“THE MEDIA PROFILE OF ANTI-EU GROUPS IN THE UK”

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ABSTRACT

The UK has the most fully developed set of anti-European Union groups of any country, from national political parties through to local grassroots organisations and sectoral lobbies. For most of these groups, the media plays a central role in their work, enabling them to reach audiences much greater than otherwise possible. In this paper, the profile of such groups in the national print media will be considered, using frequency analysis. This analysis demonstrates that coverage, while generally increasing over time, remains very uneven and episodic, both in time and between groups. These findings are further backed up by study of discourse markers. Differences between newspapers are discussed, with particular reference to the general political affiliation of the newspaper, as well as its position on European integration. The paper concludes by considering the consequences of this pattern of media coverage for anti-EU groups at a time when the integration process would appear to be particularly susceptible to expressions of opposition.
Since the late 1980s there has been a proliferation in the UK of groups and organisations directed against the European Union (EU). This was in large part driven by the rising political profile of the issue in the wake of Margaret Thatcher’s Bruges speech in 1988 (Young 1998, Usherwood 2004), but also by the institutional structures of the British political system. The use of a First-past-the-post electoral system and the subsequent development of a two party system in the House of Commons requires a high level of party management and cohesion, with the effect of pushing opposition outside the House and into the formation of single-issue groups (Aspinwall 2000, Usherwood 2002). The consequences of this have been stark: in 1985 there were only 5 single-issue anti-EU groups in existence, all small in size and importance; by the end of 2004, there were some thirty groups, including political parties such as the UK Independence Party and high profile pressure groups such as the Bruges Group and Business for Sterling (see Usherwood 2005 for a brief overview).

In this paper we will consider the extent to which this proliferation in number and volume of groups has been reflected in their media profile. This is of intrinsic importance, since for the very large majority of these groups, the media represents their primary means of disseminating information and arguments, with a view to gaining some form of influence with the body politic. The assumption behind this is that all groups share a common aim, namely to shape public policy. In the particular case of anti-EU groups, their aim is to shape public policy either to reform or to reject the EU as it stands. Because of the electoral system issue already mentioned, direct control is effectively off-limits, so groups have to resort to more indirect methods. These range from influencing politicians (most commonly found when looking at factions within political parties), through using the media (as discussed here), to contacting members of the public directly (either through the internet or through face-to-face activities). Of these, use of the media has been predominant, for the simple reason that national media outlets provide the most cost-effective means of reaching the general population. Larger groups can afford to employ full-time media or communications officers to ensure a steady feed of material to the media, while smaller groups tend to concentrate their efforts on specific campaigns, given their more limited resources.

1 This paper was originally presented at the ECPR Third Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, 21 to 23 September 2006, Istanbul, Turkey. Thanks are due to comments from Roberta Guerrina, Mitchell Smith, Amy Verdun and two anonymous reviewers.
Even with such constraints of resourcing and manpower in place, it might be anticipated that the media profile of anti-EU groups in the UK has grown. Notwithstanding the key role that the main political parties play in shaping political debate in the UK, even if individual groups cannot increase their profile beyond a certain point, then the increase in the number of groups over time would potentially add to the collective profile. Likewise, we would expect the rising importance of the issue would draw media outlets to such groups for comment and content.

However, such a pattern does not appear to be borne out by the data. In this paper, we will perform some frequency analyses with respect to anti-EU groups in UK national daily newspapers between 1985 and 2004. These show that while there is an upward trend in the volume of coverage, it remains a low level in comparison to the main political parties, and that it is highly episodic, indicating the ambivalent nature of coverage of the EU by media outlets and the failure of anti-EU groups to place themselves in a central position in the public discourse on European integration. The paper thus forms a complement to the work by other authors on the relationship between the media and European integration, which has tended to focus on questions of framing and trans-national comparisons (e.g. Meyer, 2005; Trenz, 2004;彼得, Semetko & de Vreese, 2003; Semetko, de Vreese & Peter, 2000; Semetko & Valkenburg 2000).

The paper is structured as follows. After a brief note on methodology, there is a consideration of the general pattern of newspaper coverage over the study period. This leads into discussions about the uneven coverage between groups, group life-cycle effects on coverage and variation on the basis of newspaper affiliation, before rounding up with some conclusions.

**METHODOLOGY**

Before considering the results of the data analyses, it is necessary to unpack the methodology used. This essentially concerns the choice of raw data, the time frame, and the means of analysis.

The paper looks at those British groups with a primary focus on opposition to the European Union. By this, we understand a primary focus to mean that a group is either purely about opposing the European Union and nothing else, or that it expresses positions on other issues, but work from a base-point of EU opposition. Other groups have been excluded on the
grounds that it would be too complicated to isolate those references that relate to the groups’ EU opposition and that the sheer volume would drown out the other groups.

The time frame of 1985-2004 is chosen to provide an opportunity to relate the volume of media references to the development of the European Union itself. 1985 marks the start of negotiations that led to the Single European Act (SEA), and the period contains the full negotiation and implementation cycles for the SEA, the Treaty on European Union, the Amsterdam Treaty and the Nice Treaty, as well as 4 European Parliament election cycles. These treaty and EP cycles are potentially important because they represent the points at which the European issue has enjoyed a relatively high media profile, and so we might expect that dissenting voices would find some expression at these times, if only as a result of media outlets wanting to provide some balance of coverage. Likewise, the period also marks the time of greatest expansion of anti-EU groups, in both number and size.

The use of national daily newspapers is largely a product of data availability: while it provides an incomplete picture of media coverage, it does represent the only practical means of collecting data. Television, radio and the internet do not have the same searchable archiving systems as newspapers, the internet further suffering from its novelty. In addition, some anti-EU groups have followed a policy of cultivating links with local newspapers, in order to avoid perceived distortion of their message. Nonetheless, newspapers still form an important part of the media system in the UK, with 44% of people claiming to read a newspaper on a daily basis (Eurobarometer 64, 2005, p.271: the EU25 average is 36%). Moreover, the aim is not to provide a comprehensive and systematic account of media coverage, but merely an impression of overall trends. The use of all national daily newspapers is designed to highlight different sectors of the news market, from high-end titles all the way through to the tabloids. This range also allows us to make some observations on variations in coverage due to political affiliation.

Data is taken from the Lexis-Nexis Professional archive (www.lexis-nexis.com). This medium was chosen for ease of data collection, although in some cases, the back catalogue for particular newspapers does not extend back to the start of the time period in consideration. Searches were performed by use of group title (and alternative common abbreviations where appropriate (e.g. UKIP)), then manually counted (to remove duplicate entries), on the basis of references per group per month. Any reference at all to a group is counted, without consideration of its location in an article or the subject of article as a whole:

2 As a case in point, there is no back archive available for the Financial Times, so it has been excluded.
any reference to a group is taken to imply a media profile: multiple references to a group within an article are not counted. Some effect of varying month length is present, as is the impact of only having six days per week (since Sunday nationals were excluded), but these do not produce any significant effects. Data for each newspaper were then collated, to produce a monthly figure for references per group per newspaper (since the number of newspapers varied over time). Month-long units are used since they are large enough to give meaningful figures, but small enough to highlight relatively short-term fluctuations.

In addition to the group references, references to ‘euroscepticism’ (and variants) were also collected. Within the British discourse on European integration, euroscepticism has gained common currency as a signifier for those opposed to the EU. Despite the reluctance of many people so described to accept the term (not to mention its academic indeterminacy) it is still useful as a measure of more general media interest in the subject of opposition to the EU.

Naturally, in all of this it must be remembered that media coverage is not a passive matter. Generally speaking, anti-EU groups have to push their stories to media outlets if they are to have a chance of being covered. Alternatively, certain groups may gain a reputation with the media and their opinions on various news items may be sought. In both cases, the different actors have different agendas, which may or may not complement each other. As discussed previously, media outlets have their own interests, and this might result in over- or under-coverage of anti-EU groups and their activities, relative to other outlets (see Gleissner & de Vreese 2005, Morgan 1995). While this is countered to a certain extent by using a variety of sources, it cannot be guaranteed that such effects will be eliminated.

**THE GENERAL PATTERN OF MEDIA COVERAGE**

Figure 1 shows the monthly references per newspaper for all UK groups with a primary focus on opposition to the European Union. As a guide to reading this, a value of approximately 26 would be equivalent to one reference per newspaper per day.

**FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE**

The corollary of this is that, generally speaking, anti-EU groups do not have a particularly high profile: at the end of the study period, the baseline average (excluding peaks) was about one mention per week per newspaper between 30 groups, or less than two mentions per year per group. At the same time, coverage is also highly uneven: peaks usually only last one month and even at the end of the period there are months with little or no coverage. Of those
peaks present, in only 5 months does the figure for references exceed 26 (i.e. one mention per day). By way of contrast, the Conservative party records figures in excess of 100 on a regular basis.

Thus at first glance, it would seem that anti-EU groups have made little and sporadic impact on the national print media. At the same time, it must be recognised that newspaper coverage has generally increased over time. Taking annualised totals it can be seen that there is a clear evolution in Figure 2. Even when looking at falls in coverage year-on-year, the coverage during troughs increases over time: thus the 2002-3 trough has more coverage than the 1993 trough, which in turn has more coverage than the 1987 flat-line.

FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE

However, even with this aggregate progression of coverage, there are still only three years out of the 20 that produce as much coverage as the Conservative party gets in most months. Thus it must be considered that the presence of anti-EU groups is still highly marginal. This is borne out when one considers the figures on a per group basis, as in Figures 3 and 4. These reveal that period of most generalised success for anti-EU groups came in the early 1990s, although this is partly a statistical artefact from the very small number of groups (a point which will be returned to later).

FIGURES 3 & 4 ABOUT HERE

Having now looked at markers for groups, the focus now moves to a more general indicator of anti-EU discourse. In order to do this, we have plotted usage of the world “Euroscepticism” and its variants in Figures 5 and 6. The term chosen sprang out of the public debate on European integration and so can be taken as a marker of more generalised media interest in the subject. However, it must be noted that many British groups have, in recent years, tended to reject the “eurosceptic” mantle, often preferring to be thought of as “eurorealists” instead (for example, the European Foundation describes itself as “the leading Eurorealist think tank” (http://www.e-f.org.uk/)). Despite this, the media has been slow to adapt to this, preferring to use the more widely understood term, even if anti-EU groups do not feel it is entirely accurate.

Once again, there is a high degree of variability between months, reflecting a lack of a systematic debate, although from the mid-1990s there is the development of an increased baseline of references. Again, there are only two months when the references exceed 26 (i.e.}
c. one reference per newspaper per day). Indeed, the pattern presented is consistent with the overall positive correlation (0.562, 99% significance) between the two sets of media references, demonstrating not only the periodicity of coverage, but also that trends in group coverage have been mirrored in more general coverage.

FIGURES 5& 6 ABOUT HERE

The main point to be drawn from this section is not so much the growth of media coverage, but rather that the unevenness of coverage suggests that it is almost completely event-driven, rather than systematic: rather than occupying a fixed position within the national polity, anti-EU groups only have a profile at certain points. This is mostly seen when looking at the peaks in coverage. The 1991 peak is composed of articles covering the Bruges Group’s criticism of the government’s European policy, the bulge in 1996-7 is almost completely made up of references to the Referendum Party, while the 1999 and 2004 peaks are related to the UK Independence Party’s electoral success at the European elections. In short, in all cases, coverage is linked to specific events that do not provide for a consistent interest by the media. Moreover, the majority of these events are not created by the anti-EU groups, in the sense that they are events which would happen regardless of what they decided to do: the biggest peaks are the result of one or more groups standing for election. Only exceptionally do groups’ own positions come to the forefront (as with the Bruges Group in 1991).

UNEVEN COVERAGE OF GROUPS

Within the aggregate picture presented in the previous section, it is tempting to make some tentative conclusions regarding coverage. However, to do so would be to miss some important differentiation within that data. The first key differentiation comes from the fact that coverage is not evenly split between groups. Instead there are a few groups that gain the majority of the coverage, with the rest getting occasional mentions now and again.

To help isolate these peaks of coverage, we can use a simple measure, as seen in Table 1, which shows the percentage of total coverage falling to the two most referenced groups in that year. With the sole exception of 1996 the two most referenced groups never receive less than 50% of total coverage. Looking at the period as a whole, there is a very marked concentration on specific groups, as seen in Figure 7: just 4 groups (UKIP, Referendum Party, Bruges Group and Business for Sterling) produce over 80% of all references, while 18 other groups produce less than 5%.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

The reasons for such a concentration must be inferred, but given the pattern that the concentration takes, it seems reasonable to suggest three explanations that might play a role. The first lies with the groups themselves. In most cases, anti-EU groups have worked with very limited resources, both financially and in terms of manpower. Consequently, while they might be able to sustain activity that is covered by the media for a short period, they are usually constrained in the long-run (a point which will be discussed in the context of group life-cycles later on). One upshot of this is that it is typically the larger and better financed groups that gain most coverage; UKIP, the Referendum Party, Business for Sterling. However, this is not always the case: the Bruges Group was very successful in the early 1990s despite a tiny office and staff, partly through its novelty and partly through its proximity to the Conservative Party; likewise, one of the largest anti-EU groups in the UK today, the Democracy Movement, has hardly any coverage at all, as a result of concentrating instead on grassroots activities with its members.

FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE

The second explanation comes from the media’s perspective: they require quick and repeated copy, which must in turn be of interest to readers. Journalists build up relationships with certain individuals upon whom they rely for information and given that the general thrust of most anti-EU groups is the same (i.e. “we don’t like what the EU is doing”), there is no need to gather endless repetitions of this same message. Indeed, some ignorance on the part of journalists of the existence is only to be expected, given the small size of many of them. This lack of knowledge is also apparent in the continuing references to the Referendum Party, which was disbanded in 1997 after James Goldsmith’s death: in 2004 it was the second most referenced group! More generally, the shift towards the personalisation of political coverage shifts the focus on to those individuals of notoriety or fame. In this context, it is worth observing that much of UKIP’s huge amount of coverage in 2004 came not from its success in the European election, but rather the joining of the party by a former daytime talk-show host, Robert Kilroy-Silk, and his subsequent departure after failing to gain control of the leadership. Another example would include Sir James Goldsmith’s role as leader of the Referendum Party in 1996-7.

The third explanation is an environmental one and is partly modulated by the other two dimensions already mentioned. Both anti-EU groups (because of their limited means) and the media (because of its nature) are largely reactive: they respond to political events, rather than
shaping them. For much of the study period, this worked to the advantage of the groups: after Thatcher’s Bruges speech in 1988, the fragile pro-European consensus in Westminster was broken and the persistent in-fighting in the Conservative party on the issue since then has generated much media coverage. Likewise, the rapid development of the European level of governance after the SEA provided repeated opportunity for comment and activity by anti-EU groups, from the TEU to the single currency to Eastern enlargement to the Constitutional Treaty.

In the following sections, we will provide some limited data to illustrate the possible effects of each explanation.

LIFE-CYCLE EFFECTS

Typically speaking, anti-EU groups have small memberships and limited resources. Groups such as the Referendum Party, with its access to Goldsmith’s sizeable fortune, or UKIP, with a string of significant backers and a membership in the order of 20,000, are exceptional. As argued above, the upshot of this is that we might expect individual groups to be unable to maintain a long-term media profile. This might be due to the difficulties of maintaining member’s full and active involvement over a long period, the difficulty of maintaining the media’s interest in the same core message (a particular problem for single-issue groups), or just that the financial resources are not there to support large-scale activity (often, though not always, a prerequisite for generating media interest).

Whatever the underlying reasons, we would expect to see what we term a life-cycle effect in the coverage of the group. In the first phase of coalescence and formation, the group is coming together: media coverage will be minimal, since there is little to say other than that the group is forming (in several cases, this has been triggered by a letter to a newspaper, either inviting people to join, or announcing the group’s foundation). In the second phase of territory marking, the group implements its strategy and aims to make an impact on public debate and policy-makers, making full use of the resource base available: this is the period of maximum media coverage, for obvious reasons. In the third phase, of stabilisation, the group settles down for the long-run, deploying resources as needed/available: here we expect media coverage to become more episodic, and generally follow a down-ward trend over time. This notionally leads to a fourth phase of atrophy and disbanding, assuming the group loses members and resources and either formally or practically shuts down.
In order to see whether the media coverage bears out this model, Figures 8 and 9 shows averages per group at 6-monthly intervals after group foundation. Figure 8 provides the data in terms of absolute references, while Figure 9 uses data expressed as a percentage of the first point for which data is available, in order to reduce size effects between groups. Despite this, Figure 10 shows two lines, one for all groups and one for the average without UKIP or the Referendum Party. The reason for this is simply that because of the sheer volume of references to those two groups (even with the use of relative data), they produce a very marked distortion of the overall averages, which might mask a more fundamental pattern.

FIGURES 8 & 9 ABOUT HERE

To a certain extent, the three-phase model is borne out. There are rising levels of media interest over the first 2-2.5 years after foundation, after which coverage falls off again, with occasional peaks of no more than 18 months in length. The peak at 132 months is purely the result of the massive coverage for UKIP in 2004, while the high figures after 12 years (144 months onwards) are a statistical artefact relating to the very small number of groups that have existed this long and which had hardly any coverage in the early years of their existence.

At the same time, it is hard to be particularly categorical about the life-cycle dimension, if only because the bulk of the groups have not been in existence long enough for a full comparison to be made. Also, the very low level of media coverage that most groups have received means that relatively small absolute changes in coverage can have a very marked impact. But most importantly, the experience of the large groups, particularly UKIP, is a salutary one. As can be seen in Figure 10, for the first six years after its foundation in 1993 it received hardly any coverage, before its first big breakthrough at the 1999 EP elections, which then fed through into a raised profile in advance of the 2001 general election, where it performed very poorly. Despite this set-back, UKIP was able to maintain some presence through the early 2000s, particularly in the context of the debate on British membership of the euro, before its coup de théâtre with the recruitment of Robert Kilroy-Silk to its ranks for the 2004 EP elections, where it came third nationally. The subsequent departure of Kilroy-Silk in unhappy circumstances maintained the media’s interest into the latter part of that year. Thus it is possible to transcend the life-cycle model, but it remains exceptional.

FIGURE 10 ABOUT HERE

UNEVEN COVERAGE BY NEWSPAPERS
Given the life-cycle variations for anti-EU groups, we might also consider the extent to which newspapers themselves affect coverage. There has already been a discussion about the constraints on journalists imposing by the news cycle and by personal knowledge. Such factors would appear to affect all newspapers, but it might be possible to observe some variation between different types of paper. Here we will consider two such possible dimensions, newspaper format and political outlook.

Typically speaking, tabloid newspapers contain much less content (in terms of words per issue) than broadsheets, partly as a result of shape constraints, partly as a result of a more encompassing agenda. Thus it is no real surprise that tabloids have fewer references to both groups and euroscepticism over the study period (Figures 11 and 12). In the period 2001-4, when data is available for all 9 papers, the average annual coverage by broadsheets was between 3 and 5 times that of the tabloids. Moreover, in not a single case during this period does a tabloid have more coverage than a broadsheet. However, it is worth noting that all the newspapers in this survey have correlations of 99% significance with each other on group references, so despite the division in volume, there is strong similarity in trend.

Having noted this discrepancy in relation to format, we turn to political affiliation. Here we might expect a number of effects. In terms of identification of a newspaper with a political party, it might be that where this occurs, there is a desire to cast that party in the best light, so internal problems will be downplayed and trouble within other parties will be stressed. Since both Labour and the Conservatives have internal cleavages on the European issue, and have both generated single-issue anti-EU groups within their ranks we are able to test this. Figure 13 shows coverage of groups with clear partisanship, split between newspapers with left-wing politics and those with right-wing ones, covering the period since March 2002, when all the groups were in operation. The results are ambivalent, not least because of the very small number of references involved. Looking at references across the whole period, while the right-wing papers do have more references to Labour-aligned groups than the left-wing papers do (in line with the hypothesis), they also have more references to Conservative groups. The simple explanation for this that the right-wing papers have more coverage of

3 The Labour groups are Trade Unions Against the Single Currency, Labour Euro-Safeguards Committee and Labour Against the Euro. Conservative Groups are the European Foundation, Bruges Group, Conservatives Against a Federal Europe, Conservative European Research Group and Fresh Start Group. The left-wing papers used are The Guardian and The Independent; those for the right are The Times and The Daily Telegraph. The analysis has been limited to these papers since tabloids have few references.
anti-EU groups of all flavours than do the left-wing ones: unfortunately, because of the limits on the dataset, it is not possible to have a longer time-frame for analysis.

FIGURE 13 ABOUT HERE

ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS

Having considered the group- and media-based explanations, we finally turn to environmental considerations. The assumption here is that at times of heighten public interest in a particular issue, the media will respond by producing more coverage of that issue. Certainly we might question the direction of causality, since the media does play some role in shaping peoples’ priorities, but as a proxy for this level of interest, it seems reasonable to look at public opinion. It should be noted here that there is no direct examination of the role that the development of the EU itself plays in shaping the environment: we have noted above that there is some coincidence of peaks of coverage with specific events, such as elections and policy developments, but it is beyond the scope of this piece to address the question fully.

The marker used to measure public opinion comes from the regular monthly surveys by Ipsos-MORI, which asks people “What do you see as other important issues facing Britain today?” (see www.ipsos-mori.com for a full dataset). The percentage of people listing the EU or Europe is shown in Figure 14. We can note here the general peaks of interest in 1992-3, at the time of the TEU, and again from 1996 to 2001, at the time of most debate about British euro membership.

FIGURE 14 ABOUT HERE

When we plot this against absolute group references per newspaper, as in Figure 15, we can see that there is a positive correlation (0.381, significant to 99%) thus suggesting that the environmental explanation might have some weak value. At the same time, it remains unclear quite how the relationship works. Since there is a degree of correlation between the group and discourse markers, and between both and the public opinion data, we cannot isolate a particular correlation. It might be possible to isolate some clearer pattern with more fine-grained data, but the Ipsos-MORI data only repeats on a monthly basis. Introducing a one-month time-lag does not help: while correlations remain at 99% significance, the Pearson correlations drop both for a one month lag on the group references and on the public opinion data. Thus the question remains moot.
CONCLUSION

The purpose of this paper has been to explore the extent to which anti-EU groups in the UK have managed to gain a foothold in the British national print media. With the help of some frequency analyses of the period between 1985 and 2004 we have seen a very mixed pattern of results emerge. On the one hand, it can be said that there has been a general increase in newspaper coverage of anti-EU groups and of anti-EU discourse more generally. However, this increase has been uncertain and largely dependent on groups’ involvement in bigger events, notably elections: likewise, general coverage has been focused around particular events. It is only rarely that groups have been able to push their own agendas. As a result, substantial coverage is the exception, rather than the norm.

Within this, there is much variation between groups. The typical pattern has been for one or two groups to dominate coverage at any one time. Since most groups have limited resources, they are prone to life-cycle effects, which mean that if they fail to make much impact in the first few years of their existence then they are very unlikely to be able to do so later on. This has long-term consequences for the anti-EU movement as a whole, since the formation of new groups has slowed significantly since the end of the 1990s: despite the massive coverage afforded to UKIP in 2004, there is no indication that this is anything other than passing. Coupled to falling public interest/concern about the European Union as an issue more generally since 2000, it is tempting to suggest that in the future media coverage is more likely to fall than it is to rise.

Despite the long period of sustained public interest and debate through the 1990s in the process of European integration, the groups which have effectively aimed to steer that interest and debate have failed to mark out a sizeable profile for themselves in the national print media, one of the main channels of political education in the country. This is not to suggest that anti-EU rhetoric and discourse is absent, but rather that it is driven by the weight of the Conservative party, as a party of (potential) government, rather than by the wider anti-EU movement. This failure suggests that while interest has been widespread, it has not been deep: most groups enjoy a brief period of growth and public interest, before slowly fading away. Notwithstanding the fact that anti-EU groups engage in other activities that seek to promote their cause (such as direct lobbying of MPs or grassroots campaigning), the inability to maintain media profile cannot be seen as any kind of benefit to them. The waning of the EU as an issue in recent years does not bode well for the groups: the smoothing over of
internal party divisions in both the Conservative and Labour parties (both tactically and strategically in the face of a maturing EU system) will similarly slow the flow of politicians willing to invest themselves in generating new anti-EU activity. Indeed, the failure of the anti-EU movement to capitalise on the opportunities presented by the constitutionalisation process launched at Laeken in 2001 suggests that even such high profile events are not enough to change the structural position of these groups.

REFERENCES


The full data-set is available from the author upon request
Figure 1: Absolute Number of Group References per Newspaper per Month, 1985-2004
Figure 6: References to "Euroscepticism" per Newspaper per Month, 1985-2004
Figure 6: References to "Euro scepticism" per Year per Newspaper
Figure 7: Concentration of Media Coverage, 1985-2004
Figure 8: 6-Monthly Absolute Averages of Monthly References per Group per Newspaper
Figure 9: 6 Monthly Relative Average of Monthly References per Group per Newspaper
Figure 10: UKIP’s 6-Monthly Average References per Newspaper
Figure 13: Comparison of Impact of Group Coverage by Political Affiliation of Newspapers, March 2002-December 2004

References per Group per Newspaper

Month


- Left Paper, Left Grp
- Left Paper, Right Grp
- Right Paper, Left Grp
- Right Paper, Right Grp
Figure 14: Percentage of People Listing "EU/ Europe" as One of the Most Important Issues, 1985-2004

Source: www.ipsoe-mori.com
Figure 15: Monthly Absolute References per Newspaper Against Percentage of People Rating the EU as an Important Issue
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Groups</th>
<th>Percentage of Annual References Held by 2 Largest Groups (% annual coverage)</th>
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<td>5</td>
<td>100 (Conservative European Reform Group (100))</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100 (Conservative European Reform Group (100))</td>
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<td>1987</td>
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<td>1988</td>
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<td>100 (Conservative European Reform Group (100))</td>
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<td>100 (Bruges Group (100))</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>2003</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>62 (UKIP (54); Referendum Party (9))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>97 (UKIP (94); Referendum Party (3))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>