Are long-term incentive plans an effective and efficient way of motivating senior executives?

Pepper, A, Gore, J and Crossman, A (2012) Are long-term incentive plans an effective and efficient way of motivating senior executives? Human Resource Management Journal.

	PDF Pepper,Gore,Crossman 20112.pdf Restricted to Repository staff only Available under License : See the attached licence file. Download (409kB)
	PDF (licence) SRI_deposit_agreement.pdf Restricted to Repository staff only Download (33kB)

Abstract

Research on senior executive reward has typically explored the connection between pay, performance and the alignment of interests of executives and shareholders. This article examines the relationship between reward and motivation, drawing on the psychological, behavioural economics and decision-making literatures. Based on an empirical study of FTSE 350 senior executives, the research examines whether long-term incentive plans are an effective and efficient way of motivating executives, taking into account risk, time discounting, uncertainty and fairness. The article concludes that the way executives frame choices, perceive value, assess probability, evaluate temporal effects and respond to uncertainty means that long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) are generally not efficient and are often not effective in meeting their objectives. It proposes that, in its current form, agency theory does not provide a sound basis for modelling senior executive reward, and suggests five areas for development.

Item Type:	Article
Divisions :	Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > Surrey Business School
Authors :	Authors Email ORCID Pepper, A UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Gore, J UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Crossman, A UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
Date :	2012
Identification Number :	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-8583.2011.00188.x
Additional Information :	The definitive version is available at <a href=http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1748-8583.2011.00188.x/pdf</a>.
Depositing User :	Symplectic Elements
Date Deposited :	28 Mar 2017 14:39
Last Modified :	28 Mar 2017 14:39
URI:	http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/209777

Actions (login required)

View Item

Downloads