Managerial Overconfidence in High and Low Valuation Markets and Gains to Acquisitions
Petmezas, D (2010) Managerial Overconfidence in High and Low Valuation Markets and Gains to Acquisitions International Review of Financial Analysis, 19 (5). pp. 368-378.
In this paper we empirically investigate bidders' performance managed by overconfident and non-overconfident managers in high and low market valuation periods. Using a sample of UK acquisitions in the period 1990–2005, we provide evidence that the interaction between market valuation and different behavioral traits of managers is a determinant of bidders' returns. In contrast to overconfident managers, non-overconfident managers conduct value-creative acquisition deals in all valuation periods. In addition, when we control for acquirer and deal characteristics, we find that bidders with non-overconfident managers gain the most in high valuation periods, while firms are better off without overconfident managers in any type of market conditions.
|Divisions :||Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > Surrey Business School|
|Identification Number :||https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2010.06.003|
|Additional Information :||Copyright 2010 Elsevier. All rights reserved. This is the author's version. A definitive version was subseqently published in International Review of Financial Analysis, 19(5)2010, DOI:10.1016/j.irfa.2010.06.003|
|Depositing User :||Symplectic Elements|
|Date Deposited :||01 Mar 2012 13:29|
|Last Modified :||23 Sep 2013 19:05|
Actions (login required)
Downloads per month over past year