Law > Economics |
| ID Code: | 427920 |
| Deposited By: | Symplectic Elements |
| Deposited On: | 21 Jun 2012 14:45 |
| Last Modified: | 24 Jan 2013 09:34 |
Document Downloads
Repository Staff Only: item control page