INTRODUCTION

This paper reviews a remarkable experiment in organisation. At the centre of the story is James G. (Jim) March, one of the most influential scholars in management and organisation studies over the last half century. He is best known for his work on organizational decision-making, though he has published in the fields of politics, economics, psychology, sociology, leadership and organization studies. From 1954 to 1964, March was a leading member of the Graduate School of Administration (GSIA) at the Carnegie Institute of Technology. GSIA was a truly exceptional group of scholars from various disciplines, led by the remarkable and prodigious Herbert Simon. In 1964, March was already an academic ‘star’ - even though we was just 36 years old - when he left his position as Professor of Industrial Administration and Psychology in the Department of Psychology at GSIA to become Dean of the School of Social Sciences in the new Irvine campus of the University of California, which, at that time, had not yet enrolled any students.

This was a period of intense political debate about inter alia, radical societal change, the nature of the University, the organisation of academic work, the Vietnam War, and the direction of American society. In this fluid context, March articulated a clear vision for the new School. First, he wanted it to be interdisciplinary. Second, March incorporated a large amount of mandatory mathematics and statistics in the new undergraduate programmes, on the basis that mathematics provided perhaps the only common language that could span the disciplines. In particular, March advocated the mathematical modelling of social behaviour. Fourth, in line with the wider interest in contrarianism and anarchy, March’s vision was that the division should be “conspicuously experimental and innovative”.

This paper provides a detailed processual account of the organisational experiment from the inception of March’s vision to its demise. It draws on interviews with many of the main players - including James March, Jean Lave, Duncan Luce, Arnie Binder, William Schonfeld, Mike Cole, William Sharpe, Charles Lave, Julian Feldman, Michael Cohen, Kim Romney and John Payne, correspondence with others, and a detailed analysis of secondary and archival material. The story is interesting for the following reasons. First, since March is such an influential figure in management and organization studies, it’s worth inquiring into the immediate context out of which the ideas associated with him emerged. Second, this is a case of a keen and skilled student of organization getting involved in setting up, running, studying, playing with and leading an organization. This was an interesting and early case where the ‘manager’/‘leader’ is a knowledgeable manager leader, as indeed, to a lesser extent, were those who are being led/managed. Many contemporary organizations are akin to this in that they are populated with people who have studied organizations. We could say it’s an early and extreme case of this phenomenon. Third, it describes an unusual attempt to escape from and work with the powers of an institution. It is a case study of creativity, work, power and play.

This paper just tells the story, based on my research, and for now I will avoid imposing a theoretical frame on the story, though it is surely open to a number of theoretical interpretations.
SITUATING THE VISION

March’s vision was of its time, and therefore we will begin the story by setting the context for the Irvine experiment (‘Irvine’ refers to School of Social Sciences rather than the broader university, which in some ways was also an experiment)

The Educational Context

Immediately before, during and after the Second World War a significant number of European scholars migrated to the United States shifting the balance of scholarly power and purpose. After the Manhattan project, it became clear in the United States that university research had played a vital role in the war effort and that universities were more than simply teaching institutions. The evidence was that ‘scientific’ research had delivered in spades during the war, creating, what March referred to as, “post-World War 2 enthusiasms in social and behavioural science”. Those enthusiasms, “relative to other times [both earlier and later], were strongly interdisciplinary, were strongly quantitative, strongly ‘scientific’” [Jim March]. Thus the Irvine approach merely “reflected …the dominant beliefs of a dominant group of social behavioural scientists at the time” [JM]. These beliefs were articulated by those social scientists who were members of the National Academy of Science, the Social Science Research Council, the Centre for Advanced Study into Behavioural Sciences (CASBS), founded in 1954 in Palo Alto, and the RAND Corporation.

March was well-known within this “relatively small community” [JM]; many of them had contributed to the Handbook of Organizations (March, 1965) which he edited and to the Handbook of Social Psychology (Lindzey, 1956) see March (2007b: 12-13) for development). Earlier institutes and centres also fostered inter-disciplinarity even if they did not share the post-war enthusiasm for mathematical analysis of social phenomena. Particularly influential were Yale’s Institute of Human Relations, founded in 1929 around the idea of having physical and social scientists working closely together, and Harvard’s Department of Social Relations, another innovative, inter-disciplinary collaboration between three social science departments, set up in 1946. Yale was important, not least because March obtained a PhD in political science from Yale in 1953 (for details on March’s time in Yale, see Augier and March (Augier and Kreiner, 2000)). Mike Cole, an early recruit, also came from Yale and for him it “was a more or less faithful attempt in continuining [the] sort of inter-disciplinary social science research” pioneered in Yale. That institute, which was the first of its kind in the U.S., was founded by two of Yale’s deans, Robert Hutchins of the Law School and Milton Winternitz of the medical school, who subsequently led the Institute. Winternitz was a strong, brilliant and eccentric scholar, and perhaps a role model for March himself (Spiro, 2001). To some of his colleagues he was brilliant, bold, and a ‘steam engine in pants,’ and to others he was an insufferable ‘martinet,’ a Napoleon, and an anti-Semite (http://yalemedicine.yale.edu/ym_au01/capsule1.htm ). The Institute was effectively defunct by the time Winternitz retired in 1950.

1 CASBS was one of a number of institutes modeled on the Institute for Advanced Study (IAS) founded in Princeton in 1930 as a postdoctoral research institute. The stated purpose of IAS was to foster the free pursuit of learning “to the utmost degree that the facilities of the institution and the ability and faculty of the students will permit”. The idea - which was inspired by All Souls College at Oxford, the Collège de France in Paris, and Humboldt’s concept of a research university - was that intellectual exchange across disciplinary boundaries, the sine qua non for excellent research, could be achieved if disciplinary experts were collocated in a small community. Other institutes that subsequently modeled themselves on IAS include the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences (19xx), the National Humanities Centre (1979), the Institute for Advanced Study Berlin (1980), the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences (1985), the Collegium Budapest (1992), the International Institute for Advanced Studies in the Kansai Culture and Science City, and more recent entities such as the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study and MIT Media Labs. Common to all of these institutes, and to the School of Social Sciences in Irvine, was a commitment to creating a space for the free exchange of ideas, where scholarly serendipity, curiosity and contrariness would be respected and fostered.

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Harvard’s Department of Social Relations was another interdisciplinary collaboration, this time among three of Harvard’s social science departments (anthropology, psychology, and sociology). Kim Romney, who moved to Irvine in 1966, had trained in Harvard’s Department of Social Relations and saw clear parallels between the three experiments in inter-disciplinarity in Harvard, Yale and Irvine. March saw Harvard as a ‘different kind of thing’, probably because it lacked a commitment to mathematical analysis. Set up in 1946 by Talcott Parsons, it disaggregated into its component departments in 1972. In Romney’s view, “there has been no permanent successful experiment to have a multi-disciplinary social science programme anywhere in the world that lasted more than 20 years.” Harvard’s Department of Social Relations “lasted about 20 years after the original enthusiasm of the original organizers [Talcott Parsons and Gordon Allport]. Those people, when they got to retirement time or died, then Harvard reverted back to straight departments. The experiment here [in Irvine]… lasted roughly twenty years. It was inevitable that it would become departmentalized” [K.Romney]

The RAND Corporation, located in Santa Monica, just 50 miles north of UC-Irvine, was another inter-disciplinary institute of note at the time and it shared and manifest some of the same enthusiasms for ‘big science’, mathematical economics, mathematical modelling, systems analysis and operations research that also engaged March, Simon, and others. For instance, Bill Sharpe observed that “you could call Jim March an operations research guy, in some senses”. Julian Feldman, who joined Irvine soon after March and who, with March, was a central figure in hiring new faculty, had done consulting work for System Development Corporation, a military consulting offshoot of RAND, as had other faculty in Irvine (e.g. Arnie Binder, Kathleen Bell and Bill Sharpe), while Herbert Simon had spent some summers working there during the 1950s.

But probably the biggest influence on Irvine was the Graduate School of Industrial Administration (GSIA) at the Carnegie Institute of Technology in Pittsburg, which, from 1954 to 1964, was an extraordinary hotbed of ideas and research. The group was led by Herbert Simon, a true polymath who is now recognised as a founding father of many scientific domains including artificial intelligence, information processing, decision-making, complexity theory and computer simulation. As well as Simon and March, the GSIA group included Richard Cyert, who went on to become President of Carnegie-Mellon University, Abraham Charnes, William Cooper, and Charles Holt whose work shaped the development of operations research, John Muth and Robert Lucas, whose ideas underpin rational expectations economics, Oliver Williamson, who pioneered transaction cost economics (and received the Nobel Prize for Economics in 2009), William Starbuck, who subsequently became a leader in management and organisational studies (editing ASQ at the age of 32), Victor Vroom, who develop the expectancy theory of motivation, Edward Prescott, who began his work on the driving forces behind business cycles, Edwin Mansfield who pioneered the study of the economics of technology and innovation, Franco Modigliani, who formulated influential theories in corporate finance and on savings in the economy, Richard Nelson, who published seminal work on evolutionary theories in economics, and Edward Feigenbaum, who developed one of the first computer models of how people learn. Remarkably, six of the GSIA group - which fluctuated in number from 30 in 1955 to about 50 in 1964 - subsequently received Nobel Prizes in Economics (Lucas, Miller, Modigliani, Prescott, Simon and Williamson), 10 were elected to the US Academy of Sciences (including March) and 15 were elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (again including March).

GSIA also provided the model, rationale and method for a new form of Business School, founded on, on the one hand, a strong commitment to research (which emphasised deductive reasoning and

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See (Augier and Prietula, 2007) for a good description of the emergence of GSIA, while see (Augier and March, 2001; 2002; 2004) for descriptions of Simon and his varied activities in GSIA. Tadajewski (2009) presents an insightful description of how Cold War sensibilities affected the School and how, in particular, the term ‘behavioural science’ emerged as a more palatable alternative to ‘social science’, which, to some, had more than a whiff of socialism. See (March, 2007a) for a discussion of the longer term impact of GSIA.
mathematical modelling) and, on the other, a commitment to teaching through the case-method, which had already developed at Harvard Business School. Curiously, the case method is essentially an inductive epistemology, while mathematical modelling is more of a deductive epistemology. For a good articulation of Simon's position see his influential article The business school: A problem in organizational design (Simon, 1967).

A final important factor in the educational context was the large imbalance between the demand for university education, which increased rapidly after the Second World War partly due to the G.I. Bill - and the supply of faculty, which, of necessity, is difficult to increase quickly.

**The University of California at Irvine**

UC Irvine was appealing to March, not least because the whole University of California system was at that time going through an “explicit attempt to experiment with some new forms or state sponsored higher education” [Bill Sharpe]. For instance, UC-Riverside implemented the idea of mass-producing liberal arts graduates, and they also tried new pedagogical approaches such as taking different disciplinary perspectives on a single subject within the one course. UC-Santa Cruz modeled itself on Oxford, having small, residential colleges where students would not receive grades.

These experiments were partly in line with the fashion of the time, probably harking back to the 19th century fascination with utopian communities. They were relatively low-risk as well because the rapid growth in the population of California during the 1950s was putting pressure on the administrators of higher education to quickly increase the capacity in the system. In 1958, Clark Kerr, then President of the University of California, produced a landmark Master Plan for Higher Education in California which identified UC as the State’s research institution which would be expanded by building four new campuses, one of which was to become UC-Irvine. Things moved rapidly after that (see *Instant University* by the historian Sam McCulloch for further details on these developments (McCulloch, 1996)). In 1961 L.E. Cox (47) was appointed UCI’s first Vice Chancellor for Business & Finance and in January 1962 Kerr appointed Daniel Aldrich (44) as Chancellor. Within months Aldrich had appointed Ivan Hinderaker (46) as VC of Academic Affairs and he quickly published “A Provisional Academic Plan” that set out the academic strategy for the new campus. A key element in this strategy was to recruit a mix of senior and junior faculty, in contrast to UC-Riverside where mainly junior faculty were hired at the beginning. [something about purchase of site and how barren it was]

In early 1963 a UC Senate Committee visited eight English universities, both new and old, and produced an influential report supporting the proposition that the University of California should do novel, imaginative things in higher education.

Aldrich’s strategy was that UC-Irvine should be a general rather than a specialized campus. By July 1964 he had appointed six deans, all under 48, overseeing the following divisions: Biological Sciences; Letters & Science; Humanities; Social Sciences; Fine Arts; and the Graduate School of Administration. Soon after these appointments Hinderaker moved to Riverside, and Jack Peltason, who had been appointed Dean of Letters & Science, took over as VC for Academic Affairs, which meant that there was no Dean of the College of Letters & Science.

Partly because the university was growing so fast, and partly because there was no Dean of Arts & Letters, and partly because of the personalities involved, UCI came to be, in Feldman’s words, a “collection of baronies”, where each of the divisions “pretty much worked on their own with relatively little regard for the others”. In practice, and notwithstanding the fashion for inter-disciplinarity, there wasn’t much interest in inter-disciplinary activities across the campus, though March did collaborate with Fred Tonge, director of Irvine’s computer facility. (In 1965, they succeeded in obtaining a grant from Carnegie Corporation to develop new models of student instruction in the social sciences.)
The national context
The instability within the University of California system was symptomatic of wider socio-political upheavals of the time, which centred around US foreign policy, especially US involvement in the Vietnam war which was escalating in the early 1960s, the Civil Rights Movement (the Civil Rights Act was passed in 1964), and a resurgent Feminist Movement (the contraceptive pill was legalised in 1961), and a turn to alternative understandings of the human condition (the Esalen Institute opened in California in 1962), and a popularisation of radical (often Marxist) critiques of society and social science. There was also, at the time, an emerging hostility towards organization. For instance, the Free Speech Movement in the 1960s often cited Paul Goodman, who attacked the ‘organized system’ proferring a utopian anarchist alternative (Goodman, 1960), while C Wright Mill’s *The Power Elite* was also hugely influential (Mills, 1957). And while March was in Irvine new movements emerged, such as the post-structuralist, post-modern worldview and the romantic enthusiasm for ‘flower power’ and other countercultures.

THE SCHOOL UNDER MARCH (1964-69)

Jim March
The central figure in this whole story is undoubtedly Jim March. March received his BA and MA from the University of Wisconsin in 1950 and his PhD from Yale in 1953. His academic output is prodigious including 21 books, eight books of poetry, two films and fourteen honorary doctorates. His most famous books include *Organizations* (with Herbert Simon (1958)) *The Behavioural Theory of the Firm* (with Richard Cyert (1963)). His most widely cited article is *Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning* (March, 1991) and his ‘garbage can’ article with Mike Cohen and Jonah Olsen (Cohen et al., 1972) which have 6223 and 3736 citations in Google Scholar, respectively (July 2010). It is difficult to identify his most important contribution because his work is so varied, but he is probably most famous for concepts such as ‘bounded rationality’, decision-making in conditions of high ambiguity, his ‘garbage can’ model of decision-making, and his distinction between exploration and exploitation.

March was a strong, extremely intelligent, charismatic individual, as the following selection of quotations illustrate.

“Jim was really charismatic…. He’s a remarkable guy” [Bill Sharpe]

“If you met Jim March you’d know that he can be an exciting guy, and he communicated that to the students” [John Payne]

“Volney [Stefflre] and Jim knew more about everything than any of us did” [Charles Lave].

“I still consider him one of the most creative brilliant academics I have ever known” [John Payne].

Even Arnie Binder, who March classed as a “loser” and “particularly disaffected”, reckoned that March “is one of the nicest, most honourable men...He was a strong dean. He was a strong individual. I say this over and over again, because it’s important since I say so many negative things. Never unpleasant. My animosity is not to him as a person - he’s a very decent, nice man - but in terms of his inflexibility, that, maybe more than anything else, I resented. His inflexibility. Because I had such brilliant ideas that he rejected!” [Arnie Binder]

While March sought to manage “unobtrusively”, he well recognised the central position he played in the experiment: “I think some people would describe it as a benevolent despoticy [sic]!”

March moves to Irvine
The GSIA group was breaking up in the early 1960s and Irvine offered March a new challenge. When Ivan Hinderaker asked March why he agreed to come to Irvine, March replied: “I like to see the dirt fly”. Julian Feldman’s recollection is that “we weren’t quite sure why March left that environment”, though he speculated that March and his wife had taken a liking to California after he had spent some time at the CASBS in Palo Alto
In November 1963, just before he joined Irvine, March wrote a letter to Hinderaker in which he set out his vision. The Division (the unit was initially called a Division, before it became a School some years later) “should be conspicuously experimental and innovative” with the burden of proof “shifted to the existing system. I think there should be major innovations with respect to curricula in the social sciences, instructional methods, academic organization, and staffing policies. The social science division should be viewed as an experimental laboratory rather than as primarily a production facility.” His second point was that specialization should be by problem areas rather than by traditional academic disciplines, with growth coming through pursuing new specialities “rather than by mimicry of standard views on what is subsumed under the terms ‘psychology’, ‘sociology’”. In short, “faculty should [have] substantial disrespect for traditional disciplinary identifications”. Third, March’s vision that that the division should become a “leader in the application of modern techniques for empirical investigation and theory building”, which meant that the “social sciences should be heavily laced with mathematics, statistics and computer methodology”. Finally, March was of the view that the division has to take some risks. “There is no serious possibility of becoming a major institution with a conservative strategy”.

From the other archive material and the interviews, it’s clear that March very much followed through on these plans that he set out in 1963. Interestingly, March didn’t spend much time worrying about the graduate program which “didn’t seem to me to be a significant matter” (March interview with McCulloch, March 1973).

Forming the Group

March’s first appointment, in 1964, was Julian Feldman (34), who had been one of his graduate students in GSIA. Feldman had graduated from GSIA in 1959, joining the faculty in the business school in Berkeley. He was an expert on the computer simulation of human thought and decision-making, and, with Edward Feigenbaum, he had just published *Computers and Thought*, the first collection of articles about artificial intelligence. Feldman and March took responsibility for the initial round of appointments.

While Hinderaker had hoped that March would follow a traditional approach, March was insistent that the Division of Social Sciences would have no departments because he saw this as necessary if the Division was to be truly inter-disciplinary and innovative. He was also against using disciplinary titles for programmes or positions: “And so we created these fancy titles. I had something like “Associate Professor of Psychology and Economics or something like that. He [March] was a Professor or Political Science and Sociology. Between the two of us we were covering four disciplines” [JFeldman].

The first group of students were due to arrive in the Fall of 1965, so March and Feldman hired about fifteen faculty during that year, including Kathleen Archibald, Duran Bell, Inga Bell, Isabel Birnbaum, John Boyd, Myron Braunstein, Gordon Fielding, Barbara Foley, Lewis (Creel) Froman, Joseph Hart, Sheen Kassouf, Alan Miller, Deane Nuebauer, Karl Radov, and Martin Shapiro. Most of these were in their early 20s and still hadn’t completed their dissertations. 287 students registered with the School of Social Sciences in the Fall of 1965, including 13 graduate students. Even though a departmental structure was not in place, the records shows that the students registered to the following disciplines: anthropology (9), economics (39), geography (1), political science (83), psychology (61), sociology (30), social sciences (44), undecided (7). In 1966, a further 375 students registered, of which 20 were graduate students. More new staff were appointed including, Arnie Binder, Charles Cnudde, Lyman Drake, Alan Gross, Mary Key, Jerry Kirk, Charlie Lave, Jean Lave, Duane Metzger, Volney Stefflre, and John Wallace.

This was a remarkable burst of hiring. While Hinderaker’s plan was that each Division should hire a mix of senior and junior staff, March followed the Riverside model by hiring mainly junior faculty, for perhaps understandable reasons. As William Schonfeld, who joined in 1970 recalls: “Nothing was here. I mean, these were empty fields; cows were running around, the freeways didn’t exist. The question was, who would you get to get involved in the adventure?” In practice, virtually
all the new hires were junior people: “There were a lot of young junior people, energetic..” (the average age of the faculty in 1966 was just 26, with five women in the faculty of 30, which was unheard of at that time). Feldman wasn’t sure why Irvine didn’t attract more senior faculty, but he did speculate that the decision not to have departments may have been counter-productive in this respect: “I think that getting senior people fell apart because of the lack of structure. I don’t know.”

March’s “other point was that the only way to be distinctive was to do something radically different; that you could never attract the really good people here if you just did things the way everybody else did them” [Arnie Binder]. March made this explicit in a strategy report (November 1968) to Aldrich: “it seems clear to us that our basic strategy should be to exploit our special competences, to develop national preeminence in areas that have not been developed at the major institutions and to innovate in new curricula, new procedures, and new organization”. Elsewhere he made the hiring strategy explicit: “Our guiding principle in acquiring future faculty will be to appoint people whose area of specialization are particularly conducive to interdisciplinary effort”.

Here’s March’s retrospective take on these hirings:

“We discovered fairly early on that hiring into Irvine, first class, first rank people was extremely hard. We tried, but they mostly preferred to be at Harvard, Chicago or Berkeley or some place like that. I think mostly our basic strategy was to hire young people and to try to be ahead of the market and to take risks – to hire people who had a distinctive interest in playing with ideas; hard to tell, we didn’t have very good testing devices for that, so basically we said we’re going to run a strategy in which we’ll have more failures that successes, but our successes will look pretty good.

DK: It was a strategy of letting many flowers bloom?

JM: Many flowers bloom, but we tried to have standards – flowers that don’t bloom well, you weed out. But I think we were a little less successful in doing that. That was the strategy at least”

Another issue he mentions in a 1973 interview is that the UC system was inflexible in terms of the salaries that could be offered (in contrast to the Stanford, Harvard and Yale systems which separates decisions with respect to a person’s rank from decisions with respect to a person’s salary). As a result, March was unable to attract the “top 10 or the top 20 in their field” because while he could offer a professorship he wasn’t able, much to his frustration, to offer a high enough salary. (The archives include a very strongly worded letter from March to Hinderaker, dated January 1964, in which he complains about the inflexibility of the UC system in terms of salary).

William Schonfeld took a more political take on the hiring strategy, observing:

“There are two reasons you can surround yourself with people who can’t challenge you. One reason is you’re trying to get the others [senior faculty] and you just can’t quite recruit them. But the other is you don’t really try to recruit them and you want to have a dramatic difference between you and the rest because that allows you to carry out your experiment in a more unhindered fashion. Since I wasn’t here, I don’t know which of those interpretations is correct.” But Schonfeld is unambiguous in his opinion that: “some of the people hired were absolutely outstanding. And some of the people were the absolute mirror image of being absolutely outstanding.”

The hiring process was unusual, even for the time, and certainly in retrospect. “All appointment and promotion cases went before a committee that consisted of all the faculty in social science, and there weren’t that many then, plus the senior [non-academic] staff members. They participated in that evaluation which was completely unheard of anywhere” [C Lave]. Some student representatives were also on these appointment and promotion committees, including Michael Cohen, who joined as a graduate student in 1966 and subsequently co-authored a book with March. But neither was it an truly egalitarian system: “[March] was interested in making changes and doing things differently but probably not interested in being a long time administrator/manager. Some people thought (and I think it was true) that he was not as much of a democrat as some faculty
people would like to have - certainly not in terms of consulting people on a point. He pushed through some appointments with less than a majority endorsement” [JFeldman].

The hiring criterion was relatively straightforward but, in retrospect, unusual: “‘Was this person interesting?’ And I think clearly the dominant story was ‘we don’t care whether you have the same kind of ideas as we have, as long as we can find your ideas interesting’” [J March]. Almost inevitably this eclecticism created an very high level of variety: “as it developed it turned out to be a number of people who I would now describe as social constructivists, a number of people who turned out to be relatively pure mathematical modelers. There were some people who became committed ethnographers, and you are talking about a range - someone like Bill Sharpe at one end was creative and a little bit different, but a financial economist, and then you have people like Duane Metzger and Jean Lave at the other end and who were fairly creative, constructivists, post modern anthrogroupists.” [JM].

Kim Romney, who joined in 1968, opinioned that the variety that emerged was probably intentional: “I don’t know whether he made it explicit or not but I think that he also wanted variety. High variance. You wouldn’t have people coming out of the same mould.”

William Schonfeld now takes a somewhat jaundiced view of some of the hiring practices: “The way the search committees were constructed - now, I don’t know if March did it quite that way or not - the Dean appointed the Chair, announced the committee, and anyone who wanted to joined and came to the meetings. One of the early ‘March people’, a fellow named Harvey Sacks, who did something called conversational analysis, was an ethnomethodologist. He came to these meetings, he was trained as a sociologist and early on one day he comes into a meeting and he announces, “I have found someone absolutely spectacular!” I, in my era of raving naivety, asks Harvey, “tell us something about the person?”, so he says, “He’s just marvellous! He lives in a caravan!” So I said, “ok, tell us something else”. And Harvey said, “I don’t know anything else. But isn’t that wonderful!!” The idea that you have someone who either was getting a Ph.D or had a Ph.D and was living in a caravan, made them perfect as a recruit, knowing nothing else about them. That’s high variance from standard practise”.

Bill Sharpe, who joined in 1968, gives a faculty perspective on why it was attractive: “Certainly I went there - as others - on the ground of Jim’s goals, which were to make it in the image of Jim’s work which was rigorous, academic, creative and innovative…Jim’s a brilliant guy, a lot of charisma”.

In 1967, Julian Feldman went on sabbatical for a year, and when he returned he was appointed Chair in Information & Computer Science, which meant he was no longer in the Social Sciences Division. In March’s opinion, both Feldman and Binder ended up being “particularly disaffected” [email from March to Author, August 2004].

Creating the Curriculum

Notwithstanding March’s hope that “faculty should [have] substantial disrespect for traditional disciplinary identifications”, the faculty in the 1965/66 catalogue have conventional titles, e.g. Kathleen Archibald was Acting Assistant Professor of Sociology, Duran Bell was Assistant Professor of Economics, and courses were offered in disciplines such as anthropology, economics, geography, political science, psychology and sociology. The catalogue says that the programs will focus on the systematic empirical observation and quantitative analysis of human behavior” and it emphasises the use of computers, the application of mathematics to social sciences, and the continued refinement of techniques of inquiry. The focus and rationale for the school is clear from this extract from the first catalogue:

“Important new problems confront society; and social scientists have a responsibility to assist in the development of solutions to these problems. A rapidly changing technology, the pathologies of a population explosion and urban concentration, the thrust of once underdeveloped societies, the creeping master of disease, the strains of race relations, the tempestuous marriage of men and
machines in problem solving, endemic crises in international affairs, lagging or explosive economic growth, political instability, and explorations of space provide social scientists with an extraordinary list of unsolved problems and opportunities.”

The catalogue shows the central position given to mathematics in the curriculum (see Table 1).

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Table 1: Curriculum extracted from 1965-66 Catalogue.

The mathematics requirement imposed on all social science undergraduates was “most unusual”, according to Arnie Binder, while Julian Feldman perceived that the requirements in computer programming, mathematics and statistics were “controversial”. Consistent with the fashion of the time, maths was perceived to offer a universal language on which inquiry could and indeed had to be based, but it also “acts as a screening device for improving the calibre of students who are attracted to the social sciences. So far, we seem to be very successful at discouraging anti-scientific humanists but only partially successful at attracting potential scientists, who now go into physics, chemistry and math” [memo from March to Aldrich, 1968]. This maths requirement was somewhat at odds with the hiring strategy: “March hired a lot of people who were not mathematically inclined so [the maths requirement] was never…I mean it was held more as a value than as a practise” [Kim Romney].

Another most unusual feature was the notion of just offering one degree, and not offering degrees in subjects such as psychology or economics.

An important, memorable and influential pedagogical innovation was the “Introduction to Analysis” course taught by March and many of the other staff. Initially, March wanted all of the faculty to contribute to the course, but many of them were so inexperienced that the took the course with the students. Here, Mike Cohen - who took the course as a student - describes it.

“The centrepiece of all that was a course called Social Science 1. March did a lot of the lectures - in the early years he did them all; a number of the faculty did them. The course was taken by all of the students, the undergraduates and graduates all had to take it. I think in the early years the faculty also took it. I recall the very early years; the faculty ran the sections of the courses so basically they were taking it with the students. Then March & Lave produced the text book for it [(Lave and March, 1975)]. The text book was also used in high schools. A beautiful course. When
I got to Michigan, I built a course around the text book. It was taught up until a few years ago with a reproduction of the book. Certainly the most beautiful course on thinking about social life - it had a huge effect on me – a way of thinking.

**DK – what was unique about it?**

It managed to convey a creative attitude and aesthetic criteria and a commitment to simultaneously holding multiple perspective on phenomena and I think that’s great training for social science and life. You ended up getting a strong feeling on the course that life is always more complicated than your ideas about it, but your ideas can still be useful and illuminating even though they're not perfectly right.”

Bill Sharpe was one of the faculty who sat in on the course and describes it thus.

“Jim had a required course, which everybody had to take, which was in effect models and social science. I audited that. It was brilliant. He did things like marriage, he had a contagion model; he took not just economic issues, but a series of applications, and in each case a model thereof. There was a lot of angst. He’d get these kids, who took it in their sophomore year; they were do-gooders, the social science majors, they were going to go out and save the world. He made them look at each of these problems with models, some equations, some graphs, maybe a computer programme. I can’t remember. There was a lot of no, no, no; this is not how you do social science. I don’t know if the students liked it.”

William Schonfeld, who arrived in 1970 and was Dean from 1982 to 2002 was of the opinion that “By 1970 that was just another course like every other course”.

At the graduate level, Mike Cohen explains the procedure: “The basis way the graduate teaching programme was explained to students was when you get together three faculties who agree you should get a PhD, you get it, period. There were a few more rules than that, but it was basically a customised degree plan where you choose a committee. If you weren’t getting along with some of the people, you could change the membership. It was up to the students to get the committee together.”

William Schonfeld sees this more negatively:

“No for some people this worked marvellously well. Michael Cohen who was an early graduate student, he’s at Michigan now, was a case in point of someone who prospered under this kind of system. Most students admitted into the system became totally lost. I think much the same is true at the undergraduate level, where there were a few very bright gifted students who found the capacity to circle among the faculty, do lots of independent studies, to be a very positive experience. But the bulk of students, for example, basic introductory courses in the separate disciplines were not allowed, students were told to read a text book and were then given a multiple choice exam to take. A student decided whether he or she, without any faculty sense as to how you put together a programme of study. A very gifted student might put together an innovative new programme of study, but a lot of them just fell through the cracks.”

The following extract from 1967/68 Catalogue gives a flavour of the pedagogical philosophy:

“The Division of Social Sciences has no great confidence in a college education that consists solely in regular attendance and grades in a specified list of courses, each lasting some multiple of one quarter. As a result, ‘courses’ in the Division do not always resemble the conventional university course either in content or in format. Enrolment in a course is simply a commitment on the part of a student that he will educate himself (with such faculty assistance as is required).

When the education is complete, the course is complete. Thus, a student may obtain credit through examination for any course in the Division for which he is otherwise eligible”.

The Division emphasized educational innovation, experimenting with variable-length courses, content-indeterminate seminars, self-instructional introductory materials, accelerated courses in
mathematics for social scientists, critical incident evaluation procedures, and extensive use of qualification through competence examination. The archives include detailed reports on such things as whether learning is as good in large as in small classes, on the relationship between a student’s Grade Point Average and post-college success, on the factors that correlate with GPA, on the effects of College environments on students, etc. The 1969-70 Catalogue summarises the philosophy: “Undergraduate and graduate education in the School of Social Sciences at UCI involve participation in an experiment. The program, faculty and students differ substantially from conventional counterparts elsewhere” (p. 115).

One notable initiative that emerged at the time was the ‘farm school’. Michael Butler was interested in alternate forms of education and so he started an elementary school cum pre-school on an old farm on campus. It was “a Programme B kind of a thing …there was this experiment that was right on campus, an alternative education” [M Cole].

The School also ran a commune from 1968-69, probably the only commune on a state university. In many ways, the commune (also known as the farm) was a symbol and reflection of the School and what it might become. March describes it well:

“It was a charming sort of illustration of the problems of romantics in the real world. I think to a large extent I was their buffer, between them and the world, and they managed to survive.

Absolutely. One of the conspicuous things was they could never solve the governance problem. They could never figure that out. You wanted a system in which no one told anyone what to do, but on the other hand you wanted the garbage taken out, and they just never got around to figuring out that. Periodically I would get a phone call saying, essentially, ‘Don’t tell anyone I called, but could you please fix this?’ So I would pick up the garbage.

DK – Was that to do with the commune or more broadly to do with the school?

In some sense, more broadly it was to do with the school. The commune, of course was the symbol of all of that. I saw my role in large part as a buffer and, not that I could do it very well, but I tried. It’s a fairly common role for somebody. For me, it was fairly easy to talk to the local military, when they got upset about things, try to calm them down; talk to the local townspeople, when they got upset, calm them down; talk to the chancellor when he got upset. That was my role. It varied in size, we didn’t have membership lists, I think the maximum was 80 or so. They built their own houses, shacks I suppose. Some of my best stories were stories about trying to give them agronomy help – they fancied themselves being gardeners but they came from a background they didn’t know anything about gardening or farming. I as a good mid-Westerner had more knowledge about growing corn than they did. I closed it down as one of my last acts as Dean

DK: Why?

Because I didn’t think I should leave that as a problem for my successor. The people that were involved were not connected to the university. They were hangers on in one way or another. The university people who were involved evolved it to a little different structure - they started a school [the farm school]. I think in retrospect it was time to close it down because there was not very much outcry or resistance. The people in it were not socially or politically adept; there were innocents – to be pushed around by me or by others, as long they didn’t trigger a deep ideologically strain. They were injured people. They hated protection. Things had run their course by that time.”

Organized Anarchy

In his 1963 letter to Hinderaker, March highlighted what he saw as the problem with the usual model of academic organizations. “Academic organizations ordinarily combine inflexible central control with irrelevant local initiative. First, the structure is usually exceptionally rigid. The
departments are substantially unchanging over time; they are the same from one university to the another. As a result, subunits tend to become inviolate, individual faculty members tend to be linked with a specific subunit in perpetuity, and the university as a whole becomes a loose alliance of migratory workers. Second, typical academic organization overuses ‘legislative’ techniques for decision making; it underuses staffwork, consultation and executive decision making.”

In implementing an alternative, de-differentiated mode of organizing, “March had set it up so that there was far more equality among faculty, students and staff than in most universities” [Kim Romney]. He clearly emphasised socialization among the faculty. In particular, the (non-academic) staff played a much more important role than was the norm in other universities, with some informants observing how “unique” [Romney] it was to have staff, students and faculty socializing together. Kim Romney reflects on the unique position of staff in contrast to other institutions at the time and in contrast to the current situation: “One of the things that I thought was almost unique when I first got here was that it came as a complete shock to me because, at both Stanford and Harvard, staff were people who worked for you. They were not ever brought in or consulted, and they are no longer consulted about anything here….They were invited to all of the meetings. And had a big impact. And their ideas were reflected and they also served as go-betweens and communicators, not only to faculty and staff but to graduate students and students. The circle was complete”.

In many ways it worked, especially in the early days. Romney again:

“people met in the very beginning, in each others homes as well as in different places on campus. That included groups from different disciplines, who really tried to get joint research going. I would say that for a period of up to 5 years there was hope that that would make a breakthrough to new kinds of research and collaboration. Not unlike what happened in the Harvard Social Relations that I saw the early days of”

The eschewal of formal structure did give the appearance of chaos. According to William Schonfeld (who only arrived in 1970 so his perception shouldn’t be extended back into the 1960s), “the only rule was, there are no rules”, though Mike Cole, who arrived in 1967, says something similar: “There were no rules, and it was as close to a blank slate in an institution as you’re ever going to find.” In his interview, Arnie Binder emphasized the notion of disorganization: “‘disorganization’ was a word that was used permanently…it meant that we were certainly never going to have departments here, above all; that we’re never going to assign offices according to discipline. So you have to have the psychologists here and anthropologists in the next office, and so forth, and the interactions had to be so that there were no organizations by disciplinary focus above all… if they moved in a direction of what some would call ‘responsible organization’, he [March] would oppose it.”.

Mike Cole recalls that “There was a lot of probably illegal relations between students and teachers, there was a lot of drug use, and a lot of alcohol abuse was going on…There were affairs between faculty, between couples on faculty, and between faculty and students. So you had these different things that would make it seem chaotic.”

“part of the disorganization was that it seemed like, you know what you’re against but you don’t know what you’re for. Literally we would go in on Saturday to see what the hell we were going to do on Monday. And we would do that quite regularly” [M Cole].

Of course, there were rules, not least the rules of the university regarding tenure, which became very real for some of the staff in 1968-69. And March himself didn’t agree with the proposition that the School was rule-less:

“JM: Rule-less would not be quite right. We had some fairly strict rules. Obviously we viewed the University of California as having a whole bunch of procedures that got in our way, and we were arrogant enough to think that, by and large, we were being ruled by colleagues who were not of the quality equal to ours.
DK: Was this arrogance justified?

Probably not. The University of California is a wonderful institution; but there is an awful lot of mediocrity in it.”

March’s suspicion of the academic status quo did not extend to rejecting academic principles of rigour, critical thinking, and scholarship. In particular, he and Volney Stefflre, another charismatic figure in the group, consistently attacked the use of jargon, emphasising the importance of clear thinking and communication. March identified Martin Shapiro as another key person in the group: “[he] was a very tough-minded, hard-edged student of law and politics. He had no tolerance of the student political radicals, no tolerance of the playful intellectual gamesmanship, but was a very important intellectual person to have around.” Mike Cole remembers when Harvey Sachs “gave a talk about how social life is organized around the “not saying” of things. After he talked…Jean Lave got up and gave us all a break and said ‘I’ve been sitting here for an hour and a half and so far you haven’t said anything at all. Are you planning to say anything in the next hour or so because if you’re not I have a lot of work to do!” It was that kind of place. People would do that”. Jean Lave recounted much the same story but in her version Harold Garfinkel (who was twice hired by the School but quickly left both times) was giving the lecture. In her story, Jim March rowed in as well: “I found it very difficult to understand what’s going on and Jim just broke in and said what she’s trying to say to you is that you haven’t said anything… It wasn’t me that was rude or if I was rude - I don’t care if I was or I wasn’t – but if I was I was surprised that Jim backed me up by being even ruder”.

Volney Stefflre and Duane Metzger, two charismatic figures within the group, also took a forthright approach to inquiry and representation, articulated the principles that all talk across disciplines must be in words of one syllable, or at least directly intelligible. Providing citations to one’s own discipline was disallowed, as were similar academic evasions.

Looking back, March paints it thus:

“I think some people would describe it as a benevolent despotcy [sic]! I don’t think that it was, it didn’t have much structure, so in that sense it was democratic, you had to make your case, and anyone could make their case, and little subgroups formed, of people who liked to be with each other” [JMarch]

Program A, B and C

March’s ‘experiment’ was to put about 30 young academics together and then see how they might organise without replicating existing structures, or as Mike Cole recalls it: “we created this rule that you cannot create an academic unit which was identifiable with an existing discipline [like sociology, anthropology or economics]”. Out of this mix, three groupings emerged, which, in 1967, came to be named as Program A, Program B and Program C.

Program A, sometimes referred to as ‘Formal Models’ or, more officially, the “Program of Mathematical and Computer Models in the Behavioral Sciences”, followed through on the GSIA work, and the maths and computer programming requirements placed on the students was in harmony with the philosophy of this group. By 1968, Program A consisted of economists, an engineer, psychologists, and computer science specialists.

Program B was sometimes known as ‘Language and Development’. This group included what would be recognised as anthropologists, sociologists, and social psychologists. It sought “to provide sufficient understanding of complex cultural phenomena to produce significant cultural change [and to develop an] understanding of individual and small group behavior, as well as national, macro-level behavior.” [March’s report to Aldrich, Nov. 1968]. In practice, this group divided into two or three sub-groups, though the membership and identity was fluid. One sub-group focused on language and behaviour and the members included Isabel Birnbaum (a psychologist interested in learning and retention), John Boyd (a communication scientists interested
in mathematical models of kinship and bargaining behaviour), Doug Chalmers (a psychologist interested in psycholinguistics and learning), Nick Colby (an anthropologist interested in change and development in an Indian community in Guatemala), Mike Cole (a psychologist interested in mathematical models of learning in animals and humans), Joseph Hart (a psychologist interested in awareness), Duane Metzger (an anthropologist interested in exotic beliefs), Harvey Sacks (a sociologist interested in the sociological organisation of conversation), Volney Stefflre (a psychologist interested in relations between language and behaviour), Dave Sudnow (a sociologist interested in non-verbal behaviour), and Ken Wexler (a psychologist interested in psycholinguistics). Another sub-group, with some overlap in membership, focused on ‘Development and Change’ and the members of this sub-group included Mike Butler (Social Science; the sociology of the Mexican intelligentsia), Mike Cole (Culture & education), Jerry Kirk (Sociology; social foundations of collective innovation), Charlie Lave (Economics; quantitative economic history, transportation economics), Jean Lave (Anthropology; comparative studies of social structure), Kim Romney (Anthropology; change and development in Mexico), Volney Stefflre (language and behaviour). This group intended to undertake a large-scale interdisciplinary research project. The group’s students had already participated in field studies in Mexico, Liberia, Samoa and Brazil and native informants from Mexico and Samoa had been brought to the campus to work with the students.

Finally, Program C was “is a residual category for those faculty members in the Division who are not members of either program but hold appointments in the Division” (memo from March to Aldrich, June 1967). It was “the set of those not belonging to any set” (Lave, 2009). It appears that the Social Ecology group, led by Arnie Binder, emerged out of Program C.

Jean Lave perceived a further group - the ethnomethodologists - who were outside of this A, B, C structure. One could be a member of one or more groups and move between groups. Once a year each faculty member had to declare whether he or she would be in a program or not, which, according to Jean Lave, was “a pretty serious business. You had to make a positive move to declare your intentions. Programs really did cut across academic disciplines. They absolutely violated standard divisions between disciplines”.

Froman and Metzger were appointed as Program Directors for B and C, respectively. Notifying Aldrich about these appointments, March stated “Their general responsibilities are essentially equivalent to those of Departmental Chairmen in other divisions. They should be included on your mailing lists of Departmental Chairmen, and should be accorded all the rights, love and aggression normally associated with such offices” [memo from March to Aldrich, June 1967].

Notwithstanding these internal groupings, the primary social science subject that Irvine came to be known for externally was political science, because “we had March who had in PhD in political science from Yale, you had Peltason who had a reputation of constitutional law and Dick Snyder who was the Dean of the Graduate School of Administration, was also a very well known political scientist in addition to young people” [JFeldman]. (Even though March was the only person in the Social Science Division).

DISRUPTIONS

Social Ecology

The tensions within the group developed, culminating in a number of significant leavings. The first major issue centred on Arnie Binder, who joined the group in 1966 and whose field of interest was mathematical psychology. Even though this was an abstract subject, Binder had received research grants for two research projects that dealt with applied community problems, one on accident prevention and another on biometeorology. As a result he became more interested in research that would have more direct social benefits - “that led me to think of social ecology”. By 1968, Binder had proposed a “Program in Social Analysis” and March included this in his report of that year to Aldrich. This program, which March presented as just a proposal, “centers on the very problems
which society presents for solution. e.g. 1. urban development, etc. 2. community mental health; 3. riots and unrest; 4. injury control in home and highways”. March proposed that Arnie Binder would be allocated to this full-time along with three part-time faculty. However, “within 2 weeks he [March] withdrew [his support] and said he had just made a mistake in giving initial support” [A Binder]. Binder was clearly disaffected and worked to split off from the School of Social Sciences a new independent unit/program. This he eventually set up in 1970, after March had left Irvine. Binder’s unit and program was called “Social Ecology”, and, curiously, it mirrored much of March’s interest in the interdisciplinary study of social problems. Twelve faculty were aligned with the program when it opened in 1970, and it attracted 113 undergraduate students that year. The program in Social Ecology continued to increase in size over the years. By 1981 there were 685 undergraduates and 57 graduate students in the program, increasing to 1320 and 117 by 1992. For further details on the School of Social Ecology see Binder (1972) and http://socialecology.uci.edu/pages/conceptual-social-ecology.

March leaves

In November 1968, March produced a ‘planning report’ for Chancellor Aldrich, in which he identified three developments that he felt would have a significant impact. First, an increasing concern with quantification and formal theorizing (i.e. amenable to mathematical representation and/or computer simulation). Second, substantial elements of borrowing (or convergence) among the social sciences, hence inter-disciplinarity and disorganisation were celebrated. Third, concern with the application of social sciences, which meant a return to ‘applied problems’. March’s vision was positivist in so far as “we assume a theoretical model is valid only if it predicts the kinds of changes actually produced”.

“There is a pervasive sense at UCI of new beginnings, youth, enthusiasm, flexibility and innovation. We intend to sustain these qualities by anticipating growth and change in the University, and making, organizational arrangements to insure maximum flexibility and revolutionary character in the long run” [from the same report].

In the report he reaffirmed his commitment to inter-disciplinarity: “SSS has been organized to facilitate the integration of research and teaching activities around the concept that the most crucial and exciting work in the social sciences is that which is interdisciplinary in nature.”

And he ends the letter accompanying his report with typical quip: “I hope that things continue to be unstable enough so that neither one of us will really know what is going on”.

Within a few months, March informed the faculty that he was leaving Irvine to take up a professorial position in Stanford. Stanford was clearly a more prestigious university than Irvine and it meant that he could continue his career as a research professor-cum teacher rather than become a university administrator. He has remained in Stanford ever since.

When I asked March why he left, he answered: “The glib answer is that parents should allow their children to grow up. I think as long as I was around it was relatively difficult for individuals to escape from attending to me”. March also “didn’t want to be a College President and having made that decision the issue was where could I do my work best. But from Irvine’s point of view I felt the School would develop better without me than with me”. John Payne, who was a student at the time took the view that “every leader somehow wears out his welcome but everyone had a great respect for Jim March. I still do.” Charles Lave, mused as follows: “I hope there was little of the idea that ‘Well, it was neat idea but it has failed, so move on’. But you know you always suspect that.”

March’s leaving was devastating to the group: “..the major incident is Jim leaving, and that was significant because the guy who brought us here and was our intellectual leader was all of a sudden saying that he didn’t love us anymore….When the person who left, the kind of father figure, left, that created a disappointment…” [C Lave]. “His leading left a big vacuum” [Kim Romney]. “One of the things that I was very unhappy about was March leaving when he did. I thought he’d stirred
the pot and then just walked away from it. I mean I’m sure Jim has a different story about that. But then I followed.” [M Cole].

But in his interview, March distanced himself from the trauma: “There were a number of traumatic things associated with [my leaving], but not particularly my leaving. My leaving necessitated some decisions which articulated some of the differences that were suppressed by my presence, I suppose”.

Bill Sharpe presents a good picture of this wider trauma. Sharpe observed that the hostility that the group held to the status quo had a number of, probably unintended, consequences. One important issue, which was a corollary of the assumption that disciplinary is bad and inter-disciplinary is good, was the position held by some in the School that “all academic journals of consequence are in the hands of the disciplines, so therefore publishing in one of them is bad, [and so] we won’t”. This led to something of a crisis in 1968 when many members of the group were coming up to their ‘up or out’ tenure reviews. “The way the University of California operated, a campus that was new and fresh might not have enough senior faculty in a particular discipline to do a review, especially a tenure review, so they would bring in some faculty from some other universities in the system. A lot of review committees said ‘How can you promote this person?’ And there was a group that lived in a house – an old farm house – and engaged in – I think they grew pot and they certainly used it – I was sympathetic to them, I was counter-culture, sympathetic not active – it was a pretty free-wheeling operation out there. So the problem came, at one point Jim said ‘I am going to get these people through, they put their faith in me, they did what I thought they should do, I’ve got to find some way to keep them from being canned’. Then came a point when he said ‘I can’t really give tenure to these people as they really haven’t done anything that advances the state of the knowledge particularly’, and then he said he was going to resign as Dean, and then he said he was not, ‘because I am going to stay on to try and get these people through the system”, then he resigned after all. Jim was very conflicted. But most of us who wanted to do rigorous modelling, theoretical mathematics within our disciplines or even across disciplines were disappointed and really didn’t feel that this was going to be a place that we’d be happy in. So a fair number of us left. I certainly did.” Soon after March left Sharpe also moved to Stanford.

According to Kim Romney, “the economists wanted to departmentalize and I think Bill Sharpe left because Economics didn’t get independence as a department”. Bill Sharpe was probably never as intensely engaged with the experiment as others, and tended to view it from a distance. For instance, in his interview he didn’t recall the Program A-B-C groupings at all: “I kind of dropped out. In my second year I taught my courses, I didn’t participate very much.” Similarly, March is adamant that while Sharpe and Shapiro “were not part of the play group” they “were not antagonistic, in that they didn’t want to eliminate it” and left simply because “they had good opportunities”. Perhaps fittingly or ironically, while Sharp wasn’t enthusiastic about much of what was going on in Irvine, he was one of the originators of the inter-disciplinary field of financial economics, for which he received the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1990.

Post- March

When March left everything went into flux and there was quite a bit of controversy. Johan Olsen, who subsequently wrote three books with March as well as the ‘garbage can’ paper with March and Cohen, was a research fellow in the School of Social Sciences in 1968-69 and closely observed the decision-making process involved in appointing March’s replacement. Olsen published two reports on what happened (Olsen, 1970; 1971) and he also wrote a book chapter which used the case study to show how far from theory the practice of decision-making can be (Olsen, [1976] 1979). At the end of quite a tortured and painful process, Kim Romney, who had joined the School in 1968 was appointed as Dean. Mike Cole promptly left: “The decision about the Dean was really a decision which went for stability and standard social science. That put an end to the whole thing. And I walked away from it” [Mike Cole]. Others, like Bill Sharpe, left as well, if not for the same reason.
And Arnie Binder then took the opportunity to create a new unit, called the School of Social Ecology, bringing staff and students away from the School of Social Sciences.

Kim Romney was Dean from 1970 to 1972, at which point Lewis (Creel) Froman became Dean. The following quotations give a sense of the time:

“I mean he was a kind of anarchist and he was opposing the Marchian ideology and he was anti-quantitative. But he was one of the original people and he started out as a hard-headed quantitative political scientist and he eventually began teaching courses whose essence was…well, what does it matter anyway? A brilliant guy. He became an anarchist” [C Lave].

“Creel Froman didn’t have a strongly defined sense of direction, I’d don’t think. He got other interests over time and the school started to drift and not know exactly what it was doing” [Kim Romney]

“He made a total change in his social science philosophy while at Irvine. The third year I was working with him, I went into his office and he'd given away all his books, as he no longer believed what was in them. What was left was one shelf, mostly literary criticism such as Kenneth Burke….He became quite a difficult person during his ‘transformation’. I was surprised actually that he became Dean since his views of much traditional social science became pretty negative, and he was inclined to act on what he thought…I think he was pretty disappointed in me... I regret it, as I learned a lot from him and respected his courage of his convictions” [M Cohen].

According to Charles Lave, Froman was eventually ‘deposed’ in 1975 to be replaced by Christian Werner who was Dean up to 1979, followed by Linton Freeman (1980-81). While I have not collected much data on the School during the 1970s, my general sense is that it was a period of drift and emptiness. Some of the spirit and excitement of the 1960s remained, but the overwhelming sense seems to be one of disappointment, resentment, and loss.

In 1982 William Schonfeld, who arrived in 1970 when March was leaving, was appointed as Dean and he continued in this position for twenty years. Schonfeld has a fairly negative perspective on the School of Social Sciences under March’s leadership: “It was at every level a game being played with other people’s lives. You could draw that as a conclusion – I think there was an ugly quality to what they did because of exactly that. None of us had a right to play games with other human beings. We have a right to found institutions on the basis of principles in which we believe. We don’t have a right to take other people and throw them out there and see what they do”. During the 1980s, Schonfeld effectively dismantled the original structure putting in place a conventional social science departmental structure.

LOOKING BACK

Almost all of those I interviewed look back on those days with fondness, though it’s important to emphasise that the people I interviewed were those who remained in and were successful in academia.

“In retrospect, I cherish those memories and those days. They were very heady days” - [Kim Romney]

“I didn’t regret a moment the time I spent there.” [M Cole]

Jim March felt that that the greatest successes were “spiritual. I think that we constructed a culture, at least among the faculty… that we were able to exhibit the possibility of having a non-departmentalized structure and exhibit the possibility of having a fairly significant quantitative undergraduate program, a kind of what I call organized anarchy, an organizational style that involved a lot of spontaneous coordination, an unobtrusive coordination rather than a formal structural coordination that was feasible, but not easy.”

“my saddest feelings about Irvine was that we never built, while I was there, a campus community. The level of discomfort with one another on the faculty and the level of acrimony among the
faculty, not only within the School of Social Science but collectively on the campus, the level of pettiness on the campus was just way above what it should have been... Ordinary decency and ordinary elements of human life were somehow driven out... Part of the socialization process and part of the missionary zeal produced a kind of snottiness and a kind of cockiness and a kind of maybe indifference to other people that I don’t think I intended to communicate, but I think it got built into that culture”.

“The one major administrative thing is that I did not educate the faculty to the administrative facts of life.... They were allowed a kind of deceptive irresponsibility; they were being covered.” [March, interviewed in 1973].

Jean Lave notes the irony of being “a delighted, enthusiastic participant in its collective search for interdisciplinary unity via a mathematical language, empirical modeling and anti-historical, anti-social-theoretical stance, and [yet] end up today working within a historical, materialist theoretical problematic” (Lave, 2009).

Bill Sharpe recalls as follows: “There was not enough of a coherent notion of what a truly interdisciplinary group could do. It veered off, which I think was partly contagion from the cultural situation at that time, into being so virulently anti-establishment it partly threw out the ideas of doing serious research, testing and peer review, what have you.... it was a sort of flower child mentality...I characterised it to others as ‘it was a really interesting experiment, but unfortunately all the rats died’”.

“Things that are easy for me to say are unconditionally I enjoyed it” [Jim March].

While many of the Faculty may have shared March’s enjoyment, William Schonfeld’s take is that it wasn’t attractive to the students:

“No, there were not many students, that is to say the Department of Social Sciences were not acquiring their normal share of students. I guess you could go back and find out statistically today at UCI, the school of Social Sciences graduate 38% of the undergraduate student body. My guess it, and it’s a pure guess, that in 1970, the School of Social Sciences graduated 8%. [My data is that the current figure is 25% in 2010 compared with 14% in 1970. Schonfeld may be including students from the School of Social Ecology in his 38%]. That is to say that one of the consequences was that since most students got lost they went elsewhere, including going over to Social Ecology which became an alternative programme and Binder …certainly understood those frustrations.”

“It was an experiment. But it was an experiment by an experimentor who was playing with the faculty who were hired, which is not the best form of experiment” [W Schonfeld].

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