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Re-evaluating Threat Perception as a Major Requirement for European Defence in the Post Cold War Era
Case Study: Greece

A thesis submitted in part-fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
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June 1995
Every state is absolutely sovereign in its internal affairs. But this implies that every state must do nothing to interfere in the internal affairs of any other. However, any false or pernicious step taken by any state in its internal affairs may disturb the repose of another state, and this consequent disturbance of another state's repose constitutes an interference in that state's internal affairs. Therefore, every state - or rather, every sovereign of a great power - has the duty, in the name of the sacred right of independence of every state, to supervise the governments of smaller states and to prevent them from taking false and pernicious steps in their internal affairs.

(P. Schroder, Classic Readings in International Relations, Williams P., Goldstein, M., Shafritz, J., eds., p. 196).
Abstract

This study attempts to contribute to the debate of the role of threat perception for the management of European Security in the post Cold War era by developing a model which aims to demonstrate the need for identifying perceptions of threat, similar to the situation pertaining during the Cold War. It is argued, among other matters, that a perception of threat is a major requirement for European defence in the 1990s, as without such a perception, the management and effectiveness of European security becomes questionable. This argument is examined in two parts: a review of the literature and a case study. The second part is also aiming to identify questions of concern relating to European defence. Building upon previous work related to the field, an analytical framework is developed and tested with data collected from a sample of informed elites from Greece.

The empirical findings support the view that threat perception is an important factor and a requirement which can shape the nature of a security organisation in which a state participates. Due to differences in national interest, threat perceptions may vary according to each state's particular security concerns, and this can create problems in reconciling the diverse and possibly conflicting requirements of the members of any security organisation. However, the evidence examined supports the view that security mechanisms are necessary even in the absence of a clear threat. International cooperation is sought as the elites in the field study indicated that such cooperation can alleviate their security concerns. The field work suggests that European security should gradually be led by Europeans, despite the fact that their Atlantic partners should also continue to be involved, albeit to a reducing level.

For the purposes of validation, a number of interviews were undertaken among London - based elites from six European states. Their comments supported the empirical findings of this study and it was felt that the absence of clear threat perception did effect the management of European security, and that threat perception is an important factor determining the choice of a security option.
Acknowledgements

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The field of research in Greece was made possible through the support of various people, but most importantly by my father, Vassilios D. Kiritsis who was always at the right place at the right time. This study is dedicated to my father, for his support throughout the years and I wish to make him proud.

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Abbreviations

- ACA: Agency for the Control of Armaments
- COMECON: Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
- CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy
- CSCE: Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
- EC: European Community
- ECSC: European Coal and Steel Community
- EDC: European Defence Community
- EDI: European Defence Identity
- EEC: European Economic Community
- EPC: European Political Cooperation
- EU: European Union
- Maastricht: Treaty on European Union signed by EU members, Jan 1991
- NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
- OSCE: Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
- PFP: Partnership for Peace
- PU: Political Union
- SEA: Single European Act
- SACEUR: Supreme Allied Commander Europe
- SPSS: Statistical Program for Social Sciences
- WEU: Western European Union
- WTO: Warsaw Treaty Organisation
- UN: United Nations
Introduction

The Topic:

This study examines the question of European security. The rigid military confrontation of past decades is increasingly giving way to a concern for enhanced security and to the active pursuit of peace using a combination of military and political elements. The European Continent has become the home of many newly formed states and the topic of European security requires adjustments.

European security is a matter that must now be looked at afresh. Observers are generally agreed that European security has entered a period of transition - between Cold War stability and an uncertain future. The passing of communist rule in Eastern Europe was bound to leave wreckage which needs to be cleared up, and as well to engender political, economic and nationalist tension. The Yugoslav crisis, the general instability in the Balkans and the continuing unrest in the former Soviet Union are just a few examples of the problems that have surfaced after the end of the Cold War. As a consequence, the various threats perceived during the Cold War have become irrelevant. Perceptions of threat have changed and so may have the roles of institutions. NATO's character has evolved towards a crisis management mechanism, the WEU is seen as a Europeanised solution for security through Maastricht, and the EC has opened its borders to most of Scandinavia. In addition, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 suggested the unpredictability of world events.

- Can NATO adjust and successfully work as a crisis management mechanism?
- Can the EC create a security dimension through the WEU?
- Who, which, or what are the new European challenges?
- Do Europeans have to have a threat to perceive?

These are just some of the questions that concern the topic of European security. A case study shall be analysed with a view of exploring the reasons behind the instabilities and whether threat perception continues to be as important for the stability of Europe in the 1990s as it was for Europe during the Cold War.
The Purpose:

The purpose of this study is to identify some of the problems created after the unpredictable events of 1989 and to demonstrate the importance of threat perception as a major requirement for the management of security organisations, through the analysis of empirical evidence. Gianni De Michelis parallels the situation of Europe in the 1990s with that after World War two: *In psychological terms, 1989 was very much like 1945. It marked the end of a period of war and division. *"Unfortunately, the way we set about reconstruction in 1946 - 47 created the basis for the next war" (Freedman, Europe Transformed, 1990, p. 514).

The above citation suggests the sensitive nature of the 1990s. By researching the topic of European Security, an effort is made to emphasise the importance of threat perception through history as well as for the 1990s. The study is an attempt to present specific threats through the case study, their importance and how these threats should be managed, according to a sample of elites from Greece. How do Greek elites feel about institutions such as the EC, NATO, or the CSCE providing for their security concerns? To what extent should the United States be involved in Europe's defence? How have perceptions of threat changed since 1989? What are the threats for Europe and for Greece in the 1990s according to Greek elites? These questions are some of the topics examined in this study. By analysing the relevant literature, raising a number of questions through the field work, the findings may provide useful information about the state's security concerns which may, in turn, help in the quest for European security and / or raise the demands for the 1990s.

*Note: The structure / outline of the work undertaken in this thesis is presented on page 11.*
NOTES

1. The concepts of "security" and "defence" are used in this study. According to Wolfers (1962), "security in an objective sense measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in the subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked" (Discord and Collaboration, p. 150). "Defence", according to Feld (1994), "is much narrower and focuses on the utilisation of military activities and strategies to assure the attainment of pertinent security structures" (The Future of European Security and Defence Policy, p. 4). Despite the fact that the concepts of "security" and "defence" could be defined differently, they are used to characterise organisations such as NATO, the WEU and/or the WTO, without specific reference as to which organisation provides more "security" or is more "defensive" in character. Organisations such as the above are considered defensive (not necessarily by counting weapons) and were created to enhance security by perceiving threats and collectively dealing with them. Therefore, because the study is concerned with threat perception as a stimulus towards international cooperation and "defence" or "security" mechanisms, these terms are used with similar meanings, although their difference has not been completely ignored.

2. Threat perception has been examined in relation to states and defence mechanisms. It is not the primary concern of this study to examine perception of threat(s) in psychological terms, i.e., what leads a state or a defence institution to perceive a threat and why, as the study discusses threat perception as a stimulus towards international cooperation and the evaluation of security structures. For example, Communism was a threat perceived by the West during the Cold War which stimulated the West to search for and create a defence mechanism. It is the importance of perceiving such a threat which led to that specific defence mechanism which is of concern to this study, not the psychological state of the decision-maker, although such aspects have also not been completely ignored.

3. The Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) is also known as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), as of 5 Dec. 1994. However,
owing to the recent nature of this change and the fact that the abbreviation CSCE has been used in the field study, its original name shall be retained in this project. The abbreviation EEC (European Economic Community) has also been used in the analysis of the field study (chapters 7,8), instead of EU (European Union), or EC (European Community), as it was used in the Greek translation of the questionnaire and was the abbreviation widely used in Greece. For reasons of consistency and comprehension, the analysis of the data (chapters 7,8) uses "EEC" to refer to the respective questions where the term has been used ("EU" became more commonly used after December 1993, around the time in which the field work was completed).
STRUCTURE OF THE WORK

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  - Reasons
  - Importance
  - Preconditions

Chapter 2
Threat Perception / Cold War era
  - Importance
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Chapter 3
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Chapter 7
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Chapters 7 & 8
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Chapter 9
- General Conclusions
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- Further suggestions

Appendix A
  - Validation Interviews
Chapter One
Collective Security
1.1 Introduction

Alliances, such as NATO, the Western European Union, (WEU) or the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO), are structures that are based on the concepts of collective security and Interdependence. In the case of the WTO, however, this is arguably irrelevant as the Soviet domination upon its member states demonstrated its forceful character towards collective security.

Collective security implies states coming together through an inter-governmental organisation (i.e. NATO, WEU) in which member states retain their full sovereignty and independence. The organisation should provide the forum in which they consult together on any issues they may choose to raise and take decisions on political and military matters affecting their security. The CSCE can be considered a collective security arrangement as debates on security issues take place, but it cannot act militarily as it is not a military structure. The essential purpose of a collective security structure is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. In addition, the member states of a collective security arrangement must be liable to be co-operative and committed to the security of its members. The arrangement assures (as in NATO's case) that no member state is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges.

*Through collective effort, the Alliance (NATO) enables them to enhance their ability to realise their essential national security objectives.*

*NATO Handbook, 1992, p. 12*

This chapter examines the concept of collective security, its requirements and the major reasons that lead towards collective security arrangements.

The Problem of Security

For the first forty years after the end of the Second World War, European Security was a lively but well focused political issue as Booth and Wheeler (1993) discuss. There was a consensus, in both the East and West, on priorities and parameters. When people opened a book or attended a seminar on "Security in Europe", they knew what to expect. Questions about the Soviet Union, the NATO / WTO confrontation and the US nuclear guarantee now seem outdated. "Security in Europe" seems ambiguous and it is no longer well focused. It has become apparent that "security" cannot be sensibly conceived along its previous narrow confines.

Between 1945 and 1989, as Booth and Wheeler (1993) point out:

*... security implied some or all of the following: that a state is free from the threat of war; that it is able to pursue its national interests and preserve its core values; and that it feels safe against potential aggressors (that is, war is believed to be unlikely, but should one ever occur, the state in question does not expect defeat).*

*Security and Strategy in the New Europe, ed. McInnis, p. 4*
These traditional ideas concerning security were based on the assumption that security policy seeks to preserve the status quo and on the belief that security is based upon states coming together in order to face common threats. Therefore, the concept of security focuses not just on one state but on many states collectively.

Security is an essential precondition of an ordered human existence; it is accepted as natural for people to take precautions against danger. Governments must provide a secure environment which would allow people to pursue their economic and social goals without undue anxiety and fear. "The concept of security covers every facet of life, and governments find it difficult to meet every contingency which might arise" (Pick and Critchley, 1974, Collective Security, p. 15)

States may find security in cohort with other states, which on the whole share some of their values and interests. Historically, these combinations, as Pick and Critchley (1974) argue, have been more cohesive when they were formed for a very specific purpose and with a 'preferred enemy' in mind. This was the case of NATO and the WTO. The systems of regionalised collective self-defence, which have grown out of the alliance institutions on both sides of the Iron Curtain, had served to stabilise the military and political position and in this sense had contributed before 1989 to the consciousness of security in both camps (Eastern and Western blocs).

Collective security in Europe can be considered to have been effective through alliances for a certain period of time as NATO and the WTO never confronted one another. An analysis of collective security and collective security structures is therefore relevant to the problem of threat perception, and particular emphasis has been placed on the gradual transformation of the international environment which has made it possible for Europe to complement confrontation with negotiation.

1.2 Collective Security Evolution - Definition

States can inflict enormous destruction on their enemies. As a consequence, national security remains elusive. To defend themselves, states have the option to form alliances to combine their armaments with those of other states while maintaining a balance of power and negotiate arms control and disarmament agreements so as to reduce the threat of adversaries' weapons.

The idea of collective security has excited the minds of both statesmen and scholars for most of this century. The development of international organisations has been preoccupied with the achievement of collective security to such an extent that one scholar was moved to describe the relationship between them in these words:

*The twentieth century hope that international organisations might serve to prevent war, or, failing that, to defend states subjected to armed attack in defiance of organised efforts to maintain the peace, has been epitomised in the concept of collective security.*

*International Conflicts and Collective Security, Zacher, 1979, p. 1*
Conservatives and reformers, realists and idealists alike, affirm the sad truth of Hans Morgenthau's 1978 observation that throughout history,

... nations active in international politics are continuously preparing for, actively involved in, or recovering from organised violence in the form of war.

(Brown, International Relations in a Changing Global System, 1992, p. 57)

Kakonen (1973), argues that the concept of security is independent of the time and place. All states in different historical periods have had common interests to protect their integrity and independence. The belief in the intrinsic value and necessity of collective security has been apparent in Europe since 1919 with the formation of the League of Nations. In 1945, the United Nations was created, relying on, "... great power unanimity". Soon after the formation of the United Nations, it became apparent, according to Zacher (1979), that the UN could not institutionalise the idea of collective security in the form of concerted diplomatic, economic and military action to deter and terminate all armed attack. Thus, many scholars and statesmen began to search for alternative ways of utilising the UN's potential in conflict situations (International Conflicts and Security, p. 3). There were also movements in the direction of establishing regional collective security systems with the end result being the formation of NATO, the Western European Union and the French proposal for the creation of the European Defence Community between 1948 and 1950.

Erich Hula (1959), discussing the evolution of collective security, argues that by realising that the ideal of an international community of power, organised upon the pattern of the national community, is beyond reach...

We [the US] have turned to the device, employed in traditional diplomacy, of balancing power against power. We try, accordingly, to ensure the global equilibrium between our forces and those of potential enemies by means of national armaments and defensive alliances.

Alliance Policy in the Cold War, Ed. by Arnold Wolfers, 1959 p. 75

Hula's argument is reinforced by Thompson (1965) who stated that the rock bottom principle upon which collective security if founded provides that an attack on any state will be regarded as an attack on all states. It finds its measure in the simple doctrine of one for all and all for one (balancing power against power). Thompson partly explains why states should join collectively for their security by adding: "War anywhere, in the context of article II of the League of Nations, is the concern of every state" (From Collective Security to Preventative Diplomacy, Ed. by Laurus, J., p. 287).

Self-help and neutrality, according to Thompson (1965), are the antithesis of such a theory. However, in a more integrated world such as Europe of the 1990s, a conflict in any part of the world can affect conditions of peace in other parts. A disturbance at one point can upset the equilibrium at other points, and the adjustment of a single conflict often restores the foundations of harmony at other points of the world. The war in the Gulf is a recent
example of a war outside Europe which also affected the continent of Europe (in economic terms).

Collective security could be paralleled with what police action does for the domestic community. If the individual is threatened or endangered, he/she turns to the legitimate agents of law enforcement: the police. Similarly, if a state which is a member of a collective security alliance feels threatened, it seeks help and protection from the other member states. The legitimate agents of law and enforcement in this case are the binding agreements (i.e. article 5 of NATO) and the military help of the other member states.

Collective security arrangements of the 1990s include NATO, the WEU, the CSCE, as well as the EC. Unattributable sources have characterised them as collective security structures despite the fact that not all enjoy the characteristics discussed earlier for collective security; These options and their likely problems over the next decade are discussed in Chapter 4.

Collective security may not necessarily be related to sources that suggest the concept promoting peace and cooperation through interdependence and common interests. This may be the case within the structure but it is often not so outside the structure. Based on Karl Von Clausewitz's definition of war as "... the continuation of policy by other means", Brezinski (1992) suggested that by extension, the Cold War can be defined as warfare by other (non-lethal) means (Foreign Affairs, Fall 1992, Vol. 71, No. 4, p. 48). The main actors of the Cold War, NATO and the WTO, were collective security arrangements that made policies. In that sense, during the Cold War, collective security organisations, by opposing themselves and perceiving each other as threats, were involved in a non-lethal war. Therefore, although not promoting peace, the Cold War brought stability to Europe. As John Lewis Gaddis (1993) discusses:

We can now see that the Cold War, the most dangerous, bitter, and protracted rivalry between Great powers in modern history, did in time become the most protracted period of freedom from Great power war in modern history. Whether or not one approves of the means by which it happened, whether or not one even agrees on the way in which it happened, the simple fact is that the Cold War did evolve into a Long Peace. Whether the Long Peace can survive the end of the Cold War is, however, quite another matter.

(The End of the Cold War, ed. by M. J. Hogan, 1993, p. 21)

Thompson (1965), refers to the "real issue of collective security" by questioning why the implementation of a system logically so flawless, and enjoying such impressive official devotion and popular support, should have been accompanied by a period of virtually unprecedented collective security. It is a sobering fact that the 19th century was perhaps the most peaceful of modern times while the 20th century, by contrast, has been an epoch of unparalleled bloodshed (two World Wars, the Wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan where hundreds of thousands of people lost their lives).

NATO, although an organisation promoting peace as claimed in its preamble, most probably caused the creation of its counterpart, the Warsaw Pact, and became an important actor in the Cold War era of 1949 to 1989. It seems ironic that NATO was formed to create
security and stability for Europe but also contributed to the development of the Cold War. Would the WTO have been created if NATO had not existed? What are the reasons for the gap between theory and practice, the promise and the performance of collective security?

Part of the answer is related to threat perception, arms enhancements and not being able to predict the future. At the time of NATO's creation, the world was not in peace. Western Europeans were perceiving Communism as a threat and the chief consequence of the Second World War was the shift from a multi-polar system of dispersed power to bi-polarity (Pugh and Williams, Superpower Politics, 1990, p. 176). Therefore with (a) no political solidarity in the world; (b) with no common interests for the whole of Europe; and (c) at a changing time for the Continent, the promise of collective security and peace promoted counter-collective security arrangements and insecurity. If these three points were positive, then Europe might have had the major variables mentioned below that deal with the preconditions for collective security. At first sight, the task of maintaining external security would seem to be a simple one - to defend the state against attacks, to make provision for such a contingency and to maximise the state's position in relation to that of potential aggressors. By paralleling the state's position with that of an alliance, the objectives have more similarities than differences. The alliance, however, though theoretically and logistically equal (that is, each member is considered equal), is in fact a hierarchy, the order of which is determined by the capability and power potential of individual states, such as the case of the Soviet Union in the WTO, or the US in NATO. So far, security policy, according to Kakonen (1993), has been dominated by the preferences of those in power.

There are two approaches to the idea and the reality of collective security that have vied with one another in recent years, according to Thompson (1965). The one demands in the name of a principle that all nations at all times resist aggression. Its adherents maintain that only in this way can the national interests of independent states be protected and served. Another approach reaches other conclusions on the basis of opposing concepts and principles. In the present state of world affairs, "... we are told, a policy of collective security leads inevitably down the road of general war and universal catastrophe" (Classic Readings of International Relations, Williams, Goldstein, Shafritz, p. 301).

Thompson's approach may seem logical, however can be considered outdated, since the policies of the WTO and NATO, as collective security arrangements, did not eventually lead to general war and universal catastrophe. However, if the general transformations of Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union are seen as the consequence of the break-up of a bi-polar collective security world, then tensions in the East could possibly be described as catastrophic and war-like, reinforcing Thompson's approach.

In sum and based on the above discussion, collective security can be defined as "the method by which states with common interests combine their efforts to work together in order to face a common threat, through an institution of an organisation." A collective security arrangement can provide security for a specific state based on the assumption that an attack on that state is considered as an attack on all states included in the collective security arrangement.
Claude Jr. (1994) states that the definition of collective security may be approached by the process of elimination:

*It represents the means for achieving national security and world order which remain when security through isolation is discarded as an anachronism, security through self-help is abandoned as a practical impossibility, security through alliance is renounced as a snare and a delusion, and security through world government is brushed aside as a dream irrelevant to reality.*

(Classic Readings of International Relations, Williams, Goldstein, Shafritz; 1994, p. 211)

As Claude Jr. continues (p. 211),

... it is the principle that, in the relations of states, everyone is his brother's keeper; it is an international translation of the slogan 'One for all and all for one', it is the proposition that aggressive and unlawful use of force by any nation against any nation will be met by the combined force of all other nations.

Kegley and Wittkopf (1994), offer another definition of collective security with reference to alliances: Collective security through alliances are formal associations of states for the use (or non use) of military force, intended for either the security or the aggrandisement of their members, against specific states. Alliances thus are correlations that adhere to realism's first rule of statecraft: to increase military capabilities. States can do this by acquiring arms or by acquiring allies, and, throughout history, states have vigorously pursued both methods. (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1994, World Politics, p. 466-467).

Collective security is often viewed as an alternative to competitive alliances and the balance of power as a method for preserving peace. Collective security, according to Kegley (1994), asks each state to share responsibility for every other state's security. They are to take joint action against any transgressor, and all are to act in concert. (World Politics, p. 513).

During the Cold War, NATO and the WTO were the most popular examples of collective security organisations. They were regional alliance systems designed to deter a common external enemy. According to Haas (1969), alliances usually come into existence when the members are agreed on the identity of the enemy and wish to insure each other against him (When knowledge is power, Berkely, University of California Press, 1990).

1.3 Preconditions of Collective Security

In contrast to pacific settlement, which is mainly concerned to evoke peaceful attitudes, collective security depends upon a positive commitment to the value of world peace by a great mass of states.

According to defence analysts such as Laurus (1965), Pick and Critchley (1974), and Cuthbetson and Robertson (1990), the three main preconditions generally accepted among others are:
Chapter One

Collective Security

- Collective enforcement assumes a situation of peace, on which states with predominant strength agree. The unresolved conflict between East and West during the Cold War era had prevented the establishment of peace and this is a reason why the 1990s is characterised by many analysts as a unique decade. The WTO no longer exists, Communism is no longer perceived as a threat and the states of Europe have developed more promising relations. It is a promising time to bind states together for common purposes.

For example, since the CSCE's creation in 1973, the institution has brought together dozens of states to discuss security issues during the time of the Cold War and East-West confrontation. It provided an important step for debating such issues on a wide platform.

- Collective security demands that states subscribing to the status quo be willing and able at all times to muster overwhelming strength for collective defence at successive points of conflict. NATO is probably the best example of this despite the fact that it actually never fought a war. NATO, as it included the United States, was considered able militarily to confront the WTO and used bases in member states of the alliance such as Greece, Turkey and Germany among others.

The distribution of burden was unequal, however, with the US undertaking major responsibilities and the other states operating mainly in a supporting role. This may need to change in the 1990s as the demise of the Soviet threat permits a narrower and unilateral definition of the national security of the United States; they may replace collective security with selective security. "Tired of the Cold War burden, they will look to others to take the lead in ensuring the subsequent peace" (Luck, 1992, Foreign Policy #89, Winter 1992 - 93). Contributions from every member of the alliance is a necessity even when - and if - Europe takes the lead in any one of the options discussed. The CSCE and the EC do not have military objectives or military contributions to their structures which makes it even more difficult to stand on their own. The WEU, through NATO, can probably make such a provision eventually, whereas NATO enjoys this requirement.

- Finally, collective security requires, in Thompson's (1965) words: "... that at least the major powers enjoy a minimum of political solidarity and moral community". Arguably, the US and the Soviet Union lacked this requirement and became opponents on almost every level. It is essential that in the 1990s, the US, as the major remaining superpower, helps Russia, as well as other Eastern European states, in order to develop a partnership that would make both powers acceptable and allow peaceful coexistence under a collective security mechanism. America and the West seem in favor of a strong, prosperous and democratic Russia that, for the first time in history, will want to be able to live in accord with the laws of the civilised, democratic community. According to the Economist (May 6, 1995), Russia is suspicious of the West while Russia seems unreliable for the West (as a partner), paralleling the situation with the one after World War II and despite Russia's initial stance after the events of 1989.
Russian strength will allow us [the Russians] to contribute meaningfully to stability and peace

*(Foreign Policy, #88, Fall 1992, Essay, Lukin, V., pp. 74 -75)*

McNamara (1968), explains the importance of political solidarity and moral community at a national level, by looking at the United States and Canada: "Here are two modern nations, highly developed technologically, each with immense territory, both enriched with great reserves of natural resources, each militarily sophisticated and yet divided by an unguarded frontier of thousands of miles. There is not the remotest set of circumstances in any tangible time frame of the future in which these two nations would wage war on one another. But why is that so? Canada and the United States are at peace for reasons that have nothing to do with mutual military readiness. We are at peace, because of the vast fund of compatible beliefs, common principles and shared ideals" (The Essence of Security, p. 142 - 143).

Claude Jr. (1994), discusses that the basic requirement of collective security is that the premise of the 'indivisibility of peace' should be deeply established in the thinking of governments and peoples. The geographical remoteness of aggression is irrelevant; Kant's prophetic insight that "the intercourse which has been everywhere steadily increasing between the nations of the earth, has now extended so enormously that a violation of right in one part of the world is felt all over it" (Classic Readings of International Relations, Williams, Goldstein, Shafritz, p. 213) must be universally acknowledged. Examples supporting the above statement can be found when examining the situations in the former Yugoslavia, Kuwait, Somalia, Ethiopia and Haiti.

In summary, collective security assumes political solidarity, peaceful cooperation among states, the subjective requirement of "wanting" peace, military option to enforce and protect a state's rights (this implies economic vulnerability), and an institution to legally (by providing the necessary articles), express these basic principles.

**1.4 Collective Security and Political Union**

The chief practical obstacle to collective security is the political problem deriving from the conflict of independent foreign policies. The loyalties and interests of states participating in international organisations and collective security systems are of a different order from those of individuals taking part in the more intimate communities of the family and state.

Political Union is what the European Community has tried to achieve throughout the years. However, by assuming the difficulty of fifteen different, even interdependent states to reach common objectives, then the idea of a more complex collective security system such as NATO having to fight a war and requiring some sort of decision-making abilities becomes unlikely.

By examining decision-making, NATO has enjoyed a good record due to the fact that the United States was generally accepted as the superpower leader. In the fear of losing its US partner, Europeans backed away from instances such as the European Defence Community (EDC) or the WEU and it would be logical to say that if a war occurred in Europe, the
United States would probably be able to lead and unite Europeans for a common purpose. The United States presence is still an issue, with governments such as the Netherlands and Great Britain applauding the idea of continuing US involvement in Europe through NATO (Algeri, 1993, The European Union in the 1990s, eds. Wessels, Engel).

Even though the changes of 1989 have brought about the democratic reform for most states in Europe, this does not mean that it would be an easy task for the Continent to unite politically. Such an undertaking requires identical threat perceptions and common foreign policies and although the setting to do just that is more ideal than that of 1945 which created the bi-polar world, it remains a difficult task. It is a unique epoch, as the whole world has embarked into a form of cooperation, either political, economic or defence-related, and thus gradual steps are necessary as politics and foreign policy matters of each state differ in priorities. In addition, it is most likely for Europe to find a "leader" for defence, generally accepted, only when, arguably, political union has become a more plausible reality.

1.5 Summary: Collective security, a necessity

Security organisations such as NATO, the WEU and the WTO have been based upon the concepts of collective security and interdependence:

... recognition of this interdependence means that nations must begin to organise their security policies in cooperation with one another.

(The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, 1982, p. 6)

The European* environment is changing, and indeed always has and will continue to do so. Furthermore, this change is not orderly and moderately predictable like, for example, the growth and ageing process of a human being. "It is chaotic, disorderly and difficult to predict..." according to Nicholson (1981), (Change and the study of International Relations, ed. Buzan and Jones, 1981, p. 173). Collective security can be a way of being able to face a possible threat and can provide for stability for Europe, the way NATO and the WTO had during the Cold War era.

The primary benefit of "collective security" through an alliance is security. Security benefits, in a mutual defence alliance include chiefly a reduced probability of being attacked, greater strength in case of attack and prevention of the ally's alliance with one's adversary. The "success" of a collective security mechanism is arguably a difficult matter to measure. NATO is considered a successful organisation and has never overtly fought a war. It could be that because of this, (never fought a war), it has enjoyed success. The WTO can most probably be seen as successful by the Soviets (during the Cold War era), as they were the ones leading by force. Arguably, it depends on who is judging a particular institution and if that states security concerns could be alleviated through that mechanism.

Understanding the concept of collective security is essential towards the comprehension of the requirements and challenges that the collective security options face in the 1990s.
Chapter two deals with European attempts towards collective security between 1945 and 1989.

* The concept of Europe, its definition and which states are considered "in or out", is discussed in chapter 2, section 2.5.
Chapter Two

1945 - 1989: Europe and European Security
2.1 Introduction

The European politico-strategic situation has changed since the late 1980s. This chapter traces the problem of European security since the end of WW II. It discusses the various reasons for the formation of NATO, the WEU, the attempt of creating a European Defence Community and the division of Europe into superpower blocks.

European states, although satisfied with the presence of NATO and the United States and their involvement in European security after its formation in 1949, embarked on two European projects for security, influenced through the treaty of Dunkirk in 1947 and the Brussels Treaty of 1948. These projects concerned with security were the Western European Union (WEU) and the European Defence Community (EDC). Both attempts to build a “Europeanised” security structure failed in different ways and for different reasons which will be discussed in this chapter, and these only served to reinforce the view that post World War II Europe needed a superpower such as the United States on its side.

The WEU and the EDC were two attempts made to unite Europeans through concern for security. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), as well as the European Economic Community (EEC), demonstrate other integrative and interdependent in character unions whose roles also related to the security of the Continent, albeit indirectly. Collective security as well as alliances, whatever their nature, are based on the theory of interdependence. Europeans attempted to pool their resources together, therefore limiting the possibility of an attack on one another.

Furthermore, this chapter deals with the reasons for the break-up of the old security order. The grip of Soviet imperialism which held Eastern Europe together has now relaxed, releasing nationalist energies. Defence structures and military doctrines of states are being re-defined: “Everywhere, familiar but outdated ideas from the past are mixed with the uncomfortable but inescapable demands of the future” (Klaus Kinkel, German Minister of Foreign Affairs NATO Review, #5, October 1992, p. 3).

2.2 Background: Post 1945 Era - Overlay

The European security complex between 1945 and 1989 became the nut in the nutcracker of a global rivalry dominated by the two superpowers - the United States and the Soviet Union. The attitude of the Soviet Union to Europe in general, and the problem of Germany as a legacy of the War in particular, gave the Europeans the two major reasons to feel threatened by the danger of war inherent in the superpower rivalry. In addition, the wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan promoted additional tension for the Continent of Europe.

Fursdon (1980) suggests that the signing of the United Nations Charter at San Francisco on 26 June 1945 had raised the hopes of the world that at last a formula had been devised which could somehow keep the peace for years to come. However, speeches by the Soviet President Kalinin in August 1945, followed thereafter by Stalin and Molotov, ominously foreshadowed the line of Soviet policy to strengthen “...co-operation between the peace-loving socialist powers and to overtake and surpass the most developed countries of Europe and the United States.” (The European Defence Community, 1980, p. 20).
Keenan, of the United States, stated in 1945:

A basic conflict is ... arising over Europe between the interests of Atlantic sea power, which demand the preservation of vigorous and independent political life on the Eurasian peninsula, and the interests of the jealous Eurasian land power which must always seek to extend itself west and will never find a place, short of the Atlantic Ocean, where it can, from its own stand-point, safely stop.

Riste, Western Security, 1986, p. 60

Keenan's assessment of the post-war situation made it clear to the Americans that something had to be done to protect Western interests.

Bown and Mooney (1981) and Rubinstein (1989) generally agree with the assumption that the Europeans were caught in the middle of a “Soviet-Western suspicion”. The Soviets were interested in extending their military power westward into the centre of Europe and transforming the social, economic and political order of the states influenced. In addition, President Truman stated on 12 March 1945 that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. “I believe we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way” (Cold War to Detente, 1981, p. 16 - Soviet Foreign Policy since 1945, p. 69 respectively)

Fursdon (1980) and Riste (1986) argue that Germany, as a legacy of war was also a perennial preoccupation not only of European statesmen, but also of the two superpowers. Furdsdon argues that it was clear that the key to the future of Europe lay in a solution to the German problem (Fursdon, p. 12). A joint US chiefs-of-staff analysis in April 1947 summarised the dilemma that without German aid, the remaining states of Western Europe could scarcely be expected to withstand the armies of their ideological opponents. Riste (1986), adds that the complete resurgence of German industry was essential for the economic recovery of France whose security is inseparable from the combined security of the United States, Canada and Great Britain (Riste, Western Security p. 72).

According to Buzan (1990), by the late 1940s, Europeans were appealing to the United States to rescue them from a threat of a continental empire, posed by the Soviets and the fear of Germany. The Soviets had taken their military position at the 1945 cease-fire line as an opportunity to reconstruct in their own image the governments of the five states (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania) plus East Germany under their occupation.

The “assistance” Truman had mentioned in his speech was the initial step of American involvement in European affairs. The second step that effectively promoted US interests in Europe was the Marshall Plan. Hogan (1989) and Kirsanov (1975) suggest that the Marshall plan rested squarely on an American conviction that European economic recovery was essential to the long-term interests of the United States. Policy makers in the Truman administration were convinced that a “dynamic economy” at home required American trade and investment abroad, which in turn required the reconstruction of the major trading partners in Europe and their reintegration into a multilateral system of world trade. By doing this, the US would be able to play a role in the Continent and also promote their own interests. Gimbel (1976) also suggests that action on European recovery was urgent as George Marshall, the one who proposed the plan, was convinced that the Russians wanted to delay European recovery—perhaps for the political advantage that economic chaos would provide to the communists (Gimbel, The Origins of the Marshall Plan, 1976, p. 8).
The Marshall plan through its economic character can be perceived, apart from a mere charity offer to Europe, as an American action that could give them a reason to promote their own defence concerns, a thought discussed by Hogan (1989), Gimbel (1976) and Lane (1987).

The Soviet pressure on the straits, Iran and Northern Greece made possible a Soviet break-through which might open three continents to Soviet penetration.

According to Gimbel (1976), the Marshall plan could possibly control or serve as a German stabiliser. The United States, through the Marshall plan, would publicly declare its willingness to have its zone of Germany collaborate in European recovery. Transactions between Germany and other European states as well as German production could be monitored by the US (Gimbel, The Origins of the Marshall Plan, p. 250).

The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall aid plan and the later formation of NATO on one hand and the formation of the WTO and COMECON on the other were the steps that cut Europe in half, creating the basis of the Cold War and made the question of European security one to be dealt with by outsiders: The US and the Soviet Union respectively.

Pugh (1992) argues that the apparent durability of the Cold War was attributed to the division of Europe and the creation of two German states, the conventional military power of the two alliances and the threat of nuclear war (European Security- towards 2000, p. 7). Essentially, the European security complex was dominated by "non-Europeans" between 1945 and 1989. NATO, as Kaplan (1970) argues, was both a cause and a consequence of developing international bipolarity (Great Issues of International Politics, p. 124).

Despite both structures' (NATO - WTO) membership policies as stated in both treaty preambles (open to all states of Europe), their memberships were limited and became a main factor causing the division of Europe into superpower blocs. Did not the Europeans seek a security structure of their own without outsider influence? The post-1945 European security complex had as a requirement the need of superpower assistance generally accepted in the literature. However, the Western Europeans made two attempts to acquire European security by Europeans, for Europeans: the Western European Union (WEU) and the European Defence Community (EDC). Did these structures have the requirements needed at the time of their formation to become critical for European security concerns? And what are their similarities with the post-1989 era?

The Western European Union (WEU)

The WEU was an idea suggested before the formation of NATO and has its origins in the Brussels Treaty of 1948. Cahen (1989) states that the origins and immediate purpose of the Brussels Treaty were concerned with security, but the circumstances in which it was conducted as well as its title and content clearly indicate its role in the general process of building a United Europe (The WEU and NATO, p. 2). The 1954 Protocol, modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty, admitted the FRG and Italy to the Organisation and replaced its explicit anti-German dedication with an anodyne statement of purpose: "To promote the unity and encourage the progressive integration of Europe."
Chapter Two

It went on to establish a Council of Western European Union, giving each member state one seat, which would in turn direct the mechanism that was the WEU's real raison d'être - the so-called Agency for the Control of Armaments (ACA).

However, with the signing of the Washington Treaty in 1948, the treaty's implementation and the subsequent establishment of NATO, the organisation gave up the defence structures and transferred its military activities to NATO. This was achieved through Article 4 of the protocol modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty on October 23, 1954 which prevented the WEU from duplicating the work of NATO staff.

Analysts such as Alford and Hunt (1988), and Cahen (1989), argue that due to the fact of the WEU not being able to take on responsibilities from NATO made the WEU subservient to NATO and in a way made it fall into oblivion. At the time of the WEU's creation (1948 - 1954), the Europeans were reconstructing and the time was ripe for Europeans to secure themselves. Communism was looming and the idea of breaking away from NATO, or giving the WEU additional responsibilities could have made the Americans withdraw from Europe, and the Europeans did not seem ready to take that chance. As Ullman (1991) and Frost and Mchallan (1992) argue, the elaborate institutional arrangements and processes set in motion by the WEU protocols were scarcely necessary. West Germany's rearmament (a major concern for Europe's security after World War 2) proceeded slowly. By the time its forces came anywhere near their stipulated WEU ceiling, they had become mainstays of NATO's strength, and a solid community of trust had developed between Bonn and its WEU partners, who were also partners in NATO and, following the British entry in 1973, the European Community. The WEU's Agency for the Control of Armaments (ACA), far from being the ever-vigilant watch-dog that the drafters of its charter had in mind, soon found itself a bureaucracy without a mission.

Unwin (1990) describes the WEU as an "essentially paper organisation" demonstrating its lack of dominance in the European scene and reinforcing its subservience to NATO. However, analysts suggest a new, dominant and responsible role for the WEU in the 1990s, due to the change of the European scene and to further assist European integration. The Maastricht Treaty of 1991 (in articles J1 and J2) sets a deadline (1996) for the WEU to take over - up to a certain point - new tasks and replace the old security structure, by providing a European platform for security.

The interesting point to make about the WEU is the structure's attempt to become an actor in European security despite its limited membership (Figure 1) and lack of superpower assistance at the time that hampered its achievements.

The European Defence Community (EDC)

The EDC was the object of a long series of negotiations stretching from the presentation of the Pleven Plan on October 24, 1950 to its final rejection by the French National Assembly.

The EDC was a far-reaching architectural scheme - not only for European Security but for European governance. The Pleven Plan called for a European army in which "... contingents supplied by the participating states would be incorporated ... at the level of the smallest possible
Chapter Two 1945 - 1989: Europe and European Security


The land-force components of the so-called European Defence Forces would consist of fourteen French divisions, twelve German, twelve Italian, and five from the Low states, all under one flag, wearing a common uniform, and brought together in mixed corps.

Because the sphere of responsibility lay at the core of national sovereignty, the EDC was widely regarded as the embryo of a true European government. Sovereignty seemed so much at stake as the French National Assembly failed to ratify the EDC treaty on August 30, 1954.

Professor G. L. Williams (1991) parallels the EDC attempt of 1950 - 54 with 1990s European quest towards security. The essential question, according to Williams, is whether the so-called "Europeanist approach" which would, in practice, entail little or no involvement by the United States in the defence of Europe, would (at the time) or should (in the 1990s) prevail over the "Atlanticist" approach which stresses European defence links with the United States, and the ascendancy of American strategic doctrines (The Logic of Diversity, p. 5). The similarities of both eras are discussed.

American troops at the time of the EDC proposal were engaged in a war in South Korea, re-awakening fears of communism in the Western world and leaving a gap in America's military presence in Europe, a fact which raised doubts as to the effectiveness of trans-atlantic security in the event of an attack on Europe. Europeans had their first reason to search for a more "Europeanised" approach to European defence.

The Germans were pressing for rearmament and the EDC was a proposal to rearm Germany and give Europeans a defensive dimension. Monnet (1978) argues that the United States would be prepared to listen to France if she expressed such ideas in the form of a positive and practical plan (Memoirs, p. 340).

Van der Harst (1986) and Furdson (1980) demonstrate the fears of certain European states of breaking away or scaring away United States' assistance and NATO. Despite the ambitious scheme of the EDC to operate in accordance with the undertakings of the Atlantic Pact, the Netherlands thought that their interests would be better promoted within NATO, fearing the plan would bring about a cleavage in the Atlantic Community (The Netherlands and the European Community, p. 2). Experiments such as the EDC might have hampered the execution of plans within NATO and placed certain states' commitments to NATO at stake, as well as their state's defence.

Similar fears of breaking away from NATO and searching for a more "Europeanised" security structure face Europeans in the 1990s. Williams (1992), Buzan (1991), Pugh (1992) are some of the analysts who state the difficulties, even for the 1990s, of breaking away from NATO. Their observations deal with the uncertainties of Europe in the 1990s, the new states being formed and the possibility of dealing with nationalist tensions and external threats as illustrated by Iraq.
Four years after the French proposal for the creation of the EDC, the French assembly voted against it, shelving the whole idea and stimulating Fursdon to state that "... the EDC was dead, without even having the honour or the dignity of a funeral oration." (The European Defence Community - A History, 1980, p. 297).

The major reasons for the EDC's failure could be seen in a context where a parallel with Europe in the 1990s can be drawn.

1. At the time the EDC was debated, there was no dominant political leadership in Europe. The question of who would be in charge and which state would lead the possible security structure were left unanswered. There was uncertainty about what the next British government would do. The British were also tied up in conflict situations around the world. France's situation was also rather uncertain; the 4th Republic was left to solve problems left by the 3rd republic thus creating an unstable French government. The Germans were the ones in question of being rearmed, and were thus on probation, and this therefore left no generally accepted political leadership in Europe able enough to form and run the EDC, without creating possible disputes among its European partners.

Similarly, the question of leadership is apparent in the 1990s. If the Europeans decided to create their own structure and break-away from NATO, or even lead an existing structure (NATO or WEU), does it seem possible to do so without raising any doubts of leadership? Europe in the 1990s is dealing with existing problems of the EC and the implementation of Maastricht. Is it feasible for the Europeans to embark on such a project (leading to a European defence structure) without creating problems and being acceptable by all European states? Lacouture (1993) stated in Time Magazine (July 12, 1993): "In the history of the world, I cannot think of a period where they have been so few great leaders. Are they here and we are not aware of them?" The American Enterprise Magazine (1993), documents the case. Large majorities of polling samples in every G-7 state except Japan express unhappiness with the directions their nations are taking: 71% in the US, 70% in Canada, 63% in Britain and 61% in France. The surveys bear out a growing sense that electorates see their leaders not as temporarily lost path-finders but rather as "Empty suits". (Time Magazine, July 12, 1993, p. 14).

2. The EDC discussed the idea of a United Army but did not set political objectives. Who would command the army? In order to have a military strategy, political objectives and methods are required. According to Stares (1991), a major component for a security structure concerns the adequacy of the command system that an alliance can establish to warn of threatening developments, harness its collective military power to deter attack and orchestrate its defensive operation should deterrence fail (Command Performance, p. 1). The EDC lacked these requirements and could be characterised as an optimistic attempt for European security only half a decade after the end of WW II.

Similarly, these requirements need to be met in the 1990s for Europe and need to be handled with sensitivity. The topic of leadership and command with set political objectives require common foreign policies up to a certain point creating an additional problem for Europeans, who have been trying to reach economic integration for almost four decades now.
The EDC planners seemed not ready to take the responsibility of replacing the Americans by creating their defence community. The pressing question of abandoning American support lies with Europe today and is discussed in chapter 4.

Membership figure 1

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
WEU: Western European Union
CSCE: Conference in Security and Co-operation in Europe
EU: European Union

★ Membership of North Atlantic Co-operation Council
♀ Associate member of WEU
♀ Observer at North Atlantic Co-operation Council
♀ Observer in WEU
♀ Observer in CSCE
♀ Participation suspended

Source: Times, June 9, 1994, p. 23
Europe's second attempt towards a European defence structure had failed and the lessons drawn from the EDC adventure must be analysed to parallel them with the situation in the 1990s and avoid similar problems.

2.3 Europe in the International System - Interdependence and Europe

What is Europe? .... Thought that is never contended.

P. Hazard, The Recovery of Europe, ed. R. Mayne 1970

The question of Europe is essential for the overall understanding of the Continent's security pressures. After WW II, the Continent found itself in the middle of two opposing superpower structures: The United States and the Soviet Union. The US emerged undisputedly as the strongest military and economic power. Its leaders had to come to accept, as Unwin (The Community and Europe, 1992, p. 13) argues, that it had, even if only for the sake of its own security and prosperity, global responsibilities which could not be evaded.

Europe had an identity which was divided into two opposing blocs. Its geographical security was dependent upon two outside superpowers. Therefore, Europe's security was affected by the character and structure of the international system. Buzan (1990), argues that the stability and character of the international system are deeply affected by what happens in Europe. "At no point in this century, or the previous one, has European security been a subject confined to the interests of Europeans" (The European Security Order Recast, p. 45).

Arguably, with the formation of European communities such as the ECSC and the EC, the member states emphasised the alienation of Eastern Europe by its absorption into the Soviet sphere after 1945. The European communities were becoming a narrow European vision and a new possibility to count as a great power, based and built on the theory of interdependence.

Rosenau (1980) suggests in a theoretical context that:

... the more societies, cultures, economies and politics become interdependent, the less do the resulting conflicts lend themselves to resolution through military threats and actions.

The Study of Global Interdependence, p. 41

Keohane and Nye (1977, p. 75) state:

In common parlance, dependence means a state of being determined or significantly affected by external forces. Interdependence, most simply defined, means mutual dependence. Interdependence in world politics refers to the situations characterised by reciprocal effects among countries or actors in different countries.

A characteristic of complex interdependence stated by Keohane and Nye which is relevant to the study has to do with military force. The assumption is that military force is not used by governments towards other governments within the region, or on the issues, when complex interdependence prevails. The term "complex interdependence" entails various characteristics of an alliance such as economics and politics along with defence.
Unattributable sources suggest that European Security since 1945 was believed to be achievable though economic interdependence. This was the case of the ECSC and the EEC.

The ECSC was the first major post-war step towards European integration. Borchard (1990) states that the ECSC's preamble expressed the resolve firstly to create "real solidarity" through practical achievements and by establishing an Economic Community to create the basis for a deeper and broader community among peoples, thus suggesting the treaty's defensive concerns between France and Germany, channelled though economic interdependence.

Duchene and Cockfield (1990) reinforce the above argument and add that the whole idea of European integration was to achieve political union and thus have commonly accepted European security. Political union was to be achieved through economic integration. The member states had enmeshed themselves in a network of interdependencies which press even more tightly on their freedom of action, therefore suggesting less probability of members coming against each other.

In more recent studies, Martin (1991) and Pinter (1991) argue that the movement towards Political Union was not abandoned with the creation of the EEC; "It was instead channelled into the economic field." Political union which is a requirement for common European security was - and still is - a key factor missing from the puzzle of a common European defence structure and the member states are aware of this fact, as their attempts to reach PU through the EC suggest.

The preambles of both the ECSC Treaty and the EEC Treaty demonstrate their concern for European security:

ECSC:

Considering that world peace can be safeguarded only by creative efforts ... convinced that the contribution which an organised and vital Europe can make ... is indispensable to the maintenance of peace relations ... to raise the standard of living and further works of peace ... to substitute for age old rivalries the merging of their essential interests; to create a broader and deeper community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts ...

Treaties Establishing the European Communities, 1987
Abridged Version, p. 19

EEC:

... resolved by thus pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty, and calling upon the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts.

Treaties establishing the European Communities, 1987
Abridged version, p. 120

Martin (1991), in his study Europe, an Ever Closer Union, argues that "European Political Union has been the theoretical goal ever since the first modern conception of the European Community" which supports the argument of the EEC being not only an economic union, but more than that.

It has taken the EC several decades to reach this goal and part of the explanation lies with the assumption that Europeans felt comfortable with the idea of NATO acting as a deterrent not only from external threats, but also among themselves. Only after 29 years (1957 - 1986) of
efforts towards economic union did the Europeans discuss common foreign policy and political union explicitly through the Single European Act (SEA).

Article 224 of the EEC treaty obliges member states to consult each other with a view to taking united steps to minimise disturbance to the functioning of the common market by measures that a member state may need to take in the event of:

- serious internal disturbances affecting the maintenance of law and order;
- war or serious international tension constituting the threat of war; or
- in order to carry out obligations it has accepted for the purpose of maintaining peace and international security.

Lodge (1989, The European Community and the Challenge of the Future, pp. 224 - 225), commenting on Article 224, argues that the term “security” was recognised as having economic dimensions with the result that the member states could not credibly reserve exclusively to themselves the pursuit of high politics and diplomacy, a reality privately recognised years ago through the Article, and a degree of cooperation in defence matters may be inferred from this.

The ECSC, EDC, EEC, WEU and NATO are “interdependent” structures in nature, that qualify as examples of Rosenau’s, and Keohane and Nye’s theories of interdependence. Furthermore, it is assumed that the broader the security structure, the less likely the threat since within a broad structure states would not act against one another.

Roland Stromberg (1965), reinforcing the interdependent nature of collective security, associates with it the following assumptions:

- All international disputes are subject to peaceful, just, satisfactory settlement;
- Nations are for the most part inclined to peace, not war;
- The inclination to war is everything: war results only when at least one side is guilty of a deliberate aggressive action;
- Since wars are always caused by a deliberate aggressor, this must be checked in its first stages if it will lead on to even greater aggression; the incipient criminal will certainly become a hardened one if not caught in time.
- As an inference from the last two points, all states have an obvious stake in a war no matter where it may occur, and will, if they understand their interests properly, join in helping to suppress it (Joel Laurus, editor, From Collective Security to Preventative Diplomacy, p. 277).

Undoubtedly, NATO enjoyed these characteristics and these also existed up to a certain point in the EEC and the ECSC. The EDC as well as the WEU were not prepared to handle an international dispute, as both European attempts failed (literally in the case of the EDC), to satisfy all member states. The above assumptions include political thinking and appropriate leadership. Only NATO, as an example, satisfies most requirements.

When states pool resources to form an economic or political union, they need one another to face external threats, or in other instances would most probably consult one another before harming anyone in order to keep the union in peaceful terms. An example arises by suggesting
the unlikely event of one member threatening another of the same union either in the EU or NATO. Whether this is achieved successfully or unsuccessfully is a different question. Analysis of each structure is required before an attempt is made to answer the above question.

2.4 The Post WWII Era Transition: Reasons

The transition of the post World War 2 era was a rapid phenomenon taking place immediately after 1989. A whole array of internal and external forces, some of them in the making for several decades, had been pushing in that direction. The internal forces in Eastern Europe, according to Buzan (1990) included:

1. The growing demoralisation, corruption and incompetence of community parties (e.g. Rumania, Soviet Union);
2. The loss of economic momentum, and
3. The consolidation of civil society against communist rule.

During 1989, the internal balance of forces in Eastern Europe underwent fundamental change. From late 1989 onwards the process of German unification bridged Eastern and Western Europe and dealt a massive blow to overlay by removing its keystone.

The external forces are related with the "change" in attitude of the former Soviet Union under President Gorbachev which lowered threat perceptions in both Eastern and Western Europe, the different stance that the United States needed to take in order to blend in with their improved and developed Western allies - which had also closed the gap between them, and the end of the Cold War, with the East conceding and recognising Western political ideals.

Furthermore, the European Community played its role as an institution that promoted the concept of European integration attracting other European states into its system. As Serfaty (1992) argues, the revolutions of 1989 celebrated the victory of the Atlantic Community: "the end of Europe's ideological division after the liberation of Eastern Europe and the unification of Germany, together with (and because of) a mellowed Soviet state anxious to join Europe by consent after it had been shown that Europe could not be conquered by force" (Europe in Transition, Jackson, ed., p. 75)

The Cold War ended, according to Jackson (1991), when two conditions were fulfilled. First, Soviet stakes in Central and Eastern Europe drastically diminished in importance. That occurred when the government of Mikhail Gorbachev made clear that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) would no longer use coercion to maintain in power the Communist regimes that Moscow had once imposed upon much of the region. Second, the Federal Republic of Germany became a power committed to preserving Central Europe's territorial status quo rather than revising it. For the first time, neither the Soviet Union nor the Federal Republic of Germany face any problem whose solution might lie in the use of military force beyond its own state frontiers (Jackson, Europe in Transition, 1991, p. 138).
The change in the Soviet attitude under Gorbachev brought with it the fall of the Berlin wall, the end of the Cold War, and the decline of Communism. "Even a year ago, we could scarcely have imagined the extent and the speed of the changes which have since swept the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary and now East Germany" (Thatcher in Freedman, Europe Transformed, 1990, p. 359).

The failed coup of August 1991 in the Soviet Union had given the final blow to the tumbling communist empire and thus to the post-war world order. In the wake of the coup, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was formally dissolved. The legality of the communist party in the Soviet Union on the former territory of the USSR was suspended, and the party was outlawed in some of the republics. As Gorbachev pointed out, "The three days in August were a real watershed. I sometimes say that what happened before the coup was, so to speak, before the new era, and after it was the beginning of a new epoch." (Rummel, Towards Political Union, 1992, p 3). The above citation demonstrates the recognisable change not only for the Soviet Union, but for the whole of Europe.

Europe is entering a new epoch, the old one shattered by the metamorphosis of Eastern Europe. The breakup of the old European structure through the various reasons mentioned have created uncertainty and new questions deriving from these reasons need to be examined.

1. What would be the new position of NATO and the United States commitment towards Europe?

2. What will be the new role of the European Community as far as security and defence matters are concerned?

3. Which security structures (CSCE, WEU, NATO, EU) merit to be chosen, authorised and accepted by European states?

4. The identification of a possible threat(s) in order to formulate and organise the chosen security regime;

5. And finally, who will lead the new security arrangement in Europe?

Kliot (1992), characterised the decade of the 1990s as "a world of many consortia in which no single actor can dominate the rest, a world of forging coalitions and agreements." (Kliot and Waterman, The Political Geography of Conflict and Peace, 1992, p 38). University of Chicago political scientist John J. Mearsheimer discussed in his article "Back to the future* Instability after the Cold War" in 1990 that the decade of the 1990s will not enjoy the stability of the Cold War era. The future, he hypothesises, will indeed resemble the past. European international politics in the decades ahead will be more reminiscent of the turbulent periods before the two world wars than the stable period between 1945 and 1990. Europe will be transformed to a multipolar system of shifting alignments and complex manoeuvrings for power that will be "far less stable than the one the world has known since 1945." (Jackson, Europe in Transition, 1991, pp. 139 - 140)

As the Cold War has come to an end, the post world war two alliances are either disintegrating or undergoing profound transformation, promoting a symbiosis of the two Europe's: "... the real Europe", as President Mitterand wrote, "... that of history and geography" (Crouch and Marquard, The Politics of 1992, 1990, p. 38).
2.5 New Political Geography for Europe

Cohen (1992), based on the assumption that power is becoming more diffused across the globe, draws two diametrically opposed conclusions about prospects for peace. One view is that the decline of superpower domination and the rise of economic interdependence means not only far less risk of global war, but also presages a general condition of peace and prosperity. The other is that there is every reason to assume that the 1990s will be even more unstable, as clashes of economic interest supersede or exacerbate territorial or ideological disputes (Kliot and Waterman, The political Geography of Conflict and Peace, 1992, p. 18). This view suggests that economic interests of regions or states are more likely to trigger conflict than possible military threats.

Hegemonic powers are declining and there is an international reorganisation of our world. Hegemony is a condition in which one state is powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing interstate relations and is willing to do so (Kliot and Waterman), such as the Netherlands (17th century), Britain (18th-19th centuries) and the United States (mid 20th century). Sir Charles Powell, Private Secretary to Prime Minister John Major of Britain, as well as Dominique Moisi, Associate Director of the French Institute of International Affairs in Paris, reinforce the above argument of a “decline of hegemonic power”. At a recent conference in Berlin (1991), both Powell and Moisi characterised the United States as a slowly fading presence on the European scene. Moisi stated that the Europeans should be prepared for the time when there is less America in Europe. “In the immediate future there is no alternative to NATO. But in the long-run, the United States interest is to help Europeans to get their act together. (Time Magazine, December 9, 1991, p. 21).

With hegemonic power declining in our era, and with the bi-polar world vanished, “Europe” is becoming more and more difficult to identify and states are sceptical about taking on responsibilities over security concerns.

With the Eastern European states on their way towards democracy, the Continent, in security terms, has acquired new boundaries. Arguably, the European Community member states could form one version of “Europe”, or the area from Poland to Portugal. Another could suggest Europe as the area from the Atlantic to the Urals (based on de Gaulle or on Gorbachev’s Common European home Perestroika), or the states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Therefore when the term “European security” is analysed, the boundaries of Europe have to be specifically set and objectives established.

The difference between the various security structures are presented. The 16 states that have membership in NATO include the United States; the WEU has a membership of 10 European states; the EU, based on article 257 of the Treaty of Rome, consists of 15 states, and membership in the CSCE, according to NATO review (1994), has reached 54 states. All of them include the term “European” but all set their own different boundaries (Figure 1).

As far as the EC is concerned, article 257 of the Treaty of Rome states: “Any European state may apply to become a member of the EC”. It has therefore mattered to governments of Turkey and Malta, for example, whether they are considered by their neighbours to be included in the accepted definition of Europe. The article demonstrates the ambiguity of the definition of Europe.

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All these structures could be used as stepping stones towards the creation of a new security structure, or could be transformed and adjusted to meet the needs of the Europe of the 1990s.

Based on these different options Europeans have in concentrating on an institution, the boundaries of a possible new European Security structure would most probably be based on member-states of institutions rather than maps. Security and common defence are matters of great concern. If a possible applicant state could contribute towards defence issues or if a possible applicant state could be controlled by becoming a member then its acceptance is most probable (e.g. US and Germany respectively for NATO in the late 1940s and the newly formed Eastern Republics for NATO's PFP plan in 1994 - discussed in chapter 4).

2.6 Summary: Time for Europeans to lead their own security?

The political upheavals of the past few years have fundamentally altered Europe's security landscape. Just as after the Napoleonic Wars or in the post-war years after 1918 and 1945, Europeans in the 1990s have the task of developing a permanent and just order of peace in Europe. Europe is faced with a double challenge. Geographically, it is no longer between two unitary military blocs. Instead, to the East of the area covered by the former WTO, new states have emerged some of which are still searching for identity and stability. To the West, NATO continues to exist. But since the East-West confrontation, which originated primarily from the tension between two different value systems and ideologies has concluded, Europe, according to many analysts, has to acquire more responsibilities in its quest towards security. After all, Europeans are the ones needing security directly. The two attempts for a dominant security structure through the WEU and the EDC demonstrate the sensitivity of matters. More “European” responsibilities might trigger US support in the wrong direction and the question of leadership is also important. By including the various problems discussed in chapter three (namely nationalistic tensions, threat perception, Germany and outdated security structures), it becomes apparent that the Europeans need to work in order to find a feasible and “accepted by everyone” security architecture for the next decades.

As Manfred Wörner, Secretary General of NATO (1988 - 1994) had argued:

Indeed, small risks that our democracies find difficult to handle can prove more dangerous in the end than massive threats, such as that from the Warsaw Pact, which tend by their very enormity to generate political solidarity and military means of deterrence needed to counter them.

What is European Security after the Cold War?, PMI publication, December 1993, p. 5

Finally, the various attempts towards security between 1945 and 1989 were all based on a possible, but clear, threat; Germany and the former Soviet Union for NATO, the WEU, the EDC, the ECSC and the West for the WTO. A number of the above organisations continue to exist, but clear threats are not evident, making the whole issue of European security uncertain. Chapter 3 deals with the various issues Europe may face in the 1990s, as well as the essential topic of threat perception. European attempts towards common security were based on perceptions of threat. The major changes in the European Continent since 1989 have created a new Europe, as discussed earlier in this chapter. However, has the importance of threat perception effaced despite the end of the Cold War?
Chapter Three
New Challenges for Europe
3.1 Introduction

The European political-strategic situation has changed over the past few years. The threat of massive attack from the USSR and its satellites has receded and the emergence of new risks - the violent nationalist sentiments associated with instability, intrinsic to the historic changes - are taking place in Eastern Europe. At the same time, the Gulf crisis proved that threats now facing Europe no longer come from only one direction, and has provided tangible evidence of the danger of a proliferation of weapons of man destruction. (NATO Review, #3, June 1992)

The aftermath of the Cold War has created new problems for Europe. The Continent in the 1990s is required to deal with various pressures that require solutions and close attention: What will happen to European Integration and the Maastricht agreement? How should Europeans deal with the nationalist tension in the former Yugoslavia? Should NATO continue to be involved? Should NATO continue to exist at all, since its former opponents, the WTO and Communism no longer exist? What about the threat of Germany which seems (as a state), much stronger re-unified and lies in the centre on the Continent? These unprecedented questions/developments have convinced even hard-headed pragmatists that a crucial turning point in world affairs has now been reached.

Arguably, the Continent has entered an era of insecurity and a period of "cold peace" (a characterisation by M. Pugh, 1991). This chapter deals with four major problems confronting Europeans today:

- The problem of perceiving new threats (vital for the organisation and management of a security structure);
- The problem of choosing between a Europeanist or Atlanticist response, (e.g. should NATO depart from Europe along with US assistance?);
- The problem of German unification as a threat for stability in Europe; and finally,
- The problem of Europe in the post Cold War era being managed by Cold War structures (e.g. NATO, WEU).

By examining these problems, a picture of European security dilemmas can be acquired to comprehend the nature of the problems being faced by the alternatives discussed in chapter 4.

3.2 Threat Perception: A Definition

Research in international crisis takes it for granted that a perception of threat is central to the overall phenomenon. Hermann (1979) cites the threat to "high-priority goals of the decision-making unit as one of the three defining characteristics of International crisis" (Cohen, Threat Perception in International Crisis p. 3). Threat perception is, if anything, the decisive intervening variable between event and reaction in international crisis. For when
threat is not perceived, even in the face of apparently objective evidence, there can hardly be a mobilisation of defence resources. Conversely, threats may be perceived and measures taken, even when the supposed opponent possesses no malicious intent. This could enable alliances or states to have the appropriate readiness.

Similarly, states form alliances to pool resources with others facing a common threat. For example, emerging from World War II, the common threat to the Western democracies was two-fold according to Sharp (1991, After an American Withdrawal): a resurgent Germany and an expansionist USSR. Initially, the German threat loomed larger, as reflected in the language of the 1947 Anglo-French treaty of Dunkirk and the 1948 Brussels Treaty. After the Soviet blockade of Berlin and the communist-controlled coup in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviet threat began to dominate West European perceptions, and statesmen on both sides of the Atlantic looked for certain structures that would secure them defensively. Hence, NATO and the WTO were created.

When there is a reasonable idea of both the nature of threats, and the vulnerabilities of the objects towards which they are directed, the importance of common security as a policy problem may become easier to comprehend. As Buzan (1991) states,

"insecurity reflects a combination of threats and vulnerabilities, and the two cannot meaningfully be separated."

The European Security Order Recast, p. 112

The period of the Cold War was probably the most dangerous phase of the "imaginary" war (as Kaldor characterises it), a period when the two sides, the US and the Soviet Union, seemed closest to real war. Both sides could be said to have been testing out the boundaries of their systems, exploring limits, feeling their way towards the set of rules and regulations which would govern their behaviour. Both the Soviets and the Americans perceived each other as threats, and when threat perceptions are clear, as they were between the Soviets and the Americans, security structures can become a more plausible reality.

By defining threat perception as "the expectation that another state will be harmful in a specific way" this could be elaborated, adding that it also involves evidence of two kinds: of capability to do harm and on intent to do it. Knorr (1979), one of the first theorists to analyse the topic suggests: "Threat perceptions rest on estimates of the past and present. These estimates are inferences from usually fragmentary, opaque and contradictory bits of information. Second, these perceptions concern the future, and there can be no reliable information about this future" As Cohen (1979) adds,"... thus, threat perception is above all cognitive construct which creates an image of reality; it is a device, a hypothesis" (Threat Perception in International Crisis, Cohen, ed., p. 9).

The US hypothesis after the Soviet blockade of Berlin and the communist-controlled coup in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was concerned with the Soviets and communism as the perceived threats towards Western Europe, which in turn could also become threats to the United States. As Lister (1974) states (commenting on the "rules" of the Cold War game), in his
third rule: The Herman Kahn rule - "Each side must act on the assumptions that the other harbours the worst possible intentions towards it" (The Cold War, p. 65). Cohen also discusses that threat perception in international crisis is doubtless analogous to threat perception in everyday life. Nevertheless, there are certain characteristics peculiar to international politics which suggest that caution is required when rigidly applying conclusions taken from the spheres of individual and social psychology. On the whole, for example, threats perceived in international crisis are to central value of the state which the decision makers represent, rather to the state's own private interests. However, it is of value to note that common perceptions of threat among states - through alliances - may affect a state's initial perception or level of importance of a certain concern due to the socialising effect of legislation. Through the platform of an alliance, a number of states are called upon on giving their views and possible ways of confrontation on possible scenarios. In the process, a whole array of views are closely looked at and in order to reach common positions and speak with one voice (that of the alliance), a state may require to give additional importance to a matter that most probably would not affect that specific state directly, but would affect another member. Legislation therefore can also affect a state’s perception of threat, through the "social" nature of an alliance or a collective security mechanism.

Border threats and invasions are recurrent and familiar objects of international concern, and state perceptions are likely to be widely analogous. In many cases, the threatening event or constellation of events can be found to contain wholly new elements. One may be able to discover historical precedents for the crisis, but this does not alter the likely originality of the phenomenon from the point of view of the perceiver (Threat perception in International Crisis, p. 13, Cohen, R.). The above citation implies the unpredictability of world events.

Examples such as the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the Soviet blockade of Berlin in 1948 and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 suggest the uniqueness of events, substantially different from anything that had gone on before. Therefore, the difficulty defence analysts have had throughout the century - and are constantly having in trying to perceive future threats - becomes somewhat clear. The bottom line, according to analysts such as Knorr, Cohen (1979), and Lister (1974), is to work one's assumptions and defend yourself.

Jervis (1989), relates the perception of threat with psychology. In order to determine what leads states to perceive others as threats, it is necessary to examine cases in which this perception is absent as well as cases in which it is present. The most obvious way, according to Jervis, for states to judge whether others are a threat would be by monitoring capabilities. Although capabilities are rarely ignored, they do not determine the image that is formed. On one hand, the United States could easily destroy Britain, France and Germany, yet those states do not fear a United States attack. Britain and France could inflict grave damage on the United States, but the United States wants to see those states increase rather than decrease their arms. In the same way, as Jervis continues, "it is extremely worrisome to find another state spending great sums of money for a project that can be justified only if war occurs" (Psychology and deterrence, Jervis, Lebow, Stein, 1989, p16). Singer (1958) argues that for another state to be perceived as a threat, it must be seen as having both the capability and the intent to interfere with goal attainment. "Why would they have all those
arms if they didn't intend to attack us?" (Classic Readings in International Relations, Pruitt and Snyder essay, Williams, P., Goldstein, D., and Shafritz, J., eds., p.358).

Singer (1957), provides a definition of threat which summarises the above arguments: Threat, according to his estimation, "arises out of a situation of armed hostility in which each body of policy-makers assumes that the other entertains aggressive designs; further, each assumes that such designs will be pursued by physical and direct means if estimated gains seem to outweigh estimated losses. Each perceives the other as a threat to its national security and such perception is a function of both estimated capability and estimated intent. To state the relationship in quasi-mathematical form: Threat perception = Estimated capability x Estimated intent" (Threat Perception in International Crisis, Cohen, ed. p. 5).

Knorr (1976), provides the factors that may lead to a underestimation of threat, facilitate the perception of threat and encourage, as pointed out by Jervis (1988), misperception. There is some overlapping here, but the following predispositions seem to be of recurrent importance: First, there are the predetermined expectations and beliefs of individuals (emotional factors, personality of the decision maker); Second is the past experiences of societies that have been subject to repeated attack and military pressure. Conversely, societies that are basically unfamiliar with the new opponent may disregard evidence of danger; Third is the present experience of societies faced by an opponent whose military strength is either greater or growing relative to that of the perceiver (Threat Perception in Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, Knorr, ed., p. 78). The above arguments of threat are related to threat perception of common security structures and alliances, as when threats are common, and common interests exist among the various member states, these states may pool their resources together to face that common threat, as stated in chapters 1 and 2, even if it is misperceived.

The above discussion may suggest that capabilities can affect a states' perception of threat when the impact of international history is also examined. Furthermore, people are strongly influenced by events that are recent, that they or their state experienced first-hand, and events that occurred when they were first coming to political awareness. The lessons people learn are usually oversimplified and overgeneralised - they expect the future to resemble the past. "So if a state recently fought an aggressor, it will be prone to see states it later encounters as threats" (Jervis, 1976, Threat Perception in Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, Knorr, ed., p.22). If a states' political history can characterise the state as an aggressor at one recent time, other states cannot easily refuse to take that into account. This is why Germany remains a topic that is examined as it concerns European Security, and why the United States, at least as far as the West is concerned (especially during the Cold War) is not seen as a threat despite the state's capabilities. History and impact in international politics play a role in the perception of a threat.
Chapter Three

New Challenges for Europe

Threat Perception in the Post W.W. II Era

"We will soon miss the (stability of) Cold War"

Mearsheimer (1990), The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 26, #2, p.35

The question of restoring even an independent European security dynamic, let alone a globally dominant one, was quickly swept aside as the new bipolar power structure made itself felt after 1945. Perceptions of threat became more clear and the European security complex was defined primarily by the common fate of its overlay by the superpowers.

Western Europeans were appealing to the United States to rescue them from the threat of a continental empire, posed by the Soviet Union. The Truman Doctrine, Marshall Aid, currency reform in West Germany, the Berlin Crisis, the founding of COMECON, the founding of NATO, the failure of the EDC, the recruitment of West Germany into NATO and the establishment of the Warsaw Pact rapidly drew nearly all of Europe into rival superpower blocs. Many analysts argue that the bipolarity formed was the major deterrent factor that avoided a third world war: One state threatens harm to another state (US-NATO) in order to get the latter to do (or refrain from doing) an aggressive act (SU - WTO). Sometimes threat works as the threatener intends. A relevant example is the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962. American threats to remove Soviet missiles from Cuba by force led the Soviets to dismantle their missile bases as the United States demanded.

Like the Soviet Union, the United States had interpreted the second World War as justifying a need for a forward defence policy in the post-war era. The Soviets had not hesitated to establish their own bases in Eastern Europe, and the United States did not take long to blend the NATO commitment into its own security desire for forward defence (Buzan, 1991, People States and Fear, p. 37).

If there is a historical analogy to NATO, it is to the other basic kind of alliance, which is typified by the coalitions engaged in the conflict between Athens and Sparta. In both cases, as Cuthbertson and Robertson (1990) suggest, quite large numbers of sovereign states allied over relatively lengthy periods, with some sort of peacetime structure. (The Treasury at Delos represents the organisation in the Greek case). In both cases, one side (Athens/United States) headed a relatively democratic alliance, dominating by economic strength rather than military-political supremacy. The other side (Sparta/USSR) led more tightly controlled, much weaker client states. Even the languages of conflict, centring on the values of freedom and pluralism is common with the situation during the Cold War (Cuthbertson and Robertson, Enhancing European Security, p.69).

In both situations (Ancient Greece and the post World War II era), the organisations and the pooling of resources were made to face clear threats. Their perceptions were evident and it seems logical to assume that the organisation, role definition and institutional structures are easily formed facing clear and common threats, unlike the situation in Europe after 1989 where Europeans, as well as the United States are having trouble "finding" an enemy.

Georgi Arbatov, director of the Institute for the Study of the United States and Canada
stated on the eve of the superpower summit in Moscow in 1988: "We are going to do something terrible to you. We are going to deprive you of an enemy" (Pugh, 1992, European Security - Towards 2000, p. 1). Indeed this deprivation, and the political dramas in central and Eastern Europe during 1989-90, were important reasons that caused the Cold War system to disintegrate.

**Threat Perception in the 1990s**

Ramsbotharm and Miall (1991) state that the nature of any security policy is conditioned by the nature of the perceived threat or threats that it is there to meet. They discuss three types of threats in the 1990s:

1. Threats within Europe;
2. Threats to Europe from the outside; and

Among threats within Europe they include the residual Soviet Union along with its nuclear power. Although the demise of the Warsaw Pact was welcomed, there is great uncertainty about the future. In central and Eastern Europe the resulting security vacuum increases nervousness about a re-nationalisation of local armed forces at a time of mounting pressure from ethnically displaced peoples. And there are two hundred-year-old fears of Russian military power on one side and German revanchism on the other. The increasing economic power of Germany arouses deep apprehension - a fear, it must be said, also shared by some observers in the West such as Gunter Grass (1990, *The Case Against Unification*,).

A relevant example among threats to Europe from the outside, according to Ramsbotharm and Miall (1991) would be Middle Eastern fundamentalism. Culture and religion are widely seen to have been scorned and violated by the West, the economic interests of the bulk of the Arab populations to have been thwarted by the unholy alliance between Western capitalists and oil-rich sheiks. A possible attack against Turkey would trigger NATO to become involved. In addition, the situation that led to war in the Gulf in 1991, drew in many European powers as well as the United States. Europeans need to be ready to deal with these at any certain point in time. A study by *Newsweek* argues that Europe is becoming the new frontier of Islam. "NATO secretary - general Willy Claes and Stella Remmington of Britain’s M15 have gone so far as to call radical Islam the geopolitical menace of the future... Muslims have become a favourite target for racist attacks by skin-heads and neo-fascist rhetoric from right wing politicians." According to *Newsweek*, there are 8 to 10 million muslims living in Europe. "Until they learn to live with eachother, Europe may face countless years of turmoil" (*Newsweek* magazine, May 29, 1995, p. 12).

Finally, global threats concern the environment, population growth, food crisis, resource scarcity, nuclear abuse and the tendency of science and technology to run beyond human control. A relevant example is the US aid towards Somalia in 1992 - 1993. *(Note: Such global threats are not examined in this study as it is concentrated on threats that are related with traditional defence mechanisms (which were concerned mostly with military threats from states, based on capabilities and the perception these structures had of intent to use...)*

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these capabilities). However, if such global threats affect these traditional security organisations, these are examined.

Jacques Delors in an interview to Time magazine, (Dec. 28 1992), summed up his view on the threats to Europe's future:

Nationalism is resurgent. The positive aspect is that there is an identification between nationalism and the decline - the disappearance of totalitarianism. But nationalism also has a negative aspect. It is like a contagious disease that is spreading everywhere in Europe. And that is another reason why there is so much reluctance when it comes to building Europe.

As far as what the EU can do to ease the tensions of nationalism, Delors' response is optimistic stating the idea of mustering the political ability to spread the idea of peace and mutual understanding.

The conflict in the former Yugoslavia has concentrated people's minds. While it is unlikely that ethnic quarrels and nationalistic confrontations elsewhere in Eastern Europe could deteriorate in the same way, there are areas of concern such as the fate of the large Hungarian minorities in Romania and Czechoslovakia, the disputes among Poles, Lithuanians and Ukrainians, Moldova's tendency to seek a closer alignment with Romania, the presence of large Russian populations in the Ukraine and some of the Baltic Republics, the Turks in Bulgaria and the residues of German minorities almost everywhere else. (NATO review, #2, April 1992).

There exists enough material to alarm even the most optimistic politician. This is one of the reasons why a purely regional collective security arrangement faces great difficulties. According to Hopple, Rossa and Wilkenfeld (1979), each society has an agenda of active issues; "The threat agenda is that part of the general agenda which features issues with a potential or actual capacity for harm and ruin." (Threats, Weapons and Foreign Policy, McGowan and Kegley, eds., 1979, p. 44). Accordingly, NATO, from 1949 to 1990 (paralleling the defence structure with a society with a threat agenda), had pin pointed threats such as the Soviets and Communism which gave the structure the opportunity for readiness at all-times.

The end of the Cold War offers more than a pressing reason to focus on the future. It also provides an opportunity to reflect on the lessons of the past. A critical re-evaluation of NATO's military posture and policy toward the Soviet threat may seem unwarranted since aggression was successfully deterred and the West ultimately prevailed. However, NATO's practical value can be argued, as the situation in Europe has radically altered. The passing of communist rule, as Pugh (1991) states, in Eastern Europe, was bound to leave wreckage to be cleared up, and to engender political, economic and nationalist tensions. In addition, the hopes for a new European security order were dented by two great crises:

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First, turmoil in the Soviet Union threatened to unbalance the European system by enlarging the power vacuum in the former Eastern bloc. The promise of a reliable Soviet partnership in European and global security was threatened by Mikhail Gorbachev’s rule by decree and deferring to conservative and military support to save the Union. (European Security, Towards 2000, p. 1)

The second crisis, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on August 2 1990, also threatened not only to disrupt Europe’s integrating processes but in addition, made them (Europeans) think more seriously about external threats and their place in the international system. Europeans dealt with the problem through the EC, supporting the US commitment to free Kuwait. Had the Europeans vital interests to fight in the war? And should European security institutions deal with external problems such as the one in Kuwait?

It is essential for Europeans to identify these threats to help answer the above questions. Threat perception can be considered as one of the most important characteristics of a security structure. Knowing who to arm against and knowing capabilities are necessary in order to formulate policies. NATO and the WTO enjoyed these characteristics and survived for four decades, even though they had not fought a war. Possible scenarios for defence preparation between NATO and the WTO was a concern for the two structures during the Cold War era as Europeans knew their enemies.

3.3 "Europeanist" or "Atlanticist"

Two well established schools of thought dominate the current defence debate in Europe. The first, as Williams (1992) states, has traditionally been called "Europeanist" stressing the so-called "European dimension" of defence and strategic thinking; the second has, also traditionally, been described as "Atlanticist" stressing the European - Atlantic relationship and the ascender of American strategic doctrine. (Williams, The Logic of Diversity, #56, p. 8)

Undoubtedly, up until the end of the Cold War, European defence had been characterised as "Atlanticist", through the domination of NATO on European Defence matters. Europeans made an attempt to Europeanise their defence between 1950 and 1954 with the Pleven Plan (EDC) but their attempt was unsuccessful.

In the 1990s, a twin-pillar European - Atlantic defence effort would link the two in perpetuity and equality - a link which arises naturally from the strategic, economic, political and cultural convergence between Europe and North America.

Miguel Herrero de Mino (1992) provides his version of the term "Atlanticism": "In my opinion, Atlanticism means promotion of common values which exceed any institutions, even NATO. Atlanticism means defending the interests and capabilities of the Atlantic powers, which hold the main responsibility for international security, but it does not mean
believing in the general usefulness of NATO, and, of course, Atlanticism means maintaining NATO as the cornerstone of Western Security, but without forgetting that the West already has a trilateral structure and the Pacific is its Eastern flank" (Reshaping Europe in the 21st century, p. 221, Minon, 1992 ed. by Robertson)

Minon reinforces Williams' definition but also stresses the point of the member states of NATO having more at stake than defence when leaning towards the US. The problem when trying to provide a solution as far as what model to use, has to do with experience as well. NATO, (Atlanticist version) is, historically, an unusual entity. Few alliances have lasted 40 years in "peacetime", yet NATO shows every possibility of lasting as long again, or longer, and never fighting a war. States in Europe would not want to experiment with something new when NATO could provide for their defence - at least not yet. Europe in the 1990s seems to be preoccupied with the EC and economic integration, therefore it is difficult to shift attention in two different areas however interrelated they may be. Maastricht has provided new optimism for a "Europeanist" defence, reviving the WEU by setting deadlines in the mid 90s. The question is whether NATO can adapt to a post Cold = War environment and if the Alliance can become the central element of a transformed security organisation. What happens if the EC fails to develop a common foreign and defence policy by the turn of the century and the CSCE does not provide the institutionalisation required for collective security amongst its members?

Williams (1992), argues that it is crucial, that the pursuit of a possible "Europeanist" defence,

... does not lead to a total rapture with the United States, which is still the centre piece of what can be regarded as a nascent international security system upon whom edifice the new world political order might yet be erected in the 21st century.

The Logic of Diversity, p. 10

As the Atlanticist response to the European security problem, Pugh (1992), Kinkel (1992) and Robertson and Cuthbertson (1990) argue that there are many changes to be made to the structure. They suggest European command, new relationships with new states and amendments on their security concerns (NATO, as an option is discussed in chapter 4).

NATO continues to be considered irreplaceable for many analysts such as Kinkel (1992):

It would be foolish for us to think we have no further need of NATO, an organisation which has proved more effective than any other as an instrument of collective defence and in which so many common efforts, so much money and so much political energy has been invested.

NATO Review, Oct. 1992 # 5

Europeans sense the difficulty of providing alternatives, or a Europeanised structure, when NATO still provides the best forum for reconciling the differing tendencies which lie in the heart of the contemporary defence debate in post Cold-War Europe. The same way NATO
dominated the EDC era, when Europeans were sceptical about abandoning NATO, in the 1990s the thought of abandonment is related with experience, weak alternative "Europeanist" structures and NATO's achievements through 40 years of existence. Both versions (Europeanist / Atlantisist), call for certain requirements:

1. Identity of interests among member states;
2. Identity in threat perception;
3. Military option; and finally
4. Identity in values and beliefs.

By analysing these points, adjusting them to possible "Atlanticist" or "Europeanist" approaches for defence (i.e., NATO and EU - EPC), the problems that both versions carry unfold: If NATO, a 40 year defence structure with such experience needs to acquire these points, then the EU, the WEU or even the CSCE, all without NATO's pedigree, have a plethora of further adjustments to make. Identity of interests is a difficult task even within the EU and the sensitive area of European defence may be unrealistic when national interests are considered. The EC's record during economic integration and problems that European Political Cooperation (EPC) faced at the time of the Gulf war suggest the difficulty of the first point.

The problem of threat perception is another requirement. NATO is concerned living without an enemy, and the end of the Cold War has raised the problem on where to focus. Similarly, in a possible Europeanised version of defence, the problem of focusing on a threat will most probably still exist.

A military option to meet the threat is needed, but who would manage the military option? Cuthbertson and Robertson (Enhancing European Security, 1991) argue that "no national government could rationally hope to manage". The United States would not have so much "pull" as they had at the time of the Cold War and this point, although ambiguous, stresses the argument of leadership. The Pleven Plan lacked leadership at the time, and Political Union was not achieved. A possible European structure, requires leadership from Europeans for Europeans, and this could raise a debate as to which equal partner should manage.

Identity of values and beliefs in the populations "so that there are no legitimate grounds of disapproving of any means" used or of any burden imposed, is related to cooperation in the interrelated fields of defence, economics, politics and foreign policy. Time is certainly required for Europeans to achieve these optimistic goals, therefore possibly creating additional problems for the "Europeanist" version of defence.

The interest exists (through the Maastricht Treaty's goals, and earlier through the SEA). However, Europeans have the task of "pulling together" to achieve these points. The European interest in defence has existed since the time of the ECSC. Attempts such as the EDC, the WEU, the EC, EPC and Maastricht suggest so. But can the Europeans break away from the interrelated Atlanticist version of defence?
3.4 The German Question

"Now Germany is united again. Even if history does not tend to repeat itself, fundamental questions therefore arise: Is there any proof that the Germans possess a distinct personality that makes them essentially different from other nations? Does the fact that the unified Reich of 1871 exercised supreme power, challenging the European equilibrium of 1815 until it was destroyed, indicate that the unified Germany of the 1990s could once again become a destructive force in Europe? And will the geopolitical position of such eminent magnitude in the past, be a destabilising factor again, or could the geographic location of Germany also be turned into an advantage for both the Europeans and the Germans themselves?"

The European borders have changed significantly since October 3 1990 when the division of Germany came to an end and added new dilemmas to the security debate. The so-called German problem had again been put on the European Agenda. Buzan (1990) and Havel (1990) argue: "The elements of the problem are diverse and complicated, but two essential aspects stand out. One relates the problem to issues of power and security, the other relates it to culture and ideology" (The European Security Order Recast, Buzan, p. 107).

It is conceivable that the two Germanies will be brought together in the future. A democratic system in Germany is more important than the possibility that it might become one nation.

Havel, Time, Jan. 3, 1990

The possibility of a United Germany providing for its own defence and achieving a certain military autonomy, a goal pushed since the Adenauer years through the Western European Union, the European Defence Community and eventually NATO, can be considered a threat to Europe given the state's great economic potential. According to a Time Magazine panel discussion held in December 1991 in Berlin, Germany, now 80 million strong, of all members of the EU with a dominating currency was considered the most anxious to shed parts of their sovereignty, if only to ease the burden of their history. As German Chancellor Kohl has repeatedly argued in speeches and interviews, "Fears are understandable because of our history. So I tell our neighbours, we all need Europe, and Germany needs Europe more than anyone else." (Time, Dec. 9, 1991). Kleiber (1994), argues "we are part of the European Union and we must do our duty as such" (The Rusi Journal, February 1994, p. 38).

The lessons learned through Nazism, the Holocaust, a lost war and a searing separation have been absorbed and the Germans seem committed in becoming an integral part of European stability and peace. However, Germany's unification has complicated the problem of Europe's security equation. Former US president George Bush stated the need to keep Germany within NATO, arguably a statement demonstrating the need to control Germany. In June 1990, Shevardnadze, minister of foreign affairs of the former Soviet Union under Gorbachev, argued that Germany should become a military non-aligned state and a demilitarised state in the sense that it ought to possess the lowest possible military capability sufficient for defence (NATO's 16 Nations, June 1990, p. 22).
The danger that history might once again become a present reality cannot be ruled out. The end of Soviet supremacy in Eastern Europe, combined with German unification, signals a renaissance, at least in the short term, according to Hans-Joachim Spanger (1991), of a classical nation state. This is counterbalanced in the West by political-military and political-economic integration, having proved their ability to function in conditions of confrontation but not in a situation of opening up to the East. Germany in the 1990s, re-unified and still among the members of NATO and the EU, has shifted from its position on the PERIPHERY of the two European blocs - where its containment was guaranteed - to the CENTER of the Continent, where its scope for action is enlarged.

John (1992) argues that the Eastern European revolution of 1989/90 has confronted us with the oldest and most critical problem in modern European history, that is, how to balance Germany’s national interests against the claims of European security and stability (The End of the Cold War, Armstrong and Goldstein eds. 1992).

Germany, after the events of 1989, remains a member of NATO as the US, British and French governments have supported the idea. The case according to John (1992) in his essay The re-emergence of "The German question": a United Germany and European Security and stability, is twofold:

First, accepting the view that NATO has at least been and may still be a key factor in the maintenance of the security of Western Europe and the peace and stability of Europe on a whole, then the role of Germany is vitally important. Without their armed forces, strategic location and territory, NATO would most probably be unable to have a flexible response strategy. In addition, if Germany goes, then most likely, the US go. Their commitment to Europe since 1949 has been linked with Germany and NATO without Germany might lead to a Europe without the US. If the United States depart from Europe totally, the Atlanticist approach mentioned earlier does not seem feasible, leaving Europeans with only one option: a Europeanist structure. Bearing in mind the various European problems of our decade (i.e., nationalist tensions, EC integration) and adding the departure of the US, the situation becomes difficult.

Second, NATO was, and still is an essential vehicle for containing Germany. For its own sake no less than for the sake of its neighbours and other European states, a united Germany should be firmly anchored in the Western alliance, which would reinforce other constraints and encourage self-restraint on the part of the German’s themselves.

The ironic point about the German problem is the fact that since the end of World War two, Europeans have made a number of attempts in order to control them and even after almost five decades, the fears are apparent:

- 1949: NATO.
- 1951: ECSC (French fears of the German legacy covertly presented through an economic agreement).
- 1951-54: EDC proposal (to control German rearmament)
Chapter Three
New Challenges for Europe

- 1954: WEU (to control German rearmament)
- 1954-55: WTO (To control East Germany).
- 1957: EEC. Arguably, another economic pact with covert defensive intentions

Professor Williams (1992) argues that the collapse of Soviet power has heightened the awareness of Germany's overall strength. *The old age that NATO existed to keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down clearly no longer applies.* Today NATO's primary, yet not exclusive role, is in providing an institutional framework for keeping America in Europe as a counter-balance to the possible exercise of a restrained German power in the new century. Williams (1992), provides another point:

*Germany is unlikely to become a military threat again, as she now possesses enough economic power to make it unnecessary for her to use war as an instrument of policy. Equally, a liberal, democratic state - which Germany undoubtedly is by its nature, threatens no one through overtly coercive means. German economic ascendancy and political dominance may, however, eventually become a real problem.*

*The Logic of Diversity, pp. 47 - 48*

The fears of Germany as a legacy of war is a fact generally accepted by a significant number of analysts, such as Buzan (1990), Pugh (1992), John (1992), Williams (1993). The state has grown significantly, has a greater population and is placed in the middle of Europe between the transforming Eastern side and the capitalistic West. Its military arsenal has grown since it inherited weapons and machinery left by the former Soviets in the Eastern part of Europe. It has also supplied forces to others such as Israel; an arms deal worth DM 1 billion ($700 million; *The Economist*, Feb. 16, 1991, p 55).

The German question as far as security is concerned functions today as an accelerator, pressuring the Europeans and the United States to find solutions to the security debate involving or controlling Germany, but at the same time functions as a potential brake for Europeanization, due to the various different fears other states may have for Germany.

Based on capabilities, geographical location, population and economic dominance, the Germans may pose a well justified threat that has to be closely looked upon in the process of creating a new European security structure.

A significant development in Germany's favour has been the state's relation with France. Franco-German military cooperation has its roots in the friendship treaty signed in 1963 by Chancellor Conrad Adenauer and President Charles de Gaulle. For Adenauer, according to Feld (1994), a policy reconciliation with France was important for continuous economic recovery at the time and it meant support for new foreign policy initiatives toward Eastern Europe. Military cooperation between the two partners has gradually developed since the 1970's, especially with the creation of the Franco-German Defence and Security Council. The functions of the Council are:
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- the elaboration of common concepts regarding defence and security;
- the assurance of increasing concertation between the two states in all questions respecting the security of Europe, including arms control and disarmament;
- decisions with respect to mixed military units to be formed with mutual consent;
- decision making relative to common manoeuvres, the training of military personnel and agreements of support for strengthening the capabilities of the forces of both countries in peace and in the times of crisis or war;
- improvement in the interpolarity of weapons and equipment between both military forces; and
- the development and deepening of the cooperation on armaments.

(The future of European Security and Defence policy, Feld, 1994, p. 102).

In the military field, another step was taken reflecting the organisation of the two states: the agreement to establish a joint brigade of German and French soldiers, which was completed in 1990 and encompasses 4,200 troops. This cooperation between the two states evolved further, when in October 1991 the brigade was expanded to 30,000 troops and in May 1992 when the brigade was characterised as "Eurocorps" and would operate outside the NATO command and would be open to other EC members. This defensive cooperation between France and Germany has been an important development for Europe in general, as well as for the EC, since it is a "European" in character effort in close cooperation with the EC, that could eventually become the back-bone for a future European security mechanism through the EC. The new government in France (May 1995), should not cause any problems for the two states according to the Economist (May 6, 1995 - May 27, 1995): "Resolving differences has become second nature to German and French diplomats. Basic goals on defence and security converge, though Germany's will to remain close to America is in all respects stronger than France's" (Economist, May 6, 1995, p. 46).

Through the maintenance of NATO, Germany could be closely looked upon and controlled. The panic is fading today, eroded under the reality of a Germany burdened and preoccupied by the unexpected, debilitating cost of unity, and European integration.

3.5 Cold War Establishments to Manage Post-Cold War Era

By examining the security structures existing in Europe, there exist arrangements that were established to secure the Continent from the Soviet threat, communism or to control Germany. NATO, the WEU and the CSCE are establishments of bipolar Europe. In the 1990s there exists a move from a bi-power structure into a specific uni-power structure. The United States seems to be the only superpower that can possibly influence and attract other states to support them militarily to face a common threat (e.g. the war in the Gulf).

Many analysts suggest that if Cold War confrontation was indeed to be transcended in Europe, then the vast military establishments on both sides, programmed to react to worst-case scenarios of each others' capabilities, would have to be overborne. There is a demand, as Miall and Ramsbotham state (1992) for statesmanship able to envisage commonly desired goals and capable of working effectively towards them.
By examining the membership of NATO, the WEU and the CSCE (Figure 1), the dominance of Western European states is reflected, except in the case of the CSCE where although Eastern European states are included, the organisation's achievements, experience and defensive capabilities have been limited. Therefore the problem is unfolded: The West European states continue in the 1990s to be members of NATO and have considerable security, whereas Eastern European states, after the 1990-91 dissolution of the Warsaw Pact have nothing binding to secure them. If there is a Pan-European Security interest, Eastern Europe should be included. The Eastern Europeans such as the Poles, Czechoslovaks and Hungarians have expressed their interest in joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Poland's Pavel Ziolek (leading member of Poland's forum for a democratic right) sees NATO as essential because it includes the US in the European security equation: "We need to construct a Europe where Germany and Russia would be balanced; US involvement in NATO is a factor securing that balance" (Time magazine, October 8 1990, pp. 19 - 20). The Economist, (June 15, 1991), characterised the Poles, Czechs and Hungarians as "NATO hopefuls" (their signing of NATO's Partnership for Peace Plan, discussed in Chapter 4, supports the above citation).

The end of East-West polarisation, according to Heurlin (1992), has entailed a new geopolitical, regional, military and economic situation for Europe. The role and capabilities of the main actors have changed, both objectively speaking and in their own perceptions. It is essential for Western Europe to include Eastern Europe in their common security concerns, even though this may be difficult to achieve when one takes into consideration the break-up of the former Soviet Union into more than a dozen different Republics. Adding on the former Warsaw Pact states, NATO could be receiving applications for years to come (European Security, towards 2000, M. Pugh ed., 1992).

Furthermore, NATO and the WEU would need to transform their agreements and articles. NATO, in 1949 was formed to secure Western Europe from the states now applying to join them. It has been generally agreed that NATO's structure does not fit Europe of the 1990s. It can be used as it has been tested through time and has the required institutions. NATO actually won the Cold War without going to war. A relevant example of an establishment not being able to fit in our changing world is the WTO, created in 1954-55 to fit the old European challenges and deter Western perceived "aggression". Its disolvement in 1991 demonstrates its inability to continue to exist in the 1990s. If it had continued to exist, the Soviet Union would most probably have to re-establish its position within the structure: Plurality in views among its member states, democratic relations based on non-interference in each others internal affairs, the principle "... that was purely declarative in the past" as former Soviet foreign affairs minister Shevardnadze mentions and a natural structure of sovereign equal nations where no one claims hegemony or monopolies the truth when needed (NATO's 16 Nations, June 1990).

The problem of NATO and the WTO being used in Europe in the 1990s does not only lie in their articles or their limited contracting parties. By paralleling NATO's problem from a business-like marketing view, alongside the WTO, the continuing existence of NATO and the dissolution of the WTO seem logical evolutions.
NATO and the WTO could be paralleled with two companies that sell a certain product (security) as illustrated in Figure 2. Company A (NATO) used to serve area a (Western Europe), while company B (WTO) used to serve area b. After a specific point in time, (1989, end of the Cold War, fall of Berlin wall) the two areas which used to consume, unite and the demand becomes greater. Company B cannot keep up with the demand and goes out of business. (WTO, Soviet Union). Company A becomes a monopoly for the product (NATO/defence) and has to transform to meet the new demand. The United area a and b (Europe as a whole) produces new competition for company A (NATO), in companies C, D and E/EC, CSCE and WEU). The old context needs to be abandoned and transformations need to be made to meet the new challenge. Europe needs to adapt to the transition in the international system, which might include having to take on a more global role. As stated by Kenneth Waltz (1991), the transformation from a multi-power to a bi-power system in the 1940's created a situation that permitted wider ranging and more effective cooperation among the states of Western Europe. "They became consumers of security" (M. Pugh, European Security- Towards 2000, p. 31)

As all that has now changed, Europeans can work on the new demand and use NATO and the WTO as stepping stones. Even though both structures do not fit in Europe of the 1990s, the lessons derived are many. Building on Waltz's point of Western Europe becoming "consumers of security", East European states, including the newly formed republics of the former Soviet Union will most probably examine what the existing security structures have to offer, before applying for membership. In re-shaping the conceptual framework within which nationalism will be tackled (as far as Eastern European tensions), the perceptions formed in Eastern Europe about the whole of Europe's future, and the level of interest shown and assistance offered by the wider European policy, will have vital functions.

NATO was formed to secure its member states from perceived threats, but its involvement in the Yugoslav crisis, by debating whether to get involved, (Ethnos Newspaper, Monday, Feb. 8, 1993, p. 23) and eventually getting involved, suggests its dilemma in trying to acquire a new look to transform into a structure for the "new" Europe without its old opponent (the WTO). NATO, the WEU or the CSCE also require to adjust. And in their process of adjusting, they require to take into consideration the new needs of Europe and the possibility of enlargement. There is also a possibility of various Soviet Republics coming together to create their own security agreement or certain states not wanting to align themselves with any establishment. Whatever the case, the structures that managed the security scene between 1945 and 1989 are being pressed to transform and attract new member states while gradually enhancing security.

3.6 Summary: From the Cold War to new uncertainties

The disintegration of the Cold - War security system in Europe requires a reappraisal of Europe's security needs. In trying to find options and alternatives it is necessary to first deal with the various problems confronting Europe in the 1990s.

- Threat perception is vital; collective security requires identifying possible threats and this is why Cold War stability became effective. Knowing who to secure against can make
management and response to threats more flexible. Europe in the 1990s lacks clear threat perception and if the existing security structures continue to exist, they need to adjust and perceive.

- Europeans in the 1990's need to decide between retaining the United States' assistance through the Atlantic view for security, or break away and become more Europeanised. Their dilemma has to do with debating whether the United States are needed in Europe's security equation. Bi-polarity is no longer a fact and the United States has remained the only superpower in the world, suggested by most defence analysts.

- German unification has caused tension among Europeans and many experts have been concerned about the newly formed state acquiring a dominant role. They require to deal with the problem by examining how to control the state through defence structures and through cooperating with Germany in a peaceful manner.

- Europeans need to take into consideration the former East European states in their security equation. Analysts talk about "Europe as a whole", "Peace in Europe" and "European integration", but the existing security structures include only West European states (apart from the CSCE with its debative, but not binding platform).

The Cold War stability (between 1949-1989) has given rise to more problems for Europe and despite Europe's transformation and no actual overt threat such as Communism or another superpower, the Continent seems more unstable than during the Cold War. Below is a list of major problems Europeans may have to deal with in the next decade, derived from the literature examined:

European Integration (EC);
Threat perception;
Transforming security structures (adjusting them for the 1990s);
Choosing a security structure (NATO, WEU, CSCE, EEC ...);
Including the US? (continued US assistance?);
Nationalist tensions (Former Yugoslavia-Soviet Republics)
Germany as a threat to European stability;
Leadership within the security structure / command;

All of the above are real possibilities, as Heisbourg (1993) discusses, and US leadership cannot be expected to compensate for European insufficiencies.

The current political weakness and economic difficulties of nearly all European governments make a prompt, decisive and well co-ordinated reappraisal of security policy unlikely

The Future Direction of European Security Policy, Paper No. 37, PMI Publication
Chapter Four
The Options - NATO, WEU, CSCE and EC/EPC
4.1 Introduction

As the nature of the security agenda facing the Europeans in the 1990's evolves, the security structures of the Continent may also evolve. The post-war security system - based on the bipolar arrangements of the Cold War era - have been suggested as no longer appropriate for a Europe in which there is no credible Soviet threat; in which Germany is united; and in which Communism is a spent force (Hyde-Price 1992, Frost and Mchallam, eds. In search of Security). These developments have altered the existing bi-polar East-West system into a unipolar one, with the United States considered as the only remaining superpower. The decline in the perceived threat of the Soviet military had already begun, since the late 1980's to modify European and US. views of the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) for European security and had sparked considerations of new missions for this Atlantic alliance and even alternatives to NATO. A number of Western Europeans, according to Feld (1994) "began to see the Western European Union (WEU) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as a potentially useful base upon which to build an all - European security and defence policy system. Thought has also been given to a possible expansion of the EC institutional framework to accommodate a fully integrated foreign and security policy set-up" (The future of European Security and Defence policy, p. 1-2).

A majority of defence analysts have identified the European security problem of our decade including Williams (1991), Pugh (1991), Buzan and Kelstrup (1990), and Frost and Mchallam (1992). By taking into consideration the various problems examined in chapters two and three, namely the importance of threat perception for a security structure, and the importance of choosing between remaining "Atlantic" or becoming clearly "European", four alternative structures are examined:

- NATO
- WEU
- CSCE
- EC/EPC

Although it is difficult to predict with any certainty the precise nature of Europe's post-Cold War security arrangement, a number of broad alternatives are emerging. Price (1992) suggests that it is apparent that the new European Security system will be structured around three key institutions - NATO, the European Community and the CSCE. And the precise nature of Europe's future security system will depend on what sort of relationship develops between these three crucial bodies.
Chapter Four
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4.2 NATO

Introduction - History and Transformation

NATO has been an important defence institution since the end of world war two, and has been the chief contributor according to an important number of analysts for creating stability during the Cold War era (1945-1989). Since NATO’s formation in 1949, the alliance took on the responsibility of securing Western Europe but also "created" its own opposition, the Warsaw Pact. Williams (1977), states that since its formation, the alliance members committed themselves not only to the defence of Western Europe but to a strengthening of their political systems as well as such steps as would improve general stability and viability (The Permanent Alliance, p. 24).

Archer (1990) and Smith (1990) state that the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation reflected the need of the West European states to side with the United States in order to secure themselves against what, in 1948, they considered to be the Soviet threat. The governments of these states saw themselves at risk internally from political and economic collapse and menaced by the presence of the Red Army in Eastern Europe. Western Europeans felt unable to defend themselves against this insecurity as they were still suffering from the deprivations of war. Article 5 has been characterised as the touchstone of the North Atlantic Treaty. It is agreed by the parties that:

... an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or north America shall be considered an attack against them all... if such an armed attack occurs, each of them will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic Area.

NATO, created at the end of WWII to fit the requirements of Europe’s security concerns during the Cold War, is still in existence, and current analysts have called upon the structure to continue its services despite the end of the Cold War and the break-up of the Soviet Republic. However, The Economist (May 23, 1992) stated: "For those mesmerised by NATO’s one obvious triumph - its success in defending the West against the Soviet menace - its job is over", creating scepticism concerning continuing US assistance and involvement in European affairs.

Both the North Atlantic Treaty and the Warsaw Treaty which institutionalised the Cold War can be considered out-dated, despite the fact that the preambles of their treaties can be considered applicable in the 1990s.

The contracting Parties, reaffirming their desire for the establishment of a system of European collective security based on the participation of all European States irrespective of their social and political systems, which would make it possible to unite their efforts in safeguarding the peace of Europe.

The parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.


The above preambles of NATO and the WTO, drafted after the end of World War two, imply identical "good intention" views - in antithesis with what evolved later on in Europe as two different opposing structures that established the "Cold War" and a bi-polar world.

NATO and the WTO state their desires towards collective security based on peace and participation of ALL European States. Whether the WTO or NATO would accept the Federal Republic of Germany or Poland respectively in their organisations during the post-war era is an arguable question. The scepticism deriving from such a question demonstrates the notion that what was on paper (treaties) was not always - and most probably still not is - the only factor for the acceptance of states in security structures.

Despite both structures' official open-minded membership policies, their memberships were limited and became main factors (NATO, WTO), for dividing the world in super-power blocs. NATO's area is well defined in Article 6 of the Washington Treaty; but because of developments since its inception, the meaning of these limits have changed somewhat since 1949. As Minón states (1992), when NATO was created in 1949, the USA refused to extend its guarantees further than the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean in the colonial conflicts of European allies. Years later, when those same allies wrongly believed in the divisibility of security and the possibility of replacing global responsibilities with regional interests, they invoked the limits established in Article 6 to avoid sharing USA's world-wide responsibilities while maintaining its benefits. (Reshaping Europe in the 21st century, Robertson, 1992)

Reinforcing Minón's observation, in the 1990s there are economic, military and political powers in the world. Ethnic conflicts, migration and imperialism dangers derive from areas out of NATO's responsibilities and capacities and from NATO "hopefuls" such as Poland, Hungary or Czechoslovakia. Should NATO expand? Or simply, is NATO required in Europe as an option? And what are the requirements for its transformation? These questions will concern the next section.

The Need to Transform

NATO has been one of the most important alternative security structures discussed for Europe since the end of the Cold War. Since 1990, NATO has achieved a drastic reduction in nuclear stockpiles; has adopted a new strategy, command structure and force structure; has formulated a new concept of multinational forces, new types of crisis management exercises and has participated in peace-keeping. (NATO Review, no 6, Dec. 1992).

According to Manfred Wörner, former NATO Secretary General and Chairman of the North Atlantic Council (1992), NATO has to face the fact that as fast as the alliance transforms,
new challenges emerge and new expectations are aroused that obliges NATO to question whether enough has been done. The Cold War is behind, but a "Hot War" is going on in the Balkans. The political division of Europe is another challenge, and in the former Yugoslavia new ethnic divisions are in the making.

Throughout the Euro-atlantic Community, war has been devalued as an instrument for deciding disputes between constituted states; but sadly, in relations between ethnic communities it is making a tragic come-back.

Wörner, NATO review, #6, Dec. 1990

The US has good reason to break-away from Europe in the 1990s as the communist threat has receded and Europeans have made vital steps towards integration through the process of the EC. However, the US has been one of the few states, if not the only one, that has been able to unite states under a common cause. The Gulf War is an example of this. Helmut Sonnenfeld (1991), scholar at the Brookings Institute stated:

Washington believes that the United States is the only pole - in a so-called multi-polar world - that is able to attract a lot of people for whatever cause or reason. We must look for allies and partners wherever we can and Europe is going to end up being the principal one.

Time, March 11, 1991, p. 36

Most research undertaken on the subject of NATO generally agrees to the fact that NATO has been the major, most successful defence establishment of the Cold War and suggest NATO as an option for the future. The long term prospects for NATO are uncertain, and the need, according to Feld (1994), for defensive action by NATO forces on the Continent has been reduced substantially. A major feature in the assessment of NATO's future may be its cost, which is estimated at about $144 billion for the fiscal year 1992. This figure includes the cost of the forces allocated to NATO; nevertheless, even the expenditures for the administrative and logistical overhead of NATO headquarters are substantial (Feld, The future of European Security policy, p. 8). The War in the Gulf gave one of the reasons for NATO's continuation: "We reiterate our firm commitment to the security of the entire Southern region, the strategic importance of which is highlighted by the crisis" (NATO review, # 6, December 1991, p. 5). Chapter three suggested and outlined the basic requirements for any structure in the 1990's to exist and be accepted by its member states; (Identity of threats, military options, interests and values among member states).

Specifically, defence researchers such as Pugh, (1991), Cuthbertson and Robertson (1990), Buzan (1991, 1990) and Clark (1990) generally agree on the following major requirements:

1. NATO needs a new raison d'être. There are suggestions that the decline of the traditional threat from within Europe will be replaced by regionally more diverse challenges to Western interests and that NATO must increasingly re-define its security role on a global basis. Clark (1990), doubts whether an Atlantic alliance is really the best structure for such an undertaking, given that historically the relationship between the US and its European
allies has been severely tested whenever out of area issues have confronted the organisation.

Clear objectives for such a security establishment require threat perception such as the continued nationalist and religious pressures generated by the unresolved problems of the Third world (Williams, The Logic of Diversity, 1992). External threats such as the example of Iraq should also be taken into consideration. A raison d'être would mean focusing on where and when should NATO be involved. The pin-pointing and intensity of new threats should be agreed by all members and this will probably require modification of the North Atlantic Treaty. The 1991 Gulf war, according to Hogan (1992), demonstrated that NATO cannot serve as an adequate organisation to co-ordinate European involvement in external conflicts, even when European action is sanctioned by UN resolutions. Hogan argues that this will not change in the future. Despite German preparations to make constitutional changes so that it can participate in UN efforts to enforce peace and security in the world, the German people "... will not sanction the sending of German troops under NATO command outside of the NATO area. Thus, although NATO is the only viable option currently available for maintaining peace in the "Old World", there is no chance that the passing of the Post War era presages an expanded role for either Germany or NATO outside the European area". (The End of the Cold War, Hogan, p. 183).

NATO needs to clarify where and when and under what circumstances it should get involved and take action in out-of-area issues.

2. NATO, as the Atlantic option for European security suggests American involvement in European affairs. United States support was inevitable and required after World War two, according to Williams (1977). Loth (1988) discusses "European requests for military protection in 1948; but is it required in the 1990s? Despite the halting of the Cold War, "nobody is arguing ...", according to the Economist (May 25, 1992), "... that America should halt the planned withdrawal of more than half of its troops from Europe. On the contrary, on both sides of the Atlantic, NATO's military indolence in Europe's new time of trouble raises again the question of whether West Europeans and Americans still need their old defence alliance." Bertel Heurlin (1992) in his essay on "the roles of the USA and the USSR" argues that Europe is still important in American forward defence, raising the suggestion that even if the Europeans chose to scrap US support, the choice is not only theirs. The war against Iraq demonstrated the importance of American military and political support. (Turkish, Greek and German bases were used during the war in the Gulf). Naturally, any deterrent to a Soviet use of force such as an attempt, however unlikely, to re-establish Soviet control over former Eastern Europe (or even newly established independent states emerging from a dissolution of the Soviet Union) must have its base in the European arena. (European security, towards 2000, M. Pugh, p. 24).

President Clinton of the United States is aware of possible problems in Europe: "We are seeing the flip side of the wonder of the end of the Cold War. The bi-polar world gave the US and the Soviet Union a limited capacity to contain some of what we are now witnessing in Bosnia. I am worried about what is happening in Russia. I think it is all eminently predictable that there would be some set-back" (Time Magazine, Jan 4, 1993).
Chapter Four

Whether the US 'departs' from Europe in any way (namely limited leadership and less bases) will depend upon what both sides agree upon. Clark (1990) offers three important points supporting the degree of difficulty for Europe breaking away from the US:

a) The United States remains pre-eminent. There are no alternatives to US leadership. The United States remains the only power with global range and presence in all political, military and economic realms, though its ability to meet the long-term costs of the Gulf war may be in doubt.

b) The US requires Europe's support, while sharing the burden of world leadership. Although the European powers will be mainly regionally oriented, the Middle East crisis reminded Europeans that there continue to be interests outside Europe which can best be tackled in cooperation with the US.

c) A European-American community in values remains intact. Although the US and Europe have many divergent interests and the relationship between the United States, and the European Community has been characterised by bitter and harsh competition resulting in trade wars, there exists a common ground of democratic, capitalist and pluralistic values.

Former Prime Minister of England Thatcher reinforced these points in the International Herald Tribune (March 13, 1991) by saying that "America must lead the free world, and no European confederation will emerge to help it". The Americans seem to be aware of these points and realise that "NATO's continuation is feasible" (Former US defence Secretary Dick Cheeny, International Herald Tribune, Thursday, May 30, 1991). Antony Hartley (1992, Securing Europe, ed. by Ullman) argues that it is inconceivable that any autonomous military operation of any scale could be carried out by member states of the European Community without, not merely the approval, but also the active co-operation of the United States, reinforcing the importance of the US support in European affairs. The question which arises concerns a positive consequence from the Gulf war: How many of the above points would Europe focus upon, if the Gulf war had not existed? Operations "Desert Shield" and "Desert Storm" enabled the world community to expect the unexpected and this can be seen as a reason to perceive threats and achieve the readiness required.

Hartley argues that in out-of-NATO situations, the use of force would be entirely dependent on American transport planes and logistical facilities. Its autonomy would, therefore, be purely nominal. Nor is it probable that European governments, under pressure from an increasingly pacifist public opinion would be able, or willing, to afford the public resources needed to build up a defence infra-structure which could function independently of the United States - particularly if there was no apparent threat to their security (Securing Europe, Ullman ed., p. 367). Former US president Richard Nixon gave his own view on supporting the United States' continuing role in Europe and the World in general:

Only the US has the combination of military, economic and political power a nation must have to take the lead in defending and extending freedom and in deterring and resisting aggression. Germany and Japan may have the economic clout, but they lack the military muscle. China and Russia have the potential military might, but they lack the economic
NATO requires to be Europeanised, if it continues to exist and this does not necessarily mean losing American support. Having "won" the Cold War, and needing to focus on their own domestic economy, the United States seem likely to pass the leadership on to Europeans as European defence concerns Europe to a greater extent. According to NATO Review (# 3, 4, 5 and 6, 1992) NATO has realised its need to transform into a more European structure choosing something between an "Atlanticist" and an "Europeanist" security structure.

Other Points

NATO defence ministers met in Brussels in June 1991 and approved a drastic overhaul of the alliance's military structure and a 22% overall reduction in NATO's personnel force. (Time, June 10, 1991). One important question will be whether the US, still functioning as a generator of European military security, will extend its military deterrence to include East European states and up to what point would they leave some military and political role for the new Republics of the former Soviet Union, especially Russia, assuming they participate.

As far as NATO cooperating closely with the European Community, such overlaps are becoming more apparent, according to Murray (1992). The Rome EC Summit of December 1990 identified security issues for consideration by the Twelve in the framework of Political Union. The question asked is whether US's European partners will choose to harmonise their policy on overlapping issues first among the twelve, and then bring an agreed position to NATO; or whether NATO will be the focus of both primary and conclusive policy formulation among 16 allies (Rummel, Towards Bilateral Union, 1992, p. 215).

A more Europeanised NATO could also be achieved through a cooperation format with the Western European Union, suggested as a defence establishment in the Maastricht treaty for the near future. Hence, NATO will have to give up some leadership power over to the EC or the WEU (as examples) if Europeans desire a more dominant role in their defence. However, as Manfred Wörner, the former Secretary General of NATO pointed out (1992), a European Defence Community, acting through the Western European Union, would not possess the intelligence or logistical capacity to undertake operations on its own. Within the NATO area, any European force would have to be subordinated to the NATO command if it were to be effective (NATO Review, #1, Feb. 1993).

The changing nature of the relationship between the US and its Western European partners does not simply arise from the collapse of the Soviet power and the formal ending of the Cold War, according to Williams (1992), but arises also from pressures within the alliance itself. These have been building up for some time and have much to do with the notion that the rich and highly developed states of Western Europe should be capable of playing a
primary role in their own defence. A "Europeanised" NATO suggests command positions to Europeans (perhaps even a European supreme Allied Commander Europe - SACEUR); by expanding the competence and remit of the Euro-group; or associating the WEU more closely with NATO.

NATO requires the creation of an identity of values and beliefs among its populations so there are no legitimate grounds for disapproving of any means used. This may seem a vague point since it requires NATO members to cooperate and agree on matters of defence with not only its 16 current states, but with more states in the future, as Eastern European states may eventually join. The Partnership for Peace Plan of January 1994 (PfP) was seen as a solution towards the gradual enlargement of NATO. As at 30 April, 1995, 26 states have signed the Partnership For Peace framework document (Appendix 2 - PfP states). Logically, if more states join, and US leadership decreases, NATO will have difficulty in reaching agreements, the same way the EC has had trouble over the years reaching unanimous decisions. Although Economics are interrelated with politics and defence, it has taken the EC four decades to actually include Political Union and European Political Cooperation in their agenda. NATO will have to make positive that all interests are taken into consideration and all members considered equal.

At the NATO summit meeting in July 1990, NATO suggested the establishment of a series of formal diplomatic links between the Alliance and individual Warsaw Pact states. In this respect, NATO has been building on the recommendations of the 1967 Harmel Report, which called for the Alliance not only to provide deterrence for its members, but also to take responsibility for developing détente and managing the co-operative aspects of the East-West relationship.

If NATO could develop diplomatic and political links with the East Europeans, then it could begin to function as a focus for broad-ranging discussions and consultations on security issues affecting the continent.


Therefore, in a changed international environment, NATO is required to take on several new roles and missions:

- as an instrument of crisis management in the context of the new international order;
- as the cornerstone of a security community encompassing both East and West;
- as an element of stability in Europe from which the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe will also benefit, (Worner, NATO Review, # 6, Dec. 1992)

The Partnership for Peace (PfP): The Partnership for Peace plan, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO headquarters in Brussels on 10 - 11 January 1994 has paved
the way towards NATO's enlargement. Up until January 1995, 24 states have signed. Russia had decided to set new conditions for signing the Partnership for Peace and this has created new concern about Russia as a threat: "It is time for the West to rethink the limits of its relations with Russia" (The Economist, May 14, 1994, p. 17).

Due to the current nature of the PfP, there is limited bibliography on the subject and only possible scenarios could be drawn from analysing the agreement's goals. The objectives of the plan are:

- facilitation of transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes;
- ensuring democratic control of defence forces;
- maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the US and/or the responsibility of the CSCE;
- the development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peace-keeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and other that may subsequently be agreed; and
- the development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance. (NATO Review, #1, Feb. 1994)

The Partnership Programme was devised as a way of preparing some states for eventual full membership in the alliance without drawing new lines across Europe and without locking out Russia entirely. Russia wants NATO to accord it "a special status" (Economist, May 14, 1994) however, trouble may arise if Russia is given a veto over military actions. The plan can be seen as a way of securing the 26 NATO hopefuls from one another or as a way of the United States "keeping an eye" on Eastern developments through NATO's umbrella. Stepachin (1993), argues from a Russian point of view that Russia and NATO is a vital partnership for European security. "First and foremost we do not want to set the United States against other NATO states and vice versa, not mentioning past attempts to play on traditional contradictions between NATO members. Thus considering NATO is a consanguineous entity, and as we plan to become part of it in the future, we would like to avoid a sagging of our (meaning NATO - Russian) Eastern security flank. This is also
completely in the interests of the Euro - American component of a prospective global security system" (The Rusi Journal , August 1993, p. 13).

The issue of NATO expansion is crucial to the alliance's strategy for the future but anathema to Moscow, which views such a policy as divisive and a potential threat to Russia's security, according to the Times (June 1, 1995). Kozyrev, the Russian foreign minister said - in the same article - that "hasty moves towards enlargement could threaten the establishment of mutually advantageous and constructive relations between Moscow and the alliance". NATO has yet to announce the actual requirements for full membership and it seems that NATO is more occupied with the "how" and "why" instead of the "who" and "when".

In January 1994 NATO decided to create "Combined Joint Task Forces", CJTFs. These task forces enable the alliance to mount military operations outside Western Europe and North America; and troops from non - NATO states such as Poles, Czechs and Hungarians, might join these operations. Each taskforce would consist of chosen units from various states, depending on the nature of the job to be done. To save money, according to the Economist (February 25, 1995 p. 25), the taskforce would be controlled by an existing headquarters, such as that of a national army corps, or the Eurocorps, or the British - led Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, or the French - Spanish - Italian Mediterranean fleet. These "borrowed" headquarters would be adopted - adding Frenchmen, say, or dropping Germans - according to whose soldiers were involved. NATO is changing into a "crisis management mechanism", (as characterised by its former Secretary - General Manfred Wörner in 1992 - NATO Review, # 2 April, 1992), but what is a crisis management mechanism?

According to Snyder (1972), "The primary aim (of crisis management) is to serve their common interest in peaceful settlement; the constraint is to do this while minimising sacrifice to their self interest. Thus, the 'mixed motive' character of any bargaining situation - the coexistence of conflict and common interest - appears in a crisis as a complex interaction between two sets of goals and constraints: coercion versus disaster avoidance, and accommodation versus loss avoidance. Achieving an optimum mix among these four elements may be conceived as the ideal goal of "crisis management" (Classic Readings in International Relations, Williams, Goldstein, Shafritz, eds., p.327). Whether NATO could survive in becoming the above is yet to be seen, however the alliance's "deepening" involvement in Bosnia (The Times, May 31, 1995), suggests NATO's new role for at least the short run.

Conclusions - NATO: A dominant alternative

NATO is more than just the sum of its military parts. America's commitment to Europe's freedom has been the foundation on which European prosperity and integration have been built. It is not just that US presence prevented any prospect that Europe could again be dominated by a menacing power, a prospect almost as worrying to America as to Europe; it was also that American troops gave West Europeans the security they needed to settle their old rivalries and build a new. Sir Richard Vincent (1993), provides another NATO achievement: "One of our greatest achievements over the past 44 years, is not only that we
kept the Warsaw Pact out, but that we kept the peace within the NATO area” (The Rusi Journal, December 1993, p.11). This achievement could be related to the reasons of the creation of the PfP plan. By broadening the structure, NATO could continue to keep the peace in its area by "controlling" the new members.

Despite NATO's positive characteristics, its negative ones are also important (Table 1). Whether NATO can continue to provide for Europe's security concerns is yet to be seen. The requirements mentioned are necessary and will overshadow many of the negative points stated. Possible coexistence (with sustained US leadership) with the WEU or the EC is another possibility. However, newly changed Europe will have to take gradual steps in choosing any alternative to prevent new revolutionary transitions. As Williams concludes, "only NATO is capable of providing a credible defence posture in present circumstances" (The logic of diversity, p. 49). In relation to this, Britain's Foreign and Commonwealth office has stated:

NATO is still needed to promote continuing stability and security during a period of great political uncertainty in Europe. Britain also believes that NATO provides the most effective forum for transatlantic cooperation and consultation on security and arms control, for co-ordinating the implementation of arms control agreements and for establishing the basis for further negotiations.

Based on the literature examined, NATO's positive and negative points could be summarised:

**TABLE 1 - NATO IN THE 1990s**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITIVE</th>
<th>NEGATIVE</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>• US involvement in European affairs - slows down European autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US support</td>
<td>• Designed to &quot;keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open membership</td>
<td>• Does not include Eastern Europe (Does it fit Eastern European concerns?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective military structures</td>
<td>• Not legitimate in regional crisis outside the North Atlantic Area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binding treaty</td>
<td>• No actual threat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalised (unlike CSCE)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helps prevent re-nationalisation of German defence policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provides assurance and stability for Europe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

4.3 The WEU

**Introduction - The European Alternative**

The Western European Union has come into focus once again as a European defence solution for the future, as it offers two basic advantages: Its long existence (since 1954 despite its limited achievements), and its "European" character. However, Burrows and
Irwin, (1972, p. 39) state three elements concerning its creation which makes the WEU "unfit" in Europe of the 1990s.

- First of all, the WEU was created to invite Germany and Italy to the Brussels Treaty;
- secondly, it was created to ensure that certain arms restrictions on behalf of Germany were maintained; and
- thirdly, the WEU gave another reason for increasing NATO's powers, as eventually Germany became a member and the WEU transferred its defence functions to NATO.

Furthermore, the Western European Union, since its creation in 1955, has not had any major achievements in the field of defence. Since its defence functions were shifted to NATO, the organisation was stagnated until 1989, when the changes in Europe provided a better "scene" and "reason" for its existence. As Mackay stated (1961), the organisation has no executive power and it would be difficult to find any case where it has had any influence over any recent political developments in Western Europe (Towards a United States of Europe, p. 102). The Council of the Western European Union has, indeed, consistently taken the view that so long as existing arrangements apply, the North Atlantic Council of NATO is the power forum in which to discuss strategic planning and defence policies. The WEU was considered only part of a wider defence structure and can only be considered against that background.

NATO and the WEU have similar tasks on paper, but in reality, the WEU is working for a group of states which belong within NATO, (as the ten member states of the WEU are also among NATO's 16). This is what has made the WEU subservient to NATO and has left it with the fear of overlapping matters which have been or eventually will be discussed within NATO. Therefore, its obligations have become limited stimulating Jordan and Feld (1980), to characterise the WEU as a "European manifestation of NATO" (Europe in the Balance, p. 55).

The WEU was reactivated (using Cahen's description) in 1984, but even then, Richard Bust, the US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian affairs had sent a letter to the seven - at the time - member states cautioning them that "they should not seek a common position on arms control matters outside the NATO framework" (Kessing's Contemporary Archives, Volume 31, p. 33879).

What can the WEU can do as an option for European defence as it has been a structure with limited achievements and one that has always been supported by the United States? Despite this question, Europeans share optimism for the structure, something evident through the Maastricht Treaty of 1991. Article J.4 of Title 5 calls upon the WEU to develop, elaborate
and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications, however, still in respect to the obligations of certain Member States under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework (The Maastricht Treaty, 11. Oct. 1992, The Sunday Times, p. 16). Laursen, (1993), commenting on the Maastricht treaty's articles stated: "The Treaty constitutes a step forward, but only a relatively minor one" (Policy in Europe ed. by Anderson and Eliassen, p.236).

Can the WEU play a dominant role in Europe of the 1990s? And what are the requirements for its future existence? Can it stand on its own or does it still require guidance from NATO or the European Community?

Positive and Negative Points

Based on the assumption that the WEU remained a "European" organisation and provided solely for the defence of Europe, it would most probably face a few drawbacks:

It would need to break away from NATO and the United States. The distribution of burdens within NATO were unequal: The United States was the dominant power in the partnership, a fact justified on the grounds of its relative economic strength. Europe's reliance on the US strategic nuclear deterrents and conventional US military forces had cemented European military dependence on the United States. Moreover, the forward deployment of conventional US forces in Europe has served the military interests of the United States by providing it with a stronger defensive posture and by giving it greater political leverage in Europe. (NATO Burden - sharing, Golden, p. 3, 1983).

With the US's continuing influence in Europe, the WEU faces the difficulty of overcoming this point. Europeans require superpower assistance and it seems unlikely that the WEU will stand alone with such a limited membership. Robert Hunter, the United States ambassador to NATO, commenting on the US's policy towards Europe stated: "The Cold War argument that the alliance (NATO) needed centralised military direction, and that a robust WEU could interfere, no longer applies. We support the WEU as a means of preventing the renationalisation of defence. The WEU will help to focus minds on security policies; and it will, like NATO, provide a home for the Germans. Furthermore, the more the European allies help themselves, the more Congress is likely to pay for transatlantic defence" (The Economist, February 25, 1995, p. 21).

The WEU serves 10 states, all from Western Europe. It would most probably require to broaden its structure and serve the security needs of a much larger Europe. Being the smallest among the options discussed (ten members compared with NATO's 16, the CSCE's 54, and the EC's 15) it has the most adjustments to make. States united for a common purpose seem most likely to call upon the broader structure for help instead of the smaller one. If a state such as France, a member of both the WEU and NATO faced a threat, it seems more likely that they would prefer NATO to tackle the problem at this certain point in time as NATO infers US assistance, experience, is broader and is binding as a treaty, through article 5.
The WEU would most probably need to modify and change the central part of the Paris Agreements which modified the 1948 Brussels Treaty by adding Article 4 which expressed the intention of the parties to work in close cooperation with NATO and promised to rely on the Military Authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters. This article requires the WEU to be subservient to NATO and gives it no actual power. Breaking away and enhancing its responsibilities may make the WEU a more influential organisation and one member states could rely on if it becomes binding through certain articles such as article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Finally, the WEU would need to "expand" institutionally. It has a Consultative council and a Consultative assembly as the main bodies, an Agency for the Control of Armaments (ACA) and various committee-type agencies which deal with security questions. Taking into consideration its limited structure member wise, and institutionally wise, its problem about being a binding source, its achievements and it being "a manifestation" of NATO, the difficulty of the WEU becoming dominant in Europe in the 1990s becomes apparent.

Despite all these negative drawbacks, the Western European Union does have a few basic positive points:

- It is a "Europeanist" approach for security and one European visionaries were keen since 1948. When the states of Europe feel prepared to depart from US assistance, the WEU provides them the gradual and systematic step in doing so. Working closely with NATO during the years has helped the structure acquire experience and in the sense that the US would applaud such a step and still have a role in Europe leaving both sides satisfied. The WEU member states have agreed on the need to develop a genuine European Security and defence identity and a greater responsibility on defence matters through the treaty on European Union. (Declaration on Western European Union, p. 24, the Maastricht Treaty, The Sunday Times, Oct. 11 1992). This identity may be pursued through a gradual process involving successive phases. The WEU can form an integral part of the process of the development of the European Union and could enhance its contribution to solidarity within the Atlantic Alliance. WEU members States agree to strengthen the role of WEU, in the longer term perspective of a common defence, compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance. In November 1994, France and Britain have agreed to set up a joint planning group for their air forces in Southern England. In addition, Britain plans to join France, Germany, Italy and Spain to make the "Future Large Aircraft", a military transport (The Economist, February, 25, 1995).

- A second positive point is that the WEU member states have already taken certain steps through the treaty of European Union and through conference declaration which enhance the organisation's operational role and relations with other organisations. Point C of the declaration calls for the strengthening of its operational role by examining and defining appropriate missions structures and covering:
• a WEU planning cell;
• closer military co-operation complementary to the Alliance;
• meetings of WEU chiefs of Defence staff;
• military units answerable to WEU

Arguably, these steps demonstrate the necessity for a European approach towards defence, identified by European states. Cooperation can be a positive aspect and this is another reason why the WEU has been seen as an "option". The French insist that it makes no sense to talk of a "European Identity" unless the WEU can decide whether to mount an operation without NATO strings attached. They worry that Congress would not want American military equipment to be used in a confrontation over which America had no control. "one lesson of Bosnia is that joint authority does not work", runs the French argument. "There, the problem has been the tug-of-war between the United Nations and NATO. We do not want that to happen between NATO and the WEU" (The Economist, February 25, 1995, p.25).

However, there is also another difference between NATO and the WEU. NATO's article 5 (Appendix C) binds the member states to assist one another in the case of an armed attack, but this assistance is not automatic. Discussions take place and there could be disagreement leading to a state's withdrawal from specific military action (as Greece did in NATO's involvement in Bosnia in 1994). The WEU, however, automatically calls its member states to assist the threatened state. Therefore, this point should also be taken into consideration by European leaders and adjusted accordingly. In reality and in present circumstances most WEU military operations will most probably need some sort of American support (transport aircraft, command and control systems and other means). If European defence evolves as a matter of concern of only Europeans, this would require increases in spending on, among other things:

a. The vital thing called logistics, especially air transport;
b. Intelligence, including spy satellites;
c. Europe's nuclear forces and probably an anti-missile defence system;
d. Computerised communications systems;
e. More ships, including aircraft carriers, for the Mediterranean and beyond; and
f. The creation of common standards for tanks and heavy weapons.

The Royal United Services Institute in London estimates that such a policy might require the European states to raise the proportion of GDP they spend on defence, now 2.5% on average, by 1.5 percentage points - $107 billion a year at current prices - and sustain that figure at least for the rest of the decade (The Economist, February 25, 1995, p. 25).
WEU: The future alternative?

The role of the WEU in the integration of Europe has been paradoxical. Created after the failure to build a European Defence Community on the ECSC's foundations, the WEU had wide powers in its constitution. However it had limited achievements due to article 4 of the protocol modifying the 1948 Brussels treaty which gave NATO additional responsibilities and in a sense, WEU's guidance.

More recently, as Archer (1990) argues, it has again become an institution of convenience for the mooted West European defence identity. It is West European enough - and limited in membership - to make such an effort worthwhile and yet its intimate links, in its creation and subsequent existence, with NATO, help to insure against a divide forming between European and American defence efforts (Organising Western Europe, 1990).

The role of the WEU has changed since its reactivation in 1984. According to Archer (1994), the WEU's reactivation was due to European distrust for U.S. foreign security policies. The U.S.-Soviet INF agreement, European reservation about SDI led Europeans to call for greater West European defence cooperation. This could be considered as a step which meant less NATO involvement in European affairs. Three other points support the above assumption:

- WEU member states coordinated their naval presence in the Iran - Iraq war (1980 - 1988);

- WEU member states did hold meetings with their observers during the Kuwait crisis (1990 - 91); As Freedman and Karsh (1993), point out about "out - of - area" involvement in the Gulf War of 1990 - 1991: " A narrow interpretation argued that participation in alliances covered only the NATO area, but a broader interpretation saw possible support for wider collective security arrangements, including the WEU, which, unlike NATO, did allow for operations outside the European Area" (The Gulf War Conflict 1990 - 91, p. 118).

- By the end of 1992, WEU was coordinating the naval vessels of its members in their contribution to the UN blockade of Serbia / Montenegro. (Archer, Organising Europe, 1994, EUI Working Papers, No. 94 / 18). WEU's role is changing and the structure seems to be breaking away from its NATO partner. Taking into consideration the Maastricht Treaty's optimistic goals for a dominant WEU in the late 1990s, the structure could take over as a more European "NATO".

If the Europeans feel that they have common defence problems to discuss, the WEU seems likely to be able to contribute in the European scene. It has a few drawbacks which make it almost impossible in the short run to exist on its own. However, its positive points are those which have brought it again to the surface of European defence and it seems likely that it can continue to contribute during the 1990s through cooperation with other institutions such as NATO and the EU.
"If European Defence Identity (EDI) is to move beyond, then it is to be obliged to reproduce NATO on a European scale" (Birch and Crotts, 1990, The State of the European Community, 1990, Cafurny, Rosental, eds., 1993, p. 272).

4.4 The European Community

Introduction - History and movement towards Security

The 1957 Treaty of Rome does not provide for a common foreign and security policy. The fathers of the treaty did not think in categories of foreign policy, let alone defence policy (Rhein, 1992). After the 1954 European Defence Community (EDC) debate, it was natural that the new integration effort was concentrated solely on economic, rather than political integration. The European Community, according to Cockfield (1990), Rhein (1992) and Lodge (1989) was to become the instrument of the Continent's political unification as well.

The first step towards some sort of European Integration was made through the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) of 1951. European visionaries had in mind eventual political union which could lead to common foreign policy and defence, but regarded economic integration as the first necessary step towards their goal. As Paul-Henri Spaak reminded the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe in 1964: "Those who drew up the Rome treaty did not think of it as essentially economic; they thought of it as a stage on the way to political union". Walter Hallstein, the West German representative at Messina and the first President of the EEC Commission, had earlier stressed the same point: "We are not integrating economies, we are integrating politics". (Unwin, The Community of Europe, 1990, p. 76).

Political union was to be achieved in the long run through a sustained effort at economic integration across a broad front. The sector by sector approach of the ECSC had proved uncertain. In the end the ECSC was still trying to integrate only one part of complex industrial economies, and could not possibly pursue its aims in isolation from other economic segments.

The EEC was the next major step which, while ambitious, was on the surface less revolutionary than the European Political Community. It placed an economic dressing over the political goals in the hope that it could accommodate as many interests and groups as possible. However, the overarching concept of political union remained undefined, and sufficiently vague to be acceptable to member-states, until 1986, with the inclusion of the Single European Act which became part of the legal bed-rock on which the Community rests and on which European Union is built. As Borchardt states (1989),

The task now is to make full use of the new opportunities which it opens up in order to further the cause of integration for the good of everyone in the Community.
The Treaty on European Union signed at Maastricht in 1992 goes further than any previous European Community agreement and provides for a common foreign and security policy, in a way elaborating on article 30 of the 1986 Single European Act. The plans for a common foreign policy and a single security policy have been characterised by many analysts as much too ambitious "given the deep divergencies on issues of international relations and the use of force which the Yugoslav crisis has made obvious" (International Herald Tribune, Oct. 5, 1992, W. Pfaff).

However controversial Maastricht's attempt for common defence may be, it is a further step towards European security, taking on from where and what the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the Treaty of Rome (EEC) and the Single European Act (SEA) had left behind and this is the context in which the EC as an option for security will be examined.

Europe's Systematic Movement Towards Political Union

The ECSC and Security

European security has not been a topic where much has been discussed in previous European treaties - at least not overtly. Since the ECSC (Paris, 1951) and the EEC treaty, (Rome, 1957) there are limited steps taken on the topic of European Security.

The ECSC treaty did not give any overt hint on security, a concern that had been treated earlier (1948) only through the Brussels treaty. The preamble to the ECSC treaty expressed the resolve first to create "real solidarity" through practical achievements and by establishing an economic community to create "the basis for a broader and deeper community among peoples". (European Unification, the Origins and Growth of the European Community, Documentation, K.D. Borchardt, 1989, p. 24).

The signs of concern towards Germany were evident, however the whole treaty dealt with the problem in a cooperative economic matter. The word "peace" is mentioned a considerable amount of times in the preamble of an "economic" treaty for it to be coincidence. The underlined sections demonstrate fears and call for an end to bloody conflicts giving the treaty a concern and a "securititative" character. Archer (1994), argues that the French feared
that Germany, unrestrained, might come to dominate politically and militarily (Organising Europe).

However, the ECSC treaty was the first step towards European integration that dealt covertly with security. The motivation underlying this approach was the conviction that the causes of war lay in economic rivalry and that by substituting economic co-operation for economic rivalry the causes of war would be removed. "It was the treaty of Paris and the Treaty of Rome which preserved the peace between the nations of Europe whose differences and divisions had been the source of so much conflict over the century" (The Politics of 1992, essay by Cockfield, p. 2 Edited by Crouch and Marquand).

Lindberg and Scheingold (1971), reinforce the ECSC's "covert" concern with security, apart from its Economic concern: "The preconception in this case, was, I believe, that integration was good by definition since it was directed at economic reconstruction and permanent reconciliation between nations whose bloody conflicts had led to major wars engulfing significant portions of the world" and "The consensus that the founders perceived in the ECSC lay in the future. Their economic goal was not simply to utilise integration as an agent of economic construction but also to exploit a single continental-sized market to increase the rate of economic growth which had sagged badly during the interwar period...Affluence, in its turn, was to undermine the appeal of extremist ideologies, thus simultaneously insuring political stability" (Regional Integration, Lindberg and Scheingold, p. 376, 378).

In essence, the ECSC represented a revolutionary approach to international relations. It put the seal on France - German reconciliation by linking the destinies of the two states. After the failure of the EDC, the Fouchet talks, Suez and Hungary in 1956 it became clear to Western Europeans, according to Tsakaloyiannis (1989) that "there were no anodyne shortcuts to European Unity" (The EC and the Challenge to the Future, ed. by Lodge, pp. 242 - 243).

The six ECSC members along with the UK, aware of the difficulty in providing for a European defence structure, thought the logical place to resume the task of European unification was at the point where the ECSC had left off, in other words with the less emotionally charged question of economic integration. Borchardt (1989), argues that this aim was more modest, but more realistic (European Unification p. 14). It was apparent that a defensive structure would require closer political union and the Europeans were not ready.

The EC and Security

The preamble of the EEC treaty speaks of the determination "to lay foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe". (Treaties Establishing the European Communities, 1987, p. 119). Pinter (1991) suggests that it was clear that the movement towards Political Union was not abandoned. "It was instead channelled into the economic field" ("The single market: a step towards European Union", p. 94, Edited by Lodge The European Community and the Challenge of the Future, 1991).
The second step towards European integration had been taken. The topic of defence was not overtly discussed in the treaty of Rome even though arguably, integration in any sense, as well as cooperation among states, create a sense of safety and this was believed to be achieved through economic cooperation. Another part of the EEC preamble states:

... resolved by thus pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty, and calling upon the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in the efforts.

Treaties establishing the European Communities, p. 120

The key words underlined suggest defensive fears and those who signed the treaty seem conscious of this reality. Martin (1991) in his study Europe an ever closer union, argues that European Political Union has been the theoretical goal ever since the first modern conception of the European Community supporting the argument of the EEC being not only and economic union, but much more than that. Political Union was - and still is - the key factor missing from a common European defensive structure. The fact that it has taken the EC so long to reach their goal has to do partly with the fact that they felt relaxed with the idea of NATO acting as a deterrent not only from external threats but also between themselves. Only after 29 years (1957-1986) did the Europeans discuss common foreign policy and political union formally through the Single European Act (SEA).

A common defence policy achieved and run "by Europeans for Europeans" was considered not feasible during the Cold War with the Soviet threat looming on Western democracies. The US and NATO were considered necessary. Lord Cockfield, Vice President of the European Commission (1985 to 1988) states:

The motivation underlying this approach was the conviction that the causes of war lay in economic rivalry and by substituting economic co-operation for economic rivalry the causes of war and conflict would be removed.

The Community started life endowed with a determination to achieve economic union (with the ECSC, and when the EDC failed, with the EC); indeed many analysts argue political union as well.

SEA and Security

The Single European Act (SEA) contains one of the most fundamental reforms of the Treaties Establishing the European Communities undertaken since their creation in 1957. The SEA is designed to bring ever closer union among the European states in accordance with the original treaties. In achieving this goal the SEA considers operating on two fronts: the original treaties themselves and in the sphere of foreign policy.

Defence is considered of importance for Europe's self definition. Article 30 of the SEA addresses the issue of cooperation in foreign affairs but only of external problems outside the EC, such as the Gulf Crisis of 1990-91. Unfortunately, in the case of the Gulf War the EC seemed unable to reach common grounds. Jacques Delors stated: Judging by the
public opinion, I think Europeans drew the lesson that they must move faster toward political Union (Time Magazine, Star Crossed, April 22, 1991, p. 28).

The above example demonstrates the difficulty in achieving political union, because of the differences in national interests. "National interest is understood to mean a state of affairs valued solely for its benefit to the nation. The motive of national egoism which leads men to seek this end, is marked by the disposition to concern oneself with the welfare of one's own nation; it is self love transferred to the national group". According to Ifestos (1987), the controversy surrounding the concept of national interest lies in the fact that, when we speak about it, we refer to values to which we should not expect all people or groups of people to subscribe (European Political Cooperation, p. 97). Building on the above, Nuttall (1992), argues that there is a limited degree of penetration it achieves within national administration. "This is a result of the fact that political cooperation is confined to foreign ministries. Accidents can occur when national positions are set out by those who have not been involved in the co-ordination process" (European Political Cooperation, p. 312). The various changes of government and cabinet shuffling can also create problems due to the change in direction of their national policies which in turn make common approaches a difficult task in institutions such as the EC. There is a need for the national governments' interests to adjust in order to better deal with issues through the EPC platform. "It should be noted that that the pattern of foreign ministry adaptation is much more closely related to the bureaucratic traditions of each state and diplomatic service than to its government's attitude to European unity" (European Political Cooperation, Wessels, Allen, Rummel, p. 56). Therefore, it could be implied that when this convergence is achieved, EPC could become a useful institution. Security through the EC has become an important concern for Europeans as Martin (1991) states:

What is becoming clearer and clearer is the need for the European Community to speak with one voice on foreign policy matters. The European Community must be the democratic rock, the beacon of hope, which keeps Europe stable.

Europe, an ever closer union, p. 49

It is essential for the world's largest commercial power (EC), to assume more responsibility in world politics. "We cannot strive to be an economic giant and yet be content to remain a political pygmy". (Martin, An Ever Closer Union, p. 50). The ECSC was the formal starting point which dragged with it the covert topics of European defence and political Union (only to be formalised thirty five years later.)

The SEA has contributed to European integration and has made the European members consider common security with greater effort. Article 30 (6) of the SEA states that closer cooperation on questions of European security "would contribute in an essential way to the development of a European identity in external policy matters" and confirms the High Contracting Parties readiness to coordinate their positions more closely on the political and economic aspects of security. These are important commitments even though no direct reference is made to military aspects. As Lodge (1989) argues, these aspects were implicit in the form of words chosen.
Overall, the Single European Act exhibits continuity both in its content and the highly qualified presentation of European Political Cooperation (EPC) goals.

- Jacques Delors, describing the Single European Act stated: "It is a compromise for progress giving us a sober reminder that Rome was not built in a day". Delors is known for his great optimism in many European matters and knows that such matters take time. On March 7 1991 he expressed his optimism for common defence policies within the European Community by saying that it should be written in the Treaty of Rome (1957) "... even if it would take several years to achieve." (Financial Times, March 8, 1991). In March 1991 Delors also stated that the Gulf War revealed the limitations of the European Community. Another example of those limitations occurred with its response to the civil war in that erupted in the former Yugoslavia in 1991. More than in any previous conflict, according to Kegley and Wittkopf (1994), the Community played a central role in monitoring cease-fires and mediating between the central Yugoslav government and the Croats and Slovenes. Nonetheless, divisiveness not only between contending forces in Yugoslavia but also among Community members themselves postponed a concerted, effectual European response to the conflict (World Politics, p. 186-187).

Since the SEA, EPC has shown some signs that it may work: The Community has explored more active measures through EPC both to combat international terrorism and international crime with a degree of success. It is somewhat clear that the member states are developing a degree of convergence and joint purpose towards single states (India, China, Australia) and it also proved to be a useful debative platform during the Gulf crisis even though it did not take rapid action.

The political and economic impact of the Gulf war, the problems associated with the reform process in some Eastern European states, civil war in Yugoslavia, but, above all, the precariousness of the economic and constitutional situation in the Soviet Union make further development in Europe more uncertain. The European Community, according to Buzan (People, States and Fear, p. 287) has clearly reached a level of rare cohesion sufficient to insert a powerful political, economic, societal and military presence between the declining superpowers. The SEA had introduced the 1992 deadline, and therefore to fill in the gaps and finally achieve the levels of cooperation required, the Maastricht Treaty was introduced. Forty years have gone by since the ECSC and a series of integrative attempts: ECSC, EDC, WEU, EEC, SEA, Maastricht. Step by step, the Europeans felt committed to the idea of a common defence policy, evident in the treaty of Maastricht.

Maastricht and Security

"It is fully acknowledged that the logic of an integration process includes inevitably foreign and security policy" (Vladimir Handil, The European Union in the 1990s, Wessels and Engel eds. p. 227).

One month before the summit in Maastricht (January, 1992), a conference was held at Berlin's Aspen Institute by eight experts to discuss and argue over the future of a Continent torn between apparently conflicting trends: one toward greater unity, another toward chaotic
nationalism. (Time magazine, December 9 1991). It was believed that not since the end of WW2 have the states of Europe reached such a turning point. The United States was discussed as a slowly fading presence on the European scene. Moisi, associate director of the French institute for International affairs in Paris commented:

> We must be prepared for the time when there is less and less America in Europe. In the immediate future there is no alternative to NATO. But in the long run, the US interest is to help Europeans get their act together.

Anderson, director of the Aspen Institute in Berlin also agreed that the US is at this stage looking more inward than outward (Time Magazine, December 9, 1991).

The 1945 to 1989 bipolar security order was clearly dying and although the outlines of a new one were only barely discernible, they suggested an ever closer Union. On February 7, 1992 the Maastricht treaty was signed, where foreign and security policy is clearly written in. Title 5 is a particularly controversial one. Article J.1 spells out explicitly the objectives of the common foreign and security policy:

- “to strengthen the security of the Union...”
- “to preserve peace and strengthen international security...”
- “to promote international co-operation...”

Article J2 calls on "concerted and convergent action" when necessary, while article J4 states that the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to common defence. The Maastricht treaty calls upon the Western European Union, in a way reactivating it, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. It characterises the WEU as an integral part of the development of the Union boosting its prestige and giving it credibility.

Cooperation on foreign policy matters is spelt out in Article J2 of the Maastricht Treaty: "Member states shall inform and consult one another within the council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to ensure that their combined influence is exerted effectively" (Articles taken from "The Maastricht Treaty", The Times, Oct. 11 1992). Birch and Crotts (1993), argue that the steps taken at Maastricht were notable insofar as they addressed the institutional arrangements governing Europe's future defence. While the process remains intergovernmental in nature, the Union Treaty envisions the gradual development of a European Defence Identity (EDI) within the WEU. Two competing visions of EDI have been advanced. First, the British have argued that EDI should avoid duplication of NATO's defence function. From this perspective, WEU functions as a bridge to NATO, while serving as the forum through which a more efficient European defence capability can be developed within the Atlantic Alliance. A second view associated with French and EC Commission ambitions, calls for a merger between WEU and the European Union. Prior to Maastricht, the French had argued that WEU should be accountable to the European Council. "Further, Delors had made it plain that he regards WEU as transitional in nature, a vehicle to overcome 'national sensitivities
on the road to defence integration" (Birch and Crotts, The State of the European Community, p. 265-266).

Arguably, there seems to be optimism in the treaty concerning a topic with limited success in the past. CFSP is only one part of the treaty, which also deals with single economy, social issues, monetary policy, education and a series of amendments of the EC treaty as well as new provisions and concepts.

According to Norgaar, Pedersen and Petersen (1993), the differences between the CFSP and the EPC are:

- The objective is common action, rather than coordination of national foreign policies;
- Joint action aims at establishing more elaborate and deliberate policies than the EPC;
- Joint action involves a higher degree of commitment on the part of member states; and
- Joint action implies the possibility of majority voting.

Therefore, the Maastricht treaty introduces an authentic qualitative change in the community's handling of foreign and security policy questions. Arguably, it could be assumed that the confusing approach of the EU during the Gulf War and through the EPC, gave the rationale for strengthening cooperation.

The "jist" of the treaty is progressive, based on the visionaries of the fifty's. Security and possible common defence are introduced once again and judging from the great European changes of the early 90's, the WEU could arise and become the major actor in such matters. In the Final Act declarations of the Maastricht treaty, the WEU member states "agree on the need to develop a genuine European security and defence identity and a greater European responsibility on defence matters". The objective is to build up the WEU in stages as the defence component of the European Union. This entails closer co-operation between the WEU and the European Community's institutional framework. Whether the WEU could break away, up to a certain point, from NATO is yet to be seen, but certainly the measures for such a task have been written in the Maastricht treaty: The objective is to develop WEU as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. The time for the WEU to take a protagonistic role in European security is evident and desired. The reason for its limited success since its birth was that it became subservient to NATO. In the 1990's the scene has changed. Europe is cooperating as a whole, NATO's role is being redefined and the communist threat is gradually fading. The US seem to applaud the idea of gradually helping the Europeans "get their act together" as mentioned by David Anderson, the director of the Aspen Institute in Berlin (Time Magazine, December 9, 1991).

The Maastricht treaty is one that deals with many issues apart from security and calls for Union among its member states that member states seem threatened by. UK Prime Minister John Major said that "Defences of national culture are instincts rooted deep in the blood. They are not to be swept away by rhetoric about growth or slogans about Unity" (Time magazine, September 21, 1992). France's narrow vote in favour of the treaty on September 20th proves this: Douglas Hurd, minister for foreign affairs believes that "changes should be made in the treaty in order for it to be possibly ratified in Britain"
(Economist, September 26, 1992). The treaty is a necessary step towards Political Union and closer cooperation on defence matters. Europeans require a "Europeanised" security dimension to provide for their own self-definition. How fast and how far from acquiring one is yet to be seen.

Can the EC, through EPC / CFSP, Provide a Security Option for Europe?

The EC has been suggested by research as a possible option for European security. Can it provide the requirements of Europe in the 1990s?

Schmit (1992) argues that European Integrationists want to use defence even as a "federator" for a new Western Europe. They claim to charge the Community with all the defence duties at present within the competence of member states and/or NATO. (Essay, A defence role for the EC, Reshaping Europe in the Twenty-first Century, Robertson ed.).

Schmit (1992) and Williams (1992) argue possible cooperation between the EC and NATO in the future as one option of thinking of the EC as dealing with defence. However, as Price (1992) points out, proponents of such a "Europeanist" alternative argue that it provides the only reliable long-term basis for a durable and robust security regime in Europe.

NATO, they argue, was a product of the Cold War. A West European Defence Community (through the EC), linked to a dedicated inner grouping of EC members, could provide the solid core of a proposed Europe of non-centric circles (Reshaping Europe in the twenty-first century, Robertson ed.).

By focusing on the feasibility of the EC as a provider for European defence, a few problems arise:

- A "European" security structure suggests integrating Eastern Europe into the Community system as the 15 will deal with their own affairs;
- The EC is still a substantially "economic" union;
- The EC lacks any "defence" experience; and
- The EC's attempt towards common foreign policy has not demonstrated any notable results (i.e., poor performance in the Gulf War.)

Historians may judge the Community's political performance in the 1990s by its ability to associate Eastern Europe and to establish a cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union. This means cooperating with Eastern Europe economically and politically. In the longer term, according to Rhein (1992), it will require a Community position on the question of if and when to admit those East European states which want to join the EC and which demonstrate the ability of living up to the commitments of full membership.
To state it more boldly, the Community's major responsibility during the 90s is to re-define the governance of the whole of Europe, from the Soviet union to the Atlantic and from the Mediterranean to the North Cape

Toward Bilateral Union, Rummel, ed., p. 27

This entails widening the EC, and creating relationships with those states that do not wish to join. Therefore, in summarising the requirements needed for the EC to establish a defensive character, it seems to require:

1. To enlarge, in order to encompass Eastern European states in their framework;
2. To acquire efficient political cooperation among its member states, to avoid reaching deadlock on agreements;
3. To find a common platform for agreements. (Given the general German reluctance to do anything with a military touch, the French hesitation to do anything alongside the Americans, and the British eagerness to support the Americans, the difficulty becomes apparent.)
4. To become European, meaning breaking away from American dependence.

A European Defence Identity through the EC "may not, after all, be a European decision to make, but rather may be forced by a reorientation of United States policy. Complete US disengagement from the defence of Europe could have catalytic effects upon the current debate" (Birch and Crotts, The State of the European Community, 1993, p. 279).

A survey taken in October 1990 in the EC member states to probe the impact of the Gulf crisis on the attitudes of EC citizens regarding security and defence aspects of the European Community showed that 61% of the respondents stated that a common defence organisation for the European Community was now necessary, 29% did not consider it necessary, and 10% did not know (Frost and Mchallan, In Search of Security, 1992, p. 58). As pointed out by Leo Tindemans in his 1975 report on European Union, European integration will not be complete until the Community draws a common defence policy. "Identifying the basic strategic determinants, in the context of which European integration operates, is therefore as important as any legal or institutional issue of European integration" (Ifestos, 1987, European Political Cooperation, 1987, p. 581).

Since 1990, the EC has been faced with two major crises, one in the Gulf and one closer to the Continent in Yugoslavia, which provide an opportunity to analyse - up to a certain point - the state of EPC. According to Woods (1993), during the Gulf War and the Yugoslav crisis, economic and diplomatic actions were coordinated through EPC, and the Europeans were able to agree to certain common responses, such as trade embargoes and diplomatic sanctions. However, "Europe's fragile political cooperation remains dependent on interstate bargains between member governments to protect national interests...Throughout the two crises, the degree of coordination achieved by the EC depended on the type of action contemplated" (Woods, The State of the European Community, Birch and Crotts, eds. 1993, p. 241-242). The EC was able to agree to various embargoes against Iraq and the former Yugoslavia. However, the biggest problem facing EC unity continues to be the lack of a security or military arm. According to Woods (1993), it was this military inability and
certain EC members' preference for the UN that propelled the Yugoslav issue into the UN forum. "EPC will continue to express the interests and objectives of its most powerful nation states" (The State of the European Community, p. 242).

Conclusions - Adjustments Required For The European Community

John Major, Prime Minister of the U.K, speaking in the British Parliament on Oct. 20, 1992 (BBC 2, Westminster Live) stated: "European Union has had many definitions since the first day of the Treaty of Rome." This comment not only demonstrates the difficulty of the concept of European Union, but also of achieving the concept in practical terms.

Europe since the ECSC has changed. In the early days the European Community had a very restricted role in international politics. Until the Single European Act came into force in July 1987, the dominant view was that the EC had a role in external relations but not in any aspect of international affairs impinging on the traditional diplomatic endeavours of the member states. According to Pugh, (1992), "the military aspects of security were certainly considered taboo" (European Security Towards 2000, p. 49).

However, gradual optimism and organisational stepping stones towards European security exist. The ECSC played its own role in deterring Germany, the EDC made an attempt for European defence but not at the right time. It made Europeans think about possible solutions for cooperation in the sphere of defence. The WEU demonstrated the European persistence on creating something more European but became subservient to NATO, at the time when NATO was needed due to the US presence in Europe (Cold War and Communism). With the European Community came the change in method towards achieving security dimensions: economic integration could bring political cooperation, the necessary prerequisite for common defence. The SEA grouped together a series of amendments to the existing treaties. Title 3 (Provisions on European cooperation in the sphere of foreign policy) constitutes an important landmark in the evolution of the EC's role in security matters. And finally, Maastricht went further on providing for joint action in specified foreign security matters which will be binding on all member states; it also discusses objectives of common foreign policy and requests the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions which have defence implication. Europe has gone through a series of changes and despite the great optimism in the treaty, it seems that only if all the member states work towards the Maastricht Treaty's goals, will the vision of European Union live on.

As H. Van den Brock, the Dutch Minister for foreign affairs stated on 17 February 1986:

We know from experience that the best and even most ambitious texts can remain a dead letter, if the political will is lacking. If on the contrary it is present, apparently modest or impregnable texts can pave the way for a decisive advance.

The SEA, A Transnational Study Church and Keogh, eds. p. 26
Chapter Four

4.5 The CSCE

Introduction - A broad alternative

The Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE), created in 1973 as a debative platform on security issues, is the broadest of any type of structures that deals with the topic of European Security.

The entrenched patterns of cooperation that developed in Western Europe through the ECSC, the EEC, the WEU, NATO were extended to Eastern Europe with the establishment of the CSCE. It’s collective commitment to the inviolability of current European borders and the peaceful resolution of disputes, as well as its promotion of human rights and political self-determination, provides the solid foundation for a true pan-European security regime. (Stares, Command Performance, 1991, p. 218).

Following the changes that swept through Eastern Europe in 1988-89, NATO no longer faces the threat of a Soviet-led Warsaw Pact attack. Although a revival of Cold War antagonisms is not considered likely, great uncertainty persists about the fate of the East. The CSCE came into focus again after these changes and is seen by many analysts as the possible solution towards European security. However, the CSCE is still in an embryonic stage and has yet to prove that it can function collectively to deal with security threats towards its members defensively. The structure’s achievements and experience, although important, force the CSCE to transform as it lacks the institutionalisation required to become a binding common defence mechanism for its broad range of members. Would the CSCE become a major actor for common defence if institutionalised? The first step in that direction was taken following the Charter of Paris for a New Europe signed on 21 November 1990, but again its political efforts proved disappointing, particularly when faced with the civil war in Yugoslavia and the resurgence of the problem of national minorities.

Historical Roots - The CSCE Process

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has its roots in a 1954 Soviet proposal for a grand Conference on Security in Europe. Goetze (1987) states that the proposed conference was viewed by the Soviets as an effort to forestall the integration of the Federal Republic of Germany in the North Atlantic Alliance, and to isolate the states of Western Europe from the United States and Canada which were to be accorded no place at the conference table or in the pan-European "security system" (Security in Europe, p. 68).

The idea of such a security conference was "thrown around" in Europe throughout the sixties as the major diplomatic effort from the Soviets who always mentioned that the participating states of the conference should not include the United States. But the scope of the CSCE had changed significantly from the original Soviet aim to consolidate the USSR's own position in Eastern Europe and to inhibit Western cohesion. It actually evolved quite differently.
Questions such as the unification of Germany, military matters between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT), had been addressed in other forums, leaving the CSCE to evolve in a political negotiation about ways and means of easing the burden of Europe's East-West split and alleviating some of the human hardships resulting from it.

The topics suggested for the agenda had been greatly expanded to include concrete questions of co-operation in the fields of economics, science and technology, and environment, and the key human contacts, information and cultural issues, as well as the formulation of general principals guiding interstate relations and certain limited confidence building measures (CBMs) in the military security field. (Goetze, Security in Europe, 1987, p. 71). The CSCE was held in three stages - respectively.

- In Helsinki on July 3-7, 1973;
- In Geneva from September 19, 1973 to July 21, 1975; and
- again in Helsinki from July 30 to August 1, 1975. (Helsinki final act)

It was attended by representatives of Canada, the United States and 32 states of Europe.

CSCE's Importance for European Defence

In the 1970's the CSCE process had been the chief diplomatic instrument for discussions on security and cooperation among all European States, with the addition of the two North American allies of Western Europe, the United States and Canada. Its consensus rule is not only a symbol of the sovereign equality of its participants but also an indication of the difficulty in producing clear-cut decisions on distinctly controversial issues. Andren and Birnbaum (1980) have characterised the CSCE as a "powerless" organisation with conceivably some potential influence. "In the CSCE the nominal equality of 35 states [at the time of the statement] is reflected in an equitable diplomatic practice with more than symbolic significance" (Belgrade and Beyond: The CSCE Process in Perspective).

The above factor of sovereign equality among its participants, in a way democratizing international politics, can be deceptive; smaller European states may have been looking upon the CSCE as a way to acquire influence in international politics. As Andren and Birnbaum continue, equality among unequals adds to the difficulty of enhancing the political influence of the CSCE process.

Valsalice (1980), argues that it would seem difficult to deny the fact that the real importance of the CSCE has to be gauged by the efficiency of the implementation of the follow-up clauses and if the follow-up process still means something in the fabric of a lively East-West debate in Europe; or whether the CSCE has been a diplomatic experiment, which had its roots in a different period of infra-European relations, and is no longer relevant in the
present situation. (Valsalice, The CSCE Follow-up Process: An Assessment, p. 75 from Belgrade and Beyond, Andren and Birnbaum eds.).

By redressing the same questions concerning Europe in the 1990s, it becomes apparent that the CSCE faces challenges. Between 1973 and 1989 the CSCE functioned as an instrument to overcome the artificial division of Europe. The break-up in the East and the process of German unification have had implications for the CSCE as well as other structures such as the EC, NATO and the WEU. All these institutions are under the stress of adapting to the new relationships that are developing in Europe.

The complex pattern of interactions which characterises the 54 state CSCE process is perhaps the most hopeful political development in Europe since the end of World War two. It's broadness is unique and greater than any institution created after the wars. There exists an evident desire that its participants wish to keep the process alive after more than twenty years since its existence. The CSCE process before the revolutionary changes of 1989 in Europe was dependent on being not institutionalised; and thereby retaining a dynamic nature from the force of constant concessions. The different actors had different hopes for the CSCE as Buzan (1990) states, but for these different reasons they all attempted to keep the process alive. In order to do this the different states took turns to present their demands. "Under cold war conditions, the old CSCE would probably have died if it had been institutionalised". (Buzan, The European Security Order Recast, 1990, p. 158).

Under Cold War conditions, it would have been difficult for the CSCE to "compete" with existing and established security structures such as NATO, even if it had tried to be institutionalised, due to its great broadness in equal participants from the Eastern bloc as well, where a "Cold War" within the CSCE could have been possible. The CSCE as such could have been risky for humanity. For example, article 2 from the Helsinki final act states that:

... the participating states will refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of political independence of any state ...

It seems that possible "Cold War era" disputes between the US and the Soviet Union would have been altered by this clause and not through NATO's and the Warsaw Pact's deterring mechanisms. It demonstrates the CSCE's optimistic nature among many different states, but does not bind these states together. The question is whether it can do so in the 1990s. The CSCE's importance is related to the process's' great broadness in membership, including European states plus those who have forces in the region such as Canada and the United States; the fact that it survived the Cold War and contributed to the fall of the Iron Curtain through its useful debative platform; and finally, its progress towards the creation of Conference building measures (CBMs) reducing misunderstanding between states.

The CSCE in the 1990s, Useful for the future of European Defence

The CSCE in the 1990s continues to exist as a grand forum for European Security matters. As in its earlier days, it does not have the operational resources it requires for a Europe in
which the risk of a "conflict" is still around. If a major crisis blew up, the CSCE with its current character of a debative platform with no actual binding agreements among states as far as foreign policy is concerned, would most probably not be able to cope. All experiences with the League of Nations and the United Nations, as examples of broad structures, seem bleak. A Conference diplomacy with some loose organisational structure is usually not worth much in a major crisis. Following the charter of Paris for a New Europe, signed on 21 November 1990, which recognised the end of the Cold War and institutionalised the CSCE, its political efforts proved disappointing, particularly when faced with the civil war in Yugoslavia and the resurgence of the problem of national minorities, re-emphasising the above point of it not being effective in major crisis.

In a fragmented Europe, the CSCE could be useful, and for some period free of major crisis it could cultivate interesting ways of cooperation. But what happens when this cooperation develops into alliances among member states within the CSCE as a relationship between, for example Germany and the Russian Republic? The danger is that process breakdown could lead to the German trigger, and thus to power balancing, rather than an important and efficient European Security structure.

At the same time, the CSCE is still dealing with another reality: tough institutional competition from NATO, the European Community, the Western European Union and the Council of Europe. The question is can it continue to exist at the same time as these other collective security structures? The European Community seems to be under pressure through the Maastricht treaty and this may be the right time for the CSCE to try to expand its powers. The Western European Union would most probably require four to five years until it can stand alone (based on the target date suggested in the Maastricht treaty), and the Council of Europe is dealing with its own problems (Eastern European observers) emphasising on human rights, a topic also discussed in the CSCE. Would the Europeans benefit from these structures existing together, and possibly cooperating? On which ones would specific states rely on? Some states are members in all these structures while many are only members of the CSCE.

By examining the above structures that exist among others in Europe in the 1990s, (EC, WEU, NATO, CSCE) the question to ask is what has the CSCE to offer to its members or new applicants more than the other structures. And what is the point of a state being a member of all of these at the same time?

It's differences derive partly from its dozens of participants compared to the EC's 15, the WEU's 10 and NATO's 16. NATO in the 1990s has no clear reason of still existing in Europe carrying with it the American presence. The WEU is too limited for a common European structure and would probably evolve within the European Community which lacks clear security regulations. In addition, although NATO (and the WEU as subservient to NATO) had perceived threats such as Communism and the Warsaw Pact, the CSCE including the former communist states and without the threat of the Warsaw Pact seems to be around to secure "Europeans from Europeans"; or in other words a United Nations of Europe, for Europe.
Improving the CSCE's Institutional Structures

The CSCE participants, aware of the above problems and the limited institutional structures met in July 1992. Entitled the Challenges of Change, the Helsinki Document makes some innovative proposals on improving the CSCE’s institutions and structures, rendering its security capabilities operational, and developing the framework of activities relating to the human dimension. (NATO Review, # 4, Volume 40, August 1992).

Decisions were taken on opening the CSCE’s meetings to Japan, the establishment of practical working relations with other European and transatlantic organisations (NATO, EC, WEU, Council of Europe) the strengthening of relations with revision of the scale of contributions to CSCE expenditure. Furthermore, the Helsinki document specifies that the CSCE approach (in the sphere of security) is based on the concept of Global security and implies co-ordinated cooperation at the various international levels: regional, sub-regional and even trans-frontier. Even though the Document seems to recognise the unstable and uncertain period of time, it decided on the creation of the function of a High Commissioner for National Minorities (HCNM), the empowering of the CSCE to conduct peace-keeping operations, and the setting up of a Forum for Security Cooperation. (NATO Review, # 4, Volume 40, August 1992, p. 5).

The HCNM is close to what the European Political Cooperation (EPC) is for the EC. It calls on the participants to provide early warning of a possible threat or problems to states of the CSCE. The inclusion of peace-keeping operations in the document transforms the CSCE, for the first time in its history into an institution with operational functions. However, the operations must conform to the major principles of UN practice, not using force and requiring the full consent of the parties concerned. This part seems ambiguous; as ambiguous as the terms "parties concerned" is. It can also call for help through the direct resources of the EC, WEU or NATO. Therefore, the CSCE is accepting the fact that the effective management of post-communist Europe requires the joint action of an interlocking set of European and transatlantic institutions, (answering in part the question on why a certain state should be a member of all these other institutions but at the same time putting the burden on those states, members in all of them.)

Finally, the Document deals with disarmament creating committees and various forums. These steps are still in their embryonic stages in order to evaluate them.

Conclusions - An option used in cooperation with other institutions

Will the Helsinki decisions enable the CSCE to evolve into a prestigious and dynamic institutionalised security structure? It seems that Greater Europe can look forward to the conclusions of the major CSCE meeting (Budapest 1994) with a reasonable degree of optimism. In Budapest, the structure’s name was changed to OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) and member states expressed their desire to further acquire a more important role in Europe’s defence. Russia stated that there should be a decision making body specially tasked for conflict management (as the UN’s security council), of permanent and non permanent members and "regional tables" (Balkans,
Mediterranean etc.), on security stability and cooperation matters. Furthermore, Russia proposed another central role for the CSCE: to coordinate all other security institutions of the area from Vladivostok to Vancouver (NATO Review, #2, March 1995). Certain combinations may come into existence such as NATO and the CSCE working together. But there are problems to be solved within NATO over what justifies it. The durability of NATO is likely to lead not to a fusion of CSCE and EC, but to a development where the EC is pushed away from the military sphere, and gains hegemony in the politico-economic sphere, according to Buzan (1990, The European Security Order Recast, p. 277). This is when the WEU could come in, possibly replacing an unjustified NATO.

It seems unlikely for the CSCE to stand alone in the near future as a security structure. Its loose framework has not allowed it to become a "binding" defensive structure. Undoubtedly, it has been useful as a "grand European" platform and it can continue to be in the spotlight in the post Cold War Europe.

4.6 Co-operation - Working Together

Most research has suggested the possibility of these options, or some of them, working in close cooperation. However the research does not provide in actuality how this should be done structure wise, as the future European security system is not something that will just occur on its own. Europeans would most probably have to endure a certain process of trial and error in their search for the best formula.

The concept of interlocking institutions has in this respect only just begun to take shape. It will require time to make such institutions function properly in accordance with their new responsibilities. As former Secretary General of NATO Manfred Worner had stated:

> Set-backs are unavoidable. NATO was not created overnight or without some hard negotiation either. I do not draw the conclusion that we should abandon our efforts but rather that we have to redirect them.

NATO review, #6, December 1992

Working together entails one basic requirement for all these organisations: Common interests and identity of values.

Williams (1992), states that a reduction of the US presence is as certain now as was their deployment in Europe at the outset of the Cold War, yet it is nonetheless as well to remember that America's role in NATO remains indispensable, as the sole condition for the final reconciliation between the Atlanticists and the Europeanists. He adds that this reconciliation is necessary due to Germany's new found role in Europe. Germany is, arguably, the most dominant power in Europe: supreme in the EC and now NATO's most salient power. Without Germany, neither institution - it could be said - has any meaningful role. A "deeper" as opposed to a "wider" European Community runs the risk of making the Community an adjunct of German power. Therefore, Williams' suggestions requires NATO
continuing to exist, and cooperating with the WEU and the European Community. The question is how?

NATO's success in containing the Cold War and surviving through it demonstrates its essence in European security concerns. The US is still the only power which could possibly succeed a new "Desert Storm" without a massive increase in defence expenditure from Europe. The WEU provides the European version of NATO and gives Europe the possibility of inheriting their own security in the future. The question of what the Europeans would have come up with if the WEU had not been reactivated or had not existed is an interesting one. A new EDC could have been in the making with a similar conclusion.

The CSCE as a regional organisation provides a wide debative platform where many states can discuss security issues. It requires to interact more with NATO in order to peacefully settle disputes, as its institutional structure does not call for military options. The EC through EPC is an essential step towards EC foreign policy but what happens if an Eastern European state is threatened? Hungary, for example, is not a member of NATO, nor the WEU, nor the EC but of the CSCE. The CSCE could not provide for its defence, however, its problem could be debated through its structure. Or what would happen if Ireland had a defensive problem? It would most probably first proceed through the EC platform but possible immediate action may be necessary. The EC does not provide military objectives, and in the event of failure, responsibilities must be taken. Could NATO handle such a matter, on the grounds that such a crisis may disrupt European affairs?

Certain Institutional liaison committees between these organisations are essential, but then again, even if this step by step procedure is feasible, it only serves Western Europe. Europe in the 1990s is searching for a Pan-European Security structure and as long as the US is included in the European equation, at least states such as Russia, Poland or Hungary feel more secure. Closer cooperation entails distinct responsibilities between these structures. For example, a strong WEU means a WEU that is closely associated with NATO. To operate meaningfully, it would probably need to be able to use NATO's assets or NATO's assigned forces in cases where NATO does not choose to act.

It is essential for all the structures examined in this chapter to redefine their roles before they begin to cooperate. NATO has started to discuss broadening, the WEU has tried to increase cooperation with NATO and the EC, while the CSCE has tried to enhance and evolve its institutional structures. But then, against who? A threat is required. Scenarios must be laid out such as what would happen in certain events.

It is important to understand the nature of the dynamics of change within the European security system. Cooperation among these structures is an advantageous scheme, but not in loose terms.
4.7 Summary: Pressing challenges for existing structures

Chapter 4 dealt with options and alternatives for European security in the next decade. A new security framework will not emerge as the result of a conscious plan - either in the form of Gorbachev's "Common European Home", Mitterand's "European Confederation" or Bush's Europe "whole and free". The words of Thomas Schelling are even more appropriate in the 1990s than when they were first penned twenty five years ago: "The time for the Grand Schemes is over. We are moving out of our architectural period in Europe into the age of manoeuvre" (Price, 1992, European security, Towards 2000, Pugh, ed., p. 137).

In this "age of manoeuvre", European security analysts are dealing with an important number of issues: role definitions for the existing structures; threat perception; cooperation among institutions; institutionalisation; objectives for these options and analysing possible responses. Taking into consideration the overall problems that Europe faces in the 1990's, and the fact that all these structures were formed during the Cold War era, this age of transition becomes even more challenging. Various failures in trying to achieve such dimensions might prove vital for Europe's security future. The EDC failure of 1951-54 demonstrates this point.

The political and strategic situation in the Continent is likely to remain fluid for years to come and Europe's post-Cold War security system will thus evolve organically on a piecemeal and incremental basis, as the result of ad hoc and largely pragmatic responses to specify security challenges. And this is why most analysts argue NATO as the only structure that could offer security in this transformational era. Threats posed by the Soviet Union break-up, the various nationalist tensions, Yugoslavia, ethnic minorities, Germany and external possibilities (such as Iraq) can only - at this point in time be counterbalanced by NATO and the United States' assistance. NATO has been able to define over the past 40 years and establish a link between capability and commitment within the context of the prevailing economic and political situation. The WEU as well as the EC would most probably require additional time, while the CSCE, would require the necessary institutionalisation.

Should the basis for the next future security framework be built on the assumption of a new war coming into existence? Williams (1992), believes it should not, adding that this piece of conventional wisdom may prove a fragile assumption on which to base our security policy. The unpredictability of events over the years can prove fatal for this assumption and it would in turn be fatal if Europeans do not organise - in any way - and set military objectives to meet the possibility of a new war.

Finally, European security has the task in the next years of searching for all these requirements. Therefore, the Continent seems more and more likely to continue to witness NATO as a major actor in European affairs despite less US assistance. NATO has less negative aspects and its experience in cooperation with the WEU might be the first step in the systematic problem of "Europeanising" security.
Chapter Five
Conclusions to the Literature Review
Introduction to the empirical work
A highlighting of a few concepts examined in the literature review:

To feel secure is to feel free from threats, anxiety or danger. Security is therefore a state of mind in which an individual, whether the highest political leader or the land of the average citizen, feels safe from the harm of others. Therefore, a state believes itself secure (its leaders and its citizens) when it fears that nothing adverse can be done to it by other states.

In this sense security depends on the perceptions people have of their position in their environment. If these perceptions are common among more than two states, then a collective security relationship could be formed, known as an alliance. Alliances are seen as a way for states to increase their security in response to an external threat. The greater the threat - a function of relative power, geographic proximity and aggressive intentions - the greater the tendency for states to ally against it. This threat can endanger not only the state’s population, but the state’s ideology, commitment to democracy, or economy (i.e. communism was a threat for the West during the Cold War, while the Gulf war affected the Continent economically). Threats may be classified according to their nature, their magnitude, their imminence. Perception of threat is therefore linked with the security of states and a reason for the formation of alliances.
5.0 Conclusions to the Literature Review

The end of the Cold War has brought to a close the confrontation between the Eastern and Western blocs and, as regards the West, eliminated the massive threat represented by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

However, these developments have also led to the breakdown of the mechanism that previously kept hotbeds of crisis under control. As a result, Europe has witnessed the emergence of new risks and tensions which, far from being controllable, have been multiplying and spreading. The end of the Cold War does not ensure a peaceful future. Nor does it promise that the current configuration of power and influence will remain. Many analysts have speculated about the range of new problems and potential threats caused by the end of the Cold War. Mearsheimer (1992) stated on the great power relations after the Cold War:

"The prospects of major crises, even wars, in Europe is likely to increase dramatically now that the Cold War is receding into history"

Steele (1992), commenting on the same subject stated:

"We are witnessing today in Europe a return to history...a return to ethnicity, to nationalism, to self determination, to the struggle for influence and power"

(Both citations, Kegley and Wittkopf, eds. World Politics, 1992, p. 112)

Therefore, the current strategic context, characterised by instability and tension, requires a high degree of political and military commitment. The various small wars, regional crises and areas of ethnic and religious tension call for a rethinking of traditional security guarantees, especially at the collective level. The era of 'confrontation' of the Cold War has ended and Europeans are moving toward a much more complex international structure in which numerous organisations might interact in order to ensure stability.

The review of literature has identified a number of security problems in the 1990s for Europe, inherited generally from the break-up of the former Soviet Union and the unification of Germany. Based on these challenges, Europeans are called upon to create their new character for their defence mechanism:

- Europeans are faced with the problems of identifying a new threat, necessary as discussed, for the formation of an adequate security mechanism. Collective security implies states coming together in order to be able to face a possible threat or threats, as was the case of NATO and the WTO with their nuclear and conventional arsenals. The apparent stability Europe enjoyed, despite the WTO and NATO opposing each other is explained by a great number of defence analysts through their clear perceptions of threat. The threats perceived between 1949 (formation of NATO) and 1989 (fall of the Berlin Wall) no longer apply in Europe of the 1990s, and therefore the search for new threats is on. For some years since 1989, Europeans have been seeking to identify new threats in order to justify the continuing existence of NATO or to build other institutions such as the WEU, the CSCE or
Chapter Five
Conclusions to the Literature Review

the EC. Knowing who or what to arm against is a major factor in ensuring stability. Threat perception in the 1990s is proving a difficult task:

Various questions need to be answered:

- Who is a threat to Europe?
- Should Europeans take into consideration 'out-of-Europe' (out-of-area) threats?
- Does the threat have to be from other states?

Based on the answers given to the above questions about threat perception, European defence may acquire a new character and role.

- European affairs have, since 1945, been characterised by the involvement of the United States. After 1949, with moves such as the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine and the formation of NATO, the United States has been the major actor, through NATO, in European defence matters. Therefore, the defence of Western Europe was, in geographical terms, a matter of a non-European actor. Attempts for a more 'European' defence mechanism such as the European Defence Community and the Western European Union were eventually hampered by tough US competition and the necessity of a superpower for the West in their attempt to confront the Eastern Bloc.

Is it time for Europeans to break away from American assistance and lead their own defence matters? Can Europeans, despite the instability of the Continent, risk sending Americans home? In other words, even if the US agrees to limit its influence in European affairs, is it time to abandon the 'Atlantisist' approach to defence and take the 'Europeanist' approach? This is another problem which remains to be answered.

- German unification has stimulated researchers to place the states' potential of becoming a dominant power in Europe politically, economically and defensively on the agenda of possible threats, bearing in mind Germany's history. What role will Germany acquire in the 1990s? And is Germany a threat to Europe or a specific state?

Moreover, Europe has new borders, and new states have emerged. Do any of these newly formed states present a threat to other European states? Should they be incorporated collectively in the future security arrangement for the whole of Europe? If the answer is yes, how?

- Europeans, since 1989, have been left with a number of security structures such as NATO, the WEU and the CSCE. These security related arrangements were created in the time of the Cold War and are therefore arguably, considered unfit in their current state to defend Europe.

The emergence of a new framework on the Continent and the increasing frequency of crisis of a different nature from those for which NATO, for example, was originally conceived, have sparked a debate on the subject commonly known as out-of-area problems. Can
NATO adjust? What will its new character be? The structure's involvement in the former Yugoslavia in 1993 demonstrates NATO's change of character by undertaking what might be labelled humanitarian and peace-keeping operations on behalf of the United Nations.

Can NATO continue to defend Europe? The EC has not yet been given a defensive dimension and thus adjustments here need to be made also. Chapter Four of the literature review dealt with the options for European defence and discussed their various positive and negative points (i.e. US assistance and experience through NATO, broad membership in the CSCE, the European Character of the WEU and the EC to name a few). But which will take on the task to defend Europe in an adjusted version? Who will lead and, most importantly, against what threat will this future alliance be based upon?

- European security for the 1990s becomes even more complex and uncertain when consideration is given to the possibility of such institutions (options), working together, as discussed in Chapter Four. Can the various structures work together? If these institutions do continue to exist and find the formula for cooperation, what will happen to the states which are not members in all structures? Does it mean that Germany, for example, is more secure than Sweden, since Germany is a member in all these options whereas Sweden is not a member of the WEU? In addition, the major economic problems facing the EC (i.e. monetary Union, ECU, implementation of Maastricht) are procrastinating the questions of European security which need to be addressed.

As discussed through the review of the literature, during the bipolarity of the Cold War, the superpowers could maintain discipline among their allies and protoges. The fault lines were unambiguous, the behaviour of the adversaries predictable, and incentives to drive enemies into submission weak. Arguably, the Cold War induced caution, because the risk of a nuclear exchange exceeded any benefits either superpower could derive from upsetting the status quo. The threat was clear even though according to Jervis (1991), the rules of prudence developed between the superpowers to assure that the frictions between them did not become unmanageable (Jervis, R., Soviet - American relations after the Cold War, 1991).

The Post Cold War era promises to be different. In part this is because the emergent configuration of power itself introduces greater uncertainty. The issues may also be different, as discussed in chapter three of the literature review. "Security" will still be at issue, but the definition of security might change, depending on the new threats perceived and the new challenges that need to be dealt with. It is essential therefore, to determine if there is a general feeling towards the importance of threat perception, whether the threat(s) has receded, which are the new threats for the Continent and if there is a need to adjust or dissolve existing security arrangements, or which ones are preferred.
5.1 Introduction to the empirical work

The problems and issues addressed in the literature review may be examined in a variety of ways. An empirical investigation of such problems can also be undertaken from a variety of perspectives. It is therefore necessary to specify in detail the central objectives of enquiry, the methods and sources of data, and the theoretical perspectives which underpin both the subject matter from the research and the particular approach adopted. The literature review made an attempt to provide an understanding of the theoretical framework and historical process of European security in structural terms. However, in order to clarify images of possible ‘futures’ or anticipate consequences, it is necessary to know the direction of change.

Much of the work and studies on European security are concerned with the shape European security might take in the future. Much of the work appears in journals, reviews and books with emphasis is on definitional disputes, the changing nature of the topic in theoretical terms, and much less on how these developments may or may not affect a specific state, (through statistical explanation from a large sample of elites from that state). Although these studies provide a wealth of information on specific problems and recent developments of some significance at the policy level, they frequently do so without sufficient attention to the numerous challenges for examination, that is, how these may correlate with one another, in order to determine levels of importance and preferences of a similar sample of elites. In essence, there has been little attention paid to the problem of analysing in detail smaller states such as Greece, maybe because of the state’s involvement in the EC or NATO which may seem to provide it with adequate security and the platforms from where Greece’s security concerns should be seen.

Singer (1961), argues that in order to analyse a theoretical model, three goals must be achieved: First, an accurate description of the phenomena; second, an explanation of the relationships among the phenomena under investigation; and finally, that the model offers the promise of reliable prediction. The focus on a specific state is a traditional style of analysis according to Singer, and is an advantageous method of investigation "because it encourages the observer to examine the national actors in detail" (Classic Readings in International Relations, Williams, Goldstein, Shafritz eds., 1994, p. 89). The description of the model of this study, its explanation and the variables involved along with the analysis of the empirical data are presented in chapters 7 and 8.

A large number of studies were examined with a view to identifying the problems they have encountered and how these were overcome. The first step was to chose a sample state from Europe as a source of information, which is or has been involved in European institutions, which had and / or has security concerns, affected by and preoccupied with the revolutionary changes that occurred in 1989. For personal interest as well as the above reasons, the state chosen was Greece. However, it is essential to define the term "state". According to Hall (1993), "there is a great deal of agreement among social scientists about how the state should be defined. A composite definition would include three elements. First, a state is a set of institutions which possess the means of violence and coercion. The state staffs such institutions with its own personnel; the continuity of such personnel over time
distinguishes the state from the more transient government or administration as used in the context of US politics. Second, these institutions in principle, control a geographically bounded territory, usually referred to as a society. Crucially, the state looks inward to its own society and outward to larger societies in which it must make its way; its behaviour in one area often can only be explained by its activities in the other. Third, the state monopolises rule-making within its territory. This tends toward the creation of a common political culture shared by all citizens. Differently put, the historical record witnesses an increasing merging of nation and state. Sometimes national sentiment is created by the state, but sometimes the national principle can call into existence new states" (The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, Kreiger, ed., 1993, p. 878). A state can also be referred to as a "country" or a "nation state", however this study uses the term "state" throughout (except in citations), and its definition is based on the above.

Greece enjoys the three elements of the definition: It is a state with a set of institutions which possess the means of violence and coercion; its institutions control a geographically bounded territory, and Greece monopolises rule-making within its territory. But who are the actors concerned with rule-making in the designated territory of the state? The actors of the state which perform "important roles in the governance of society, and make important decisions or have influence in decisions at the national and local levels of government are called elites" (Eldersveld, 1993, The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, Kreiger, ed., p. 263 - A detailed definition of the term "elites" is presented in chapter 7, section 7.7).

The state of Greece has had a recent history of activity in the European scene and has occupied the minds of statesmen and institutions on numerous occasions (1967 - 1974 military coup, 1974 invasion of Cyprus, the Macedonian issue and the ongoing diplomatic struggles with Turkey). Greece's involvement in NATO the WEU, the EC, and the CSCE makes it an interesting subject for examination. Have Greece's security concerns changed? Do Greeks feel that the above institutions can continue to serve their security interests? How do Greeks feel about the absence of threat perception identified in the literature? The historical parallels and examples in the review of the literature were concerned to identify the material conditions for the production of a theory, and to assess empirically its application to the state of Greece. Therefore, both historical and structural factors required attention and served as a starting point towards the proposition of a model. The theoretical assumptions and the proposed hypotheses (examined in chapter 7) are operating as paradigms for analysis. The starting point in the development of this focus stems from a proposition put forward by Ernst Haas (1968, p. 33):

A helpful, but by no means indispensable condition [for international unification] is the existence of an external threat, real or imagined.

Based on this proposition, it becomes essential for Europe to perceive a threat as a requirement for organising the Continent's defence institutionally. Threats, according to this theory, provide a stimulus for a state to engage in international cooperation. Europe, having lost the clear threats perceived through NATO and the WTO has lost a focus in the field of threat perception.
Even the character of the term threat - its definition - is bound to change from the traditional military perceptions, to religion, economy or even food scarcity and defence institutions may be required to deal with these issues. Whatever the threat perceived, the easier the response in collective security terms. Threats may be perceived as immediate, remote, economic, military, political and so on. The type of threat involved is an important determinant of the type of response selected to deal with it by the decision-makers of the threatened state, as it seems reasonable to expect that a situation involving a military threat (for example) which is specific, immediate or very probable to materialise will necessitate an immediate response.

Based on the assumption that each state is unique, carrying its own identity, culture, values and interests, it would be logical to argue that there is no "typical" state in Europe which could possibly represent the rest of the Continent. The fieldwork attempts to investigate the topic of this thesis by using Greece as a sample. If the research was focused on another state of Europe, then the findings may have differed. This is one of the reasons why research is undertaken in various states in order to compare and contrast findings, common positions and policies. Therefore, Greece, in this thesis does not represent the whole Continent and it is not the attempt of this study to base Europe's concerns on what is found from the empirical work.

A questionnaire was designed to elicit information from a sample of Greek elites mainly from 4 major areas, which assisted the formation of the questions. These 4 areas are believed to encompass an array of issues that may affect the model of this study and are derived from the literature review.

- Greece's perception of threat in the 1990s and its opinion of threats facing the whole of Europe;
- Greece's policy responses or solutions as a result of their perceptions of threat. In other words, which security mechanism would better serve their interests;
- The level of importance of the challenges and possible threats that may occur in Europe in the 1990s for Greek policy makers, and their view of the same challenges or threats for Europe; and
- Greece's opinion on continuing United States assistance for Europe and Greece, especially through NATO. These are the central objectives of enquiry, as stimulated from the review of the literature. After the construction of the questionnaire, it was necessary to choose the suitable statistical tests that would enable towards the effective analysis of the data. (The specific tests used and why are presented in chapters 7 and 8).

In summary this study attempts to elicit information and analyse the current security debate from Greece's viewpoint. The main thesis of the study is that of: **Re-evaluating threat perception as the essential or major requirement for European defence in the post Cold War era (Case study: Greece).**

The examination of the state of Greece follows in chapter 6, to set the context which will help determine the shape of the specific questions to be addressed and subsequently the
interpretation of the field findings. An attempt to question the applicability of the findings beyond the sample is discussed in chapter 8.
Chapter Six
Greece: International Relations and Defence Matters
“Greece belongs to the West”
C. Karamanlis

“Greece belongs to the Greeks”
A. Papandreou

Clogg, 1992, A Concise History of Greece, p. 179
6.1 Introduction

The two opening statements symbolise the protracted identity crisis Greece had experienced - and for many is still experiencing - during the state's transition from the military dictatorship of 1967 - 1974, to democracy. Couloumbis (1984), Woodhouse (1986) have identified this political difference coming from two men who have dominated the state's political scene: Constantine Karamanlis and Andreas Papandreou. Both were prime ministers and are still at the time of writing in the centre of the public eye; Papandreou as Prime Minister and Karamanlis as President.

In clarifying his slogan, Karamanlis consistently places Greece in the Western political and economic institutional nexus, while Papandreou has felt that the state would be best served by adopting a model of self-reliance in solidarity with other member states of the Third World (Couloumbis, Greece in the 1980s, p. 96).

Karamanlis had tried, with much success, to incorporate Greece in major-western organisations such as the EC and NATO, while Papandreou opted to abandon such structures as he clearly stated in 1981 during his election campaign. However, even though Papandreou won these elections, Greece remained a member of both institutions despite Papandreou's persistent and often unclear stance about continuing membership (Richter, 1990; Clogg, 1992).

Greece is a member of several Western and European Institutions, such as the EC, NATO, WEU, the OECD and the Council of Europe. Relations were disrupted by the dictatorship of 1967 - 1974, but Karamanlis and Rallis (Prime Minister between 1980 - 1981) devoted much time to their restoration. Karamanlis secured early entry to the EC, despite efforts by the commission to link its application to that of the Iberian nations.

6.2 Greece's Security Considerations

The post-war orientation of Greece's defence policy was predicated on the US belief that Greece's main security concern was of an internal rather than of an external nature (Veremis, 1984). According to a National Security Report of 1949, Greece was to have:

... a military establishment capable of maintaining internal security in order to avoid communist domination, while Turkey was designated with a military establishment of sufficient size and effectiveness to insure her continued resistance to Soviet pressures.

Greece in the 80's, Clogg ed., 1984, p. 174

The Greek army was therefore primarily supplied and organised to face the communist threat from within. Greece, according to Veremis, was expected to cause some delay to Soviet and satellite forces in case of global war.

In 1952, Greece and Turkey were accepted as members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and Greece was expected to aid Turkey at the risk of attracting enemy reprisals. However, Greece withdrew from the integrated military structure of NATO
following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. Richter (1990) described this move as a tactical mistake. Karamanlis believed that by withdrawing, Greece would have complete control of its own armed forces in the event of a Turkish attack on the Greek mainland:
Thus Athens lost all possibility of influencing the NATO council during subsequent developments. In addition, according to Richter, Greece's withdrawal reinforced Ankara's claims in the Aegean (Background to Contemporary Greece, M. Sarafis and M. Eve, eds., p. 325).

When Greece sought to rejoin and restore command and control over the Aegean, Turkey objected. However, in 1980, Rallis accepted a formula for re-entry which left these matters to be resolved in subsequent negotiations through NATO and between the two states.

Poor relations with Turkey have dominated foreign policy for the past decade. The Greeks believe that the Turks, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit report on Greece (1992-93), have designs on the Eastern Aegean islands and feel confirmed in their view because of the continuing occupation of northern Cyprus by some 35,000-Turkish troops. As a consequence, Greece has fortified many of the islands of the Aegean. The Turks claim this contravenes international treaties, though the Greeks claim that they are only exercising a legitimate right of self defence (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1992-93, p. 13).

Greece has not agreed to a new command and control arrangements in the Aegean from NATO because it claims they could provide justification for Turkish arguments regarding the continental shelf and Aegean airspace. Since 1985, Greece has not participated in NATO exercises in the Aegean as a consequence of a dispute over the deployment of forces on the island of Lemnos near the mouth of the Dardanelles.

The Conservatives (The New Democracy Party) under Mitsotakis (1985 - 1993 and M. Evert 1993 - ) and the Socialists under Papandreou (1981 - ) follow a broadly common line on national issues and have indicated that they will block Turkey's application for membership of the EC so long as outstanding differences in the Aegean and over Cyprus remain unresolved.

Greek - Turkish relations have been a major issue since ancient times as Richter states, and the major question is: Who controls the two continental shores and the bridge of islands connecting them across the Aegean (p. 317)? Much will depend on the EC, even though Veremis (1986) argues that:

... EEC membership will probably disappoint those Greeks N%, Ilo believe that it will constitute a guarantee against Turkish aggression.

Greece in the 1980s, Ed. by Clogg, p. 175

The argument that the EC will benefit Greece's security as far as the states' relations with Turkey is based on the weakening traditional influence of the US and NATO on Turkey of the 1990s. Thus, the chances for a solution via NATO, especially when the organisation faces new problems and dilemmas over its new character (discussed in the literature review - Chapter 4), are dwindling rapidly. However, are the Europeans ready to accept Turkey as a new member? And when are they prepared to let the Turks in? The answers to these questions could constitute the solution to the whole complex of Greaco-Turkish conflict and
simultaneously could provide the time-table for a solution to the Cypriot problem. Pierros and Docos (1993), Richter (1990), Clogg (1992) clearly place Greaco-Turkish relations at the forefront of Greece’s security matters. Specifically, Pierros and Docos (1993) in their article on Greece’s security issues (Economicos Tahidromos, November 18, 1993), argue that the primary occupation for Greece’s defence experts should be the definition of the Turkish threat. They recognise the necessity of remaining a member of NATO and other organisations which have contained fears of a possible conflict between the two states, but argue that they are not enough to secure the state. They call for new advanced weaponry for the enhancement of Greece’s defence mechanisms.

Until December 1991, Greece and Turkey had only observer status in the Western European Union (WEU). Greece threatened to veto the Maastricht Treaty if they were not offered membership. Reluctantly, WEU member governments offered membership to Greece while extending associate status to Turkey, as a member of NATO. However, there is a debate within the WEU as to whether its guarantee of a collective response to a threat of aggression applies in the event of hostilities between member states or only in the event of a threat from an external enemy. Bearing this in mind, it seems that Greece’s security concerns could not possibly be effectively dealt with through the EC, as it is not defensive in nature whereas the WEU is unclear as far as its guarantees are concerned (with the possible exception of NATO). Stable relations with other Western democracies, as well as with Turkey become essential as a means of alleviating these concerns, and the strengthening of Greece’s own defence mechanisms is a logical consequence.

On the other hand, Turkish foreign policies with Greece have been based on trying to develop economic relations with their neighbour as well as trying to settle Greaco-Turkish relations on their own (Ecevit, 1984; Mackenzie, 1990).

History bears witness to that because whenever other countries were involved in the Turko-Greek differences, the Turks and Greeks ended up in conflict. But whenever they were left alone to settle their own differences, they showed great ability to do so.

Ecevit, Greece and Turkey, J. Alford, ed., p. 140 - 141

And, Mackenzie states that:

... Ozal's approach has been flatly rejected by the Greek Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou, a doctrinaire socialist.

Turkey in Transition: The West’s Neglected Ally p.47

For Turkey, Greece is seen as a foe, and relations with Greece, according to D. Bazoglusezer (1984) have, since 1963, been the salient security issue in Turkish eyes. Veremis (1986), Pezmatzoglou and Bazaglusezer (1984) agree for both sides (Greece and Turkey) that there are four disputed issues:

1. Control over airspace in the Aegean;
2. Delimitation of the continental shelf;
3. The limits of territorial waters; and
4. Cyprus.
Control of airspace has to do with the fact that NATO, in 1952, gave control of Aegean airspace, by bilateral agreement, to the technical responsibility of Greece. Turkey argues that this was used as though it entitled Greece to establish sovereignty over the Aegean airspace. After the invasion of Cyprus, Turkey declared a "security zone" which was agreed by the United Nations, while Greece characterised it a "danger zone" (Bazoglusezer, *Turkey and Greece*, J. Alford, ed., p. 58).

Continental shelf delimitation concerns who has control over resource exploitation in the Aegean waters. The problem became evident after the oil shock of 1973 when Greece started to drill for oil near the island of Thasos.

The limit of territorial waters is the mile distance allowed (by international law) to each state for navigation as well as exploration purposes. The maximum is 12 nautical miles which, according to the Turks, would solve, by proxy, the continental shelf issue in favour of the Greeks and reduce the international navigable waters by more than a half. Turkey, according to Veremis (1984), accuses Greece of violating articles of the Paris (1961) and Lausanne (1962) Treaties by militarising her islands off the coast of Asia minor. Prominent Turks, such as former Defence Minister Sancar, former Prime Minister Demirel, former Minister of Foreign Affairs Esenbel and former Vice-Premier Turkes, have made undisguised references to Turkish "rights" and claims on the Greek islands (Veremis, *Greece and Turkey*, Alford, ed., p. 5).

Finally, the Cyprus problem has been a major issue for decades and both sides have differences over the control of the Northern part of the island. Bazoglusezer (1984), argues that the invasion was a response to the situation in the Aegean. On the other hand, the Greeks believe that the geo-political position of Cyprus has always been in the minds of Turks (since the early 1960s) and demonstrates Greece’s belief of their forceful nature as well as place them in the list of possible threats.

The differences over such issues are many and solutions cannot be found rapidly. Greece often denounces Turkish violation in Aegean airspace while Turkey denies the incidents. The Cyprus problem has complicated the relations between the two states, has blocked the entry of Turkey in the EC and has created additional problems in the Aegean. Turkey continues to be the primary defensive issue of Greece, and a "threat" in the mind of Greek elites. However, two more questions arise: Based on the assumption that what or who one state may perceive as a threat may not be for another, can defensive organisations provide the guarantees required? Should Greece’s security be based solely on the perception of the Turkish threat? Although outside the context of this study, it would be interesting to see how Turkey perceives its threat to Greece.

6.3 Greece and the Balkans

Before the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, Greece had stable relations with its Balkan neighbours but the subsequent revival of nationalist and minority issues has created tensions. Antagonism between Serbs and Croats of the former Yugoslavia as well as the problem of Kossovo and Albania has posed a threat to the stability of the whole region.
The demise of the rigidly Stalinist regime in Albania, according to Clogg (1992), made the situation all the more threatening for any successor regime was likely to take an aggressive line in championing the cause of the large Albanian populations of Kossovo and Yugoslav Macedonia. Moreover, the prospect of a liberalised Albania was likely to prove a strong pole of attraction for Albanians compactly settled along the Yugoslav-Albanian border (Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, p. 207).

The beginnings of the thaw in Albania also focused attention on what is at once the geographically closest, yet until recently much isolated, area of Greek settlement outside the borders of the state, namely the Greek minority in Albania. Greek officials estimate the Greek minority at some 370,000 people (*The Economist Intelligence Unit*, 1992 - 1993, p. 108), out of a total population in Albania of 3,270,000 (Webster's *New World Encyclopaedia*, 1992, - 1990 estimation), while the official Albanian figure, according to Clogg (1992), is 60,000 (*A Concise History of Greece*, p. 207). The Mitsotakis government of 1989 - 1993 had pressed the new democratic administration in Tirana to grant them human and political rights and for a time maintained a virtually open door policy for migrants, both legal and illegal. However, Greek resources had been over-stretched by the numbers who came and when Albania acceded to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1991, Greek policy changed to permit only migrants who had been properly processed by consular officials. Thousands of Albanians who had entered Greece without legal papers were rounded-up and deported and troops were deployed along the border to try to prevent new illegal entries. This led to skirmishing and soured relations with Tërana which had complained to the UN and the Council of Europe about Greek treatment of Albanian refugees. The Albanians, in turn, have frustrated efforts by the Greek minority to form a cohesive political force.

Greece differed from its EC partners on the issue of recognition of the newly independent republics of the former Yugoslavia. It has traditionally maintained good relations with Serbia, once the dominant force in the federation, because of the ties of the orthodox religion and because the government in Belgrade provided a counter-weight to nationalist sentiment in the Southern Republic of Slovenia but Greece opposed unilateral sanctions in Serbia and has adamantly refused to agree a recognition of Macedonia under that name. The issue was important - and still is - during the 1993 elections and was the reason which forced the formation of a new political party (POLA - Political Spring) mainly from the New Democracy party of K. Mitsotakis. Greece argues that the use of the name implies territorial ambitions against its own Greek region of Macedonia.

Only in 1945 did the Skopje region become Yugoslav Macedonia as part of a campaign by Marshall Tito to seize, according to Ogden (1994), the Macedonian portions of Greece and Bulgaria. During Greece's 1946 - 1949 civil war, more than 100,000 loyalists died fighting Greek and Macedonian communists who tried to unite the territories and occupy Salonika in order to give Yugoslav an Aegean port.

The Skopjia region in 1991 produced a constitution for "a Greater Macedonia" and for the protection of "Macedonian" people in neighbouring states. It was not helpful that Skopje proposed a currency emblazoned with a picture of the white tower of Salonika (in Greece),
produced brochures extolling the FYROM’s (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) beaches or that they published maps which showed their Macedonia to include parts of Greece. In addition, Yugoslav "Macedonia" adopted the 16-point star of Vergina for their flag which created additional tension for the Greeks: ... a nearly sacred emblem that was discovered near Salonika in the tomb of Philip of Macedonia, Alexander’s father (Ogden, C., *Time Magazine*, p. 52, May 2, 1994).

The Clinton administration has recognised the new republic, which created dissatisfaction towards the US by Greece, but the US forbids its diplomats to call it by anything other than its full name or acronym, and has delayed sending an ambassador to Skopje. Newly elected Greek Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou, clamped an economic blockade on its northern neighbour which has had a crippling effect on its economy. Papandreou, in defending his decision, stated the importance of the issue:

One of the possibilities that has to be kept in mind in that while Skopje by itself is incapable of taking over Greek territory, Skopje in alliance with another Balkan country could easily create a serious security problem for Greece

*Newsweek*, May 9, 1994, p. 60

Greece maintained good relations with the former communist regime in Bulgaria and, once a democratic administration took power, moved to consolidate these through a series of high-level political and military contacts. Relations cooled during the course of 1991, but as the non-communist Union of Democratic Forces was forced to rely on the support of Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedoms to secure electoral victory and they were nearly ruptured when Sofia recognised the independence of Macedonia. Greece and Bulgaria, and Turkey and Bulgaria have signed a series of Bilateral agreements designed to reduce the military presence in their common border region. However, despite the problems created by the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and the end of the Cold War, Greece enjoyed stable relations with the states of the Balkan region before 1989. In addition, there is Greek concern about the over-reaching Turkish influence in the region as the Turkish military is helping to reorganise the Albanian armed forces and Ankara has developed warm relations with Sofia while expressing sympathies with the beleaguered Muslim minorities in Bosnia, Kossovo and Macedonia.

Furthermore, along with the refugees from the Balkan region, Greece is witnessing a movement of immigration from the former Soviet Union. Most of these Greeks, numbering some 350,000 according to the most recent census (1992), were the descendants of Greeks from the Pontos who, during the 19th and early 20th century migrated to the more welcoming Caucasus and Northern shores of the Black Sea. During the early years of the Soviet regime, they had enjoyed considerable cultural autonomy and had published freely in their Pontiac Greek dialect. They had the misfortune, however, to be deemed by Stalin as one of the aggressive national minorities. Their intellectual leadership, according to Clogg, was eliminated and the bulk of them deported to the inhospitable wastes of the central Asian republics.
Through Perestroika, there was a revival of Soviet-Greek culture and many, threatened by the new assertiveness of larger ethnic groups, were led to emigrate. It was estimated that as many as 100,000 would settle in Greece during the early 1990s (A Concise History of Greece, Clogg, 1992, p. 208)

6.4 Conclusion: Greece, as a sample case

Greece, as a sample case can help clarify and add to the concept of threat perception for several reasons. First, Greece is a state which, because of its geographical position, has been preoccupied by threats throughout its history. Since 1821 (the year of Greece’s Independence from the Turkish occupation), Turkey has been a concern and a threat which has not faded. The long occupation of Greece by the Turks (1453-1821), the various struggles between the two states (the most important being the 1922 Asia Minor war and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974), and the continuing diplomatic clashes stated in chapter 6 of this thesis have given the Greek state a continuous concern about its security and a perception of threat. Such a threat has -up to a certain point - been deflected through Greece’s involvement in European Institutions such as NATO, the EU and the WEU. This is the second reason why Greece is a meaningful area for research.

Membership of the above institutions has helped to dilute such a threat for Greece or be used as a balancing factor between the two states. Both states’ membership in NATO has provided the containment required for Turkey and Greece not to go to war or let the Cyprus situation deteriorate. The EU has provided a platform for Greece where concerns can be addressed without Turkey being included (as Greece has consistently blocked Turkish entry in the past decade), and the WEU has been the “European” defence mechanism which Greece believes will assist its security concerns even though Turkey is an associate member and the WEU does not guarantee assistance for Greece if a possible Turkish threat arises. Arguably, there is a sequence in Greece’s security concerns which begins with threat perception and conclude with the state’s participation in European institutions, in keeping with the discussion in the literature review.

Thirdly, Greece has also been preoccupied with other issues such as the Macedonian problem, the instability in the Balkans and the Albanian refugees. There is a whole array of issues which require examination and have been topics believed to be relieved partly through international cooperation and specifically through institutions such as NATO the EU, the WEU and the CSCE. Therefore, Greece is a state where the variables identified in the literature: threat perception; International cooperation; and security option (defence mechanism), are matters which are live and therefore observable.

The sample of Greek elites questioned in the field study (chapter 7) could elicit information on how important such concerns are for the Greek state as well as for Europe and which type of security is preferred. The views of the Greek elites are important, as they have knowledge on the subject and could be used to instigate and undertake further research. According to Snyder (1975), and Eldersveld (1993), the behaviour of a given state can best be explained in terms of the way important decision makers define their situation. The definition of the situation involves perceptions, choices and expectations on the part of the
decision makers (elites). "Elites do play and should play a dominant role in operating political systems, with the public only having a minimal or subordinate role and elites do share and should share power with their publics" (Eldersveld, 1993, The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, Kreiger, ed., p. 263). Therefore, based on the above and having in mind that the state monopolises rule-making within its territory through the actors involved in policy making of a specific geographical territory (the state and elites, sec. 5.1), it becomes somewhat easier to accept that elites can speak for "views" of the state in which they perform their roles in the governance of society. Therefore, the assumption that a "state can have perceptions", implies that the "elites of that state" are responsible for these perceptions, hence (for the purposes of this thesis), these perceptions can be investigated through a sample of elites from Greece.

How important are threat concerns for Greece? How do Greek elites feel about these issues in relation to Europe? What security preferences do Greek elites have? How essential is it for Greece to be included in European organisations? Greece's recent political history has been marked by a military coup (1967-1974), the Turkish invasion of Cyprus (1974), five changes of government (1974, 1981, 1989, 1990, 1993), diplomatic clashes with Albania (1992-1995), Turkey and Skopje (1990-1995). Its security concerns have been high on the state's agenda and therefore, a fruitful basis for examining threat perception and security preferences. Chapter 7 introduces the model of the study, the analytical framework, the sample and the questions examined.
Chapter Seven
Analytical Framework
Methodology
7.1 Analytical framework, hypothesis and methodology

A state's perception of threat(s) and security preferences can be determined by many variables, and the relationships involved can be exceedingly complex. The formulation of various hypotheses, could serve as starting points to suggest the nature and direction of relationships between variables.

The analytical framework utilised in the present study expands on the work of Graham (1980) - "Threat perception, policy making and international cooperation: a comparative study of the British and French cases", and is composed of three main elements:

- A specification of four categories of variables which serve as sources of and constraints on the defensive preferences of states;
- A typology of the state (Greece); and
- A typology of issue areas and foreign policy behaviour as concerning security.

7.2 Categories of Source and Constraint Variables

The categories identified through the review of the literature of "source and constraint" variables used throughout the questionnaire are as follows:

a. Threat perception of Greek elites; variables which make up the icon surrounding Greece's perceptions of threat as well as their opinion on Europe's perceptions of threat.

b. Greece's policy responses or solutions as a result of their perceptions of threat; variables which relate to the various opinions on European defence options, clearly through specific perceptions of threat.

c. Perception of Greek elites on the level of importance of the current instability in Europe and Greece, variables which make up the various challenges Europe is facing in the 1990s.

d. Views of Greek elites on continuing US assistance in European affairs either through NATO or independently; variables which make up the level of consent for US assistance or involvement.

7.3 Typology of State

The second element of the analytical framework is a typology of the state in question. Andriole, Wilkenfeld and Hopple (1975) argue that type of state is a (the) key mediating variable in foreign policy behaviour and suggest that a typology can be constructed by positioning a state along three dimensions: governmental structure, economic structure and military capability. The examination of Greece's security concerns was presented in chapter 6, which could assist in the construction of a model from the four major categories shown above.
7.4 Typology of Issue Areas and Foreign Policy Behaviour with Reference to Security

The third element of the analytical framework is a typology of issue areas and foreign policy behaviour / opinion with reference to security and defence issues. As noted, the general issue area under investigation in this study is threat perception and European security options for the 1990s. The study thus deals with national policy behaviour and elite opinions with respect to international cooperation and defence. Hence, the specific areas of defence which are under study are defence cooperation through various security organisations, identification of threat perception and new challenges for European security.

7.5 The Model

The foregoing analytical framework serves as a specification of the possible variables relevant to foreign policy analysis. The elements of this framework, together with the literature review contribute to the development of a model of a state's defensive behaviour in relation to threat perception and the new challenges of Europe in the 1990s.

The focus is this effort to determine how the new challenges on Europe (such as absence of threat perception) could affect Europe's quest for new defensive options. How much or how little are Greek elites affected by the new defensive dilemma in Europe? What is the best defensive option for the Continent as far as Greek elites are concerned?

As stated in section 5.1 of this study (introduction to the empirical work), the starting point in the development of the Model stems from a proposition put forward by Ernst Haas (1968).

A helpful but by no means indispensable condition (for international unification) is the existence of an external threat, real or imagined.

Accordingly, in a simple stimulus-response model, it is hypothesized that:

External threats provide a stimulus for a state to engage in international cooperation. (proposed hypothesis 1)

The variables of the hypothesis may be divided into three groups:

1. The independent variable, meaning the type of threat involved;
2. The elite threat perception process; and
3. International cooperation or the collective option (the dependent variable).
Therefore, the model could be designated as follows:

\[
\text{TT} \supset \text{TP} \supset \text{S}
\]

Where: TT represents the type of threat involved; TP the elite threat perception process; and S international cooperation or the security option.

The independent variable of this model, drawn from the categories of source and constraint variables in the analytical framework, is the external threat. However, some threats may not be of concern to certain states. Do all threats stimulate international cooperation? For example, would NATO have been created around an environmental threat? If the answer is yes, then its character would most probably have been different and not defensive in nature. Therefore, due to the complexity of the threat involved, as it can be viewed as likely to produce severe or little damage if it materialises, as well as the complexity in the sense of the different nature of threats (economic, cultural, military, political or social), a new hypothesis has been derived:

*The type of threat involved is an important determinant of the type of response (option);* (proposed hypothesis 2)

This determination includes whether or not international cooperation or collective security is sought and, if sought, what form or option is selected. For example, between 1945 and 1989, the type of threat(s) that dominated the European Continent were mainly three generally agreed in the literature, (among others): The Soviet Empire; Communism; and German rearmament. The identification of these types of threats enabled defence experts to create the appropriate structures that would be able to deal with these threats. NATO, the WEU and the EDC incident are examples that based their mechanism operation on these threats. Arguably, had the threats been different, the structure might have been built differently and the options would have been based on how to deter these other threats. Europe in the 1990s is facing the problem of not being able to clearly identify a threat. In view of this, the following two hypotheses are being proposed:

*As a threat becomes less specific but remains probable, it is more likely to stimulate cooperation than the opposite;* (proposed hypothesis 3) and

*Threats which are either improbable or not serious are not likely to lead to new responsive action;* (proposed hypothesis 4)

Hypothesis 3 may seem confusing insofar as it is not easy to conceive of a less specific threat remaining probable. However, this hypothesis is proposed as the defence departments of various states as well as defence structures base their policies on possible scenaria, many of which may not seem likely to materialise, however the fact that these matters are discussed, as these issues may be considered as possible threats, usually stimulate cooperation (i.e. membership in alliances or the retainement of stable relations by states that
feel they might be threatened), than the opposite. For example, the Macedonian issue between Greece and Skopje is considered a clear threat to Greece but not a specific one as to where such a threat may lead. States like Britain or Italy discuss how their governments may be involved in such an issue despite the fact that their "involvement" may not be as specific as Greece's. As such a threat remains probable for states that are not directly affected (as in the above example of Britain or Italy), based on possible scenarios of involvement, such a threat is more likely to lead to international cooperation than the opposite.

The basis for the above hypothesis becomes understood when Europe's current defensive state in the 1990s is examined and compared with the 1945 - 1989 period: As stated earlier, due to the East-West confrontation between 1945 and 1989 both sides were organised collectively to oppose specific threats. After 1989, the fall of Communism, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the improbability of various threats to materialise, as well as the absence of clear threats have procrastinated the formation of a new security order, but the new challenges which are emerging (Yugoslav crisis, general instability in the Balkans and in the former Soviet Union) have not hampered Europe's desire to continue to collectively deal these challenges through institutions such as NATO, the CSCE and the WEU. In addition:

*The absence of threat perception makes the selection of the defence option uncertain, while options for international cooperation may vary; (proposed hypothesis 5)*

The response from decision makers of the various states threatened is based on their perception of threat. Accordingly, if there is no clear threat, the decision-making elites' opinions on various options or responses can become uncertain. Divisions of opinion on what might constitute a threat or constraint upon perceived values at a given time are influenced by each state's social backgrounds, past experiences, ideology and so on. Hypothesis 5 is best explained by the situation confronting NATO in the 1990s. With the fall of the Iron Curtain and the dissolution of the WTO, analysts have suggested that NATO does not have a reason to exist. NATO's clear threats no longer exist and this has created uncertainty as to what justifies NATO's continued existence. The structure's involvement in the former Yugoslavia gave NATO, arguably, one reason to continue, however the Yugoslav issue was not only a concern of NATO, but the EU's and the CSCE's. Options for international cooperation on the Yugoslav crisis varied as the issue did not fall clearly under any of the above structures' reasons for existence. The situation may have been even more uncertain had the Yugoslav crisis not existed. Would other challenges have been matters that could justify NATO (for example), to become involved? Or would the absence of clear threats create additional uncertainty for options of international cooperation? Furthermore:

*A military threat is less ambiguous and easier perceived than an economic, cultural or political threat; (proposed hypothesis 6)*

Military threats have, throughout history been more specific and easier to perceive than economic, cultural or political threats. The military threat of the WTO for example was specific and easy to identify in order to justify NATO's further military build-up and helped
focus defence policies. Political threats are probable, however not as specific as a state which is governed by a militarist regime such as the Greek dictatorship of 1967 - 1974 may not threaten other states and may even cooperate internationally with other states. It is difficult to perceive where a state’s policy under such a government may lead, as the case of Greece where the state enjoyed stable relations with the United States, however Greece became one of the major reasons, after 7 years of military rule that stimulated Turkey to invade Cyprus in 1974. Greece’s government did not imply such a development.

An example of an economic threat could be seen through the situation between 1945 and 1989 with the formation of the two blocs in Europe. The EC, as an economic cooperation organisation, was not overtly organised around a threat, but more as a unifying project for Europe. However, the Gulf War, as an extreme instance, concerned economics through its relationship with oil resources (such as pricing) and contradicts the expectation of hypothesis 6. Therefore, the Gulf War must be considered as an exception to the above suggestion.

Based on the above hypotheses and understanding the problem of perceiving new threats for Europe in the 1990s, which is suggested as a requirement towards the quest for the selection of an adequate response-option, the following hypothesis is concluded:

\[ \text{Threat perception is a major requirement for international cooperation and there is a relationship between the type of threat involved and the form and level of responsive options. (proposed hypothesis 7)} \]

The aggregated form of the model can be designated as follows:

\[ \text{TP} \rightarrow \text{IC} \rightarrow \text{X} \rightarrow \text{OP} \]

Where:
- TP represents the perception of threat, real or imagined;
- IC represents international cooperation;
- X represents intervening variables that may affect the model;
- OP represents the option.

The model can only work when used in this form and sequence. It seems quite impossible to start with an option without cooperating internationally or without perceiving a possible threat. The option would most probably, in this case, be of an uncertain nature as different threats might have not been considered, or expected cooperation with other states might prove disappointing. Hypothesis 7 suggests that it is easier for states to cooperate internationally if a reason for cooperation exists. If a state feels threatened, then it most probably seeks assistance through cooperation. If it does not sense a threat and international cooperation is sought, then the response (option), may not have the readiness it should require if threats which have not been considered arise. Therefore, based on the sequence (TP, IC, X, OP), the model would have a negative output when the lack of Threat Perception, for example, is presented. Based on the model, the lack of threat perception would not (most likely) stimulate International Cooperation, and this in turn would not present options for European defence. Chapter 8 deals with this possibility and in many
instances, the lack of clear threat perception or consideration for Greece and for Europe reinforce the defence dilemma discussed in the literature review (Chapters 3 and 4).

7.6 The Variables

Based on hypothesis 7 and the model presented in symbolic form, it is essential to explain the reasons behind the questions asked in the questionnaire, and how the questions asked could assist in the investigation of the model.

Question 1 examines whether it makes sense to abandon membership in the EC and NATO. This question affects the dependent variable of the option or response towards a threat as the EC and NATO (as organisations that can be seen as options for defence). If the data from the field study prove that elites would like to abandon these structures, the options become limited.

Question 2 examines whether stable relations with other Western democracies have contributed to the fact that Greece has not been overtly threatened by another state since 1974. As an independent variable, this question could help with the realisation that collective security, interdependence and stable relations stimulate and influence the type of response towards that threat.

Question 3 examines possible threats at the present time. The external threat, based on the model, is a major requirement towards the development of a collective security organisation. The aim is to pin-point a possible threat or threats that could enable this study to find adequate solutions or responses (in collective security terms) of the dependent variable (option).

Questions 4, 5, 6, 8 (parts A and B), 9 (Parts A and B), 22, 23, 25, 28, 29 and 30 aim to gather information about the first independent variable: "the external threat". As in question 3, the focus is the identification of possible specific threats and on the importance of threat perception in the process of finding the appropriate option. Specifically, these questions aim to examine the seriousness and probability of threats arising such as Germany, the former Soviet Union with its nuclear arsenal, religious fundamentalism, or other external, out-of-area threats not only in relation to Greece, but also for Europe. The importance of these independent variables can help in the examination of the most felt threat by Greek elites and contribute to the search for the most appropriate solution. In addition, the above questions investigate the importance of threat perception not only in establishing a collective security arrangement, but also for existing collective security mechanisms such as NATO. The focus of the same possible threats not only for Greece but also for Europe will allow the study to determine how much of a problem or threat each is visualised by Greek elites specifically for it and as for the whole of Europe. This is based on the logical assumptions that what one state may perceive as a threat may not be seen or perceived as one by another. A relevant example is the Cypriot problem, which for obvious reasons is an issue which is of greater concern to Greece than to other European states.
Questions 1, 2, 10, 12, 14, 15, 16, 26 and 27 examine the independent variable “International Cooperation” which is the second step of the model. The aim of these questions was to gather evidence which would help determine the level of interdependence, as well as the level of importance attributed to membership in collective organisations such as the EC, WEU, NATO and CSCE. The importance of each option according to the ranking given could help in determining the best perceived solution or response. The questions above were either specifically focused on one organisation or on many to determine a rank-order for the one most preferred by Greek elites. Again, the questions asked the same for Greece as for Europe based on the assumption that a state’s interests can be better promoted through one mechanism, while the same mechanism might not be liked by other states, for some other reason. The above questions are an attempt to study the level of success which NATO might have in containing possible threats, continuing membership in NATO and the EC, the importance of the US in European affairs and the level of importance of the Treaty of Maastricht for Europe and Greece.

Questions 12, 16, 24, 26, 27 and 31 examine other specific issues (some have been mentioned earlier as they overlap with other areas of the model but these questions can be seen independently as well) which may affect the model. Specifically, the issues focused upon are concerned with continuing United States assistance in European affairs, the question of European defence dealing only with European matters (contributing to the “European” or “Atlantic” characters of European defence discussed in the literature), whether the US is seen as the only major superpower in the world and how important is agreement to the terms of the Maastricht treaty for the stability of European affairs (economic and defensive). These questions all relate to European defence and may affect the model in the sense that they address issues that could help, through their ranking in order of importance, to determine important aspects and issues of European affairs that elites feel should be taken into consideration before developing responses.

Finally, questions 7, 11, 13, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 32 aim to gather information about the dependent variables of the model, the option(s) for European defence. After the pin-pointing of external threats and the importance of threat perception which affect international cooperation, along with possible subsequent intervening variables, the ranking of the possible options could be examined. These questions specifically gather information about best forms of security either among others or independently. Again, the reason for this is because one option on its own may be ranked highly but when considered among others, it may receive a much lower ranking as being not the best option for Greece’s or for Europe’s interests.

Question 7 examines the credibility of four possibilities for European security in general terms (no defence posture, national conventional arms, collective European security, collective Atlantic security). Question 11 examines whether NATO should continue to exist despite the fading existence of communism and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Question 13 explores the specific requirements of NATO, given that it continues. Question 17 investigates the question of whether Europe should break away from US assistance or NATO and deal with the Continent’s security through arrangements European in character such as the EC or the WEU. Question 18 examines which way would be most practical for
Greece to ensure its military security (NATO, WEU, combination NATO and the CSCE or withdrawal from all) while question 32 is concerned specifically with the WEU and if Greece’s interests would be better promoted through this organisation. Question 19 examines the most credible defence for Europe (not for Greece), and examines the possible differences with question 18. Finally, questions 20 and 21 aim to elicit information on whether the EC should provide a defence mechanism for Europe and if NATO should acquire new Eastern European members in order to become an alliance that could serve the whole Continent.

Figure 3
MODEL (Breakdown of Variables towards the Model)

Questions

| Questions | 2, 4, 6, 8, 9, 22, 23, 25, 28, 29, 30 | 1, 2, 10, 12, 14, 15, 16, 26, 27 | 12, 16, 24, 26, 27, 31 | 7, 11, 13, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 32 |

TP: Threat perception  
IC: International cooperation  
X: Intervening variables  
OP: Option

Note: Some questions may relate to more than one variable, as the specific questions may have two parts or touch upon more than one issue.

7.7 Methodology - Research Activity

Two sources and methods of obtaining data were utilised in this study during a three month period of field-work in Greece:

1. Documentary and press searching; and
2. An Elite questionnaire (survey).

Elites

Every political system, whatever its official ideology, is in fact ruled by a political elite or elites, according to Robertson (1993). The term elites often connotes superiority, as Evans and Newnham (1990) state, and is a descriptive term for individuals and groups found at the
top of a particular hierarchy (the Dictionary of World Politics). Within the fairly permissive parameters set by public moods, the status above the mass of the population operate. The public then, by default, becomes the audience in front of which elites make and justify their policy. The study is therefore interested in the elite approach as they are the ones closer to policy making due to their access to, and interest for, the subject in question. The growth in the number of state actors in world politics since 1945 has stimulated new interest in elite theories and elite responses according to Evans and Newnham (1990). "Elitism" assumes that by nature or by nurture, the majority in a population are unsuited and unqualified for elite status. Therefore, based on the knowledge, position, interest and involvement in the subject in question, elites were chosen to give their own responses in the field study. When the term "elites" is used, it refers to the sample of the case study which encompasses the above characteristics. According to Eldersveld (1993), "there are many types of elites - presidents or prime ministers, parliamentary deputies, judges, administrators, political activists, policy specialists, campaign consultants and political financiers for example" (The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, Kreiger ed., p. 263).

The questionnaire was designed closely in relation to the hypothesis of the study. All the questions in the survey were designed solely for this study. Although the original questionnaire was drafted in English, it was the Greek translation that was mostly used in the field study, accompanied by a letter of intent. A follow-up letter as well as a telephone reminder to the office of the respondent were used to encourage their response (see appendix H for questionnaires).

Anonymity was assured if requested by the respondent. In addition, the responses included elites from all major parties in Greece namely the New Democracy (ND) party, the Panhellenic Socialist Party (PASOK), the Communist Party (KKE) and Political Spring (POLA) party. The above parties are all represented in parliament. Although stating their political affiliation was optional, approximately 60% of the respondents did.

The Elite questionnaire was conducted in order to investigate the perceptual variables and hypothesis of the model. The questions (including the Greek translation) were submitted for evaluation and criticism to six (6) knowledgeable academics and the questionnaires were pre-tested on a group of nine (9) non-governmental nationals in Greece to determine possible problems or to clarify certain aspects of the translation. After the necessary modifications were made to ensure the questions in the Greek questionnaire conveyed the desired meaning, a pilot study was undertaken using five academics. The pilot study revealed no problems in procedure or comprehension, so the questionnaires were then sent in turn to the sample of Greek elites (114).

The survey was conducted from September 10, 1993 to December 2, 1993 in Greece. During that time, the state of Greece held elections. These were earlier than expected as normally they would have been held in April 1994 but were called because of the weak majority in parliament of the ruling party and due to the formation of a new party called the "Political Spring" (POLA). The outcome of the elections gave PASOK (The Panhellenic Socialist Party) a majority, overthrowing the New Democracy party (ND). The interesting point to make is the lack of representation of one of the two communist parties
(Synasipsmos - SYN) for the first time in many years, as well as the weak representation of the other communist party (KKE) in parliament where it obtained only ten seats out of 300.

According to a press search at the time of the field study, the issues that were at the forefront of Greece's security concerns were as follows:

a. The Macedonian Problem

This is an issue which has existed for decades, but has become more worrying to the Greeks after the break-up of the former Yugoslavia when a region of the former republic called upon the United Nations for recognition under the same name (Macedonia) as the region in the Northern part of Greece. The issue, as far as the Greek government is concerned, is mainly the name and the flag of the new state; they would not recognise it under any name related to "Macedonia". The issue is being discussed in the EC and the United Nations.

b. Concern about instability in the Balkans

The war in the former Yugoslavia in relation to the above Macedonian problem and the continuing flow of refugees from Albania have created instability in the Balkan region which has been affecting Greece in terms of creating new issues and threats. In general terms, Greece has been trying to form relationships with the newly formed states of Yugoslavia extending their foreign policies and seeking possible cooperation with them towards the Macedonian problem. The continuing war has raised fears of extension in the Greek northern borders especially when the region of Skopje (the region trying to use the name Macedonia) and Greece do not reach agreement. Great numbers of Albanian refugees are seeking jobs and have flooded the market with cheap labour creating new economic problems for professionals in the major cities and this issue has been a matter for concern as well.

c. The Cypriot Problem

The continuing deadlock since the 1974 invasion of Cyprus by Turkey has made the Cypriot problem an ongoing issue for Greece. The issue has also affected Cyprus' as well as Turkey's applications to join the EC and a solution that would satisfy both sides of the state is essential for international and European cooperation economically and defensively.

7.8 Timing

The timing of this study is important for a number of reasons. First of all, it was conducted at a time when the European Continent was going through important changes. New states have been formed after the events of 1989, the WTO has been dissolved, the Maastricht treaty goals are just beginning to be approached, and Europeans no longer feel the impact of the Cold War. Greece, as a state in Europe, is affected by all these changes as its relationship with Europe has not only been in geographical terms, but also in political, economic and defensive terms. As a member of NATO, the European Union and the
Western European Union, it has created trading patterns and stable relations with other democracies which are essential towards the state’s security. Therefore, it is essential for Greece to deal with, and have a say in Europe’s transformation.

Secondly, the instability in the Balkans is still a major issue in European affairs, along with the Macedonian issue specifically, affecting the state’s security and answers on perceptions of threat, options for defence and outside assistance are essential at this time.

Finally, the fact that Greece was undergoing elections at the time of the field work helped the this study for two reasons: First, during the election period, issues such as the Macedonian problem, the Yugoslav crisis, the Cypriot problem and Greece’s relations with Turkey were concerns debated repeatedly through pre - election campaign speeches and in the press. It was therefore a convenient time to examine such issues and perceive possible differences in the way parties felt these issues should be dealt with. Secondly, during the election period, most elites were interested in providing their views and comfortable with the questions, as these were some of the topics examined constantly through the media. These two reasons may, partly, explain the high response rate of 87.8%. Despite the initial feeling that the timing of the study would create problems, on the contrary, there seemed to be great interest in assisting the study and the response rate proves this point. Whether the same responses would have been obtained outside the elections is open to debate.

7.9 The Sample

The sample which was given the questionnaire included military officials, current and former cabinet officials, political appointees and academics. The reason for these four categories was because they were all considered relevant to the case study in terms of their specific knowledge about and/or participation in decision making on the policies in question. The military officials because of their specific knowledge on defence issues and their relevance to Greece’s military regime history, the members of parliament because of their involvement in defence spending and current political and foreign affairs, the academics because of their ability to analyse and study international relations issues and the political appointees because of their involvement in public affairs through their work in the various ministries, as economists and lawyers (a small number of political appointees were economic consultants and investors of political parties). They were identified and selected mostly through a press search. After the press search, a list of various "essential to meet" elites was made. It was necessary to acquire a response from elites which had been or were being involved in foreign affairs and foreign policy making as the issues discussed in chapter 6 were on top of their agendas. Several visits to the Greek Parliament were made in order to talk to officials that could arrange appointments with the MPs or to find out where to mail a questionnaire if the elite(s) could not be met in person. A significant number of elites were helpful enough to assist the study further, through guidance towards other former MPs and officials that they thought might provide more information. In most instances, their advice was taken. In the same manner, military officials from the Greek Pentagon were approached. It was decided to approach the academic elites by visiting them in their place of work at Universities and Colleges. Most of the Academics worked in private English -
speaking institutions and were lecturers in International Relations or Greek Politics. Two academics were given the questionnaire from each institution (8 institutions in total), in order to avoid bias. Finally, the political appointees were suggested by the above categories of the sample and included a wide range of individuals discussed further on. About 40% of the questionnaires were sent by mail while 60% were handed in person to the office of the respondent (especially in the case of the Military Officials and Academics), when it was thought by those surrounding the elites that this method would be most effective. One hundred and fourteen questionnaires were distributed and exactly one hundred were returned (response rate: 87.8%). The high response rate must be indicative of the empathy of the sample to the issues raised even though a few questionnaires were not completed fully. A small number of questionnaires were also sent after the field study had been completed, however were not taken into consideration as the processing of the data had already begun. The actual number of 100 responses was considered adequate after examination of other similar studies.

As previously stated, respondents were categorised as follows:

- Cabinet Officials: 19%
- Military Officials: 49%
- Academics: 16%
- Political Appointees: 16%

\[N = 100\]

Specifically, the Cabinet officials had all served (or were still serving) in the Greek Parliament. Three of the MPs had served as minister for foreign affairs and/or under-secretary for foreign affairs. The academic elites were lecturers in various Universities in Greece. A substantial number of political appointees were foreign ministry officials, treasury officials and individuals that have worked or were still working on committees formed by MPs or the PMs office to research foreign policy issues. Finally, the military officials had been, or were involved in Greece’s security issues by serving as Captains in the Greek military, Chiefs of staff, Commanders, Lieutenants and were working in the Greek Pentagon. All of the military officials held high positions (e.g. former Greek "chief of staff" during the Gulf War).

As presented in the breakdown of the sample, 49 per cent of the respondents were military officials. This is because it was felt that these elites are likely to hold specific knowledge and be aware of Greece’s security concerns, due to the nature of their occupation. It may seem that this percentage may have affected the results of the research. However, this is not necessarily true as the other half of the sample were not military officials, providing the necessary balance. In addition, the Greek military has a history of affecting Greek policy making and this was the reason for including a high percentage (the military coup of 1967-1974 reinforces the above).
Due to the fact that there are four major parties in Greece, it was considered prudent to find representatives from each of these parties. This was based on their breakdown in the outgoing Greek Parliament. Around 75 per cent of the political respondents came from the two largest parties in Parliament, PASOK and New Democracy, while the rest came from the Communist Party and the newly formed Political Spring. However, it must be noted that there cannot be clear evidence of party preference due to the fact that a number of respondents did not wish to identify their party. Party affiliation was mandatory and the rough estimate presented above derives from their (the respondents') activities over the years, as reported in the press.

Due to geographical convenience / proximity, 40 per cent of the questionnaire was mailed while 60 per cent was delivered in person, as mentioned earlier. Many elites could easily be seen in person while others desired the questionnaire to be mailed. All were encouraged to make further comments on the questions asked, either in person or by mail and these comments have also been noted. The questionnaire did not seem to present problems in its Greek form, as only two (2) individuals required further clarification (one in person and one by phone).

The Data

Most of the questions from the survey did not produce unexpected results as far as security preferences are concerned. In some instances, however, the expectation was clear and in other instances no explanation of the results could be given, probably due to the uncleanness of the perceptions of threat in Europe. Military officials sensed a greater threat than others in their response to the threat perception questions. This is possibly due to the nature of their occupation and their awareness of defence matters. In addition, the military officials' responses proved to be more consistent in most questions as opposed to the answers of the other respondents.

It was interesting to note the level of a threat that Turkey presented to Greece, especially in question three where it occupied the primary position among the alternatives offered. The choice was expected but not the overall level (Table 3), especially when consideration is given to the fact that Turkey has not overtly threatened Greece and that both are NATO members bound by the treaty of the North Atlantic Council. It was interesting to see the difference in the level of importance (for Europe and Greece) when asked about the importance of various problems Europe may face in the 1990s. A relevant example was the question of the problem of the break-up of the former Soviet Union. Greek elites thought of the problem as more important for Europe than for Greece with no clear explanation (Table 2).

Another interesting result drawn from the data was the ambiguity of preferring an "Atlantic" or "European" option for defence (discussion in Chapter Three of the literature review). Although there was not a sense of abandoning NATO, Greek elites also favoured more Europeanised forms of defence, independent of US assistance, as presented in questions 20 and 32 (Table 18 and Table 30). An overwhelming majority of the respondents favoured the option of the European Union offering a defence mechanism for Europe and also
believed that Greece's interests could be better promoted through the Western European Union. However, when asked if NATO should continue to exist, its requirements and whether Greece should continue to be a member, the respondents answered positively. This is evident from questions 6, 18 and 19 (Table 5, Table 16 and Table 17 respectively). NATO was preferred when a response was sought about the most credible forms among others (WEU, EC or new membership). This is an example of the uncertain nature of European defence, and can be explained by arguing that Greek officials realise the need for a more Europeanised form of defence in the future but understand the risk of abandoning NATO when the EC has not provided a defence mechanism and the Western European Union has not become a dominant institution for defence. The absence of threat perception for Europeans in the 1990s has made the problem greater.

As far as the United States is concerned, Greek elites responded quite positively to the importance of the US for European defence. Their response, however, was not as expected. A larger percentage of importance was expected and can only demonstrate the belief of the respondents that it is time for the gradual transformation of European defence without outside assistance either through NATO or through other organisations.

Despite the above ambiguities, the data in general terms presented "expected" results and reinforced the dilemmas and problems discussed in the literature review. The importance of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union was evident, especially from the academics, and international cooperation was also evident as was the importance of threat perception for the creation of a defence mechanism.

Chi - Square Test

In order to analyse further the results from the tables, the "Chi - square" value of each table was calculated through the SPSS (Statistical Program for Social Sciences) for Windows (SPSS for Windows, Norusis, 1993). This was done to determine how significant the results from the tables were with reference to the possibility of differences among the four types of respondents. Although there are a number of Chi - square tests, the one which has been used is the "Pearsons" Chi - square, as defined in SPSS for Windows (Norusis, 1993).

Essentially, such a significance test consists of calculating the risk that an observed correlation might be a purely accidental result, generated by the random behaviour of uncorrelated variables. Any indication of correlation is based on observed sample evidence, but chance variation can produce the same kind of "evidence", even when the variables are uncorrelated. The heart of all significance tests, according to Suits (1963), is the calculation of the probability of observing the same evidence in a hypothetical case of no correlation. The lower the risk, the greater is the significance of the evidence and it is natural to refer to the calculated risk as the significance level of the result (Statistics, p. 124).

A significance test involves weighing evidence. The higher the significance level, the lower the chance of accidental occurrence, the more convincing the evidence; if the significance level is low, this may be unconvincing. It must be noted, however, that there is no firm dividing point between what convinces and what does not. In most social sciences the .05
level is generally referred to as "significant", while the .01 level is called "highly significant".

It is essential to stress that a low significance level, for example a risk higher than .05, means only that this evidence of correlation is statistically unconvincing. It does not provide convincing evidence to the contrary.

The Data from the Chi - Square Test

The Chi - square test did not give results that would indicate that there was some association between each pair of variables with the exception of 8 correlations (out of 48), even though a larger sample may have indicated significant results, however it would have been more difficult to obtain. Two levels of significance were used to analyse the data for this specific test:

- significance at the .05 > (or smaller);
- significance at the .10 > (or smaller).

Each significance level is shown under the appropriate table.

At the 95 per cent confidence level, 7 relationships were statistically significant:

Those correlations between the various types of respondents (Military officials, Academics, Members of Parliament and Political Appointees) and the questions of:

- The level of importance of religious fanaticism as a concern for Europe (RELG);
- The level of importance of the Yugoslav crisis as a concern for Europe’s security (AYUG);
- NATO, as the major component that ensured European stability (NATO);
- The level of importance of the Treaty of Maastricht for Europe (MAST);
- The level of importance of the Soviet Union as a concern for Greece’s security (BSU);
- The level of importance of Germany as a concern for Greece’s security (BGERU);
- Whether European defence should only deal with matters of the Continent (EUDEF 1).

At the 90 percent confidence level, one correlation was significant: that between the various types of respondents and the most serious kind of threat facing Greece at the present time (STRT).

(See variables key in Appendix F for specific questions)

An analysis, presented in tabular form, of the responses to each question along with relevant comments follows.

N is the total number of cases in the specific table. This number may vary from table to table, as for some questions not everyone responded (Total number of respondents = 100)
Field Study Findings / Descriptive Statistics
Analysis
Chapter Seven Analytical Framework - Methodology - Descriptive Statistics (Tables) - Analysis

Tables

Note: The English translation of the question is shown under the table title.

Question 1

Table 1 presents the results given to the question concerning Greece's membership of NATO and of the European Community. Here the focus was on the possibility of Greece abandoning both organisations. From the results, inferences about the level of international cooperation and/or the level of neutrality of Greece could be drawn. It was found that uniformly and by a large margin over the two possibilities, 98% agreed that Greece should remain a member of both organisations. The past decade seems to have provided the growing sense of Greece continuing its membership, especially after the events of 1989 and the "success" of the EC in its systematic and gradual move towards European Union. This is despite the fact that the Socialist Party in its political campaign under Andreas Papandreou in 1980 sought to abandon both institutions. The economic benefits of the EC along with NATO's success in "winning" the Cold War seems to be recognised by Greek elites.

Table 1 - Membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Greek MPs</th>
<th>Academics</th>
<th>Military Officials</th>
<th>Political Appointees</th>
<th>Cumulative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 100 / chi-square not significant at .10 level
Source: Field Study

Question 2

Table 2 presents the results of the question relating to the effect which stable relations with Western Democracies have had in Greece's security. Uniformly, the Greek elites surveyed expressed their agreement to the statement that stable relations with states such as the UK, France and the US have played a role in that Greece has not been overtly threatened by another state since 1974. Interdependence here seems clear. Greece, being a small democratic state is somewhat required to have stable relations with more powerful states and the responses received to question two demonstrate this expectation.
Chapter Seven

Analytical Framework - Methodology - Descriptive Statistics (Tables) - Analysis

Table 2 - Stable Relations

*The fact that Greece has not been overtly threatened by another country since 1974 has to do with the country's stable relations with Western democracies such as the US, Britain and France*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Officials</td>
<td>11  19  8  5  3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>3   6   7   ...  ...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek MPs</td>
<td>3   6   7   2   ...</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Appointees</td>
<td>5   4   5   1   ...</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cumulative</strong></td>
<td><strong>22</strong>  <strong>35</strong>  <strong>27</strong>  <strong>8</strong>  <strong>3</strong></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 95 / chi - square not significant at .10 level
Source: Field study

Questions 3 and 4

Table 3 is an effort to provide areas of elite concern. From the results in Table 3, Turkey is seen as the primary threat to Greece. Approximately 58% of Greek elites in the sample believe that Turkey is the greatest threat to Greece's security at the present time. This result reinforces an article, written at the time of the survey, by Dr. Filippos Pierros from Harvard University and Dr. Thanos Docos, from Cambridge University (*Economicos Tahidromos*, November 18, 1993). The article argued that Greece's major threat came from Turkey and that Greece's major occupation should be "... the definition of the Turkish Threat." It questioned whether Turkey's aims had to do with occupying Greek territories and whether Turkey's diplomatic moves intended to sabotage Greece's prestige in Europe (*Economicos Tahidromos*, November 18, 1993, p. 106). The result obtained was as expected. There was, however, an expectation for a larger percentage regarding the Macedonian problem (5%). In addition, all respondents sensed a threat towards Greece at the present time.

In an attempt to further specify the kind of threat or problem areas facing Greece, but not necessarily towards Greece's security, the state's economy occupied the primary position. A foreign military threat was ranked third although the Greek military officials cited this variable most frequently (28%). The Chi - square for this relationship was significant (.09543). This is explained by the assumption that the military elites are more likely to feel military threats than other types of respondents, because of the nature of their occupation (Turkey was most probably the threat implied). It must be noted that Greece's economy was a major issue during the October 1993 elections.

130
### Table 3 - Greatest Threat

*Which of the following is the greatest threat to Greece's security at the present time?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Threat</th>
<th>Greek MPs</th>
<th>Academics</th>
<th>Military Officials</th>
<th>Political Appointees</th>
<th>Cumulative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balkan Instability</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Macedonian Problem</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No threat</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 100 / chi-square not significant at .10 level  
Source: Field Study

### What is the most serious kind of threat facing Greece at the present time?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Threat</th>
<th>Greek MPs</th>
<th>Academics</th>
<th>Military Officials</th>
<th>Political Appointees</th>
<th>Cumulative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic economy</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic political instability</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign military threat</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign economic threat</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No threat</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 100 / chi-square significant at .10 level  
Source: Field Study
Question 5

Table 4 presents the results of question five which enquired about the level of seriousness of the current European instability as a threat towards Greece's security. As expected, a larger percentage of Greek elites surveyed expressed the opinion that the current instability in Europe, in relation to Greece's security, was serious compared to those who felt that it was not serious. A cumulative 65% reinforces the level of seriousness. When the Greek elites were asked, however, for an opinion as to how probable the threat is to arise, it was felt that the likelihood was rather small (52% occupying the middle area of the probability scale). Mazower (1994) however, argues that the scenarios for expanded war due to this current instability, erupting in Kosovo or "Macedonia", drawing in neighbours, including NATO members Greece and Turkey are real (Balkan War Report, Bulletin of the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, March - April 1994, # 25).

Table 4 - Current Instability

*It has been suggested that the military balance in Europe and in the world has been changed considerably. In your opinion, how serious is the current instability in Europe to Greece's security?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek MPs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Officials</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Appointees</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 100 / chi square not significant at .10 level
Source: Field Study
Table 4 (continued)

How probable is it for a threat towards Greece's security to arise?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very Probable</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>Not at all Probable</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greek MPs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Officials</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Appointees</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 100 / chi-square not significant at .10 level
Source: Field Study

Questions 6 and 7

Turning to policy preferences expressed by the Greek officials, Table 5 presents data on their views as to the best form of defence against a perceived military threat. Important differences in preferences are presented. The two options with the largest percentage preferences were collective security which is European in character (EC and WEU) and integration of Atlantic community forces (NATO). Apart from the Greek MPs, the other three groups were slightly more supportive of European defence efforts. In this instance, the defence problem expressed through the literature review as to the debate of "Europeanising" European defence or remaining "Atlantic" ("Europeanist" vs. "Atlanticist") is presented. The dilemma is apparent as NATO is regarded as a major option for Greece's defence, despite European efforts. "For the next decade or so, NATO should continue in some form, and the United States should back it. Europeans may rail at American leadership - but they still prefer to be led by the US to being headed by another European power" (The United States and the New Europe, Duignan and Gann, 1994, p. 261).
Table 5 - Best Form of Defence

Given your views on a military threat to Greece's security, what is the best form of defence against this threat?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Greek MPs</th>
<th>Academics</th>
<th>Military Officials</th>
<th>Political Appointees</th>
<th>Cumulative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No defence posture</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National conventional arms</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective security</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Europe - EEC, WEU)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration of Atlantic Community Forces (NATO)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 100 / chi - square not significant at .10 level
Source: Field Study

Table 6 presents the results of question 8 (parts A and B) which had dealt with religion as a source of threat for Europe in general and for Greece specifically. In both cases, the level of seriousness was low, apart from the case of the political appointees who believed that religious fanaticism is a very serious threat for Europe (67%) and for Greece (50%). However, in general terms, Greek officials thought that religion for Greece was more of a threat than for Europe (46% compared to 40% respectively). The Chi - square significance level was high for the table concerning "Europe", implying that the types of respondents held different levels of opinion on the importance of religion as a threat for Europe (.00587 as a threat to Europe). The Economist (March 11, 1995), reinforces the above: "Militant Islam is now the single most serious threat to Western Security, or so Willy Claes, secretary - general of NATO, recently claimed in a moment of hyperbole. It is possible to see part of his point: Islamic terrorists try to blow up Manhattan's World Trade Centre, America's airlines and the globe - trotting Pope; Algeria's civil war threatens to spread its nastiness to the "bidonvilles" of France; freelance gunmen from the Afghan war add a touch of zealotry to the conflict in Bosnia; from Egypt to Pakistan angry preachers compete to denounce the satanic West" (Economist,p. 137).
Table 6 - Religion

Based on the religious fanaticism evident in the Middle East (Iraq, Syria and Kuwait) as well as in Europe (Turkey, Muslims in former Yugoslavia), how serious a threat, in your opinion, is Islamic fundamentalism to Europe's security?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Serious</th>
<th>Not at all Serious</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek MPs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Officials</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Appointees</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 99 / chi - square significant at 0.05 level
Source: Field Study

How serious a threat, in your opinion, is Islamic fundamentalism, to Greece's security?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Serious</th>
<th>Not at all Serious</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek MPs</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Officials</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Appointees</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 99 / chi - square not significant at 0.10 level
Source: Field Study
Question 9

Table 7 presents the data on Greek officials' views as to the level of seriousness of Germany as a threat for Europe and for Greece. Here, the emphasis was not on Germany as an economic threat, but as a military threat, based on Germany's legacy of war, discussed by analysts in the literature review, especially after the German unification. In both situations, the threat was not perceived as being serious, especially towards Greece's security, as expected. As Gortemaker (1994) argues, within the new Europe, the unification of Germany is as much a matter of anxiety as it is an expression of hope. German unification could bring new attention to the idea of "Mitteleuropa" as a bridge between East and West thus promoting an all-European understanding and identity apart from traditional structures of East-West partition and bipolarity. Given the disorientation of Eastern Europe and its need for economic assistance and cooperation, the unified Germany could establish the link between the capitalist democracies of the West and the transforming societies in the East, providing economic strength and political weight alike. On the other hand, the notion of putting Germany in the driver's seat of Europe again could provoke feelings of uneasiness, if not outright rejection. History remains a burden, even if European Cooperation takes precedence over memories of the past and gradually revises the German image (Unifying Germany, 1989 - 1990, p. 15).

However, according to Duignan and Gann (1994), Europe has been fortunate because of Germany's unification: "The problems of Unification are difficult but not insoluble. The task of rebuilding East Germany will keep the Germans busy for at least a decade. In the meantime, they will become even further committed to transnational bodies such as the EC, the WEU, and the CSCE. Europe and the world have indeed been fortunate" (The United States and the New Europe, p. 127).
Table 7 - Germany

Many defence analysts present Germany as a legacy of war. How serious a threat is Germany for Europe’s security?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very Serious</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greek MPs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Officials</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Appointees</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cumulative | 8 | 9 | 9 | 23 | 19 | 22 | 10 | ... |

N = 100 / chi - square not significant at .01 level
Source: Field Study

How serious a threat is Germany for Greece’s security?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very Serious</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greek MPs</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Officials</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Appointees</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cumulative | 5 | 7 | 6 | 12 | 30 | 23 | 15 | 2 |

N = 99 / chi - square not significant at .10 level
Source: Field Study

Question 10

Table 8 presents the data from question 10 regarding Greek officials’ views on NATO as being the major component that ensured European stability. Here, the level of agreement was high from all types of respondents with the military officials as the highest (78%). The results suggest NATO’s success in being a dominant and major component in Europe’s security. Again, these results send the message of the difficulty in abandoning NATO for
another security organisation as its contribution is widely accepted from Greek elites. Veremis (1984), Clogg (1990) and Richter (1990) identify the procrastinating role that NATO has played over the years not only for Greece, but also for Europe.

Table 8 - NATO and European Stability

According to many defence analysts, NATO has been the major component that ensured European stability.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greek MPs</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Officials</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Appointees</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative</td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 100 / chi - square significant at .05 level
Source: Field Study

Question 11

Table 9 focuses specifically on whether NATO should continue to exist despite the dissolution of its counterpart, the WTO, and the fall of communism. The level of agreement here is high as in the previous table and quite uniform for all types of respondents; 68% for Greek MPs, 62% for academics, 73% for Greek military officials, and 75% for political appointees. It seems clear that NATO's dominance is still present and required. "The NATO connection is particularly valuable to Germany, which finds that NATO enhances the legitimacy of German foreign policy while reassuring France. The US can improve its own position by proposing a number of reforms that would please the Germans without harming any other power" (The United States and the New Europe, p. 261).
Table 9 - On NATO's continuation

Due to the current instability in Europe, NATO should continue to exist despite the fall of communism and the dissolution of the Warsaw pact.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek MPs</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Officials</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Appointees</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 99 / chi - square not significant at .01 level
Source: Field study

Lazaridis and Branis (1993) reinforce NATO's importance in continuing to exist and applaud the transformations occurring in the structure (Economicos Tahidromos, October 28, 1993, p. 31). Most defence analysts agree with NATO's continuation (as discussed in the literature review), and Kemp, chief editor of the European Wall Street Journal (August 11, 1993), stated: Yugoslavia may have gone, but the search for the future role of NATO is just beginning.

Question 12

Table 10 presents the results on the question of continuing US involvement in European affairs. Although a higher percentage of agreement especially in relation to the previous two questions regarding NATO was expected, agreement only reached 46%, significantly lower than NATO's results (which implies US assistance). The possible explanation could be the fact that Greek officials have realised the importance of NATO and the need for the organisation's continuation, but most probably, without US control. This would mean that NATO would probably have to acquire a European character as far as its leadership is concerned. Again, these results reinforce the Europeanists' debate of "European security becoming more European".
Table 10 - US and Europe

Despite the end of the Cold War and the fall of Communism, the United States should still continue to play a role in European affairs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek MPs</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MilitaryOfficials</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PoliticalAppointees</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 99 / chi-square not significant at .05 level
Source: Field study

Question 13

Table 11 deals with the results from question 13, which deal with NATO's requirements in the next decade in order for the structure to continue. Opinions here vary, with four of the requirements given a relatively greater importance by the respondents: The requirement of NATO acquiring European leadership (37%); the requirement of NATO including Easter European states (33%); the requirement of NATO amending its treaty (63%); and perceiving new threats (16%). The expectation here was the requirement of NATO perceiving new threats. However, the fourth option from the questionnaire, which received the highest ranking, also stated that NATO needed to set new goals along with amending the treaty and threat perception could have been considered by the respondents when choosing this option. However, the variety of requirements demonstrate the various new problems presented to NATO after the events of 1989 and the reason for the organisation's slow but gradual transformation discussed in the literature review. Duignan and Gann (1994), argue that NATO policy makers will have to remodel the alliance so as to take account of the Europeans' enhanced role. In addition, they argue that the structure requires restructuring: "The US should continue its NATO membership for at least another decade while gradually transferring power to the WEU" (The United States and the New Europe, p. 261, 271).
However, Iordanides (1994), argues that NATO should be cautious: "The danger for NATO can only come from the unclarity of the political goals of its leadership" (Defence and Diplomacy, March, #37, p. 4, Greek edition). This point may become a difficult problem to overcome, if one considers NATO's enlargement through the PFP.

Table 11 - NATO Requirements

Based on the assumption that NATO remains the major defensive organisation in Europe in the 1990s, which of the following are vital requirements for the structure's successful continuation?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Greek MPs</th>
<th>Academics</th>
<th>Military Officials</th>
<th>Political Appointees</th>
<th>Cumulative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US leadership</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European leadership</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion of Eastern European countries</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amendment of treaty</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat perception</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to deal with out-of-area threats</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 97 / chi-square = invalid data, SPSS could not calculate
Source: Field Study

European leadership as well as acquiring new members in NATO, which was also highly ranked, indicated the shift from US leadership to European leadership as well as a security organisation for more European states.

Question 14

Table 12 presents the data from question 14 which seeks to determine whether NATO has been a major reason for containing fears of a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey as both are NATO members. Here the emphasis was to see whether Greek officials viewed NATO as the balance between these two states whether NATO is not responsible for the fact that no clear threat from either state has existed since both (Greece and Turkey), are NATO members. Despite the fact that Papandreou had threatened to pull out of NATO in 1981, he did not carry out his threats, according to Wegs (1991), primarily because the United States would have found it necessary to strengthen Greece's major opponent, Turkey, in NATO if Greece left. "This would threaten the Greeks in Cyprus where 20,000 Turkish troops were stationed to protect the Turkish minority" (Europe since 1945, A concise History, p. 284).
Table 12 - NATO, Greece and Turkey

NATO has been a major reason for containing fears of a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey, as both are NATO members.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th></th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek MPs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Officials</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Appointees</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 96 / chi - square not significant at .10 level
Source: Field study

Despite the expectation of strong agreement to the question, Greek elites were rather divided with half of the respondents agreeing and the other half either disagreeing or holding a non-committal view. Dr F. Pierros, an EP member, also reinforces the argument that Greece's membership in NATO along with Turkey's has served as a procrastinating factor for Turkey's threats towards Greece. However, as he argues, Greece's membership in NATO, along with the state's membership in other international organisations, is not enough to secure the state from outside threats (Economicos Tahidromos, November 18, 1993, p. 107).

Question 15

Table 13 presents the data on whether Greece should continue to remain a member of NATO. The focus was to see specifically (not along with the EC as in question one) if there is a sense of abandoning NATO. Agreement was expected, however, and occupied the primary position with 91%, reinforcing the discussion in the review of the literature and a large part of the field study findings.
Question 16

Table 14 demonstrates that when asked specifically about the United States' importance for Europe's defence in the 1990s, the responses were uniformly spread out over the seven point scale, with a slight edge indicating the US as important for Europe. America's fading presence in Europe had been argued 16 years ago by Serfaty (1980), in his study *Fading Partnership - America and Europe after 30 years*. It is assumed that Greek officials would probably favour Europeans taking over leadership in Europe either through NATO, by giving it European leadership or through other institutions. However, this view is not uniform, and can be partly explained by the "recent" transformation of the European Continent.
Table 13 - Greece and NATO

_Greece should continue to remain as a member of NATO._

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Greek MPs</th>
<th>Military Officials</th>
<th>Political Appointees</th>
<th>Academics</th>
<th>Cumulative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 93 / chi - square not significant at .10 level
Source: Field Study

Table 14 - US and European Defence

_How important is the United States, in your opinion, for European defence?_

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Important</th>
<th>Not at all Important</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek MPs</td>
<td>1 5 5 3 3 1</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Officials</td>
<td>13 10 9 5 6 4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>1 6 3 2 2 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Appointees</td>
<td>4 4 2 5 1</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative</td>
<td>19 25 19 15 12 6 3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 99 / chi - square not significant at .10 level
Source: Field Study

Question 17

Table 15 presents the results from the question regarding Europe breaking away from the US and NATO and dealing with the Continent's security only through arrangements which are European in character such as the EC and the WEU. In these results, the level of uncertainty was high, especially in the case of the Greek MPs (47%). The results to this question contradict the expectation that Greek officials would favour "Europeanising" European defence and adds reinforcement to the defence dilemma of choosing between "European" or "Atlantic".
**Table 15 - Europe and European Security**

*Europe should break away from the US and NATO and deal with the Continent's security only through arrangements which are European in character such as the EEC and the WEU.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek MPs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Officials</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Appointees</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 99 / chi - square not significant at .10 level
Source: Field study

**Question 18**

Table 16 presents the results of the Greek officials' views as to the most practical way to ensure Greece's military security under the present circumstances.

**Table 16 - Greece and Military Security**

*Under present circumstances, which do you think is the most practical way for Greece to ensure its military security?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Greek MPs</th>
<th>Academics</th>
<th>Military Officials</th>
<th>Political Appointees</th>
<th>Cumulative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Continue present arrangements (NATO)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pursue entry to the WEU</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combination of coll. sec. arrangements (NATO, CSCE)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdraw from coll.sec. arrangements</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 100 / chi - square not significant at .10 level
Source: Field Study
The primary position was occupied by the option combining collective security arrangements such as NATO and the CSCE (71%). Despite the fact that in previous questions the elites did not seem in favour of abandoning NATO and had identified its success, the option of continuing present arrangements was significantly low (10%). The logical explanation lies with the changing needs of Europe and the "out-datededness" of NATO. The results indicate that NATO would be preferred when working together with other security arrangements such as the CSCE.

Question 19

Table 17 shifts the focus from Greece to Europe asking the elites which alternative for European defence is the most credible. The results in this case indicated a high percentage (42%) favouring that Europe should rely on NATO with the inclusion of the United States. The options for this question offered no combination alternatives and NATO received the primary position, demonstrating that when comparing or choosing the most credible alternative, the respondents ranked NATO as the highest. In addition, the CSCE alternative was preferred by only 4% of the respondents indicating what the literature review discussed about the difficulty it faces in becoming institutionalised and its broadness in membership that make it a defensively weak alternative for Europe's defence. In addition, the European Community was favoured (24%) over the Western European Union option (5%), even though the EC does not have a defence mechanism (and is indicated on the questionnaire). The reason for this is partly due to the fact that Greece feels that the EU is the institution in which a solution to the Cyprus problem could be found. "If war between Greece and Turkey is to be averted, no step could be more useful than a democratic settlement of the Cyprus conflict" (Hitchens, 1994, Balkan War Report, Bulletin of the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, p. 11). Turkey is not a member of the EU, and this can explain why Greece favours this platform. The chi - square significance level of this table was high, suggesting that the respondents had different responses than expected, and point to the assumption that there was some association between this pair of variables at the 95 per cent confidence level (chi - square value = .04810). Although NATO occupied the primary position, half of the number of political appointees chose the EC as the most credible alternative for European defence.
Table 17 - Greece and Military Security

Which of the following alternative for European defence is the most credible?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Greek MPs</th>
<th>Military Officials</th>
<th>Academics</th>
<th>Political Appointees</th>
<th>Cumulative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rely on US force</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rely on NATO, including US.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rely on itself independent of US</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rely on EEC to form a defence mechanism</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rely on the CSCE</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rely on the WEU</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 99 / chi - square : not significant at .10 level
Source: Field Study

Question 20

Table 18 presents the results of question 20 as to whether the EC should provide a defence mechanism for Europe. Here, the level of agreement was high with 73% giving it the primary position as expected. The Treaty of Maastricht on European Union has identified the absence of a defensive dimension from the EC and has called upon the Western European Union to fill the gap. Whatever the case may be, Greek elites demonstrate the need for the EC to deal with security questions, a feeling which may be seen in relation with the earlier comment of the EC being the only institution in which Greece and Turkey are not both members, and the one in which Greece could pressure its European partners towards a solution to the Cyprus problem, and their own defensive concerns in relation to Turkey.
Table 18 - EEC and European Defence

In your opinion, should the European Economic Community (EEC) provide a defence mechanism for Europe?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Greek MPs</th>
<th>Military Officials</th>
<th>Academics</th>
<th>Political Appointees</th>
<th>Cumulative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 97 / chi - square not significant at .10 level
Source: Field Study

Question 21

Table 19 demonstrates that when asked about whether NATO should acquire new members from the former Eastern bloc to serve defensively the whole of Europe, the respondents indicated a relatively high percentage of agreement (67%) especially in the case of the academics (87%). NATO has already begun to change in character and the results from the questions relating to NATO demonstrate the various new challenges it faces (requirements, combination with other security arrangements, leadership, and membership being the most important). The membership option was also offered in question 13 (see Table 11), but along with other NATO requirements for the 1990s. However, in this instance, NATO’s inclusion of Eastern European states was ranked higher, demonstrating that even if it is not ranked as the highest priority for NATO, it still remains a very important one. NATO has already begun to discuss opening its membership to new states (NATO is Paving the Way for East Europeans to Join the Alliance, BBC 2 News, Jan 10 1994, 10:15 p.m.). The Partnership For Peace plan has encompassed 24 Eastern European states to NATO (see Appendix E). Holbrooke (1995), argues that expansion of NATO is a logical and essential consequence of the disappearance of the Iron Curtain and the need to widen European Unity based on shared democratic values. “PFP is an invaluable tool that encourages NATO and individual partners to work together. It helps newly democratic states restructure and establish democratic control of their military forces and learn new forms of military doctrine, environmental control and disaster relief. In the future, it will provide a framework in which NATO and individual partners can cooperate in crisis management or out - of - area peace keeping (Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, #2, March - April, p. 42 - 43).
Table 19 - NATO and Eastern Europe

*NATO should acquire new Eastern European members in order to become an alliance that could serve the whole of Europe.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>No response</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greek MPs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Military Officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Academics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Political Appointees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Cumulative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 97 / chi - square not significant at .10 level
Source: Field study

Question 22

Table 20 focuses on the question of threat perception in NATO and specifically, the importance of perceiving new threats to ensure the organisation’s continuation. As expected, the importance was ranked relatively high (77% cumulatively), with the military officials giving it their highest priority (90%). As expressed in this study, threat perception is among the major requirements, if not the major one, for any defence organisation’s existence. This has been identified by the Greek elites, even if the threat perception ranking of NATO as one of the organisation’s requirements, in question 13 (Table 11), among others, was not seen as the most vital one. "In the Alliance’s New Strategic Concept, dialogue and cooperation have the outmost importance; the significance of crisis management has increased; ...the threat which was accepted in a bi-polar world turned into risks as a result of a set of developments in Europe " (General Gures, The Rusi Journal, June, 1993 p. 1). The above comment can partly explain why threat perception was not ranked higher as one of NATO’s requirements.
Table 20 - NATO and Threat Perceptions

*Given the fact that the Warsaw Pact has been dissolved and the Communist threat has receded, how important is it for NATO to perceive new threats for its continuation?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very Important</th>
<th>Not at all Important</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek MPs</td>
<td>5 8 2 2 ...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Officials</td>
<td>19 16 10 3 1 ...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>4 3 6 1 1</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Appointees</td>
<td>4 4 4 2 1 ...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative</td>
<td>32 31 22 8 3 ...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 96 / chi - square not significant at .10 level
Source: Field Study

Question 23

Table 21 indicates the level of importance which the respondents give to some of the problems which Europeans might face in the 1990s. The respondents were asked to indicate how important these problems were, in their opinion, for Europe (Table 21 - A) and for Greece (Table 21 - B).

In the first part of the table (part A), the most pressing problem seen by the Greek elites was the Yugoslav crisis (90%) with the break-up of the Soviet Union following a close second with 87%. In the second part of the table (part B), the problems of greatest importance for Greece differed from those for Europe (as seen by the Greek elites). The Cypriot problem was believed to be of greatest importance (91%), followed closely by the Macedonian problem and the Yugoslav crisis (90% each). This demonstrates the various national priorities for security matters and is one of the main problems when discussing common foreign policy or common threat perception within security arrangements. How a problem may be sensed by one government may not be identical to how it is perceived by another government and this makes the establishment of common goals or collective structures difficult.

The ranking of the problem of the dissolution of the Soviet Union was different when perceived as a problem for Greece (47%) compared to it being a problem for Europe (87%). Greek elites may feel that the new republics would not present a problem for their state, but hold this view without an evident explanation for their belief (the Chi - square value in this instance was also high, .00380 for the former Soviet Union as a threat to Europe. The break-up of the former Soviet Union can be seen as a threat through the fact that the newly
formed republics have inherited weapons left in their areas by the Soviet regime. Based on Gleditsch and Njolstad’s (1984) argument, that "highly armed states can use their military power as leverage in forcing other states to make concessions that are detrimental to their sovereignty, security and welfare"; these republics could pose as well - justified threats for Europe and for Greece (Arms Races, p. 353). The Macedonian problem along with the Cypriot problem were expected to be and were ranked as most important and this is understandable as these were the major issues, along with the domestic economy, associated with the election held in Greece during the time of the survey.

Clogg (1986, 1992), Veremis (1986), Lazaridis and Branis (1993) also identify these various problems that have been affecting and might continue to affect Greece more dramatically. Specifically, Clogg presents the problem of Albanian refugees and the Greek minority returning from the former Soviet Union. These minorities have created various economic problems for Greece, offering cheap labour causing problems for the local labour markets. The crime rate has risen since the refugees, especially Albanians, started to flow into Greece. Lazaridis and Branis identify the problems that the Yugoslav crisis has created, mostly for Europe and NATO, which have affected the Balkan region and created problems in the perception of new threats, such as the Macedonian incident, through the creation of new states. They conclude that Greece needs to have a say within NATO in order to present its own view of the problems affecting their own state.

Veremis and Richter (1990) identify the issue of Cyprus for Greece as well as for Europe as it is a major factor affecting Turkish entry to the EC. They recognise the difference in importance for Greece compared to that for Europe. In addition, Bazoglusezer (1984) also discusses the negative effect that Greco-Turkish relations have had especially due to the Cypriot problem for Turkey's Western allies (Turkey and Greece, ed. by Alford; A Concise History of Greece, Clogg; Greece in the 1980s, Clogg). Rizopoulos (1994), argues that "for over 20 years - certainly since the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in the summer of 1974 - the one predominant idee fixe of Greek policy makers, irrespective of party affiliation, has been the conviction that Greece’s main, and perhaps only, vital security threat came from the East: from a revanchist Turkish bent on permanently dividing (and occupying) Cyprus and upsetting the Aegean balance of power". Derala (1994), states that Turkey has been "Macedonia’s" best ally, responding to every twist of the diplomatic battle between Greece and "Macedonia", interrelating the issues of Cyprus, Macedonia and Turkey presented in the tables (Balkan War Report, Bulletin of the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 1994, pp. 4 - 8).

The above situation worsens when Greece’s and Turkey’s relations with Serbia are presented, to reinforce the importance of the Yugoslav crisis presented in the results of the descriptive statistics. Nenadovic (1994), and Stitkovac (1994), argue that the disintegration of Yugoslavia left "Macedonia" between Athens and Belgrade. As a result, the anti-"Macedonian" factor is the main link of Greco-Serbian relations. In addition, Stitkovac argues that a Turkish-Serbian media war has raged for two years and relations between the two states are strained (Balkan War Report, Bulletin of the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, March - April 1994, pp. 16 - 17).
## Chapter Seven
Analytical Framework - Methodology - Descriptive Statistics (Tables) - Analysis

### Table 21-A
Possible Problems

*Here are some problems that Europeans might face in the 1990s. Please indicate how important each is for Europe.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Of very great importance</th>
<th>Of great importance</th>
<th>Of some importance</th>
<th>Of no importance</th>
<th>No response</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>THE CYPRIO PROBLEM, N = 95</strong> / chi-square not significant at .10 level</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greek MPs</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Officials</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Appointees</td>
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<td>Cumulative</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS, N = 99** / chi-square significant at .05 level | 27                        | 22                  | 5                  | 3                | 3           |
| Greek MPs                   | 11                        | 5                   | 2                  | 3                | 3           |
| Military Officials          | 22                        | 20                  | 5                  | 3                | 3           |
| Academics                   | 23                        | 20                  | 5                  | 3                | 3           |
| Political Appointees        | 23                        | 20                  | 5                  | 3                | 3           |
| Cumulative                  | 62                        | 35                  | 2                  | 3                | 3           |

| **THE MACEDONIAN PROBLEM, N = 95** / chi-square not significant at .10 level | 15                        | 12                  | 16                 | 5                | 1           |
| Greek MPs                   | 5                         | 5                   | 8                  | 3                | 3           |
| Military Officials          | 15                        | 12                  | 16                 | 5                | 1           |
| Academics                   | 5                         | 3                   | 7                  | 1                | 1           |
| Political Appointees        | 4                         | 4                   | 5                  | 3                | 3           |
| Cumulative                  | 29                        | 24                  | 36                 | 6                | 5           |

| **ALBANIAN REFUGEES, N = 91** / chi-square not significant at .10 level | 12                        | 23                  | 46                 | 10               | 9           |
| Greek MPs                   | 1                         | 4                   | 9                  | 1                | 4           |
| Military Officials          | 6                         | 9                   | 25                 | 7                | 2           |
| Academics                   | 1                         | 7                   | 7                  | 1                | 1           |
| Political Appointees        | 4                         | 3                   | 5                  | 2                | 2           |
| Cumulative                  | 12                        | 23                  | 46                 | 10               | 9           |
### Table 21-A

**Possible Problems**

_Here are some problems that Europeans might face in the 1990s. Please indicate how important each is for Europe._

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Of very great importance</th>
<th>Of great importance</th>
<th>Of some importance</th>
<th>Of no importance</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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**NEO-NAZISM,**  
_N = 94 / chi - square not significant at .10 level_

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<td>Military Officials</td>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
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**THE SOVIET UNION BREAK-UP,**  
_N = 94 / chi - square significant at .05 level_

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**GERMAN UNIFICATION,**  
_N = 94 / chi - square not significant at .10 level_

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Source: Field study
Table 21-B
Possible Problems

Here are some problems that Europeans might face in the 1990s. Please indicate how important each is for Greece.

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<th>Of some importance</th>
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THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS, N=91 / chi-square not significant at .10 level

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<td>7</td>
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<td>...</td>
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<td>...</td>
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THE MACEDONIAN PROBLEM, N=91 / chi-square not significant at .10 level

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<td></td>
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ALBANIAN REFUGEES, N=90 / chi-square not significant at .10 level

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<td>6</td>
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Table 21-B
Possible Problems

Here are some problems that Europeans might face in the 1990s. Please indicate how important each is for Greece.

<table>
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NEO-NAZISM, N = 90 / chi square not significant at .10 level

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THE SOVIET UNION BREAK-UP, N = 90 / chi square not significant at .10 level

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<th>2</th>
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<td>Academics</td>
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GERMAN UNIFICATION, N = 89 / chi square significant at .05 level

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<td>31</td>
<td>36</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field study
Question 24

Table 22 presents the data on the opinion of the respondents as to whether the US was the only remaining superpower in the world at the present time.

Table 22 - US, The only Remaining Superpower?

The United States in the only remaining superpower in the world at the present time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>2</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

N = 99 / chi - square not significant at .10 level
Source: Field study

As expected, a large majority agreed (91%) and this agreement was uniform among the various groupings of respondents. Evidently, the fall of Communism, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact along with the break-up of the Soviet Union has made the United States seem as the most dominant state in the world.

Question 25

Table 23 presents the results to the question of how serious a threat is Russia to Europe's security, despite the break-up of the Soviet Union. The Greek MPs, along with the military officials gave the highest ranking among the four groups of respondents (60% and 47% respectively). In general terms, however, the results were well distributed along the seven point scale. Again, as in Table 21 which concerns the break-up of the Soviet Union, the threat which Russia poses is not seen as substantial although there is no evident logical explanation for this apart from stable relations and common religious beliefs (Christian Orthodox).
Table 23 - The Threat which Russia Poses

*Despite the break-up of the Soviet Union, how serious a threat is Russia to Europe’s security?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very Important</th>
<th>Not at all Important</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td>2 7 5 1 4 2 ...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek MPs</td>
<td>8 5 10 9 8 7 2</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Military Officials | 2 4 5 1 3 1 | ...
| Academics     | 3 2 2 4 3 1 1   | ... |
| Political Appointees | 11 16 21 19 16 13 4 | ...
| Cumulative    | 11 16 21 19 16 13 4 | ...

N = 100 / chi - square not significant at .10 level
Source: Field Study

Questions 26 and 27

Table 24 presents the results to the question of how important the Treaty of Maastricht is for the stability of European affairs. Without agreement to the terms of Maastricht, the EC would most probably create additional problems for Europe which, along with other problems mentioned in the literature review, would mean a more unstable Continent. As expected, the respondents considered the Treaty highly important (67%; 99% cumulatively), demonstrating the awareness and importance felt by Greek elites of the Treaty for European Union. The chi - square value for the correlation of the importance of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union for Europe with the types of respondents was high (.02282), demonstrating this uniformity among all categories of respondents. Similar findings are displayed in Table 25. For example, when asked specifically about the importance of the Treaty of Maastricht for Greece, not a single respondent chose the "not important" alternative.
### Table 24 - Maastricht and European Affairs

*How important is agreement to the terms of Maastricht for the stability of European affairs (economic and defensive)?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not important</th>
<th>Fairly important</th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greek MPs</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Officials</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Appointees</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ N = 100 / \chi - square \text{ significant at .05 level} \]

Source: Field study

### Table 25 - Maastricht and Greece

*How important is the treaty of Maastricht for Greece?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not important</th>
<th>Fairly important</th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>Europe will procrastinate unification</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greek MPs</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Officials</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Appointees</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ N = 100 / \chi - square \text{ not significant at .10 level} \]

Source: Field study
Question 28

Table 26 deals with the former Soviet Union and how serious a nuclear threat it poses to Europe despite the formation of new republics.

### Table 26 - The Nuclear Threat from the former Soviet Union

*How serious a nuclear threat does the former Soviet Union, despite its break-up into smaller republics, present to Europe?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very Serious</th>
<th>Not at all Serious</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek MPs</td>
<td>3 3 6 2 5</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Officials</td>
<td>18 11 11 4 2 3</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>4 2 5 3 1</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Appointees</td>
<td>4 3 3 1 4</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative</td>
<td>29 19 25 10 12 4</td>
<td>1 ...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 100 / chi-square not significant at .10 level

Source: Field Study

As expected, the overwhelming majority of the respondents felt that the possession of nuclear weapons was serious, with the military officials raking the threat as greatest. The various civil differences within the former Soviet Union, the coup in Russia in 1992 and the continuing violence in the smaller republics (i.e. Cheznya), suggest that the former Soviet Union should be seen as a possible threat, and Greek elites are aware of this. The results of this question, however, contradict the results of question 23b and 25 (as seen in Tables 21-B and 23), where the Soviet Union was not seen as a major problem or a threat to Europe’s security.
Question 29

Table 27 deals with the importance of perception of threat for the establishment of a collective security arrangement, shifting the emphasis from NATO to other defence mechanisms as well. As expected, the importance given to this was very high (94%), especially by the military officials and the political appointees.

Table 27 - The Importance of Threat Perception

How important, in your opinion, is perception of a threat to establishing a collective security arrangement?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not important</th>
<th>Fairly important</th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greek MPs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Officials</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Appointees</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 98 / chi - square not significant at .10 level
Source: Field study

Question 30

Table 28 presents the results to the question on whether external threats should be taken into consideration and precautions taken in the defence mechanism of Europe as such threats may arise in European affairs. The focus of this question was to determine whether there was a sense of European or Greek levels of involvement in out-of-area threats, given that these threats affected European affairs. As expected, the level of agreement was high (81%), demonstrating the requirement of a defence organisation to be able, based on its treaty, to deal with out-of-area threats as NATO has done in the Yugoslav crisis or the EC through European Political Cooperation in the Gulf War which had affected Europe economically.
Table 28 - External Threats

External threats (out-of-area threats) such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, should be taken into consideration and precautions taken in the defence mechanism of Europe as such threats may arise in European affairs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th></th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek MPs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Officials</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Appointees</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 99 / chi - square not significant at .10 level
Source: Field study

Question 31

Table 29 presents the results to the question of whether European defence should deal with matters of the Continent.

Table 29 - European Defence

European defence should only deal with matters of the continent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th></th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek MPs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Officials</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Appointees</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 100 / chi - square significant at .05 level
Source: Field study
Chapter Seven
Analytical Framework - Methodology - Descriptive Statistics (Tables) - Analysis

Here, the responses were divided, contradicting the results of the previous question. The chi-square significance level in this correlation was high (.01307), demonstrating the level of uncertainty depicted in the table. However, this could be explained by revealing that the respondents probably feel that the primary concern of European defence should be dealing with matters of the Continent, and only when affected by out-of-area threats, should they deal with these.

Question 32

Finally, Table 30 presents the results to the question of whether Greece's interests would be better promoted through the Western European Union. The agreement level was high (78%) demonstrating the respondents shift towards a more "Europeanised" form of defence. However, Greece has just recently become a member of the WEU (1992) at which time Turkey was also accepted with associate member status and thus the other members of the WEU have not yet guaranteed security for Greece if threatened by Turkey (Economist Intelligence Unit, p. 13, 1992). Therefore, the clarity of Greece's defence with the WEU remains unclear.

Table 30 - Greece and the WEU

Greece's interests would be better promoted through the Western European Union.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek MPs</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Officials</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Appointees</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 100 / chi-square not significant at .10 level
Source: Field study

Summary - Descriptive Statistics

Chapter 7 presented the results of the descriptive statistics as well as the methodology and the analytical framework of the study. In most instances the results were as expected especially those concerning Turkey as a threat for Greece and those concerning NATO as a significant mechanism for Europe's security. A significant number of responses were uniform such as those concerning Greece's continuing membership in security institutions.
and the EC. It is essential to analyse these responses by examining them with one another (crosstabulations), through correlations. The questions related to each variable of the model are analysed with the next variable in sequence, based on the sequence of the model (for model and variables see section 7.6). The analysis of the correlations, as well as the statistical program used and why is presented in chapter 8.
Chapter Eight

Test of the Model
TP ⊗ IC ⊗ X ⊗ OP
8.1 Introduction

Given the threat perceptions and various options presented in the previous chapter, is there any relationship between them? The model suggests that there should be a relationship between the perception of threat and preferences for international cooperation, through stimulation towards international cooperation and other intervening variables. This proposition is being tested in this chapter.

This chapter is composed of two major parts; one examining the first part of the model, that of threat perception stimulating international cooperation (TP → IC) and secondly, that of international cooperation leading to preferences for international cooperation, or options through intervening variables that may affect the model (IC ↔ X ↔ OP).

The data was analysed though the Statistical Program for Social Sciences (SPSS) by using contingency tables for each variable under examination of the model with those variables which affected the dependent variable. Some correlations were analysed separately while others were examined with other relevant correlations to benefit the analysis. For all cases, however, the variable abbreviations are listed (see appendix for relevant question) along with the chi square value for each correlation (specifically the likelihood ratio for each relationship) along with the amount of degrees of freedom exhibited in the data.

The test is based on maximum likelihood theory and is often used in the analysis of categorical data. Certain conditions must be met for the chi-square distribution to be a good approximation of the distribution of the statistic in the equation. The data, as in this study, must be random samples from multi-nominal distributions and the expected values must not be too small. While it has been recommended that all expected frequencies be at least five, studies indicate that this is probably too stringent and can be relaxed (Everitt, 1977 in Norusis, SPSS inc., SPSS for Windows, p. 208).

In addition, two other values from the data determined the analysis of the correlations; the approximate significance value (between 0 and 1) and the C value, or the contingency coefficient, where the maximum value possible depends on the number of rows and columns.

For the purpose of this study, the approximate significance of the relationship was considered, as well as the C value in order to discern trends or patterns from the contingency table.
Finally, it must be noted that the significance level was considered as reflective of the relationship between the variables in question when the value was closer to zero (for the purpose of the study, between 0 and 0.35). A higher value would probably mean results by chance, but they are also analysed to evaluate patterns or trends from the contingency table responses (with the assistance of the C value.)

Notes: Most cases correlated with TYPE (the type of respondent) are analysed in the frequencies chapter (7).

Although other statistical tests can be used to provide data for such surveys, the chi square test along with the C value have been used extensively for analysis on similar projects.

The appropriateness of the chosen scales and the statistical tests have been discussed with several people with a suitable statistical background.

See Appendix F for the list of the abbreviations of the variables (questions), along with their respective question number.

Each question follows the variable name in the correlation analysis following.
8.2 Threat Perception \( \Rightarrow \) International Cooperation

**ACYP by MELOS** (Importance of the Cypriot issue for Europe by agreement of membership in NATO and the EEC)
- Chi square: 2.12 with 3 degrees of freedom
- Significance: 0.672
- \( C = 0.12701 \)

There seems to be a strong positive relationship between elites who felt that the Cypriot problem is an issue of great importance and that Greece should remain a member of the European Union and NATO. However, it must be noted that the question of the issue of Cyprus was related with Europe, not with Greece (a separate question - variable BCYP - relates the Cypriot issue with Greece) where the expected correlation was higher.

Those elites who believed that Greece should continue to remain a member of NATO and the EC also attributed a high level of importance to the Cypriot issue for Europe. This finding suggests that the elites feel that Europeans and their Atlantic partners should probably shift their attention more closely to the specific issue of Cyprus.

**ACYP by FNRA** (Importance of the Cypriot issue for Europe by stable relations as a reason for Greece's stability since 1974)
- Chi square: 22.1 with 12 degrees of freedom
- Significance: 0.02073
- \( C = 0.45638 \)

A statistically positive relationship is presented in the correlation between the importance of the issue of Cyprus for Europe with the agreement of the statement that Greece has not been overtly threatened by another state since 1974 due to Greece’s stable relations with other Western democracies. Those elites who felt that Greece's relations with other Western democracies had played a positive role in Greece's security also felt that the Cypriot problem was an issue of some importance for Europe. This finding assumes that stable relations have also played a role in the unlikely event of an escalation of the Cypriot problem. The question specifically stated the year 1974 (the year of the invasion) and therefore does not include the invasion incident. Furthermore, the fact that most elites believed that stable relations secured Greece from another threat, assumes that stable relations with Western democracies have contributed to the quest of finding a solution to the issue and the containment of further developments on the island.
ACYP by NATO (Importance of the Cypriot issue for Europe by NATO as a major component that ensured European security)
Chi square: 8.96 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.8173
C = 0.27176

When examining the importance of the Cypriot issue with the level of agreement of whether NATO is a major component that has insured European security, a statistically positive relationship was presented (especially from the C value). Those elites who felt that NATO was the major component that ensured European security also felt that the Cypriot problem was of some importance for Europe. This finding assumes that NATO has played a role in the Cypriot issue over the years as Greece and Turkey are NATO members and this has been a factor in the containment of military threats between the two states.

ACYP by US (Importance of the Cypriot issue for Europe by the importance of the US for European affairs)
Chi square: 7.12 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.8980
C = 0.25133

The importance of the Cypriot issue for Europe, when correlated with the question of the United States continuing to be involved in European affairs demonstrated a low level of correlation. Those elites who felt that the Cypriot problem was of some importance did not necessarily feel that the US should continue to play a role in European affairs. It seems likely that the Greek elites' opinion is that the US should not continue to play a dominant role in European affairs, as the United States do not seem to affect the Cypriot issue in relation to Europe.

ACYP by TUR (Importance of the Cypriot issue for Europe by NATO as a deterrent in Greaco - Turkish relations)
Chi square: 17.62 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.1583
C = 0.39635

As expected, a strong relationship was presented in the findings from the correlation of the Cypriot issue importance with the statement of "NATO as a major reason for containing fears of a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey", as both are members of NATO. Those elites who felt that the Cypriot problem was of great importance for Europe also agreed strongly to the statement that NATO is major reason for containing fears of a possible conflict.
between Greece and Turkey. This finding contradicts the results from the previous correlation (ACYP with US) that demonstrated a statistically negative relationship to the possibility of the US continuing to play a role, as NATO could be evaluated as US involvement in European issues. However, this contradiction can be partly explained by the assumption that Greek elites feel that NATO has contributed, and still can, to the issue as a security mediator, not as a US involvement method.

ACYP by MEM (Importance of the Cypriot issue for Europe by continuing NATO membership)
Chi square: 8.516 with 6 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.00843
C = 0.40476

A statistically positive relationship was presented in the results of the correlation of the importance of the Cypriot problem for Europe with the question of whether Greece should continue as a member of NATO. Those elites who felt that the Cypriot problem was of great importance or of some importance strongly felt that Greece should remain a member of NATO, suggesting NATO's success in European affairs in general, containment of fears between Greece and Turkey and also belief in NATO's future success towards a solution to the Cypriot issue as a problem for Europe.

ACYP by EUDEF (Importance of the Cypriot issue for Europe by the importance of the US for European defence)
Chi square: 20.79 with 18 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.3823
C = 0.41143

As in the correlation of ACYP by US, Greek elites, when asked of the importance of the Cypriot problem for Europe with relation to the question of how important the US is for Europe's defence, demonstrated a significant relationship. The United States was not seen as an important factor for European defence and presented a significant relationship to the importance of the Cypriot problem for Europe. This contributes to the general finding of this study that Greek elites believe in "Europeans leading European affairs", not "non-Europeans leading European issues"
ACYP by MAST (Importance of the Cypriot issue for Europe by the importance of Maastricht for Europe)
Chi square: 5.493 with 6 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.43306
C = 0.24205

As expected, those elites who believed in the importance of the Maastricht treaty for Europe also believed in the importance of the Cypriot issue for European affairs. This relationship suggests that the Maastricht Treaty goals could play a role in the solution of an issue such as the Cypriot problem and it could be assumed that the Treaty's goals will play a significant role in the solution of this specific issue. If the Maastricht Treaty on European Union is seen in broader terms and incorporates issues such as Turkey's application to the EU, the realisation of the relationship of the two variables could be comprehended.

ACYP by GMAST (Importance of the Cypriot issue for Europe by the importance of Maastricht for Greece)
Chi square: 6.189 with 6 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.44716
C = 0.23967

Not such a statistically positive relationship as in the previous correlation (ACYP by MAST) was presented from the relationship of the Cypriot issue for Europe with the question of the importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Greece. Greek elites suggest that the Maastricht Treaty on European Union is quite important for Greece but not as much as for Europe. In relation to the importance of the Treaty's goals for Greece and the importance of the Cypriot issue for Europe, elites presented a positive relationship. Those who felt that the issue was important for Europe also felt that the Treaty on European Union was important for Greek affairs. This in turn suggests that Greek elites feel that the Treaty can play a positive role in the solution to the problem of Cyprus for European affairs.
The levels of importance of the Albanian refugees as a problem for Greece and for Europe were correlated with the level of importance of the US for European defence and rather statistically weak relationships were presented. Although, as expected, the importance was different for Greece compared to the results for Europe (more important for Greece), the correlations did not point in any specific direction. Most elites who felt that the Albanian issue was of some importance for Greece also felt that the US was important for Europe's defence (40%) suggesting that Greece would applaud US involvement and assistance in the region. However, from the contingency table of Albania as a threat for Europe with the level of importance of the United States for Europe's defence, the responses were distributed quite equally throughout the table suggesting the uncertainty of Albania as a threat for Europe questioning whether US assistance was required. The perception of Albania as a threat seems unclear in both cases and this creates problems for the model.

As in the previous correlation, the Albanian threat was felt as more important for Greece than for Europe, despite agreement to the statement that stable relations with other Western
democracies have contributed to Greece's security since 1974. The assumption that what or who one state may sense as a threat may not be perceived by other states creates problems in the clarity of threat perception and in the workability of the model of this thesis. However, this uncertainty reflects the problem Europeans are facing in trying to perceive a threat and adjusting or forming an option to deter it. The dependent variable (option) would not be clear in this situation unless specific threats are identified for Greece and for the Continent. The model suggests the importance of threat perception as a major requirement towards an option for security: The absence of clear threat perception will not stimulate international cooperation and this will not lead to an option for security (TP ↔ IC ↔ OP)

**AALB by GMAST** (The importance of Albania as a threat for Europe by the level of importance of Maastricht for Greece)
- Chi square: 1.41654 with 6 degrees of freedom
- Significance: 0.96385
- C = 0.12449

**BALB by GMAST** (The importance of Albania as a threat for Greece by the level of importance of Maastricht for Greece)
- Chi square: 3.36685 with 6 degrees of freedom
- Significance: 0.74120
- C = 0.19403

**AALB by MAST** (The importance of Albania as a threat for Europe by the level of importance of Maastricht for Europe)
- Chi square: 15.82779 with 6 degrees of freedom
- Significance: 0.00560
- C = 0.40889

**BALB by MAST** (The importance of Albania as a threat for Greece by the level of importance of Maastricht for Europe)
- Chi square: 2.37728 with 6 degrees of freedom
- Significance: 0.91658
- C = 0.14865

As expected, from the contingency tables of the above correlations, Albania is seen as a threat for Greece more than it is for Europe while in all cases, the Maastricht treaty is seen as important for Greece and for Europe. Greek elites feel that Albania is a consideration taken more seriously by Greece as a threat, logically due to the state's geographical position in the Balkans and feel that the goals of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union can assist Greece's status and security concerns. The “threat” of Albania should be seen in relation to the state's...
growing problems on the path towards democratic reform, the uncertain relations with the
Greek minority in Southern Albania (Vorios Epirus) and the growing number of refugees in
mainland Greece creating economic problems, corruption and unemployment. Furthermore,
Albanian minorities are situated in the region of Skopje and this is creating further tension as
the process of trying to adopt the name "Macedonia" now involves Albanians as well. The
Maastricht Treaty's importance is reflected in the results of the data and seems to contribute to
Greece's security concerns as it calls for closer union among EC members, the WEU
"reactivation" in 1996 and, when seen Maastricht), as an interdependent and collective
European effort, Greek elites welcome the agreement and expect some sort of understanding
and assistance towards Albania through the EC platform.

**AALB by MELOS** (The importance of Albania as a threat for Europe by continuing membership in the
EEC and NATO)
Chi square: 5.79615 with 3 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.09402
C = 0.25751

**BALB by MELOS** (The importance of Albania as a threat for Greece by continuing membership in the
EEC and NATO)
Chi square: 6.91275 with 3 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.00007
C = 0.44356

As expected, those elites who felt that Albania is an important concern for Greece's security
also felt that Greece should continue its membership in NATO and the EC, presenting a
statistically high significance level. However, when continuing membership in both
institutions was correlated with the importance of Albania as a concern for Europe, the
importance was lower, and a high level of significance was also presented. The findings from
this contingency table reflect the differences in opinion of a certain concern for a specific state
and for the European Continent. Greek elites seem to be aware of the importance of
remaining in both institutions which could assist in deterring such threats. It is essential to
note, however, that this specific threat (Albania) may not be on the top of these institutions'
agenda, as it might be for Greece, and, based on this assumption, this perception of threat
(Albania), cannot easily stimulate international cooperation or become the reason to base an
option on. The Yugoslav crisis is a relevant example to support this assumption as it is a
concern for Greece, because of the possible spill-over effect it might have in the Balkans, and
for Europe, as NATO has taken a stand and the EC has debated, and is still debating, the problem. Because of the importance this issue possesses for both Greece and Europe, it is likely to stimulate international cooperation (as it has through NATO, the UN and between states by trying to find a diplomatic approach to deter escalation) and this in turn may lead to an option, or how to deal with it (air strikes etc.)

**AALB by NATO** (The importance of Albania as a threat for Europe by NATO as a component that has ensured European stability)
Chi square: 10.41968 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.69836
C = 0.30081

**BALB by NATO** (The importance of Albania as a threat for Greece by NATO as a component that has ensured European stability)
Chi square: 15.53317 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.25853
C = 0.37465

As in the previous correlation, a statistically higher significance level was presented when the statement for NATO was correlated with the importance of Albania for Greece than for Europe. Approximately 60 responses favoured agreement to the statement that NATO is a major component that has ensured European stability and felt that Albania is a concern for Greece as a problem that may arise. Despite agreement to the statement concerning NATO in the correlation that questioned Albania as a threat for Europe, responses reflected a low level of importance of Albania as a threat for the Continent. It is assumed that it is not likely for NATO to organise itself around this threat as its importance is not common for both state (Greece) and Continent. However, the model holds, especially in the case for Greece, as a concern is perceived and international cooperation is sought (NATO).

**BALB by TUR** (The importance of Albania as a threat for Greece by NATO as a deterrent in Greaco-Turkish relations)
Chi square: 16.16847 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.05270
C = 0.44378

**AALB by TUR** (The importance of Albania as a threat for Europe by NATO as a deterrent in Greaco-Turkish relations)
Chi square: 23.33571 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: C = 0.10245
C = 0.42037
Statistically high significance levels were presented from the correlations of the importance of Albania as a concern for Greece and for Europe by the statement of NATO as a major component that has contained fears of a possible Greaco-Turkish conflict. In the case for Greece, those elites who felt that NATO has served as a deterrent in Greaco-Turkish relations also felt that Albania is a concern for Greece (60 responses). This suggests a belief by Greek elites that the same way NATO has provided security in relations with Turkey (as both are NATO members), NATO can serve as a mechanism that can secure Greece from other types of threats such as Albania, even though Albania is not a member of NATO. Again, Albania is not seen as a major concern for Europe when NATO's success in containing fears of a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey was reflected. In the case for Greece, the model still holds.

**AALB by US** (The importance of Albania as a threat for Europe by the level of importance of the US for European affairs)

- Chi square: 16.29595 with 12 degrees of freedom
- Significance: 0.31884
- C = 0.36372

**BALB by US** (The importance of Albania as a threat for Greece by the level of importance of the US for European affairs)

- Chi square: 17.52702 with 12 degrees of freedom
- Significance: 0.18248
- C = 0.39236

A significant level of uncertainty was reflected from the correlation of Albania as a concern for Europe by the level of importance of the US for European affairs. The contingency table responses did not point in any specific direction suggesting the concern one of minor importance for Europe and the US as a fading support for European issues. The data were clearer in the case for Greece although the US's importance was not felt as essential for European affairs. The questions of the US's importance in European affairs is consistent throughout the study, suggesting a fading necessity for US involvement in European affairs in general. In the case for Greece specifically, it is assumed from the responses given by Greek elites, that the US is not seen as a force in need, in relation to the Albanian concern.
Statistically low significance levels were presented from the results of the correlation of the importance of the Neo-Nazi movement as a concern for Europe and for Greece with the importance of the US for European defence. The responses did not point in any specific direction from the contingency table suggesting uncertainty and ambiguity as to the level of importance of the Neo-Nazi movement and the importance of the US for European defence. This may suggest that the US, as a force should not be concerned with such threats, or at least should not base itself around such a threat. Similar findings were presented from the correlation of the movement with the importance of the US for European affairs (ANNZ / BNNZ by US: Significance ANNZ by US: 0.63566, Significance BNNZ by US: 0.70520).

In both of the above correlations, continuing membership for Greece in the EC and NATO was expressed but the Neo-Nazi movement was not seen as an important concern (for Greece especially) presenting low levels of significance but high C values, reflecting a direction in the contingency tables of the variables. In the case of the movement as a concern for Europe,
Greek elites felt that it is a concern for the Continent and that Greece should remain as a member in both institutions (68 responses). As in the concern of Albania as an issue of importance for Greece, the Neo-Nazi movement is seen more as a concern for Europe than for Greece and this non-uniformity in threat perceptions is a reflection of the absence of clear threat perception for Europe, as well as the difference in perceptions of threat between state and Continent, identified in the literature review (chapter 4). International cooperation is somewhat stimulated by threat perceptions or concerns, but options cannot be based on these as they may not be concerns for other states. It becomes apparent through the analysis of these results that only when threat perception is clear (having in mind the situation in the Cold War era) and uniform, can Europeans more easily agree to an appropriate option to confront it.

**ANNZ by FNRA**
(The importance of the Neo-Nazi movement as a concern for Europe by stable relations as a major component that assisted Greece's security since 1974)

Chi square: 9.64023 with 12 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.49084  
C = 0.33595

**BNNZ by FNRA**
(The importance of the Neo-Nazi movement as a concern for Greece by stable relations as a major component that assisted Greece's security since 1974)

Chi square: 20.01833 with 12 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.19813  
C = 0.39069

The importance of the Neo-Nazi movement as a concern for Europe and for Greece was correlated with the statement of Greece's stable relations as a component that has assisted its security since 1974. The results presented - in the case of Greece - a statistically high significance level. Opinions varied for both cases, however, suggesting that stable relations cannot - or should not - provide as a deterrent against the Neo-Nazi movement. Judging by the character of the movement around Europe, this seems a logical suggestion, as the movement is more like a terrorist organisation than an actual military threat for the Continent's or Greece's security concerns.

**ANNZ by MAST**
(The importance of the Neo-Nazi movement as a concern for Europe by the level of importance of Maastricht for Europe)

Chi square: 5.55260 with 6 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.51664  
C = 0.22925
BNNZ by MAST
(The importance of the Neo-Nazi movement as a concern for Greece by the level of importance of Maastricht for Europe)
Chi square: 9.50393 with 6 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.17102
C = 0.30221

ANNZ by GMAST
(The importance of the Neo-Nazi movement as a concern for Europe by the level of importance of Maastricht for Greece)
Chi square: 3.20629 with 6 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.85232
C = 0.16532

BNNZ by GMAST
(The importance of the Neo-Nazi movement as a concern for Greece by the level of importance of Maastricht for Greece)
Chi square: 6.19574 with 6 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.59080
C = 0.22141

The importance of the Neo-Nazi movement as a concern for Europe and for Greece was correlated with the importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Greece and for Europe and both correlations presented statistically low levels of significance. Most elites who felt that the Maastricht Treaty is important for Greece and for Europe felt rather ambiguous as to the importance of the Neo-Nazi movement. This suggests that the Maastricht Treaty is not seen as a step that could or should contribute towards the issue of the Neo-Nazi movement as a concern. Despite the low levels of importance of the movement, international cooperation is still exhibited, reinforcing the model.

BNNZ by NATO
(The importance of the Neo-Nazi movement as a concern for Greece by the statement of NATO as a component that ensured European security)
Chi square: 15.34274 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.32181
C = 0.36321

ANNZ by NATO
(The importance of the Neo-Nazi movement as a concern for Europe by the statement of NATO as a component that ensured European security)
Chi square: 9.88837 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.67082
C = 0.30111
Most responses from the Greek elites who felt that NATO is a component that ensured European security, demonstrated a level of uncertainty to the question of the level of importance of the Neo-Nazi movement for Greece and for Europe. Greek elites who agreed to the statement of NATO felt that the movement was more important for Europe than for Greece. The assumption in this case is that NATO has been successful in securing Europe and in deterring a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey (ANNZ by TUR - BNNZ by TUR), but should not be organised or based on this specific threat. International cooperation is sought, but due to the lack of clear identifiable threat perception, it is difficult to achieve or reach an option for European defence based on the model. (Values for movement by NATO as a deterrent: * For Greece: BNNZ by TUR, Chi square: 10.56834 with 12 degrees of freedom, Significance 0.49552, C = 0.34380; * For Europe: ANNZ by TUR, Chi square: 6.61319 with 12 degrees of freedom, Significance 0.88122, C = 0.26326)

AGERU by EUDEF
(The importance of German unification as a concern for Europe by the level of importance of the US for European defence)
Chi square: 28.9311 with 18 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.11409
C = 0.46323

BGERU by EUDEF
(The importance of German unification as a concern for Greece by the level of importance of the US for European defence)
Chi square: 26.63956 with 18 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.09950
C = 0.47765

AGERU by US
(The importance of German unification as a concern for Europe by the level of importance of the US for European affairs)
Chi square: 2.39388 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.99861
C = 0.15742

BGERU by US
(The importance of German unification as a concern for Greece by the level of importance of the US for European affairs)
Chi square: 8.25622 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.84711
C = 0.27424
The level of importance of German unification as a concern for Greece and for Europe was correlated with the level of importance of the US for European defence and European affairs. Statistically high levels of relationship were presented in the correlations that related to European defence. Most responses were equally distributed in the contingency table when responding to the importance of the concern for Greece and for Europe, while most elites felt that the US is important for European defence, but not so much so for European affairs.

These findings suggest the importance of the US being involved in European defence matters relating to Germany, as has been the case since 1949 with the formation of NATO. Germany has been a concern since 1949 and has been partly contained through American involvement in the former West Germany. If one relates German unification with the Neo-Nazi movement and the state's economic potential, a possible threat could be perceived, but not one that an organisation can (as seen through the literature review), organise itself around.

**AGERU by MAST** (The importance of German unification as a concern for Europe by the level of Maastricht for Europe)
- Chi square: 2.77654 with 6 degrees of freedom
- Significance: 0.86353
- C = 0.16232

**BGERU by MAST** (The importance of German unification as a concern for Greece by the level of Maastricht for Europe)
- Chi square: 3.70187 with 6 degrees of freedom
- Significance: 0.76764
- C = 0.18966

**AGERU by GMAST** (The importance of German unification as a concern for Europe by the level of Maastricht for Greece)
- Chi square: 5.79702 with 6 degrees of freedom
- Significance: 0.58599
- C = 0.18966

**BGERU by GMAST** (The importance of German unification as a concern for Greece by the level of Maastricht for Greece)
- Chi square: 1.584 with 6 degrees of freedom
- Significance: 0.95485
- C = 0.13158

The level of importance of German unification as a concern for Greece and for Europe was correlated with the importance of the Treaty of Maastricht on European Union for Greece and for Europe, presenting statistically high levels of significance. German unification was not
seen as an important concern for Greece or for Europe despite the Treaty on European Union seen as an important step for the Continent and for Greece specifically. It is assumed that Greek elites do not feel that the Maastricht Treaty (or, subsequently, the EC) should take into consideration German unification as Germany is a member and economic partnership limits the threat or the possibility of a state turning against its partners. German unification is again not a clear concern, or a uniform concern, despite international cooperation stimulation.

\( \text{AGERU by MELOS} \)
(The importance of German unification as a concern for Europe by Greece remaining a member of the EEC and NATO)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chi square:</th>
<th>2.18773 with 3 degrees of freedom</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Significance:</td>
<td>0.68059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>0.12629</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( \text{BGERU by MELOS} \)
(The importance of German unification as a concern for Greece by Greece remaining a member of the EEC and NATO)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chi square:</th>
<th>1.18327 with 3 degrees of freedom</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Significance:</td>
<td>0.87205</td>
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<td>C</td>
<td>0.08914</td>
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From the contingency tables presented from the results of the above correlations, a large number of Greek elites (62 responses) who felt that Greece should remain a member of NATO and the EC felt that Germany is a concern for Europe (38 responses as a concern for Europe). The assumption in this case is that Greek elites may feel that Germany could be contained through their membership in NATO and the EC based on the assumption that members of any institution are not likely to turn against other members. Europe includes Greece and, considering this, the model holds as a perception of threat has stimulated and called for international cooperation (by remaining members of NATO and the EC).

\( \text{AGERU by NATO} \)
(The importance of German unification as a concern for Europe by NATO as a component that has secured European security)

<table>
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<th>Chi square:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Significance:</td>
<td>0.41508</td>
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<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>0.34123</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The importance of Germany as a concern for Europe and for Greece was correlated with the statement of NATO as a major component that ensured European security. A statistically high level of significance was presented in the case of Greece while a low level (of significance) was presented for Europe. From the responses in the contingency tables, those elites who felt that NATO is a major component that ensured European security felt that German unification is more of a concern for Europe than for Greece. NATO's success over the years has been the containment of West Germany, especially between 1949 and 1960. It is essential, therefore, as presented from the data, that NATO continues to exist and provides continuing European security. Germany may not be seen as a major threat for Europe or for Greece as reflected in the results, but international cooperation and options are chosen demonstrating the need to find an appropriate solution to the defence dilemma.

The importance of German unification as a concern for Greece and for Europe was correlated with the statement of stable relations playing a role for Greece's security since 1974 as it has not been overtly threatened by any state since then. The significance levels from the above two correlations were low and no statistically significant relationship was presented from the contingency tables. German unification was seen mostly as a concern for Europe while elites felt that stable relations had played a beneficial role for Greece's security since 1974. It could be suggested that stable relations could most probably contain the possibility of a German threat arising, as the EC and NATO could be seen as examples of "stable relations" through
their platforms of individual states. Stable relations means international cooperation and therefore, the perception of a security concern such as that of Germany reinforces the model.

**AGERU by TUR**
(The importance of German unification as a concern for Europe by NATO as a deterrent in Greaco - Turkish relations)
Chi square: 18.21824 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.26743
C = 0.37476

**BGERU by TUR**
(The importance of German unification as a concern for Greece by NATO as a deterrent in Greaco - Turkish relations)
Chi square: 20.61933 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.18922
C = 0.18922

The importance of German unification as a concern for Europe and for Greece was correlated with the statement of NATO playing a role in containing possible fears of a Greaco - Turkish conflict as both are NATO members. Statistically high levels of significance were presented. Those elites who felt that NATO has played a somewhat important role in containing fears of a possible Greaco - Turkish conflict felt that German unification does not pose an important concern for Greece or for Europe. However, as NATO's success in securing Greece could be implied in this case (more than half of the responses agreed with the statement), NATO could be seen as a deterring factor in Greek - German relations.

**BSU by EUDEF**
(The importance of the break-up of the former Soviet Union as a concern for Greece by the level of importance of the US for Europe defence)
Chi square: 12.64953 with 18 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.61052
C = 0.38768

**ASU by EUDEF**
(The importance of the break-up of the former Soviet Union as a concern for Europe by the level of importance of the US for Europe defence)
Chi square: 20.04454 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.15875
C = 0.39079

**ASU by US**
(The importance of the break-up of the former Soviet Union as a concern for Europe by the level of importance of the US in Europe affairs)
Chapter Eight

Test of the Model - TP IC X OP

Chi square: 2.97998 with 8 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.93243
C = 0.17764

BSU by US
(The importance of the break-up of the former Soviet Union as a concern for Greece by the level of importance of the US in Europe affairs)
Chi square: 6.22 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.92756
C = 0.24661

The importance of the break-up of the former Soviet Union as a concern for Greece and for Europe was correlated with the level of importance of the US for European defence and European affairs. More than half of the respondents who felt that the break-up of the former Soviet Union is a concern for Europe also felt, as expected, that the US is important for European defence. However, the former Soviet Union was not seen as a major concern for Greece despite 55 respondents feeling that the US was still important for European defence. These findings suggest a difference in opinion as to the specific concern for the Continent, and for Greece, reinforcing the discussion in the literature review about the lack of clear threat perception.

Significance levels were low in the correlations of the importance of the break-up of the former Soviet Union for Greece and for Europe with the level of importance of the US for European affairs. The concern was not clear and the importance of the US was un-clear for European affairs.

ASU by FNRA
(The importance of the break-up of the former Soviet Union as a concern for Europe by stable relations as a component that assisted in Greece's security since 1974)
Chi square: 10.94101 with 8 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.30260
C = 0.30886

BSU by FNRA
(The importance of the break-up of the former Soviet Union as a concern for Greece by stable relations as a component that assisted in Greece's security since 1974)
Chi square: 17.27905 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.38230
C = 0.38230

The break-up of the former Soviet Union as a concern was seen as more important for Europe than for Greece by Greek elites despite more than half of the sample feeling that stable relations did play a role in Greece's security concerns since 1974. This was particularly
evident in the correlation of the concern for Europe (ASU by FNRA). International cooperation is seen here as quite essential for Greece despite the minor importance of the specific concern.

**ASU by MAST**
(The importance of the break-up of the former Soviet Union as a concern for Europe by the level of importance of Maastricht for Europe)
Chi square: 12.34680 with 4 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.01101
C = 0.34923

**BSU by MAST**
(The importance of the break-up of the former Soviet Union as a concern for Greece by the level of importance of Maastricht for Europe)
Chi square: 5.93276 with 6 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.57917
C = 0.22340

**ASU by GMAST**
(The importance of the break-up of the former Soviet Union as a concern for Europe by the level of importance of Maastricht for Greece)
Chi square: 3.34532 with 4 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.39735
C = 0.20358

**BSU by GMAST**
(The importance of the break-up of the former Soviet Union as a concern for Greece by the level of importance of Maastricht for Greece)
Chi square: 3.44029 with 6 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.83626
C = 0.17301

From the correlations concerning the level of importance of the former Soviet Union with the importance of the Maastricht Treaty, those correlations related with Europe presented statistically significant values. Those elites who felt that the former Soviet Union is an important concern for Europe also felt that the Maastricht Treaty is important for Europe, suggesting that Maastricht is an important step towards European Union and could help through its interdependent nature to promote international cooperation and handle concerns such as that of the break-up of the former Soviet Union. The importance of Maastricht for Greece and for Europe was high throughout, but the level of importance of the specific concerns fluctuated.

**ASU by MELOS**
(The importance of the break-up of the former Soviet Union as a concern for Europe by continuing membership of Greece in NATO and the EEC)
Chi square: 3.68973 with 2 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.05905
C = 0.23949

BSU by MELOS
(The importance of the break-up of the former Soviet Union as a concern for Greece by continuing membership of Greece in NATO and the EEC)
Chi square: 1.03441 with 3 degrees of freedom
Significance: C = 0.88858
C = 0.08411

Those elites who felt that the break-up of the former Soviet Union is an important concern for Europe also felt that Greece should remain as a member of the EC and NATO. Again, the former Soviet Union is seen as a concern that would affect the Continent more than Greece specifically, whereas NATO and the EC are seen as essential for Greece. Continuing membership is reflected in the data and it is assumed that Greek elites feel that their membership can secure their state from such concerns, as the continuing membership can probably secure them as well. This finding is more evident from the correlation of the concern of the former Soviet Union with continuing membership in NATO (ASU by MEM, Chi square: 7.30699 with 4 degrees of freedom, Significance: 0.00923, C = 0.36606).
Seventy-nine of the respondents who felt that the break-up of the former Soviet Union is important for Europe as a concern, also favoured Greece's continuing membership in NATO.

ASU by NATO
(The importance of the break-up of the former Soviet Union as a concern for Europe by NATO as a component that has ensured European security)
Chi square: 10.23116 with 8 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.33259
C = 0.29733

BSU by NATO
(The importance of the break-up of the former Soviet Union as a concern for Greece by NATO as a component that has ensured European security)
Chi square: 20.63552 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.06763
C = 0.42615
Sixty-four respondents who felt that the break-up of the former Soviet Union is an important concern for Europe also felt that NATO has been a component that ensured European security. This indicates NATO's success over the years as it is assumed that Greek elites feel that NATO is an essential mechanism for Europe's security. As NATO was formed in 1949 to deter the Soviet Union's expansion, it now faces no clear threat from the former Soviet empire, but its current requirement is reflected in the data. NATO as a deterrent in Greco-Turkish relations was also correlated with the importance of the break-up of the former Soviet Union for Europe (ASU) and for Greece (BSU): ASU by TUR, Chi square: 14.30378 with 8 degrees of freedom, Significance: 0.21296, $C = 0.32904$; BSU by TUR, Chi square: 9.36982 with 12 degrees of freedom, Significance: 0.72445, $C = 0.30544$. As in the previous correlation, Greek elites felt that Europe should be more, or is more concerned about the former Soviet Union than Greece, while agreed with NATO's success in containing fears of a possible Greco-Turkish conflict.

RUSS by EUDEF (Level of seriousness of Russian threat by importance of US for European defence)

Chi square: 60.167 with 36 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.0227
C = 0.59722

As expected, a statistically high relationship was presented from the correlation of the importance and seriousness of Russia as a threat to Europe's security with the importance of the United States in European affairs. Those elites who felt that Russia was a serious threat for Europe after the break-up of the former Soviet Union also felt that the United States was important in European affairs. It is suggested that the Greek elites feel that a Russian threat could better be looked upon and dealt with, with the help of the United States.

RUSS by FNRA (Level of seriousness of Russian threat by NATO as a deterrent for Greece and Turkey)

Chi square: 23.616 with 24 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.6487
C = 0.42224

A statistically significant relationship was presented from the results of the seriousness of Russia as a threat to Europe's security with the statement that Greece had not been overtly threatened since 1974 due to the state's stable relationship with other Western democracies. The majority of elites who believed in the importance of stable relations were divided in their
levels of importance attributed to the Russian threat. This may be due to the uncertainty of the form of possible threats for the 1990s and reinforces the lack of clear threat perception discussed in the literature review.

**RUSS by GMAST** (Level of seriousness of Russian threat by importance of Maastricht for Greece)
Chi square: 21.693 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.0154
C = 0.44622

The correlation between Russia as a threat to Europe's security with the importance of the Treaty of Maastricht for Greece were rather high and in the expected direction. Those elites who felt that the Treaty on European Union was of some importance or great importance also felt that Russia was a somewhat serious threat for Europe's security. This demonstrates the important role of the European Union in European affairs as well as for Greece. Agreement to the terms of the Maastricht Treaty could help in the quest for European defence and specifically, in this case, in the perception of Russia as a threat and how this threat could be dealt with.

**RUSS by MAST** (Level of seriousness of Russian threat by the importance of Maastricht for Europe)
Chi square: 15.517 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.1818
C = 0.37346

Turning to the correlation of Russia's seriousness as a threat to Europe's security with the level of importance of the treaty of Maastricht for Europe, a statistically high relationship is presented. Those elites who felt that the Treaty on European Union is quite important also felt that Russia should be seen as a serious threat. The Maastricht Treaty deals with various issues and ideas and Greek elites seem aware of the positive effects the Treaty could provide in terms of dealing with Russia as a serious threat for Europe. Furthermore, if the Maastricht Treaty on European Union is seen in a broader context, it encompasses the whole vision of the European Union, and suggests that how such threats are dealt with, or the identification of others, could be a matter for all EC partners in the future and this would be a positive move in the identification process of threats such as Russia.

**RUSS with MELOS** (Level of seriousness of Russian threat by continuing membership in the EEC and NATO)

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From the examination of the relationship between Russia as a serious threat to Europe's security and the question of whether Greece should continue to remain a member of the EC and NATO, the relationship was statistically high. Those elites who felt Greece should remain as members (98%) also felt that Russia is a serious threat to Europe's security. These mechanisms (EC, NATO) are seen by Greek elites as determining factors and of great importance in relation to the threat of Russia. It could be suggested that the EC and NATO could play a positive role, in Greek elites' opinion, in dealing with the Russian threat.

RUSS by MEM (Level of seriousness of Russian threat by continuing membership in NATO)
Chi square: 10.2404 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.00606
C = 0.47925

Through the examination of the correlation between the level of seriousness of Russia as a threat to Europe's security with the question of whether Greece should remain a member of NATO (only), the results demonstrated a statistically significant relationship with the majority of the sample which felt that Russia is a serious threat suggesting that Greece should remain a member of NATO. Again, NATO's success is suggested and NATO's continuation as essential when dealing with the possible Russian threat.

RUSS by NATO (Level of seriousness of Russian threat by NATO as a component in ensuring European stability)
Chi square: 28.84 with 24 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.00350
C = 0.56482

As expected, a statistically high level of relationship was presented from the data of the question of the level of seriousness of the Russian threat for Europe's security and the statement that NATO has been a major component in ensuring European stability. Those elites who felt that NATO had been a major component that ensured military stability also felt that Russia should be seen as a somewhat serious threat. This finding suggests NATO's success and the mechanism's new areas of interest, one of them being the Russian threat. It is most likely that Greek elites would prefer NATO handling the Russian issue rather than any other institution.
method to deter Eastern European uprisings against the West as well as a deterrence method against one another.

**RUSS by TYPE** (Level of seriousness of Russian threat by type of respondent)

Chi square: 24.385 with 18 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.30871
C = 0.41194

Correlation analysis between the types of respondents and the seriousness of the Russian threat for Europe presented a somewhat statistically significant relationship, as the majority of all respondents felt that the Russian threat was quite serious. This demonstrates the identification of Russia as a threat by all types if respondents which makes Russia a possible matter of consideration for Greek elites for the future.

**RUSS by US** (Level of seriousness of Russian threat by level of importance of the US for European affairs)

Chi square: 38.35 with 24 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.08248
C = 0.50630

When examining the correlation between the level of seriousness of the Russian threat to Europe with the question of whether the United States should continue to play a role in European affairs, the relationship presented was rather statistically significant. Those elites who felt that the United States should continue to play a role in European affairs also felt that Russia was a serious threat. However, those who felt that Russia was not a very serious threat for Europe, disagreed with US involvement. The correlation is pointing in two directions, both fitting the expectations of the model. Identifying a threat is the first step towards international cooperation. In this correlation, one group agrees and one does not.

**SNUC by EUDEF**

(Level of seriousness of former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal by level of importance of US for European defence)

Chi square: 35.96 with 36 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.4745
C = 0.5157

When examining the correlation between the seriousness of the former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal with the importance of the United States for European defence, the relationship
presented was statistically lower than expected. No clear relationship is discernible, as despite the fact that a great majority felt the former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal a threat for Europe, the sample's opinions on the importance of the United States in Europe were not uniform. However, this contradiction reinforces the defence dilemma of Europe discussed in the literature review (chapter 3). It is assumed that there exists a dilemma in whether the US should be a protagonist in European defence due to the existence of the Soviet's nuclear arsenal or not.

**SNUC by FNRA**  
(Level of seriousness of former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal by stable relations as a reason for Greece's security since 1974)  
Chi square: 29.5401 with 24 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.3421  
C = 0.46317

The relationship between the level of seriousness of the former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal with the statement that Greece has not been overtly threatened by another state since 1974 due to the state's stable relationship with other Western democracies, was statistically rather high and pointed in the expected direction. The results suggest that those elites who felt that the nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union posed a serious threat to Europe also felt that stable relations with other Western democracies was a major reason for Greece's security since 1974. This in turn suggests that continuing stable relations with Western democracies can help limit the perception of the former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal as a threat.

**SNUC by GMAST**  
(Level of seriousness of former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal by level of importance of Maastricht for Greece)  
Chi square: 18.23 with 12 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.03434

A statistically high level of significance is presented from the data of the correlation between the seriousness of the former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal and the importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Greece. As expected, those elites who felt that the Maastricht Treaty on
European Union was important also felt the nuclear threat of the new Soviet republics as rather serious. Threats such as this one, if perceived, stimulate international cooperation. This statement could be comprehended by the two variables analysed. A specific threat could be better dealt with through common efforts (SNUC by GMAST).

**SNUC by MAST**  (Level of seriousness of former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal by level of importance of Maastricht for Europe)

Chi square:  17.332 with 12 degrees of freedom  
Significance:  0.17462  
C =  0.37512

As in the previous correlation, the nuclear threat of the former Soviet Union was seen as serious and the Maastricht Treaty was seen as important. Those elites who felt the seriousness of the threat also felt the importance of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, in this case for Europe. Again, this finding supports the model; a threat is perceived and collective efforts are required.

**SNUC by MELOS**  (Level of seriousness of former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal by continuing membership in NATO and the EEC)

Chi square:  6.67132 with 6 degrees of freedom  
Significance:  0.0496  
C =  0.33613

As expected, those elites who believed in the level of seriousness of the former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal for Europe, also felt that Greece should remain a member of NATO and the EC. The model is reinforced. A threat stimulates international cooperation and Greek elites point in that direction. NATO and the EC are mechanisms which could be used for the deterrence of future threats.

**SNUC by MEM**  (Level of seriousness of former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal by continuing membership in NATO and the EEC)

Chi square:  11.0867 with 12 degrees of freedom  
Significance:  0.00207  
C =  0.49917

Turning specifically to the question of whether Greece should remain a member of NATO alone, the expected relationship with the level of seriousness of the former Soviet Union's
nuclear threat is presented. Those elites who felt the threat serious also felt that Greece should remain a member of NATO; the perception of a threat stimulating international cooperation.

**SNUC by NATO**

(Level of seriousness of former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal by NATO as a major component for European stability)

Chi square: 43.762 with 24 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.0001
C = 0.62847

As expected, the level of correlation was statistically high when examining the question of the level of seriousness of the former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal with the statement that NATO was a major component that ensured European stability. Those who believed the threat as serious also believed in NATO's success in European security. This statement gives NATO new responsibilities, and Greek elites seem to agree to continue as part of NATO. The mechanism suggests US involvement in European defence, but under NATO's umbrella.

When the nuclear threat of the former Soviet Union was correlated with the importance of the US in European defence, the significance level was lower, suggesting continuing US support for Europe, but under leadership which possibly incorporates the Europeans as well.

**SNUC by TUR**

(Level of seriousness of former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal by NATO as deterrent for Greek and Turkish confrontation)

Chi square: 47.2098 with 24 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.00029
C = 0.60624

When examining the relationship between the level of seriousness of the former Soviet's nuclear arsenal with the statement that NATO has been a major reason for the containment of a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey, the statistical level of correlation was rather high. Those who believed in NATO's success in Greaco-Turkish relations felt the Soviet nuclear threat as more serious. Greek elites seem to recognise NATO's success and realise its importance in future areas of threat perception such as the new Republics of the former Soviet Union which possess nuclear weapons.

**SNUC by US**

(Level of seriousness of former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal by level of importance of the US for European affairs)

Chi square: 32.857 with 24 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.18907
C = 0.48144

As expected, the relationship presented between the level of seriousness of the former Soviet Union's nuclear threat with the level of importance of the United States in European affairs pointed in the expected direction. Those elites who felt the threat was more serious also felt that the United States should continue to play a role in European affairs. Outside assistance is presented in this case and sought, in order to help with how a specific threat is dealt with.

EXTT by EUDEF
(Level of importance of external threat perception for Europe by the level of importance of US for European defence)
Chi square: 43.3601 with 24 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.00006
C = 0.61651

A statistically strong relationship was presented from the correlation of the level of agreement to the statement that external threats should be taken into consideration with the level of importance of the United States for European defence. Those elites who felt that external threats such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 should be taken into consideration also felt that the United States were quite important for European defence. Again, a threat was presented and international cooperation sought, reinforcing the model.

EXTT by FNRA
(Level of importance of external threat perception for Europe by stable relations as an important factor for Greece's security since 1974)
Chi square: 30.318 with 16 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.00374
C = 0.51990

A statistically high level of relationship was presented between the agreement to the statement that external threats required close examination as such threats may arise in European affairs, with the statement of Greece not being overtly threatened by another state since 1974 due to the state's stable relations with Western democracies. Those who agreed that external threats must be taken into consideration also agreed to the positive role played by Greece's stable relations with other democracies. International cooperation is sought probably as a means of avoiding being threatened, reinforcing the model. The sample seems to believe that external threats could be dealt with by cooperating internationally.
Another example of a threat stimulating international cooperation is presented by these two variables in the above correlations (EXTT, MELOS). Those elites who felt that external threats, such as the Gulf War, should be taken into consideration as such threats may arise in European affairs, felt that the Maastricht Treaty for Greece as well as for Europe (EXTT by MAST, Chi square: 12.78 with 8 degrees of freedom, Significance: 0.1853, C = 0.34995) is of great importance. This correlation reinforces the first part of the model as an assumed threat stimulates international cooperation, in this case the EU through the Maastricht Treaty.

A statistically high positive relationship is presented from the correlation between the level of agreement to the statement that external threats should be taken into consideration with the question of Greece remaining a member of the EC and NATO. Uniformly, those elites that felt that external threats should be taken consideration in the quest for a solution to European defence, felt that Greece should remain a member of the EC and NATO. Mechanisms such as NATO and the EC are interdependent and collective in nature, and could be stimulated when such a threat is perceived.

A rather similar finding was presented when correlating the relationship between the level of agreement to the statement that external threats should be taken into consideration in the quest for European security with the question of whether Greece should continue as a member of...
NATO alone. The finding pointed in the expected direction and fits the model. Those elites who felt that Greece should remain a member of NATO also felt that external, out-of-area threats should be taken into consideration. This demonstrates the changing character of threat perception for the 1990s as well as NATO’s new areas of interest, as discussed in the review of the literature.

**EXTT by NATO**

(Level of importance of external threat perception for Europe by NATO as a component that ensured European stability)

Chi square: 36.2111 with 16 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.00000  
C = 0.60256

A statistically high relationship was presented when the correlation between the above variables was examined (EXTT by NATO). Those elites who believed that NATO has been a major component that has ensured European stability, also believed that out-of-area threats should be taken into consideration in quest for European security. NATO’s success is presented as well as the assumed need to preserve the structure in order to continue to have success in the area of European security. It is implied that NATO can be the mechanism to deal with these out-of-area threats since it has been successful over the years.

**EXTT by TUR**

(Level of importance of external threat perception for Europe by NATO as a major component deterring a possible Greaco-Turkish conflict)

Chi square: 29.269 with 16 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.00128  
C = 0.53910

A statistically high level of significance was presented from the data between the statement that NATO has been a major reason for containing fears of a possible conflict between Turkey and Greece and the level of agreement to the statement that external threats should be taken into consideration as such threats may arise in European affairs. Those elites who believed in this specific success of NATO also felt that external threats should be taken into consideration. Greece and Turkey, however, are not external threats, but it could be assumed that NATO or states such as Greece and Turkey should deal with external threats.

**EXTT by US**  
(Level of importance of external threat perception for Europe by level of importance of US for European affairs)
Chi square: 25.602 with 16 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.00243  
C = 0.42764

A statistically high positive relationship was presented from the correlation between the attention to external threats for Europe and the question of whether the United States should continue to play a role in European affairs. Those elites who felt that Europe should be concerned with out-of-area threats also felt, however not overwhelmingly, that the US should continue to play a role in European affairs. This finding also implies international cooperation stimulated by a perceived, or an assumed, threat.

AMAC by EUDEF (Level of importance of the Macedonia issue for Europe by level of importance of US for European defence)  
Chi square: 20.323 with 18 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.27755  
C = 0.42764

Turning to the importance of the Macedonian issue for Greek elites when relating the issue to Europe, the results were expected when correlating the problem with the importance of the United States in European defence issues. Those elites that felt the Macedonian issue as important for Europe, felt that the US was important in Europe's defence. However, when correlating the importance of the Macedonian issue for Europe with the continuing US influence in European affairs, the relationship was slightly more pronounced (AMAC by US, Chi square: 30.70 with 12 degrees of freedom, Significance: 0.00213). Those elites that felt that the issue was important for Europe also felt that the US should continue to play a role in European issues.

When focusing on the correlation of the Macedonian issue for Greece with the importance of the US for European defence, the statistical significance level was higher (BMAC by EUDEF, Chi square: 14.90 with 18 degrees of freedom, Significance: 0.0856). Those elites who felt that the issue was of great importance also felt strongly about the United State's role in European defence. This result suggests that Greek elites believe that the US is more important when relating the Macedonian issue with Greece than for Europe. The Greek government has spoken to US counterparts about the issue and are expecting help (Eleftheros Typos Newspaper, March 1994), and this reinforces this finding.
AMAC by GMAST  
(Level of importance of the Macedonia issue for Europe by the level of importance of the Maastricht treaty for Greece)
Chi square: 6.931 with 6 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.3472
C = 0.25708

AMAC by MAST  
(Level of importance of the Macedonia issue for Europe by the level of importance of the Maastricht treaty for Europe)
Chi square: 6.66 with 6 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.3744
C = 0.25220

As expected, those elites who felt that the Macedonian issue is important for Europe also felt that the Maastricht Treaty is important for Europe in general and for Greece specifically. Greek elites may feel that the European Union can help towards a solution to the Macedonian issue. In addition, the Macedonian issue, if seen as a threat to Greece or to European unity, can be used as a stimulus towards international cooperation, reinforcing the model.

AMAC by MELOS  
(Level of importance of the Macedonia issue for Europe by agreement in continuing membership for Greece in the EEC and NATO)
Chi square: 5.637 with 3 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.0468
C = 0.27943

From the examination of the relationship between the importance of the Macedonian issue with the question of whether Greece should remain a member of NATO and the EC, most elites who felt that the issue was of some importance for Europe felt that Greece should continue as a member in both institutions. A similar finding was presented when relating the issue with membership in NATO alone. Those elites who felt that the issue was of some importance demonstrated the feeling of continuing membership in NATO (AMAC by MEM, Chi square: 8.515 with 6 degrees of freedom, Significance: 0.00843, C = 0.00843). Greek elites feel that membership in such an institution is essential for the state's security and they assume that these institutions could help in the quest for a solution to this issue for Europe.

A higher correlation was presented when relating the importance of the issue of "Macedonia" for Greece with the question of Greece remaining a member of NATO and the EC. It could be suggested that Greek elites feel strongly about the importance of membership in both
institutions as strongly as they feel about the importance of the Macedonian issue (BMAC by MELOS, Chi square: 8.45 with 3 degrees of freedom, Significance: 0.0000, C = 0.57546).

The issue is of major importance for Greece, as presented in the frequency analysis and Greek elites feel that NATO and the EC could help towards a solution. "Prime Minister A. Papandreou is pressuring his EC partners towards a solution" (Ethnos Newspaper, March 28, 1994). The importance of NATO was also presented in the correlation between the issue of "Macedonia" for Greece with the question of whether Greece should continue as a member of NATO (BMAC by MEM, Chi square: 15.49 with 6 degrees of freedom, Significance: 0.0000, C = 0.72383). An overwhelming majority of those who strongly believed in the importance of remaining a member of NATO felt that the issue of Macedonia for Greece was of major importance. It could be suggested that NATO is seen as a channel that could help as Greek elites count on NATO to assist their state towards a solution.

AMAC by FNRA
(Level of importance of the Macedonia issue for Europe by stable relations as a major component ensuring Greece's security since 1974)
Chi square: 14.53 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.3478
C = 0.35706

From the findings of the correlation between the importance of the issue of Macedonia for Europe and the statement about the positive role which stable relations with other Western democracies since 1974 have had for Greece's security, it could be assumed that stable relations with other Western states can contribute towards a solution for this problem. This is derived from the results presented, as those elites who felt that the issue of "Macedonia" was somewhat important also felt that stable relations had played a major role in Greece not being overtly threatened by another state since 1974.

From the data presented from the correlation of the issue of Macedonia as important for Greece with the same statement of the importance of stable relations for Greece's security since 1974, a statistically stronger relationship is reflected. Those elites who felt that the issue was important for Greece also felt that stable relations were a major reason for Greece not being overtly threatened by another state since 1974. Stable relations can be seen as another way of finding a solution to the problem for Greek decision-makers.
Chapter Eight

Test of the Model - TP IC X OP

AMAC by NATO
(Level of importance of the Macedonia issue for Europe by NATO as a component that ensured European stability)

Chi square: 22.560 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.1060
C = 0.40218

AMAC by TUR
(Level of importance of the Macedonia issue for Europe by NATO as a major component deterring possible Greaco-Turkish conflict)

Chi square: 18.26 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.0721
C = 0.42412

As in the previous correlation which examined NATO, a statistically positive relationship was presented when correlating the Macedonian issue as a problem for Europe with the statement that NATO is a major force that ensured security for Europe and NATO is a major reason for containing fears of a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey. In both cases, NATO's "success" is assumed by the Greek elites. It is suggested that NATO is seen by the respondents as a mechanism which could be used towards a solution of the issue and for mediation between Greece and Skopje (as in the case of Greece and Turkey). This suggestion is highly reflected through the correlation of the issue of Macedonia for Greece with the statement of NATO as a mechanism that contained fears of a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey (BMAC by TUR, Chi square: 12.48 with 12 degrees of Freedom, Significance: 0.00874, C = 48624). The results presented in this correlation gave a higher likelihood of a positive relationship, suggesting that Greek elites do rely on NATO playing a role in the Macedonian issue, as NATO has done in the case of Greece and Turkey. However, the correlation of the Macedonian issue with the statement of NATO as a major reason for stability in Europe is of lower statistical significance, as regards the importance of the issue for Greece. This suggests that NATO has had a positive effect in European affairs, not specifically in Greece's affairs (when comparing the Continent with one specific state related to the Macedonian issue); (BMAC by NATO, Chi square: 8.47 with 12 degrees of freedom, Significance: 0.4717, C = 0.33726).

BMAC by MAST (Level of importance of the Macedonia issue for Greece by level of importance of Maastricht for Europe)

Chi square: 3.66 with 6 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.7634
C = 0.18851

BMAC by GMAST (Level of importance of the Macedonia issue for Greece by level of importance of Maastricht for Greece)
Chi square: 5.164 with 6 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.3587
C = 0.26017

As expected, a statistical relationship was presented from correlating the importance of the Macedonian issue for Greece with the level of importance of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union for Greece and for Europe. The data suggested a higher relationship of the issue with the importance of the Treaty for Greece demonstrating a slightly stronger belief that the Treaty could assist Greece in the quest towards a solution to the Macedonian problem.

Focusing on the issue of Yugoslav's importance for Greece and for Europe, the variables related are of higher statistical significance when correlated with the issue's importance for Greece.

AYUG by EUDEF (Level of importance of the Yugoslav crisis for Europe by level of importance of US for European defence)
Chi square: 8.67 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.7094
C = 0.28889

BYUG by EUDEF (Level of importance of the Yugoslav crisis for Greece by level of importance of US for European defence)
Chi square: 19.35 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.01125
C = 0.47241

Those elites who felt that the Yugoslav crisis is a concern of major importance also felt that the United States is still important for Europe's defence, especially when the Yugoslav crisis was related to Greece. This suggests that Greek elites believe that the United States could help towards a solution for the crisis.

BYUG by FNRA (Level of importance of the Yugoslav crisis for Greece by stable relations as a component that ensured Greece's security since 1974)
Chi square: 10.00 with 8 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.0001
C = 0.51181

AYUG with FNRA (Level of importance of the Yugoslav crisis for Europe by stable relations as a component that ensured Greece's security since 1974)
As expected, a higher level of significance was presented from the relationship of the importance of the Yugoslav crisis for Greece with the statement of stable relations as a major reason for Greece not being overtly threatened since 1974, than with the crisis' importance for Europe (Significance: 0.00011). This is possibly due to the fear of Greece being drawn into the instability in the Balkans along with the issue of Macedonia as a consequence of that instability. Stable relations with other Western states is most probably seen as a way of protecting Greece's interests and there seems to be a relationship of this assumption with the problem of the instability in Yugoslavia.

**BYUG by MAST** (Level of importance of the Yugoslav crisis for Greece by level of importance of the Maastricht treaty for Europe)

- Chi square: 14.00 with 4 degrees of freedom
- Significance: 0.0061
- C = 0.36953

**AYUG by MAST** (Level of importance of the Yugoslav crisis for Europe by level of importance of the Maastricht treaty for Europe)

- Chi square: 7.439 with 4 degrees of freedom
- Significance: 0.1482
- C = 0.25309

**BYUG by GMAST** (Level of importance of the Yugoslav crisis for Greece by level of importance of the Maastricht treaty for Greece)

- Chi square: 9.729 with 4 degrees of freedom
- Significance: 0.0266
- C = 0.32830

**AYUG by GMAST** (Level of importance of the Yugoslav crisis for Europe by level of importance of the Maastricht treaty for Greece)

- Chi square: 2.1357 with 4 degrees of freedom
- Significance: 0.70706
- C = 0.14600

Through the correlations of the issue of the importance of the Yugoslav crisis for Greece with the importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Greece, the statistical relationship was stronger when both variables were associated with Greece. The Maastricht Treaty is seen by Greek elites as a topic of major importance when relating it with the Yugoslav crisis and this
assumption reinforces the hypothesis of the model which suggests that a threat stimulates international cooperation. In this instance, the Yugoslav crisis stimulates the need for the European Union to reach its goals.

**BYUG by MELOS** (Level of importance of the Yugoslav crisis for Greece by continuing membership of Greece in NATO and EEC)
Chi square: 1.3820 with 2 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.6600
C = 0.09565

**AYUG by MELOS** (Level of importance of the Yugoslav crisis for Europe by continuing membership of Greece in NATO and EEC)
Chi square: 4.193 with 2 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.1592
C = 0.19012

The majority of the respondents that felt that Greece should continue as a member of NATO and the EC felt that the Yugoslav crisis is important for Greece as well as for Europe. A higher statistical significance level was presented, however, when the relationship concerned the crisis as a problem for Europe. This suggests that the Greek elites feel that by remaining members of the EC and NATO, these mechanisms will probably assist Europe's interests more than they would specifically Greece's. However, it could also be assumed that Greece can contribute to the crisis for Europe's interests by retaining its membership in NATO and in the EC.

**AYUG by MEM** (Level of importance of the Yugoslav crisis for Europe by continuing membership for Greece in NATO)
Chi square: 10.30 with 4 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.0000
C = 0.58265

**BYUG by MEM** (Level of importance of the Yugoslav crisis for Greece by continuing membership for Greece in NATO)
Chi square: 3.20 with 4 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.57747
C = 0.18012

Those elites who felt that Greece should remain a member of NATO alone felt that the Yugoslav crisis is of great importance especially for Europe. This suggests that Greek decision-makers believe that the crisis in the former Yugoslavia can be dealt with internationally and collectively through NATO (reinforcing the model), however would
contribute more for Europe than for Greece. The assumption in this case is that Greece, by remaining a member of NATO can promote its own interests as regards to the problem and contribute towards a European solution.

BYUG by NATO
(Level of importance of the Yugoslav crisis for Greece by NATO as a major component that ensured European security)
Chi square: 11.376 with 8 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.27957
C = 0.31176

AYUG by NATO
(Level of importance of the Yugoslav crisis for Europe by NATO as a major component that ensured European security)
Chi square: 5.861 with 8 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.7792
C = 0.21493

NATO, in this correlation, is seen as the mechanism which ensured European stability and one that could contribute towards a solution to the Yugoslav crisis, especially for Greece (its interests). Those elites who felt that NATO ensured European security - or was the major reason for European security - felt that the issue of the Yugoslav crisis is of major importance for Greece. This assumes NATO's success, and suggests NATO, in the eyes of the Greek elites, as a mechanism which could help in the quest towards a peaceful solution in the Balkan region. The relationship of the crisis as an important threat for Europe with NATO as a major reason for European stability was somewhat statistically lower with no logical explanation.

AYUG by TUR
(Level of importance of the Yugoslav crisis for Europe by NATO as a deterrent in possible conflict between Greece and Turkey)
Chi square: 7.193 with 8 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.6233
C = 0.24900

BYUG by TUR
(Level of importance of the Yugoslav crisis for Greece by NATO as a deterrent in possible conflict between Greece and Turkey)
Chi square: 13.083 with 8 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.00498
C = 0.45106

In an effort to examine the importance of the Yugoslav crisis for Greece and for Europe with the statement of NATO being a major reason for the containment of fears of a possible conflict...
between Greece and Turkey, a statistically high relationship was presented when the statement was correlated with the Yugoslav crisis as important for Greece. Those elites who felt that the crisis was of greater importance to Greece also agreed with the statement of NATO being a major reason that contained fears of a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey. Despite the fact that the former Yugoslavia is not a member of NATO, it could be suggested that NATO's success in containing fears of a possible Greaco-Turkish conflict can also help in containing this crisis (Yugoslav crisis). As in a large number of correlations in this chapter, a possible problem or threat was seen as being contained by cooperating internationally, (NATO), thus supporting the model.

A much lower statistical relationship was presented by the results of the statement when correlated to the Yugoslav crisis as being important for Europe. In can be assumed that the crisis is not felt by Greek elites as important for Europe as it is for Greece, or that NATO's success in Greaco-Turkish relations was not as evident in European affairs and therefore NATO is not seen as the major option for European affairs when discussing the Yugoslav crisis.

**BCYP by MELOS**  (Level of importance of the Cypriot issue for Greece by continuing membership for Greece in EEC and NATO)

Chi square: 0.62405 with 2 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.8433
C = 0.06108

The Cypriot issue's importance for Greece, when related to the question of Greece remaining a member of NATO and the EC, presented a statistically lower level of relationship than expected. Those elites who felt that the issue was of very great importance felt that Greece should continue as a member in both institutions, although not as overwhelmingly as in the correlation of the importance of the issue for Europe with the same question.

**BCYP by MEM**  (Level of importance of the Cypriot issue for Greece by continuing membership for Greece in NATO)

Chi square: 11.16 with 4 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.0000
C = 0.70738
A statistically high level of significance was presented from the relationship of the importance of the Cypriot issue for Greece with the question of whether Greece should remain a member of NATO alone. Those elites who felt that Greece should remain as a member of NATO also felt in the issue's importance. NATO, in this case, could be seen as an international cooperation option that could contribute towards a solution to the problem of Cyprus for Greece. When relating the same issue with the statement of NATO as the major reason for ensuring European stability, a statistically high level of significance was also presented (BCYP by NATO, Chi square: 19.303 with 8 degrees of freedom, Significance: 0.0044, C = 0.44147). This finding assumes NATO's success as a defence mechanism for Europe and a major option, in the eyes of the Greek elites, for the Cypriot issue.

BCYP by TUR
(Level of importance of the Cypriot issue for Greece by NATO as a deterrent in possible conflict between Greece and Turkey)
Chi square: 14.80 with 8 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.02017
C = 0.41541

A statistically positive relationship was presented from the correlation of the importance of the Cypriot problem for Greece with the statement of NATO as a major reason for containing possible fears of a Greaco-Turkish conflict as both states are NATO members. Those elites who felt that the issue was of some importance or of great importance to Greece also agreed, although not overwhelmingly, with the statement. Greek elites seem to realise the importance of the state remaining a member of NATO and its success in containing fears of a possible conflict between the two states. As Turkish troops still occupy a large area of the island of Cyprus, it is assumed that NATO has played a role, by the fact that the problem has not escalated.

BCYP by US (Level of importance of the Cypriot issue for Greece by the level of importance of US for European affairs)
Chi square: 6.62 with 8 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.4678
C = 0.27857

A statistically low level of significance was presented when relating the issue of Cyprus as important for Greece with agreement with the statement that the United States should continue to play a role in European affairs despite the end of the Cold War. Those elites who felt that
the issue is important were quite evenly distributed along the five-point scale demonstrating a sense of uncertainty among the respondents' belief in continuing US assistance in Europe. It could be suggested that the United States is no longer seen as a determining factor for Europe's security, especially when relating their role to the issue of Cyprus. A similar correlation was presented when relating the issue with agreement to the statement that stable relations with other democracies have been a major factor for Greece not being overtly threatened since 1974 (BCYP by FNRA, Chi square: 4.376 with 8 degrees of freedom, Significance: 0.8374, C = 0.21146). As in the previous correlation, the opinions of the respondents were quite evenly distributed on the five-point scale despite an overwhelming majority believing in the importance of the issue. It is assumed that Greek elites feel that stable relations with other Western democracies have not played a major role towards the Cypriot problem specifically: The deadlock in the issue over the last 20 years is indicative of this.

BCYP by GMAST  (Level of importance of the Cypriot issue for Greece by level of importance of the Maastricht treaty for Greece)
Chi square: 5.32 with 4 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.1092
C = 0.27550

BCYP by MAST  (Level of importance of the Cypriot issue for Greece by level of importance of the Maastricht treaty for Europe)
Chi square: 2.93 with 4 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.5773
C = 0.17435

The issue of Cyprus as important for Greece presented a statistically higher level of significance when related to the importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Greece. Those elites who felt the issue as important for Greece also felt the importance of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union for Greek interests. It is assumed that Greek elites believe that the goals of the Maastricht treaty could play a positive role towards a solution to the Cypriot issue. A statistically lower level of relationship was presented when relating the issue (of Cyprus) as important for Europe with the importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Europe. In this case, it is assumed that Greek elites realise that they could focus on the issue through Maastricht in order to promote their own national interests.

BCYP by EUDEF  (Level of importance of the Cypriot issue for Greece by level of importance of the US for European defence)
When the Cypriot issue's importance for Greece was related to the importance of the United States for European defence, a statistically high significance level was presented. Those elites who believed that the issue was of great importance, felt that the United States was important for Europe's defence. This finding contradicts the earlier result of the correlation of the issue (of Cyprus) with the US continuing to play a role in European affairs (BCYP by US). An explanation, however, can be presented. This relationship (BCYP by EUDEF) was specifically about Europe's defence, not European affairs, demonstrating the view that the United States is still important for defensive issues, but not for European affairs in general.

**FNRA by EUDEF**
(Stable relations as a factor that contributed towards Greece's security since 1974 by level of importance of US for European defence)

Chi square: 45.59 with 24 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.0131  
$C = 0.55141$

A statistically high level of significance was presented from the correlation between the statement of Greece not being overtly threatened by another state since 1974 due to stable relations with other Western democracies (such as the United States, Great Britain and France), with the question of the importance of the United States for the security of Europe in the 1990s.

Those elites who agreed with the statement of stable relations, was felt that the United States was important for Europe's defence in the 1990s. This finding suggests that stable relations with other democracies or, using the term in the model, International Cooperation, can help find an option towards an assumed threat. In this case, stable relations, or cooperating internationally with states such as the US, have helped Greece's security and are considered essential for the state's security concerns.

**FNRA by GMAST**
(Stable relations as a factor that contributed towards Greece's security since 1974 by level of importance of Maastricht treaty for Greece)

Chi square: 17.58 with 8 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.0272  
$C = 0.39062$

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FNRA by MAST
(Stable relations as a factor that contributed towards Greece's security since 1974 by level of importance of Maastricht treaty for Europe)

Chi square: 16.366 with 8 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.0035
C = 0.43862

Reinforcing the model, this correlation between the statement of stable relations as a major reason for Greece not being overtly threatened by another state since 1974 with the importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Greece and for Europe, presented a statistically high level of significance. Those elites who felt that stable relations with other Western democracies was a major reason for the state's stability in defensive terms also felt that the Maastricht Treaty was of major importance for Greece, and for Europe as well. This finding reinforces the model as the Maastricht Treaty on European Union is collective in nature and, in this case, is related to threat perception since 1974 for Greece. Greek elites seem to realise the importance the Treaty could have for European affairs.

FNRA by TUR
(Stable relations as a factor that contributed towards Greece's security since 1974 by NATO as a deterrent in Greco - Turkish relations)

Chi square: 44.51 with 16 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.00013
C = 0.57619

A similar finding was exhibited in the results of the statement of stable relations with other Western democracies as a major reason for Greece not being overtly threatened by another state since 1974 with agreement to the statement of NATO as a major reason for the containment of fears of a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey, as both are NATO members. Those elites who agreed with the statement of the role played by stable relations with other Western democracies also agreed that NATO has contained a possible Greco-Turkish conflict due to the fact that both states have NATO membership, and are aware of the restrictions and obligations this membership have placed on them. International cooperation has played a role in containing a possible threat thus reinforcing the model for both variables.

FNRA by US
(Stable relations as a factor that contributed towards Greece's security since 1974 by level of importance of US for European affairs)
The correlation of the statement of the role played by stable relations for Greece (as the state has not been overtly threatened by another state since 1974), with the importance of the United States in European issues despite the end of the Cold War, a statistically high level of significance was exhibited. A majority of elites who agreed with the statement of stable relations also felt that the United States were still important in European affairs. Both variables dealt with the United States in their questions suggesting international cooperation as a reason of containing threats (in one case) and important in European affairs (in the other case), reinforcing the first part of the model and demonstrating the realisation of the need for international cooperation.

**STRT by EUDEF** (Most serious threat at the present time for Greece by level of importance of the US for European defence)

Chi square: 29.797 with 30 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.5650  
C = 0.47021

Shifting attention towards the most serious kind of threat at the present time for Greece and correlating it with the level of importance of the United States for European defence, there does not seem to be a statistically high level of relationship. However, most elites who felt that the most serious kind of threat to Greece was the state's domestic economy also felt that the United States was important for Europe's defence (49%).

**STRT by GMAST** (Most serious threat at the present time for Greece by level of importance of Maastricht treaty for Greece)

Chi square: 14.2535 with 10 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.14909  
C = 0.35646

**STRT by MAST** (Most serious threat at the present time for Greece by level of importance of Maastricht treaty for Europe)

Chi square: 13.096 with 10 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.30866  
C = 0.32311

From the results presented in the correlation of the most serious kind of threat for Greece at the present time with the importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Greece as well as for Europe (GMAST and MAST respectively), a statistically high level of relationship was exhibited
when the Treaty was related to Greece. Those elites who felt that the domestic economy was the most serious kind of threat also felt that the Treaty on European Union was of great importance for Greece. It could be suggested that Greek elites believe that the goals of the Maastricht treaty can help Greece's domestic economy in the future. In the case of the seriousness of a threat for Greece at the present time and the importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Europe, Greek elites were somewhat divided between their domestic economy (60%) and the other types of threats offered as choices in the question. This possibly explains the lower significance level, as the findings did not point in one specific direction. It is suggested that Greek elites believe that the Treaty is important for Europe, but would (the Treaty) probably not provide any assistance for Greece's interests if Greece does not pressure the European Union.

**STRT by MELOS** *(Most serious threat at the present time for Greece by continuing membership in NATO and the EEC)*

Chi square: 5.141 with 5 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.37374  
C = 0.22659

**STRT by MEM** *(Most serious threat at the present time for Greece by continuing membership in NATO)*

Chi square: 4.6768 with 10 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.7970  
C = 0.25025

When relating the question of the most serious kind of threat for Greece at the present time with the question of whether Greece should remain as a member in NATO and the EC or just specifically in NATO, the results were not as expected. Those elites who felt that the most serious kind of threat was either Greece's domestic economy, political instability or a foreign military threat all suggested that Greece should remain a member of both institutions. However, when shifting attention to NATO membership only, the significance level was lower suggesting that, at least for the major threats perceived in this question (STRT), both NATO and the EC are required as mechanisms that could contribute to the state, not just one of them. The finding seems logical as, for example, Greece's economy would better be assisted by the EC (as a predominantly economic institution), rather than NATO.

**STRT by NATO** *(Most serious threat at the present time for Greece by NATO as a major component ensuring European stability)*

Chi square: 16.796 with 20 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.4746
A rather statistically negative relationship was reflected in the results of the correlation between the most serious kind of threat for Greece at the present time with the statements of NATO as a major reason for ensuring European stability and NATO as a major reason for containing fears of a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey as both states are NATO members. Again, the domestic economy occupied the first position for the elites in both cases, although it did not show any significant relationship with either of the NATO questions. This finding suggests that NATO is not seen by Greek elites as a factor that would contribute to their domestic economy, probably because NATO does not have an economic mandate.

A statistically low level of relationship was presented from the correlation of the most serious type of threat for Greece and the importance of the United States in European affairs. Although most respondents believed that the domestic economy was the most serious threat for Greece at the present time, they were less certain about the level of importance of the United States for European affairs as indicated by the distribution of responses over the five-point scale. The United States, it could be suggested, seem not to be as important as they were during the Cold War. Their military bases have been removed from Greece (1991), and the problem of the domestic economy is not seen to require US assistance.
As in the previous correlation, the findings in this case did not seem to point in a certain direction. The responses were well distributed along the five-point scale on the level of agreement to the question of whether the elites felt that stable relations with other Western democracies played a role in the fact that Greece had not been overtly threatened by another state since 1974. This was the case despite the responses leaning towards the domestic economy as the most serious type of threat for Greece at the present time.

**PRB by GMAST** (Probability of a threat arising for Greece by the level of importance of Maastricht for Greece)

- Chi square: 10.7951 with 12 degrees of freedom
- Significance: 0.62845
- C = 0.29955

**PRB by MAST** (Probability of a threat arising for Greece by the level of importance of Maastricht for Europe)

- Chi square: 6.325 with 12 degrees of freedom
- Significance: 0.9309
- C = 0.23199

Shifting attention to the correlation between the probability of a threat arising for Greece with the importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Greece and for Europe, a significantly negative relationship was presented. Despite the exhibited importance of Maastricht for Greece and for Europe, the probability of a threat to arise for Greece's security was rather uncertain, or occupied the middle position of the scale. It could be suggested that Maastricht is not identified as a deterrent towards the probability of a threat arising for Greece's security.

**PRB by US** (Probability of a threat arising for Greece by the level of importance of the US for European affairs)

- Chi square: 39.434 with 24 degrees of freedom
- Significance: 0.09595
- C = 0.50225

A statistically strong relationship was revealed from the results of the correlation between the probability of a threat arising for Greece and the importance of the United States in European affairs. As expected, those elites who felt that the probability was high believed in the importance of the United States for European affairs. The model has suggested that perceptions of threat influence or stimulate international cooperation, as in this case. The greater the probability of a threat arising for Greece, the more the important the United States would become for European affairs.
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PRB by TUR  (Probability of a threat arising for Greece by NATO as a deterrent in Greaco - Turkish relations)
Chi square: 34.27 with 24 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.05583
C = 0.52382

A rather statistically positive relationship was revealed from the correlation between the probability of a threat arising for Greece with the statement that NATO has been a major reason for containing fears of a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey. Indeed, those elites who felt that a threat is probable also felt that NATO has been a major reason for containing those fears. This relationship supports the model, as the perception of a threat stimulates international cooperation (NATO), suggesting that NATO's success in containing fears of a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey is related to the structure's perception of that specific threat. Logically, those elites who disagreed with the above statement for NATO's success in containing fears also felt that the probability of a threat arising was also rather low.

PRB by FNRA  (Probability of a threat arising for Greece by stable relations as a component that ensured Greece's security since 1974)
Chi square: 30.44 with 24 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.28821
C = 0.47091

By examining the relationship between the probability of a threat arising for Greece and the statement that Greece has not been overtly threatened by another state since 1974 due to the state's stable relations with other Western democracies, there seemed to be a statistically positive relationship. Those elites who believed that the probability of a threat arising was high, believed that international cooperation (stable relations with other Western democracies) has played a major role in Greece's security. Again, this finding supports the model as stable relations (international cooperation) contained threats which stimulated Greece to pursue close relations.

PRB by MEM  (Probability of a threat arising for Greece by continuing membership for Greece in NATO)
Chi square: 10.03 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.0440
C = 0.43301
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**PRB by MELOS** (Probability of a threat arising for Greece by continuing membership in the EEC and NATO)

Chi square: 4.770 with 6 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.42793  
C = 0.23825

As expected, a statistically high positive relationship was presented from the correlation between the probability of a threat arising for Greece with the question of whether Greece should remain a member of NATO (PRB by MEM). Those elites who felt that the probability was high, also felt that Greece should remain a member of NATO, supporting the model. NATO's support seems to be required and acknowledged by Greece's elites.

However, when the probability of a threat arising was correlated with the question of whether Greece should remain a member of both institutions (EC and NATO), the significance level was lower suggesting not that Greece should abandon the EC, but rather that NATO is more suitable to deal with perceptions of threat.

**PRB by NATO** (Probability of a threat arising for Greece by NATO as a component that ensured European security)

Chi square: 21.20 with 24 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.57578  
C = 0.42511

A rather unusual finding was presented in the correlation between the probability of a threat arising for Greece with the statement that NATO has been a major reason for ensuring European stability. The expected result would have been agreement to the statement and a high probability of threat arising. However, this was not revealed by the correlation with no logical explanation.

**RELG by EUDEF** (Importance of religion as a threat for Europe by level of importance of the US for European defence)

Chi square: 48.159 with 36 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.1273  
C = 0.56232

**GRELG by EUDEF** (Importance of religion as a threat for Europe by level of importance of the US for European defence)

Chi square: 46.886 with 36 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.11834
C = 0.56611

The importance of religion as a threat towards Greece's security as well as for Europe's was correlated with the importance of the United States for European defence and a statistically strong relationship was presented. Those elites who felt that religion was important for the Continent's security (when perceived as a threat) as well as for Greece's security, also felt that the United States were important for European defence. As expected, those who did not feel that religion was important also felt that the US were not important for Europe's defence.

**RELG by MAST**  (Importance of religion as a threat for Europe by level of importance of the Maastricht treaty for Europe)
- Chi square: 12.6913 with 12 degrees of freedom
- Significance: 0.03600
- C = 0.42750

**RELG by GMAST**  (Importance of religion as a threat for Greece by level of importance of the Maastricht treaty for Greece)
- Chi square: 13.682 with 12 degrees of freedom
- Significance: 0.3696
- C = 0.34060

**GRELG by MAST**  (Importance of religion as a threat for Greece by level of importance of the Maastricht treaty for Europe)
- Chi square: 12.800 with 12 degrees of freedom
- Significance: 0.01333
- C = 0.45138

**GRELG by GMAST**  (Importance of religion as a threat for Greece by level of importance of the Maastricht treaty for Greece)
- Chi square: 11.316 with 12 degrees of freedom
- Significance: 0.46092
- C = 0.32648

The religious fanaticism in the Middle East expressed in the question as a threat for Greece (GRELG), was correlated with the importance of the Treaty of Maastricht for Greece (GMAST) and for Europe (MAST). From the results, a rather high level of significance was presented when the religious threat for Europe was correlated with the importance of the Maastricht Treaty, again for Europe. Those elites who felt that the religious threat to Europe's security was serious, also felt that the Treaty on European Union was important for Europe. It could be suggested that Greek elites may feel that religion as a threat should be a topic
examined more closely by Europeans as it may pose a threat to the Continent's security. A strong relationship was also presented when correlating the religious issue as a threat to Greece's security with the Maastricht Treaty as important for Europe. It is assumed that Greek elites feel that Greece's security may be threatened by a religious out-of-area threat and the goals of the Maastricht treaty should provide a platform to deal with such a threat as they believe in its importance.

However, a statistically higher level of significance was expected from the correlation of both issues (religion and the Maastricht Treaty) when both were related to Greece. There did not seem to be a positive relationship, as the results did not point in any specific direction. A similar finding was revealed from the results of the issue of religion as a threat for Europe and the importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Greece.

**RELG by MELOS** (Importance of religion as a threat for Europe by continuing membership in the EEC and NATO)
Chi square: 3.605 with 6 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.81074
C = 0.17193

**RELG by MEM** (Importance of religion as a threat for Europe by continuing membership in NATO)
Chi square: 6.12309 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.83693
C = 0.27119

**GRELG by MELOS** (Importance of religion as a threat for Greece by continuing membership in the EEC and NATO)
Chi square: 3.13672 with 6 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.87472
C = 0.15598

**GRELG by MEM** (Importance of religion as a threat for Greece by continuing membership in NATO)
Chi square: 7.6178 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.34732
C = 0.35544

The issue of religion as a threat to Europe and to Greece was correlated with the questions of whether Greece should remain a member of NATO and the EC, and specifically if Greece should remain a member of NATO. From the above four correlations, it was shown that the most significant finding was the issue of religion as a serious threat for Greece with the question of whether Greece should remain a member of NATO (GRELG by MEM). More
than half of the respondents which felt that the issue was serious also felt that Greece should remain a member of NATO. This demonstrates the feeling of belief in NATO by Greek elites to successfully deal with the problem of religion as a threat.

It was expected that the issue of religion as a threat for Greece would produce a statistically high positive correlation when examined with the question of membership in NATO and the EC (GRELG by MELOS). However, the relationship was weak, suggesting not that Greece should abandon the EC structure, but rather that NATO would be a better option to deal with the issue.

However, this analysis contradicts the finding of the relationship of the issue with NATO as a major reason that insured European stability (GRELG by NATO, Chi square: 23.037 with 24 degrees of freedom, Significance: 0.6406, C = 0.41807). The significance level was rather low, suggesting a weak relationship between the two variables.

Furthermore, a statistically higher level of significance was presented from the results of the issue for Europe, when related to the same question of NATO as a major reason that insured European security. The respondents were divided in their response suggesting an ambiguity and uncertainty in the relationship between the variables (RELG by NATO, Chi square: 26.96 with 24 degrees of freedom, Significance: 0.42219, C = 0.44685).

GRELG by TUR (Importance of religion as a threat for Greece by NATO as a deterrent in Greaco - Turkish relations)
Chi square: 27.776 with 24 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.38560
C = 0.46105

RELG by TUR (Importance of religion as a threat for Europe by NATO as a deterrent in Greaco - Turkish relations)
Chi square: 35.643 with 24 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.08217
C = 0.51618

Those elites who felt that religious fanaticism was a serious threat for Europe's security were divided with those who felt that it was not as serious when the issue was correlated with the statement that NATO was a major reason that fears of a possible Greaco - Turkish conflict were contained as both states are members of NATO. The finding is important, as it demonstrates a level of uncertainty in the responses. NATO may have played a role in Greaco
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- Turkish relations but can it contribute to the containment of a religious threat towards Europe? An uncertainty was also exhibited in the results correlating the statement about NATO with the religious threat as serious for Greece's security, contradicting the expectation, however, of a higher significance level.

The seriousness of the possibility of a religious threat arising to Europe's security, as well as to Greece's security was presented when the issue was correlated with the level of importance of the United States for European affairs (GRELG by US, Chi square: 38.27 with 24 degrees of freedom, Significance: 0.17806, C = 0.51896). The results did not point in any specific direction, demonstrating a level of uncertainty. The views were divided and distributed rather evenly in the contingency tables suggesting that the US is not seen as the factor which could contribute - or should tribute - to the containment of a possible religious threat, as the issue of religious fanaticism as a threat was presented with uncertainty. It was, however, higher in the case of religion as a threat to Greece.

GRELG by FNRA
(Importance of religion as a threat for Greece by stable relations as a component that ensured Greece's security since 1974)
Chi square: 21.79 with 24 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.66654
C = 0.42151

RELG by FNRA
(Importance of religion as a threat for Europe by stable relations as a component that ensured Greece's security since 1974)
Chi square: 34.84 with 24 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.1601
C = 0.49274

Most elites who felt that the issue of religious fanaticism was serious for Europe also felt that stable relations played a major role in that Greece had not been overtly threatened by a state since 1974. This finding suggests that stable relations could be a way of deterring such a threat and stresses the need for Greece to continue to have good relations with other Western democracies (RELG by FNRA). The level of significance was expected to be higher when relating the statement that Greece has not been overtly threatened to the issue of religious fanaticism as a threat to Greece. However, it produced a statistically weak relationship suggesting that stable relations would help to deter a possible religious threat if it occurred to the whole Continent, not specifically to Greece.
NEWTH by EUDEF (Importance for NATO to perceive new threats by the level of importance of the US for European defence)
Chi square: 44.99 with 24 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.00921
C = 0.56567

Shifting attention to the importance of NATO perceiving new threats for its continuation with the question of the importance of the United States for European defence, the relationship exhibited was statistically high. Approximately 62% of the respondents demonstrated the feeling that it was essential for NATO to perceive new threats for its continuation and the United States was important for European defence. This finding supports the model, as the importance of threat perception (for NATO in this case) stimulates international cooperation (continuing US assistance).

NEWTH by GMAST (Importance for NATO to perceive new threats by the level of importance of Maastricht for Greece)
Chi square: 16.839 with 8 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.0383
C = 0.38793

NEWTH by MAST (Importance for NATO to perceive new threats by the level of importance of Maastricht for Europe)
Chi square: 4.745 with 8 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.68678
C = 0.24047

Those elites who felt that the perception of new threats was important for NATO also felt that the Maastricht Treaty was important for Greece (80%). This finding supports the model as a perception of threat stimulates international cooperation which - in this case - is the Maastricht Treaty on European Union. A lower significance value was produced from the correlation of the importance of NATO perceiving new threats for its continuation with the importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Europe.

NEWTH by MELOS (Importance for NATO to perceive new threats by continuing membership in NATO and the EEC)
Chi square: 5.120 with 4 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.12024
C = 0.27274

NEWTH by MEM (Importance for NATO to perceive new threats by continuing membership in NATO)
Chi square: 10.084 with 8 degrees of freedom
As expected, a statistically high positive level of significance was presented from the correlation of the importance of NATO perceiving new threats with the question of whether Greece should remain a member of NATO and whether Greece should continue as a member of NATO and the EC. In both cases, an overwhelming majority who agreed that it was important for NATO to perceive new threats, also felt that Greece should remain a member of both institutions. This result supports the model, as both variables are examples of threat perception and international cooperation. It is important for NATO to perceive new threats for the mechanism's continuation and Greece should continue as a member of the structure, as well as in the EC.

**NEWTH by NATO** (Importance for NATO to perceive new threats by NATO as a component that ensured European stability)
Chi square: 32.007 with 16 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.00065
C = 0.55295

**NEWTH by TUR** (Importance for NATO to perceive new threats by NATO as a deterrent in Greaco-Turkish relations)
Chi square: 25.635 with 16 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.03237
C = 0.49287

NATO's success is suggested from the findings of the next two correlations. Those elites who felt that it was essential for NATO to perceive new threats for its continuation, also believed in the statement that NATO was a major reason that ensured European stability and that NATO has been a major reason that contained fears of a possible Greaco-Turkish conflict, as both states are NATO members. In both cases, NATO is suggested as being able to deal with threats (European stability and fears of a conflict between Greece and Turkey, for example) and their containment. This supports the aspect of the model which deals with a threat stimulating international cooperation. Logically, it can be determined from the findings related to NATO, that the structure is seen, by Greek elites, as a possible option for European (and Greek) security for the future.

**NEWTH by US** (Importance for NATO to perceive new threats by the level of importance of the US in European affairs)
Chi square: 29.61 with 16 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.04062  
C = 0.47888

NEWTH by FNRA  
(Importance for NATO to perceive new threats by stable relations as a component that has contributed to Greece's security since 1974)  
Chi square: 22.885 with 16 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.1757  
C = 0.43557

From the correlations of the importance for NATO to perceive new threats for its continuation, with the importance of the United States in European affairs and with the statement that Greece has not been overtly threatened by another state since 1974 due to the its stable relations with other Western democracies, rather high levels of significance were presented. The data suggest that those elites who felt that it was important for NATO to perceive new threats also felt that the United States was important for European affairs (65%) and that stable relations were a major reason for Greece not being threatened by another state since 1974 (68%). Stable relations with other states implies international cooperation, as does agreement to continuing US assistance in European affairs, thus lending support to the model.

TP by EUDEF  (Importance of threat perception by the level of importance of the US for European defence)  
Chi square: 10.335 with 12 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.57806  
C = 0.31162

TP by US  (Importance of threat perception by level of importance of the US for European affairs)  
Chi square: 5.268 with 8 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.82180  
C = 0.20774

Attention was focused on the level of importance of threat perception (on a seven point scale) with the variables which affected the model. Those elites who felt that threat perception was fairly important to very important for the establishment of a collective security arrangement did not produce a statistically significant relationship with the level of importance of the United States in European affairs, or with the level of importance of the United States in European defence. This result assumes the notion that Europeans realise the importance of perceiving new threats on their own, and not being influenced by the United States. This is despite the earlier finding that the US is important for European defence, probably in military terms or as an ally in a major crisis.
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TP by MELOS (Importance of threat perception by continuing membership in NATO and the EEC)
Chi square: 5.102 with 2 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.00353
C = 0.32289

TP by MEM (Importance of threat perception by continuing membership in NATO)
Chi square: 8.3059 with 4 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.00010
C = 0.45263

The importance of threat perception in establishing a collective security arrangement was correlated with the questions of whether Greece should remain a member of NATO and whether Greece should remain a member of both the EC and NATO. The expected statistical significance was presented, as those elites who believed in the importance of threat perception also felt that Greece should remain a member of both institutions in both cases. The finding supports the model as perceptions of threat stimulate international cooperation. Threat perception is seen as an important factor towards the establishment of a defensive option and NATO and the EC are structures that can be characterised as international cooperation platforms.

TP by MAST (Importance of threat perception by level of importance of Maastricht for Europe)
Chi square: 4.429 with 4 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.39715
C = 0.19959

TP by GMAST (Importance of threat perception by level of importance of Maastricht for Greece)
Chi square: 6.694 with 4 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.21263
C = 0.23686

The importance of threat perception was also evident in the correlations with the importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Greece and for Europe. In both instances, the levels of significance were rather high, especially in the case of the importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Greece. Those elites who felt that threat perception is an important factor in the establishment of a collective security arrangement also felt that the Maastricht Treaty was important for Europe as well as for Greece. This finding, again, supports the model by suggesting that threat perception stimulates international cooperation.

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(Importance of threat perception by stable relations as a component that has contributed to Greece’s security since 1974)
Chi square: 6.909 with 8 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.61571
C = 0.25028

TP by TUR (Importance of threat perception by NATO as a deterrent in Greaco-Turkish relations)
Chi square: 9.545 with 8 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.23646
C = 0.31596

Those elites who felt that threat perception was important showed a statistically higher level of significance when correlated with the statement that NATO has been a major reason for containing fears of a possible Greaco-Turkish conflict as both are NATO members, than with the statement that stable relations with other Western democracies are a major reason for Greece not being overtly threatened by another state since 1974. The feeling may be that threat perception is important, but does not relate to the fact that stable relations with other Western democracies have helped Greece’s security. Stable relations may deter a threat from capitalising, do not necessarily relate with the perception of common threats. In the other case, the suggestion is that threat perception is essential as it has been for Greece (in perceiving Turkey as a threat) which made them feel secure under NATO’s umbrella. This finding reinforces the model as NATO again is the international cooperation variable being stimulated by Turkey (as a threat).

TP by NATO (Importance of threat perception by NATO as a component that ensured European security)
Chi square: 9.645 with 8 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.44320
C = 0.27314

A lower significance level (than expected), was presented from the correlation of the importance of threat perception for the establishment of a collective security arrangement with the statement that NATO has been a major reason that ensured European stability. However, the finding has demonstrated the notion that threat perception is important and that NATO has played a role in European stability. This suggestion, although not as strong as expected, still reinforces the model.

GER by EUDEF (Importance of Germany as a threat for Europe by level of importance of the US for European defence)
Chi square: 41.591 with 36 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.51642
C = 0.51102

GR by EUDEF (Importance of Germany as a threat for Greece by level of importance of the US for European defence)
Chi square: 44.85 with 36 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.20155
C = 0.55343

The seriousness of Germany as a threat for Europe's security and for Greece's security was correlated with the level of importance of the United States for European defence. A higher level of significance was presented when the US was related with Germany as a threat towards Greece's security, as those elites who felt that Germany was not a threat towards Greece's security felt quite uncertain about the importance of the United States in Europe's defence. This finding also supports the model for, as Germany was not seen as a major threat, logically, according to the model, the absence of a specific threat would not stimulate international cooperation. A statistically low level of relationship was presented from the correlation of the seriousness of Germany as a threat with the level of importance of the US in Europe's defence. The results were distributed quite equally and did not point in any specific direction as 96% of the cells were under the figure 5 (total 99 for this specific correlation) suggesting uncertainty for both variables.

GER by MAST (Importance of Germany as a threat for Europe by the importance of the Maastricht treaty for Europe)
Chi square: 7.88 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.73052
C = 0.28251

GER by GMAST (Importance of Germany as a threat for Europe by the importance of the Maastricht treaty for Greece)
Chi square: 14.90 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.40896
C = 0.33294

GR by GMAST (Importance of Germany as a threat for Greece by the importance of the Maastricht treaty for Greece)
Chi square: 14.8582 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.41487
C = 0.33502

GR by MAST (Importance of Germany as a threat for Greece by the importance of the Maastricht treaty for Europe)
Chi square: 18.991 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.10337
C = 0.39782
The level of threat Germany poses both to Greece and to Europe (separately) was correlated with the level of importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Greece as well as for Europe. The most statistically significant relationship was exhibited from the correlation of the possible German threat for Greece with the importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Europe (GR by MAST). The results pointed in the direction of most elites who felt that Germany was not a serious threat for Greece and that the Maastricht Treaty was important for Europe (75%). It is suggested that the Treaty on European Union should probably not deal with Germany as a threat. It is unlikely that the German threat would stimulate international cooperation and, based on this assumption, the model would still hold. This could be assumed from the weak relationship presented in the remaining alternatives from the related correlations. Germany was not seen as a major threat for Europe and therefore there was a level of dissimilarity in the responses creating the notion of uncertainty as to whether Maastricht should deal with it.

**GER by MELOS** (Importance of Germany as a threat for Europe by continuing membership in NATO and the EEC for Greece)
- Chi square: 7.259 with 6 degrees of freedom
- Significance: 0.1294
- C = 0.30133

**GER by MEM** (Importance of Germany as a threat for Europe by continuing membership in NATO for Greece)
- Chi square: 8.452 with 12 degrees of freedom
- Significance: 0.2286
- C = 0.37523

**GR by MELOS** (Importance of Germany as a threat for Greece by continuing membership in NATO and the EEC for Greece)
- Chi square: 8.3363
- Significance: 0.03871
- C = 0.34708

**GR by MEM** (Importance of Germany as a threat for Greece by continuing membership in NATO for Greece)
- Chi square: 8.9164 with 12 degrees of freedom
- Significance: 0.01720
- C = 0.45883

Relationships were more clearly reflected when the seriousness of Germany as a threat for the Continent as well as for Greece were correlated with the questions of Greece remaining as members of NATO and the EC. The results pointed to the assumption that despite Germany not being considered as a serious threat for either Greece or Europe, Greece should remain as
members of both institutions, suggesting, possibly, that there should be other threats to justify the institutions' continuation. The model was based on the assumption of a real or imagined threat that is necessary for defence structures to work successfully. Based on this assumption, Greek elites should have other threats in mind (many have been already analysed) to prove this result.

**GER by NATO** (Importance of Germany as a threat for Europe by NATO as a component that has ensured European security)
Chi square: 21.45 with 24 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.35266
C = 0.45433

**GR by NATO** (Importance of Germany as a threat for Greece by NATO as a component that has ensured European security)
Chi square: 14.76 with 24 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.86251
C = 0.38125

The seriousness of Germany as a threat for Greece and for Europe was correlated with the statement that NATO has been a major reason that ensured European stability. Those elites who felt that Germany was not a serious threat to Greece did not suggest a pattern of correlation with the statements on NATO's success. The significance level was low suggesting that NATO's success in ensuring European stability had little to do with containing Germany as a threat for Greece. However, the significance level was rather high when Germany was related as a threat for Europe suggesting that NATO did play a role in continuing fears of a possible German threat (German rearmament containment was one of the reasons for NATO's creation).

**GER by TUR** (Importance of Germany as a threat for Europe by NATO as a deterrent in Greaco - Turkish relations)
Chi square: 40.52816 with 24 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.06648
C = 0.51958

**GR by TUR** (Importance of Germany as a threat for Greece by NATO as a deterrent in Greaco - Turkish relations)
Chi square: 30.716 with 24 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.14281
C = 0.50236
GR by FNRA
(Importance of Germany as a threat for Greece by stable relations as a component that has ensured Greece's security since 1974)
Chi square: 29.40804 with 24 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.27903
C = 0.47420

GER by FNRA
(Importance of Germany as a threat for Europe by stable relations as a component that has ensured Greece's security since 1974)
Chi square: 32.91 with 24 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.20735
C = 0.48386

A statistically high level of significance was presented from the results of the correlations between the seriousness of Germany as a threat for Greece and for Europe (separately) with the statements (for both questions) of NATO as a major reason for containing fears of a possible Greaco-Turkish conflict as both are NATO members, and that stable relations with other Western democracies has been a major reason why Greece has not been overtly threatened by another state since 1974. The statistical significance was higher when the statement about the role of NATO for Greece and Turkey was correlated with a possible German threat. Those elites who felt that Germany was not a serious threat for Europe (60%) or for Greece (64%) also felt that NATO did play a role in containing fears of a possible Greaco-Turkish conflict.

It could be assumed that NATO has also played a role in containing fears of a possible German threat for the Continent, as well as for Greece, as Germany has been a member since 1954. In addition, one of the major reasons for NATO's creation was, according to many defence analysts, the containment of Germany after World War II. The issue of Germany as a threat arose again after the unification of East and West Germany, thus creating a much more powerful state in terms of its economy, population, and defence potential.

A statistically strong relationship was presented from the correlation of the seriousness of the German threat for Europe and for Greece with the statement that Greece has not been overtly threatened by another state since 1974 due to the state's stable relations with other Western democracies. Most elites who felt that Germany was not a serious threat for Greece (69%) and for Europe (62%) also felt that the previous statement was somewhat true, suggesting that stable relations with other Western democracies have assisted by way of Greece not considering Germany as a threat. This may be due to their common membership in NATO,
the European Union, the CSCE and the WEU. These findings support the first part of the model, as international cooperation was sought after the perception of a threat (stable relations, NATO formation in 1949).

**GER by US** (Importance of Germany as a threat for Europe by level of importance of the US in European affairs)
- Chi square: 14.071 with 24 degrees of freedom
- Significance: 0.97246
- C = 0.33585

**GR by US** (Importance of Germany as a threat for Greece by level of importance of the US in European affairs)
- Chi square: 29.925 with 24 degrees of freedom
- Significance: 0.33878
- C = 0.46175

Germany's seriousness as a threat towards Greece and towards Europe was correlated with the question of the level of importance of the United States in European affairs. A statistically weak relationship, as expected, was exhibited by the level of seriousness of the German threat for Europe with the importance of the United States for European affairs. The United States have already started to move out of Germany, and therefore the finding is logical and suggests a limited importance of the United States in European affairs. This move by the US assumes that Germany should no longer be closely looked upon and this supports the model in that a lack of threat does not stimulate international cooperation (Germany - US).

A closer relationship was presented from the correlation between Germany as a threat for Greece with the level of importance of the United States for European defence. 51 percent of Greek elites felt that Germany was not a serious threat but felt that the United States was still important for Europe. This finding does not seem to support the model at first, however it seems more likely that Greek elites may feel this way as other threats may require US assistance.
8.3 International Cooperation \( \bowtie \) (Intervening Variables) \( \bowtie \) Option

**US by EUDEF** (Level of importance of the US for European affairs by level of importance of the US for European defence)

Chi square: 55.66066 with 24 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.00074  
C = 0.58947

A statistically significant relationship was presented from the correlation of the level of importance of the United States in European affairs with the level of importance of the United States in European defence. 50 percent of the elites who felt that the US was important in European affairs felt that the US was important for European defence. However, the other half of the elites felt the opposite creating a sense of uncertainty about the role of the US in Europe, thus supporting the literature review (chapter 3).

**US by EUDEF1** (Level of importance of the US for European affairs by European defence dealing with matters of the continent only)

Chi square: 31.42909 with 16 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.01146  
C = 0.49157

Those elites who felt that the United States was important for European affairs did not present a uniform pattern when correlated with the statement that European defence should only deal with matters of the Continent. The elites were divided in their responses suggesting a level of uncertainty for both questions. The finding mirrors the dilemma Europe is facing trying to find a mechanism ideal for Europe in the 1990s. Should the United States continue to be involved European affairs? Should European defence deal with matters of the Continent only?

**US by GMAST** (Level of importance of the US for European affairs by level of importance of the Maastricht treaty for Greece)

Chi square: 12.30941 with 8 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.2197  
C = 0.31221

**US by MAST** (Level of importance of the US for European affairs by level of importance of the Maastricht treaty for Europe)

Chi square: 6.2944 with 8 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.22763  
C = 0.31052
The question of the level of importance of the United States was correlated with the level of importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Greece and for Europe. Both correlations presented a statistically high level of significance suggesting that there is a level of uncertainty about the future role of the United States in Europe despite the Treaty of Maastricht's strong level of importance, both for Greece and for Europe. This finding also supports the literature review's discussion of the problem of continuing US assistance in Europe and the problem of choosing between an “Atlantist” or a “Europeanist” approach for European defence (chapter 3).

**US by ONLY** (Level of importance of the US for European affairs by US as the only remaining superpower)
Chi square: 15.21 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.32003
C = 0.35026

Despite the result of this correlation, suggesting that the United States is the only remaining superpower in the world, elites were again uncertain on the future role of the United States in Europe. This finding reinforces the literature review discussion on the power the US possesses, but it is not certain if it is required for European defence in the 1990s. Europeans feel somewhat ready to form a more European in nature defence mechanism, even if this means little or no support from the US.

**FNRA by EUDEF**
(Stable relations as a component that has contributed to Greece's security since 1974 by the level of importance of the US for European defence)
Chi square: 34.3409 with 16 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.00166
C = 0.55141

**FNRA by ONLY**
(Stable relations as a component that has contributed to Greece's security since 1974 by the US as the only remaining superpower)
Chi square: 14.950 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.35477
C = 0.34926

The statement that Greece has not been overtly threatened by another state since 1974 due to Greece's stable relations with other Western democracies was correlated with the statements that the US is the only remaining superpower and that European defence should only deal with matters of the Continent. In both cases, the statistical relationship was strong suggesting in the case of the US as the only remaining superpower in the world, that stable relations are
necessary for the security of Greece and continuing good relations are required for the state's security. In the case of the statement that European defence should only deal with matters of the continent, a level of uncertainty was presented. Stable relations were seen as important, but they did not seem to suggest an affect on the question of whether European defence should deal with matters of the continent. There is still ambiguity as to what form European defence will take in the next decade.

**NATO by EUDEF**
(NATO as a component that has ensured European stability by the level of importance of the US for European defence)
Chi square: 43.80336 with 24 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.00002
C = 0.62686

**NATO by US**
(NATO as a component that has ensured European stability by the level of importance of the US for European affairs)
Chi square: 33.994 with 16 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.00065
C = 0.53907

The question of whether NATO is a major reason that ensured military stability was correlated with the level of importance of the US in European affairs and in European defence. High levels of statistical significance were presented in both cases with those elites who felt that NATO was a major reason that ensured military stability also felt that the US is still important for Europe's defence, but slightly less important for European affairs (60% and 54% respectively). It seems logical to assume that Greek elites feel that the US is important in the quest towards a new security structure but not for their involvement in other general European issues.

**NATO by EUDEF1**
(NATO as a component that has ensured European stability by whether European defence should only deal with continental matters)
Chi square: 20.429 with 16 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.11219
C = 0.43887

**NATO by ONLY**
(NATO as a component that has ensured European stability by the US as the only remaining superpower)
Chi square: 27.759 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.01787
C = 0.44476
Chapter Eight

Test of the Model - TIP IC X OP

The statement that NATO is a major reason that ensured military stability was correlated with the statements that European defence should only deal with matters of the Continent and that the US is the only remaining superpower in the world. Statistically strong relationships were presented. In both cases, those elites who felt that NATO is a major reason that ensured European stability also felt that the US is the only superpower in the world (70%) and that Europe should only deal with matters of the Continent (57%). NATO's success is assumed in this case, and it could also be assumed that US assistance is still required in NATO and that NATO should deal with matters of the Continent only.

**NATO by MAST** (NATO as a component that has ensured European stability by level of importance of Maastricht for Europe)

Chi square: 9.62821 with 8 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.22834

**NATO by GMAST** (NATO as a component that has ensured European stability by level of importance of Maastricht for Greece)

Chi square: 15.86662 with 8 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.02946
C = 0.30896

The statement that NATO is a major reason that ensured European stability was then correlated with the level of importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Europe and for Greece. In both cases, those elites who felt that the statement was true also felt that the Treaty on European Union was important for Europe and Greece (75%). It can be suggested that Greek elites feel that the goals of the Maastricht Treaty are important towards the stability of Europe as NATO is for the Continent.

**MELOS by EUDEF1**
(Continuing Greek membership in NATO and the EEC by whether European security should only deal with continental matters)

Chi square: 4.1189 with 4 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.46699
C = 0.18662

**MELOS by ONLY** (Continuing Greek membership in NATO and the EEC by US as the only remaining superpower)

Chi square: 3.789 with 3 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.37049
C = 0.17534
The question of whether Greece should remain a member of NATO and the EC was correlated with the question of whether European defence should only deal with matters of the Continent and with whether the US is the only remaining superpower in the world. In the first case, elites felt divided in their opinions, as they were uncertain if Europe should only deal with continental matters, despite their overwhelming agreement that Greece should remain members of both institutions (98%). In the second case, the relationship was stronger as those elites who felt that Greece should remain a member of NATO and the EC also felt that the US is the only remaining superpower. These findings suggest a level of uncertainty about the new roles for NATO and the EC as to whether they should include out-of-area threats in their mechanisms. However, the elites feel quite certain that the US is the only remaining superpower in the world and that the US should probably continue to play a role within NATO and pursue, along with the EC, a good partnership.

**MELOS by MAST** (Continuing Greek membership in NATO and the EEC by the level of importance of Maastricht for Europe)
- Chi square: 4.60455 with 2 degrees of freedom
- Significance: 0.11802
- C = 0.20343

**MELOS by GMAST** (Continuing Greek membership in NATO and the EEC by the level of importance of Maastricht for Greece)
- Chi square: 1.6378 with 2 degrees of freedom
- Significance: 0.45075
- C = 0.12587

The question of whether Greece should remain a member of NATO and the EC was correlated with the level of importance of the Treaty of Maastricht on European Union, for Europe and for Greece. Overwhelmingly, those elites who felt that Greece should remain a member of both institutions also felt that the Treaty was as important for Greece as for Europe. The Maastricht Treaty is seen as a major step towards European unification and Greek elites seem to feel positive about its consequences towards European security.

**MELOS by EUDEF** (Continuing Greek membership in NATO and the EEC by level of importance of the US in European defence)
- Chi square: 6.395 with 6 degrees of freedom
- Significance: 0.16945
- C = 0.29111
Chapter Eight

Test of the Model - TP IC X OP

MELOS by US (Continuing Greek membership in NATO and the EEC by the level of importance of the US in European affairs)
Chi square: 4.10821 with 4 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.29711
C = 0.21834

Those elites who felt that the US is important for European defence also felt that Greece should remain a member of NATO and the EC (70%). However, opinions were divided when membership in NATO and the EC was correlated with the level of importance of the US for European affairs. These findings suggest ambiguity in the new role of the US in Europe but also highlight the importance of the US in European defence matters.

MEM by EUDEF (Continuing Greek membership in NATO by the level of importance of the US in European defence)
Chi square: 8.40976 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.13161
C = 0.39981

MEM by US (Continuing Greek membership in NATO by the level of importance of the US in European affairs)
Chi square: 7.824 with 8 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.06270
C = 0.37250

A higher level of significance was presented when the related question of whether Greece should remain a member of NATO (mentioned alone in this question to reflect the influence of the EC from question 1), with the importance of the US in Europe's defence and in European affairs. Those elites who felt that Greece should continue as a member of NATO also felt that the US is still important in European defence matters (68%) but were divided as to whether the US was important in European affairs. This reinforces the findings from the previous correlations (MELOS by EUDEF, MELOS by US).

MEM by ONLY (Continuing Greek membership in NATO by the US as the only remaining superpower)
Chi square: 3.938 with 6 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.76650
C = 0.18689

MEM by EUDEF (Continuing Greek membership in NATO by whether European security should deal with continental matters only)
Chi square: 4.224 with 8 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.88177
C = 0.19602

A statistically low level of significance was presented to the correlations of whether Greece
should continue as a NATO member with that of whether the US was the only superpower in
the world and whether European defence should only deal with matters of the Continent. The
contingency table presented an uncertainty in both correlations and these point towards
Europe's defence dilemma.

MEM by MAST (Continuing Greek membership in NATO by the level of importance of Maastricht for Europe)
Chi square: 4.7591 with 4 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.34127
C = 0.21508

MEM by GMAST (Continuing Greek membership in NATO by the level of importance of Maastricht for
Greece)
Chi square: 7.53425 with 4 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.03107
C = 0.32026

A statistically high level of significance was exhibited from the correlation of whether Greece
should continue as a member of NATO with the level of importance of the Maastricht Treaty
on European Union for Greece and for Europe. In both cases, those elites who felt that Greece
should remain a member of NATO also felt that the Treaty was important for Greece and for
Europe. This finding suggests that it is important for Europe to continue to remain a member
of NATO. Europeans feel the urgency for closer European cooperation despite NATO's
presence. Europe has changed considerably and it is essential to work as a European
community and as an Atlantic community.

MAST by CONT
(Level of importance of Maastricht for Europe by whether Europe should deal with its defence with European in
caracter arrangements)
Chi square: 10.6649 with 8 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.25908
C = 0.30406

The level of importance of the Treaty of Maastricht for Europe was correlated with the
statement that Europe should break away from the US and NATO and deal with the
Continent's security only through arrangements European in character such as the EC and the
Western European Union. The significance level was rather high, as most elites who felt that the Treaty on European Union was important for Europe felt rather uncertain as to whether Europe should break away, suggesting a dilemma as to which option to choose for European defence. Greek elites seem to recognise the importance of achieving the goals of the Maastricht Treaty, but they do not seem firm about an Atlantisist or a Europeanist option for defence. Maastricht alone may not be seen as a credible alternative for European defence and US assistance is still debated as a good idea. An even higher level of significance was presented from the results of the correlation of the level of importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Greece with the same statement on Europeans dealing with matters of the Continent and breaking away from the US and NATO (Chi square: 14.436 with 8 degrees of freedom, Significance: 0.10923, C = 0.34158). Despite the elites' recognition of the Treaty's significance as important for Greece, the division in their opinions was clear (57% for breaking away, 43% for not breaking away). These findings demonstrate the problem Europe has in finding the new character for European defence, reinforcing the literature review.

**MAST by CRD**  
(Level of importance of Maastricht for Europe by the most credible defence for Europe)  
Chi square: 15.18991 with 12 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.46905  
C = 0.32525

**GMAST by CRD**  
(Level of importance of Maastricht for Greece by the most credible defence for Europe)  
Chi square: 11.993 with 12 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.70202  
C = 0.28883

Greek elites presented a level of uncertainty as to which alternative for European defence was most credible when the alternatives were correlated with the level of importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Greece and for Europe. The statistical significance level was low, suggesting a low level of relationship. From the contingency tables presented, those elites who felt that the Treaty was important for Europe and for Greece seemed uncertain as to which alternative was most credible for European defence. Elites were divided through all alternatives given by the question although NATO (NATO and US) and the EC options carried the majority of elites (the EC in this case was given as the alternative that should deal and form a mechanism for European defence). The alternative from the question support the dependent variable of the model, as they deal with options for European defence. The fact that the
options were suggested reinforce the model, but the uncertainty as to which would be most credible reinforces the argument in the literature review (Chapter 3) due to the lack of clear threat perception. Clear threat perception, elaborating on the model of this study, would stimulate international cooperation and a commonly suggested alternative. The lack of clear threat, especially for Europe, creates this problem. The questionnaire deals with possible threats felt by Greek elites towards their own state and for Europe. Aside from the clarity of the Turkish threat for Greece, the remaining possible threats are important, but not as clear. Therefore, the option becomes more difficult to find.

**MAST by EUDEF** (Level of importance of Maastricht for Europe by the level of importance of the US for European defence)

| Chi square:  | 8.229 with 12 degrees of freedom |
| Significance: | 0.62475 |
| C = | 0.30151 |

**GMAST by EUDEF** (Level of importance of Maastricht for Greece by the level of importance of the US for European defence)

| Chi square:  | 19.448 with 12 degrees of freedom |
| Significance: | 0.10352 |
| C = | 0.39607 |

The level of importance of the Treaty on European Union for Europe and for Greece was correlated with the question of the importance of the US for European defence. A statistically high level of significance was presented for Greece and a low one for Europe. Sixty-five percent of the respondents who felt that the Treaty was important for Greece also felt that the US was important for Europe's defence. In the case of the importance of the Treaty for Europe with the above statement, the results presented an uncertainty as to whether the US was important for European defence, despite the elite's strong belief in the importance of the Maastricht Treaty. It seems that the Greeks feel certain that the US is still required for their interests but they are not as certain for Europe's interests. The new character of Europe's defence is still unclear, again reinforcing the discussion in the literature review (Chapter 3).
Elites also felt uncertain as to whether European defence should only deal with matters of the continent, despite their belief in the importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Greece and for Europe. The statistical relationship was high in the case of the importance of Maastricht for Europe with the question of Europe dealing with matters of the Continent only. Maastricht has been an important step towards closer cooperation between member states, but when looking closely at the nature of European defence in the 1990s, the question remains unanswered. The Gulf War and the crisis in Yugoslavia where Europeans have taken positions, are examples of Europe dealing with out-of-area threats and Europe's position remains unclear.

Significance levels were high when the Treaty's importance for Europe and for Greece was correlated with the statement that the US is the only remaining superpower in the world. Those elites who felt that the Treaty of Maastricht was important for Europe and for Greece also felt that the US is the only remaining superpower in the world. The recognition of this statement suggests that close cooperation with the US is essential but, using the findings from the previous correlations, the way in which the US should be involved in Europe is uncertain.
Following from the previous correlations, those elites who felt that the Treaty of Maastricht was important for Europe and for Greece felt rather uncertain as to whether the US should continue to play a role in European affairs. The previous correlations recognised that the US was the only remaining superpower in the world, however Greek elites feel that this does not mean more US influence and involvement. The nature of European defence is changing and despite the finding that Maastricht is as an essential and important step towards closer cooperation in many ways among European partners, there is still a dilemma in whether the US, as a superpower, should continue to play a role in European affairs.
elites were not clear as to which form of defence would be best to deal with the threat. Greek elites may hold the assumption that what one state may see as a threat may not be so perceived by another. Therefore, Turkey may not be a clear threat for Europe, and as all options are collective in character, choice of options varied. The important note to make, however, is that when a clear threat was presented, even for one state, options were presented and this clearly reinforces the model.

**GMAST by GMIL**  
(Level of importance of Maastricht for Greece by most practical alternative for Greece's defence)  
Chi square: 13.554 with 18 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.14510  
C = 0.32901

**MAST by GMIL**  
(Level of importance of Maastricht for Europe by most practical alternative for Greece's defence)  
Chi square: 7.54471 with 8 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.14821  
C = 0.32815

The importance of the Treaty of Maastricht for Greece and for Europe was also correlated with the question of the most practical way for Greece to ensure its military security, presenting high levels of significance. Responses were uniform, (71% in both cases), those elites who felt that the Treaty of Maastricht was important for Greece and for Europe felt that the combination and collective security arrangements (NATO, CSCE) would best ensure Greece's security among others. This finding contradicts previous correlations, which presented uncertainty for continuing US assistance (NATO implies this), but this may also imply that Greek elites would favour a more “Europeanised” NATO with European leadership.

The model holds from these results as an option was again chosen based on a previous question of threat perception. It is assumed from this correlation that the Maastricht Treaty has not done enough for European defence and cannot stand alone to defend Europe.

**MAST by WTO**  
(Level of importance of Maastricht for Europe by whether NATO should continue)  
Chi square: 6.724 with 8 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.50028  
C = 0.26275

**GMAST by WTO**  
(Level of importance of Maastricht for Greece by whether NATO should continue)
Chi square: 10.5610 with 8 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.24944  
C = 0.30599

The importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Greece and for Europe was also correlated with the question of whether NATO should continue to exist, despite the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the end of the Cold War, presenting a rather high relationship in the case which involved the importance of Maastricht for Greece. Those elites who felt that the Treaty on European Union was important for Greece also felt that NATO should continue to exist despite the dissolution of its rival, the WTO. NATO is still required, especially for Greece, and, along with the strong belief in the importance of Maastricht, European stability can be ensured.

GMAST by GRWEU  (Importance of Maastricht for Greece by the WEU as an option to promote Greece's defence interests)  
Chi square: 3.708 with 6 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.70107  
C = 0.19274

MAST by GRWEU  (Importance of Maastricht for Europe by the WEU as an option to promote Greece's defence interests)  
Chi square: 8.73 with 6 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.2167  
C = 0.27750

A statistically high level of relationship was presented in the results of the correlation of the level of importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Greece and for Europe with the question of whether Greece's interests would be better promoted through the Western European Union. In both cases, the contingency table showed that those elites who felt that the Treaty was important for Greece and for Europe also felt that Greece's interests would be better promoted through the WEU. Although Greece became a full member of the WEU in 1993, the organisation has not yet guaranteed Greece's security from the possible threat of Turkey as the latter holds a position of an associate member in the WEU. The model still holds, however, as options are presented (WEU) which have been stimulated by international cooperation (Maastricht treaty). However, options seem to be varied, especially in the correlations regarding threats to Europe. This supports the literature review as it shows that Europeans are having trouble in determining a security mechanism due to the apparent lack of clear threat perception.
Chapter Eight Test of the Model - TP IC X OP

MAST by EEC (Level of importance of Maastricht for Europe by whether the EEC should provide a defence mechanism)

Chi square: 10.548 with 4 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.01277
C = 0.33733

GMAST by EEC (Level of importance of Maastricht for Greece by whether the EEC should provide a defence mechanism)

Chi square: 9.19807
Significance: 0.11862
C = 0.26285

Those elites who felt that the Maastricht treaty was important for Greece and for Europe also felt that the EC should provide a defence mechanism (73% in both cases) for European security. This complicates but reinforces the defence dilemma of Europe as Greek elites agree to NATO's continuation, probably with European leadership, feel ambiguous as to whether the US should continue to be involved in European affairs but feel that they are still important to European defence, agree that the EC should provide a defence mechanism and also feel that Greece's interests could be better promoted through the Western European Union. Options are presented, stimulated by international cooperation (Maastricht Treaty on European Union), however but there is not an option which receives uniform support in the Greek elites' responses. Europe alone has not done enough to ensure its own security and, with the lack of clear threat perception, options may vary.

MAST by EEUR (Level of importance of Maastricht for Europe by whether NATO should enlarge)

Chi square: 2.532 with 8 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.97489
C = 0.14835

GMAST by EEUR (Level of importance of Maastricht for Greece by whether NATO should enlarge)

Chi square: 8.3490 with 8 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.48064
C = 0.26840

The level of importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Greece and for Europe presented statistically low levels of relationship when correlated with the question of whether NATO should acquire new European members in order to become an alliance for the whole of Europe, suggesting uncertainty for new membership in NATO. The US have not yet allowed
expanded NATO membership despite Eastern European's requests (and the PFP plan), and this is probably due to the uncertainty over the new role to be played by NATO in Europe.

**GMAST by MAST** (Level of importance of Maastricht for Greece by level of importance of Maastricht for Europe)

Chi square: 34.279 with 4 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.00000  
C = 0.50509

As expected, those elites who felt that the Maastricht Treaty was important for Greece also felt that the Treaty was important for Europe. There is a statistical relationship suggesting that Maastricht is an essential step towards closer international cooperation and could help towards the problem of European defence.

**MEM by CONT**

(Continuing Greek membership in NATO by whether European security should be dealt with by European in character arrangements)

Chi square: 8.8013 with 8 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.01872  
C = 0.40783

**MELOS by CONT**

(Continuing Greek membership in NATO and the EEC by whether European security should be dealt with by European in character arrangements)

Chi square: 3.46402 with 4 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.59775  
C = 0.16567

The questions of whether Greece should remain a member of NATO and whether Greece should remain a member of NATO and the EC were correlated with the statement that Europe should break away from NATO and the US and deal with the Continent's security through arrangements which are European in character such as the EC and the WEU. The elites felt positive about remaining members of both institutions but the contingency tables presented uncertainty on the five point scale as to whether Europe should break away from the US and NATO. It is suggested that Europeans feel that the Continent's defence is still in its early stages of dealing with it alone, without outside interference, reinforcing the literature review (Chapter 2 and 3) and supporting the argument of the lack of clear threat perception.

**MEM by CRD** (Continuing Greek membership in NATO by the most credible defence for Europe)
Chapter Eight

Chi square: 5.756 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.78698
C = 0.28246

**MELOS by CRD** (Continuing Greek membership in NATO and the EEC by the most credible defence for Europe)
Chi square: 3.19078 with 6 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.76804
C = 0.18096

As expected, the correlations of the questions of remaining members of NATO and the EC and of NATO alone with the most credible defence for Europe presented uncertainty. The significance levels were low and elites were divided, especially among those who felt that the most credible defence for Europe was NATO, including US forces, and the EC (to form a defence mechanism). International cooperation has stimulated options (even if they are the same ones), but no particular one stands out due to the lack of clear threat perception. The two major options of this dependent variable (CRD) reinforce respectively the “Atlantisist” and the “Europeanist” dilemma as discussed in chapter 3. Greek elites feel that membership in the EC and NATO is essential, but there is uncertainty as to which option stands out.

**MEM by EEC** (Continuing Greek membership in NATO by whether the EEC should provide a defence mechanism)
Chi square: 5.059 with 4 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.07230
C = 0.29217

**MELOS by EEC** (Continuing Greek membership in NATO and the EEC by whether the EEC should provide a defence mechanism)
Chi square: 1.24819 with 2 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.69168
C = 0.08641

Seventy percent of the respondents who felt that Greece should remain a member of NATO and the EC felt that the EC should provide a defence mechanism for Europe. It is assumed, along with the previous findings, that Greek elites recognise the importance of NATO, but feel that it is essential for the European Union to provide a defence mechanism which is European in character. The model is again reinforced, as international cooperation (IC) has stimulated another option (the EC to provide a new defence mechanism).

**MELOS by EEUR** (Continuing Greek membership in NATO and the EEC by whether NATO should enlarge)

245
MEM by EEUR (Continuing Greek membership in NATO by whether NATO should enlarge)
Chi square: 4.7613 with 8 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.75299
C = 0.22914

The question of membership within NATO and the EC and NATO alone was correlated with
the question of whether NATO should acquire new members in order to become a security
structure for the whole of Europe, presenting a statistically high level of relationship. Those
elites who agreed to continuing membership also felt that NATO should acquire new members
suggesting that NATO should “change”, and this can be seen as a new option for European
defence, supporting the model in this study. The variety of options felt credible under various
correlation examinations, suggesting the uncertain nature of European security. If there was a
clear threat, the option may have pointed in one direction. Despite this, the model still holds.

MELOS by FORM (Continuing Greek membership in NATO and the EEC by the best form of defence for
Greece)
Chi square: 4.4390 with 4 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.11477
C = 0.26424

MEM by FORM (Continuing Greek membership in NATO by the best form of defence for Greece)
Chi square: 6.9589 with 8 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.04872
C = 0.37885

The questions of membership in NATO and the EC were then correlated with the best form of
defence for Greece against its first choice of a military threat (Turkey). Options 3 and 4 (the
EC with the WEU and NATO respectively) held the majority of responses; 48% for the EC
and WEU and approximately 35% for NATO in both correlations. As in previous
correlations, the dilemma is evident, despite regarding membership in the EC and NATO as
essential. This finding contradicts the model, as Turkey was seen by a majority of
respondents as the major threat, one would expect a clear option to emerge.

MELOS by GMIL (Continuing Greek membership in NATO and the EEC by most practical alternative for
Greece’s military security)
Chi square: 8.6972 with 4 degrees of freedom

246
MEM by GMIL (Continuing Greek membership in NATO by most practical alternative for Greece's military security)
Chi square: 12.6124 with 8 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.00000
C = 0.60436

The model was reinforced from the correlations of membership in NATO and the EC, and NATO alone, with the question of the most practical way for Greece to ensure its military security. The options did not mention the EC, but the WEU, and the responses were more uniform, choosing the "combination of collective security arrangements (NATO, CSCE)". This finding suggests that NATO and the CSCE are seen as the better options compared to the WEU, and also the more practical. An option is chosen again, stimulated by international cooperation (NATO, EC) and various threat perceptions, as the question stated "under present circumstances" implying the consideration of the issues Greece was facing at the time of the study (Cypriot problem, Macedonian issue, instability in the Balkan region and Turkey).

MEM by GRWEU (Continuing Greek membership in NATO by the WEU as an option for Greece's security)
Chi square: 9.5580 with 6 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.0104
C = 0.44229

MELOS by GRWEU (Continuing Greek membership in NATO and the EEC by the WEU as an option for Greece's security)
Chi square: 5.273 with 3 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.02580
C = 0.29410

Approximately 70% of the respondents who felt that Greece should remain a member of NATO and the EC also felt that Greece interests would be better promoted through the Western European Union, giving another highly agreed upon option (however among no other alternatives). Greek elites suggested that NATO and the EC were the most practical ways of ensuring their military security, over the WEU, but still fancy the idea of the WEU promoting Greece's defence interests when questioned alone. This reinforces the defence dilemma over which option to choose to best deal with the state's, and the Continent's, security problems. International cooperation has stimulated yet another option for defence, reinforcing the model but at the same time creating more problems.
MEM by WTO (Continuing Greek membership in NATO by whether NATO should continue to exist)
Chi square: 9.73606 with 8 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.01566
C = 0.41241

MELOS by WTO (Continuing Greek membership in NATO and the EEC by whether NATO should continue to exist)
Chi square: 3.52578 with 4 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.33569
C = 0.21082

The questions of continuing membership of Greece in NATO and the EC, and in NATO alone, were correlated with the question of whether NATO should continue to exist despite the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the end of the Cold War. In both cases, a statistically high level of significance was presented. 70 percent of the elites who felt that Greece should remain as a member of NATO and the EC, and NATO alone, felt that NATO should continue to exist suggesting its success throughout the years and the difficulty (when analysed with previous correlations) in abandoning such a structure along with US assistance. International cooperation variables have stimulated the option of NATO's continuation, reinforcing the model of the study.

EUDEF by ONLY (Level of importance of the US for European defence by the US as the only remaining superpower)
Chi square: 33.259 with 18 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.00818
C = 0.51565

The question of the importance of the US in European defence was correlated with the question of whether the US was the only remaining superpower in the world, presenting a high level of significance. Those elites who felt that the US was important for European defence, also agreed with the US being the only superpower in the world, suggesting that the US is important as a superpower for Europe's security. It is assumed that Greece and Europe would continue stable relations with the US because of the belief that the US would assist in the event of a crisis. Such US assistance seems to meet with the approval of the Greek elites mainly when it is related to the defence of the Continent. This intervening variable assumes that the character of European defence in the 1990s will include the US.
Chapter Eight

Test of the Model - TP ⊕ IC ⊕ X ⊕ OP

(Level of importance of the US for European defence by whether European security should deal with Continental matters only)
Chi square: 40.410 with 24 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.02221
C = 0.53765

US by CONT
(Level of importance of the US for European affairs by whether European security should deal with Continental matters only)
Chi square: 50.713 with 16 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.00000
C = 0.60748

Significance levels were high when the question of whether the US should break away from the US and NATO and deal with matters of the Continent only was correlated with the level of importance of the US for European defence and for European affairs. In both cases, the data presented uncertainty supporting the dilemma of what would be the new character for European defence; there was no clear indication. Should Europeans keep the Americans involved or excluded and should Europe deal with European affairs only? These questions remain unanswered, despite the statistically high significance of the relationship between them.

EUDEF by CRD (Level of importance of the US for European defence by the most credible alternative for European defence)
Chi square: 51.5038 with 36 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.07578
C = 0.57648

US by CRD (Level of importance of the US for European affairs by the most credible alternative for European defence)
Chi square: 49.93304 with 24 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.01186
C = 0.54921

The dilemma of which option to choose was reinforced through the results of the correlations of which alternative for European defence was the most credible with the level of importance of the US for Europe's defence and in European affairs. The apparent lack of a clear threat perception for Europe - the study has suggested various possible issue areas with different levels of importance for Greece and for Europe - does not assist the model towards the quest for the most credible alternative for European defence. The options with the highest percentages are those of NATO and the EC, two completely different institutions in nature, with 65% in both cases. This reinforces the dilemma of choosing between an “Atlantisist” or
a "Europeanist" option for European defence. The involvement of the US, however, was unclear in the contingency tables analysed, especially in the case of the US importance in European affairs. The responses of the Greek elite's mirror the problem of finding an option to fit the Europe of the 1990s, but they still reinforce the model, in its negative direction however, as the apparent lack of clear threat perception does not (according to the model), assist in the quest towards an option. The first part of the model holds better, as the identification or assumption of possible threats stimulate international cooperation, even if these threats are not as clear as the former Cold War threats. This statement can be considered as a general finding of the study.

**EUDEF by EEC** (Level of importance of the US for European defence by whether the EEC should provide a defence mechanism)
- Chi square: 15.4927 with 12 degrees of freedom
- Significance: 0.28538
- C = 0.35624

**US by EEC** (Level of importance of the US for European affairs by whether the EEC should provide a defence mechanism)
- Chi square: 9.727 with 8 degrees of freedom
- Significance: 0.32316
- C = 0.29341

Those elites who felt that the EC should provide a defence mechanism for Europe also felt that the US was important for European defence while those elites who felt the EC should provide a defence mechanism for Europe felt rather uncertain of the future role of the US in European affairs. The EC is seen as an option for defence by Greek elites, despite their quite strong feelings about continuing US assistance in European defence matters. The indication is that the US is still important for defensive issues in Europe, but it is time for the EC to deal with security. This finding also supports the discussion in the literature review about which option to choose (Chapters 3 and 4) and gives the EC a responsibility for security in Europe from its own part.
Chapter Eight

**EUDEF by EEUR** (Level of importance of the US for European defence by whether NATO should enlarge)
- Chi square: 39.255 with 24 degrees of freedom
- Significance: 0.00000
- C = 0.67940

**US by EEUR** (Level of importance of the US for European affairs by whether NATO should enlarge)
- Chi square: 23.87 with 16 degrees of freedom
- Significance: 0.08636
- C = 0.44830

The question of whether NATO should acquire new members to its mechanism in order to become an alliance that could serve the whole of Europe was correlated with the level of importance of the US in European defence and in European affairs in general. The attitude was that NATO should include more members and that the US was still important for European defence, but not so much so for European affairs. NATO has broadened, including Eastern European members in the alliance, but not as full members. This has occurred through the Partnership for Peace plan (PEP) as discussed in chapter 4. It seems likely that the US will continue to play a role in Europe mostly through NATO, and use NATO as an umbrella that could deter Eastern European states from threatening the West or creating instabilities in their own areas.

**EUDEF by FORM** (Level of importance of the US for European defence by best from of defence for Greece)
- Chi square: 38.04262
- Significance: 0.05060
- C = 0.51829

**US by FORM** (Level of importance of the US for European affairs by best from of defence for Greece)
- Chi square: 23.686 with 16 degrees of freedom
- Significance: 0.06854
- C = 0.44954

As far as which was the best form for Greece's defence against their first choice of military threat, when correlated with the importance of the US for European defence and for European affairs, it appeared that an integration of all European continental forces (EC and WEU with 49%) and NATO (with 34%) occupied the majority. Those elites who felt that these two were the best options for European defence also felt that the US was still important for the defence of the Continent. NATO implies US involvement, but the EC and the WEU do not (the WEU
could possibly be seen as a NATO structure as discussed in chapter 3), creating uncertainty and differences in opinion as to which option to choose.

**EUDEF by GMIL** (Level of importance of the US for European defence by the most practical alternative for Greece's security)
Chi square: 24.104 with 24 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.45143  
C = 0.44304

**US by GMIL** (Level of importance of the US for European affairs by the most practical alternative for Greece's security)
Chi square: 23.65762 with 16 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.19510  
C = 0.41488

The question of which would be the best way for Greece to ensure its military stability was correlated with the level of importance of the US for European defence and for European affairs in general. The results suggest that the combination of collective security arrangements such as NATO and the CSCE as the best way to ensure military security for Greece and that the US is important for European defence issues. NATO seems to occupy the primary position among others, but the Greek elites recognise the importance for Europe to find other ways and mechanisms to secure the continent, as seen in the findings of previous correlations. The US is considered important again for Greece's military security and for Europe's defence but not necessarily in other areas.

**EUDEF by GRWEU** (Level of importance of the US for European defence by the WEU as an option for Greece's security)
Chi square: 24.65802 with 18 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.17089  
C = 0.44005

**US by GRWEU** (Level of importance of the US for European affairs by the WEU as an option for Greece's security)
Chi square: 12.928 with 12 degrees of freedom  
Significance: 0.50115  
C = 0.32187

Most elites who felt that the Western European Union would best promote Greece's interests also felt that the US was important for European defence, supporting the previous finding. Greece's elites recognise that Europe should deal with security through institutions "European"
in character but do not seem to want to abandon other structures such as NATO which has contributed to their security.

**EUDEF by WTO**  
(Level of importance of the US for European defence by NATO should continue to exist)

<table>
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<th>Value</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chi square</td>
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<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>0.00025</td>
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<td>C =</td>
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**US by WTO**  
(Level of importance of the US for European affairs by NATO should continue to exist)

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<td>Chi square</td>
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<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
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<td>C =</td>
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The results from the correlations of whether NATO should continue to exist despite the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact with the level of importance of the US in European affairs and for European defence presented, as expected, statistically high levels of significance. NATO was considered as essential for Europe, despite the dissolution of its counterpart and the US also as important for European defence. NATO is assisted by the US and it can be assumed that the US importance for European defence is reflected from this connection. The mechanisms continuation is necessary to filter US assistance in Europe in that character. Furthermore, elites felt rather uncertain, as reflected from the contingency table, about US involvement in European affairs in general.

**ONLY by CONT**  
(The US as the only remaining superpower by whether European security should only deal with matters of the continent)

<table>
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<tr>
<td>Chi square</td>
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<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
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<td>C =</td>
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**ONLY by EEC**  
(The US as the only remaining superpower by whether the EEC should provide a defence mechanism)

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<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>0.00150</td>
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<td>C =</td>
<td>0.42406</td>
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The correlation between the question of whether the United States was seen as the only remaining superpower in the world was correlated with the questions of whether Europe should break away from NATO and the US and deal with the Continent's security only through arrangements which are European in character, such as the EC and the WEU, and the question
of whether the EEC should form a defence mechanism for European security. All of these correlations presented statistically high levels of significance. 70 percent of those elites who felt that the US was the only remaining superpower in the world also felt that the EC should provide a defence mechanism for Europe. This suggests that Greek elites recognize the power of the US in world affairs, but it does not mean that Europeans should only rely on the US and not embark towards the creation of a defence mechanism for Europe. This feeling is reflected from the results of the correlation ONLY BY CONT. The elites were not uniform in their opinions as to whether Europe should break away from NATO and the US and deal with the Continent's security only through "European" in character mechanisms. This reflects the dilemma of which option to choose and is being considered despite them agreeing with the statement of the US as the only remaining superpower in the world. The US is a superpower and is important and therefore there is a dilemma as to whether Europe should break-away from NATO and the US and let the EC provide a defence mechanism.

**ONLY by EEUR** (The US as the only remaining superpower by whether NATO should include new members)
Chi square: 16.8120 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.28401
C = 0.35970

**ONLY by WTO** (The US as the only remaining superpower by NATO should continue to exist despite the fall of the WTO)
Chi square: 14.834 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.34981
C = 0.3453

The correlations of the question of whether the US is the only remaining superpower in the world with the questions of whether NATO should include new members for its continuation as an alliance for the whole of Europe and how important is it for NATO to perceive new threats for its continuation. These correlations produced statistically high levels of significance. Most elites who felt that threat perception is important for NATO's continuation also felt that the United States is the only remaining superpower in the world. Apparently, Greek elites recognize the importance of NATO for European security along with US assistance (probably, based on previous assumptions, through NATO) and NATO's new responsibilities in expanding and perceiving new threats. These two points reinforce the literature review and the model, as threat perception is an essential requirement towards
determining a credible option. The PFP (Partnership for Peace) plan of NATO has led in that
direction by including new Eastern European members, although without full membership, and
has tried to adjust to become a “crisis management mechanism”, as discussed in the literature
review, for European security and to deal with threats as they evolve. The Yugoslav crisis is
one example, but it remains to be seen if the lack of **clear** threat perception will create
problems.

**ONLY by GRWEU**
(The US as the only remaining superpower by whether Greece's interests could be better promoted through the
WEU)
Chi square: 24.767 with 9 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.00224
C = 0.45621

The question of whether the US is the only remaining superpower in the world was correlated
with the question of whether Greece's interests would be better promoted through the Western
European Union, presenting a statistically high significance level. Those elites who felt that
the US is the only remaining superpower in the world also felt that Greece's interests could be
better promoted through the WEU. Again, as in the previous correlations, Greek elites strive
towards a European solution for their defence interests, while at the same time they recognise
the need, as suggested, for stable relations with the US. This creates more ambiguity as to the
shape of the future European character.

**ONLY by CRD** (The US as the only remaining superpower by the most credible defence for Europe)
Chi square: 21.825 with 18 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.10767
C = 0.45556

**ONLY by FORM**
(The US as the only remaining superpower by the best form of defence against Greece's first option of a military
threat)
Chi square: 19.2195 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.00428
C = 0.47444

**ONLY by GMIL** (The US as the only remaining superpower by the most practical way for Greece to ensure
its military security)
Chi square: 15.7263 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.14482
C = 0.38405
The question of whether the US is the only remaining superpower in the world was correlated with the following different statements: the most credible option for Europe's defence; the best form of a defence against Greece's first option of a military threat; and the most practical way for Greece to ensure its military security. In all cases, statistical significance was high.

As far as the most practical way to ensure Greece's military security, those elites who felt that the US is the only remaining military superpower in the world felt that the combination of collective security arrangements (NATO, CSCE) was the best option (65%). The options did not include the EC, as practicality implies existing structures, and the choice of option was clear. In the other two cases, however, a difference of opinion among the options appeared as NATO and the EC occupied the primary positions. 39 respondents felt that NATO, including the US, is the most credible alternative and that the US is the only remaining superpower in the world. The option of the EC providing a defence mechanism for Europe had the second strongest following (23 respondents) among those who also believed that the US is the only remaining superpower in the world. Furthermore, as for what would be the best from of defence against Greece's perception of a military threat (Turkey occupied a primary position as a threat for Greece), 44 respondents would rely on NATO and 34 on the EC with the Western European Union, among those who also felt that the US is considered the only remaining superpower in the world. These divisions in opinion were expected, and the reason that some options were omitted in specific questions was to better determine the option most relied on.

From these cases, a clear dilemma has arose; between a "Europeanist" or an "Atlantisist" structure. This diversity comes from the apparent lack of clear threat perception. It would be logical to say that during the period of the Cold War, NATO along with US assistance would have been preferred to deter European or, for the purpose of the case study, Greek threats, at it had deterred the Soviets and the expansion of communism. It is likely that Europeans would not tinker with other options at such a time. These findings reflect and represent the changing character of European security. Threat perceptions vary in their levels of importance, and Europeans striving towards the establishment of the new nature of their defence option (not necessarily abandoning existing structure such as NATO) are having trouble providing a uniform answer due to the apparent lack of clear threat perception.
EUDEF1 by CONT
(Whether European security should only deal with matters of the continent by whether Europe should break away from NATO and deal with security with mechanisms European in character)
Chi square: 36.8811 with 16 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.01005
C = 0.49414

A statistically high significance level was presented from the correlation of whether European security should only deal with matters of the Continent with the question of whether Europe should break away from NATO and deal with security only through European in character institutions such as the EC and the WEU. The contingency table presented a division in responses to both questions. The correlation did not point in one direction suggesting a diversity and uncertainty about whether European security should, after breaking away from NATO, only deal with European issues and whether Europe should deal with the Continent's security through “European” in character arrangements. These findings reflect the general discussion in the literature review of the dilemma facing European security in what would be its new face.

EUDEF1 by WTO
(Whether European security should only deal with matters of the continent by whether NATO should continue to exist)
Chi square: 19.72913 with 16 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.33495
C = 0.39050

EUDEF1 by EEUR
(Whether European security should only deal with matters of the continent by whether NATO should include new Eastern European members)
Chi square: 24.95124 with 16 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.05115
C = 0.46122

The question of whether European security should only deal with matters of the Continent was correlated with the question of whether NATO should continue to exist, despite the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and whether NATO should include Eastern European members in order to become an alliance for the whole of the Continent. Statistically high levels of significance were presented, especially for the latter. The majority of elites who felt that European security should only deal with matters of the Continent also felt that NATO should continue to exist despite the above changes in Europe. However, elites were rather uncertain as to whether NATO should include new East European members.
These findings suggest that an ambiguity exists as to the character of European security in the 1990s. Elites would like to see NATO expanding and continuing to exist, but it is unclear whether European security (even through NATO) should only deal with matters of the Continent. It could be assumed, based on the Cold War era character, that if there existed a clear threat, responses would have been more uniform as to the question of whether European security should deal with matters of the Continent only.

**EUDEF1 by CRD**
(Whether European security should only deal with matters of the continent by the most credible defence for Europe)
Chi square: 42.777 with 24 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.01843
C = 0.44109

**EUDEF1 by FORM**
(Whether European security should only deal with matters of the continent by the best form of defence for Greece's perception of a military threat)
Chi square: 24.0856 with 18 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.08615
C = 0.44109

**EUDEF1 by GMIL**
(Whether European security should only deal with matters of the continent by the most practical way for Greece to ensure military security)
Chi square: 20.86596 with 16 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.30298
C = 0.39389

The question of whether Europe should only deal with matters of the Continent was correlated with the questions of the most practical way for Greece to ensure its military security, the most credible alternative for European defence, and the best form of defence for Greece against the elites' perception of a military threat. All three options presented statistically high significance levels and a diversity in the alternative of the dependent variable (the option). As in previous correlations, those elites who felt that Europe should only deal with matters of the Continent also felt that NATO and the CSCE would be the most practical way to ensure Greece's security. This suggests that elites expect NATO to deal with European issues only, or at least for it to be dominated by them. Furthermore, Greek elites feel that NATO, when dealing with European issues, would be able to secure Greece's military security.
The results from the contingency table of the other two correlation (EUDEF1 by FORM, EUDEF1 by CRD) reflected a division in opinions of the elites questioned. Those elites who felt uncertain as to whether European security should only deal with matters of the Continent were also uncertain in their choice between the two major alternatives (NATO and the US, and EC with the WEU) for the most credible defence for Europe and the best for defence against Greece's perception of a military threat; in other words, between "Atlantisists" and "Europeanists". International cooperation is sought through these institutions, but should they deal only with European matters? It must be noted that the NATO option in both instances occupies the majority of responses, although the EC and the WEU hold a significant percentage (49% and 35% respectively for FORM, and 42% and 24% respectively for CRD).

These findings reflect the defence problem for Europe in the 1990s and reinforce the relevant discussion in the literature review. The model still holds as intervening variables that influence international cooperation, along with the apparent lack of clear threat perception, create problem in choosing a uniform and consistent option. Questions such as the inclusion of new members for NATO, if the EC should provide a defence mechanism and whether European security should deal with matters of the Continent only, negatively stimulate the dependent variable, as these and other relevant questions reflect the dilemma and questions for European defence in the 1990s. Consequently, uniform responses are limited. It would be logical to assume that if these questions could be uniformly answered, the option would have been clearer. For example, there was no issue as to whether NATO should expand to the East or whether it should continue to exist as during the Cold War era due to the East - West confrontation. Therefore, NATO would most probably occupy the primary position in responses.

**EUDEF1 by EEC**

(Whether European security should only deal with matters of the continent by whether the EEC should provide a defence mechanism)

| Chi square: | 13.7126 with 8 degrees of freedom |
| Significance: | 0.30350 |
| C = | 0.29561 |
EUDEF1 by GRWEU
(Whether European security should only deal with matters of the continent by whether Greece's interests would be better promoted through the WEU)
Chi square: 26.81686 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.00138
C = 0.49425

The question of whether European security should deal with matters of the Continent only was correlated with the questions of whether the EC should provide a defence mechanism for Europe and whether Greece's interests would be better promoted through the Western European Union, presenting rather high levels of significance. Despite the results reflecting a positive feeling towards the EC providing a defence mechanism for Europe, and the WEU as an institution where Greece's interest could better be promoted, the question of whether European security should deal with matters of the Continent only demonstrated divisions in opinion. The Gulf War, the Yugoslav crisis and the instability in the Balkan region seem to have left Europeans with a question of whether to deal with out-of-area threat or out-of-Continent threats. Greek elites applaud the efforts of the WEU and would like to see the EC providing for defence with possibly a separate institution. However, the great interdependence of the world in the 20th century implies that issues, even out of the Continent, have an influence on Europe, as the Gulf War did in 1990. The EC had to eventually deal with it through European political cooperation. The manner, and with what option to deal with such issues is, however, problematic.

TUR by CONT
(Whether NATO had been the major reason for containing fears of a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey as both are NATO members by whether Europe should break away from the US and NATO and deal with European security through "European" in character mechanisms such as the EEC and the WEU)
Chi square: 35.3475 with 16 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.00421
C = 0.51990

TUR by WTO
(Whether NATO had been the major reason for containing fears of a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey as both are NATO members by whether NATO should continue to exist despite the dissolution of the WTO and the end of the Cold War)
Chi square: 43.70301 with 16 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.00005
C = 0.58106

TUR by EEUR
Chapter Eight

Test of the Model - TP IC X OP

(Whether NATO had been the major reason for containing fears of a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey as both are NATO members by whether NATO should include Eastern European members to become an alliance for the whole of Europe)

Chi square: 24.06282 with 16 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.06265
C = 0.46533

As expected, those elites who felt that NATO is a major reason for containing fears of a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey as both are NATO members also felt that NATO should continue to exist despite the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and that NATO should include Eastern European states in order to become an alliance for the whole of Europe. These findings reflect NATO's success throughout the institution's existence and the need for it to continue as an enlarged security organisation for Europe and specifically for Greece (to contain fears of a Turkish threat).

However, when the question of whether NATO is a major reason for containing fears of a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey, as both are NATO members, was correlated with the question of whether Europe should break away from NATO and the US and deal with the Continent's security only through institutions “European” in character such as the EC and the WEU, divisions in opinion were presented. Most elites believed in NATO's success in Greaco-Turkish relations but were uncertain, as would be expected, as to whether Europe should break away from NATO and the US. It is assumed that Greek elites would like to see Europeans taking more responsibility as far as defence is concerned either through NATO or the WEU. They felt uneasy, however, about the thought of abandoning US assistance through NATO. Again, options are presented, reinforcing the model of the study.

TUR by EEC
(Whether NATO had been the major reason for containing fears of a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey as both are NATO members by whether the EEC should provide a defence mechanism)

Chi square: 10.006 with 8 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.23056
C = 0.31572

TUR by GRWEU
(Whether NATO had been the major reason for containing fears of a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey as both are NATO members by whether Greece's interests would be better promoted through the WEU)

Chi square: 21.3407 with 12 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.09945
C = 0.40616
Both of the above correlations presented statistically high significance levels. Those elites who agreed with the statement that NATO is a major reason for containing a possible Greco-Turkish conflict as both states are members, were uncertain as to whether the EC should provide a defence mechanism for Europe (37%), but felt that Greece's interests would be better promoted through the WEU (64%). This finding is explained by the assumption that NATO has done a successful job in containing a possible Greco-Turkish conflict and therefore the WEU could do the same due to Greece being a full member and Turkey having associate membership status. Based on this, there is no reason for the EC to provide another forum, especially for the idea of containing the Turkish threat (in the opinion of the Greek elites as related to the Turkish issue).

**TUR by CRD**
(Whether NATO had been the major reason for containing fears of a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey as both are NATO members by the most credible defence for Europe)

Chi square: 36.16535 with 24 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.10660
C = 0.50907

**TUR by FORM**
(Whether NATO had been the major reason for containing fears of a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey as both are NATO members by the best form of defence against Greece's perception of a military threat)

Chi square: 42.02561 with 16 degrees of freedom
Significance: C = 0.00015
C = 0.56563

**TUR by GMIL**
(Whether NATO had been the major reason for containing fears of a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey as both are NATO members by the most practical way for Greece to ensure its military security)

Chi square: 26.246651 with 16 degrees of freedom
Significance: 0.01573
C = 0.49277

The question of whether NATO is a major reason for containing fears of a possible Greco-Turkish conflict as both are NATO members was correlated with the questions of the most practical way for Greece to ensure its security; the most credible alternative for European defence and the best form of defence against the elites' response to the most probable military threat for Greece at the present time (question 3). Significance levels were high, reflecting a level of uncertainty as to a clear alternative in all three correlations, based on the contingency table data. Although a relatively high percentage of elites felt that NATO is a major reason that contained fears of a possible Greco-Turkish conflict, the options did not point in one
specific direction. NATO and the EC occupied the primary position, reinforcing the defence problem of choosing between European or Atlantic. The interesting note to make is that Turkey, as the most clear threat for Greece's security, did not present NATO as a deterrent, at least not uniformly.

In the related question of the best form of defence against this threat, 40 responses were for NATO and 30 for the EC, of those elites who felt NATO had been, and still is, a deterrent between Greece and Turkey.
Summary

This thesis has aimed to contribute to the issue of European security by examining the importance and necessity of threat perception towards the management of security in the post Cold War era.

The Problem

The problem which stimulated this study was derived from the geo-political developments which have been taking place since 1989 in Europe. The events of 1989 marked the end of the Cold War, the fall of the Iron Curtain and the beginning of a "new era" in relations among European states. From the review of the literature, it was observed that the perceptions of threat which were determining factors for the creation of collective security arrangements between 1945 and 1989 might no longer apply for Europe in the 1990s, or at least that perceptions of threat might be assuming a different role in stimulating a defence posture.

European states, during the Cold War, formed alliances in order to face one or several of the following threats:

- The Soviet Union;
- Communism;
- Germany.

Many ideas were advanced and explored to collectively secure states, starting with the formation of the Western European Union, NATO, the ECSC, the EDC attempt, the Warsaw Pact, and the CSCE. All of these had something in common: they all had certain perceptions of threat. Some have failed to contribute to security, while others, such as NATO, are thought to have played an important role in European defence. However successful these organisations might have been, they all displayed perceptions of certain threats which led them towards international cooperation (TP > IC).

The situation after 1989 has been one of great uncertainty due to the perceived disappearance - or changing nature - of the above threats for Europe. The changing character of Europe, either related to the formation of the new democracies of the former Eastern bloc and the gradual disintegration of the former Soviet Union, have created an area where there is no longer a clear threat for Europe. Issues and crises will undoubtedly continue to exist, but these are unlikely to be the same as those issues which dominated the period from 1945 to 1989. Structures which were formed to deter Germany, the Soviet Union, and the expansion of Communism are called upon to provide defence for many states against which they were originally formed to deter. Arguably, some of the structures mentioned above may be characterised as being out-of-date in the spirit and letter of their original constitutions.
Therefore, keeping in mind the essential need of states to collectively secure their existence, as discussed in chapter 1 of this thesis, has the absence of clear threats affected the existing security structures? How important is it for states or structures to perceive threats?

Western Europe is preoccupied with integration, high levels of material well being and political stability, whereas the states of the former Eastern bloc are characterised by political turbulence, the destruction of civil society by Communism, economic stagnation, an outmoded industrial structure and a revival of ethnic and nationalist tensions. The new European architecture is being built on three pillars or forms of integration and cooperation: economics, politics and security. Complex agendas of inter-state relations are being addressed in a number of different forums: the EC, NATO, CSCE, and WEU, a few which have concerned this study. The problems of political reconstruction in Eastern/Central Europe are no less formidable than those of economic reconstruction. The experiences of totalitarian rule, the weakness of democratic traditions and the disappearance of most aspects of civil society under Communism have left these states ill-equipped to make the transition to stable democracies. This concern has created dilemmas about how these states will eventually transform and how their transition may or not affect the security of the Continent. The end of the Cold War does not mean an end to security threats (Laffan, Integration and Cooperation in Europe, 1992). Are these developments in Europe important enough for states or structures to take into consideration? Are these developments the areas of threat perception in the 1990s?

The Evidence

The European Continent still has a heavy concentration of troops, tanks and weapons. The former Soviet Union republics, Russian power and the Gulf War issue highlight some of the concerns that may affect the Continent. The existing institutions discussed in the review of the literature as options for European security are attempting to grapple with the profound changes affecting security and defence. This implies that these institutions, as discussed in the literature review, have identified new areas of concern, different from those during the Cold War era, and are attempting to adjust. The security options examined in chapter 4 carry important reasons for continuation of their "services", by providing security for their member states either militarily or through "negotiating" security issues through their platforms:

- The CSCE is the only platform which is concerned with security issues that incorporates the "whole" of Europe, even the former Soviet Union Republics with the United States and Canada.

- Based on history, NATO carries with it the American commitment towards Europe's security, an essential requirement for Europe's transitional period. As discussed through the literature, Western European analysts see a US presence as a prudent and necessary counterweight to future Russian power.
Chapter Nine General Conclusions

- The WEU and the EC have a "European" character and are forums in which Europe can take over its own security issues if the US decides to reduce its commitment. The WEU can be seen as the bridge between NATO and the EC while the EC could eventually tackle issues such as arms control and disarmament as a part of developing a common foreign policy. The Maastricht Treaty refers to the WEU as the implementing arm of the EU concerning defence and security. However, the future shape of a European security policy will depend - partly - on what happens to NATO and on developments in the wider Continent, especially in the former Eastern bloc and how involved the United States would wish to be in Europe. One of the problems that these structures are encountering is that they have an unclear threat perception, or at least their perception of threat does not appear to be as clear as it was during the Cold War era.

After the dissolution of the WTO in 1994, NATO created the Partnership For Peace plan (PfP) and called on Eastern European states to cooperate defensively, offering them possible full membership (in NATO) in the future. Furthermore, NATO's character is now one of a crisis management mechanism, with the task of assisting in arising situations that may affect the security of its members. The CSCE has become a debative platform which includes more than four dozen states, all with equal vote. Therefore, despite the absence of clear perceptions of threat, structures have continued to cooperate internationally and efforts have continued to exist in order to provide for Europe's defence. This assumption was made in hypothesis three (3), which dealt with the probability of a threat, even if seen as less specific, as most likely to stimulate rather than hinder, international cooperation.

Lack of clear perception of threat has created doubts on the ability of these organisations to justify their continued existence. The EC and NATO have been concerned about the Yugoslav issue almost since it began (1991 - 1992). Therefore, it is essential to question whether the Yugoslav crisis provided a way for NATO (for example), to focus on a crisis and thus justify its continued existence and military build-up. The reason for this assumption is based on the fact that the former Yugoslavia was not a NATO member, and therefore NATO's involvement was not a matter that was based on the treaty's articles. Arguably, if the Yugoslav crisis had not materialised, the situation of justifying the purposes and existence for these institutions might have been even more difficult (NATO, CSCE, EC, WEU), and especially for NATO, to survive intact.

For analysing Europe's new face and challenges, it was essential to investigate the options for European defence, their strengths and weakness, and to make an attempt to explain whether the absence of a clear threat is creating difficulties for their management. It was therefore essential to ask:

- Whether the US was still required for Europe's defence;
- The level of importance of threat perception for Europe of the 1990s;
- Which alternative would best provide for Europe's defensive concerns;
- Which areas of concern would be most likely to materialise;
- What type of requirements are essential for NATO's continued success;
- Whether external threats should be included on the European defence agenda;
- Whether the EC should provide a defence mechanism;
- Whether the absence of a clear and specific threat was causing any problem to the existing security institutions.

The literature review endeavoured to demonstrate the importance threat perception had for the management of the Cold War era, and it served as the basis for building the model (presented in figure 3 of chapter 7 and figure 5 of this chapter), which was proposed with a view to providing an insight to the above questions if examined empirically. The model was derived from the literature review examination which pointed out two important findings: a) the importance of threat perception for security mechanisms through history and b) the absence of clear threat perception in the 1990s, expressed by defence analysts, which may create problems for security structures to successfully deal with these. The model hypothesises that threat perception is an essential requirement for the management of the post Cold War era. The model suggests the continued importance of threat perception as a stimulus which may lead to international cooperation and systematically towards an effective option for security (either from the existing structures or from a new one).

"Effective cooperation is easiest in the face of a clear common threat. Remember that NATO was not formed until 1949, when it had become apparent that the Soviet Union presented a serious threat to the West... Now, holding the alliance together is difficult precisely because the Soviet threat has disappeared" (The Economist, June 10, 1995, p. 15).

Empirical Work

The state chosen to examine the above hypothesis was Greece due to convenience and personal interest. The sample of Greek elites was believed to be an effective way of examination into such a hypothesis for the reasons presented in chapters 5 & 7. It is noted that the sample was sought to elicit information on the wider topics of European defence and threat perception and must be seen in this manner (see figure 4).
A questionnaire was developed in order to gather information which would help test the model. The method of "direct gathering" (collecting evidence at first hand through questions) was determined as a convenient and effective way for examining such propositions. Statistical testing was undertaken with the intention of:

a) establishing the extent to which there were relationships among identified variables, explaining the data in descriptive terms, and

b) examining the possibility of differences in opinion stated among the various types of respondents, as discussed in chapter 7 of this thesis.

The statistical tests used were decided after discussion with individuals with a research and statistical background. The statistical programme used was the SPSS for Windows. Additional interviews with a number of London based international elites from 6 different European states were undertaken. The reason for these interviews was to further discuss the credibility of the model and the findings from the field study. The respondents from this 'second research enquiry' were relevant to the study based on their interest and knowledge on the subject matter. Most interviewees were defence attachés in their respective embassies in London while the rest were relevant in an academic manner (Director of Atlantic Council - Director of International Institute for Strategic Studies - IISS). Excerpts from these interviews are presented in this chapter while more extensive notes are presented in Appendix A. It was believed that the interviews could provide important personal viewpoints on security concerns and specific threats from various European states (Greece, Turkey, Russia, United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Cyprus), as the case study was concerned with one European state (Greece). In addition, it was essential to notice whether any threats were perceived as "common" (to Europe and to Greece).

(It must be noted, as earlier in chapter 5, that Greece does is not used in this study to represent the whole of Europe. As argued in chapter 5, there is no "typical" state that could possibly represent the whole Continent. Each state enjoys its own culture, identity, values and interests and therefore the findings of this thesis represent the Greek sample chosen and must be seen in this manner.)

The field study has provided a considerable amount of information related to the model. The methodology has allowed for a quantitatively based approach which could uncover rankings of importance, seriousness of threats, the importance of threat perception and structure preferences. In sum, the results of the research do provide some support for the model, despite the change in the strategic context of Europe. Specifically, in the case of the perception of threats, those which were perceived as important appeared to have a statistically positive relationship with international cooperation and options for defence. For example, as Turkey was seen as the most important threat for Greece's security, the relationship with the best form of defence against this threat was high, and the first option chosen was clear (NATO at 70%).

There is support for the six proposed hypotheses presented in Chapter 7 which served as stepping stones towards the evolution of the model. Before the discussion of each of the result areas is considered it is germane to review how these hypotheses held: Hypothesis 1
stated that external threats provide a stimulus for a state to engage in international cooperation. From the results of the analysis of the questionnaire data, in the majority of situations that dealt with external threats or any possible concern, international cooperation was sought (7 out of 8 questions). Areas of concern such as Turkey (for Greece especially), Macedonia, or the Yugoslav crisis clearly stimulated international cooperation. In these cases where a threat appeared improbable or was seen not as important, international cooperation was again sought for, thus supporting hypothesis 3, which dealt with the probability of a threat, even if seen as less specific, as most likely to stimulate rather than hinder international cooperation. German reunification is a relevant example as Germany remains of concern although not one thought likely to materialise in the foreseeable future. US involvement in European defence and "stable relations" as a method of securing a state as well as structures such as the EC or NATO were presented when the related correlation was undertaken. The above findings were supported by the interviews undertaken as well. Apart from Lieutenant Commander Theophanides from the Greek embassy, who felt that Germany should be a major concern for Europe because of the state's economic power, geographical position and history, the other interviewees felt that Germany was not a preoccupation for their states. In addition, "stable relations" were also seen as essential for securing states and especially Captain Yordanov of the Bulgarian embassy who felt that closer relations between states, could provide the "necessary balance required to avert threats". Taking his argument further, Captain Yordanov felt that stable relations of states could be achieved through collective security institutions such as NATO, as "the possibility of Bulgaria becoming a member of NATO could make his state the balance between Greece and Turkey".

Hypothesis 4 proposed that the improbability of a threat arising, or a threat which is not seen as serious, is not likely to lead to new responsive action. In all the relevant questions in the questionnaire, new options were not presented by the respondents when threats were not seen as serious (for example Germany, Albania and the Neo-Nazi movement).

Hypothesis 5 proposed that the absence of threat perception makes the selection of a defence option uncertain, as options for international cooperation may vary. From the field study, apart from the case of Turkey as a clear threat for Greece, Greek elites felt rather uncertain about clear threats for Europe. Levels of importance differed to concerns that were linked to Greece and to Europe. The Yugoslav crisis, the break-up of the former Soviet Union, and Russia specifically, seemed important but did not yield statistically significant results. The above uncertainty in perceptions of threat was identified by all the interviewees presented in Appendix A. Chakallis, First Secretary of the Cyprus High Commission, Duncan of the IISS and Daukes of the UK Ministry of Defence all related this uncertainty to the continuing instability on the Continent. Chakallis argued that "the situation in Europe was still vague" while Daukes and Duncan supported the differences in perceptions of threat concerning Europe and Greece when presented with this empirical finding: "A threat is a subjective judgement different for each statesman and state" (Daukes), "Issues of concern such as Macedonia or Turkey logically concern Greece to a greater extent due to geography and history" (Duncan). As some threats or concerns were perceived as more important for Greece than for Europe (from the case study), a variety of responses were offered for the dependent variable (option):
NATO was seen as a successful security organisation which secured Europe; the EC was seen as an institution that should provide a defence mechanism for Europe; and the Western European Union as an institution which could promote Greece's interests, but only when considered alone as an option. When among others as an option, NATO and the EC were preferred to the WEU. Based on hypothesis 2 which proposed that the type of threat involved is an important determinant of the type of response (option), it is suggested that the lack of a clear threat, despite leading to international co-operation (based on the above hypothesis), impedes the quest towards a clear defence option. Developing this argument further, the more numerous the threats, the more difficult it would be to choose an option as attention would have to be focused on various areas and readiness to deal with possible crises would have to be certain. This finding was reinforced and identified by the London based elites interviewed and presented in Appendix A. Specifically, the Greek military and naval attaché, Theophanidis and First Secretary to the Cyprus High Commission, Chakallis stated that the continuing instability in Europe due to the transformation of the former Eastern bloc has created uncertainties and a number of new issues that needed to be addressed. It was believed that only when this instability was removed would Europe be able to more easily focus on an option for security. However, in most instances, NATO was seen (by all the interviewees apart from the Turkish official), as the only structure which would continue to dominate the European scene despite the accepted absence of clear perceptions of threat which did affect the choice of a defence option: "NATO only has the military capability and will continue to dominate in the future" (Daukes); "NATO is a good option as time is essential and required, until problem areas are settled" (Ivanovich); "NATO will be able to cope with the instabilities in Europe and serve as a crisis management mechanism" (Williams).

Focusing on the general findings of the study, the following observations could be noted in relation to perceptions of threat and security options:

- Greek elites felt that continuing membership in NATO, the EC and the Western European Union is essential for the state's security;

- Stable relations with other Western democracies have proved effective for Greece's security and international co-operation can provide the basis towards collective security. Threat perception or the common identification of threats by Europe can indeed stimulate collective concern and lead towards an option for defence;

- The levels of importance attributed to the specific threats listed in the questionnaire (Albania, Macedonia, Germany, former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia), varied in their perception as threats for "Greece" and as threats for "Europe", demonstrating a level of uncertainty as to which was the more essential. This finding reinforces the argument developed in chapter 4 as well as that developed by the London interviewees, concerning the difficulty in abandoning national interests. In most cases, however, international cooperation was stimulated by the listed threats, thus supporting the model; Captain Yordanov stated that "many issues have nothing to do with Europe" and that each state has its own approach and level of seriousness for a specific threat, affected by history.
Chapter Nine

General Conclusions

- The dependent variable, or a defence option for Europe's security, was presented in all instances in the responses from the questionnaire, and apart from the necessity of NATO, the EC was seen by Greek elites as an institution that should provide a defence mechanism for Europe. This finding was not held by the elites interviewed in London as they did not see the EC as an important option for Europe's defence. Brigadier Daukes (MOD), cited common foreign policy as the major obstacle of the EC, whereas Theophanidis (Greece) and Williams (Atlantic Council), were sceptical about the EC providing for Europe's defence. Captain Yordanov (Bulgaria), felt that there was no reason for the EC to provide for Europe's security when other structures such as NATO still existed. This is probably due to Greece's concerns about Turkey, as the EC and the WEU do not include Turkey (at the time of writing Turkey is an associate member of the WEU only).

- The United States was seen as important for Europe's defence but not necessarily important for European affairs in general. (The fading presence of the United States was felt in Greece through the closing of a number of US bases). Williams (Atlantic Council) argued that "the US was the cement in the NATO partnership. If the US commitment in Europe through NATO fades, there would be a problem with dealing with out-of-area threats. European defence would require more investment by Europeans and this is unlikely".

- NATO has played a key role in the containment of Greco-Turkish relations as both states are members and this has deterred them from making overt threats towards each other. Although this finding was heavily supported by the Turkish official, Yordanov (Bulgaria) and Daukes (MOD), Theophanidis (Greece) stated an interesting question of disagreement: "Wouldn't it have been better for Greece if Turkey was not a member of NATO?"

- There is uncertainty in the findings as to whether European defence should deal with only matters of the Continent and uncertainty as to whether issues of concern should be dealt through arrangements European in character, such as the EC or the WEU. This is probably due to the changing situation in Europe of the 1990s. Greek elites felt more clear in their defence structure preferences than their views on perception of threat from outside the Continent, and this point is not in keeping with the sequence of the model; The Turkish military official suggested that the UN would be the most efficient platform to deal with such areas of concern.

- NATO requires transformation and adjustment in various areas, the major ones being the identification of new threat(s), membership (enlargement) and leadership. Enlargement was also pointed out by Ivanovich (Russia) and Yordanov (Bulgaria) as essential for NATO and these responses are logical if seen in conjunction with Russia's and Bulgaria's "application" to NATO through the PfP.

- The Maastricht Treaty is seen as an important step for Europe's security and unification, and one that could promote Greece's interests, probably due to the fact that the EU does not, at the time of writing, include Turkey.

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Finally, there is a difference of opinion as to the most practical way to ensure Greece's security and the best form of defence against Greece's most important military threat (as presented in the related question). NATO was seen as the best form whereas the EC along with NATO occupied primary responses as being the most practical way. NATO and the EC were seen as the most credible options for Europe's security. This could be attributed to the fact that NATO provides a defensive arm and could also manage Greece's concerns through its forum as it includes Greece's first choice of military threat: Turkey. The inclusion of the EC with NATO in the questions which were concerned with "practical" and "credible" defence is explained by the "conditioned" style of the question avoiding specific threats in the options offered. The assumption is that Greeks feel more secure defensively through NATO because of its military ability and US involvement.

The findings above provide support for the model presented in figure 5 and are in keeping with the literature. The absence of clear threat perception created by the break-up of the Cold War security order has generated a sense of uncertainty about the dependent variable (option for European security). The fact, however, that alternative options were given by the respondents, reinforces the model's assumption and sequence in most cases. The EC, Maastricht, NATO, the WEU and the CSCE, despite their characterisation as defence options, are also interdependent in nature, as identified in the literature review. The variety of states involved in the above platforms brings a whole array of concerns that may or may not be of equal importance to all. As discussed in the general findings, the Macedonian issue, for example, was seen as more important for Greece than for Europe, while German unification was a more important threat for Europe than for Greece.

The status quo of the Cold War era as E. L. Morse (1976), stated, had become a comfortable retreat...

... in which governments knew how well off they were rather than think of the risks they would confront in an unknown future.

Modernisation and the Transformation of International Relations, p. 18

As shown in chapters 3 and 4 (and largely supported in the subsequent analysis), the European defence dilemma is a consequence of the absence of a clear threat. "The post Cold War era is left to be managed by Cold War era mechanisms" (Pugh, 1992). The rapidly changing European environment seems to require additional time to adequately create a credible and overwhelming option as there is the need for adjustments. Should NATO deal with out-of-area threats? Should it include new members? Will the EC provide a defence mechanism? Can NATO continue being credible despite the absence of a clear threat such as the former Soviet Union? How much should the US be involved in European affairs? What should be the level of contribution of each state? These questions are just a few of the issues Europeans are confronting as discussed in this study. The research findings have served as a reinforcement of the existing European defence dilemma and provided an insight into the importance and necessity of threat perception for the (successful) management of a European defence alternative. This was the case during the
Cold War even though the research findings did not manage to answer the above questions clearly due to the inevitable limitations of statistical analysis discussed further on.

Discussion of the Model / Limitations

Figure 5 highlights the model sequence. The main proposition expressed in the model is that threat perception provides an impetus towards international cooperation and towards the formation of a security option (or continuation of an adjusted security option). Yet, this assumption should not be over-emphasised, as it is by no means uniform. As Kuhn (1964), has argued, "there is no such thing as research without counter - instances" (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 79). It is useful to identify some instances in which the model might not be as helpful.

Identification of a common threat may not be the only way to stimulate International Cooperation. Most West European states and even Austria, Switzerland or Sweden, which have been considered by themselves and by a number of analysts as "neutral" states, have cooperated with their European neighbours through institutions such as EFTA or the EU which are "economic" in their nature. However, there is a tendency, as suggested in the literature review and supported by the field study, for states to also cooperate collectively when identifying a common threat (for example, Communism, the Soviet Union, Germany, or the Yugoslav crisis) which makes threat perception a stimuli for International cooperation.

Figure 5 - Model of study

A good part of this thesis was taken up with the effort to develop and test a model of threat perception. With it, it was sought to account for variations and attitudes towards perceptions of threat and security preferences. Aside from the qualified success of the first part of the model, namely that threat perception can influence states towards international cooperation, the model was limited in helping with the prediction of new challenges. This difficulty is probably the result of the political changes on the European Continent and the uncertainty of its needs.
Issues that may affect European security remain unclear and this was supported by the field study, where no new or "other" challenges were put forward. This may have been due to the questionnaire not naming challenges apart from those which have been of concern to Greece.

Another possible influence on the findings and the suitability of the model is related to the specific period of time of the study. The events of 1989 which have transformed Europe have not filtered down politically on a uniform basis. It was believed that it is useful to concentrate on "classic" threats for the state instead of "revolutionary" issues as it also believed that this should be the starting point for such an investigation. "Classic threats" in this case implies threats that concerned the Cold War era, while "revolutionary" threats are defined as a radical movement towards other areas of concern, basically non-military. It was essential to determine whether the importance of threat perception has decreased and whether the existing security organisations are still desired in order to determine the direction of change (if security preferences are different) before embarking on the examination of possibilities that may seem unrealistic (i.e. new defence option).

In general terms, the sequential nature of the model appeared to be supported by the evidence examined, but it is important to enquire to what extent the model would be applicable to other settings, specifically in a few years time or in a decade's time? Politics and issues of concern change and acquire different levels of importance from day to day and therefore if the same model was investigated in the future, the findings produced might prove to be quite different and the model not as helpful or even more helpful. This appears to be a common problem with such studies, as international relations change in a rapid manner. As Duvall (1976) has pointed out, "whether quantitative studies try to suggest new hypotheses or whether they attempt to supply convincing evidence, they will make a greater contribution if they keep in mind the results of traditional research and case studies rather than turn inward" (The costs of Quantitative Study, essay, Contending Approaches to International Politics, Knorr and Rosenau, eds., 1962, p.217).

The use of the field study data, collected to supplement the analysis of the importance of threat perception towards the effectiveness of an option for European defence, was critical to this study. Obtaining adequate response rates from elites required some effort but this is necessary as such a field study is one of the few practical ways available to collect primary data. Although attempt was made to avoid bias in this study, it is certainly possible. The use of data through the Statistical Program for Social Sciences (SPSS), can also create constructive argument, as the use of aggregate data may cause one to reject a model "which is a valid representation of reality" (Cushak, 1978, The Major Powers and the Pursuit of Security in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, p. 267). This is mainly due to the fact that "numbers" are called upon to explain actions and perceptions of states (as in the case of...
this thesis), and associations of variables may sometimes have illogical explanations or may not represent reality and this can stimulate debate.

Statistical analysis was applied to what are, essentially, perceptual variables. For example, the indicator for threat perception used three classes of such data:

- Different types of elites to determine possible differences in their perceptions of threat with one another;

- Different types of variables (proxies), representing options for security to generate estimates of preferences; and

- The combination of the two to estimate levels of importance of threat perception and preferences of various options for security (chi square test, contingency tables, C value).

All of the above indicators are plausible in social sciences, as is the statistical procedure for combining them. However, Jervis (1969), highlights some of the pitfalls of quantitative studies in general: "The methods used to measure several important concepts seriously distort the more common meaning of those terms. Quantitative methods lack the faults of subjectivity, lend themselves to the systematic treatment of large amounts of data, facilitate comparative analysis, and are amenable to treatments to discover unusual and unexpected relationships" (Knorr and Rosenau, Contending Approaches To International Politics, p.203). Despite this reservation, such testing is used widely and was chosen after regular consultation with persons with a statistical and research background.

Depending on the degree of confidence in the manner in which the concepts have been operationalised in chapter 7 of this study, different conclusions could be drawn about the practical limitations of the findings. For example, if there is little confidence in the procedures taken, reserve judgement might be taken in this matter, for example if there was little confidence in the statistical tests used. Such a lack of confidence would entail reservations about the findings presented and in turn, the conclusions that follow from them. Whereas there could be limitations on the ability to generalise from these findings, it would be imprudent to ignore their (internal) validity within the context of this work.

The finding that held across the field study, particularly the association between threat perception and international cooperation, entails a number of implications if questioned and analysed in a practical manner. This association (Threat perception.... International Cooperation) is one link in the chain of the model. Thus, the first point that arises is whether Greek elites were detached when responding to perceptions of threats for Europe, having in mind their own national security concerns. The Greek elites were asked to give their views on issues concerning Europe and their responses may have been biased. For example, the Macedonian issue was clearly seen as a more important concern for Greece than for Europe. Therefore, when asked to respond on how important this issue was for Europe, concerns for Greece's national security are not easily avoided. This is similar to the problem of national interests obstructing common a foreign policy from being formed in the
Chapter Nine

General Conclusions

EC, identified in chapter 4 (Ifestos and Nuttall) and by the respondents interviewed in the validation study presented in Appendix A.

The field study has provided an insight into the importance and effect of threat perception as a determinant towards international cooperation and collective effort. The various types of respondents did not seem to show a significant difference in their opinions, this point also expressed through the Chi-square test presented in chapter 7. The percentages for each category of respondents were quite uniform in the descriptive statistics, suggesting that the uncertainty and concerns were associated. This also suggests that the military elites, even though they constituted the largest sub-sample, have statistically similar concerns as the rest of the sample, thus reducing the concern about bias from sub-groups or sub-samples.

Further Research

The model of this study needs to be modified in certain respects as a result of the field study findings. This modification would introduce another variable in sequence, that of a specific threat and how that specific threat may affect a state. For example, instead of threat perception as the initial variable of the model (TP), the Yugoslav crisis could have been the independent variable: Yugoslav crisis.....International Cooperation.....Intervening Variables.....Option, therefore examining how a specific threat could stimulate international cooperation and how, this cooperation of different states could lead towards an option for defence (Figure 6).

![Figure 6](image)

Another modification would be the inclusion of national interests and the state of the economy as variables which may affect decision-making through collective institutions (Threat Perception.....National Interests.....Economics.....International Cooperation.....Security Option). National Interests were clearly presented through the findings and it is worth examining the extent to which such interests affected collective interests through institutions (Figure 7).

![Figure 7](image)

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Furthermore, it seems appropriate to examine the same issues with respondents from another state in Europe in order to determine the perceptual differences on the topic as well as the extent to which the model is sensitive to elites or the case of another state’s national interests. Another justifiable area of investigation would be a comparative study with data from two or more European states with a view to comparing and contrasting perceptions of threat (differences in levels of importance) and security preferences. A “follow-up” field study in Greece would also be fruitful, as it could be determined how the same issues examined in this study hold over time in the light of continuously changing environmental stimuli as well as the direction of change.

Finally, it would be incomplete not to propose the examination of Turkey and its own perception of threat. Turkey was the major concern presented in the field work for Greece and it would be interesting to see whether Turkey sees Greece as a threat to its security. This could be done through a comparative study of two matched samples: of Greek elites and of Turkish elites responding to issues of common concern or options for common defence (figure 8). This model would aim to investigate not only how one is perceived from the other, but also how the elites of each state “think” it is perceived by the other. Specific threats could be investigated in order to determine which are common and which options are preferred.

**Figure 8**

In sum, the findings of this study have contributed to the theory of threat perception, as its importance, despite the problems such studies encounter, does not seem to have effaced. History - it could be argued - has demonstrated that it repeats itself. Based on this widely accepted statement, it is important that the importance of threat perception be acknowledged, which could assist alliances and institutions to prepare for, or avoid, crises. However, the changing environment in Europe since the end of the Cold War does not imply peace.
"The absence of war and military conflict among states does not in itself insure international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security."


Threats are constantly changing and evolving and security structures may be required to deal with "non-traditional" areas of concern: from military threats to economic threats, environmental threats or humanitarian efforts. These should also be investigated and examined as these threats may prove to be of even greater impact for humanity than war has been in the past.

"To a predominant school of thought, known as political realism, war is an inevitable outcome of human insecurity and the desperate quest for power it generates. In realist thinking, most saliently represented by American historian Hans Morgenthau, the world is a violent, hostile environment, in which the will to self-preservation rules. In such a setting, one must remain constantly on the alert, making others cower so that they do not attack, always ready to kill before being killed" (Karsh, War, Freedman, ed., p. 66, 1994). The only way, according to Karsh (1994), to alleviate this bleak human condition is to establish a 'common power' that will keep mankind in awe. The above suggests "insecurity" which is usually derived from perceptions of threat. The common power suggested by Karsh is also known as collective security through alliances, usually formed, according to Brown (1987), against a common opponent or set threats. On the basis of the historical record, whether alliances tend more often to cause or to deter wars remains an open question.

"The profound changes in Europe since 1989 do not imply peace. "The next decades in a Europe without the superpowers would probably not be as violent as the first 45 years of this century, but would probably be substantially more prone to violence than the past 45 years. This pessimistic conclusion rests on the argument that the distribution and character of military power are the root causes of war" (Mearsheimer, 1990, from War, Freedman, ed., p. 304, 1994).

The above two citations support the contradiction attributed to Roman wisdom:

\[
\text{Si vis pacem, para bellum} \\
\text{[If you want peace, prepare war].}
\]

Note: No similar research topic has been submitted in the UK at this specific point in time.
Appendices
Appendix A

Summary of the Interviews

For the purpose of verifying some of the issues raised and examined in this study, it was decided to undertake a small number of interviews with U.K. based elites interested in European security, particularly related to the findings of this thesis. Arranging appointments with the various elites proved difficult as many military attachés were busy as were defence researchers. Persistent approaches had to be made before an appointment could be secured.

The following sample is a cross section of those who could be reached and agreed to be interviewed and comprises of:

1. Lieutenant Commander D. Theophanidis, Military and Naval Attaché. Greek Embassy, London, UK (May 25, 1994, 4:30 pm);
2. Brigadier C. D. Daukes, Director, NATO and European defence directorate, Ministry of Defence, London UK (May 27, 1994, 11:30 am);
3. Alan Lee Williams OBE, Director, (Former MP), Atlantic Council of the UK, London, UK (May 27, 1994, 3:30 pm);
4. George Chakallis, first Secretary to the Ambassador of the Cyprus High Commission, London, UK (6 June, 1994, 11:00 am);
5. Captain Ivan Yordanov, Military, Naval and Air Attaché, Bulgarian Embassy, London, UK (June 7, 1994, 11:00 am);
6. A Turkish military official, Turkish Embassy, London, UK (June 14, 1994, 11:00 am); at his request, anonymity has been respected;
7. Colonel Andrew Duncan, Director of Information, International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, UK (June 17, 1994, 3:00 pm);
8. Captain Alexander Antropov Ivanovich, Assistant Defence Attaché, Russian Embassy, London, UK (July 4, 1994, 10:00 am).
The interviews were conducted in the UK during the period between May 15 and July 5, 1994. Despite the distances and congested diaries of the interviewees, it was possible to conduct the interviews on a face to face basis.

Efforts were made to contact the following Institutes and individuals, but due to congested diaries or limited personnel, these were unsuccessful: The Institute of European Affairs; Lord Finsberg, former Vice President of the WEU; the Republic of Northern Cyprus Office in London and the "Macedonian" office in London.

The aim of the interviews was to get a response and add some dimensions in the major findings of the study, as well as to question the feasibility of the proposed model. The areas discussed were:

-the difference in the levels of importance given by Greek elites from the field study when questioned on specific concerns for Greece and for Europe;

-the respondents' opinion on continuing US assistance in Europe as the findings indicated, only in terms of defensive purposes;

-the respondents' attitude towards the importance of threat perception in the European security equation;

-the respondents' views about the uncertainty reflected from the field study on the Greek elites' choices for European defence;

-whether NATO requires further transformation in order to deal with external threats and the absence of clear threat perception;

-whether the EC should provide a defence mechanism for Europe; and

-if the respondent felt that the proposed model was a logical explanation for the uncertainty of an option in the field study, due to the lack of clear threat perception in Europe.

Extracts from the interviews are presented below (anonymity has been respected wherever it was requested).
Lieutenant Commander Theophanidis
Military and Naval Attaché, Greek Embassy, London, UK

He felt that the uncertainty in the structure alternatives for European defence in the study was logical due to the geographical changes in Europe. Only when borders and tensions are settled would Europeans be able to reach a common agreement. He also felt that the United States' presence in Europe, through NATO, continues to be essential for Europe's defence as it, being the only remaining superpower in the world, would be able to motivate other states towards a common purpose. He felt that NATO would continue to dominate European defence concerns and that Maastricht's attempt to reactivate the WEU would be unsuccessful. Lieutenant Commander Theophanidis' opinion on the uncertainty in the levels of importance of various concerns for Greece and for Europe were related with geo-politics as Greece's geographical location in the Balkan's threatens the State more than the whole Continent. As far as the EC is concerned, he thought that it was not necessary for the structure to provide a defence mechanism as NATO still exists and provided US assistance. External threats should be taken into consideration as situations such as the war in the Gulf in 1991 affected the world economy. Future threats for Europe include Germany and Russia depending on its relation with NATO and the PFP plan. Finally, he agreed with the sequence of the model as the apparent lack of clear threat perception has created uncertainty towards an option.

Brigadier C. D. Daukes
Director, NATO and European Defence Directorate, MOD, UK

The Brigadier felt that the differences in the levels of importance of the various threats proposed in the study for Greece and for Europe was related to the fact that a threat is a subjective judgement. Europe "needs to create" a threat but not as in the Cold War era as the ingredients of the Cold War no longer exist. US involvement "is still essential" as the US through NATO provides the European - Atlantic link and NATO and the US are interrelated. Newly formed Eastern European states want NATO more than the existing members do. NATO's summit in January 1994 has demonstrated the need to deal with external threats,"... or
taking on jobs that are not article #5.” He also felt that NATO can survive as a “crisis management mechanism.”

Brigadier Daukes felt that NATO has been essential for Greece as it has become the balancing factor in Greaco-Turkish relations. As far as the differences in structure preferences from the field study, he felt that elites would be able to choose if there was an actual clear threat. However, NATO will continue to dominate as it has an integrated military staff (unlike what the WTO had) and unlike the situation in the WEU. The EC requires common foreign policy in order to promote defence, but if this is achieved, there would be no benefit for Greece to have Turkey in the EC.

Finally, the model was seen as logical and the absence of clear threat perception was seen as the major reason why there seemed to be an uncertainty towards an option for European defence.

Alan Lee Williams, OBE
Director, Atlantic Council, UK

Mr Williams felt that the US is the “cement” in the NATO partnership. The challenge of statesmanship for NATO is difficult to hold together without the US. If the US commitment in Europe through NATO fades, there would be a problem in dealing with out-of-area threats. European defence would require more investment by Europeans and this is unlikely. He stressed the importance of the US for Europe and felt that if the WEU was reactivated and eventually dominated the European defence equation, this would mean that the US would be out of Europe. The US is also the umbrella for the German question. The changes of 1989 “... took NATO by surprise... How can we hold the Alliance together without clear threat perception?” It was felt, however, that the respondents believed that NATO would be able to survive as a crisis management mechanism, despite the lack of a clear threat.

Mr Williams was sceptical about the WEU gaining more power. “It is separate, but not apart from NATO.” The Western European Union's binding treaty obliges states to assist another member state without putting the issue on the table as in NATO. As far as the EC is concerned, this respondent was also skeptical about political union as he felt that a “common approach” would be better. The variety of options presented from the study were due to the
lack of clear threat perception. The model was seen as logical and the absence of clear threats is creating the problem in finding the best alternative.

Finally, the respondent felt that NATO will be able to cope with the instabilities in Europe and serve as a crisis management mechanism.

Mr George Chakallis
First Secretary to the Ambassador of the Cyprus High Commission, UK

Mr Chakallis thought that the whole European defence question is still uncertain and unclear due to the continuing instability in the Balkans and the Russian continuing transformation towards democracy. He felt that the focus on a threat is still an ongoing process: "Things in Europe are still vague and there is no actual identification of threat." However, Mr Chakallis was uncertain as to whether there is a need for identifying new threats. NATO has been able, in the respondents' opinion, to transform into a crisis management organisation and could thus survive in this manner. He sees NATO dominating European defence in the future as the Western European Union does not include the United States even though the WEU, as a stepping stone, can deal with European matters before they get transferred to NATO. He felt that the United States' interests are not parallel with those of the EC as far as defence is concerned, and based on the assumption that Europe "needs" America, it is not yet feasible for the EC to form a defence dimension. On the whole, he favoured NATO and continuing US involvement in Europe for defensive matters.

He felt that "geopolitics" was the reason for the differences in threat perception for Greece and for Europe as it is difficult to make a state's own domestic interests the same as those of Europe. He sees the CSCE as the "talking shop" that did play a role during the Cold War but with no actual power to threaten other organisations. Threat perception, or specifically the lack of it, was felt as causing the problems for European defence, and especially for the existence of the various organisations.
Captain Ivan Yordanov, Military, Naval, and Air Attaché
Bulgarian Embassy, UK

Captain Yordanov used history and geopolitics as the major reasons for the differences in threat perception for Greece and for Europe. He said that many issues "... have nothing to do with Europe" and that each state has its own approach and level of seriousness for a specific threat; Greece's historical concerns are logically more intense than Europe's on the same issues.

He felt that there exist too many security organisations and characterised the CSCE as a structure which is "not well organised", and the WEU as not being clear about its security responsibilities and with no clear objectives. NATO's new character would be that of a crisis management organisation and its enlargement through the Partnership for Peace Plan will help European defence. He saw Bulgaria as a PFP signatory that could become the balancing factor in the Balkan region and specifically between Greece and Turkey. If Bulgaria, Turkey and Greece become allies through NATO, that could bring stability to the whole Balkan peninsula.

He felt that NATO does have the experience to lead European defence as it is a "well built structure." However, he sees Russia as a necessary ally for the West through NATO and if Russia does not sign the PFP plan, the effects for European defence would be disastrous. Russia would become isolated and the West might have a new threat to deal with based on capabilities. He felt that there is no reason for the EC to provide a defence mechanism for Europe and characterised this possibility as one that "... would increase bureaucracy and bring no solutions." He sees the United States as essential for Europe as they are the only defensive, but not the only economic, superpower in the world. The situation in Europe is not yet ideal for the United States to withdraw its support and he does not see this happening for a long period of time. On the whole, he felt that the absence of clear threat perception is the reason for the variety of alternatives given in this study.

Turkish Military Official (anonymity requested) Turkish embassy, UK

This official felt that threat perception has become a very difficult task for Europe, but that it is essential for Europeans to identify common concerns in order to be able to deal with threats...
when they arise. NATO must now change due to the absence of a clear threat: "It is easier to unite for a common purpose than to unite with no clear purpose."

He sees the United Nations as a body that could gain more power and, through a revised decision-making process, one that could become an important actor for world defence. NATO was seen as an arm of the UN as were other defence structures such as the WEU and the CSCE.

Even though the respondent felt that "no state would like to be the police of the world" the United States remains the only superpower that has relatively clear policies in Europe and must still continue to play a role in European defence. However, all states in NATO should share military expenses in order to feel involved. The respondent cited the interesting example of Germany as a state that has become economically dominant due to fact (according to the respondent), that it has never spent large sums of money for its military. Therefore, the US and other Western European partners, by controlling Germany, allowed the state to enjoy economic progress which may lead towards a future threat.

He felt that the difference in levels of perception for issues concerning Greece and Europe are due to "own national goals, as all states have different national concerns and priorities". If it was easy for all states to accept concerns or have mutual interests, then the world would be in peace. The identification of threat is essential for the balance of military power.

On the whole, he felt that the absence of clear threats in Europe has created the uncertainty in the options reflected in this study.

Colonel Andrew Duncan, Director of Information
International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, UK

Colonel Duncan felt that the various differences in levels of perception of concerns for Greece and for Europe were related to the "directness" of concerns. Issues such as "Macedonia" or Turkey logically concern Greece to a greater extent due to geography and history. "The threat of war in the Balkans is more direct." He sees too many structures for security existing and overlapping. He felt, however, that only NATO has the military capability and "... will continue to dominate in the future." The Western European Union was seen as an essential...
structure that may assist NATO in various tasks. As the WEU obliges its member states to assist in the event of an armed attack on one of its members, NATO takes the issue to the council first. This point was seen as a drawback of the WEU as most states would favour putting the issue on the table rather than immediately interfering.

He felt that the US is essential for European defence: "After all there have been no cries for the US to get out." He sees NATO's new character as a crisis management mechanism as successful and one that has proved it can work through its involvement in the Yugoslav crisis. However, whether it could continue without clear threats "... in order to justify its forces" is a difficult question.

Finally, he felt that the absence of clear threat perception has created a problem in justifying security structures' existence, but "... even if there was not Yugoslavia, there would have been something else to base their reason of existence."

Captain Alexander Antropov Ivanovich
Assistant Defence Attaché, Russian Embassy, London, UK

The Captain felt that the difference in levels of importance on the various issues of the study was logical due to the fact that national interests do not always coincide with "European" interests. "If humans were able to want the same at the same time, then there would be a world government." As the Russian Assistant Defence Attaché, the respondent expressed Russia's good intentions vis-à-vis Western Europe and the state's intention on signing the PFP plan of NATO. His opinion on the PFP plan was that it was a good step for Russia to join but expected full membership and a logical "key-role" based on Russian capabilities. As far as Russia combining efforts with other parts of the world, the feeling was negative.

In addition, the respondent felt that the uncertainty in structure alternatives from the study was logical due to the ongoing transformations in Europe. And as far as Russia was concerned, NATO is a good option but time is essential and required, until problem areas are settled.

Finally, the respondent's opinion on the model of this study was that threat perception is a major problem creating this uncertainty, and especially for the Eastern European states.
Appendix B
The Partnership for Peace Agreement

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE: INVITATION

Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters,

We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, building on the close and longstanding partnership among the North American and European allies, are committed to enhancing the security and stability of the whole of Europe. We therefore wish to strengthen ties with the democratic states to our East. We reaffirm that the alliance, as provided for in article 10 of the Washington Treaty, remains open to the membership of other European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe.

We have today launched an immediate and practical programme that will transform the relationship between NATO and participating states. The new programme goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership - a Partnership for Peace. We therefore invite other states participating in the NACC and other CSCE countries to contribute to the programme, to join with us in this partnership. Active participation in the Partnership for Peace will play an important role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO.

The Partnership for Peace, which will operate under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, will forge new security arrangements between the North Atlantic Alliance and its partners for Peace. Partner states will be invited by the North Atlantic Council to participate in political and military bodies at NATO Headquarters with respect to Partnership activities. The Partnership will expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships by promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin our Alliance. NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security. At a pace or scope determined by the capacity or desire of the individual participating states, we will work in concrete ways towards transparency in defence budgeting, promoting democratic control of defence ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, and creating the ability to operate with NATO with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations, and others as may be agreed.

To promote closer military cooperation and interoperability, we will propose, within the Partnership framework, peacekeeping field exercises beginning in 1994. To coordinate joint military activities within the Partnership, we will invite states participating in the Partnership to send permanent liaison officers to NATO Headquarters and a separate Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons (Belgium) that would, under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, carry out military planning necessary to implement the Partnership programmes.

Since its inception two years ago, the North Atlantic Cooperation council has greatly expanded the depth and scope to its activities. We will continue to work with all our NACC partners to build cooperative relationships across the entire spectrum of the Alliance’s activities. With the expansion of NACC activities and the establishment of the Partnership for Peace, we have decided to offer permanent facilities at NATO Headquarters for personnel from NACC countries and other Partnership for Peace participants in order to improve out working relationships and facilitate closer cooperation.
PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE: FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT

1. Further to the invitation extended by the NATO Heads of State and Government at their meeting on the 10th/11th January, 1994, the member states of the North Atlantic Alliance and other states subscribing to this document, resolved to deepen their political and military ties and to contribute further to the strengthening of security within the Euro-Atlantic area, hereby establish, within the framework of the North Atlantic cooperation Council, the Partnership for Peace.

2. This Partnership is established as an expression of a joint conviction that stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved only through cooperation and common action. Protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice and peace through democracy are shared values fundamental to the Partnership. In joining the partnership, the member states of the North Atlantic Alliance and the other states subscribing to this document recall that they are committed to the preservation of democratic societies, their freedom from coercion and intimidation, and the maintenance of the principles of international law. They reaffirm their commitment to fulfil in good faith the obligations of the charter of the United Nations and the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights; specifically, to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial or political independence of any state, to respect existing borders and to settle disputes by peaceful means. They also reaffirm their commitment to the Helsinki Final Act and all subsequent CSCE documents and to the fulfilment of the commitments and obligations they have undertaken in the field of disarmament and arms control.

3. The other states subscribing to this document will cooperate with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in pursuing the following objectives:
   a. facilitation of transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes;
   b. ensuring democratic control of defence forces;
   c. maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the CSCE;
   d. the development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may be subsequently agreed;
   e. the development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of the North Atlantic Alliance.

4. The other subscribing states will provide to the NATO Authorities Presentation Documents identifying the steps they will take to achieve the political goals of the Partnership and the military and other assets that might be used for Partnership activities. NATO will propose a programme of partnership exercises and other activities consistent with the Partnership’s objectives. Based on this programme and its Presentation Document, each subscribing state will develop with NATO an individual Partnership Programme.

5. In preparing and implementing their individual Partnership Programmes, other subscribing states may, at their own expense and in agreement with the Alliance and, as necessary, relevant Belgium authorities, establish their own liaison office with NATO Headquarters in Brussels. This will facilitate their participation in NACC/Partnership meetings and activities, as well as certain others by invitation. They will also make available personnel, assets, facilities and capabilities necessary and appropriate for carrying out the agreed Partnership programme. NATO will assist them, as appropriate, in formulating and executing their individual Partnership Programmes.

6. The other subscribing states accept the following understandings:
   ▶ those who envisage participation in missions referred to in paragraph 3(d) will, where appropriate, take part in relevant NATO exercises;
   ▶ they will fund their own activities in Partnership activities, and will endeavour otherwise to share
the burdens of mounting exercises in which they take part;

- They may send, after appropriate agreement, permanent liaison officers to a separate Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons (Belgium) that would, under the authority of the North Atlantic council, carry out military planning necessary to implement the Partnership programmes;

- those participating in planning and military exercises will have access to certain NATO technical data relevant to interoperability;

- building upon the CSCE measures on defence planning, the other subscribing states and NATO countries will exchange information on the steps that have been taken or are being taken to promote transparency in defence planning and budgeting and to ensure the democratic control of armed forces;

- they may participate in a reciprocal exchange of information on defence planning and budgeting which will be developed within the framework of the NACC / Partnership for Peace.

7. In keeping with their commitment to the objectives of the Partnership for Peace, the members of the North Atlantic Alliance will:

- develop with other subscribing states a planning and review process to provide a basis for identifying and evaluating forces and capabilities that might be made available by them for multinational training, exercises, and operations in conjunction with Alliance forces;

- promote military and political coordination at NATO headquarters in order to provide direction and guidance relevant to Partnership activities and the other subscribing states, including planning, training, exercises and the development of doctrine.

8. NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security.
Appendix C

Highlights of the North Atlantic Treaty

Article 2

Article 2 of the Washington Treaty extends its scope beyond defence matters and includes the promotion of conditions of stability and well-being and economic collaboration among Alliance member countries.

Article 5

Based on Article 51 of the United Nations charter, which confirms "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence", the North Atlantic treaty states that all its signatories desire to live in peace with all peoples and governments. In Article 5 they agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.

Article 9

Article 9 established the North Atlantic Council. This was the only official body directly created by the Treaty. The council itself was given the task of creating "such subsidiary bodies" as might be necessary. This led to the establishment of the North Atlantic Organisation which implements the Council's decisions and provides the practical means of collaboration between member countries in all areas of mutual interest or concern.
Appendix D

Defence Highlights from the Maastricht Treaty

PROVISIONS ON A COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

Article J

A common foreign and security policy is hereby established which shall be governed by the following provisions.

Article J.1

1. The Union and its member states shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy, governed by the provisions of this Title and covering all areas of foreign and security policy.

2. The objectives of the common foreign and security policy shall be:

   - to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union;
   - to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways;
   - to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the Objectives of the Paris Charter;
   - to promote international cooperation;
   - to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for Human rights and fundamental freedoms.

3. The Union shall pursue these objectives:

   - by establishing systematic cooperation between members states in the conduct of policy in accordance with Article J.2;
   - by gradually implementing, in accordance with Article J.3, joint action in the areas in which the Member States have important interests in common.

4. The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in the spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations. The council shall ensure that these principles are complied with.
Article J.2

1. Member States shall inform and consult one another within the council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to ensure that their combined influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and convergent action.

2. Whenever it deems necessary, the Council shall define a common position.

3. Member States shall coordinate their action in international organisations and at international conferences. The shall uphold the common position in such forums.

   In international organisations and at international conferences where not all the Member States participate, those that do take part shall uphold the common positions.

Article J.4

1. The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence.

2. The Union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. The council shall, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, adopt the necessary practical arrangements.

3. Issues having defence implications dealt with under this Article shall not be subject to the procedures set out in Article J.3.

4. The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.

5. The provisions of this article shall not prevent the development of closer cooperation between two or more member states on a bilateral level, in the framework of the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, provided such cooperation does not run counter to or impede that provided for in this Title.

6. With a view to furthering the objectivity of this Treaty, and having in view the date of 1998 in the context of Article XII of the Brussels Treaty, the provisions of this Article may be revised as provided for in Article N(2) on the basis of a report to be presented in 1996 by the Council to the European Council, which shall include an evaluation of the progress made and the experience gained until then.
## PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE PARTICIPANTS

(as at 30 April 1995)

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Appendix G

Greek Defence Figures

The armed forces have permanent and reserve officers and the other ranks consist chiefly of conscripts (125,800 out of a force of 158,000 in 1991) serving 19-23 months. The length of conscription was being reduced but the process has been stopped because of the upheavals in the Balkans. The army consists of 113,000 soldiers (100,000 conscripts) divided into four corps, comprising one armoured division, one mechanised division, nine infantry divisions and one marine brigade, together with armoured, artillery and missile battalions. Its armaments have been programmed to upgrade its substantial numbers of Korean war vintage M-48s. The country has been developing a domestic armaments industry including the manufacture of weapons, artillery, missiles and armoured personnel carriers.

The navy, consisting of 19,500 sailors (11,400 conscripts), has major bases at Salamis, near Athens, Patras at the mouth of the Gulf of Corinth, and at Suda Bay on the northern coast of Crete. It is equipped with 10 submarines, 11 destroyers and seven frigates, plus missile, torpedo and patrol craft and helicopters. The country has embarked on a frigate building programme utilising German designs and US technology.

The air force, comprising 26,000 personnel (14,400 conscripts), consists of seven combat wings and one transport wing. Fighter aircraft include the US F-16 and the French Mirage 2000, though there have been problems with the radars supplied with the latter craft. Other aircraft include the A-7H, F-104G, F-4E and F-5A/B. The air force is equipped with modern missiles of foreign and domestic manufacture. Nuclear missiles are deployed in Greece under treaty arrangements with the USA and NATO.

Despite difficulties with NATO over command and control arrangements in Aegean, Greece is part of the NATO Air Defence Ground Environment (NADGE) and provides a forward operating base at Preveza for the NATO Airborne Early Warning Force (NAEWF).

In 1985 the Greek Socialist government introduced a New Defence Doctrine redirecting force planning eastward towards Turkey rather than the Balkan states. This apparently did not involve redeployment of troops though a number of island airfields were hardened to take fighter aircraft and priority was given to the acquisition of equipment which would allow rapid reinforcement and supply of the islands. The New Democracy government has embarked on an equipment acquisition programme including heavy lift, attack and anti-submarine helicopters, 200 modern offensive and defensive combat aircraft, and 950 tanks and 550 anti-aircraft guns to be supplied by Germany. The navy is to acquire nine vessels of various types from Germany, three frigates with helicopter decks from the Netherlands plus three frigates and four Adams class destroyers from the USA. There are three frigates and five tank carriers under construction in Greek yards. In the first two years a reported $1 billion was spent on the programme.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies, using a NATO definition of military spending, estimates Greek outlays in 1991 at Dr777 bn ($4.5 bn), or 6 per cent of GDP. The 1992 state budget estimate showed defence spending of Dr324.5 bn in 1991 and projected Dr364.2 bn for 1992, respectively 2.5 and 2.4 per cent of GDP. These figures do not take into account costs of procurement of the repayment of US foreign military sales credits.
Appendix H
Greek and English Questionnaires
Questionnaire

Name: ________________________________

Occupational status: __________________________

Party affiliation: __________________________
(if desired)
1. Based on the assumption that Greece's security cannot rely on the country's own national defence mechanisms, Greece should continue its membership in structures such as the EEC and NATO.

   \[\text{AGREE} \quad 1 \quad \text{DISAGREE} \quad 2\]

2. The fact that Greece has not been overtly threatened by another country since 1974 has to do with the country's stable relations with Western democracies such as the US, Britain and France.

   \[
   \begin{array}{cccccc}
   \text{STRONGLY AGREE} & \text{AGREE} & \text{UNCERTAIN} & \text{DISAGREE} & \text{STRONGLY DISAGREE} \\
   1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5
   \end{array}
   \]

3. Which of the following is the greatest threat to Greece's security at the present time? (Please tick only one)

   1. [ ] Instability in the Balkans
   2. [ ] The Macedonia problem
   3. [ ] Turkey
   4. [ ] Other (Please specify: ____________________________ )
   5. [ ] No threat

4. What is the most serious kind of threat facing Greece at the present time? (Please tick only one)

   1. [ ] Domestic economy
   2. [ ] Domestic political instability
   3. [ ] Foreign military threat
   4. [ ] Foreign economic threat
   5. [ ] Other (Please specify: ____________________________ )
   6. [ ] No threat

5. It has been suggested that the military balance in Europe and the world has been changed considerably. In your opinion, how serious is the current instability in Europe to Greece's security?

   \[
   \begin{array}{cccccc}
   \text{VERY SERIOUS} & \text{NOT SERIOUS} & \text{AT ALL} \\
   1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 & 6 & 7
   \end{array}
   \]

6. How probable is it for a threat towards Greece's security to arise?

   \[
   \begin{array}{cccccc}
   \text{VERY PROBABLE} & \text{NOT PROBABLE} & \text{AT ALL} \\
   1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 & 6 & 7
   \end{array}
   \]
7. Given your views on a military threat to Greece's security, what is the best form of defence against this threat? (Please tick only one)

1 - No defence posture
2 - National conventional arms
3 - Collective security (Integrated European Conventional Forces: EEC, WEU)
4 - Integration of all forces of the Atlantic Community (NATO)
5 - Other (Please specify: ____________________________)

8. A. Based on the religious fanaticism evident in the Middle East (Iraq, Syria, Kuwait) as well as in Europe (Turkey, Muslims in Yugoslavia), how serious a threat, in your opinion, is Islamic fundamentalism to Europe's security?

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B. How serious a threat, in your opinion, is Islamic fundamentalism for Greece's security?

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9. Many defence analysts present Germany as a legacy of war. How serious of a threat is Germany for:

A. Europe's security.

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B. Greece's security.

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10. According to many defence analysts, NATO has been the major component that ensured European stability.

11. Due to the current instability in Europe, NATO should continue to exist despite the fall of communism and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact.

12. Despite the end of the Cold War and the fall of communism, the United States should continue to play a role in European affairs.

13. Based on the assumption that NATO remains the major defensive organisation in Europe in the 1990s, which of the following are vital requirements for the structure's successful continuation. (Tick more than one box, if desired)

14. NATO has been a major reason for containing fears of a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey, as both are NATO members.
15. Greece should continue to remain a member of NATO.

AGREE [ ] 1  

DISAGREE [ ] 2

16. How important is the United States, in your opinion, for Europe's defence in the 1990s.

V E R Y  I M P O R T A N T  
N O T  I M P O R T A N T  
A T  A L L  

1  2  3  4  5  6  7

17. Europe should break away from the US and NATO and deal with the Continent's security only through arrangements which are European in character such as the EEC and the WEU.

S T R O N G L Y  A G R E E  
A G R E E  
U N C E R T A I N  
D I S A G R E E  
S T R O N G L Y  D I S A G R E E  

1  2  3  4  5

18. Under present circumstances, which do you think is the most practical way for Greece to ensure its military security?

1 - [ ] To continue present arrangements (NATO)
2 - [ ] To pursue entry in the WEU
3 - [ ] Combination of collective security arrangements (NATO, CSCE)
4 - [ ] Withdraw from collective security arrangements
5 - [ ] Other. (Please specify:___________________________)

19. Which of the following alternatives for European defence is the most credible? (Please tick one only)

1 - [ ] Europe should rely on US force
2 - [ ] Europe should rely on NATO, including the US
3 - [ ] European countries should rely on their own defence and form a joint nuclear force independent of US control
4 - [ ] Europe should rely on the European Economic Community (EEC) to form a defence mechanism
5 - [ ] Europe should rely on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
6 - [ ] Europe should rely on the Western European Union (WEU)
7 - [ ] Other. (Please specify:___________________________)
20. In your opinion, should the European Economic Community (EEC) provide a defence mechanism for Europe?

YES / AGREE □ 1 NO / DISAGREE □ 2 UNCERTAIN □ 3

21. NATO should acquire new Eastern European members in order to become an alliance that could serve the whole of Europe.

STRONGLY AGREE □ 1 AGREE □ 2 NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE □ 3 DISAGREE □ 4 STRONGLY DISAGREE □ 5

22. Given the fact that the Warsaw pact has been dissolved and the Communist threat has receded, how important is it for NATO to perceive new threats for its continuation?

VERY IMPORTANT □ 1 NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL □ 7

23. Here are some problems that might face Europeans in the 1990s. Please indicate how important each is for:

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<td>Neo-nazism</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union break-up</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German reunification</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
24. The US is the only remaining superpower in the world at the present time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRONGLY AGREE</th>
<th>AGREE</th>
<th>UNCERTAIN</th>
<th>DISAGREE</th>
<th>STRONGLY DISAGREE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite the breakup of the Soviet Union, how serious of a threat is Russia to Europe's security?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VERY IMPORTANT</th>
<th>NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25. How important is agreement to the terms of the treaty of Maastricht for the stability of European affairs (economic and defensive).

1 - □ Not important
2 - □ Fairly important
3 - □ Very important

26. How important is the treaty of Maastricht for Greece?

1 - □ Not important
2 - □ Fairly important
3 - □ Very important
4 - □ Without Maastricht, the EEC and in general Europe will procrastinate its unification

27. How serious a nuclear threat does the former Soviet Union, despite its break-up into smaller republics, present to Europe?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VERY IMPORTANT</th>
<th>NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

28. How important, in your opinion, is perception of a threat to establishing a collective security arrangement?

1 - □ Not important
2 - □ Fairly important
3 - □ Very important
29. External threats (out-of-area threats) such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 should be taken into consideration and precautions taken in the defence mechanism of Europe as such threats may arise in European affairs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRONGLY AGREE</th>
<th>AGREE</th>
<th>UNCERTAIN</th>
<th>DISAGREE</th>
<th>STRONGLY DISAGREE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1</td>
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</table>

30. European defence should only deal with matters on the Continent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRONGLY AGREE</th>
<th>AGREE</th>
<th>UNCERTAIN</th>
<th>DISAGREE</th>
<th>STRONGLY DISAGREE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1</td>
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</table>

31. Greece's interests would better be promoted through the Western European Union.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRONGLY AGREE</th>
<th>AGREE</th>
<th>UNCERTAIN</th>
<th>DISAGREE</th>
<th>STRONGLY DISAGREE</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Αξιότιμο/η κύριε/α,

Ονομάζομαι Κωνσταντίνος Κυρίτσης και είμαι φοιτητής-ερευνητής της Πολιτικών επιστημών στο Πανεπιστήμιο του SURREY (University of Surrey) στην Μεγάλη Βρετανία.

Αυτόν το μήνα έχω ξεκινήσει μια έρευνα πάνω στο θέμα της Ευρωπαϊκής ασφάλειας και άμυνας με βάση την Ελλάδα. Για αυτόν τον λόγο έχω συντάξει ένα ερωτηματολόγιο το οποίο θα ήθελα να συμπληρώσετε με τη σέβαστή και ενδιαφέρουσα γνώμη σας.

Με απασχολεί μόνο η ωστά του θέματος γι’αυτό και να είστε σίγουροι ότι δεν θα δημοσιεύτουν ονόματα, κομματικές προτιμήσεις ή συγκεκριμένες απαντήσεις. Άλλωστε είναι προαιρετικά γραμμένα στην πρώτη σελίδα του ερωτηματολογίου.

Σας ευχαριστώ για την κατανόηση και βοήθειά σας.
ΕΡΩΤΗΜΑΤΟΛΟΓΙΟ

Κων/νος Βασ. Κυριάτης

ΟΝΟΜΑ : ___________________________________________
ΕΠΙΓΕΛΜΑ : _________________________________________
ΚΟΜΜΑ : ___________________________________________
(προαιρετικά)
1. Στηριζόμενος/η στην υπόθεση ότι η ασφάλεια της Ελλάδος δεν μπορεί να στηριχθεί μόνο στους δικούς της αμυντικούς μηχανισμούς, συμφωνείτε ή διαφωνείτε ότι η Ελλάδα θα πρέπει να παραμείνει μέλος του NATO και της Ευρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας;

ΣΥΜΦΩΝΩ □ 1

ΔΙΑΦΩΝΩ □ 2

2. Το γεγονός ότι η Ελλάδα δεν έχει απειληθεί ΦΑΝΕΡΑ από άλλη χώρα από το 1974, έχει να κάνει με τις καλές σχέσεις της Ελλάδος με άλλες Δυτικές Δημοκρατίες όπως η Βρετανία, η Γαλλία και οι Η.Π.Α.

ΣΥΜΦΩΝΩ ΑΠΟΛΥΤΑ ΣΥΜΦΩΝΩ ΑΒΕΒΑΙΟΣ/Η ΔΙΑΦΩΝΩ ΔΙΑΦΩΝΩ ΑΠΟΛΥΤΑ

1 2 3 4 5

3. Πιο από τα παρακάτω είναι, κατά τη γνώμη σας, η μεγαλύτερη απειλή προς την ασφάλεια της Ελλάδος την παρούσα στιγμή:

(Παρακαλώ σημειώστε ένα μόνο)

1. □ Η αστάθεια στα Βαλκάνια
2. □ Το Μακεδονικό
3. □ Η Τουρκία
4. □ Άλλη Απειλή (παρακαλώ καθορίστε): __________________
5. □ Δεν υπάρχει απειλή

4. Παρακαλώ σημειώστε την πιο σοβαρή απειλή που διατρέχει η Ελλάδα την παρούσα στιγμή (παρακαλώ σημειώστε ένα μόνο)

1. □ Η οικονομία της χώρας μας
2. □ Η Πολιτική αστάθεια
3. □ Μια εξωτερική στρατιωτική απειλή
4. □ Μια εξωτερική οικονομική απειλή
5. □ Άλλη Απειλή (παρακαλώ καθορίστε): __________________
6. □ Δεν υπάρχει απειλή
5. Κατά γενική ομολογία η αμυντική ζυγαριά της Ευρώπης και κατ' επέκταση όλου του κόσμου έχει αλλάξει ριζικά. Κατά τη γνώμη σας, πόσο σοβαρή για την ασφάλεια της Ελλάδος είναι η τωρινή αστάθεια που χαρακτηρίζει την Ευρώπη:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ΠΟΛΥ ΣΟΒΑΡΗ</th>
<th>ΚΑΘΟΛΟΥ ΣΟΒΑΡΗ</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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</table>

6. Ποιά η πιθανότητα της αστάθειας αυτής να απειλήσει την ασφάλεια της Ελλάδος:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ΠΟΛΥ ΜΕΓΑΛΗ</th>
<th>ΠΟΛΥ ΜΙΚΡΗ</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ΠΙΘΑΝΟΤΗΤΑ</td>
<td>ΠΙΘΑΝΟΤΗΤΑ</td>
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7. Με βάσει την άποψη σας όσον αφορά κάποια πιθανή στρατιωτική απειλή (προς την Ελλάδα), ποιά κατά την γνώμη σας είναι η καλύτερη φόρμουλα αντιμετώπισης αυτής της απειλής:

(Παρακαλώ σημειώστε ένα μόνο)

1. □ Καμία αμυντική στάση/αντιμετώπιση
2. □ Εθνικά συμβατικά όπλα (χωρίς ξένη βοήθεια)
3. □ Συλλογική ασφάλεια (Α)
   (Ευρωπαϊκές συμβατικές δυνάμεις:Ε.Ο.Κ., ΔυτικοΕυρω-παϊκή Ενώση-Δ.Ε.Ε.)
4. □ Συλλογική ασφάλεια (Β)
   (Ατλαντικές συμβατικές δυνάμεις: ΝΑΤΟ - ΔΣΕ)
5. □ Άλλη Αντιμετώπιση (παρακαλώ καθορίστε):

8. Α) Σημειώστε/η πάνω στον καταφανή θρησκευτικά φανατισμό της Μέσης Ανατολής (Ιράκ, Συρία, Σαουδική Αραβία), όπως επίσης και στην Ευρώπη (Τούρκία, Μουσουλμάνικη στην πρώην Γιουκοσλαβία), πόσο σοβαρή απειλή, κατά τη γνώμη σας, θεωρούνται οι "βασικές αρχές" Ισλαμισμού προς την ασφάλεια της Ευρώπης:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ΠΟΛΥ ΣΟΒΑΡΗ</th>
<th>ΚΑΘΟΛΟΥ ΣΟΒΑΡΗ</th>
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</table>

Β) Πόσο σοβαρή απειλή, κατά τη γνώμη σας, θεωρούνται οι "βασικές αρχές" Ισλαμισμού προς την ασφάλεια της Ελλάδος:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
9. Πολλοί αμυντικοί ερευνητές παρουσιάζουν την Ενώμενη Γερμανία ως μία πολεμική απειλή, κληρονομία της Χιτλερικής Γερμανίας. Πόσο σοβαρή απειλή θεωρείται η Γερμανία για:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Α. Την ασφάλεια της Ευρώπης</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ΠΟΛΥ ΣΟΒΑΡΗ</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Β. Την ασφάλεια της Ελλάδας</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ΠΟΛΥ ΣΟΒΑΡΗ</td>
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<td>1</td>
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</table>

10. Κατά τη γνώμη ενός μεγάλου αριθμού αμυντικών αναλυτών, το NATO υπήρξε το βασικό συστατικό εγγύησης της Ευρωπαϊκής αμυντικής σταθερότητας:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ΣΥΜΦΩΝΩ</th>
<th>ΣΥΜΦΩΝΩ</th>
<th>ΟΥΤΕ ΣΥΜΦΩΝΩ</th>
<th>ΔΙΑΦΩΝΩ</th>
<th>ΔΙΑΦΩΝΩ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ΑΠΟΛΥΤΑ</td>
<td>ΟΥΤΕ ΔΙΑΦΩΝΩ</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. Λόγω της τωρινής αστάθειας της Ευρώπης, κατά πόσο συμφωνείτε με την άποψη ότι το NATO θα πρέπει να συνεχίσει την ύπαρξή του παρά την κατάρρευση του Κομμουνισμού και τη διάλυση της συνθήκης της Βαρσοβίας:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ΣΥΜΦΩΝΩ</th>
<th>ΣΥΜΦΩΝΩ</th>
<th>ΟΥΤΕ ΣΥΜΦΩΝΩ</th>
<th>ΔΙΑΦΩΝΩ</th>
<th>ΔΙΑΦΩΝΩ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ΑΠΟΛΥΤΑ</td>
<td>ΟΥΤΕ ΔΙΑΦΩΝΩ</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12. Παρά το "τέλος" του Ψυχρού Πολέμου και την κατάρρευση του Κομμουνισμού, οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες της Αμερικής θα πρέπει να συνεχίσουν να παίζουν κάποιο ρόλο στην Ευρώπη:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ΣΥΜΦΩΝΩ</th>
<th>ΣΥΜΦΩΝΩ</th>
<th>ΟΥΤΕ ΣΥΜΦΩΝΩ</th>
<th>ΔΙΑΦΩΝΩ</th>
<th>ΔΙΑΦΩΝΩ</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ΑΠΟΛΥΤΑ</td>
<td>ΟΥΤΕ ΔΙΑΦΩΝΩ</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
13. Στηριζόμενος/ή στη άποψη ότι το ΝΑΤΟ παραμένει ο μεγαλύτερος αμυντικός οργανισμός στην Ευρώπη για τη δεκαετία του 1990, ποιά από τα παρακάτω είναι κατά τη γνώμη σας - ζωτικής σημασίας συστατικά για την επιτυχημένη συνέχεια του οργανισμού; (Σημειώστε περισσότερα από ένα -αν χρειαστεί):

1. □ Καθοδήγηση από τις Η.Π.Α.
2. □ Καθοδήγηση από Ευρωπαίους
3. □ Να συμπεριληφθούν χώρες της Ανατολικής Ευρώπης ως μέλη
4. □ Να οριστούν νέοι σκοποί (να διορθώθει η υπάρχουσα συνθήκη του ΝΑΤΟ)
5. □ Να αντιληφθούν νέες απολήξεις προς τις χώρες της Ατλαντικής Συμμαχίας
6. □ Να έχει δυνατότητα λήψεως μέτρων και σε περιστάσεις εκτός των χωρών του ΝΑΤΟ
7. □ Αλλο (παρακαλώ καθορίστε):

14. Το ΝΑΤΟ υπήρξε ο βασικός λόγος της συγκράτησης φόβων για πιθανή διαμάχη μεταξύ Ελλάδας και Τουρκίας, μια και οι δύο χώρες είναι μέλη του ΝΑΤΟ.
ΣΥΜΦΩΝΩ  ΣΥΜΦΩΝΩ  ΟΥΤΕ ΣΥΜΦΩΝΩ  ΔΙΑΦΩΝΩ  ΔΙΑΦΩΝΩ ΑΠΟΛΥΤΑ  ΟΥΤΕ ΔΙΑΦΩΝΩ  ΔΙΑΦΩΝΩ ΑΠΟΛΥΤΑ
1          2          3          4          5

15. Η Ελλάδα θα πρέπει να παραμένει μέλος του ΝΑΤΟ:
ΣΥΜΦΩΝΩ  □ 1  ΔΙΑΦΩΝΩ  □ 2

16. Πόσο σημαντική είναι η στάση της Αμερικής (Η.Π.Α.), κατά τη γνώμη σας, για την ασφάλεια της Ευρώπης στην δεκαετία που διανύουμε (1990)
ΠΟΛΥ ΣΗΜΑΝΤΙΚΗ ΚΑΘΟΛΟΥ ΣΗΜΑΝΤΙΚΗ
1          2          3          4          5          6          7

17. Η Ευρώπη θα πρέπει να αποσπαστεί απο την Αμερική και το ΝΑΤΟ και να αντιμετωπίσει το πρόβλημα της ασφάλειας της ηπείρου της μόνο με μηχανισμούς "Ευρωπαϊκούς" σε χαρακτήρα όπως η Ε.Ο.Κ. και η Δ.Ε.Ε.
ΣΥΜΦΩΝΩ ΑΠΟΛΥΤΑ ΣΥΜΦΩΝΩ ΑΒΕΒΑΙΟΣ/Η ΔΙΑΦΩΝΩ ΔΙΑΦΩΝΩ ΑΠΟΛΥΤΑ
1          2          3          4          5
18. Κάτω από τις παραπάνω συνθήκες, ποιός κατά τη γνώμη σας είναι ο πιο πρακτικός τρόπος στρατιωτικής ασφάλειας για την Ελλάδα:

1. □ Να συνεχίσει ως μέλος του NATO μόνο.
2. □ Να κάνει προσπάθεια εισόδου στην Δ.Ε.Ε.
3. □ Να βασίσετε σε συνδιασμούς αμυντικών μηχανισμών (NATO, ΔΑΣΕ (CSCE))
4. □ Να αποσυρθεί από όλους τους συλλογικούς αμυντικούς μηχανισμούς
5. □ Άλλος τρόπος (παρακαλώ καθορίστε):

19. Ποιά από τις παρακάτω εκλογές-λύσεις για Ευρωπαϊκή ασφάλεια είναι η πιο αξιόπιστη; (παρακαλώ σημείωστε ένα μόνο)

1. □ Η Ευρώπη πρέπει να βασίσετε στην δύναμη των Η.Π.Α.
2. □ Η Ευρώπη πρέπει να βασίσετε στο NATO, που συμπερι-λαμβάνει τις Η.Π.Α.
3. □ Οι Ευρωπαϊκές χώρες θα πρέπει να βασιστούν στις δι-κες τους και μόνο αμυντικές δυνάμεις και να συγκροτήσουν εννιάλα πυρηνική δύναμη, ανεξάρτητη από Αμερικανική διεύθυνση
4. □ Η Ευρώπη θα πρέπει να βασίσετε στην Ε.Ο.Κ. για να συγκροτήσει κάποιο αμυντικό μηχανισμό Ευρωπαϊκού χαρακτήρα.
5. □ Η Ευρώπη θα πρέπει να βασίσετε στον μηχανισμό της ΔΑΣΕ.
6. □ Η Ευρώπη θα πρέπει να βασίσετε στην Δυτικοευρωπαϊκή Ένωση (Δ.Ε.Ε.)
7. □ Κάτι άλλο (παρακαλώ καθορίστε):

20. Κατά τη γνώμη σας, θα πρέπει η Ευρωπαϊκή Οικονομική Κοινό-τητα (Ε.Ο.Κ.) να "παράγει" κάποιον αμυντικό μηχανισμό για την Ευρώπη;

NAI/ΣΥΜΦΩΝΩ □ 1  OXI/ΔΙΑΦΩΝΩ □ 2  ΑΒΕΒΑΙΟΣ/Η □ 3
21. Το ΝΑΤΟ θα πρέπει να αποκτήσει νέα μέλη-κράτη της Ανατολικής Ευρώπης για να μπορέσει να γίνει μια συμμαχία που θα υποτεθεί σε ολόκληρη την Ευρώπη.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ΣΥΜΦΩΝΩ</th>
<th>ΣΥΜΦΩΝΩ</th>
<th>ΟΥΤΕ ΣΥΜΦΩΝΩ</th>
<th>ΔΙΑΦΩΝΩ</th>
<th>ΔΙΑΦΩΝΩ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ΑΠΟΛΥΤΑ</td>
<td>ΟΥΤΕ ΔΙΑΦΩΝΩ</td>
<td>ΑΠΟΛΥΤΑ</td>
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| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

22. Πόσο σημαντικό είναι για το ΝΑΤΟ η αντίληψη νέων απειλών για την συνέχιση του οργανισμού μια και η Συνθήκη της Βαρσοβίας έχει διαλυθεί και η Κομμουνιστική απειλή έχει υποχωρήσει;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ΠΟΛΥ ΣΗΜΑΝΤΙΚΟ</th>
<th>ΚΑΘΟΛΟΥ ΣΗΜΑΝΤΙΚΟ</th>
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</table>

23. Παρακάτω αναγράφονται μερικά προβλήματα που ισως απασχολή- σουν την Ευρώπη στη δεκαετία που διανύουμε. Παρακαλώ σημειώστε πόσο σημαντικό είναι το καθένα για:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ΠΟΛΥ ΜΕΓΑΛΗΣ ΣΗΜΑΣΙΑΣ</th>
<th>ΜΕΓΑΛΗΣ ΣΗΜΑΣΙΑΣ</th>
<th>ΚΑΘΟΛΟΥ ΣΗΜΑΣΙΑΣ</th>
<th>ΚΑΜΜΙΑΣ ΣΗΜΑΣΙΑΣ</th>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. ΤΗΝ ΕΥΡΩΠΗ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Το Κυπριακό</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Κρίση Πουκουλάκης</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Το Μακεδονικό</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Αλβανοί μετανάστες</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Νέο-Καζιούσοι</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Απόλυση της κράτικης Συμβολής</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ενισχήματα Περιφερειακής</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
24. Οι Η.Π.Α. παραμένει ως η μόνη υπερδύναμη στον κόσμο την παρούσα στιγμή.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ΠΟΛΥ ΜΕΓΑΛΗΣ ΣΗΜΑΣΙΑΣ</th>
<th>ΜΕΓΑΛΗΣ ΣΗΜΑΣΙΑΣ</th>
<th>ΚΑΘΟΔΗΣ ΣΗΜΑΣΙΑΣ</th>
<th>ΚΑΜΜΙΑΣ ΣΗΜΑΣΙΑΣ</th>
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Ετοιμασίας

25. Παρά την διάλυση της πρώην Σοβιετικής Ενώσεως, πόσο σημαντική απειλή θεωρείται η Ρωσία για την ασφάλεια της Ευρώπης;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ΠΟΛΥ ΣΗΜΑΝΤΙΚΗ</th>
<th>ΚΑΘΟΔΟΥ ΣΗΜΑΝΤΙΚΗ</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

26. Πόσο σημαντική είναι η συμφωνία από τις χώρες της Ε.Ο.Κ. των διατάξεων της συνθήκης του Μάαστριχτ για την σταθερότητα των Ευρωπαϊκών υποθέσεων;

1. καθόλου σημαντική
2. σημαντική
3. πολύ σημαντική
27. Πόσο σημαντική είναι η συνθήκη του Μάστεριχτ για την Ελλάδα:

1. ☐ Καθόλου σημαντική
2. ☐ Σημαντική
3. ☐ Πολύ σημαντική
4. ☐ Χωρίς τη συνθήκη του Μάστεριχτ, η Ε.Ο.Κ. και γενικότερα η Ευρώπη θα χρειαστεί παράταση χρόνου προς την ένωσή της.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ΠΟΛΥ ΣΗΜΑΝΤΙΚΗ</th>
<th>ΚΑΘΟΛΟΥ ΣΗΜΑΝΤΙΚΗ</th>
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28. Πόσο σημαντική πυρηνική απειλή είναι κατά τη γνώμη σας η πρώην Σοβιετική Ένωση, παρά τη διαλύση της σε μικρότερα κράτιδα, για την Ευρώπη:

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<th>5</th>
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29. Πόσο σημαντική είναι, κατά τη γνώμη σας, η αντίληψη απειλών, ως απαραίτητη προσπάθεια για τη δημιουργία ενός συλλογικού αμυντικού μηχανισμού:

1. ☐ Καθόλου σημαντικό
2. ☐ Σημαντικό
3. ☐ Πολύ σημαντικό

30. Εξωτερικές απειλές (απειλές εκτός συνόρων συμμαχίας) όπως η εισβολή του Κουβέίτ από Ιράκινα στρατεύματα το 1990, θα πρέπει να μελετηθούν και μέτρα που θα πρέπει να ληφθούν στον αμυντικό μηχανισμό της Ευρώπης, μια και τέτοιου είδους απειλές μπορούν να παρουσιαστούν και στην Ευρώπη

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ΣΥΜΦΩΝΩ</th>
<th>ΣΥΜΦΩΝΩ</th>
<th>ΟΥΤΕ ΣΥΜΦΩΝΩ</th>
<th>ΔΙΑΦΩΝΩ</th>
<th>ΔΙΑΦΩΝΩ</th>
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<tr>
<td>ΑΠΟΛΥΤΑ</td>
<td>ΟΥΤΕ ΔΙΑΦΩΝΩ</td>
<td>ΑΠΟΛΥΤΑ</td>
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31. Η "Ευρωπαϊκή άμνηστα" θα πρέπει να λαμβάνει μέτρα μόνο για υποθέσεις της Ευρωπαϊκής ηπείρου

<table>
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<th>ΣΥΜΦΩΝΩ</th>
<th>ΣΥΜΦΩΝΩ</th>
<th>ΟΥΤΕ ΣΥΜΦΩΝΩ</th>
<th>ΔΙΑΦΩΝΩ</th>
<th>ΔΙΑΦΩΝΩ</th>
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<tr>
<td>ΑΠΟΛΥΤΑ</td>
<td>ΟΥΤΕ ΔΙΑΦΩΝΩ</td>
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32. Τα συμφέρονται της Ελλάδος μπορούν καλύτερα να διασφαλιστούν και να υποστηριχτούν μέσα από την Δυτικοευρωπαϊκή Ενώσε (Δ.Ε.Ε.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ΣΥΜΦΩΝΩ ΑΠΟΛΥΤΑ</th>
<th>ΣΥΜΦΩΝΩ ΑΒΕΒΑΙΟΣ/Η ΔΙΑΦΩΝΩ ΔΙΑΦΩΝΩ ΑΠΟΛΥΤΑ</th>
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