Formal analysis of a non-repudiation protocol
Schneider, Steve A. (1998) Formal analysis of a non-repudiation protocol Proceedings of the 11th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop. pp. 9-11.
This paper applies the theory of Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) to the modelling and analysis of a non-repudiation protocol. Non-repudiation protocols differ from authentication and key-exchange protocols in that the participants require protection from each other, rather than from an external hostile agent. This means that the kinds of properties that are required of such a protocol, and the way it needs to be modelled to enable analysis, are different to the standard approaches taken to the more widely studied class of protocols and properties. A non-repudiation protocol proposed by Zhou and Gollmann is analysed within this framework, and this highlights some novel considerations that are required for this kind of protocol.
|Additional Information:||Published in the Proceedings of the 11th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 1998 June 9-11. © 1998 IEEE. This material is presented to ensure timely dissemination of scholarly and technical work. Copyright and all rights therein are retained by authors or by other copyright holders. All persons copying this information are expected to adhere to the terms and constraints invoked by each author's copyright. In most cases, these works may not be reposted without the explicit permission of the copyright holder. Click here for a full list of Steve Schneider's publications.|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Engineering and Physical Sciences > Computing Science|
|Depositing User:||Mr Adam Field|
|Date Deposited:||27 May 2010 14:45|
|Last Modified:||23 Sep 2013 18:35|
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